INFORMAL LOGIC XlVI, Winter 1992 The Dialectic of Second-Order Distinctions: The Structure of Arguments about Fallacies DAVID GOODWIN Unirersity of Waterloo Key Words: Informal logic; argumentation and reasoning used to support these history and theory; rhetorical theory; dialectic. claims. Specifically, it analyzes the struc­ Abstract: Arguments about fallacies generally at­ ture and function of one countermove tempt to distinguish real from apparent modes of common to all such arguments about argumentation and reasoning. To examine the fallacies-distinction. To accuse an oppo­ structure of these arguments, this paper develops a theory of dialectical distinction. First, it explores nent of fallacious reasoning is to argue that the connection between Nicholas Rescher's con­ his or her argument is reasoning in appear­ cept of distinction as a "dialectical countermove" ance only, that it fails, in some important and Chaim Perelman and L. Olbrecht-Tyteca's respect, to meet the criteria of "real" argu­ "dissociation of ideas." Next, it applies a theory of mentation. Hence all arguments about fal­ distinction to Aristotle's extended arguments lacies proceed from, and frequently argue about fallacies in De Sophisticis Elenchis, prima­ for, a primary distinction between appear­ rily with a view to analyzing its underlying strate­ gies of argumentation. Finally, it examines how ance and reality as it pertains to the form, second-order distinctions (those designed to chal­ conduct, and function of argumentation. lenge previously formulated distinctions) under­ Moreover, all arguments about fallacies pin current arguments against the Aristotelian or reveal a "dialectical reflexivity," as I call it, "Standard Treatment" of the fallacies. which may be their most intriguing, if not characteristic, feature. From Aristotle's De This paper is not about fallacies per se. Sophisticis Elenchis to the works of con­ By this I mean, it will not offer any claims temporary informal logicians, all argu­ about the nature of fallacies, nor speculate ments about fallacies are arguments about about whether they exist. It will not ad­ argumentation. How this reflexivity in­ vance a theory of fallacies, nor, equally, forms the dialectical strategies of such make judgments about their use (or abuse) treatises is the main concern of this paper. in everyday reasoning. Indeed, it will not Specifically, it asks: what roles do distinc­ even attempt to differentiate the various tions play in dialectical exchanges about types and functions of fallacies. Other pa­ fallacies? How do distinctions differentiate pers, monographs, and books have done so "real" from "apparent" modes of reason­ already, and many of these, I think, with ing? In what way do they determine the great success. outcome of arguments about argumenta­ Rather than join in the various debates tion? Are there different kinds of dialecti­ about fallacies-about what they are or how cal distinctions? And finally, can these they work-this paper develops a meta­ differences account for shifts in models of analysis of the debate: it examines the dia­ argumentation, and, in particular, shifts lectical countermoves characteristic of between "traditional" and "contemporary" ancient and contemporary arguments arguments about fallacies? about fallacies. It discusses controvertible To answer these questions, the first claims that philosophers have asserted section of this paper examines the role that about fallacies and the kind of evidence distinction plays in dialectic generally. It develops a theory of distinction by outlining evidential ground that limits the the relationship between Nicholas Rescher's probative force of a proviso) (5-17). concept of "dialectical countermove" and As defined by Rescher, a distinction is a Chaim Perelman and L. OIbrechts­ dialectical countermove which challenges Tyteca's "dissociation of ideas." The sec­ a provisoed assertion or denial. Take. for ond section applies this theory to example, the following provisoed asser­ Aristotle's Sophistici Elenchi in order to tion: "I know this is a human hand (P) analyze its underlying strategies of argu­ because my senses tell me so directly" (Q) mentation. And finally, the third section (16). Schematized by Rescher as P:Q and examines how second-order distinctions read as "P because of Q," this proviso can (distinctions designed to undermine the be challenged by the distinction, "you probative force of previously formulated can't really support this claim CP) be­ distinctions) play an instrumental role in cause, although your senses provide evi­ the construction of current challenges to dence (Q), this evidence is quite often the Aristotelian, or "Standard Treatment," deceptive" (R). The distinction, schema­ of the fallacies. tized as -P:Q&R and read as "not P be­ cause although Q yet R." limits the grounds established by the initial proviso I. Dialectic, Distinction, and the (Q) by qualifying the status of these Dissociative Construction of the Real grounds. Put simply. it provides an over­ riding exception to be considered: namely, In Dialectics: A Controversy-Oriented that the senses are open to deception. Such Approach to the Theory of Knowledge, a distinction adds a new set of evidential Nicholas Rescher defines "dialectic" as considerations (R) to the dispute, one which any form of "disputation, debate, and is meant to diminish the probative strength rational controversy" which "exhibits of the opponent's proviso. A distinction at­ epistemological processes at work in a tempts to accomplish this by transferring setting of socially conditioned interac­ the opponent's primafacie case to another, tions" (xii). These "epistemological more hostile epistemological context, one processes," as he calls them, require partic­ that militates against, rather than provides ipants to present evidence that is either support for, an assertion or denial. plausible enough to shift the burden of Extending Rescher's discussion, then, proof away from. or garner presumption a distinction, I would argue, challenges an for, their respective assertions. Dialectic, opponent's dialectical grounds by (1) pro­ therefore, is a process which shapes, viding a new ground for consideration and is shaped by, socially-constructed which (2) separates the old ground from knowledge, knowledge which allows the initial assertion by (3) splitting the old communities to establish and test plausi­ ground into two elements, one of which it bilities, and therefore to set standards and concedes and the other it denies. In the ex­ make judgements in human affairs. To ample above, R introduces a new concept achieve this goal, dialectic proceeds by (that the senses can be deceived) in order successive motions of exchange: to break the bond holding Q to P. the provi­ "assertions" (initial statements or claims), so to its assertion. A distinction accom­ "denials" (challenges to such claims), plishes this by a strategy of "yes but," that "provisoed assertions and denials" (the is, by conceding that "yes, your senses pro­ presentation of grounds which support­ vide evidence" and then by denying "but that is, provide prima facie evidence this evidence cannot support the initial for-an assertion or denial), and finally, claim." The pivot, or "but," of the distinc­ "distinctions" (the presentation of an tion, then, is its most powerful feature. To Dialectic of Second-Order Distinctions 13 function as a dialectical countermove, a under discussion. In The New Rhetoric: distinction must grant more evidential A Treatise on Argumentation, Chaim weight to what is denied than to what is Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca conceded. This, of course, is how it garners discuss such distinctions under the heading presumption for -P. For without the pivot, of "dissociation" (411-50). Dissociation is the distinction could not tip the scales of the argumentative technique of reconfigur­ plausibility against the opponent's claim ing previously constructed integrities. pri­ taken as a Whole, and instead, would only marily by showing them to be unstable, serve as a neutral division of the issue illusionary, or in some way deficient. The under discussion. real is created by dissociation, which not In Rescher's account of dialectic, pre­ only breaks connecting links, but which sumption favours the plausible, and the involves a more profound change that is al­ plausible, in tum, favours evidence which ways prompted by the desire to remove an conforms to the desiderata of cognitive incompatibility arising out of the confron­ systematization-simplicity, completeness, tation of one proposition with others, directness, regularity, uniformity, distinct­ whether one is dealing with norms, facts. ness, normalcy, and the like--or what or truths, (413) Rescher calls "thesis-warranting princi­ Dissociations, then, postulate a coherent, pies" (39). Distinctions invoke a thesis­ self-consistent realm of being and a "rule warranting principle to advance the cause of reality" against which conflicting claims of the newly-stated position, and to make can be judged. Dissociations resolve im­ it seem more epistemically desirable than passes created by incompatible claims or antecedent positions. In the above exam­ principles, primarily by showing that one ple, the provisoed assertion appeals to of the two claims only appears to be plau­ "directness," that is, to an immediate sible, relevant, useful, and so on, "The ef­ sensory perception of the body. The dis­ fect of determining reality," Perelman tinction, on the