DPRIETI Discussion Paper Series 15-E-020
Abenomics, Yen Depreciation, Trade Deficit, and Export Competitiveness
SHIMIZU Junko Gakushuin University
SATO Kiyotaka Yokohama National University
The Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry http://www.rieti.go.jp/en/ RIETI Discussion Paper Series 15-E-020 February 2015
Abenomics, Yen Depreciation, Trade Deficit, and Export Competitiveness*
SHIMIZU Junko† and SATO Kiyotaka‡
Abstract
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s economic stimulus package, Abenomics, depreciated the yen sharply from the end of 2012, which was expected to have a positive impact on Japan’s trade balance. Contrary to the J-curve effect, however, Japan’s trade balance has not shown any signs of improvement, even though two years have passed. There is a growing concern that Japanese firms might lose their export competitiveness in the global market. This paper shows that Japanese firms conducted a strategic relocation of their production bases by expanding their overseas production of low-end products, while domestic production is concentrated more on high-end products. This new phase of international division of labor is likely to impede the positive effect of the yen depreciation on Japan’s trade balance, which is empirically supported by the auto-regressive distributed lag (ARDL) model. In addition, Japanese manufacturing export prices in terms of the contract (invoice) currency have not changed in response to the large depreciation of the yen, which is empirically confirmed by the time-varying parameter estimation of the exchange rate pass-through analysis. Thus, the slow recovery of Japan’s trade balance in response to the yen depreciation can be explained by the Japanese firms’ pricing behavior as well as the changes in their production and trade structure.
JEL Classification: F23, F31, F33 Keywords: Abenomics, J-curve effect, Exchange rate pass-through, Pricing-to-market (PTM), Export competitiveness, Invoice currency, Auto-regressive distributed lag (ARDL) model, Time-varying parameter estimation RIETI Discussion Papers Series aims at widely disseminating research results in the form of professional papers, thereby stimulating lively discussion. The views expressed in the papers are solely those of the author(s), and neither represent those of the organization to which the author(s) belong(s) nor the Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry.
*This study is conducted as a part of the Project “Research on Exchange Rate Pass-Through” undertaken at Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI). The authors are grateful for helpful comments and suggestions by Discussion Paper seminar participants at RIETI. The authors would also appreciate the financial support of the JSPS (Japan Society for the Promotion of Science) Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (A) No. 24243041, (B) No. 24330101, and (C) No. 24530362. † Corresponding author. Faculty of Economics, Gakushuin University. Email: [email protected] ‡ Department of Economics, Yokohama National University. 1
1. Introduction
After the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, the Japanese yen started to appreciate sharply and hit the post-war record high (75.32 vis-à-vis the US dollar) in March 2011. Such an unprecedented level of yen appreciation at around 80 or less continued up to November 2012. The economic-stimulus package initiated from the end of 2012 by Prime Minister Abe, so-called Abenomics, successfully reversed the yen appreciation. A rapid and large depreciation of the yen was expected to have a positive impact on Japanese trade balance. According to the J-curve effect, after initial deterioration in response to the domestic currency depreciation, trade balance will improve gradually due to a decline of export price in terms of the destination currency. However, Japanese trade balance, especially the quantity of Japanese exports, has not readily improved, even though the yen depreciated rapidly from less than 80 in 2012 to around 120 in 2014. It has been a matter of major concern for policy makers that Japanese firms might lose export competitiveness in the global market. This paper empirically investigates why Japanese trade deficit continues to grow despite the substantial depreciation of the yen from the following two aspects. First, by using the auto-regressive distributed lag (ARDL) model, it is demonstrated that J-curve effect does not work well in Japanese trade from 1999 to 2014, while it is empirically confirmed from 1985 to 1998. Japanese firms established regional production network in Asia, but the sharp appreciation of the yen from 2008 to 2012 pushed the international division of labor one step further by concentrating domestic production more on differentiated products for exports. The low-end or less differentiated goods are shifted to overseas production by Japanese manufacturing subsidiaries. This drastic change in production and trade structure is likely to increase imports of intermediate inputs and low-end products from overseas subsidiaries, which weakens a positive impact of yen depreciation on Japanese trade balance. Second, the above observation is empirically supported by an analysis of exchange rate pass-through of Japanese exporting firms. Casual observation of the export price data published by Bank of Japan (BOJ) shows that Japanese machinery export price in terms of the contract (invoice) currency has not changed in response to large exchange rate fluctuations of the yen. However, by conducting the time-varying parameter estimation of the exchange rate pass-through in Japanese machinery exports, we demonstrate that Japanese firms pursue different pass-through behavior in response to asymmetric exchange rate changes in the yen. Although it is widely known that Japanese exporters have a strong tendency to pursue pricing-to-market (PTM) behavior,
2 the unprecedented appreciation of the yen from 2009 to 2012 drastically changed the pricing behavior of Japanese exporters by raising the degree of exchange rate pass-through. In contrast, once the yen started to depreciate from the end of 2012, Japanese firms quickly came back toward, though not completely, the previous level of PTM, which hinders a decline of export price in destination countries and, hence, weakens a positive impact of yen depreciation on trade balances. Such an asymmetric response of exchange rate pass-through and PTM is observed in Japanese major machinery industries. Thus, the slow recovery of Japanese trade balance in response to the yen depreciation can be explained by the Japanese firms’ pricing behavior as well as the drastic change in Japanese firms’ production and trade structure caused by the unprecedented level of yen appreciation before Abenomics. A sharp fall in the world oil price from the latter half of 2014 reduces the amount of Japanese imports, which has positive impact on trade balance. However, given growing overseas operation of Japanese firms, Japanese export quantity will not be readily increasing. It is more important to look at income balance as well as trade balance. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the current characteristics of Japanese trade. Section 3 empirically analyzes the impact of yen depreciation on Japanese trade balance by using the ARDL model. Section 4 observes the export price data published by BOJ and conducts a time-varying parameter estimation of the exchange rate pass-through in Japanese machinery exports. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2. What are the main factors in Japanese trade deficit?
Trade deficit has become almost the norm in Japan since the Great East Japan Earthquake that occurred in March 2011. Figure 1 shows the monthly series of Japan’s trade balance and the nominal exchange rate of the yen vis-à-vis the US dollar from January 2010 to December 2014. The yen kept appreciating in 2010 and stayed at around 80 or less from the mid-2011 to the end of 2012. In October 31, 2011, the yen hit a post-war record high of 75.32. Such a high value of the yen is likely to have negative impact on trade balance through a fall of Japanese exports. Table 1 shows that, in response to the yen appreciation, the amount of Japanese exports declined from 2010 to 2012 in all industries except raw materials. Another important factor in the growing trade deficit from 2010 to 2012 is a
3 sharp increase in imports of oil and mineral fuels. According to Table 1, Japanese imports of mineral-related fuels grew remarkably: The amount of imports rose by 38.5 percent from 2010 to 2012, due to a sharp increase in imports of liquefied natural gas (LNG) for generating thermal power prompted by the suspension of nuclear power plants. From the end of 2012, the yen started to depreciate substantially. In terms of the annual average exchange rate, the yen depreciated from 79.79 in 2012 to 105.84 in 2014 (Table 1). Despite such a large depreciation by 32.6 percent, Japan’s trade deficit increased further in 2013 and stayed at a high level in 2014. According to the J-curve effect, trade balance tends to deteriorate at the beginning of depreciation of the domestic currency, and the trade balance will be improving over time. The question is why such gradual improvement of trade balance cannot be observed in 2014. First possible reason is the effect of invoice currency. Table 1 shows that Japanese imports increased in 2013 and further in 2014 in all industries. As will be shown in Section 4, the share of foreign currency invoicing is larger than that of yen invoicing in Japanese exports and imports. Since about 79 percent of imports are invoiced in foreign currencies (mostly in US dollars), the yen depreciation automatically increases the amount of imports in the yen.1 However, imports of mineral-related fuels increased only slightly in 2014, even though the yen depreciated further from 97.6 in 2013 to 105.84 in 2014. Such slowdown can be attributed to a sharp and large fall in world oil prices in the latter half of 2014, which may help the trade balance improve in 2015 and after. Second possible reason is the Japanese firms’ strategic change in production place during the yen appreciation period. As shown in Figure 2, Japanese firms increased overseas production for the last two decades, which reflects active division of labor in growing regional production network, especially in Asia. The historically high level of the yen in 2011-2012 drove Japanese firms to take the division of labor one step further by moving domestic production of low-end goods to overseas subsidiaries to the limit. Instead, Japanese firms concentrated their domestic production on high-end products. Given severe competition in global markets, it is hard to keep exporting domestically produced goods during the period of unprecedented yen appreciation unless the goods are highly differentiated. Even after the yen started to depreciate in the end of 2012, the quantity of Japanese exports does not show any clear increase. Table 2 presents the export quantity
1 The data on the invoice currency is available from the website of the Trade Statistics of Japan (http://www.customs.go.jp/toukei/info/index.htm).
4 of selected products.2 Electronics parts and components including integrated circuits (ICs) exhibit a large decline in export quantity. Export quantity of audiovisual products also fell sharply. In contrast, export quantity of motor vehicles and parts of motor vehicles does not decline much compared to electronic products. This evidence supports the above argument that Japanese firms export the high-end products and produce the low-end products in the foreign countries. According to Table 3, the quantity of Japanese imports of manufacturing products such as automobile parts and ICs increased after the yen depreciation, which is another supportive evidence that Japanese firms enhanced the division of labor much further with overseas subsidiaries by importing parts and components as well as low-end products from subsidiaries. Thus, to overcome the negative effect of yen appreciation in 2010-2012, Japanese firms drastically changed their production and export structure. Even during the yen depreciation period, Japanese exporters do not have to lower the export price, because their export products are differentiated and, hence, have strong export competitiveness. Given a large share of foreign currency invoicing as well as the above pricing behavior, Japanese exporters can enjoy exchange gains from yen depreciation. The low-end products are less differentiated and tend to be highly price elastic, but these products are produced by overseas subsidiaries and not exported from Japan. These factors are likely to impede the improvement of Japanese trade balance. The next two sections attempt to empirically support the above argument. In Section 3, the J-curve effect of Japanese trade is tested by the ARDL model. In Section 4, Japanese exporters pricing behavior will be empirically investigated by employing the time-varying parameter estimation of the exchange rate pass-through.
3. Empirical analysis of J-Curve effect
There are numerous empirical studies on the J-curve effect. 3 As a representative study on the trade between the United States and Japan, Rose and Yellen (1989) used the quarterly data for the period from 1960 to 1985, but they could not find both short-run and long-run relationship between bilateral real exchange rates and trade flows. Bahmani-Oskooee and Brooks (1999), on the other hand, employed the auto-regressive distributed lag (ARDL) model that incorporates both cointegration
2 The selection of products is based not only on the availability of the export quantity data but also on the amount of exports. 3 Bahmani-Oskooee and Ratha (2004) provide the extensive literature review on the empirical papers of the J-curve effect.
5 relationship and error-correction model (ECM) between US and its trading partners. They found that the long-run effect of real depreciation of the US dollar improved the US trade balance, while the short-run effect did not follow the J-curve pattern. Using the quarterly bilateral data from 1973 to 1998, Bahmani-Oskooee and Goswami (2003) employed the ARDL model to analyze the relationship between Japan and its nine major trading partners, confirming the evidence of the J-curve effect between Japan and Germany as well as between Japan and Italy.4 In this section, we empirically analyze the effect of the real effective exchange rate (REER) on Japanese trade balance by using the ARDL model over the sample period from January 1985 to June 2014, including the recent yen depreciation period due to Abenomics. We divide the whole sample in two sub-samples: the former includes the period from January 1985 to December 1998 when the J-curve effects were empirically confirmed, and the latter ranges from January 1999 to June 2014. As shown in Figure 2, the overseas production ratio of Japanese manufacturing companies exceeded 10 percent in the end of 1998. In addition, the revised Foreign Exchange Law was enforced in April 1998 to totally liberalize cross-border transactions, which results in a drastic change of the Japanese firms' exchange rate risk management. As we have to have sufficient number of observations in each sub-sample, it is reasonable to assume that the latter sub-sample starts from January 1999.
3-1. Model
Following Rose and Yellen (1989) and other previous studies cited above, we employ the following log-linear equation model to consider a long-run relationship between trade balance and REER:
ln , a b∙ln , c∙ln , d ∙ ln , (1)
where TBJapan,t is a measure of the Japan’s trade balance, YJapan,t is a measure of the
Japan's real income, YWorld,t is a measure of the foreign countries' real income, and 5 REERJapan,t is the real effective exchange rate of the yen. As a measure of the trade balance, we adopt the ratio of Japan's real exports to the world over her real imports
4 They also found that real depreciation of the yen has favorable long-run effects in the cases of Canada, UK and the United States. 5 In this analysis, we use REER of the yen (narrow indices) published by Bank for International Settlements (BIS).
6 from the world.6 Since we use the monthly series of the data for empirical analysis, we employ the industrial production index (IPI) as a proxy for the Japan’s real income. The Japan’s IPI series is taken from the website of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), Japan. As for a measure of the world real output fluctuations, we calculated the World IPI, i.e., the weighted average of IPI of Japan’s 20 trading partner countries.7 Based on the definition of the above variables, we expect the sign of estimated coefficients as b<0, c>0 and d<0. In addition, we include two dummy variables in the latter period. One is the dummy variable (Lehman dummy) for the period of the Lehman Brothers collapse when Japanese exports declined drastically. The other is the dummy variable of the Great East Japan Earthquake (Shinsai dummy) that reflects the prolonged negative effect of the earthquake in March 2011 on the Japan’s trade deficit.8 In order to elucidate both long-run and short-run effects of real appreciation/depreciation of the yen, we follow Pesaran et al. (2001), which places both the level and the first difference of each variable in a single-equation ECM. We specify equation (1) as an ARDL form with lag lengths n as follows:9,10,11