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A Handbook in Logic and Rationality Brendan Myers View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Opus: Research and Creativity at IPFW Indiana University - Purdue University Fort Wayne Opus: Research & Creativity at IPFW Philosophy Faculty Publications Department of Philosophy 2013 Clear and Present Thinking: A Handbook in Logic and Rationality Brendan Myers Charlene Elsby Indiana University-Purdue University Fort Wayne, [email protected] Kimberly Baltzer-Jaray Nola Semczyszyn This research is a product of the Department of Philosophy faculty at Indiana University-Purdue University Fort Wayne. Follow this and additional works at: http://opus.ipfw.edu/philos_facpubs Part of the Philosophy Commons Opus Citation Brendan Myers, Charlene Elsby, Kimberly Baltzer-Jaray, and Nola Semczyszyn (2013). Clear and Present Thinking: A Handbook in Logic and Rationality. Northwest Passage Books. http://opus.ipfw.edu/philos_facpubs/286 This Book is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Philosophy at Opus: Research & Creativity at IPFW. It has been accepted for inclusion in Philosophy Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Opus: Research & Creativity at IPFW. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Clear and Present Thinking A handbook in logic and rationality. Clear and Present Thinking Project Director: Brendan Myers (CEGEP Heritage College) Authors: Brendan Myers Charlene Elsby (Queen’s University) Kimberly Baltzer-Jaray (University of Waterloo) Nola Semczyszyn (Franklin & Marshall College) Editor / Proofreader: Natalie Evans (University of Guelph - Humber) Layout and Design: Nathaniel Winter-Hébert, Lana Winter-Hébert www. winterhebert.com Version 1.1 (21st May 2013) Northwest Passage Books This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NoDerivs 3.0 Unported License. To view a copy of this license, visit: creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/3.0/ For all other enquiries, please visit brendanmyers.net Clear and Present Thinking A handbook in logic and rationality. Version 1.1 Northwest Passage Books Contents Contents Acknowledgments 2.2.2 Self-Awareness 39 Introduction 7 2.2.3 Health 40 2.2.4 Courage 40 Chapter One: Questions, Problems, 2.2.5 Healthy Skepticism 41 and World Views 15 2.2.6 Autonomy 41 2.2.7 Simplicity 42 1.1 Intellectual Environments 15 2.2.8 Precision 42 1.2 World Views 17 2.2.9 Patience 43 1.3 Framing Language 19 2.2.10 Consistency 43 1.4 Problems 20 2.2.11 Open-ness and Open-Mindedness 43 1.5 Observation 21 2.2.12 Asking for help 44 1.6 Questions 23 2.3 A few summary remarks for Chapter Two 45 1.7 Differing World Views 25 2.4 Exercises for Chapter Two 45 1.8 Value Programs 26 1.9 World Views, Civilization, and Conflict 27 Chapter Three: Basics of 1.10 Exercise for Chapter One 28 Argumentation 47 Chapter Two: Habits of Good and 3.1 Propositions 47 Bad Thinking 33 3.2 Parts of Arguments 49 3.3 Truth and Validity 50 2.1.1 Self-Interest 33 3.4 Types of Statements (Modern Logic) 50 2.1.2 Saving Face 34 3.5 Category Logic 53 2.1.3 Peer Pressure 34 3.6 Some Common Deductive Argument Forms 54 2.1.4 Stereotyping and Prejudice 35 3.6.1 Modus Ponens 55 2.1.5 Excessive Skepticism 36 3.6.2 Modus Tollens 56 2.1.6 Intellectual Laziness 36 3.6.3 Categorical Syllogisms 57 2.1.7 Relativism 37 3.6.4 Enthymemes 58 2.1.8 The Consequences of Bad Habits 39 3.6.5 Hypothetical Syllogism 58 2.2.1 Curiosity 39 3.6.6 Disjunctive Syllogism 60 Contents 3.6.7 Adjunction 61 4.24 Weak Analogy 77 3.6.8 Dilemmas 61 4.25 Exercises for Chapter Four 78 3.7 Induction 63 3.7.1 Inductive Generalization 64 Chapter Five: Reasonable Doubt 81 3.7.2 Statistical Syllogism 65 3.7.3 Induction by Shared Properties 66 5.1 What is reasonable doubt? 81 3.7.4 Induction by Shared Relations 67 5.2 Contradictory Claims 83 3.8 Scientific Method 67 5.3 Common Sense 84 3.9 Exercises for Chapter Three 68 5.4 Emotions, Instincts, and Intuitions 84 5.5 Looking at the evidence 86 Chapter Four: Fallacies 73 5.6 Conspiracy theories 87 5.7 Propaganda and Disinformation 88 4.1 Appeal to Authority 73 5.8 Doubting experts and professionals 81 4.2 Appeal to Force 73 5.9 Doubting your own eyes and ears 92 4.3 Appeal to Pity 74 5.10 Scams, Frauds, and Confidence Tricks 93 4.4 Appeal to Tradition 74 5.11 Doubting the Mass Media 96 4.5 Appeal to Novelty 74 5.12 Doubting the News 97 4.6 Appeal to Ignorance 74 5.13 Doubting Advertisments and Marketing 99 4.7 Appeal to Popularity 74 5.14 Exercises for Chapter Five 100 4.8 Accident Fallacy 74 4.9 Amphiboly 75 Chapter Six: Moral Reasoning 103 4.10 Fallacy of Composition 75 4.11 Fallacy of Division 75 6.1 Features of Moral Arguments 103 4.12 Red Herring 75 6.2 Moral Theories 104 4.13 Straw Man Fallacy 75 6.2.1 Utilitarianism 105 4.14 Abusing the Man 75 6.2.2 Deontology 107 4.15 False Cause 76 6.2.3 Virtue Theory / Areteology 108 4.16 Non Sequitor Fallacy 76 6.2.4 (Distributive) Justtice 110 4.17 Fallacy of the Undistributed Middle 76 6.3 Summary Remarks: Why can’t 4.18 Naturalistic Fallacy 76 we all just get along? 111 4.19 Loaded Question Fallacy 76 6.4 Exercises for Moral Reasoning 112 4.20 Equivocation 76 4.21 Begging the Question 77 4.22 False Dilemma 77 4.23 Hasty Generalization 77 Acknowledgments This project was financially supported by the dona- Gresham, Carol Waller, John Pritchard, Mark tions of over 700 people, through the Kickstarter.com Cumisky, Ed Kowalczewski, Tamarra Wallace, fundraising platform, including: Cheri Lovell, JD Ferries-Rowe, Maria Laine, Ralph Warnick, Cletus Stell, Lucas York, Jeff Chen, Michael Sena, Lisa Isaacson, Dag Hovden, William Linda Demissy, Jeffrey Wyndham, Jonathan Tapia, Andrews, Bill Dourte, Joseph de Leon, Douglas Carl Witty, Charlene Elsby, Jennifer Bezanson, Rod Bass, Dean Holbrough, Grant Haavaldsrud, Jussi MacPherson, Jennifer Hunt, Kadri Weiler, T. Scarlet Myllyluoma, Peter C. March, Deborah Spiesz, Evan Jory, Jennifer Hunt, Theo Geer, Teo Bishop, Grummell, Robert Carnochan, Angela Gallant, Julien St-Laurent, Tammy Longe, Holly Bird, Nic Kevin J. Maroney, Stephanie McMillen-Sherry, Daines, Gillian Watson, Chris Rybisky, Sydney Md. Muazzam B. Sham Khiruddin, David Lim, Mark Lancaster, Fernando Villasenor, Ruth Merriam, Wendelborn, Thomas Bourke, James Husum, Doug David Burch, Katt Taylor, Kevin L. Krakauer, Matan Eves, Bruce Becker, Bob Levin, Simon Lieutaud, Nassau, Jon Nebenfuhr, Bill Hovingh, Thomas Steven Hosford, Brian LaShomb, Colin Boswell, Darlington, Robin Powell, Peter Wolanski, Fabiola John Fox, Jason Piterak, Dirk Renckens, Sam Martin, Cequinne Reyamoir Sky, Robert Moore, Sabra, Bobby G Berney, Hannah Hiles, Albion Brian Baskerville, Claire Verney, Melissa Kean, Gould, Enrico Chir, Richard L Skubic, Corwin Melissa Reid, Ian McNab, Deirdre Hebert, Rory Samuelson, Zac Trolley, Melanie Meixner, Andrew Bowman, Jennifer Neal, Phil Kessler, Nick Warner, Bowser, Danny Witting, Melinda Reidinger, Hugh Long, Turlough Myers, Pat Bellavance, Graeme Barber, Matthew Slatkin, Barbara Jacobi, Chris Nichols, Michael Brown, Sarah Clements, Jennifer Mott, Melody Lake, Philipp Schneider, Stevie Miller, Marcos Gomez, Lisa Tamres, Karen Nicholas Pietrzak, Elizabeth A. Stout, Andrew Schreiber, Idalia Nelson, Debbie Carman, T Thorn Ma, Bernadette Martinez, Dominic Caplan, John Coyle, John Beckett, Selene Vega, Soli Johnson, Baksa, Todd Penland, Christian R. Meloche, Lianne Lavoie, Jennifer Ramon, Brian Figgins, Ivan Yagolnikov, John Merklinghaus, Matthew Amanda Strong, Lydia Ondrusek, Neil Negandhi, Habermehl, Burrell Crittendon, Scott Morris, Seto Konowa, Bart Salisbury, John Rahael, Nancy Sean Herron, Glenn Slotte, Björn Fonseca, Jay Allin, H Lynnea Johnson, Katherine Lawrence, Welshofer, David Fugate, Ty Sawyer, David Sosulski, Samuel Basa, Jim Burrows, Robert E. Stutts, Damion Moser, Thomas Brincefield, Paul Schultz, Daryn Tsuji, Deanna Victoria, Frederick Polgardy, Kevin Tibbs, Nicholas Dunne, Chris Felstead, Jim Elodie Crespel, Walter Erskine, Wilma Jandoc, Hill, Jayson Mackie, Matthew Suber, Sam Sgro, Nanci Quinn, Rachel Porteous, Teree McCormick, Mike Kallies, Garry Crossland, Michael Gradin, Bailey Shoemaker Richards, Ana de Montvert, John Bernardo, Elena Martinez, Justin Minnes, Brian Andrew, Nick Mailer, Gavin Lambert, Mike Ranti Junus, Mark Phelps, Susanne Huttner, Little, Antonina York, Laura Packer, Cynthia Andrea Hess, Simon Ward, Thomas Langenbach, Acknowledgments Alex Gibson, Philippe Chanelet, Skye Nathaniel C.D. Carson, Sheena MacIsaac, Andy Lawton, Schiefer, Julian Greene, Jennifer Gibson, James Rebecca Turner, Ivan Lewis, Ryoji Nakase, Deborah Foster, Kennita Watson, Robert Meeks, Corina Goldsmith, Truls Bjørvik, James R. Hall, William Thornton, Hilary Sadowsky, Eric Hortop, Joann Healy, Gareth Thomas, Todd Showalter, Russ Neff, Keesey, Alison Lilly, Millard Arnold IV, Adam Daw, Brittany Wilbert, Tobias Ammann, Mj Patterson, Garth Elliott, Mary Henderson, Mike Mallory, JD Joe Salek, Mostafa Faghfoury, Caroline Kenner, Hickey, Andrew Dulson, Stanley Yamane, Aurora Joshua Smith, Homam Alattar, Mara Georges, Jade Pichette, Jennifer M Shaw, Kami Landy, Bryan Bonifacio, Chad Hobson, Ryoichi Kinoshita, Gaston Croteau, Seonaid Lee, Dan Pierson, David O’Brien, Glenn McCrimmon, Susan Grant- Adrienne Dandy, Ealasaid haas, Roland Conybeare, Suttie, Mike Smith, Benjamin Wade. William Blumberg, Regina P. Wade, Christye Gruen, Maria Bement, Michelle Bar-Evan, Raja Thiagarajan, Nicholas George, Larry Wood, Kerry Michalski-Russell, Michael Green, Paul Fischer, Kiran Reddy, Thomas King, Edward Hinkey, Bryce Bederka, Martin Gray, Nick Allott, Jonas Schiött, Sara Korn, Jessica Heaston, Dan Reshef, Kevin Chin, Donald & Sabrina Sutherland, Derric Pruitt, Ben Rossi, Chris Rose, Deanna Jones, David Churn, Solomon Matthews, Judith Wouk, Gary Gibson, Rob C. Agnew, Robert Young, Kay M Purcell, John Benner Jr, Mark Bisignano, Stephen Antonello, Ed Deeley, Jochen Schmiedbauer, Andrew Kwon, John Moreau, James E.
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