INFORMAL LOGIC XlVI, Winter 1992

The Dialectic of Second-Order Distinctions: The Structure of about

DAVID GOODWIN Unirersity of Waterloo

Key Words: Informal logic; argumentation and reasoning used to support these history and theory; rhetorical theory; dialectic. claims. Specifically, it analyzes the struc­ Abstract: Arguments about fallacies generally at­ ture and function of one countermove tempt to distinguish real from apparent modes of common to all such arguments about argumentation and reasoning. To examine the fallacies-distinction. To accuse an oppo­ structure of these arguments, this paper develops a theory of dialectical distinction. First, it explores nent of fallacious reasoning is to argue that the connection between Nicholas Rescher's con­ his or her is reasoning in appear­ cept of distinction as a "dialectical countermove" ance only, that it fails, in some important and Chaim Perelman and L. Olbrecht-Tyteca's respect, to meet the criteria of "real" argu­ "dissociation of ideas." Next, it applies a theory of mentation. Hence all arguments about fal­ distinction to Aristotle's extended arguments lacies proceed from, and frequently argue about fallacies in De Sophisticis Elenchis, prima­ for, a primary distinction between appear­ rily with a view to analyzing its underlying strate­ gies of argumentation. Finally, it examines how ance and reality as it pertains to the form, second-order distinctions (those designed to chal­ conduct, and function of argumentation. lenge previously formulated distinctions) under­ Moreover, all arguments about fallacies pin current arguments against the Aristotelian or reveal a "dialectical reflexivity," as I call it, "Standard Treatment" of the fallacies. which may be their most intriguing, if not characteristic, feature. From Aristotle's De This paper is not about fallacies per se. Sophisticis Elenchis to the works of con­ By this I mean, it will not offer any claims temporary informal logicians, all argu­ about the nature of fallacies, nor speculate ments about fallacies are arguments about about whether they exist. It will not ad­ argumentation. How this reflexivity in­ vance a theory of fallacies, nor, equally, forms the dialectical strategies of such make judgments about their use (or abuse) treatises is the main concern of this paper. in everyday reasoning. Indeed, it will not Specifically, it asks: what roles do distinc­ even attempt to differentiate the various tions play in dialectical exchanges about types and functions of fallacies. Other pa­ fallacies? How do distinctions differentiate pers, monographs, and books have done so "real" from "apparent" modes of reason­ already, and many of these, I think, with ing? In what way do they determine the great success. outcome of arguments about argumenta­ Rather than join in the various debates tion? Are there different kinds of dialecti­ about fallacies-about what they are or how cal distinctions? And finally, can these they work-this paper develops a meta­ differences account for shifts in models of analysis of the debate: it examines the dia­ argumentation, and, in particular, shifts lectical countermoves characteristic of between "traditional" and "contemporary" ancient and contemporary arguments arguments about fallacies? about fallacies. It discusses controvertible To answer these questions, the first claims that philosophers have asserted section of this paper examines the role that about fallacies and the kind of evidence distinction plays in dialectic generally. It develops a theory of distinction by outlining evidential ground that limits the the relationship between Nicholas Rescher's probative force of a proviso) (5-17). concept of "dialectical countermove" and As defined by Rescher, a distinction is a Chaim Perelman and L. OIbrechts­ dialectical countermove which challenges Tyteca's "dissociation of ideas." The sec­ a provisoed assertion or denial. Take. for ond section applies this theory to example, the following provisoed asser­ Aristotle's Sophistici Elenchi in order to tion: "I know this is a human hand (P) analyze its underlying strategies of argu­ because my senses tell me so directly" (Q) mentation. And finally, the third section (16). Schematized by Rescher as P:Q and examines how second-order distinctions read as "P because of Q," this proviso can (distinctions designed to undermine the be challenged by the distinction, "you probative force of previously formulated can't really support this claim CP) be­ distinctions) play an instrumental role in cause, although your senses provide evi­ the construction of current challenges to dence (Q), this evidence is quite often the Aristotelian, or "Standard Treatment," deceptive" (R). The distinction, schema­ of the fallacies. tized as -P:Q&R and read as "not P be­ cause although Q yet R." limits the grounds established by the initial proviso I. Dialectic, Distinction, and the (Q) by qualifying the status of these Dissociative Construction of the Real grounds. Put simply. it provides an over­ riding exception to be considered: namely, In Dialectics: A Controversy-Oriented that the senses are open to deception. Such Approach to the Theory of Knowledge, a distinction adds a new set of evidential Nicholas Rescher defines "dialectic" as considerations (R) to the dispute, one which any form of "disputation, debate, and is meant to diminish the probative strength rational controversy" which "exhibits of the opponent's proviso. A distinction at­ epistemological processes at work in a tempts to accomplish this by transferring setting of socially conditioned interac­ the opponent's primafacie case to another, tions" (xii). These "epistemological more hostile epistemological context, one processes," as he calls them, require partic­ that militates against, rather than provides ipants to present evidence that is either support for, an assertion or denial. plausible enough to shift the burden of Extending Rescher's discussion, then, proof away from. or garner presumption a distinction, I would argue, challenges an for, their respective assertions. Dialectic, opponent's dialectical grounds by (1) pro­ therefore, is a process which shapes, viding a new ground for consideration and is shaped by, socially-constructed which (2) separates the old ground from knowledge, knowledge which allows the initial assertion by (3) splitting the old communities to establish and test plausi­ ground into two elements, one of which it bilities, and therefore to set standards and concedes and the other it denies. In the ex­ make judgements in human affairs. To ample above, R introduces a new concept achieve this goal, dialectic proceeds by (that the senses can be deceived) in order successive motions of exchange: to break the bond holding Q to P. the provi­ "assertions" (initial statements or claims), so to its assertion. A distinction accom­ "denials" (challenges to such claims), plishes this by a strategy of "yes but," that "provisoed assertions and denials" (the is, by conceding that "yes, your senses pro­ presentation of grounds which support­ vide evidence" and then by denying "but that is, provide prima facie evidence this evidence cannot support the initial for-an assertion or denial), and finally, claim." The pivot, or "but," of the distinc­ "distinctions" (the presentation of an tion, then, is its most powerful feature. To Dialectic of Second-Order Distinctions 13 function as a dialectical countermove, a under discussion. In The New Rhetoric: distinction must grant more evidential A Treatise on Argumentation, Chaim weight to what is denied than to what is Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca conceded. This, of course, is how it garners discuss such distinctions under the heading presumption for -P. For without the pivot, of "dissociation" (411-50). Dissociation is the distinction could not tip the scales of the argumentative technique of reconfigur­ plausibility against the opponent's claim ing previously constructed integrities. pri­ taken as a Whole, and instead, would only marily by showing them to be unstable, serve as a neutral division of the issue illusionary, or in some way deficient. The under discussion. real is created by dissociation, which not In Rescher's account of dialectic, pre­ only breaks connecting links, but which sumption favours the plausible, and the involves a more profound change that is al­ plausible, in tum, favours evidence which ways prompted by the desire to remove an conforms to the desiderata of cognitive incompatibility arising out of the confron­ systematization-simplicity, completeness, tation of one proposition with others, directness, regularity, uniformity, distinct­ whether one is dealing with norms, facts. ness, normalcy, and the like--or what or truths, (413) Rescher calls "thesis-warranting princi­ Dissociations, then, postulate a coherent, pies" (39). Distinctions invoke a thesis­ self-consistent realm of being and a "rule warranting principle to advance the cause of reality" against which conflicting claims of the newly-stated position, and to make can be judged. Dissociations resolve im­ it seem more epistemically desirable than passes created by incompatible claims or antecedent positions. In the above exam­ principles, primarily by showing that one ple, the provisoed assertion appeals to of the two claims only appears to be plau­ "directness," that is, to an immediate sible, relevant, useful, and so on, "The ef­ sensory perception of the body. The dis­ fect of determining reality," Perelman tinction, on the other hand, appeals to "per_ says, "is to dissociate those appearances ceptual consistency"--or perhaps more that are deceptive from those that corre­ accurately, "inconsistency"-by pointing spond to reality" (416), out that the senses often generate false Dissociations generate what Perelman patterns of expectation, as, they do, for and Olbrechts-Tyteca call "philosophic instance, when an oar in water appears to pairs," ranked dichotomies that distinguish be, but is not in fact, broken. The disputant realities from appearances. Every philo- making this distinction, then, not only adds a new consideration (the deceptiveness of sop hIC' paIr,, TermTerm III ' aI' Igns ltse'If' WIt h t h e the senses) to the argument, but advances primary dissociation appearance , Term I the cause of a new thesis-warranting prin­ reality ciple (perceptual consistency), one that is represents whatever is deemed by the dis­ more pertinent to, and true of, the issue putant to be apparent, illusory, insubstan­ under discussion than that advanced by the tial, irrelevant, insignificant, false, opponent. erroneous. Term II, on the other hand, Distinctions tip the scales of plausibili­ represents whatever is actual, substantial, ty because they construct or derive from relevant, coherent, true. The real is a previously constructed concepts of the construct: "real." The "real" both shapes and is Term II provides a criterion, a norm which shaped by dialectical processes. It stands allows us to distinguish those aspects of for whatever a community designates to be term I which are of value from those which the most true, meaningful, relevant, or nor­ are not; it is not simply a datum, it is a con· mal considerations touching upon the issue struction which, during the dissociation of 14 David Goodwin

term I, establishes a rule that makes it pos­ In summary, then, a distinction is a dia­ sible to classify the multiple aspects of lectical countermove that challenges a term I in a hierarchy. (416) provisoed assertion or denial by introduc­ The real, then, functions to distinguish ing a new, more plausible ground (R) and classify those aspects of appearance which qualifies-and by qualifying, which conform to, or conflict with, previ­ diminishes-the epistemic force of the op­ ously established guides for resolving ponent's claim. To accomplish this goal, incompatibilities. the new ground introduces a dissociation Applied to our example above, the which differentiates appearance from reali­ distinction implicitly generates a series of ty, and which allows the disputant to con­ philosophic pairs: cede the appearance of proof in the opponent's argument (the "yes") but then 1 2 3 4 deny the underlying reality of such proof Q sensory directness concede appearance - = > > --,----- (the ·'but"). Finally, the dissociation of re­ R non-sensory consistency deny reality ality inherent in distinctions shapes the di­ As represented by 1, the distinction ad­ alectical process by generating and vances a new ground, R, which serves as consolidating plausibilities. In this way, a measure of the real-at least pro distinctions help determine which of two tern-against which Q is found wanting. positions will garner presumption at any Specifically, at 2, R introduces the philo­ given point in a disputation. sophic pair-sensory versus non-sensory evidence-aligning the first with Term I and the second with Term II. The ranking II. The Dialectic of First-Order at 2 is derived from another distinction, Distinctions: Aristotle's Arguments 3, which ranks the principle underlying about Fallacies the appeal to the senses (namely, direct­ ness) as inferior to the newly postulated Aristotle's "De Sophisticis Elenchis­ principle of perceptual consistency. At 4, or, indeed, any of the works inspired by it, the distinction concedes the appearance of such as the medieval treatises on sophis­ proof established by the opponent's provi­ mata and obUgationes-reveals a complex so (based on sensory evidence and the system of distinctions, all of which serve principle of directness), but then denies to delimit licit and illicit argumentative the reality of this proof in favour of procedures. Fallacies, Aristotle tells us, the newly distinguished grounds it puts frequently arise from confused thinking, forward for consideration (based on non­ and especially, the inability to make, or the sensory evidence and the principle of unwillingness to grant, distinctions perceptual consistency). In many cases, (1 69a23ff]. Verbal and am­ distinctions employ pre-existing philo­ biguous phrasing, for instance, can lead sophic pairs created by longstanding or unsuspecting disputants into the abyss of ongoing argumentation to generate disso­ self-refuting paradoxes if they fail to exer­ ciations (420-26). In other cases, the cise their right to draw a distinction: dialectical exchange itself introduces If one does not distinguish new pairs. If adopted by a discourse (OWPWt:'tj1E VO£,) the meanings of a doubt­ community, new pairs become part of ful term, it is not clear whether he has been the construction of the real, and in this confuted or not, and since the right to draw distinctions (OzE AE tv) is conceded in ar­ way, may serve to reallocate presump­ guments, it is obvious that to grant the tion and burden of proof in future question simply, without making distinc­ controversies. tions (olOp(auvm), is a mistake .... It Dialectic of Second-Order Distinctions IS

frequently happens, however, that, though the absolute and relative predication of a people see the , they hesitate to term; of petitio principii, the premises and make the distinction (alalPEO faOal), be­ conclusions of an argument; of "non-cause cause of the numerous occasions on which people propose subjects of this kind, in or­ as cause," the relevant and irrelevant ele­ der to avoid seeming to be acting perverse­ ments of a proof; and of "several questions ly all the time. Then, again, though people at once," the kinds of questions which can would never have thought that the argu­ and cannot be adequately answered by ment would hinge upon this point, they are single affirmation or negation. often confronted with a paradox. So, since Distinctions block a sophistical refuta­ the right to draw a distinction (alalPEO fv) is conceded, we must not hesitate to use it, tion by stipulating the conditions under as was said before. (I75b 27-38) which one disputant will assent to a claim formulated by another. That is, distinctions Disputants have "the right to draw distinc­ clarify what can be accepted and what re­ tions" and thus to avoid falling into seem­ jected in the argument of the other dispu­ ingly self-contradictory claims, but they tant. For example, if someone should argue frequently fail to exercise this right in or­ for the following paradox-"the same man der "to avoid seeming to be acting per­ can be seated and walking" (166a2Sff)­ versely all the time." Derived from the Aristotle advises that we distinguish the Greek expression for conversation, "dia­ various meanings of "can." Does it mean lectic" requires disputants to follow the "has the power, potential, or desire to rules of "turn-taking" that regulate conver­ walk" (while sitting)? Or does it mean "has sations generally, and which permit the ex­ the ability to do both activities (walking change of ideas and the equitable and sitting) at the same time"? Similarly, if distribution of opportunities to speak and someone should argue that "something can reply in argumentation. Those disputants be white and not-white because an Indian who insist on making distinctions at every is black and has white teeth," we should turn, and who admit little or nothing "for distinguish between the absolute and rela­ the sake of argument," may feel they are tive use of the predicates "black" and acting perversely, that is, against these "white" (l67a8ff). Does "black," for in­ rules of social interaction. Sophistical refu­ stance, apply "in every respect" or just "in tations. then, force disputants to sustain some respects"? And finally, if someone their ethos at the expense of logos, preying should argue "I know that it has rained be­ on misplaced goodwill and habits of cause the ground is wet," we must distin­ socialization. guish the cause from the effect, ensuring Distinction allows disputants to differ­ that the first has not been inferred from the entiate relevant from irrelevant, true from second (167b6ff). Is the ground wet for false, real from apparent considerations in other reasons? Was someone watering the matters of reasoning. The of com­ garden, for instance? position and division, for instance, requires Using Rescher's notation system, we disputants to distinguish those complex ex­ can schematize Aristotle's examples of pressions which signify a compound from fallacious arguments as the following those which do not; the , provisoed assertions: to distinguish among the "supra segmental phonemes" that signify different mean­ I. "the same man can both walk and not ings; the fallacy of figure of speech, the walk at the same time (P) because he can walk while sitting" (Q). Hence P:Q, read as different categories that a word may be­ "P because of Q." long to; of and consequent, the 2. "something can be white and not-white symmetrical and asymmetrical natures of (P), since an Indian is black and has white relation; of secundum quid et simpliciter, teeth (Q)"; hence P:Q. 16 David Goodwin

3. "I know that it has rained (P) because walk while sitting." But denies: "that the drenched earth accompanies rain" (Q); man can perform both tasks at the same hence P:Q. time." In the second example, the disputant The first is an instance of the fallacy of coneedes: "that the Indian is black and equivocation; the second, the fallacy se­ white." But denies: "that the Indian is cundum quid et simpliciter; the third, the black in every respect and is not black in fallacy of . To every respect." And in the third example, counter these fallacious provisoed asser­ the disputant concedes: "that drenched tions, Aristotle recommends introducing earth accompanies rain." But denies: "that the following distinctions to the argument: the relationship between antecedents and consequents is necessarily convertible." I. "you can't support this claim CP) be­ By employing distinctions, disputants cause, although you argue that a man can both walk and not walk (Q), you have not concede that many features of distinguished between two conflicting argumentation-the ambiguity of lan­ senses of 'can' (R)"; hence -P:Q&R, read guage, the predication of terms, the princi­ as "not P because, although Q, yet R" ples of causality and validity, and so 2. "you can't support this claim (-P) be­ on-are easily overlooked or confused or cause, although the Indian is black and omitted from consideration, but deny that white (Q), the predicate, 'black: is being such oversights or confusions or omissions used both absolutely (black in every re­ spect) and relatively (black in one respect reflect the "reality" of argumentation. That only) at the same time (R)"; hence is, by differentiating antecedent from con­ -P:(Q&R). sequent or relative from absolute. dispu­ 3. "you can't support this claim CP) be­ tants accomplish two tasks: first, they cause, although drenched earth accompa­ introduce a qualification, R, which under­ nies rain (Q), the relationship between an mines the ability of the fallacious ground, antecedent and a consequent is not the Q, to support the initial claim, P; second, same as that between a consequent and its they demonstrate their expertise in matters antecedent. i.e., the relationship is not con­ vertible (RY'; hence -P:Q&R of reasoning, since, according to Aristotle, the ability to distinguish real from appar­ Each distinction, then, adds evidential ent modes of reasoning is the sign of a true grounds (R) to a provisoed assertion which dialectician. limits or diminishes the probative strength Aristotle's motives for writing this of the opponent's prima facie case. And treatise are clear. During the fifth and each distinction limits the initial proviso fourth centuries B.C., students could learn (Q) by invoking an overriding exception to from certain teachers, or sophists be considered: in the first case, that "can" (croqJLcrrm), how to use paradoxes or denotes both potentiality and actuality, sophisms (croqJfcrJ.uxra) as refutations namely, both the desire to do, and the per­ (e-AEJXOl) of established doctrines or be­ formance of, two contrary activities; in the liefs. Although Aristotle discusses dialec­ second, that a word cannot be predicated tical strategies in Topics book VIII, of a term both absolutely and relatively at erroneous reasoning in Analytics II, and the same time; and in the third case, that fallacies in Rhetoric book II chapter 24, De the relationship between antecedent and Sophisticis Elenchi is the only extant trea­ consequent is neither symmetrical nor tise which attempts, on a large scale, to transitive. In the three examples above, (R) outline procedures for challenging, in turn, divides the grounding proviso (Q) into two the sophistic refutations of philosophic aspects, one of which it denies, the other it thought. The treatise differentiates, then, concedes. In the first example the dispu­ between two kinds of disputants: those tant concedes: "that a man may desire to who accept the force of an argument such Dialectic of Second-Order Distinctions 17 as "a man can be black and not black" and showing them to be solvable within his those who do not. The first group fail to new philosophic framework of distinction, distinguish between relative and absolute so that they "present an obstacle no long­ predication, and, equally, between real and er." In short, Aristotle's treatise outlines a apparent dialectical exchanges. By accept­ system of real distinctions: real, because ing the system of distinctions constituting they reflect the truth of reasoning, namely, Aristotle's treatise, however, the second truths such as "the antecedent to conse­ group demonstrates a real knowledge of quent relationship is not symmetrical"; argumentation. For example, the ability to real, too, because they serve as plausibili­ distinguish between absolute and relative ties against which the sophistical grounds predication generates the dissociation of reasoning can be found wanting. In absolute/relative not distinguished h' h . short, his treatise is an extended argument absolute/relative distinguished ,w IC , m in defense of his concepts of reasoning. As turn, aligns itself with the dissociation such, it seeks at every point to dissociate sophi stical reasoning sophistical reasoning from his own, more Aristotelian dialectic . In other words, true "real" reasoning, and equally, to dissociate dialecticians know and can make use of from his own refuta­ distinctions proper to the conduct and tions of them, study of argumentation. As Sten Ebbesen points out, dialectical exchanges about dialectic determine the III. The Dialectic of Second-Order Distinctions: Current Arguments very basis of reasoning, and thus determine against "The Standard Treatment" the paradigms or general theories govern­ ing the conduct and outcomes of intellec­ So far I have discussed only the dialec­ tual debate and problem solving generally: tic of first -order distinctions, namely, those A standard procedure for proving the supe­ which challenge a provisoed assertion or riority of a new theory to an old one is to denial. As Rescher points out, however, show that 'unreasonable arguments' known distinctions can also challenge other dis­ to be constructible and not soluble within tinctions (15). These complex distinctions the framework of the old theory present an obstacle no longer; either because they I call "second-order." An example of a sec­ cannot be constructed at all within the new ond-order distinction in action might be: framework, some general principle pre­ opp. CP) "You can't really support your venting this; or because they need not, in claim (that you know that 'this is a hand'), the new theory, be considered unreasona­ because, although your senses provide evi­ ble. And a standard procedure for attacking dence (Q), this evidence can be deceptive" the new theory consists in demonstrating (R), Hence -P:Q&R (first-order distinction), either that it does not neutralize all the old paralogisms or that it gives rise to some prop. (P) I can support my original claim new ones, (1) because, although my senses have provided evidence (Q) that has misled me in the past In other words, the distinctions attending (R), those past cases differ from this an argument about argumentation generate present case in some significant respect dissociations which serve to regulate what (S). Hence, P:(Q&R)&S (second-order constitutes the structures, purposes, and distinction). outcome of reasoning itself. One of the pri­ The proponent uses (S) to restrict the op­ mary dialectical functions of Aristotle's ponent's ground of distinction (R), by treatise, I would argue, is to align the "un­ showing that claims about the deceptive­ reasonable" (i.e., paradoxical) arguments ness of the senses may be irrelevent to the of the sophists with mere appearance, issue at hand. That is, the proponent uses a 18 David Goodwin second-order distinction to concede that first-order distinctions. According to the first-order distinction (R) appears to Aristotle, the dialectician knows "the support its claim (that the senses can de­ various sources of apparent refutations­ ceive) but denies its reality on the strength apparent, that is, not to everyone but only of a new claim (that past cases differ from to a certain kind of mind" (170b5ff). This the present in some significant respect). "certain kind of mind" is the mind expert Equally, S introduces a new thesis-war­ in argumentation, the one that can distin­ ranting principle-the principle of con­ guish "the various ways in which, on the formity (that like cases should be treated basis of common principles, a real or alike, different cases should be treated apparent refutation ... is brought about." differently)-which displaces the principle Certainly, Aristotle believed himself to be of perceptual consistency introduced by R. the first expert in dialectical reasoning, and A first-order distinction introduces a his "system" of dialectic to be the most qualifier to restrict an opponent's proviso, "adequate" and "complete" account of rea­ and thus signals a greater complexity of re­ soning yet postulated. For whereas his lation than that found in the provisoed predecessors, "paid teachers of contentious assertion/denial. Similarly, the presence of argument," trained students in a "rapid but a second-order distinction signals yet unsystematic" manner, he claims to impart greater complexity, since S qualifies and an art-that is, true expertise-to a student restricts R by introducing new considera­ (l83b35). Aristotle's self-professed exper­ tions to the debate. Put simply, a second­ tise in reasoning rests, as he himself says, order distinction "yes buts" a "yes but," on his ability to distinguish systematically conceding the appearance but denying the between true and false reasoning. And it is plausiblity of the evidence introduced by on the strength of his carefully worked out the opponent's first-order distinction. This system of distinctions about argumenta­ complexity, in tum, signals progressively tion that he successfully argues against higher levels of expertise, primarily be­ sophistic reasening, showing it to be cause, by definition, experts know the divi­ reasoning in appearance only. sions constituting their discipline and are Contemporary informal logicians and capable of making precise discriminations. dialecticians, however, make claims to ex­ In the above example, disputants use dis­ pertise based on their ability to draw tinctions to demonstrate their familiarity second-order distinctions. Where Aristotle with the concepts, information, and argu­ introduces first-order distinctions to ments relevant to the issue being dis­ challenge the paradoxical provisoed cussed: epistemology. In the first instance, assertions/denials of the Sophists, contem­ the opponent employs a first-order distinc­ porary scholarship introduces second-order tion to demonstrate knowledge about the distinctions to challenge the Aristotelian unreliability of the senses and the need for formula, or what C. L. Hamblin calls the perceptual consistency. In the second in­ "Standard Treatment" of the fallacies. By stance, the proponent attempts to regain discriminating among the complex circum­ ground by introducing a sophisticated stances and factors attending claims of fal­ second-order distinction, one that demon­ lacious reasoning, this scholarship attempts strates an even greater epistemic knowledge to reclaim many forms of argument. It at­ by acknowledging that the reliability of the tempts to show, therefore, that modes of senses must be judged on the strengths of reasoning once considered fallacious by the evidence surrounding each case. traditional standards, only appear to be so, The expertise that Aristotle claims for and that, in reality, they may be relevant, dialecticians in general, and for himself in informative, probable, valid, epistemically particular, derives from his ability to draw interesting, predictive, or useful. Dialectic of Second-Order Distinctions 19

For example, we find J. E. Broyles re­ turn out either to be arguments that are not claiming the fallacies of composition; D. fallacious at all, or arguments in which Gerber, the argumentum ; T. guidelines are so lacking that a non­ Govier, the argument; L. arbitrary sorting of the correct from the Groarke, the argument that two wrongs fallacious cases seems highly problematic make a right; J. Woods and D. Walton, the or impossible" (v.). ad verecundiam; J. Barker, the fallacy of Though recent reappraisals of fallacies ; D. Van de Vate, Jr., are varied in their methods and aims, one the appeal to force, just to name a few. aspect of their work remains constant: the Each of these scholars engages in argu­ use of second-order distinctions both to ment about argumentation. And each argu­ demonstrate the complexity surrounding ment, in turn, attempts to garner claims about fallacies and to underscore presumption by introducing second-order the expertise of authors/disputants who distinctions. By virtue of these new dis­ make such distinctions. Because of the tinctions, informal logicians claim to posit ltmitations of space, I plan to follow more comprehensive, complex, representa­ Aristotle's advice to rhetoricians. Rather tive, or "real" grounds for understanding than attempt a full induction, I will choose and evaluating the argumentative process representative examples, ones that I hope than those of their opponents. Conversely, will demonstrate the "distinctive" structure they attempt to shift the burden of proof of arguments about fallacies. My examples against positions that are derived from, or are taken from two recent sources: D. that provide support for, earlier and more Walton's Informal Logic: A Handbookfor "simplistic" treatments of fallacies. Critical Argumentation and R. Grooten­ Since the publication ofe. L. Hamblin's dorst's "Some Fallacies about Fallacies." Fallacies, informal logicians have com­ Both authors attempt to develop criteria for plained that the Standard Treatment of the discriminating between fallacious and Fallacies, derived in part from Aristotle's non-fallacious forms of argument from au­ Sophistici Elenchi and other related hand­ thority. The first author advances "six criti­ books of argumentation, is reductive, inad­ cal questions" and the second, three rules equate, and extremely simplistic. As of argumentative discourse to differentiate Walter Ulrich puts it, we should stop "arbi­ between real and apparent argumentation trarily rejecting all arguments that have as well as between real and apparent accu­ been traditionally labeled fallacies," and sations of fallacious reasoning. Specifical­ "develop standards for determining how ly, I will focus on their discussion of one much weight should be given to these ar­ fallacy-the ad verecundiam-in order to guments. Factors such as the nature of the show how their discriminations function as decision being made, the nature of the con­ an inventory of both first- and second­ flicting arguments, and the presence of order distinctions about argument. other supporting arguments would be rele­ Both Walton and Grootendorst believe vant to such calculations" (111). Similarly, that expert opinion can be a legitimate and S. Toulmin, R. Rieke, and A. Janik argue helpful strategy for introducing evidence that "most disturbingly to some people, ar­ to a discussion, but that such arguments guments that are fallacious in one context from authority must meet certain condi­ may turn out to be sound in another con­ tions lest they lapse into the ad verecundi­ text. Therefore, we shall not be able to am fallacy. Walton sets out these identify any intrinsically fallacious forms conditions as "six critical questions of arguing" (132). And finally, as J. Woods [which] must be kept in mind when evalu­ and D. Walton point out, "on closer inspec­ ating any successful appeal to authority" tion, many of the examples [of fallacies] (194). According to Walton, arguments 20 David Goodwin from authority require the disputant to statement is dubious CP) because, al­ reflect on the following questions. Does though you have offered your own person­ the "judgment put forward by the authority al guarantee of truth (Q), yet you have actually fall within the field of competence "advanced a standpoint without defending in which that individual is an expert"? Is it" (R). In the same way, the two other "the cited expert actually an expert, and rules and all six of Walton's questions can not merely someone quoted because of his serve as R in a first-order distinction chal­ prestige, popularity, or celebrity status"? Is lenging an assertion grounded in an appeal the expert's opinion authoritative? Is there to authority. "disagreement among several qualified Insofar as a disputant can invoke authorities who have been consulted?" Grootendorst's rules or Walton's questions Is "objective evidence on the cited to challenge an opponent's first-order opinion presently available ... and is the distinction-that is, to challenge a previ­ expert's opinion consistent with it?" And ously formulated accusation of fallacious finally, has the "expert's say-so been cor­ reasoning-they serve as inventories for rectly interpreted" (194-97)? Similarly, second-order distinctions. Again, a dispu­ Grootendorst argues that argumentum ad tant could respond to the argument above verecundiam is a fallacy only insofar as a by using Grootendorst's first rule of dis­ disputant violates at least one of three per­ course: "my claim is not dubious (P) be­ tinent rules of argumentative discourse. causc. although I support the truth of my These rules include, first, "whoever ad­ claim based on my own authority (Q&R), vances a standpoint is obliged to defend it you have not, until now, asked me to de­ if asked to do so"; second, "a standpoint fend it on any other ground (S)." In other can only be defended by advancing evi­ words, because the first rule uses the for­ dence which relates to this standpoint"; mulation "is obliged to defend it if asked to third, "a standpoint must be considered to do so," the disputant can distinguish be­ be defended conclusively if arguments are tween refusing to defend a standpoint and used in which a commonly accepted argu­ not being asked to do so. As Grootendorst mentation schema is being applied in a points out, the importance of the first rule correct way" (138-39). is to keep the discussion from ending be­ Any argument that fails to satisify the fore it has a real opportunity to develop. In requirements posed by the questions or in­ this case, however, the respondent argues scribed in the rules can be deemed falla­ that his or her argument is not fallacious cious. Conversely, any argument that does since he or she is willing to provide further meet these conditions can defend itself, if grounds for making his claim. To the ex­ need be, against such accusations. In this tent that these new grounds meet the re­ way, Walton's questions and Grootendorst's quirements of rule three, and thus fit into a rules serve as inventories for both first- and schema acceptable to the opponent, the ar­ second-order distinctions. Insofar as they gument will not be fallacious. can be invoked to challenge an opponent's Of course, Grootendorst's other two provisoed assertion, the rules and ques­ rules or any of Walton's six questions tions serve as inventories for first-order could be used as the ground (S) of a sec­ distinctions. For example, a disputant ond-order distinction defending an argu­ might offer the following provisoed asser­ ment from a charge of fallaciousness. For tion: "I don't need to argue this further (P) example, a disputant could argue from because I can assure you that it really is as Walton's rules that "my argument is not I say (Q)." To which a respondent, in turn, fallacious (P) because, although I base my might argue that this claim is fallacious us­ evidence on the authority of an expert (Q) ing Grootendorst's first rule: namely, your and that authority disagrees with other Dialectic of Second-Order Distinctions 21 authorities (R), yet this expert's assertions each division engages disputants in mak­ accord with objective evidence" (S), or ing discriminations about argument in P:(Q&R)&S. In this case the disputant uses order to argue effectively. question five (objective corroboration) to undermine an objection based on rule four (expert agreement). The division between IV. Conclusion: one rule or question and another provides The Future of Argumentation the grounds of second-order distinction. "Yes, my opponent seems to have grounds Clearly, Walton's book and Grooten­ for a first-order distinction (one that char­ dorst's article are, first and foremost, argu­ acterizes my argument as fallacious) but, ments about argumentation, about what it is in reality, these grounds fail to take into ac­ and how it functions. Specifically, these count some relevant, important, pertinent, works are extended arguments which at­ and thus real aspect of argumentation (in­ tempt to distinguish real from apparent ac­ scribed in another rule/question governing cusations of fallacious reasoning. As discursive reasoning). arguments, these works attempt to garner By arguing in this manner, disputants presumption and levy burden of proof by employ a second-order distinction to show introducing distinctions whose divisions of that they understand the divisions consti­ the subject matter-argumentation-are tuting the study and practice of argumenta­ more complex, comprehensive, plausible, tion. In short, they introduce more and thus more real than those grounding the complex, and more finely discriminating arguments of their opponents. Both intro­ grounds to the debate, showing their oppo­ duce rules or questions to generate divisions nent's argument, by contrast, to be more in order to challenge the simplistic and over­ simplistic and less plausible. By doing so, ly reductive nature of arguments about fal­ of course, the disputants accomplish two lacies based on the "Standard Treatment." things. First, they attempt to determine the Not surprisingly, ongoing debates real as it pertains to argumentation, and among contemporary informal logicians therefore, to shift presumption in favour of provide an impetus for fostering a new, their own position and against their oppo­ third-order level of distinctions. For exam­ nent's. And second, they establish their ple, Grootendorst argues that fallacies are own expertise in the very area of endeav­ neither "buttercups" (the ontological enti­ our they are presently engaged in: argu­ ties of the Standard Treatment) nor "irreg­ mentation. The issue of complexity and ular verbs" (the relativistic entities of expertise becomes more pressing as an ar­ Woods and Walton), pointing out that "in gument about fallacies moves through suc­ the Standard Treatment or its liberal vari­ cessive orders of distinction. The higher ants no distinction is drawn between the the order, the more reflexive the grounds different consequences [of breaking the are for disputation. For while first-order rules]." In other words, he distinguishes distinctions discriminate between the real among the various consequences of break­ and apparent in matters of reasoning, ing the rules, and, by doing so, seeks to second-order distinctions discriminate distinguish his own "dialectical approach" between real and apparent discriminations from those adopted by his predecessors. in matters of reasoning, and so on. At "Distinction," according to Rescher, "is each point, the introduction of new the most characterstic and creative of dia­ divisions-based on rules, questions, spec­ lectical moves" (12). Rescher's point aptly ified conditions, etc.-provides progres­ describes the nature of dialectical exchanges sively more reflexive grounds for about fallacies. In such exchanges, distinc­ disputants to hold their positions, since tion is the most characteristic and creative 22 David Goodwin move: the most characteristic, because all trend will continue, with distinction re­ such arguments use distinctions to distin­ maining the engine of reflexivity driving guish the real from the apparent as it per­ informal logic. tains to argumentation; the most creative, I suspect, too, that Nicholas Rescher's because, as a discipline, informal logic gen­ concept of distinction as a dialectical erates complex discriminations about rea­ move, when conjoined with Chaim soning, and thus introduces more expert Perelman's and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca's and higher orders of distinction to gamer concept of argumentative dissociation, can presumption for an ongoing succession of provide an important tool for examining, if conflicting positions about argumentation. not fine-tuning, this "engine." For as a Given the progression from first to second, theory of distinction emerges, it will re­ and perhaps second- to third-order distinc­ mind informal logicians of the dialectical tions, the history of argumentation may nature of their own discipline: that they well be the history of the distinctions made always reason about reasoning and argue by its various disputants. I suspect that the about argumentation.

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