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BIBLIOGRAPHY [Adams, 1954] E. M. Adams. The Fundamentals ofGeneral Logic. Longmans , Green & Co., New York, 1954. [Allport, 1958] Gordon W. Allport. The Nature ofPrejudice. Doubleday An­ chor Books, Garden City, New York" 1958. [Atherton, 1993] Catherine Atherton. The Stoics on Ambiguity. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1993. [Atlas, 1989] Jay David Atlas. Philosophy Without Ambiguity: A Logico­ Linguistic Essay. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1989. [Barth and Krabbe, 1982] E. M. Barth and E. C. W. Krabbe. From Axiom to Dialogue. De Gruyter, New York, 1982. [Barth and Martens, 1977] E. M. Barth and J. L. Martens. Argumentum Ad Hominem : From chaos to formal dialectic. Logique et Analyse, 77-78:76­ 96, 1977. [Beardsley, 1950] Monroe C. Beardsley. Practical Logic. Prentice-Hall, New York,1950. [Beardsley, 1956] Monroe C. Beardsley. Thinking Straight. Prentice-Hall, En­ glewood Cliffs, 1956. [Bentham, 1969] Jeremy Bentham. The book of fallacies (1824) . In Mary P. Mack, editor, A Bentham Reader, pages 331-358. Pegasus, New York, 1969. [Bertin, 1995] Oliver Bertin . Poor communication cited in ship mishaps . The Globe and Mail, B2, 18 October 1995. [Black, 1946] Max Black. Critical Thinking . Prentice-Hall, New York, 1946. [Blair, 1988] J. Anthony Blair. What is bias? In Trudy Govier, editor, Selected Issues in Logic and Communication, pages 93-103. Wadsworth , Belmont, 1988. [Brinton, 1986] Alan Brinton. Ethotic argument. History ofPhilosophy Quar­ terly, 3:245-257, 1986. [Broad and Wade, 1982] William Broad and Nicholas Wade. Betrayers ofthe Truth: Fraud and Deceit in the Halls ofScience. Simon & Schuster, New York,1982. 281 282 FALLACIES ARISING FROM AMBIGUITY [Burtt, 1931] Edwin Arthur Burtt. Principles and Problems ofRight Thinking,. Harper & Brothers, New York, 1931. [Campbell, 1974] Stephen K. Campbell. Flaws and Fallacies in Statistical Thinking . Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, 1974. [Castell, 1935] Alburey Castell. A College Logic. The Macmillan Co., New York,1935. [Cederblom and Paulsen, 1982] Jerry Cederblom and David W. Paulsen. Crit­ ical Reasoning. Wadsworth, Belmont, 1982. [Copi and Burgess-Jackson, 1992] Irving M. Copi and Keith Burgess-Jackson. Informal Logic. Macmillan, New York, 2nd edition, 1992. [Copi and Cohen, 1990] Irving M. Copi and Carl Cohen. Introduction to Logic. Macmillan, New York, 8th edition, 1990. [Creighton,1904] James E. Creighton. An Introductory Logic. Macmillan, London, 1904. [Cresswell, 1973] M.1. Cresswell. Logics and Languages. Methuen, London, 1973. [Cushing, 1994] Steven Cushing. Fatal Words: Communication Clashes and Aircraft Crashes. Chicago University Press, Chicago, 1994. [Darner, 1980] T. Edward Darner. Attacking Faulty Reasoning. Wadsworth, Belmont, 1980. Second edition, 1987. [Delvlorgan, 1847] Augustus DeMorgan. Formal Logic. Taylor and Walton, London , 1847. [Donohue, 1978] William A. Donohue. An empirical framework for exam­ ining negotiation processes and outcomes. Communication Monographs, 45:247-257,1978. [Donohue, 1981] William A. Donohue. Development of a model of rule use in negotiation interaction. Communication Monographs, 48: 106-120, 1981. [Edlow, 1977] Robert Blair Edlow. Galen on Language and Ambiguity. E. J. Brill, Leiden, 1977. [Eisenberg, 1984] Eric M. Eisenberg. Ambiguity as strategy in organizational communication. Communication Monographs, 51:227-242,1984. [Engel, 1982] S. Morris Engel. With Good Reason: An Introduction to Infor­ mal Fallacies. St. Martin's Press, New York, 2nd edition, 1982. [Engel,1989] S. Morris Engel. The many faces of amphiboly. Metaphiloso­ phy, 20:347-355, 1989. [Fearnside and Holther, 1959] W. Ward Fearnside and William B. Holther. Fallacy: The Counterfeit ofArgument. Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1959. BIBLIOGRAPHY 283 [Fischer, 1970] David Hackett Fischer. Historians ' Fallacies. Harper & Row, New York, 1970. [Flowers et al., 1982] Margot Flowers, Rod McGuire, and Lawrence Birn­ baum. Adversary arguments and the logic of personal attacks, pages 275­ 294. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Hillsdale, NJ, 1982. [Fraunce, 1588] Abraham Fraunce. The Lawier'sLogike. William Howe, Lon­ don, 1588. [Freeman, 1988] James B. Freeman . Thinking Logically. Prentice-Hall, En­ glewood Cliffs, 1988. [Gair, 1992] Bain Gair. Pizza promotions often pie-in-the-sky: Two-for-one offers not what they seem. Winnipeg Free Press, pages 1-2, 1992. [Gibson , 1908J W. R. Boyce Gibson. The Problem of Logic. Adam Black, London, 1908. [Gillon, 1990] Brendan S. Gillon . Ambiguity, generality and indeterminacy: Tests and definitions. Synthese , 85:391--416, 1990. [Glare, 1982] P. G. W. Glare, editor. Oxford Latin Dictionary. The Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1982. [Graham, 19771 Michael H. Graham. Impeaching the professional expert wit­ ness by a showing of financial interest. Indiana Law Journal, 53:35-53, 1977. [Grice, 1975] H. Paul Grice. Logic and conversation. In Donald Davidson and Gilbert Harman, editors, The Logic ofGrammar, pages 64-75. Dickenson Publishing Co., Encino, California, 1975. [Hamblin , 1970] Charles L. Hamblin . Fallacies. Methuen, London, 1970. Reprinted by Vale Press, Newport News, Virginia, 1986. [Hamblin, 1971] Charles L. Hamblin . Mathematical models of dialogue. Theoria, 37:130-155,1971. [Hansen, 1990] Hans V. Hansen. An informal logic bibliography,. Informal Logic , 12:155-184, 1990. [Hastings, 1962] Arthur Hastings. A Reformulation ofthe Modes ofReason ing in Argumentation. PhD thesis, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois, 1962. [Henry W. Johnstone, 1981l Henry W. Johnstone, Jr. Towards an ethics of rhetoric. Communication, 6:305-314, 1981. [Hibben, 1906] John Grier Hibben . Logic, Deductive and Inductive. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1906. [Hinman, 1982J Lawrence M. Hinman . The case for ad hominem arguments . Australasian Journal ofPhilosophy, 60:338-345, 1982. 284 FALLACIES ARISING FROM AMBIGUITY [Hintikka, 1959] Jaakko Hintikka. Aristotle and the ambiguity of ambiguity. Inquiry, 2:137-151,1959. [Hintikka, 1971] Jaakko Hintikka. Different kinds of equivocation in aristotle. Journal ofthe History ofPhilosophy, 9:368-372, 1971. [Hintikka, 1981] Jaakko Hintikka. The logic of information-seeking dia­ logues : A model. In Werner Becker and Wilhelm K. Essler, editors, Konzepte der Dialektik, pages 212-231. Vittorio Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main, 1981. [Huby, 1994] Pamela Huby. Aristotle. In Douglas Walton and Alan Brinton, editors, Historical Foundations ofInformal Logic. To appear, 1994. [Hughes and Cresswell, 1968] G. E. Hughes and M. J. Cresswell. An Introduc­ tion to Modal Logic. Methuen, London, 1968. [Hurley, 1991] Patrick J. Hurley. Logic. Wadsworth, Belmont, California, 4th edition, 1991. [Jacobs and Jackson, 1983] Scott Jacobs and Sally Jackson. Speech act struc­ ture in conversation. In Robert T.Craig and Karen Tracy, editors , Conversa­ tional Coherence: Form, Structure and Strategy, pages 47-66. Sage, Bev­ erly Hills, 1983. [James, 1907] William James. Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways ofThinking . Longmans, Green and Co., London, 1907. [Jevons, 1883] W. Stanley Jevons. The Elements ofLogic. Sheldon and Co., New York, 1883. [Johnson and Blair, 1983] Ralph H. Johnson and J. Anthony Blair. Logical Self-Defense. McGraw-Hill Ryerson, Toronto, 1983. [Jonsen and Toulmin, 1988] Albert R. Jonsen and Stephen Toulmin. The Abuse ofCausistry. University of California Press, Berkeley, 1988. [Joseph, 1916] H. W. B. Joseph . An Introduction to Logic. The Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2nd edition, 1916. [Keynes, 1887] John Neville Keynes. Studies and Exercises in Formal Logic. Macmillan and Co., London, 1887. [Kilgore, 1968] William J. Kilgore. An Introductory Logic. Holt, Rinehart and Winston , New York, 1968. [Knapp, 1981] Mark L. Knapp. Telling it like it isn't: A review of theory and research on deceptive communications. Human Communication Research, 5:270-285, 1981. [Krabbe and Walton, 1993] Erik C. W. Krabbe and Douglas Walton. It's all very well for you to talk! Informal Logic, 15:79-91,1993. [Krabbe, 1990] Erik C. W. Krabbe. Inconsistent commitment and commitment to inconsistencies. Informal Logic, 12:33-42, 1990. BIBLIOGRAPHY 285 [Kreyche, 196 I] Robert1. Kreyche . Logicfor Undergraduates. Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York, 1961. [Latta and MacBeath, 1956] Robert Latta and Alexander MacBeath. The Ele­ ments ofLogic. Macmillan & Co., London, 1956. [Lepenies, 1992] Wolf Lepenies. Sombre mood of france 's darkest years. The Times Higher, page 14, 1992. [Little et al., 1955] Winston W.Little, W. Harold Wilson, and W. Edgar Moore. Applied Logic. Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1955. [Lutz, 1989] William Lutz. Doublespeak. Harper & Row, New York, 1989. [Mackenzie, 1981] 1. D. Mackenzie. The dialectics of logic . Logique et Anal­ yse, 94:159-177, 1981. [Mackenzie, 1988] 1. D. Mackenzie. Distinguo: The response to equivocation. Argumentation, 2:465-482, 1988. [Mackie, 1967] J. L. Mackie. Fallacies. In Paul Edwards, editor, Encyclopedia ofPhilosophy. 1967. [Manicas and Kruger, 1968] Peter T. Manicas and Arthur N. Kruger. Essen­ tials ofLogic. American Book Co., New York, 1968. [Mellone, 1913] Sydney Herbert Mellone.An Introductory Text-Book ofLogic. William Blackwood and Sons, Edinburgh and London, 1913. [Michalos, 1970] Alex C. Michalos. Improving Your Reasoning. Prentice­ Hall, Englewood Cliffs, 1970. [Mill, 1970] John Stuart Mill . A System ofLogic. Longmans, London, 1970. First published in 1843. [Moore, 1965] G. E. Moore. Ethics. Oxford University Press, New York, 1965. [Parker and Veatch, 1959] Francis H.
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