How Nuclear Antagonists Collaborated on Counter-Narcotics Efforts in Iran from 2007 to 2011

HIDDEN COOPERATION: How Nuclear Antagonists Collaborated on Counter-Narcotics Efforts in Iran from 2007 to 2011

Mémoire

Myriam Ménard

Maîtrise en études internationales Maître ès arts (M.A.)

Québec, Canada

RÉSUMÉ

L'Iran est depuis longtemps considéré comme un État paria sur la scène internationale en raison de son programme nucléaire. Pourtant, les mêmes États qui ont publiquement dénoncé les ambitions nucléaires de l'Iran ont collaboré avec les autorités iraniennes à la lutte anti-drogue. Cette recherche explore comment les membres de la communauté internationale ont formulé leur discours public sur l'Iran afin de justifier à la fois leur coopération avec l‟Iran contre les stupéfiants et leur dénonciation du programme nucléaire. Les déclarations politiques de sept gouvernements ayant fourni une assistance à la lutte anti-drogue de l‟Iran de 2007 à 2011 ont été systématiquement analysées à l'aide de l'analyse de contenu qualitative et de l'analyse de discours. Notre analyse a révélé que ces pays ont entretenu des représentations contradictoires, construisant l‟Iran simultanément comme un ennemi et un partenaire. Ces résultats suggèrent que la confrontation nucléaire avec l'Iran résulte des pratiques discursives d‟acteurs internationaux.

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ABSTRACT

Iran has long been considered as a pariah state in international affairs due to the development of the country‟s nuclear program. Yet, the very same states that have denounced Iran‟s nuclear ambitions and pushed for the imposition of international sanctions have collaborated with Iranian authorities on counter-narcotics issues. This research explores how members of the international community framed their public discourse on Iran in order to justify both counter-narcotics cooperation with Iran and denunciation of the country‟s nuclear program. The political statements of seven governments that provided assistance to Iran‟s counter-narcotics efforts from 2007 to 2011 were systematically analysed with the help of Qualitative Content and Discourse analyses. Our analysis revealed that these donor countries held contradictory representations of Iran, constructing it simultaneously as an enemy and a partner. These findings suggest that nuclear confrontation with Iran is not inevitable but rather results from the discursive practices of international actors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

RÉSUMÉ III ABSTRACT V TABLE OF CONTENTS VII LIST OF TABLES XI LIST OF FIGURES XIII LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS XV ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS XVII

CHAPTER 1 ANTAGONISTIC PARTNERS: HOW NUCLEAR OPPONENTS COLLABORATED ON COUNTER- NARCOTICS ISSUES FROM 2007 TO 2011 1

1. RESEARCH PROBLEM CONTEXTUALIZED: COUNTER-NARCOTICS INVOLVEMENT AND NUCLEAR NON- PROLIFERATION IN SOUTH WEST ASIA 1 1.1 THE AFGHAN OPIUM TRADE PROBLEM: PROVIDING INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE TO IRAN’S COUNTER- NARCOTICS EFFORTS 2 1.2 THE IRANIAN NUCLEAR ISSUE: OPPOSING DEVELOPMENTS OF IRAN’S NUCLEAR PROGRAM 6

2. RESEARCH QUESTION 10

3. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 11

4. ORGANIZATION 12

CHAPTER 2 THE MAKING OF A PARADOX: NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT AND DRUG CONTROL IN IRAN, 2007- 2011 13

1. POLICY RESPONSES TO THE IRANIAN NUCLEAR ISSUE: THE INFLUENCE OF INTERESTS, ALLIANCES AND PERCEPTIONS 13 1.1 EUROPEAN UNION-IRAN RELATIONS: YO-YOING BETWEEN ENGAGEMENT AND CONFRONTATION 14 1.2 FRANCE-IRAN RELATIONS: A DISPLAY OF FRANCE’S ASPIRATION TO BE A KEY PLAYER IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 15 1.3 UK-IRAN RELATIONS: CONSTRAINED BY TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS AND DOMESTIC POLITICS 17 1.4 US-IRAN RELATIONS: A MUTUAL ANIMOSITY THAT DICTATES THE CONDUCT OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 19

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1.5 JAPAN-IRAN RELATIONS: MAINTAINING A DELICATE BALANCE BETWEEN ENERGY AND MILITARY SECURITY 20

2. THE IRANIAN NUCLEAR CRISIS: COMPETING ANALYSES FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE NEO-REALIST, NEO- LIBERAL AND CONSTRUCTIVIST THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 22

3. DRUG CONTROL IN IRAN: PROBLEMS AND POLICY REPONSES 25

4. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN DRUG CONTROL: A FIELD OF STUDY THAT REMAINS LARGELY OVERLOOKED 30 4.1 THE INTERNATIONAL DRUG CONTROL REGIME: A PROHIBITIONIST FRAMEWORK THAT CONSTRAINS POLICY OPTIONS FOR NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS 31 4.2 THE MERIDA INITIATIVE: A SECURITY PARTNERSHIP THAT PRESENTS SIMILARITIES TO THE CASE OF COUNTER-NARCOTICS COOPERATION WITH IRAN 34

CHAPTER 3 UNDERSTANDING PUBLIC DISCOURSE: CONSTRUCTIVISM, QUALITATIVE CONTENT ANALYSIS AND DISCOURSE ANALYSIS 37

1. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 37 1.1 ON THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 37 1.2 ON THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF CRIME 41 1.3 THEORETICAL JUSTIFICATION: PUSHING ANALYSIS BEYOND MATERIAL CAPABILITIES AND EXOGENOUS INTERESTS 43

2. METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK 45 2.1 QUALITATIVE CONTENT ANALYSIS 46 2.2 DISCOURSE ANALYSIS 46 2.3 METHOD OF DATA COLLECTION 48 2.4 ANALYSIS GRID 56

CHAPTER 4 THE POLITICS OF NUCLEAR ISOLATION AND COUNTER-NARCOTICS COOPERATION WITH IRAN, 2007-2011 59

1. THE POLITICS OF NUCLEAR CONFRONTATION: QUALITATIVE CONTENT ANALYSIS OF DONOR COUNTRIES’ POLITICAL STATEMENTS ON THE IRANIAN NUCLEAR ISSUE 59 1.1 2007: “NORMALIZED” LEVEL OF POLITICAL TENSIONS 60 1.2 2008: NUCLEAR TALKS PROVE INCONCLUSIVE 62 1.3 2009: STALEMATE AND SHATTERED CONFIDENCE 64 1.4 2010: ESCALATING RHETORIC AGAINST IRAN’S NUCLEAR PROGRAM 66 1.5 2011: POLITICAL TENSIONS RISE TO NEW HEIGHTS 68

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2. THE POLITICS OF COUNTER-NARCOTICS COOPERATION: QUALITATIVE CONTENT ANALYSIS OF DONOR COUNTRIES’ POLITICAL STATEMENTS ON THEIR ASSISTANCE TO IRAN’S COUNTER-NARCOTICS EFFORTS 69 2.1 ITALY: FAVOURABLE TO STRONG COUNTER-NARCOTICS COOPERATION WITH IRAN 70 2.2 GERMANY: CONVEYING POSITIVE REPRESENTATIONS OF IRAN’S COUNTER-NARCOTICS EFFORTS 73 2.3 FRANCE: CAREFUL DISCRETION HINTING AT THE LEGITIMACY OF MULTILATERALISM 76 2.4 THE UK, JAPAN, BELGIUM AND IRELAND: COMPLETE RADIO SILENCE 78

3. QUALITATIVE CONTENT ANALYSIS OF IRAN’S RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR ISOLATION AND COUNTER-NARCOTICS COOPERATION 79 3.1 IRAN’S RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR ISOLATION: INCREASING CONFRONTATIONAL RHETORIC 79 3.2 IRAN’S RESPONSE TO COUNTER-NARCOTICS COOPERATION: REITERATED COMPLAINTS ABOUT POOR INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE 85

CHAPTER 5 CONFLICTING REPRESENTATIONS OF IRAN 89

1. DISCOURSE ANALYSIS OF DONOR COUNTRIES’ POLITICAL STATEMENTS ON THE IRANIAN NUCLEAR ISSUE: CARRYING NEGATIVE REPRESENTATIONS OF IRAN 89 1.1 FRAME 1: IRAN’S NUCLEAR PROGRAM AS SECURITY THREAT 89 1.2 FRAME 2: IRAN’S NUCLEAR PROGRAM AS A BREACH IN INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS 91 1.3 FRAME 3: IRAN AS A CUNNING ACTOR 93 1.4 FRAME 4: IRAN AS NON-COOPERATIVE ACTOR 94 1.5 FRAME 5: NUCLEAR ISOLATION AS INEVITABLE AND NECESSARY 96

2. DISCOURSE ANALYSIS OF DONOR COUNTRIES’ POLITICAL STATEMENTS ON COUNTER-NARCOTICS COOPERATION WITH IRAN: CONVEYING POSITIVE REPRESENTATIONS OF IRAN 97 2.1 FRAME 1: IRAN’S COUNTER-NARCOTICS EFFORTS AS GOOD PRACTICES 98 2.2 FRAME 2: IRAN AS A STRATEGIC PARTNER IN THE FIGHT AGAINST THE AFGHAN DRUG TRADE 99 2.3 FRAME 3: INTERNATIONAL COUNTER-NARCOTICS COOPERATION WITH IRAN AS POSITIVE YET CHALLENGING 100

CHAPTER 6 THE PARADOX OF CONFLICTING DISCOURSES EXPLAINED: DISCUSSING THE IMPACTS OF STRATEGY, INSTITUTIONS, MANICHAEISM, POWER AND CONTEXT 103

1. CONFLICTING REPRESENTATIONS OF IRAN: A VOLUNTARY, CALCULATED AND STRATEGIC PARADOX? 103

2. CONFLICTING REPRESENTATIONS OF IRAN: A PARADOX DUE TO THE MULTIPLICATION OF POLITICAL ACTORS AND INSTITUTIONS? 106

3. CONFLICTING REPRESENTATIONS OF IRAN: A PARADOX CREATED BY MANICHEAN DISCOURSES? 109

4. CONFLICTING REPRESENTATIONS OF IRAN: THE DISTRIBUTION OF POWER 110

5. CONFLICTING REPRESENTATIONS OF IRAN: THE EFFECTS OF CONTEXT 117

CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSION 123

1. FINDINGS: THE POWER OF SILENCE AND THE SHIELD OF MULTILATERALISM 123

2. CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE FIELD: FILLING THE GAPS 125

3. AVENUES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 127

ANNEX 1 COMPARATIVE TIMELINE OF THE POLITICS OF NUCLEAR CONFRONTATION AND COUNTER- NARCOTICS COOPERATION WITH IRAN, 2005-2011 129

BIBLIOGRAPHY 139

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. Financial requirements for the UNODC Iran Strategic Programme Framework 2005-2007 ______4 Table 2. Donor countries‟ political statements on the Iranian nuclear issue ______51 Table 3. Donor countries‟ political statements on counter-narcotics cooperation with Iran ______53 Table 4. Iranian political statements on the nuclear issue ______54 Table 5. Iranian political statements on the international assistance to Iran‟s counter-narcotics efforts ____ 56 Table 6. Analytical codes ______57 Table 7. Comparative timeline of the politics of nuclear isolation and international counter-narcotics cooperation with Iran, 2005-2011 ______130

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LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. French Ambassador attends a ceremony at an Iranian ANP dog-training center in Karaj ______77

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AEOI Atomic Energy Organization of Iran ANP Anti-Narcotics Police BLO Border Liaison Offices CERIUM Centre d‟études et de recherches internationales de l‟Université de Montréal CND Commission on Narcotic Drugs DCHQ Drug Control Headquarters DLO Drug Liaison Officers DTOs Drug Trafficking Organizations ECO Economic Cooperation Organization EU European Union E3 France, Germany and the United Kingdom GPG All-Party Parliamentary Group for the Prevention of Genocide and Other Crimes Against Humanity G8 Group of Eight G20 Group of Twenty IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency IR International Relations IRN/I50 Integrated Border Control in Iran IRN/I52 Promotion and Strengthening of Intelligence-Led Investigations Capacities IRN/I53 Promotion of Regional and International Cooperation in Drug Control IRN/I55 Nationwide Drug Prevention Measures in the Islamic Republic Iran LEF Law Enforcement Forces MDG Mini-Dublin Group MIGS Montreal Institute for Genocide and Human Rights Studies MoU Memorandum of Understanding NCRI National Council of Resistance in Iran NPT Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty P5+1 Five Permanent Members of the UNSC plus Germany QCA Qualitative Content Analysis ROS Raggruppamento Operativo Speciale UK United Kingdom UN United Nations UNGA United Nations General Assembly UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime UNSC United Nations Security Council US United States WWII World War II ZOPA Zone of Possible Agreements

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This thesis is the result of two years of active research, writing and editing. It could not have been successfully completed without the help of my two supervisors, Professors Aurélie Campana and Stéphane Leman-Langlois. I am grateful for their patience, dedication and support. Their constructive feedbacks were instrumental in the development and completion of this research.

I would also like to thank my family and friends for being supportive throughout this academic journey. Special thanks to Sami joon for instilling courage in times of doubts, giving me space in times of effervescent inspiration and for his incommensurable patience as I rode the rollercoaster of research practice.

Lastly, I would like to thank Columbia University for granting me borrowing privileges and access to their libraries. More than any other locations, the Lehman Library provided me with a safe heaven from which I could escape the busy life of New York City to work intensively towards the completion of this research.

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CHAPTER 1 ANTAGONISTIC PARTNERS: HOW NUCLEAR OPPONENTS COLLABORATED ON COUNTER- NARCOTICS ISSUES FROM 2007 TO 2011

Since January 2012, I have been researching and reporting on crimes against humanity and serious human rights violations in Iran on the behalf of the Montreal Institute for Genocide and Human Rights Studies (MIGS) and the All-Party Parliamentary Group for the Prevention of Genocide and Other Crimes Against Humanity (GPG). As part of my work with theses two organizations, I review, on a daily basis, reports published by Iranian newspapers and translate relevant ones into English. What I have consistently noted over the past two years is that not a single day passes by without my coming across news reports about tons of narcotic drugs being seized, hundreds of drug traffickers being arrested, tens of drug convicts being executed and descriptions of how Iran is engaging in active counter- narcotics collaboration with regional and international states. Interestingly enough, these events are totally left out from the Western media coverage of Iran. In fact, the coverage of the press is centered almost exclusively on Iran‟s nuclear program. Drug trafficking and counter-narcotics efforts are not topics that have been traditionally associated with Iran in Western media. Yet, combating illicit drugs is one of the top priorities on the domestic and foreign policy agendas of Iranian authorities. The present research aims at bringing a new perspective on the role played by Iran in international affairs and on how middle powers have been antagonistic partners of Iran in the fight against illicit drugs from 2007 to 2011.

1. Research Problem Contextualized: Counter-Narcotics Involvement and Nuclear Non-Proliferation in South West Asia

The Islamic Republic of Iran is located in a precarious geopolitical environment. It is bordered by two notorious failed states: Iraq and Afghanistan. It is the sole Shi‟a theocracy in a sea of Sunni countries. Most important of all, it is the immediate neighbour of

Afghanistan, the world‟s largest producer of opium poppies, the plant from which opiates are derived.1 This situation negatively impacts on the country. Iran stands both as a consumer market and a transit route for drugs originating from Afghanistan. It has one of the highest rates of drug addiction per capita in the world, with 20 % of the country‟s adult population using illicit drugs and 9 to 16 % of them injecting drugs.2 Nearly 40% of Afghanistan‟s heroin and morphine production transits through Iran every year, the majority of which is destined to European markets.3 In Western Europe, four countries emerge as the most important consumers of Afghan heroin: the United Kingdom (19mt), Italy (18mt), France (10mt) and Germany (7mt).4 Iranian authorities have implemented aggressive drug control efforts to counter the adverse consequences of the Afghan drug trade. In order to deter drug traffickers from entering the country, they have dug 688 km of trenches, constructed 477 km of embankments, built an 85 km concrete wall, installed 125 km of barbed wires, constructed new roads, erected observation towers and deployed 35,000 anti-narcotics police forces along its eastern border.5 The Iranian government had reportedly spent over $1 billion for the implementation of these measures by 2011.6 In addition to investing its own financial and human resources, the Iranian government has received financial and technical assistance from members of the international community in order to support its counter- narcotics efforts.

1.1 The Afghan Opium Trade Problem: Providing International Assistance to Iran‟s Counter-Narcotics Efforts

Since its inception in Iran in July 1999, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has been a key actor in the fight against illicit drugs in the region, enabling

1 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, World Drug Report 2012 (Vienna: UNODC, 2012), 27; and United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2011 (Vienna: UNODC, 2011), 1. 2 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, World Drug Report 2010 (Vienna: UNODC, 2010), 59. 3 Ibid., 54. 4 Ibid., 41. 5 United States Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report: Volume I Drug and Chemical Control (Washington: DoS, March 2012), 268; and United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, World Drug Report 2011 (Vienna: UNODC, 2011), 9. 6 United States Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report: Volume I Drug and Chemical Control (Washington: DoS, March 2011), 309.

counter-narcotics cooperation to take place between the government of Iran and donor countries. To this date, the UNODC has designed and implemented a total of three country programs on technical assistance on drugs and crime to Iran.7 Of particular interest to us is the UNODC Iran Strategic Programme Framework 2005-2007. The UNODC 2005-2007 country program was built on three operational targets: 1) assisting Iranian authorities in reducing narcotic drugs trafficking; 2) contributing to the development of effective prevention, treatment and rehabilitation measures in drug abuse and HIV/AIDS; and 3) promoting the rule of law through strengthened crime prevention measures and the provision of legal assistance.8 An initial budget totalling $22,245,000 was established for the implementation of the UNODC country program.9 However, due to difficulties encountered in securing the required funds, the UNODC Strategic Programme Framework was extended until 2011 and its budget and time frame were revised. For instance, the project Integrated Border Control in Iran (IRN/I50), which was only initiated in 2007, was divided into phases and its budget was reduced from $5,000,000 to $2,800,000.10 Similarly, the Nationwide Drug Prevention Measures in the Islamic Republic Iran (IRN/I55) saw its budget shrunk from $1,785,400 to $900,000 and its start date pushed into 2008.11 Table 1 shows the planned and revised budgets for the UNODC Iran Strategic Programme Framework 2005-2007.

7 “History and Achievements,” United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, accessed April 4, 2013, http://www.unodc.org/islamicrepublicofiran/en/history-and-achievement.html. 8 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Strategic Programme Framework I.R. Iran, 2005-2007 (Vienna: UNODC, 2005), 7-9. 9 Ibid., 11. 10 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Op. Cit., (2005), 11; and United Nations Office and Drugs and Crime, Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan: Border Management Cooperation in Drug Control (Vienna: UNODC, 2008), 15. 11 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Op. Cit., (2005), 11; and United Nations Office and Drugs and Crime, Preventing and Treating Opiates Addiction and HIV/AIDS Epidemics in Afghanistan and Neighbouring Countries (Vienna: UNODC, 2008), 43.

Table 1. Financial requirements for the UNODC Iran Strategic Programme Framework 2005-2007 Initial Revised Current Program budget budget funding* Donors Duration (USD (USD (USD million) million) million) France, Integrated Border Control in Ireland, 2007- 5 2.8 2.5 Iran (IRN/I50 Phase I) UK, 2010 Belgium Strengthening Control in Selected Internal Check- 2009- Points, Sea-Ports, Airports 2.5 2.4 0 - 2010 and Railway Stations (IRN/I51) Promotion and Strengthening of Intelligence-Led 2009- 2 2.1 0.6 France, UK Investigations Capacities 2011 (IRN/I52) Promotion of Regional and 2006- International Cooperation in 0.6 0.6 0.6 Italy 2009 Drug Control (IRN/I53) Drug Abuse Treatment in the 2009- Islamic Republic of Iran 2.3 2.49 0 None 2011 (IRN/I54) Nationwide Drug Prevention Italy, 2008- Measures in the Islamic 1.8 0.9 0.459 Sweden 2010 Republic of Iran (IRN/I55) Addiction and Rehabilitation and HIV/AIDS Prevention in 2009- 2.2 2.2 0 None the Islamic Republic of Iran 2011 (IRN/I56) Advocacy and Regional Sweden, 2007- Cooperation in Drug Demand 0.75 0.749 0.577 UK 2010 Reduction (IRN/I57) Anti-Corruption Measures 0.39 N/A 0.29 N/A N/A Judicial Reform 1.6 N/A 1.39 N/A N/A Organized Crime, Money Laundering and Mutual Legal 1.7 N/A 0.65 N/A N/A Assistance Trafficking in Human Beings 0.7 N/A 0 N/A N/A * As of November 2008, most recent data available. Source: UNODC, Strategic Programme Framework, 8-10; UNODC, The Green Paper, 15; and UNODC, The Indigo Paper, 43.

France, Ireland, the United Kingdom (UK), Belgium and Japan have collectively provided US$3.4 million from 2007 to 2011 for the UNODC project Integrated Border Control in the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRN/I50). The funds were reportedly employed to establish Border Liaison Offices (BLO), supply body scanners and provide material resources, such as sniffer dogs, vehicles and testing kits.12 The French and British governments also provided over US$720,000 from 2010 to 2011 for the UNODC project Promotion and Strengthening of Intelligence-Led Investigations Capacities (IRN/I52). The funds were reportedly employed to strengthen the investigation capacities of the Iranian Anti-Narcotics Police (ANP), the Customs Administration and other law enforcement agencies through the provision of trainings, equipment and support for joint border operations between Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan.13 Italy donated US$600,000 from 2006 to 2009 for the implementation of the UNODC project Promotion of Regional and International Cooperation in Drug Control (IRN/I53). However, further information on how the Italian funds were spent could not be found. France provided more than 50 sniffer dogs and trained the Iranian ANP on multiple occasions from 2007 to 2011. It is not clear though whether this assistance was part of the UNODC Strategic Programme Framework or of another multilateral initiative.14 For its part, Germany provided financial assistance to Iran in 2009 to help legislative and judiciary authorities strengthen their capacity to tackle organized crime, money laundering and to promote mutual legal assistance. The amount donated by the German government is also unknown. 15 The German Embassy in Tehran also made arrangements in 2010 for Iranian authorities to visit dog-training centres in Hessen, Germany, to “familiarise themselves

12 International Harm Reduction Association, Partners in Crime: International Funding for Drug Control and Gross Violations of Human Rights (London: Harm Reduction International, 2012), 14. 13 International Harm Reduction Association, Op. Cit., 14. 14 “Coopération Anti-Drogue.” Ambassade de France à Téhéran, December 24, 2007, accessed February 15, 2013, http://www.ambafrance-ir.org/Cooperation-anti-drogue; “Coopération Cynotechnique,” CIVIPOL, accessed February 15, 2013, http://www.civipol.fr/fr/operations/cooperation-cynotechnique; “Coopération Cynotechnique pour la Lutte contre le Trafic de Stupéfiants,” CIVIPOL, accessed February 15, 2013, http://www.civipol.fr/fr/operations/cooperation-cynotechnique-pour-la-lutte-contre-le-trafic-de-stupefiants; “ Lutte Contre le Trafic de Stupéfiants,” CIVIPOL, accessed February 15, 2013, http://www.civipol.fr/fr/operations/lutte-contre-le-trafic-de-stupefiants; and “La France Équipe la Police Iranienne,” IRIB, October 20, 2011, accessed February 15, 2013, http://french.irib.ir/info/iran- actualite/item/148322-la-france-équipe-la-police-iranienne. 15 German Delegation, Country Report from the mini-Dublin Group on Iran (Brussels: Council of the European Union, July 3, 2009), 11.

with the most scientific techniques to use sniffing dogs.16” These four examples highlight that a lot of the funding provided by European governments to support Iran‟s counter- narcotics efforts has remained unaccounted for. The UNODC Iran Strategic Programme Framework 2005-2007 has been replaced with the Technical Cooperation Programme in the Islamic Republic of Iran 2011-2014. The UNODC Technical Cooperation Programme is centered on the same three pillars than the 2005-2007 Strategic Programme.17 The UNODC 2011-2014 country program is currently funded by the governments of Norway, Denmark and Germany. The exact financial contributions made by these three donor countries are nonetheless unknown.18 Over the course of the past 30 years, the United States (US) have not provided assistance to Iran‟s counter-narcotics efforts. However, as fervent defenders of the global drug prohibition regime, the US have welcomed Iran‟s aggressive drug control policies and encouraged international cooperation against illicit drug trafficking in South West Asia. The US government also claims that it has worked hand in hand with Iranian authorities on counter-narcotics issues in international forums such as the Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND).19 It is important to mention the position of the US towards international counter- narcotics cooperation with Iran since they play a role of critical importance in shaping both international drug control policy and the regime of international sanctions imposed on Iran with regard to the nuclear dossier.

1.2 The Iranian Nuclear Issue: Opposing Developments of Iran‟s Nuclear Program

The Iranian nuclear crisis was initiated in 2002 when Iran‟s secret nuclear program was uncovered by the National Council of Resistance in Iran (NCRI), an opposition group based in the US. On the occasion of a press briefing made in Washington, D.C. on August 14, 2002, the NCRI spokesman announced that Iranian authorities had concealed the fact that they had been running a nuclear program parallel to their „official‟ program and

16 International Harm Reduction Association, Op. Cit., 10. 17 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Technical Cooperation on Drugs and Crime in the Islamic Republic of Iran 2011-2014 (Vienna: UNODC, 2011), 3-5. 18 “Funds and Partnership,” United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, accessed April 4, 2013, http://www.unodc.org/islamicrepublicofiran/en/funds-and-partnership.html. 19 United States Department of State, Op. Cit., (2012), 269.

revealed the existence of two secret nuclear plants located south of Tehran, near Natanz and Arak.20 Although Iran, as a signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), was lawfully entitled to develop a nuclear program for civilian purposes, its rights to nuclear energy were contingent on the respect of its international obligations under the NPT. 21 The issue of nuclear rights and obligations has been and remains a source of much contention between Iran and the international community. On the one hand, Iranian authorities have claimed that their nuclear program has been completely peaceful and respectful of their obligations under the NPT. Iran has also contended that the nuclear crisis has been nurtured by “certain states” that wanted to prevent the progress and development of the Iranian nation.22 On the other hand, the members of the international community have questioned the peaceful and civilian nature of Iran‟s nuclear program and have contended that Iran has not complied with the NPT. The governments of France, Germany, the UK and, of course, the US have been particularly vocal in denouncing Iran‟s nuclear program. Their suspicions and fears have arisen from the fact that: 1) Iran had conducted nuclear activities in secrecy; 2) the Iranian government had been reluctant to provide information to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) regarding its undisclosed nuclear activities; 3) Iranian authorities have refused to halt their nuclear program despite the repeated demands of the international community and have failed to engage in meaningful dialogues with the France, the UK and Germany (E3) and the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council plus Germany (P5+1) to resolve outstanding issues; 4) Iran‟s uranium enrichment program had been out of proportion for purely civilian purposes and the nuclear technology it had acquired could have dual uses; and 5) Iran had developed a ballistic missile program parallel to its nuclear program.23

20 Yonah Alexander and Milton Hoenig, The New Iranian Leadership: Ahmadinejad, Terrorism, Nuclear Ambition, and the Middle East (London: Praeger Security International, 2008), 119. 21 Emanuele Ottolenghi, Iran: The Looming Crisis: Can the West Live With Iran’s Nuclear Threat? (London: Profile, 2010), 5. 22 “Basic Facts About Iran‟s Peaceful Nuclear Activities,” The Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Oslo, accessed April 19, 2013, http://iranembassy.no/en/6.htm. 23 “Iran‟s Nuclear Program,” European Union External Action, accessed April 19, 2013, http://eeas.europa.eu/iran/nuclear_en.htm; Joachim Krause and Charles King Mallory IV, “Strategic Implications of the Iranian Nuclear Program,” in Iran’s Nuclear Programme: Strategic Implications, ed. Joachim Krause (London: Routledge, 2012), 12-13; Wyn Q. Bowen and Jonathan Brewer, “Iran‟s Nuclear Challenge: Nine Years and Counting,” International Affairs 87, no. 4 (2011), 926; Yonah Alexander and Milton Hoenig, Op. Cit., 113-114; and Alexei G. Arbatov, “The Inexorable Momentum of Escalation,” in Double Trouble: Iran and North Korea as Challenges to International Security, ed. Patrick M. Cronin (London: Praeger Security International, 2008), 66.

The members of the international community have responded to what they perceived as a threat to international security and to the nuclear non-proliferation regime by adopting a dual-track policy, balancing between constructive engagement with the Iran and its isolation through the imposition of international sanctions.24 Engagement prevailed over isolation from 2003 to 2006. Upon the discovery of Iran‟s secret nuclear program, the governments of France, the UK and Germany first sought to negotiate with the Iranian regime to obtain the suspension of its controversial nuclear program and the improvement of the country‟s transparency with regard to its past nuclear activities.25 The political negotiations between Iran and the E3 resulted in Iran‟s agreement to sign the Additional Protocol on Nuclear Safeguards on October 21, 2003 and the conclusion of the Paris Agreement on November 14, 2004. Under these arrangements, Iran accepted to suspend its nuclear enrichment activities, to fully disclose its clandestine nuclear activities and to allow for more thorough inspections by the IAEA. 26 However, the two agreements had a very short life span. On August 8, 2005, Iran resumed its uranium enrichment activities at the Isfahan uranium conversion center, breaking the agreements it had previously concluded with the E3.27 Following this affront, the three European governments rallied to the position of the US on the Iranian nuclear issue and agreed to transfer the matter to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). In exchange, the US guaranteed to join the E3 in their nuclear negotiations with Iranian authorities.28 Almost one year later, the UNSC adopted its first resolution on Iran by a vote 14-1-0 (Against: Qatar). The governments of France, the UK, Japan voted in favour of the resolution. Resolution 1696 called on Iran to suspend its nuclear enrichment and reprocessing activities within one month or else it would face the imposition of economic and diplomatic sanctions.29

24 “Iran‟s Nuclear Program,” Op. Cit. 25 Zehra Nilufer Karacasulu and Irem Askar Karakir, “Attitudes of the International Community Toward Iran‟s Nuclear Puzzle,” Journal of International and Area Studies 15, no. 2 (2008), 6-7. 26 Patrick M. Cronin, “The Trouble with Iran,” in Double Trouble: Iran and North Korea as Challenges to International Security, ed. Patrick M. Cronin (London: Praeger Security International, 2008), 14-15. 27 Semira N. Nikou, “Timeline of Iran‟s Nuclear Activities,” United States Institute of Peace, accessed April 19, 2013, http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/timeline-irans-nuclear-activities. 28 Florent Pouponneau, “Une Division Internationale du Travail Diplomatique: Analyse de la Politique Étrangère Française autour du Problème du Nucléaire Iranien,” Revue Française de Science Politique 63, no. 1 (2013), 52. 29 “Security Council Demands Iran Suspend Uranium Enrichment by 31 August, Or Face Possible Economic, Diplomatic Sanctions,” Security Council, July 31, 2006, accessed April 21, 2013,

A few days before the deadline given to Iran by the UNSC, President Mahmud Ahmadinejad inaugurated a heavy-water reactor plant in Arak.30 This event sent a strong signal to the members of the international community that Iran was not willing to respond to their demands. Consequently, the UNSC members unanimously adopted Resolution 1737 on December 23, 2006. Resolution 1737 imposed a first round of sanctions against Iran, including a ban on the import and export of sensitive nuclear material and a freeze of the financial assets of persons and entities affiliated with Iran‟s nuclear program.31 Resolution 1737 was soon followed by Resolution 1747, which was adopted by a vote 15- 0-0 on March 24, 2007. The governments of France, the UK, Belgium and Italy all voted in favour of the resolution. Resolution 1747 toughened the sanctions regime by imposing an arms embargo on Iran and freezing the assets and restricting the travel of individuals that participated in the country‟s nuclear program.32 On March 8, 2008, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1803 by a vote 14-0-1 (Abstention: Indonesia). Resolution 1803 extended the freeze of financial assets of persons and entities that supported Iran‟s nuclear program and called on all states to inspect cargos to and from Iran and to exercise vigilance over the activities of Iranian banks.33 The track of “constructive” dialogue resumed in July 2008 when the P5+1 met with Iran in Geneva to engage in talks over the country‟s nuclear program. The July 2008 Geneva talks were inconclusive as Iranian authorities refused to negotiate on the suspension of their enrichment activities.34 This failure led to the adoption of a new UNSC resolution on September 29, 2008. Resolution 1835, which was passed by a unanimous vote, reaffirmed earlier UNSC resolutions on Iran and called on the Iranian government to

http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8792.doc.htm. 30 “Timeline of Iran‟s Nuclear Program,” The New York Times, April 18, 2013, accessed April 21, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/03/20/world/middleeast/Iran-nuclear- timeline.html?_r=0#/#time243_7169. 31 “Security Council Imposes Sanctions on Iran for Failure to Halt Uranium Enrichment, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 1737 (2006),” Security Council, December 23, 2005, accessed April 21, 2013, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8928.doc.htm. 32 “Security Council Toughens Sanctions Against Iran, Adds Arms Embargo, with Unanimous Adoption of Resolution 1747 (2007),” Security Council, March 24, 2007, accessed April 21, 2013, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/sc8980.doc.htm. 33 “Security Council Tightens Restrictions on Iran‟s Proliferation-Sensitive Nuclear Activities, Increases Vigilance over Iranian Banks, Has States Inspect Cargo,” Security Council, March 3, 2008, accessed April 21, 2013, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2008/sc9268.doc.htm. 34 “Timeline of Iran‟s Nuclear Program,” Op. Cit.

comply with its international obligations “fully and without delay.35” The governments of France, the UK, Belgium and Italy all voted in favour of the new resolution. In October 2009, the P5+1 met with Iran in Geneva for a second round of talks on the nuclear issue. A proposal was made according to which Iran would send uranium to Russia for enrichment. A consensus was even reached between the P5+1 and Iran and set down in a draft agreement. However, the Iranian negotiating team was forced to back down due to domestic opposition to the conclusion of a nuclear deal.36 The UNSC approved a new round of sanctions against Iran on June 9, 2010. Resolution 1929, which was adopted by a vote 12-2-1 (Against: Brazil and Turkey; Abstention: Lebanon), expanded the arms embargo imposed on Iran and tightened the financial restrictions imposed on entities that took part in Iran‟s nuclear program.37 The governments of France, the UK and Japan voted in favour of this new resolution. In January 2011, the P5+1 met with Iran in Istanbul to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue. The Istanbul talks failed after Iran imposed two preconditions to nuclear negotiations: 1) the international community should recognize Iran‟s right to uranium enrichment; and 2) the United Nations (UN) should drop sanctions against Iran. The P5+1 rejected Iran‟s preconditions and a deadlock was reached, once again.38 This brief review of the development of the Iranian nuclear crisis highlights that the very same countries that provided assistance to Iran‟s counter-narcotics efforts from 2007 to 2011 opposed the development of the country‟s nuclear program during the same timeframe.

2. Research Question

The current research is centered on the paradox of the international community‟s policies of counter-narcotics cooperation and nuclear isolation of Iran. On the one hand, countries like

35 “Security Council Reaffirms Earlier Resolutions on Iran‟s Uranium Enrichment, Calls on Country to Comply with Obligations Fully and Without Delay,” Security Council, September 27, 2008, accessed April 21, 2013, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2008/sc9459.doc.htm. 36 Semira N. Nikou, Op. Cit. 37 “Security Council Imposes Additional Sanctions on Iran, Voting 12 in Favour to 2 Against, with 1 Abstention,” Security Council, June 9, 2010, accessed April 21, 2013, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2010/sc9948.doc.htm. 38 Michael Adler, “Why the Istanbul Talks Failed,” United States Institute of Peace, January 23, 2011, accessed April 21, 2013, http://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2011/jan/23/why-istanbul-talks-failed.

France, the UK, Japan, Italy and Germany provided a significant amount of financial and technical assistance to Iran‟s counter-narcotics efforts via the UNODC from 2007 to 2011. On the other hand, the very same countries confronted Iranian authorities over the nuclear issue and imposed punitive sanctions against Iran. Reinforcing the contradiction, these two processes occurred simultaneously. In order to problematize the aforementioned paradox, the following research question has been formulated: how did members of the international community frame their public discourse in order to justify both cooperation with Iran in its counter- narcotics efforts and denunciations of its nuclear program? In the process of providing an answer to this research question, a set of three sub-questions will be addressed: 1) How was the Iranian nuclear issue framed in the political statements of governments that provided counter-narcotics assistance to Iran? 2) How was international assistance to Iran‟s counter-narcotics efforts justified by donor countries? 3) How did Iran respond to both nuclear isolation and counter-narcotics cooperation?

3. Research Objectives

In order to uncover the paradox of the international community‟s nuclear isolation and drug cooperation with Iran, this research adopts a constructivist outlook and employs both qualitative content and discourse analyses. These theoretical and methodological choices bring us to analyse in depth the political statements of seven donor countries to uncover how the Iranian nuclear issue and international counter-narcotics cooperation with Iran were framed and how these frames allowed for certain courses of action to take place. Our research endeavour is highly interdisciplinary in nature, combining research questions, literatures, theories and methodologies that relate both to the fields of International Relations (IR) and Criminology. It should be taken note that the objective of this research is not to provide yet another security analysis of the Iranian nuclear issue. The nuclear crisis is presented only as a contextual background against which we can better understand the

puzzling phenomenon of international nuclear confrontation and counter-narcotics cooperation with Iran.

4. Organization

Our study is divided into seven chapters. Chapter two provides a review of the literature on bilateral relations between donor countries and Iran, the Iranian nuclear crisis, drug control in Iran and international cooperation in drug control. Chapter three consists in the presentation of the theoretical and methodological frameworks adopted in the course of this work. The results of our qualitative content and discourse analyses are presented in details in chapters four and five and their significance is discussed in chapter six. Finally, the findings of our research are summarized in chapter seven.

CHAPTER 2 THE MAKING OF A PARADOX: NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT AND DRUG CONTROL IN IRAN, 2007-2011

Since the revealing of the existence of Iran‟s covert nuclear program in August 2002, numbers of policy papers, op-eds and academic articles analysing an infinity of aspects of the Iranian nuclear crisis and this, from different theoretical perspectives, have been published on a regular basis. As a matter of fact, not a single day passes by without new material on the nuclear issue being published in the press. In contrast, the issue of international counter-narcotics cooperation in Iran has completely passed under the radar. Only a handful of scholars have addressed the question, most of them being Iranian academics and professionals. Despite the repeated attempts made by Iranian diplomats to raise awareness on their country‟s drug problem and policies, the issue has failed to attract the attention of Western policy-makers and scholars alike. First things first, our research endeavour begins by mapping the state of research on nuclear development and drug control in Iran.

1. Policy Responses to the Iranian Nuclear Issue: The Influence of Interests, Alliances and Perceptions

The Iranian nuclear issue presents one of the most important political challenges encountered by contemporary foreign policy-makers. They have been divided over their understanding of the problem and over what constitute the best policy options to resolve it. Yet, they have managed to present a “concerted” response to Iran‟s nuclear challenge despite their divergences. The policy responses offered by donor countries have been influenced by their national self-interests, the balance of power and their shared understandings of the Iranian nuclear issue.

1.1 European Union-Iran Relations: Yo-yoing Between Engagement and Confrontation

Since the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979, bilateral relations between Europe and Iran have been characterized by complexity and fluctuation. Indeed, European Union (EU)-Iran relations have been punctuated by cycles of engagement and crisis.39 Europe entered in a “Cold Peace” with Iran in the immediate aftermath of the Islamic Revolution.40 “Cold Peace” is an expression that was initially employed by Ziba Moshaver to designate the restrained relations that occurred between Europe and Iran from 1979 to 1989.41 The “Cold Peace” was followed by a period of political and economic engagement. Under the “Critical Dialogue”, which was initiated by the European Council in 1992, European states built economic ties with Iran while demanding the country to improve its policies to the fields of human rights, terrorism and conventional arms trade.42 However, the relations between Europe and Iran were severed following the discovery of Iran‟s sponsorship of the assassination of Kurdish exiles in Germany in 1996.43 Diplomatic engagement soon resumed as European governments staged a “Comprehensive Dialogue” with Iran in 1998. However, this rapprochement was once again brought to an end with the discovery of Iran‟s secret nuclear program in 2002.44 This event proved to be a watershed in the history European-Iranian relations. Indeed, Iran‟s nuclear program, which, up to 2002, had not been a source of concern to European policy- makers in dealing with their Iranian counterparts, came to the forefront of their bilateral relations.45 Although EU members actively sought to engage with Iranian authorities to persuade them to halt their controversial nuclear enrichment activities, their diplomatic

39 Johan Bergenas, “The European Union‟s Evolving Engagement with Iran,” The Nonproliferation Review 17, no. 3 (2010), 500-504; Ruth Hanau Santini, “European Discourses and Practices on the Iranian Nuclear Programme,” European Security 19, no. 3 (2010), 467; and Ziba Moshaver, “Revolution, Theocratic Leadership and Iran‟s Foreign Policy: Implications for Iran-EU Relations,” The Review of International Affairs 3, no. 2 (2003), 294. 40 Johan Bergenas, Op. Cit., 500. 41 Ziba Moshaver, Op. Cit., 292. 42 Johan Bergenas, Op. Cit., 501. 43 Ibid. 44 Ibid., 502. 45 Lynne Dryburgh, “The EU as a Global Actor? EU Policy Towards Iran,” European Security 17, no. 2-3 (2008), 259; and Walter Posch, “The European Union and Iran: What Next?” The International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs 42, no. 4 (2007), 537.

efforts have failed short of their objectives.46 Despite the conclusion of two agreements with the E3 on the suspension its enrichment program, Iran went on with the conversion and enrichment of uranium.47 Iran‟s violation of the terms of the agreements it had concluded led the EU to alter its approach towards the Iranian nuclear issue. European policy-makers adopted a dual-track approach, offering Iranian authorities “carrots” while threatening them with the “stick”.48 However, this second approach also failed to provide the desired outcomes. In the face of growing pressure to suspend its nuclear enrichment program, Iran simply accelerated the pace of its development.49 Up to this date, the EU has failed to secure a major breakthrough in the Iranian nuclear dossier.50 Nonetheless, despite mounting tensions, the EU members have remained committed to diplomatic engagement with Iran to address outstanding issues and have rejected military intervention as a solution to the nuclear crisis.51

1.2 France-Iran Relations: A Display of France‟s Aspiration to Be a Key Player in International Affairs

The past two years have been marked by the emergence of an academic literature that specifically analysed France‟s foreign policies towards Iran. Four authors have distinguished themselves by the analyses they offered. Florent Pouponneau, a researcher at the Centre d‟études et de recherches internationales de l‟Université de Montréal (CERIUM), has analysed how the international environment has shaped the foreign policy orientation of the French government towards the Iranian nuclear issue from 2003 to 2006. During the period understudy, France, along with the UK and Germany, actively sought to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue by engaging in a dialogue and in negotiations with Iranian authorities. As a result, the three European governments have managed to conclude two accords with Iran in 2003 and in 2004.52

46 Tom Sauer, “Struggling on the World Scene: An Over-ambitious EU versus a Committed Iran,” European Security 17, no. 2-3 (2008), 273. 47 Ibid., 275-276. 48 Ruth Hanau Santini, Op. Cit., 472. 49 Tom Sauer, Op. Cit., 278. 50 Ibid., 282. 51 Lynne Dryburgh, Op. Cit., 267; Zehra Nilufer Karacasulu and Irem Askar Karakir, Op. Cit., 12-13; and Ruth Hanau Santini, Op. Cit., 467. 52 Florent Pouponneau, Op. Cit., 51.

However, the author pointed out, their successes were mitigated by the fact that they did not secure the support of the US in their nuclear agreements with Iran.53 Pouponneau explained that the motivation of French policy-makers in securing these two nuclear agreements with Iran was, in addition to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, to show that the French government could play a key role in international affairs [“cette action extérieure est aussi l’occasion d’afficher leur prétention à « compter » dans la régulation des affaires politiques internationales.54”] Furthermore, France‟s policy towards the Iranian nuclear issue displayed the pretentiousness to “lecture” US policy-makers on “effective multilateralism.55” Yet, despites all of their pretentions and ambitions, French policy- makers were unable to secure viable and lasting nuclear agreements with Iran due to their incapacity to gain US support. Indeed, Pouponneau underlined that the E3 were tied by US unilateral sanctions against Iran, thus limiting their ability to act independently of the US in resolving the Iranian nuclear issue.56 Understanding that their capacity to play a key role on the Iranian nuclear dossier was constrained by US-Iran relations, France, along with the UK and Germany, rallied the position of the US from February 2006 onwards.57 Clément Therme has analysed how France‟s firm opposition to the development of Iran‟s nuclear program is due to the country‟s Middle East policy, which conflicts with Iran‟s regional ambitions.58 The author argued that France is opposed to the development of Iran‟s nuclear program because it compromises its interests in the region.59. The argument made by Clément Therme was very superficial and not convincing at all. The author has put too much emphasis on France‟s Middle East policy as a determinant of its nuclear diplomacy with Iran and completely left out the international dimensions of the crisis. Yet, as Pouponneau‟s article underlined, any explanation of France‟s policy towards the Iranian nuclear issue is incomplete without a consideration of the role played by the US. Similarly to Clément Therme, Pirooz Izadi has made the argument that conflictual relations between France and Iran are due to their divergent approaches to foreign policy.

53 Florent Pouponneau, Op. Cit., 51. 54 Ibid., 52. 55 Ibid., 64. 56 Ibid., 66. 57 Ibid., 52. 58 Clément Therme, “La Diplomatie Française à l‟Épreuve de l‟Iran,” Revue Internationale et Stratégique 85, no. 1 (2012), 29. 59 Ibid. 34.

However, Izadi went a step further than Therme by articulating his argument with the help of the neo-realist theory of IR.60 The author pointed out that, due to its size, resources and geostrategic location, Iran has the potential of becoming a regional hegemonic power.61 Iran‟s acquisition of nuclear power would therefore make this situation inevitable. According to Izadi, this is an outcome that the French government strives to prevent by all means. Indeed, Iran‟s rise as a regional hegemonic power would pose a serious threat to France‟s interests in the region, thus explaining the country‟s “intransigence” with regard to the Iranian nuclear issue.62 For his part, Benoit Pelopidas has explained France‟s policy towards the Iranian nuclear issue with the help of the country‟s nuclear idiosyncrasy. The author argued that there exists a French idiosyncrasy which influences French regional nuclear policies. This idiosyncrasy is based on four beliefs about nuclear weapons: the “sanctuarizing” power of nuclear weapons; the rationalizing virtue of nuclear weapons; the equalizing power of nuclear weapons and the idea that nuclear energy is safe and clean.63 France‟s fears about Iran‟s potential acquisition of nuclear weapons arise from these four beliefs.64 Accordingly, French policy-makers have been pursuing a policy that has opposed Iran‟s nuclear development in order to prevent a “cascade” of nuclear proliferation they believe would result from Iran‟s acquisition of nuclear weapons.65

1.3 UK-Iran Relations: Constrained by Transatlantic Relations and Domestic Politics

The literature on the United Kingdom‟s policy towards Iran and the nuclear issue is slightly less developed than its French counter-part. Andrea Ellner, a lecturer at London King‟s College, wrote an article on the British nuclear non-proliferation policies towards Iran and the Middle East in which she argued that the UK‟s regional nuclear non-proliferation

60 Pirooz Izadi, “French-Iranian Relations: A New Realistic Perspective,” Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs 3, no. 1 (2012), 37. 61 Ibid., 39. 62 Ibid., 40. 63 Benoît Pelopidas, “French Nuclear Idiosyncrasy: How it Affects French Nuclear Policies Towards the United Arab Emirate and Iran,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 25, no. 1 (2012), 143. 64 Ibid., 158. 65 Ibid.

policies have had limited impacts due to the country‟s alliances, its status as a nuclear weapons power state and its pursuit of self-interest in the region.66 According to the author, the British policy with regard to the Iranian nuclear issue is deeply imbedded in its alliances with international actors and cannot be understood independently of this context.67 Furthermore, she insisted that the UK has a limited influence in the Middle East, which is dependent on its historical legacy as a colonial power and its relationship with the US.68 Accordingly, Ellner pointed out, the UK is dependent on its joint-diplomacy with the US to have a weight in regional affairs.69 Chris Kitchen and Rhiannon Vickers have approached the UK‟s policy towards the Iranian nuclear issue from the perspective of domestic politics. The authors analysed how the British government‟s response to the challenges created by the Iranian nuclear issue was influenced by the Labour Government‟s traditions of international order, interest and community.70 The authors argued that the Labour governments of Tony Blair and Gordon Brown have framed the threat presented by Iran‟s nuclear program and the policy responses they adopted based on their political party‟s traditions of international order, interests and community.71 They underlined that the UK‟s nuclear policy towards Iran was informed by five core traditions: support for international institutions; belief in an international interest towards which each state has a responsibility to work; faith in democratic principles and universal moral norms, which the British government has the “moral leadership” to uphold; need for collective security, which can only be secured through multilateral solutions; and notions of anti-militarism.72 The UK‟s policy responses to the Iranian nuclear issue have evolved in three stages which all reflected the Labour‟s internationalist traditions: support for international relations; multilateral diplomatic engagement; and multilateral sanctions.73

66 Andrea Ellner, “British Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policies Towards Iran and the Middle East,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 26, no.1 (2013), 225. 67 Ibid. 68 Ibid., 228. 69 Ibid. 70 Chris Kitchen and Rhiannon Vickers, “Labour Traditions of International Order and the Dilemma of Action Towards Iran,” The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 15, no. 2 (2013), 299. 71 Ibid. 72 Ibid., 300. 73 Ibid., 305.

1.4 US-Iran Relations: A Mutual Animosity that Dictates the Conduct of International Affairs

The history of US-Iran relations is a very complex one. Prior to the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979, Iran had been a close ally of the US in the Middle East.74 Pahlavi Iran received substantial economic, military and technical assistance from the US to help the Shah strengthen his regime and prevent the expansion of communism and Arab nationalism in the region.75 In fact, Iran‟s nuclear program was originally initiated in the mid-1950s with the help of US technical expertise.76 However, these positive developments were reverted due to the US Embassy Hostage crisis.77 Following the assault on their embassy in Tehran, the US broke diplomatic relations with the newly established Islamic regime and revoked all the agreements they had previously concluded with Iran.78 US policy-makers also adopted a first set of economic sanctions against Iran at the time.79 These took the form of Executive Order 12170, which blocked all the properties of the Iranian government in the US, and of Executive Orders 12205 and 12211, which prohibited commercial transactions with Iran.80 The adoption of unilateral sanctions soon became a central element of the US policy on Iran, which authors Reza Simbar and Arsalan Ghorbani Sheikhneshin have coined as a policy of confrontation.81 The US policy of confrontation with Iran has aimed to bring about change in Iranian policies that have been deemed a threat to US interests in the Middle East.82 Accordingly, the threat of military intervention, the use of economic sanctions and diplomatic pressure have been consistently employed by US officials to achieve this end.83 Although an opportunity for rapprochement occurred during the

74 Mustafa Kibaroglu, “Iran‟s Nuclear Ambitions from a Historical Perspective and the Attitude of the West,” Middle Eastern Studies 43, no. 2 (2007), 223. 75 Ibid., 224. 76 Ibid., 225. 77 Ibid., 233. 78 Zehra Nilufer Karacasulu and Irem Askar Karakir, Op. Cit., 4. 79 Arsalan Ghorbani Sheikhneshin, “Iran and the US: Current Situation and Future Prospects,” Journal of International and Area Studies 16, no. 1 (2009), 98. 80 Sasan Fayazmanesh, “The Politics of the U.S. Economic Sanctions Against Iran,” Review of Radical Political Economics 35, no. 3 (2003), 221. 81 Reza Simbar, “Iran and the US: Engagement or Confrontation,” Journal of International and Area Studies 13, no. 1 (2006), 74; and Arsalan Ghorbani Sheikhneshin, Op. Cit., 97. 82 Adam Tarock, “Iran‟s Nuclear Program and the West,” Third World Quarterly 27, no. 4 (2006), 646-647. 83 Brandon M. Boylan, “Moving Beyond Coercive Diplomacy: A New Policy Approach Toward Iran‟s Nuclear Ambitions,” Journal of Public and International Affairs 20, (2009), 96.

Presidency of Mohammad Khatami in the late 1990s, the US failed to seize this opportunity and with the election of Mahmud Ahmadinejad to Iran‟s presidency in 2005, US-Iran relations were marked, once again, by heightened tensions.84 The tense relations between the US and Iran have borne consequences of critical importance on the diplomatic efforts of the international community to resolve the Iranian nuclear crisis. UNSC Debates have been dominated by the position of the US and US allies have been strongly pressurized to impose draconian sanctions against Iran.85 However, US policy-makers have encountered the resistance of Russia and China, both permanent members of the UNSC.86

1.5 Japan-Iran Relations: Maintaining a Delicate Balance Between Energy and Military Security

Japan‟s relations with Iran have been shaped by a number of internal and external factors. These included Japan‟s booming economy and its voracious energy needs, regional (in)security, the country‟s strategic alliance with the US and normative factors.87 Since the end of World War II (WWII), Japan‟s economy has been flourishing. Japan became a major economic power in the 1960s and has since then rose to the position of the world‟s second largest economy.88 However, the Japanese economic “miracle” has come with a heavy price. With virtually no domestic energy resources, Japan has long sought to secure access

84 Adam Tarock, Op. Cit., 647; Zehra Nilufer Karacasulu and Irem Askar Karakir, Op. Cit., 5; and Brandon M. Boylan, Op. Cit., 94. 85 Zehra Nilufer Karacasulu and Irem Askar Karakir, Op. Cit., 14; and Nikolay A. Kozhanov, “U.S. Economic Sanctions against Iran: Undermined by External Factors,” Middle East Policy 18, no. 3 (2011), 149. 86 Zehra Nilufer Karacasulu and Irem Askar Karakir, Op. Cit., 13; Nikolay A. Kozhanov, Op. Cit., 150; and David Hasting Dunn, “Real Men Want to Go to Tehran: Bush, Pre-emption and the Iranian Nuclear Challenge,” International Affairs 83, no. 1 (2007), 26. 87 Yukikio Miyagi, “Japan‟s Middle East Policy: Still Mercantile Realism,” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 12, no. 2 (2012), 292; Mandana Tishehyar, “Japan and Indian Energy Security Towards Iran,” Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs 3, no. 3 (2012), 187-188; Mohammad Abo-Kazleh, “Transformation in Japanese Foreign Policy Toward the Middle East: From Low to More Active Political Engagement,” USAK Yearbook 3, (2010), 267; and Jonathan A. Czin, “Japanese Foreign Policy in the Middle East: Balancing Economy and Security,” Asian Security 4, no. 2 (2008), 213. 88 Mandana Tishehyar, Op. Cit., 177; Mohammad Abo-Kazleh, Op. Cit., 273; and Elaheh Koolaee and Mandana Tishehyar, “China and Japan‟s Energy Security Approaches in the Central Asia: A Comparative Study,” China Report 45, no. 4 (2009), 268.

to cheap and stable energy in order to sustain its rapid economic growth.89 It was in this context that Japan developed strong bilateral relations with Iran.90 Japan‟s interest in the Iranian energy sector emerged in the 1970‟s as a result of the 1973 oil crisis.91 Japan, which had relied almost exclusively on the “Majors” for its oil supply, saw its energy security jeopardized as a result of the crisis.92 Accordingly, the Japanese government sought to secure contracts directly with oil-producing countries in order to circumvent this problem.93 This strategy led to the development of a joint venture between the Iranian National Oil Company and the Japanese company Mitsui for the construction of a petrochemical complex in Bandar-e Shahpour in 1973.94 However, the project was brought to an abrupt end due to the destruction of the complex‟s facilities during the Iran-Iraq War.95 More recently, Japan concluded an agreement with Iran in 2004 for the development of the Azadegan oil field.96 However, this move brought Japan under US pressure to abrogate its agreement and halt its economic relations with Iran, in a bid to isolate the Iranian government from the international community.97 Japan resisted US pressure until late 2006 but was ultimately forced to reduce its stakes in the Azadegan oil field as a result of growing tensions regarding Iran‟s nuclear program.98 With the unraveling of the Iranian nuclear crisis, the Japanese government faced an acute dilemma. On the one hand, Iran represented a critical commercial partner to Japan, guaranteeing access to energy resources and markets for Japanese commodities.99 On the other hand, Iran‟s nuclear enrichment activities represented a threat to the nuclear non- proliferation regime of which Japan, as a victim of nuclear weapons during WWII, was a

89 Mohammad Abo-Kazleh, Op. Cit., 273; Elaheh Koolaee and Mandana Tishehyar, Op. Cit., 268; and Raquel Shaoul, “An Evaluation of Japan‟s Current Energy Policy in the Context of the Azadegan Oil Field Agreement Signed in 2004,” Japanese Journal of Political Science 6, no. 3 (2005), 413. 90 Mandana Tishehyar, Op. Cit., 179. 91 Yukikio Miyagi, Op. Cit., 296l and Mandana Tishehyar, Op. Cit., 182. 92 Yukikio Miyagi, Op. Cit., 296; Mandana Tishehyar, Op. Cit., 178-179; and Mohammad Abo-Kazleh, Op. Cit., 274. 93 Yukikio Miyagi, Op. Cit., 296; and Mandana Tishehyar, Op. Cit., 179. 94 Yukikio Miyagi, Op. Cit., 297; Mandana Tishehyar, Op. Cit., 182; and Raquel Shaoul, Op. Cit., 426. 95 Mandana Tishehyar, Op. Cit., 182. 96 Yukikio Miyagi, Op. Cit., 306; Mandana Tishehyar, Op. Cit., 188; Brendan Taylor, Sanctions as a Grand Strategy (Abingdon: Routledge, 2010), 80; and Jonathan A. Czin, Op. Cit., 208. 97 Yukikio Miyagi, Op. Cit., 306; Brendan Taylor, Op. Cit., 82; and Jonathan A. Czin, Op. Cit., 210. 98 Yukikio Miyagi, Op. Cit., 306; Brendan Taylor, Op. Cit., 80; and Jonathan A. Czin, Op. Cit., 210. 99 Yukikio Miyagi, Op. Cit., 306; and Jonathan A. Czin, Op. Cit., 213.

fervent defender.100 Combined with North Korea‟s nuclear crisis and Japan‟s reliance on the US for military security, Japan could not afford to accede to Iran‟s covert nuclear ambitions.101 Accordingly, Japan decided to denounce the international crisis generated by Iran‟s enrichment program and to follow suit with the imposition of international sanctions against Iran, calculating that under international pressure, Iranian authorities would be compelled to end their controversial nuclear activities.102 However, the Japanese calculations proved to be wrong as Iran has failed to this date to comply with the repeated demands of the international community.103

2. The Iranian Nuclear Crisis: Competing Analyses from the Perspective of the Neo-Realist, Neo-Liberal and Constructivist Theories of International Relations

The mainstream analysis presented in the IR literature on the Iranian nuclear crisis contended that Iran‟s nuclear program posed a threat to regional and international security. Alex S. Wilner argued that an Iran with nuclear capabilities would represent a complex security challenge. Four aspects of Iran‟s nuclear threat were analysed in details: coercion, assertiveness, protection and nuclear terrorism.104 The author concluded that Iran‟s acquisition of nuclear weapons would strengthen the country‟s strategic position, giving it leverage to blackmail Western and Arab governments, galvanize its assertive foreign policy, protect its proxies and facilitate nuclear terrorism.105 The policy implications of Wilner‟s argument were that deterrence could be applied to prevent these developments.106 Similarly, Eric S. Eldman, Andrew F. Krepinevich and Evan Braden Montgomery have contended that a nuclear Iran would be a source of instability in the Middle East. The authors explained that Iran‟s foreign policy would become more aggressive once it would have acquired nuclear weapons, that US allies in the Middle East would increasingly

100 Yukikio Miyagi, Op. Cit., 294; and Brendan Taylor, Op. Cit., 82. 101 Yukikio Miyagi, Op. Cit., 292; Brendan Taylor, Op. Cit., 82; and Jonathan A. Czin, Op. Cit., 199. 102 Yukikio Miyagi, Op. Cit., 307; Mandana Tishehyar, Op. Cit., 192; and Brendan Taylor, Op. Cit., 80. 103 Yukikio Miyagi, Op. Cit., 307. 104 Alex S. Wilner, “Apocalypse Soon? Deterring Nuclear Iran and its Terrorist Proxies,” Comparative Strategy 31, no. 1 (2012), 19. 105 Ibid., 24-26. 106 Ibid., 34.

accommodate the Iranian regime out of fear, that the US would lose its ability to defend its interests in the region, that a nuclear competition would erupt between Iran and Israel and that, in the long-term, other states would acquire nuclear capabilities, further undermining an already fragile regional stability.107 The solution proposed by the authors to avoid this dreadful scenario was to follow a three-track approach, which combined diplomacy and sanctions, clandestine actions and the threat of military intervention.108 James Dobbins also abided by the mainstream security analysis according to which Iran‟s acquisition of nuclear weapons and delivery systems would pose a serious threat to regional and international security.109 However, the author proposed a policy framework for dealing with Iran both before and after it crossed the nuclear threshold.110 Sanctions should be imposed on Iran to meet two objectives: dissuade Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons in the short-term and secure Iran‟s compliance with the NPT once it acquired nuclear weapons in the long-term.111 Responding to the security threat analysis, Kenneth N. Waltz argued that a nuclear Iran would restore stability in the Middle East.112 Waltz exposed three possible endings to the nuclear crisis: 1) international diplomacy and sanctions convinced Iran to abandon its nuclear ambitions; 2) Iran developed a breakout capability but stopped short of acquiring nuclear weapons; and 3) Iran acquired nuclear weapons. The author explained that the last outcome was the most favourable. Iran‟s acquisition of nuclear weapons, by balancing Israel‟s nuclear power, would produce greater stability in the Middle East.113 The policy implications of Waltz‟s argument were that there was absolutely no need for international sanctions against Iran.114 The international security literature was centered on the threat posed by Iran‟s potential nuclear weapons and proposed practical solutions to resolve the problem. A few authors ventured outside the box of the international security paradigm. Adopting a neo-

107 Eric S. Eldman, Andrew F. Krepinevich and Evan Braden Montgomery, “The Dangers of a Nuclear Iran: The Limits of Containment,” Foreign Affairs 90, no. 66 (2011), 67. 108 Ibid., 79. 109 James Dobbins, “Coping with a Nuclearising Iran,” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy 53, no. 6 (2011), 44. 110 Ibid., 37. 111 Ibid., 45. 112 Kenneth N. Waltz, “Why Iran Should Get the Bomb: Nuclear Balancing Would Mean Stability,” Foreign Affairs 91, no. 2 (2012), 2. 113 Kenneth N. Waltz, Op. Cit., 2-3. 114 Ibid., 5.

liberal perspective, James K. Sebenius and Michael K. Singh explained that the ongoing crisis surrounding Iran‟s nuclear program resulted from the absence of a “zone of possible agreements” (ZOPA) between the interests of Iran and those of the international community.115 A ZOPA consisted in the range of possible deals that would be better to both parties‟ interests than the no-deal option. The authors demonstrated that since the minimum nuclear capability Iran was willing to accept to conclude a deal with the international community far exceeded the maximum nuclear capability the US were willing to accept, nuclear negotiations were necessarily doomed to fail.116 The policy implications of Sebenius and Singh‟s argument were that policy-makers should identify incentives and cost-imposing measures that would create a ZOPA.117 The proposition made by Sebenius and Signh was appealing but failed to weight in the perceptions held by both camps of the nuclear crisis. Maysam Behvaresh has contended that the current crisis surrounding Iran‟s nuclear program resulted from the mutual construction of Iran and the West as enemies.118 On the one hand, Iran‟s political discourse has depicted the West as “the enemy” that is restlessly conspiring against the Islamic Republic of Iran.119 On the other hand, the political discourses of Western powers have characterized Iran as a “rogue state”, a member of the “axis of evil” and a state led by unpredictable political figures.120 These demonizing discourses, the argument went on, have created deep-seated fears and mistrust through which the security concerns of Iran and of the international community have been mediated. The policy implications were that, in order for Iran and the international community to end their confrontation over the Iranian nuclear issue, both sides needed to alter the negative ideational constructions they held about one another.121 The explanation provided by Maysam Behvaresh was the most appealing of all. We contend that the Iranian nuclear crisis can hardly be explained without an examination of how Iran‟s potential acquisition of nuclear bombs was framed in the political discourses of international actors.

115 James K. Sebenius and Michael K. Singh, “Is a Nuclear Deal with Iran Possible: An Analytical Framework for the Iran Nuclear Negotiations,” International Security 37, no. 3 (Winter 2012/2013), 87. 116 Ibid. 117 Ibid., 88. 118 Maysam Behvaresh, “A Crisis of Confidence Revisited: Iran-West Tensions and Mutual Demonization,” Asian Politics & Policy 3, no. 3 (2011), 329. 119 Ibid., 328. 120 Ibid., 339. 121 Ibid., 344.

3. Drug Control in Iran: Problems and Policy Reponses

The literature on drug control in Iran is divided into two distinct but associated trends. On the one hand, there are the articles that expose the problems associated with illicit drug trafficking and consumption. On the other hand, there are those that present the policies implemented by the Iranian regime to halt the country‟s pervasive drug problem. Akbar Aliverdinia and William Alex Pridemore have characterized Iran‟s drug problem as “one of the most complex challenge currently facing Iranian society.122” Iran, which is geo-strategically located between drug producing Afghanistan and drug consuming countries, is one of the major trafficking routes for drugs destined to European markets. The authors estimated that about 50 % of Afghanistan‟s opium production transit through Iran.123 Methods of transportation include camels, horses, mules, motorbikes, buses, trucks, four-wheel drive vehicles and human mules.124 Drug traffickers usually travel in narco-caravans composed of 40 vehicles or 60 animals and are armed with sophisticated weapons. Camel caravans are their favourite mode of transportation since they do not require the presence of humans to accompany them. Aliverdina and Pridemore explained that drug traffickers get camels addicted to drugs and teach them where to get their “next fix” along trafficking roads.125 Iran is also a major consumer market for Afghan drugs. The country has a history of opium use for medical purposes. Opium has traditionally been employed to threat minor conditions, such as fatigue, anxiety and diarrhoea.126 However, today‟s drug problem resides in the consumption of opiates for recreational purposes. Aliverdinia and Pridemore estimated that there are about 1.2 million of regular drug users in Iran. The main drugs consumed are opium (thariac), opium residue (shire or sukhte) and cannabis (hashish). 127 The authors estimated that the Iranian market absorbs approximately 800 tons of opium every year.128 Aliverdina and Pridemore‟s article

122 Akbar Aliverdinia and William Alex Pridemore, “An Overview of the Illicit Narcotics Problem in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” European Journal of Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 16, no. 2 (2008), 155. 123 Ibid., 159. 124 Ibid., 160. 125 Ibid. 126 Ibid., 156. 127 Ibid., 163. 128 Ibid., 159.

was mostly factual and descriptive. It presented in details Iran‟s drug problem but provided little analysis of its domestic, regional and international implications. The authors did remark that due to Iran‟s isolation from the West and its theocratic political structure, Iran‟s drug problem has not been addressed in Western academic literature.129 Similarly, A. William Samii framed illicit drug consumption and trafficking as Iran‟s “thorniest problem.130” His article focused more precisely on the problem of drug abuse in Iran, trying to explain why it has become so prevalent, how has the Iranian government responded to it and what were the factors that have hindered Iran‟s war on drugs. According to Samii, there are about 2 million of drug users – from addicts to occasional users – in Iran.131 The author concluded that the country‟s poor economic performance and high rates of unemployment were the main factors that have fuelled drug addiction. “Boredom” and “lack of options” occupied the second rank while the availability of narcotic drugs exacerbated the situation.132 The argument put forward by Samii‟s was not very convincing. It was too cliché and not enough documented. Yet, this type of position is rather all too common. It would have been more pertinent for him to support his argument with statistics on drug use and abuse in Iran. Contrarily to Samii, Fariborz Raisdana and Ahmad Gharavi Nakhjavani presented a very well documented analysis of the economics of drug trafficking and addiction in Iran. Opiates are the principal narcotic drugs consumed and trafficked in the country. Opium, crude opium, morphine, heroin and shireh are the five most consumed substances. 133 The price of opiates has significantly decreased in Iran since the mid-1990s, with the result that, at the time of the publication of their article, one gram of heroin was the same price than “one kilogram of red meat, three kilograms of rice, ten kilograms of potatoes or two books” while the price of one gram of opium equalled “the cost of three hundred to four hundred grams of red meat.134” The authors explained that this trend was due to an increase in

129 Akbar Aliverdinia and William Alex Pridemore, Op. Cit., 169. 130 A. William Samii, “Drug Abuse: Iran‟s Thorniest Problem,” Brown Journal of World Affairs 9, no. 2 (2003), 283. 131 Ibid., 287. 132 Ibid., 288. 133 Fariborz Raisdana and Ahmad Gharavi Nakhjavani, “The Drug Market in Iran,” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 582, (2002), 155. 134 Ibid., 161-162.

opium production in neighbouring Afghanistan.135 They also observed that the aggressive interdiction efforts implemented by the Iranian regime along its eastern border with Afghanistan have not influenced the price of opiates.136 Based on their survey of the Iranian drug market, Raisdana and Nakhjavani concluded that drug consumption in Iran was influenced by factors such as unemployment and poverty, social problems and the absence of leisure.137 The policy implications of their findings were that Iran‟s drug control programs were not fruitful and that resources should be directed towards economic, social and political development rather than interdiction efforts.138 Nasser Saghafi-Ameri framed illicit drug consumption and trafficking in Iran as an international security problem and coined this phenomenon as the “Afghan drugs problem.139” The author contended that Afghan drugs were a threat to both regional and international security. He pointed out, to support his argument, that the Afghan drug trade has increased drug addition, undermined health conditions and financed terrorism and insurgency.140 The policy implications of Saghafi-Ameri‟s security analysis were that there is a need for the international community to counter the Afghan drug trade in a concerted manner. More precisely, he called on the international community to provide support to Iran‟s counter-narcotics efforts.141 Saghafi-Ameri‟s article depicted very well the position of the Iranian government regarding international drug cooperation. This situation was probably due to the fact that the author was a former Iranian diplomat and that his article was published in an Iranian journal of foreign affairs. Saied Madani et al. have presented a detailed history of Iran‟s drug control policy from 1979 to 2001. They divided the time frame into four schematic periods: 1) Period 1: Revolutionary rage against addiction (1979-1980); 2) Period 2: Abatement in revolutionary rage and denial of addition problems (1980-1988); 3) Period 3: Restructuring drug management (1988-1993); and 4) Period 4: Criticizing the past, looking to the future (1993-

135 Fariborz Raisdana and Ahmad Gharavi Nakhjavani, Op. Cit., 155. 136 Ibid., 156. 137 Ibid., 164. 138 Ibid,. 165. 139 Nasser Saghafi-Ameri, “The Afghan Drugs Problem: A Challenge to Iran and International Security,” Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs 1, no. 2 (2010), 214. 140 Ibid., 217. 141 Ibid., 231.

2001).142 In the immediate aftermath of the Islamic Revolution, Iran‟s drug control policies focused exclusively on supply reduction as a mean to restrict illicit drug use. The first period (1979-1989) was characterized by Iran‟s aggressive action against drugs and drug users, which resulted in numbers of arrests and executions.143 With the beginning of the Iran-Iraq War in 1980, the drug problem became less relevant to Iranian policy-makers as war efforts became the focus of their policies. Supply reduction nonetheless remained the main strategy throughout this period.144 In the aftermath of the Iran-Iraq War, drug control resurfaced on the national agenda. The mandate of the Drug Control Headquarters (DCHQ) was consolidated and a new legislation further criminalizing drug-related offenses, the Iranian Anti-Narcotic Law of 1988, was adopted.145 Towards the end of the 20th century, Iran‟s drug control policies were revised. Demand reduction measures were introduced at the demand of Iran‟s scientific community. 146 Madani et al.‟s principal finding was that, with the exception of the Iran-Iraq War period, addressing the country‟s drug problem had always been a top priority to Iranian policy-makers since the establishment of the Islamic Republic in 1979.147 Lillian Figg-Franzoi‟s article reviewed the history of opium use in Iran and the changing response of the Iranian government to opiate addiction from the Pahlavi era to present day. The author‟s main argument was that Iran‟s drug control policies were embedded in the Shia ideology of maslahat (i.e. expediency)148. The author pointed out that the rhetoric of the Iranian government on narcotic drugs dated back to the Pahlavi era, when Khomeini politicized opium addition as a “symbol of revolutionary discontent” with the Shah‟s regime.149 In the aftermath of the 1979 revolution, drug traffickers were represented as a threat to the regime. They were charged as “mufsid fil-arz” (i.e. “one who spreads corruption on earth”) or “mohareb ba Khoda” (i.e. “at war with God”) and

142 Saied Madani et al., “Drug Management in Iran: A periodical Schema,” Addiction Research and Theory 19, no. 2 (2011), 114. 143 Ibid. 144 Ibid.,115-116. 145 Ibid.,117. 146 Ibid. 147 Ibid., 118. 148 Lillian Figg-Franzoi, “Maslahat, the State and the People: Opium Use in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” Crime, Law and Social Change 56, no. 4 (2011), 422. 149 Ibid., 427.

executed.150 During the period of the Iran-Iraq War, these concepts were extended to include drug addicts.151 Under the presidency of Khatami, drug abuse was framed as a social plague and demand reduction policies were introduced. This legacy from the Khatami era was continued into the Ahmadinejad administration.152 Figg-Franzoi illustrated that Iran‟s drug control policies have fluctuated with the ideological environment, evolving from policies based on an aggressive revolutionary ideology to a more progressive outlook. The author argued that these changes could take place thanks to the ideology of maslahat, which has allowed Iranian policy-makers to mould the country‟s drug control policy based on popular interests and manipulate it for the expediency and safety of the state.153 Similarly to Figg-Franzoi, Amir Arsalan Afkhami has analysed the evolution of Iran‟s drug control policy based on changes in the socio-political landscape. The author observed policy changes from a predominant strategy of control, interdiction and criminalization in the 1950s to a treatment-oriented policy during the 1970s, back to a zero- tolerance policy in the post-1979 era. During this period, Afkhami pointed out, drug traffickers and addicts were stigmatized as social and religious deviants and executed. 154 More recently, Iran‟s drug control policy has shifted towards harm reduction in the late 1990s as a result of an expanding drug addiction epidemic and the growth of associated harms.155 David R. Sabatelle‟s article explained drug trafficking trends in Iran and why the country has remained subject to drug trafficking despite engaging in aggressive counter- narcotics efforts. As the single most important trafficking route for drugs destined to Europe, Iran has been responsible for the largest share of the world‟s opiate seizures. The drugs seized by the Iranian Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) included opium, heroin, crack, morphine, hashish, crystal methamphetamine and nass. 156 Sabatelle reported that Baluchi

150 Lillian Figg-Franzoi, Op. Cit., 428. 151 Ibid., 430. 152 Ibid., 434. 153 Ibid., 431. 154 Amir Arsalan Afkhami, “From Punishment to Harm Reduction: Resecularization of Addiction in Contemporary Iran,” in Contemporary Iran: Economy, Society, Politics, ed. Ali Gheissari (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 207. 155 Ibid. 156 David R. Sabatelle, “The Scourge of Opiates: The Illicit Narcotics Trade in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” Trends in Organized Crime 14, no. 4 (2011), 319.

tribesmen and Kuchi nomads were involved in cross-border trafficking between Afghanistan and Iran while Iranian criminal organizations were in charge of trafficking drugs in the country.157 Despite its zero-tolerance policy, drug trafficking has continued to flourish in Iran. Sabatelle has explained this phenomenon with regard to: the country‟s history of opium addiction; its strategic location between Afghanistan and Europe; the country‟s porous borders; and the presence of well established and numerous trafficking routes.158 The argument put forward by Sabatelle is questionable. The four factors identified by the author are contributing factors to Iran‟s drug trafficking problem but not explanations in and of themselves. Trends in Afghanistan‟s opium production would have better explained why the Iranian government has been incapable of stopping the flow of drugs into the country despite its aggressive counter-narcotics efforts. Iran‟s drug problem and the measures adopted by the Iranian government to counter it have been extensively described in the literature on drug control in Iran. What appeared to be missing though was a documentation of the international dimensions of the country‟s counter-narcotics efforts. The literature focused almost exclusively on the efforts made domestically by the Iranian government to counter the problem of drug trafficking and left out the question of international assistance to Iran‟s counter-narcotics efforts. This observation provides a rationale for the current research. We wish to bridge this gap by analyzing the counter-narcotics cooperation that took place between the governments of France, Ireland, the UK, Belgium, Japan, Italy, Germany and Iran from 2007 to 2011.

4. International Cooperation in Drug Control: A Field of Study that Remains Largely Overlooked

Since the inception of the Single Convention on Narcotics Drugs in 1961, international counter-narcotics efforts have been characterised by a prohibitionist framework that has aimed at preventing drug addiction by disrupting the supply of narcotics drugs and psychotropic substances. Iran‟s drug control efforts and the international assistance provided by donor countries can not be understood independently from the normative

157 David R. Sabatelle, Op. Cit., 320. 158 Ibid., 327.

framework provided by international conventions on narcotics drugs and psychotropic substances.

4.1 The International Drug Control Regime: A Prohibitionist Framework that Constrains Policy Options for National Governments

The international drug control regime has been the object of an extensive literature that described its development, assessed its impacts and proposed changes to its policy orientation for a better handling of the global drug problem. Letizia Paoli, Victoria A. Greenfield and Peter Reuter provided an extensive review of the history of the international drug control regime, covering major developments from the 17th to the 21st century. The authors noted that the regime evolved from a regulatory to a prohibitionist framework.159 Similarly, Julia Buxton presented a history of the international drug control regime from the early 19th to the late 20th century. Major developments covered by the author included the 1912 International Opium Convention, the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (Single Convention), the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances (1971 Convention) and the 1988 Convention against Illicit Trafficking in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (1988 Convention). Julia Buxton, who also observed the consolidation of a prohibitionist regime, reflected that this situation was due to the internationalization and institutionalization of US drug control policies.160 For her part, Catherine Carstairs presented a history of the international drug control regime during the 20th century by dividing it into three cumulative stages: the supply stage, the demand control stage and crime control stage. The author observed that despite the development of the last two stages, supply reduction has remained the dominant international drug control strategy.161

159 Letizia Paoli, Victoria A. Greenfield and Peter Reuter, “Change is Possible: The History of the International Drug Control Regime and Implications for Future Policymaking,” Substance Use & Misuse 47, (2012), 923. 160 Julia Buxton, “The Historical Foundations of the Narcotic Drug Control Regime,” in Innocent Bystanders: Developing Countries and the War on Drugs, ed. Philip Keefer and Norman Loayza (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2010), 79. 161 Catherine Carstairs, “The Stages of International Drug Control System,” Drug and Alcohol Review 24, no. 1 (2005), 57.

Emily Crick reviewed the history of the international drug control regime in order to illustrate the development of a “drug as an existential threat” discourse at the global level. The author employed the IR theory of securitization to support her argument.162 Since the end of the Cold War, the global drug control discourse has radically shifted away from the danger posed by drug addiction to the social and economic conditions of mankind towards the security of states. This discourse has been based on the construction of drugs, drug users, producers and traffickers as “antagonistic others.” More recently, the social construct has been expanded to include drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) and narco-terrorists.163 Crick noted that the securitization of drugs allowed actors to carry out extraordinary measures, including real wars against drugs in Columbia, Mexico and Afghanistan.164 The trend observed by Crick towards the securitization of the global discourse on drug control could be particularly relevant in the case of the present study. The securitization of the Afghan drug trade could have hypothetically induced European governments and Japan to provide assistance to Iran‟s counter-narcotics efforts. This question will be examined in further details in Chapter 6. The international drug control regime was described in the literature as a premise to the evaluation of its impacts. The regime is based on three UN conventions on narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances: the Single Convention, the 1971 Convention and the 1988 Convention. The 1961 Convention constitutes the bedrock of the current drug control regime. It prohibits the non-medical use of narcotic drugs.165 The 1971 Convention extends the prohibition regime to cover synthetic drugs while the 1988 Convention specifically tackles the problem of illicit drug trafficking166 The purpose of the international drug control regime is ultimately to protect individuals from the dangers of drug abuse.167 The current regime has received large support from the members of the international community, a situation, Thomas Babor et al. noted, that is quite uncommon in international regimes. As of 2006, 180 nations out of 203 had ratified the three UN conventions on

162 Emily Crick, “Drugs as an Existential Threat: An Analysis of International Securitization of Drugs,” International Journal of Drug Policy 23, (2012), 407. 163 Ibid., 408. 164 Ibid., 413. 165 David R. Bewley-Taylor, “Harm Reduction and the Global Drug Control Regime: Contemporary Problems and Future Prospects,” Drug and Alcohol Review 23, (2004), 484. 166 Thomas Babor et al. Drug Policy and the Public Good (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 205. 167 Emily Crick, Op. Cit., 407.

narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances.168. However, David R. Bewley-Taylor warned that “any appearance of harmony is in many respects illusionary.169” The impacts of the international drug control regime have been extensively evaluated in the academic literature. The majority of the articles under review concurred that the regime has been a total failure. Robin Room and Peter Reuter assessed that the international drug control regime has failed to: prevent the globalization of illicit drug trafficking and consumption, guarantee the availability of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances for medical purposes and protect the health and well-being of mankind.170 Cindy S. J. Fazey contended that the international drug control regime, with its focus on supply reduction, has been ineffective. Her argument was based on the observation that illicit drug markets have remained strong despite intensive efforts to control them.171 David R. Bewley-Taylor and Martin Jelsma took this argument one step further, saying that the prohibition of drugs led to the development of illicit drug markets.172 This position was shared by Letizia Paoli, Victoria A. Greenfield and Peter Reuter, who contended that the prohibitionist regime drove forbidden drugs into illegal markets and fuelled the growth of organized crime.173 In sharp opposition to these authors, Thomas Babor et al. assessed that the international regime has been relatively successful in terms of ensuring the availability of drugs for medical and scientific purposes.174 However, theirs was the only positive remark we encountered during our review of the literature on the international drug control regime. Understanding the international drug control regime, its history, framework, policy debates surrounding it and the reasons why this strategy has persisted despite its obvious incapacity to make the smallest dent in the stated problem is of critical importance. The regime provides a normative framework and a set of obligations for states to implement in their counter-narcotics efforts. Although the UN drug control conventions are not self-

168 Thomas Babor et al., Op. Cit., 205. 169 David R. Bewley-Taylor, Op. Cit., 483. 170 Robin Room and Peter Reuter, “How Well do International Conventions Protect Public Health,” Lancet 379, no. 9810 (2012), 84. 171 Cindy S. J. Fazey, “The Commission on Narcotic Drugs and the United Nations International Drug Control Programme: Politics, Policies and Prospects for Change,” International Journal of Drug Policy 14, (2003), 166. 172 David Bewley-Taylor and Martin Jelsma, “Regime Change: Revisiting the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs,” International Journal of Drug Policy 23, no. 1 (2012), 74. 173 Letizia Paoli, Victoria A. Greenfield and Peter Reuter, Op. Cit., 929. 174 Thomas Babor et al., Op. Cit., 219.

executing – meaning that states are ultimately responsible for their enforcement –, their legal provisions, which put great emphasis on supply reduction and international cooperation, could hypothetically be part of the explanation of the paradox of the international community‟s nuclear confrontation and counter-narcotics cooperation with Iran.

4.2 The Merida Initiative: A Security Partnership that Presents Similarities to the Case of Counter-Narcotics Cooperation with Iran

The international counter-narcotics cooperation between Western governments and Iran has not been addressed in the academic literature on drug control in Iran. However, it can be compared to another case study, the Merida Initiative. The Merida Initiative has been billed as a security partnership between the US, Mexico and Central American countries. It consisted in an aid package totalling USD$1.4 billion over three years to help Mexico and Central American countries in their fight against organized crime.175 Under this initiative, the US government has provided equipment, training, technical assistance and counter- narcotics intelligence to Mexican authorities.176 The Merida Initiative is interesting in that it presents a certain number of similarities with the UNODC Iran Strategic Programme Framework 2005-2007. Iran and Mexico are both transit states through which significant quantities of drugs are being trafficked. They both have received international assistance to support their domestic counter-narcotics efforts. The international assistance provided to them has taken the form of technical and material resources rather than direct financial aid. Yet, the cases of Mexico and Iran also differ in significant ways. In the former, the consumer country, the US, is the immediate neighbour of the transit country, Mexico. It is therefore more difficult for the US government to turn a blind eye to the problems posed by drug trafficking in Mexico than it is for European governments and Japan with regard to Iran. Additionally, Mexico has not been able to implement an efficient strategy to counter drug trafficking within its territory

175 Raul Benitez Manaut, “The Merida Initiative: Challenges in the Fight against Crime and Drug Trafficking,” ARI, December 18, 2007, accessed April 26, 2013, http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_eng/Content?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/e lcano_in/zonas_in/ari130-2007. 176 David A. Shirk, The Drug War in Mexico: Confronting a Shared Threat (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2011), 6.

whereas Iran had. More importantly, Mexico has not been suspected of secretly developing an arsenal of nuclear weapons. Despite these notable differences, we maintain that it is pertinent to review the literature on the Merida Initiative to get valuable insights on the phenomenon of international drug cooperation. David A. Shirk has devoted much attention to the security crisis caused by DTOs in Mexico, the country‟s current counter-narcotics efforts and the role played by the US in strengthening them.177 However, the author limited his explanation to the fact that the US and Mexico were confronted to a shared threat and went on to analyse how this threat impacted on drug cooperation between the US and Mexico. George W. Grayson‟s chapter on the Merida Initiative was also mostly descriptive. The author only described the initiative and noted the policy debates that surrounded it.178 Raul Benitez Manaut has explained that the threat of illicit drug trafficking in Latin America has justified a new integrated security cooperation between Mexico, Central American countries and the US, the Merida Initiative.179 However, the author did not explain in further details in what consisted this security threat and how it impacted on the cooperation between the US and Mexico. For his part, Julien Mercile contended that the war on drugs in Mexico was only a pretext for the US to intervene in Mexico‟s affairs and expand US hegemonic interests. The author supported his argument by illustrating how the war on drugs was used to repress opposition to neo-liberal policies in Mexico and to arrest individuals opposed to US hegemony.180 The Merida Initiative was depicted exclusively as a discursive manipulation by the US government.181 The author concluded that the Merida Initiative was shaped by politico-economic imperatives rather than out of genuine concerns for drug control.182 On the whole, the literature on the Merida Initiative provided little explanation for counter-narcotics cooperation between the US and Mexico. Some of the articles reviewed pinpointed the security threat posed by Mexican DTOs but never analyzed it in details. We

177 David A. Shirk, Op. Cit., 3. 178 George W. Grayson, Mexico: Narco-Violence and a Failed State? (London: Transaction Publishers, 2010), 219-249. 179 Raul Benitez Manaut, Op. Cit. 180 Julien Mercille, “Violence Narco-Cartels or US Hegemony? The Political Economy of the War on Drugs in Mexico?” Third World Quarterly 32, no. 9 (2011), 1637. 181 Ibid., 1640. 182 Ibid., 1649.

therefore come to the conclusion that international drug cooperation is a subject that has been understudied in the criminological literature. The present research aims at bridging this gap by presenting an analysis of the counter-narcotics cooperation that took place between six European governments, Japan and Iran from 2007 to 2011. The next chapter details the theoretical and methodological frameworks employed to achieve this end.

CHAPTER 3 UNDERSTANDING PUBLIC DISCOURSE: CONSTRUCTIVISM, QUALITATIVE CONTENT ANALYSIS AND DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

The academic literature is saturated with security analyses of the Iranian nuclear issue. Scholars and policy-makers alike have constantly been preoccupied with Iran‟s so-called nuclear weapons program and this obsession has translated into the IR literature. Yet, what security analysts have failed to account for is that these threats were constructed in the first place based on their shared understandings of the Iranian nuclear issue. Analysing public discourse and the constructions of reality they convey therefore proves central to understanding the international community‟s contradictory nuclear and counter-narcotics policies towards Iran from 2007 to 2011.

1. Theoretical Framework

Social constructivism is a theoretical perspective in International Relations and Criminology that has the analytical power to uncover how social phenomena are constructed. By focusing on ideational structures as explaining factors, social constructivism offers richer and thicker analyses than the neo-realist and neo-liberal paradigms, hence our adoption of a hybrid constructivist theoretical framework.

1.1 On the Social Construction of International Relations

Social constructivism (or constructivism) is a theoretical approach to International Relations that stresses the importance of ideational structures in constituting the practice of international relations.183 Following a sociological approach to the study of IR, social

183 Christian Reus-Smit, “Constructivism,” in Theories of International Relations, ed. Scott Burchill et al. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 212; Mahdi Mohammad Nia, “Understanding Iran‟s Foreign Policy: An Application of Holistic Constructivism,” Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations 9, no. 1 (2010), 151; Georg Sorensen, “The Case for Combining Material Forces and Ideas in the Study of IR,” European Journal of International Relations 14, no. 1 (2008), 6; Yucel Bozdaglioglu, “Constructivism and

constructivism contends that international relations are socially constructed.184 Social constructivism emerged in the 1990s as a competing theoretical approach to the materialist paradigms of IR.185 Contrary to the neo-realist and neo-liberal theories of International Relations, which stress that material forces have direct causal effects on international politics, constructivism contends that international relations cannot be fully explained without a reference to the inter-subjective structures through which material forces are mediated.186 Social constructivism is also rooted in the critical theory of IR. Indeed, it shares an idealist ontology with the later.187 Yet, the two theoretical approaches are usually differentiated in terms of epistemology, methodology and normativity.188 Accordingly, social constructivism has been characterized by Jeffrey T. Checkel and Emanuel Adler as a middle ground between materialist and critical theories of IR.189 However, this position has been contested by K.M. Fierke and Ronen Palan.190

Identity Formation: An Interactive Approach,” USAK Yearbook of International Politics and Law 1, (2008), 390; Marta Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in International Relations and Comparative Politics,” Annual Review of Political Science 4, (2001), 391; and Richard Price and Christian Reus-Smit, “Dangerous Liaisons?: Critical International Theory and Constructivism,” European Journal of International Relations 4, no. 3 (1998), 259. 184 Ian Hurd, “Constructivism,” in The Oxford Handbook of International Relations, ed. Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 305; J. Samuel Barkin, “Realist Constructivism,” International Studies Review 5, no. 3 (2003), 326; and Christian Reus-Smit, “Imagining Society: Constructivism and the English School,” British Journal of Politics and International Relations 4, no. 3 (2003), 488. 185 Christian Reus-Smith, Op. Cit., (2009), 223; Yucel Bozdaglioglu, Op. Cit., 389; Christian Reus-Smit, Op. Cit., (2003), 488; and Dale C. Copeland, “The Constructivist Challenge to Structural Realism: A Review Essay,” International Security 25, no. 2 (2000), 187. 186 Ian Hurd, Op. Cit., 300; Mahdi Mohammad Nia, Op. Cit., 150; Yucel Bozdaglioglu, Op. Cit., 403; David Patrick Houghton, “Reinvigorating the Study of Foreign Policy Decision Making: Towards a Constructivist Approach,” Foreign Policy Analysis 3, (2007), 29; Joseph Jupille, James A. Caporaso and Jeffrey T. Checkel, “Integrating Institutions: Rationalism, Constructivism and the Study of the European Union,” Comparative Political Studies 36, no.1-2 (2003), 14; and Jeffrey T. Checkel, “The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory,” World Politics 50, no. 2 (1998), 326. 187 Richard Price and Christian Reus-Smit, Op. Cit., 260; and Ted Hopf, “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory,” International Security 23, no. 1 (1998), 181. 188 Richard Price and Christian Reus-Smit, Op. Cit., 261; and Ted Hopf, Op. Cit., 182 and 185. 189 Jeffrey T. Checkel, Op. Cit., 327; and Emanuel Adler, “Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics,” European Journal of International Relations 3, no. 3 (1997), 322. 190 K.M. Fierke, “Constructivism,” in International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity, ed. Tim Dune, Milja Kurki and Steve Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 172; Ronen Palan, “A World of Their Making: An Evaluation of the Constructivist Critique in International Relations,” Review of International Studies 26, no. 4 (2000), 576; and Emmanuel Adler, Op. Cit., 335.

Despite these different points of view, social constructivism is characterized by a number of ontological assumptions, which constitute the core of the theoretical approach.191 Three of them are particularly salient. Firstly, social constructivism contends that ideational structures matter as much as, if not more than, material forces.192 Indeed, IR constructivist theorists argue that material forces acquire meaning for action only with regard to the ideational structures in which they are embedded.193 Accordingly, uncovering the inter- subjective meanings that constitute the context for meaningful action is a task of critical importance in the constructivist research agenda.194 Secondly, social constructivism contends that the identities of international actors are constructed by ideational structures and that their interests and actions are in turn conditioned by their identities.195 In other words, ideational structures shape who actors are, what they want and how they ought to behave.196 Accordingly, inquiring into the processes through which the identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed is also a task of critical importance in the constructivist research program.197 Finally, social constructivism contends that agents and structures are mutually constituted.198 That is to say that international structures constitute the identities and interests of agents while agents participate in the production, maintenance or alteration of international structures.199 This implies that there is no obligation for constructivist scholars to favour structures over agents or vice versa.200 However, for purposes of analytical

191 David Patrick Houghton, Op. Cit., 27. 192 Richard Price and Christian Reus-Smit, Op. Cit., 266; Yucel Bozdaglioglu, Op. Cit., 392; Marta Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, Op. Cit., 391; and Ronen Palan, Op. Cit., 576. 193 Richard Price and Christian Reus-Smit, Op. Cit., 266; David Patrick Houghton, Op. Cit., 29; and Jeffrey T. Checkel, Op. Cit., 326. 194 Georg Sorensen, Op. Cit., 7; Yucel Bozdaglioglu, Op. Cit., 390; Marta Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, Op. Cit., 395; and Ronen Palan, Op. Cit., 580. 195 Mahdi Mohammad Nia, Op. Cit., 151; Yucel Bozdaglioglu, Op. Cit., 398; Ronen Palan, Op. Cit., 576; and Richard Price and Christian Reus-Smit, Op. Cit., 266. 196 Mahdi Mohammad Nia, Op. Cit., 152; Yucel Bozdaglioglu, Op. Cit., 399; and Jennifer Sterling-Folker, “Constructivist Approaches,” in Making Sense of International Relations Theory, ed. Jennifer Sterling-Folker (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006), 117. 197 Mahdi Mohammad Nia, Op. Cit., 151; Ian Hurd, Op. Cit., 299; Joseph Jupille, James A. Caporaso and Jeffrey T. Checkel, Op. Cit., 115; and Jennifer Sterling-Folker, Op. Cit., 116. 198 Yucel Bozdaglioglu, Op. Cit., 399; David Patrick Houghton, Op. Cit., 28; Dale C. Copeland, Op. Cit., 190; Richard Price and Christian Reus-Smit, Op. Cit., 267; and Jeffrey T. Checkel, Op. Cit., 326. 199 Dale C. Copeland, Op. Cit., 190. 200 David Patrick Houghton, Op. Cit., 28; and Jeffrey T. Checkel, Op. Cit., 326.

simplification, constructivist scholars often tend to emphasize one dimension at the expense of the other.201 Despite these shared ontological premises, the constructivist theoretical landscape is nonetheless characterized by diversity and heterogeneity.202 Three axes of division are particularly salient in the literature. Firstly, constructivist scholars are divided over the agent-structure debate. The IR constructivist landscape is characterized by three major branches of constructivism: systemic, unit-level and holistic constructivism.203 Systemic constructivism, which is exemplified by the work of Alexander Wendt, stresses the constitutive effects of international structures on the identities and interests of agents while unit-level constructivism, which is exemplified by the work of Peter J. Katzenstein, focuses on how domestic ideational structures impact on the identities and interests of international actors.204 For its part, holistic constructivism, which is exemplified by the work of John Ruggie and Friedrich Kratochwil, puts emphasis on the effects of interactions between domestic and international structures of knowledge on the constitution of the identities and interests of international actors.205 Secondly, constructivist scholars are divided over epistemological issues. There are two major epistemological approaches espoused by them: positivism and post- positivism.206 Positivist forms of constructivism, which are exemplified by the work of Alexander Wendt and Peter J. Katzenstein, assert that International Relations are a subject that can be studied through the application of scientific principles.207 For their part, post- positivist forms of constructivism, which are exemplified by the work of Nicholas Onuf and Friedrich Kratochwil, reject the claim that IR can be the object of scientific study. They contend that the idealist ontology of social constructivism is incompatible with positivist modes of inquiry.208

201 David Patrick Houghton, Op. Cit., 30. 202 J. Samuel Barkin, Op. Cit., 326; Stefano Guzzini, “A Reconstruction of Constructivism in International Relations,” European Journal of International Relations 6, no. 2 (2000), 147; and Ronen Palan, Op. Cit., 576. 203 Mahdi Mohammad Nia, Op. Cit., 152; David Patrick Houghton, Op. Cit., 30; and Christian Reus-Smit, Op. Cit., (2003), 487. 204 Mahdi Mohammad Nia, Op. Cit., 152-153; and David Patrick Houghton, Op. Cit., 30. 205 Mahdi Mohammad Nia, Op. Cit., 153; and Richard Price and Christian Reus-Smit, Op. Cit., 269. 206 Ian Hurd, Op. Cit., 307; David Patrick Houghton, Op. Cit., 27; and Jennifer Sterling-Folker, Op. Cit., 118. 207 Ian Hurd, Op. Cit., 307; and David Patrick Houghton, Op. Cit., 30. 208 David Patrick Houghton, Op. Cit., 30.

Finally, a third axis of division exists over analytical issues, differentiating between modernist and post-modernist forms of constructivism.209 Modernist forms of constructivism study the role of norms and ideas in constituting international relations while post-modernist forms of constructivism study the role of power relations in constituting the ideational structures of international relations, bringing it closer to the critical theory of IR.210 In the case of the current study, a unit-level form of constructivism is adopted. Indeed, our research examines how ideational structures on the Iranian nuclear issue and on counter-narcotics cooperation with Iran contained in the political statements of donor countries constituted their contradictory policies towards Iran. As for the epistemological debate, a post-positivist epistemology is adopted here. Although we acknowledge that research must be guided by a strong methodology in order to generate valid knowledge, we reject the claim that this knowledge can only be generated through scientific modes of inquiry. Rather, we contend that reflectivism and interpretivism are better suited for the study of social phenomena. Finally, with regard to the divide over analytical issues, the current research clearly adopts a modernist agenda, examining the role played by socially constructed ideational structures in shaping donor countries‟ contradictory policies of nuclear confrontation and counter-narcotics cooperation with Iran from 2007 to 2011.

1.2 On the Social Construction of Crime

Contrary to the field of International Relations, social constructionism is not a theoretical approach proper in the field of Criminology. Social constructionism is rather a conceptual perspective that is found in a number of different strands of criminological theory. Constructionist concepts are found in criminological theories that range from the family of symbolic interactionism to social conflict and post-modernism.211 For instance, labelling

209 Marta Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, Op. Cit., 395; Richard Price and Christian Reus-Smit, Op. Cit., 269; and J. Samuel Barkin, Op. Cit., 327. 210 Richard Price and Christian Reus-Smit, Op. Cit., 268; and Ted Hopf, Op. Cit., 172. 211 Sven-Ake Lindgren, “Social Constructionism and Criminology: Traditions, Problems and Possibilities,” Journal of Scandinavia Studies in Criminology and Crime Prevention 6, no. 1 (2005), 5; J. Mitchell Miller, Christopher J. Schreck and Richard Tewksbury, Criminological Theory: A Brief Introduction (Boston: Prentice Hall, 2011), 10-11; Jonh Muncie, “Labelling, Social Reaction and Social Constructionism,” in The SAGE Handbook of Criminological Theory, ed. Eugene McLaughlin and Tim Newburn (Los Angeles: Sage,

theory, which is rooted in symbolic interactionism, contends that crime is a “label” that is attributed by agents of social control to people who engage in what is considered as “deviant” behaviour, thus constructing them as criminals while conflict theory asserts that criminality is the expression inequality in society. Indeed, conflict criminologists contend that crime is a concept constructed by powerful agents of society who employ it as a tool to exercise control over less powerful agents.212 For its part, constitutive criminology, which is rooted in post-modernism, asserts that crime is socially co-constituted by social agents and structures through discursive practices, with the implication that crime can be reconstructed through replacement discourse.213 Although differing on a number of ontological, epistemological and normative issues, these criminological theories all share a social constructionist perspective on crime.214 That is to say that, in opposition to conventional theories of criminology, these criminological theories assert that crime is not an objective reality but a social phenomenon that is socially constructed.215 Indeed, they contend that what is considered as crime and criminal behaviour is contingent on social contexts and subjective meanings.216 Accordingly, they assert that the primary task of criminologists is not to discover the objective causes of crime but rather to uncover how certain types of behaviour have been constructed as criminal while others have not been.217

2010), 150; and Judith Bessant, “Left, Right or Straight Ahead: Contemporary Prospects for Progressive and Critical Criminology,” in Critical Criminology: Issues, Debates and Challenges, ed. Kerry Carrington and Russel Hogg (Portland: Willan Publishing, 2002), 222. 212 Frank E. Hagan, Introduction to Criminology: Theories, Methods and Criminal Behavior (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2008), 178; Stuart Henry and Werner Einstadter, The Criminology Theory Reader (New York: New York University Press, 1998), 291 and 392; J. Mitchell Miller, Christopher J. Schreck and Richard Tewksbury, Op. Cit., 193-194; and J. Robert Lilly, Francis T. Cullen and Richard A. Ball, Criminological Theory: Context and Consequences (Thousand Oaks, Sage Publications, 2011), 166. 213 Stuart Henry and Dragan Milovanovic, “Constitutive Criminology: The Maturation of Critical Theory,” in Criminological Theories: Bridging the Past to the Future, ed. Suzette Cote (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2002), 242-243; Stuart Henry and Dragan Milovanovic, “Introduction: Postmodernism and Constitutive Theory,” in Constitutive Criminology at Work: Applications to Crime and Justice, ed. Stuart Henry and Dragan Milovanovic (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999), 7-9; and Andrew Bak, “Constitutive Criminology: An Introduction to the Core Concepts,” in Constitutive Criminology at Work: Applications to Crime and Justice, ed. Stuart Henry and Dragan Milovanovic (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999), 21. 214 J. Robert Lilly, Francis T. Cullen and Richard A. Ball, Op. Cit., 140 an 202; Stuart Henry and Werner Einstadter, Op. Cit., 332; and Stuart Henry and Dragan Milovanovic, Op. Cit., (2002), 243. 215 John Muncie, Op. Cit., 149; Eugene McLaughlin, “Critical Criminology,” in The SAGE Handbook of Criminological Theory, ed. Eugene McLaughlin and Tim Newburn (Los Angeles: Sage, 2010), 166; Judith Bessant, Op. Cit., 224; and Andrew Bak, Op. Cit., 27. 216 John Muncie, Op. Cit., 150; and Frank E. Hagan, Op. Cit., 187. 217 John Muncie, Op. Cit., 146; and Paul Knepper, Explaining Criminal Conduct: Theories and Systems in Criminology (Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 2001), 173.

1.3 Theoretical Justification: Pushing Analysis Beyond Material Capabilities and Exogenous Interests

A vast majority of the academic literature on Iran‟s nuclear challenge has employed a neo- realist perspective to explain the on-going crisis.218 Neo-realism is a theory of IR that focuses on the structure of the international system and on the distribution of material capabilities as a source of explanation of world politics.219 Accordingly, Iran‟s nuclearization has been explained with regard to Iran‟s weak and inferior position in the international system and its desire to bolster its strategic position and to deter security threats by acquiring nuclear weapons.220 Iran‟s nuclear ambitions have also been explained in regard to Iran‟s desire to permanently alter the structure of the international system and to become a regional hegemon.221 However, the development of Iran‟s nuclear capabilities has been perceived as a serious threat to international peace and to global and regional security.222 Indeed, the members of the international community have feared that Iran‟s acquisition of nuclear weapons would strengthen the country‟s strategic position, undermine the balance of security in the Middle East, lead to nuclear proliferation in the region and result in a nuclear competition between Iran and Israel.223 Accordingly, they have confronted Iranian authorities in a bid to dissuade them from acquiring nuclear weapons.224 The neo-realist theory of IR, with its focus on the structure of the international system and on the distribution of material capabilities, has not fully explained the crisis

218 Kenneth N. Waltz, Op. Cit., 1-5; Joachim Krause and Charles King Mallory, IV, Op. Cit., 11-33; Wyn Q. Bowen and Jonathan Brewer, Op. Cit., 923-943; Anthony H. Cordesman and Adam C. Seitz, Iranian Weapons of Mass Destruction (Santa Barbara: Praeger Security International, 2009); and François Géré, L’Iran et le Nucléaire: Les Tourments Perses (Paris: Lignes de Repères, 2006). 219 Robert Jackson and Georg Sorensen, Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 45. 220 Joachim Krause, “Introduction,” in Iran’s Nuclear Programme: Strategic Implications, ed. Joachim Krause (London: Routledge, 2012), 3; Wyn Q. Bowen and Jonathan Brewer, Op. Cit., 924; and Sophie Chautrad, L’Iran (Levallois-Perret: Studyrama, 2008), 78-79. 221 Joachim Krause, Op. Cit., 3; and Emanuele Ottolenghi, Op. Cit., 13. 222 Joachim Krause and Charles King Mallory IV, Op. Cit., 28; and Sophie Chautrad, Op. Cit., 8. 223 Joachim Krause and Charles King Mallory IV, Op. Cit., 27; Wyn Q. Bowen and Jonathan Brewer, Op. Cit., 925; and Emanuele Ottolenghi, Op. Cit., 11-12. 224 Riccardo Alcaro, “Learning from Troubled Experience: Transatlantic Lessons from the Nuclear Standoff with Iran,” International Spectator 46, no. 4 (2012), 115; Andrea Ellner, “Iran: Change or Opportunity for Regional Security?” Perceptions 16, no. 2 (2011), 3;

surrounding Iran‟s nuclear program. Indeed, Iran‟s nuclear weapons have no objective reality since Iran has not acquired them yet.225 Furthermore, under current conditions, the international community can only speculate about the military dimension of Iran‟s nuclear program.226 However, the neo-realist paradigm has not taken into account the impacts of subjective meanings on international relations but only those of “objective” material forces. This is a factor that has bore impacts of considerable importance on the position of the international community towards Iran‟s nuclear program but which has not been accounted for in the neo-realist literature. Contrary to its neo-realist counterpart, the neo-liberal paradigm has not been extensively employed to explain the crisis surrounding Iran‟s nuclear program. Neo- liberalism is a theory of IR that explains international relations on the basis of state interests and of their egoistic rationalism.227 Accordingly, the Iranian nuclear crisis has been explained in terms of a divergence of interests between Iran and the international community.228 Indeed, whereas Iran has strove to fulfill its “vital” interest in energy security, sovereignty and independence, the international community‟s supreme interest has lied in preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.229 The absence of a “zone of possible agreements” between the interests of Iran and those of the international community has fuelled the on-going crisis.230 The neo-liberal perspective has provided only a partial explanation of the Iranian nuclear crisis. Indeed, the neo-liberal perspective has treated interests as exogenous and has failed to explain the processes by which they have been shaped in the first place. A few authors have ventured to explain the Iranian nuclear crisis from a constructivist perspective. Maysam Behravesh has contended that the current crisis surrounding Iran‟s nuclear program has resulted from the mutual construction of Iran and

225 Joachim Krause and Charles King Mallory IV, Op. Cit., 16. 226 Wyn Q. Bowen and Jonathan Brewer, Op. Cit., 923. 227 Marie-Eve Desrosiers et Justin Massie, “Le Néolibéralisme et la Synthèse Néo-Néo,” in Théories des Relations Internationales: Contestations et Résistances, ed. Alex Macleod and Dan O‟Meara (Boisbriand: Athéna, 2010), 159. 228 James K. Sebenius and Michael K. Singh, Op. Cit., 60; and Mani Parsi and Steve A. Yetiv, “Unequal Contest: Iranian Nuclear Proliferation between Economic and Value Symmetry,” Contemporary Security Policy 29, no. 2 (2008), 330. 229 Bruno Tetrais, Iran: La Prochaine Guerre (Paris: Le Cherche Midi, 2007), 52-53; François Géré, Op. Cit., 141; Emanuele Ottolenghi, Op. Cit., 3; and James K. Sebenius and Michael K. Singh, Op. Cit., 60. 230 James K. Sebenius and Michael K. Singh, Op. Cit., 87.

the West as enemies.231 Similarly, Homeira Moshirzadeh has illustrated how Iran‟s interest for the development of nuclear technology has been embedded in post-revolutionary discourses of independence, justice and resistance.232 Accordingly, the author has underlined, the Iranian leadership could not forego its nuclear program since the ideational foundations of the Islamic regime have lied in discourses that have been deemed vital to its identity and survival.233 These two examples highlight the pertinence of the social constructivist theoretical approach of IR. Indeed, this type of studies has allowed researchers to go a step further than with the neo-paradigms of IR by explaining how material forces and interests have been constructed and by illustrating how these constructions have shaped the conduct of international relations. In the case of the current research, the social constructivist theoretical approach to International Relations is combined with the social constructionist perspective of criminological theory in order to provide us with adequate tools to uncover how matters of nuclear proliferation and narcotic drugs trafficking were framed in the political statements of donor countries and to explain how these frames shaped their incongruous policies of nuclear isolation of and counter-narcotics cooperation with Iran.

2. Methodological Framework

Discourse analysis is one of the best methodological tools available to uncover how speech acts construct a certain version of reality. Yet, due to the fact that no previous studies had been made on the topic of international assistance to Iran‟s counter-narcotics efforts and on the development of the Iranian nuclear crisis from 2007 to 2011, we first had to provide a thick description of donor countries‟ political statements on both the nuclear issue and on international counter-narcotics cooperation with Iran as documentary context to our discourse analysis.

231 Maysam Behvaresh, Op. Cit., 329. 232 Homeira Moshirzadeh, “Discursive Foundations of Iran‟s Nuclear Policy.” Security Dialogue 38, no. 4 (2007), 521. 233 Ibid., 523.

2.1 Qualitative Content Analysis

Qualitative content analysis (QCA) is a method “for the subjective interpretation of the content of text data.234” It should be taken note that in this definition, the term text data comprises all kinds of qualitative material and is not exclusively limited to written ones.235 The aim of QCA is to systematically describe the meaning of qualitative material.236 This is done by classifying data into categories that are inductively produced.237 QCA puts great emphasis on the contextual meaning of texts. That is to say that the method provides an analysis of both manifest and latent meanings of texts.238 QCA is not based on any theoretical assumption about reality.239 It is therefore possible to use QCA alongside discourse analysis without encountering ontological incompatibilities between the two methods. In the case of the current study, QCA is employed to provide a thick description of the content and context of donor countries‟ political statements on the Iranian nuclear issue and counter-narcotics cooperation with Iran. This proves to be a necessary step in the conduct of our discourse analysis of the paradox of European governments and Japan‟s nuclear and counter-narcotics policies towards Iran. Indeed, QCA allows us to contextualize the political statements of donor countries before proceeding with discourse analysis.

2.2 Discourse Analysis

Discourse analysis is a methodological approach to social sciences that analyses talk, texts and other forms of communicative events in order to uncover how social reality is constructed through the use of language.240 Discourse analysis is a broad methodological

234 Mikael Nygard, “Competent Actors or Vulnerable Objects? Constructions of Children and State Intervention among Finnish Politicians in Relation to the Child Protection Act 1983 and 2006,” Social Policy & Administration 43, no. 5 (October 2009), 470. 235 Margrit Schreier, Qualitative Content Analysis in Practice (London: Sage Publications, 2012), 3. 236 Ibid. 237 Jale Tosun, “Political Parties and Marine Pollution Policy: Exploring the Case of Germany,” Marine Policy 35, (2011), 538. 238 Margrit Schreier, Op. Cit., 16; and Mikael Nygard, Op. Cit., 470. 239 Margrit Schreier, Op. Cit., 47. 240 Alan Bryman, Social Research Methods (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 711.

category that comprises a number of more specific methods.241 These include, among others, pragmatics, conversation analysis, critical discourse analysis, narrative semiotics and grounded theory.242 Discourse analysis is therefore not a specific method for the analysis of texts and talk. Indeed, the choice of a specific method of inquiry remains to be made once discourse analysis has been adopted as a methodological approach.243 Despite its large embrace, discourse analysis is nonetheless characterized by a number of key analytical assumptions.244 Firstly, it contends that discourses are systems of meaning that are constitutive of social reality.245 That is to say that a discourse is the construction of an object, situation or subject X as Y.246 Secondly, discourse analysis contends that discourses are socially constructed.247 Thirdly, discourse analysis contends that discourses shape the behaviour of social agents.248 As Nicole Detraz has underlined in her analysis of discourses on security and environment, discourses “delimit the realm of understanding, action and imagination within a certain framework,” thus making certain courses of action possible while inhibiting others.249 This is what Anna Holzscheiter has referred to as “the power of discourse.250” Discourse analysts, by positioning “the power of discourse” at the centre of

241 Vincent Pouliot, “Sobjectivism: Towards a Constructivist Methodology,” International Quarterly 51, no. 2 (2007), 370. 242 Stefan Titscher, Michael Meyer, Ruth Wodak and Eva Vetter, Methods of Discourse Analysis (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2000), 51. 243 Antje Wiener, “Enacting Meaning-in-use: Qualitative Research on Norms and International Relations,” Review of International Studies 35, no. 1 (2009), 186. 244 Vincent Pouliot, Op. Cit., 371; and Antje Wiener, Op. Cit., 186. 245 Anna Holzscheiter, “Power of Discourse or Discourse of the Powerful?: The Reconstruction of Global Childhood Norms in the Drafting of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child,” Journal of Language and Politics 10, no. 1 (2011), 4; Vincent Pouliot, Op. Cit., 371; and Mark C. J. Stoddart, “They Say It‟ll Kill Me… But They Won‟t Say When! Drug Narratives in Comic Books,” Journal of Criminal Justice and Popular Culture 13, no. 2 (2006), 71. 246 Dirk Nabers, “Culture and Collective Action: Japan, Germany and the United States after 11 September 2001,” Cooperation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association 41, no. 3 (2006), 306; and Vincent Pouliot, Op. Cit., 373. 247 Mark C. J. Stoddart, Op. Cit., 71; Nicole Detraz, “Threats or Vulnerabilities? Assessing the Link Between Climate Change and Security,” Global Environmental Politics 11, no. 3 (2011), 105; and Dirk Nabers, Op. Cit, 306. 248 Charlotte Epstein, “Who Speaks? Discourse, the Subject and the Study of Identity in International Relations,” European Journal of International Relations 17, no. 2 (2010), 343. 249 Iver B. Neumann, “Discourse Analysis,” in Qualitative Methods in International Relations: A Pluralist Guide, ed. Audie Klotz and Deepa Prakash (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 62; Nicole Detraz, Op. Cit., 306; and Homeira Moshirzadeh, Op. Cit. 522. 250 Anna Holzscheiter, Op. Cit., 3.

their social inquiry, investigate how systems of meaning are constructed and how they delimit the field of possible action.251 Discourse analysis has been employed by a number of IR scholars, allowing them to illustrate how international norms have been constructed; how ideational structures and norms have shaped IR outcomes; and how international organizations have been constructed by the discourses of international actors. 252 Discourse analysis has also been employed by a number of criminologists, allowing them to illustrate how criminal behaviour and crime have been constructed in different sites of society; how criminals have drawn on discourses about criminality to construct their own identity; and how criminal offenders have constructed the crimes they committed. 253 In the case of the current research, discourse analysis is employed to illustrate how systems of meaning on nuclear proliferation and narcotic drugs trafficking in Iran were constructed in the political statements of donor countries and how these ideational structures shaped two concurrent but incongruous outcomes of international relations.

2.3 Method of Data Collection

The governments of France, Ireland, the United Kingdom, Belgium, Japan, Italy, Germany all provided assistance to Iran‟s counter-narcotics efforts from 2007 to 2011. They also simultaneously followed a policy of nuclear isolation with Iran, implementing economic and diplomatic sanctions against Iran. Accordingly, these seven donor countries were retained as actors from which data was collected.

251 Anna Holzscheiter, Op. Cit., 4-5; Mark C. J. Stoddart, Op. Cit., 72; Charlotte Epstein, Op. Cit., 343; and Iver B. Neumann, Op. Cit., 62. 252 Anna Holzscheiter, Op. Cit., 22; Antje Wiener, Op. Cit., 176; Patricia M. Keilbach, “The Power of Words in International Relations: Birth of an Anti-Whaling Discourse,” Global Environmental Politics 9, no. 3 (2009), 139; Dirk Nabers, Op. Cit., 305; Mats Braun, “Talking Europe – The Dilemma of Sovereignty and Modernization,” Cooperation and Conflict: Journal of Nordic International Studies Organization 43, no. 4 (2008), 397; and Frédéric Mérand, “Social Representations in the European Security and Defence Policy,” Cooperation and Conflict: Journal of Nordic International Studies Organization 41, no. 2 (2007), 131. 253 Susan J. Lea and Nick Lynn, “Dialogic Reverberations: Police, Domestic Abuse and the Discontinuance of Cases,” Journal of Interpersonal Violence 27, no. 15 (2012), 3094; Gwen Hunnicutt and Kristy Humble Andrews, “Tragic Narratives in Popular Culture: Depictions of Homicide in Rap Music,” Sociological Forum 24, no. 3 (2009), 615; Elizabeth Comack and Salena Brickey, “Constituting the Violence of Criminalized Women,” Canadian Journal of Criminology and Criminal Justice 49, no. 1 (2007), 1; Mark C. J. Stoddart, Op. Cit., 66; and Sara Willet, Christine Griffin and Mark Torrance, “Snakes and Ladders: Upper-Middle Class Male Offenders Talk About Economic Crime,” Criminology 39, no. 2 (2001), 441.

To answer our first sub-question, how was the Iranian nuclear issue framed in the political statements of governments that provided counter-narcotics assistance to Iran, we looked for speeches, press releases and interviews on the websites of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the seven aforementioned countries. We also looked in the press for news articles reporting statements made by government officials. As a result of our primary research, we found: 849 entries on the website of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 1,035 entries in the press from 2007 to 2011; 54 entries on the website of the Irish Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade from 2007 to 2010 and 38 entries in the press from 2007 to 2011; 94 entries on the website of the British government from mid-2010 to December 2011 and 2,026 entries in the press from 2007 to 2011; 0 entry on the website of Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 94 entries in the press from 2007 to 2011; 42 entries on the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan and 290 entries in the press from 2007 to 2011; 102 entries on the website of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 289 entries in the press from 2007 to 2011; and 18 entries on the website of the German Federal Foreign Office and 1,462 entries in the press from 2007 to 2011. On aggregate, we found a total 6,393 of entries regarding the Iranian nuclear issue. In order to reduce the number of entries to a manageable sample, a number of choices were made. We first decided to limit ourselves to the statements that were reported in the press. We chose news articles over statements from the websites of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs since the former allowed us to cover all of the period under study and to document the positions of a variety of actors within the governments of donor countries and this, with greater simplicity and efficiency. The criteria of simplicity and efficiency proved important in making this choice given the considerable amount of data we had to process and the limited time and resources we had to do so. The speeches and press releases found on the websites of the Foreign Ministries of the seven donor countries were nonetheless not fully discarded. When pertinent, we selected them to complement the political statements we found in the press. In order to select the statements that we employed for analysis, we first went through all of the 5,234 entries found in the press and discarded all of those that did not record quotations from government officials. The number of entries was reduced to 138, with: 74 entries for France; 0 entry for Ireland; 27 entries for Britain; 0 entry for Belgium; 6

entries for Japan; 4 entries for Italy; and 27 entries for Germany. We then went through the articles retained and identified statements that were related or referred to key Iranian nuclear developments from 2007 to 2011. These included, among others, the adoption of UNSC resolutions, the publication of IAEA reports, the construction of new Iranian nuclear plants and talks between the P5+1 and Iran. A few statements depicting the “general” political positions of donor countries with regard to the Iranian nuclear issue were also selected. In the final, we chose a total of 26 statements from the governments of France, the UK, Japan, Italy and Germany. Table 2 provides the details of the statements retained for analysis. The title of the news articles, the countries associated with them, the name of the speakers, their government functions, the date of publication and the name of the publishers are presented.

Table 2. Donor countries‟ political statements on the Iranian nuclear issue Title Country Speaker Function Date Source “Merkel Says Iran Must Angela Meet all Demands over Germany Chancellor 02/10/2007 AFP Merkel Nuclear Programme” “Statement by Mr. Taro Aso, Minister for Foreign Ministry Affairs, on the Adoption Minister of of of the United Nations Japan Taro Aso Foreign 03/26/2007 Foreign Security Council Affairs Affairs of Resolution Concerning Japan Iran‟s Nuclear Issue” “Iran Nuclear Threat David Foreign „Serious‟: British PM‟s UK 12/04/2007 AFP Miliband Secretary Spokesman” “Iran Nuclear Activities Chief Ulrich Worrying Despite US Germany Government 12/05/2007 AFP Wilhelm Report: Germany” Spokesman “Sarkozy: Bombe Nucléaire Iranienne, Nicolas France President 06/14/2008 AFP Menace Inacceptable pour Sarkozy la Stabilité du Monde” “Les Essais de Missiles Foreign Iraniens Renforcent les Éric France Ministry 07/09/2008 AFP „Inquiétudes‟, Selon Chevallier Spokesman Paris” “Britain Labels Iran Foreign Missile Test UK 07/09/2008 AFP Office „Unwelcome‟” “Germany Urges Iran to Government Germany Thomas Steg 07/09/2008 AFP Stop „Sabre-Rattling‟” Spokesman “Nucléaire: Téhéran n‟a Ministry of „Pas Apporté la Réponse France Foreign 08/06/2008 AFP Attendue‟ (Paris)” Affairs “West Has „No Choice‟ Kim Junior Foreign But to Pursue Iran UK 08/06/2008 AFP Howells Minister Sanctions: Britain” “Japan Says it Shares Hirofumi Foreign Global Concerns on Iran Japan 05/02/2009 AFP Nakasone Minister Nuclear Drive” “Italy Backs Criticism of Ministry of Iran‟s Secret Nuclear Italy Foreign 09/25/2009 AFP Site” Affairs “Japan Condemns Iran Katsuya Foreign Japan 09/25/2009 AFP Nuclear Plant” Okada Minister “Nucléaire/Nouveau Site Iranien: „Développement François France Prime Minister 09/28/2009 AFP Grave et Révélateur‟ Fillon (Fillon)”

“IAEA Sends „Strongest David Foreign Possible Signal‟ to Iran: UK 11/27/2009 AFP Miliband Secretary Britain” “Nucléaire: Kouchner Bernard Foreign Juge „très Dangereux‟ que France 11/29/2009 AFP Kouchner Minister l‟Iran „s‟Entête‟ (Presse)” “Germany Says „Worried‟ Foreign by Iranian Enrichment Germany N/A Ministry 11/29/2009 AFP Plans” Spokeswoman “Iran Plans for New Foreign Office Enrichment Plants a UK N/A 11/29/2009 AFP Spokeswoman Serious Concern: Britain” “Iran Enrichment Plans a Foreign Office „Serious Concern‟: UK N/A 02/07/2010 AFP Spokeswoman Britain” “Britain Slams Iran‟s Foreign Office „Contradictory Rhetoric‟ UK N/A 02/08/2010 AFP Spokesman on Nuclear Row” “Germany Says Iran „Not Ulrich Government Germany 02/08/2010 AFP Prepared to Cooperate‟” Wilhelm Spokesman “World Patience over Gordon Iran „Not Inexhaustible‟: UK Prime Minister 02/11/2010 AFP Brown British PM” “Japan‟s Hatoyama Yukio Pressures Iran on Nuclear Japan Prime Minister 02/24/2010 AFP Hatoyama Plans” “Germany to Urge More Foreign Andreas „Pressure‟ over Iran Germany Ministry 11/07/2011 AFP Peschke Nuclear Plans” Spokesman “Germany „Alarmed‟ at Guido Foreign Iran Nuclear Drive, Germany 11/09/2011 AFP Westerwelle Minister Supports Sanctions” “La France Préconise de Nicolas Nouvelles Sanctions à France President 11/22/2011 AFP Sarkozy l‟Encontre de l‟Iran”

In order to provide an answer to our second sub-question, how was international assistance to Iran‟s counter-narcotics efforts justified by donor countries, we looked for speeches, press releases and interviews on the websites of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Interior and Defence of the seven donor countries. We also looked in the press for news articles reporting statements made by government officials on counter-narcotics cooperation with Iran. Donor countries did not advertise the assistance they provided to bolster Iran‟s counter-narcotics efforts. We only found a total of 9 statements on the topic. Table 3 provides further details on the statements analysed.

Table 3. Donor countries‟ political statements on counter-narcotics cooperation with Iran Title Country Speaker Function Date Source French French “Coopération Anti- France Embassy in 12/24/2007 Embassy in Drogue” Tehran Tehran “Interview with Minister Frattini: „We Ministry of Need to Prevent Franco Foreign Italy 05/16/2008 Foreign Tehran from Frattini Minister Affairs Becoming a Nuclear Power‟” “Afghanistan: Agenzia Frattini, Coinvolgere Franco Foreign Italy 06/26/2008 Giornalistica Iran Contro Frattini Minister Italia Narcotraffico” Country Report from German Chair of the Council of the the mini-Dublin Group Germany Delegation mini-Dublin 07/03/2009 European on Iran in Tehran Group on Iran Union “Droga: Ganzer, Iran Agenzia Giampaolo General of the Molto Attivo Contro Italy 06/21/2010 Giornalistica Ganzer Carabinieri Trafficanti” Italia Country Report from German Chair of the Council of the the mini-Dublin Group Germany Delegation mini-Dublin 09/21/2010 European on Iran in Tehran Group on Iran Union “Frattini: „Italy Seeks Ministry of Dialogue with Iran. Franco Foreign Italy 09/26/2010 Foreign The US and Israel Frattini Minister Affairs Trust Us‟” “German Envoy German Fars News Lauds Iran‟s Anti- Germany Bernd Erbel Envoy to 01/24/2011 Agency Drug Efforts” Tehran German Chair of the Council of the Country Report on Germany Delegation mini-Dublin 05/27/2011 European Iran in Tehran Group on Iran Union

In order to document the answer to our third sub-question, how did Iran respond both to nuclear isolation and counter-narcotics cooperation, we looked exclusively at news articles reporting political statements made by Iranian officials on these two issues. We chose to do so because speeches and press releases were not readily available on the English websites of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Interior and DCHQ. It would have required a commensurate amount of time, which we did not have, to search into the Persian government websites and translate statements into English. Furthermore, the number of articles found in the press was largely sufficient to answer our third sub-question.

We found 7,160 entries regarding the Iranian nuclear issue from 2007 to 2011. We decided to reduce this number by restricting our research to four media: the BBC Monitoring Services, Fars News Agency, Mehr News Agency and the Iranian Students News Agency. This decision allowed us to cover the positions of different actors within the Iranian government. As a result, the number of entries was reduced to 1,207. We then went through all of the entries and selected the ones that concerned key Iranian nuclear developments addressed in the political statements of France, the UK, Japan, Italy and Germany. The number of articles was then reduced to 196. We read the articles and retained the ones that contained statements that responded to the political statements of the aforementioned countries. In the final, 16 statements were employed for analysis. Table 4 provides detailed information about them.

Table 4. Iranian political statements on the nuclear issue Title Speaker Function Date Source “Iran‟s Peaceful Nuclear BBC Mahmoud Program Transparent to President 02/01/2007 Monitoring Ahmadinejad All – Ahmadinezhad” Middle East “Resolution Unnecessary, BBC Unlawful and Manuchehr Foreign Minister 03/25/2007 Monitoring Unjustifiable – Iran Mottaki Newsfile Official” “US Intelligence Report BBC Proves Iran‟s Nuclear Manuchehr Foreign Minister 12/04/2007 Monitoring Activities Are Peaceful – Mottaki Middle East Official” “US Intelligence Report Seyed BBC Proves Non-Deviation in Foreign Ministry Mohammad Ali 12/04/2007 Monitoring Iran‟s Nuclear Work – Spokesman Hosseini Newsfile Spokesman” “Iran Says UN Sanctions BBC Manuchehr „Illegal‟, US Accountable Foreign Minister 03/26/2008 Monitoring Mottaki for Any Damage” Middle East “Resolution 1835 a BBC Political Statement, Foreign Ministry Hassan Qashqavi 09/29/2008 Monitoring Unjustifiable – Iran Spokesman Middle East Spokesman” “Iranian Spokesman Says BBC Uranium Enrichment to Foreign Ministry Hassan Qashqavi 09/29/2008 Monitoring Continue for Fuel Spokesman Middle East Production” “Nuclear Chief Says Ali Akbar Salehi Head of the 09/26/2009 BBC

Western Countries Atomic Energy Monitoring Speeches at G20 Organization of Middle East „Conspiracy against Iran (AEOI) Iran‟” Salehi: Iran to Build 10 N. Plants in Response to Fars News Ali Akbar Salehi Head of the AEOI 11/30/2009 West‟s Offensive Agency Measures” “MP Downplays Western Fars News Jafar Qaderi MP 12/01/2009 Pressures on Iran” Agency “Mottaki Reiterates Manuchehr Fars News Iran‟s Resolve to Foreign Minister 12/09/2009 Mottaki Agency Continue N. Progress” “Iran Will Not Back Mehr News Down, Even if Ali Larijani Majlis Speaker 06/02/2010 Agency Sanctioned: Larijani” “Tehran Censures Mahmoud Mehr News Security Council President 06/11/2010 Ahmadinejad Agency Sanctions Resolution” “Tehran Insists on Mehr News Continued 20% Uranium Ali Larijani Majlis Speaker 06/16/2010 Agency Enrichment” “Any Sanctions on Iran Mehr News Will Be Met with Bitter Ali Larijani Majlis Speaker 11/11/2011 Agency Response: Larijani” “Official Says EU Threats Ramin Foreign Ministry Mehr News of New Iran Sanctions 11/30/2011 Mehmanparast Spokesman Agency Are Psy-War”

With regard to counter-narcotics cooperation, we first looked for news articles on narcotic drugs in Iran. We had to do so since the research criteria “drug cooperation”, “drug” and “cooperation”, “narcotics” and “cooperation”, and the likes did not provide fruitful results. We found 1,346 entries regarding narcotic drugs in Iran in the BBC Monitoring Services, Mehr News Agency, Fars News Agency and the Iranian Students News Agency from 2007 to 2011. We went through all of the entries and identified the ones that contained statements on international counter-narcotics cooperation. As a result, the number of entries was reduced to 52. We then read all of the news articles and retained only the ones that made reference to the international assistance provided to Iran by the governments of France, Ireland, the UK, Belgium, Japan, Italy and Germany. We also included two articles from non-Iranian media that we encountered while defining the parameters of our research. A total of 8 political statements made by Iranian officials from

2008 to 2011 were retained for analysis. Table 5 provides further details on these statements.

Table 5. Iranian political statements on the international assistance to Iran‟s counter- narcotics efforts Title Speaker Function Date Source “Failed Afghan Drug Deputy Foreign The Policy Harming Us, Says Mehdi Safari 09/11/2008 Minister Guardian Iran” “Iran: Senior Diplomat Trend Hossein Vice-Ambassador to Calls for Help to Stop 07/24/2009 News Moghaddam Italy Drug Trade” Agency “Official: No Foreign Deputy Head of Iran‟s Fars News Assistance Rendered to Taha Taheri 11/07/2010 DCHQ Agency Iran‟s War on Drug” “Iran, Afghanistan Mostafa Fars News Agree to Boost Anti- Mohammad- Interior Minister 12/30/2010 Agency Narcotics Cooperation” Najjar “Iran to Boost Int‟l Mostafa Fars News Cooperation on Drug Mohammad- Interior Minister 12/30/2010 Agency Campaign” Najjar “Iran Calls for Change Mostafa Fars News in West‟s Drug- Mohammad- Interior Minister 02/20/2011 Agency Campaign Policies” Najjar “Iran Complains About Mostafa World‟s Meagre Support Fars News Mohammad- Interior Minister 07/18/2011 for Anti-Narcotic Agency Najjar Efforts” “Official Urges Europe‟s Director-General of Stronger Share in Masoud Iran‟s Drug Campaign Fars News 09/16/2011 Campaign against Zahedian Headquarter for Agency Drugs” Executive Affairs

2.4 Analysis Grid

Table 6 presents the analytical codes that were employed to proceed with data analysis. They are organized by actors (donor countries vs. Iran) and by topics (Iran‟s nuclear issue vs. counter-narcotics cooperation). The analytical codes were induced from our research material. They were developed manually as a result of careful reading, coding and sorting of analytical categories.

Table 6. Analytical codes Donor countries Iran Iran‟s nuclear Counter-narcotics Iran‟s nuclear Counter-narcotics issue cooperation issue cooperation Nuclear program Cooperation Nuclear program Cooperation Nuclear activities Coordination Nuclear activities Partnership Uranium Collaboration Uranium enrichment International assistance enrichment Nuclear plant Support Nuclear plant Material assistance Nuclear facilities Essential Nuclear facilities Training Nuclear weapons Mutually beneficial Nuclear weapons Financial support Atomic bomb Challenging Nuclear issue Insignificant International Ballistic missiles Nuclear energy Little community Nuclear Common interests Iranian nation Europe proliferation Fight against drug Insecurity National interest United States trafficking Development & Threat Counter-narcotics United Nations progress Intentions Iran International law International community Obligations Partner Rules & regulations The West Fight against drug Resolutions Political will Rights trafficking Isolation Good Resolutions Counter-narcotics Sanctions Strong Sanctions Shared responsibility Pressure The West Iran Negotiations Conspiracy Political will Talks Plot Alone Engagement Enemies Dialogue Bullying powers Diplomacy Threats Cooperation Harm Damage Negotiations Cooperation Inspections

The analytical codes presented above proved central in the conduct of our qualitative content analysis of the political statements of donor countries on the Iranian nuclear issue and counter-narcotics cooperation with Iran, the results of which will now be presented in details in Chapter 4.

CHAPTER 4 THE POLITICS OF NUCLEAR ISOLATION AND COUNTER-NARCOTICS COOPERATION WITH IRAN, 2007-2011

The policies and public discourses of the protagonists of the Iranian nuclear crisis have been, for the most part, analysed by scholars on an individual country basis. This strategy has allowed them to provide in depth analyses of the phenomenon. Yet, it has presented the disadvantage of taking them out of their context. The political statements of nuclear protagonists were and are intimately interwoven with those of their allies and antagonists. As the findings of our qualitative content analysis illustrate, despite the fact that donor countries and Iran did usually not engage in direct one-on-one communications, they did nonetheless sustain some form of conversation through their public discourses on the Iranian nuclear issue.

1. The Politics of Nuclear Confrontation: Qualitative Content Analysis of Donor Countries‟ Political Statements on the Iranian Nuclear Issue

The Iranian nuclear issue is a very contentious one. Despite the fact that all of the donor countries expressed the wish to see a diplomatic resolution of the crisis, their policy responses were constrained by a number of domestic and external factors, with the result that they were stuck against themselves in escalating political tensions. The results of our qualitative content analysis are presented in a chronological order, covering a period that extends from 2007 to 2011. Our analysis covers exclusively this five-year period since the majority of the international assistance pledged by donor countries to support Iran‟s counter-narcotics efforts under the UNODC Iran Strategic Programme Framework 2005- 2007 was provided between 2007 and 2011. A chronological presentation of our results was favoured to a country-based approach as it allows to put the political statements of

donor countries in relation to one another, thus highlighting the contrasts and similarities between them.

1.1 2007: “Normalized” Level of Political Tensions

On February 10, 2007, the German Chancellor Angela Merkel called on Iran to conform with the demands of the international community over its nuclear program without preconditions, objections or schemes. The German Chancellor warned that if Iran did not do so, it would face further international isolation. Angela Merkel added: “we are all determined to prevent the threat of an Iran with a military nuclear programme.254” This statement was made on the occasion of the 43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy. Iran‟s nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani was scheduled to give a speech the next day, on February 11, 2007, along with the US Defense Secretary Robert Gates. The conference was held two months after a first round of international sanctions had been approved by the UNSC in order to induce Iran to halt its uranium enrichment program. However, Iran refused to respond to the demands formulated by the international community under UNSC Resolution 1737. Angela Markel‟s statement sent a clear warning to Iranian authorities that they would face further international isolation if they continued along their nuclear path. On March 24, 2007, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1747, which imposed an arms embargo on Iran. Japan welcomed this decision and declared in a political statement that was published on the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan on March 25, 2007:

Japan considers it deplorable that Iran has not answered the requirements in U.N. resolutions including the suspension of enrichment and reprocessing activities, and plans related to heavy water. Japan strongly hopes that the issue will be solved peacefully through negotiations and intends to seize every opportunity to urge Iran to accept these requirements and return to the negotiation process as soon as possible.255

254 “Merkel Says Iran Must Meet all Demands over Nuclear Programme,” Agence France Presse, February 10, 2007. 255 “Statement by Mr. Taro Aso, Minister for Foreign Affairs on the United Nations Security Council Resolution Concerning Iran‟s Nuclear Issue,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, March 25, 2007, accessed April 11, 2013, http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2007/3/1172928_822.html.

The statement presented above is emblematic of the position of the Japanese government on the Iranian nuclear issue. It condemned Iran‟s sensitive nuclear activities, welcomed international diplomatic efforts and invited Iranian authorities to resume nuclear talks with the international community to resolve outstanding issues. On December 3, 2007, the United States released an intelligence report in which they indicated that Iran had halted its nuclear weapons program since 2003. The UK responded to this report by issuing a statement on December 4, 2007 in which it reiterated that Iran‟s nuclear program “pose[d] a serious security threat.256” When asked by reporters whether the new US intelligence report decreased the risks of a military action against Iran, Foreign Secretary David Miliband answered that the British government and the international community were:

100 percent focused... on a diplomatic resolution. […] None of us want to see Iran as a nuclear proliferator. […] We are happy to work with them to show there are benefits for them from pursuing an anti-proliferation course, but we have got to be clear there are negative consequences if they pursue enrichment which could lead to a nuclear weapons programme. […] It is not a matter of saying that Iran shouldn‟t have energy security. What it can‟t be is a source of political insecurity.257

Despite the publication of an intelligence report that downplayed the threat posed by Iran‟s nuclear program, the British Foreign Secretary issued a political statement that was centered on the security threat posed by Iran‟s potential detention of nuclear weapons. Similarly, the German Chief Government Spokesman Ulrich Wilhelm declared during a press conference held on December 5, 2007 that Germany remained concerned about Iran‟s nuclear program despite the recent publication of a new US intelligence report. The German official pointed out that Iran had not stopped its uranium enrichment program and had refused to follow the two resolutions adopted by the UNSC.258 The Government Spokesman added: “diplomatic pressure must therefore be maintained on Iran, along with a

256 “Iran Nuclear Threat „Serious‟: British PM‟s Spokesman,” Agence France Presse, December 4, 2007. 257 Ibid. 258 “Iran Nuclear Activities Worrying Despite US Report: Germany,” Agence France Presse, December 5, 2007.

readiness to cooperate with the Islamic Republic if it agrees to halt enrichment.259” Russia and China had suggested earlier that the US report reduced the need for further international sanctions against Iran. Yet, Ulrich Wilhelm‟s statement illustrated that the publication of the December 2007 US intelligence report did not diffuse the threat posed by Iran‟s nuclear program to the eyes of German authorities.

1.2 2008: Nuclear Talks Prove Inconclusive

The year 2008 was marked by a relaxation of international tensions surrounding the Iranian nuclear issue. Proposals for nuclear negotiations were exchanged between Iranian authorities and the P5+1 in mid-2008. A meeting was scheduled to take place in Geneva in July 2008. Prior to the Geneva talks, French President Nicolas Sarkozy declared on June 14, 2008:

L‟obtention par l‟Iran de la bombe nucléaire est inacceptable, c‟est clair. C‟est une menace inacceptable pour la stabilité du monde, surtout rapportée aux déclarations répétées du président actuel de l‟Iran. L‟Iran a le droit comme tous les autres pays du monde au nucléaire civil et nous sommes prêts à les aider […] Pour le nucléaire civil, la porte du dialogue est ouverte très largement, tout de suite, et sans condition. Pour le nucléaire militaire, la réponse ce sera des sanctions et l‟unité de la communauté internationale.260

This statement was made on the occasion of a press conference held conjointly at the Élysée Palace with US President George Bush. Nicolas Sarkozy‟s utterance illustrated the general position of the French government on the Iranian nuclear issue. The potential for Iranian nuclear bombs was presented as a threat to international stability and international sanctions were depicted as the right solution to the problem posed by the country‟s nuclear ambitions. A month later, Iran announced that it had made ballistic missile test-firings. This announcement came out shortly after Iran and the P5+1 had initiated a new round of

259 “Iran Nuclear Activities Worrying Despite US Report: Germany,” Op. Cit. 260 “Sarkozy: Bombe Nucléaire Iranienne, Menace Inacceptable pour la Stabilité du Monde,” Agence France Presse, June, 14, 2008.

negotiations on the Iranian nuclear issue. The Spokesman of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs Eric Chevallier responded to this announcement by declaring on July 9, 2008:

Nous accueillons avec préoccupation les annonces iraniennes selon lesquelles l‟Iran aurait procédé à plusieurs tirs de missiles dont un missile balistique de portée intermédiaire de type Shahab 3. […] Ces essais de missiles ne peuvent que renforcer les inquiétudes de la communauté internationale au moment où parallèlement l‟Iran développe un programme nucléaire [qui comprend des activités qui pourraient être liées à la conception et à la fabrication d‟armes nucléaires].261

The French official concluded by calling on Iran to cooperate more seriously with the international community in order to resolve the nuclear crisis. The British Foreign Office also issued a statement that said that Iran‟s firing-tests were “unwelcomed” and reinforced the United Kingdom‟s concerns with Iranian intentions.262 For his part, the German Government Spokesman Thomas Steg called on Iran to “refrain from any kind of sabre- rattling.263” The German official said during a press conference that was held on July 9, 2008 that Berlin was particularly worried about the fact that the missiles Iran had tested could carry nuclear warheads. Thomas Steg reiterated the willingness of the German government to negotiate with Iran and called on the Iranian government to “undertake confidence-building measures, refrain from actions that would escalate the situation and finally fulfill the commitments laid out by the UN Security Council and its resolutions.264” The French, British and German statements illustrated the concerns of these three European nuclear negotiators with Iran‟s nuclear ambitions. Their officials were all profoundly shocked that Iran could have made ballistic missile test-firings only ten days prior to the beginning of the Geneva talks. In the final, the July 2008 Geneva talks were inconclusive. French and British officials expressed their regrets that Iranian authorities chose the path of isolation rather than cooperation in political statements that were reported on August 6, 2008.265

261 “Les Essais de Missiles Iraniens Renforcent les „Inquiétudes‟, Selon Paris,” Agence France Presse, July 9, 2008. 262 “Britain Labels Iran Missile Test „Unwelcome‟,” Agence France Presse, July 9, 2008. 263 “Germany Urges Iran to Stop „Sabre-rattling‟,” Agence France Presse, July 9, 2008. 264 Ibid. 265 “Nucléaire: Téhéran n‟a „Pas Apporté la Réponse Attendue‟ (Paris),” Agence France Presse, August 6,

1.3 2009: Stalemate and Shattered Confidence

Following the 2008 Geneva talks, the negotiation process stalled for roughly 14 months. A new offer for nuclear talks was made by the P5+1 to Iran in April 2009. A month later, the Japanese Foreign Minister Hirofumi Nakasone declared: “Japan voices common concerns of the international community on Iran‟s nuclear issue and wants the issue to be solved based on UN resolutions.266” Hirofumi Nakasone‟s statement was made on the occasion of a joint press conference held with Iran‟s Foreign Minister Manuchehr Mottaki on May 2, 2009. The Japanese official took the occasion to urge Iran to take positive steps towards the resolution of the nuclear issue. However, the Iranian Foreign Minister brushed off Hirofumi Nakasone‟s comment, saying that Iran‟s nuclear program was fully legal and peaceful. The Japanese Foreign Minister‟s statement was an explicit invitation to Iranian authorities to respond positively to the P5+1 offer to resume the nuclear negotiation process. However, Japan‟s diplomatic efforts were fruitless as Iran rejected the P5+1 offer for nuclear talks three weeks later. On September 25, 2009, Iranian authorities revealed the existence of a secret nuclear plant located near Qom. The French Prime Minister François Fillon responded to this announcement by declaring during a press conference held on September 28, 2009 that it was a “développement grave et révélateur.267” Italy joined the wagon of international criticism by issuing a statement in which it said: “Italy is opposed to Iran developing a nuclear military programme and calls on Tehran to clarify its nuclear programme.268” For his part, the Japanese Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada commented: “It is regrettable to know that Iran was newly building a uranium enrichment facility without reporting it, Iran must take all necessary measures to gain the trust of international community, including implementation of a series of UN Security Council resolutions.269” The Japanese official

2008; and “West Has „No Choice‟ But to Pursue Iran Sanctions: Britain,” Agence France Presse, August 6, 2008. 266 “Japan Says it Shares Global Concerns on Iran Nuclear Drive,” Agence France Presse, May 2, 2009. 267 “Nucléaire/Nouveau Site Iranien: „Développement Grave et Révélateur‟ (Fillon),” Agence France Presse, September 28, 2009. 268 “Italy Backs Criticism of Iran‟s Secret Nuclear Site,” Agence France Presse, September 25, 2009. 269 “Japan Condemns Iran Nuclear Plant,” Agence France Presse, September 25, 2009.

called on Iran to “respond positively and make concrete progress in resolving the issue270” during talks that would be held in Geneva on October 1st between Iran and the P5+1. The Japanese statement was made during a Group of Twenty (G20) summit held in Pittsburgh. The Japanese Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada had met earlier that week in New York with Iran‟s Foreign Minister Manuchehr Mottaki, who had reiterated that Iran refused to negotiate on its nuclear program. As the political statements of French, Italian and Japanese officials illustrated, the announcement made by Iran that it had built a new nuclear facility in defiance of IAEA and UNSC resolutions was not welcomed by the international community. However, it was neither represented as an imminent nor as a serious threat to international security in their political statements. Given the fact that Iran and the P5+1 were about to resume nuclear talks in Geneva within the coming week, French, Italian and Japanese officials might have wanted to avoid antagonizing Iranian authorities by making remarks that would have been negatively received by them. Following the adoption of an IAEA Resolution that called on Iran to comply with its international obligations on November 27, 2009, the British Foreign Secretary David Miliband declared:

The resolution passed today by the IAEA Board of Governors sends the strongest possible signal to Iran that its actions and intentions remain a matter of grave international concern. […] As the resolution makes clear, Iran needs to comply with its obligations both to the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) and to the UN Security Council. Unless it does this, it remains impossible for the international community to have any confidence in Iranian intentions. […] We are waiting for Iran to respond meaningfully. But if it is clear that Iran has chosen not to do so, we will have no alternative but to consider further pressure on Iran, in line with the dual track policy we have been pursuing.271

David Miliband‟s statement reiterated the concerns of the British government with Iranian atomic bombs. It underlined the UK‟s lack of confidence towards the Iranian government and affirmed the country‟s willingness to put further pressure on Iran in the case it failed to provide a positive answer to the reiterated demands of the international community. The

270 “Japan Condemns Iran Nuclear Plant,” Op. Cit. 271 “IAEA Sends „Strongest Possible Signal‟ to Iran: Britain,” Agence France Presse, November 27, 2009.

British Foreign Secretary‟s November 27, 2009 speech act marked a shift in the political statements of the British government towards a policy on the Iranian nuclear issue that advocated for further isolation of Iran. Two days later, Iran announced that it planned to build 10 new nuclear plants and enrich 20 per cent purity uranium. The French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner responded to this new provocation by declaring: “Que l‟Iran s‟entête à ignorer les demandes d‟une grande agence indépendante comme l‟AIEA, c‟est tout de même très dangereux.272” The German government expressed “worry” while the British Foreign Office Spokeswoman commented: “reports that Iran is considering building more enrichment facilities are clearly a matter of serious concern. It would be a deliberate breach of five UN Security Council resolutions.273” The political statements made by the three European nuclear negotiators illustrated that they were profoundly dismayed by the Iranian government‟s defiant behaviour.

1.4 2010: Escalating Rhetoric against Iran‟s Nuclear Program

In early February 2010, Iran confirmed that it planned to produce 20 per cent enriched uranium. The British Foreign Office Spokeswoman responded to this announcement by declaring on February 7, 2010: “Reports that Iran is planning to enrich some of their fuel to 20 percent level of enrichment are clearly a matter of serious concern. This would be a deliberate breach of five UNSCRs.274” A day later, the Foreign Office Spokesman slammed Iran for being inconsistent. The British official commented:

President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad suggested last week that Iran might accept the deal proposed by the IAEA last October to send fuel abroad for enriching. A few days later he has rejected that proposal and ordered that Iran increase its enrichment to 20 percent from tomorrow. These latest statements by Iran are deeply worrying. […] Instead, enriching to 20 percent would just add to the catalogue of concerns about a nuclear programme with no civilian application,

272 “Nucléaire: Kouchner Juge „très Dangereux‟ que l‟Iran „s‟Entête‟ (Presse),” Agence France Presse, November 29, 2009. 273 “Germany Says „Worried‟ by Iranian Enrichment Plans,” Agence France Presse, November 29, 2009; and “Iran Plans for New Enrichment Plants a Serious Concern: Britain,” Agence France Presse, November 29, 2009. 274 “Iran Enrichment Plans a „Serious Concern‟: Britain,” Agence France Presse, February 7, 2010.

in a country building nuclear facilities in secret and refusing to answer IAEA questions about weapons related activity. It is time for Iran to move away from contradictory rhetoric and to start engaging with the IAEA and the international community. Iran needs to address the legitimate concerns […] and to start restoring trust in its intentions.275

On February 11, 2010, the British Prime Minister Gordon Brown said, regarding the most recent Iranian announcement:

I think the choice could not be clearer. Iran can either pursue a civilian nuclear programme, respect human rights and earn the trust and respect of the international community. Or it can move ahead with its nuclear weapons programme, trample on human rights and be isolated and ostracized on the wrong side of history, outside the international community. […] Now I want dialogue with Iran but the patience of our countries is not inexhaustible and we are stepping up our discussions with other countries about sanctions imposed on Iran. It is not what we want to do but we have an accelerated programme of talks with other countries about sanctions.276

The three statements presented above illustrated that British officials were becoming increasingly exasperated with Iran‟s lack of cooperation with the international community. Britain remained open to dialogue with Iran, although it grew increasingly disillusioned with the positive outcomes that could result from engagement with Iran. Germany also condemned the Iranian announcement. The Government Spokesman Ulrich Wilhelm said in this regard:

The statements and announcements of the Iranian leadership at the weekend demonstrate, in our opinion, that Iran apparently continues to refuse to accept the offer of the IAEA and is not prepared to cooperate. The German government continues to support a twin-track approach: making Iran an offer if it agrees to cooperate with the demands of the international community and, on the other hand [...] increasing the pressure through sanctions.277

275 “Britain Slams Iran‟s „Contradictory Rhetoric‟ on Nuclear Row,” Agence France Presse, February 8, 2010. 276 “World Patience over Iran „Not Inexhaustible‟: British PM,” Agence France Presse, February 11, 2010. 277 “Germany Says Iran „Not Prepared to Cooperate‟,” Agence France Presse, February 8, 2010.

Ulrich Wilhelm‟s statement was made on February 8, 2010, a few days immediately after Iran had made its controversial announcement. At the time, the negotiation process between the P5+1 and Iran had stalled and the nuclear rhetoric of the Iranian government had become increasingly more confrontational. The statement made by the Government Spokesman illustrated that Germany felt obligated by the political circumstances surrounding the Iranian nuclear issue to increase international pressure on Iran in a bid to bring the country back to the negotiation table. For his part, the Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama urged Iran‟s Parliamentary Speaker Ali Larijani to prove to the world the peaceful nature of Iran‟s nuclear program by implementing UNSC resolutions and fully cooperating with the IAEA and remove any doubts regarding the military dimension of Iran‟s nuclear program.278 The Japanese demand was made on the occasion of a visit by Ali Larijani to Japan on February 24, 2010. Yukio Hatoyama also expressed his desire for Larijani to see the “horrors” left by atomic bombs during a visit to Nagasaki.279 Once again, the Japanese government‟s nuclear diplomacy proved the be vain as the Iranian official defended the country‟s nuclear program and rejected the claims that it was trying to acquire nuclear weapons.

1.5 2011: Political Tensions Rise to New Heights

In January 2011, a new round of nuclear talks was held between Iran and the P5+1 in Istanbul. However, the negotiations proved once again to be inconclusive. From January to November 2011, the diplomatic process came to a standstill and Western governments convened in search for means to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue. Prior to the publication of an UN report on Iran‟s nuclear program, the German Foreign Ministry Spokesman Andreas Peschke commented on November 7, 2011:

It is clear to us that if this report should show that Iran has still taken no credible measures to fulfill its international commitments with regard to the transparency of its nuclear programme, then the German government will call for greater political and diplomatic pressure so Iran will fulfill its international

278 “Japan‟s Hatoyama Pressures Iran on Nuclear Plans,” Agence France Presse, February 24, 2010. 279 Ibid.

commitments. That remains for us the decisive way to contend with this danger to regional and international security.280

Following the release of the UN report, the German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle declared: “The detailed signs concerning a possible military dimension of the Iranian nuclear programme are alarming […] If Iran continues to refuse to conduct serious negotiations on its nuclear programme, new, more severe sanctions would be inevitable.281” Less than two weeks later, the French President issued a press release in which he demanded for sanctions “d’une ampleur sans précédent” against Iran.282 As these three political statements from the governments of Germany and France illustrated, due to the repeated failures of the negotiation process and the fastened development of Iran‟s nuclear programme, Western governments were now seriously considering the imposition of draconian sanctions against Iran in order to resolve the nuclear issue. The years 2007-2011 were marked by a constant escalation of the international crisis surrounding Iran‟s nuclear program. From 2007 to 2009, donor countries engaged in a multilateral negotiation process with Iran to resolve the nuclear issue. The political statements analyzed illustrated that while condemning Iran‟s nuclear activities, they truly believed that a negotiated resolution of the Iranian nuclear issue was within reach. However, from 2010 to 2011, their political statements illustrated that they grew increasingly disillusioned with the diplomatic process and now perceived the imposition of international sanctions against Iran as necessary and inevitable.

2. The Politics of Counter-Narcotics Cooperation: Qualitative Content Analysis of Donor Countries‟ Political Statements on their Assistance to Iran‟s Counter-Narcotics Efforts

As much as it was easy to document the positions of donor countries on the Iranian nuclear issue, as much was it difficult to record their justification of the assistance they provided to

280 “Germany to Urge More „Pressure‟ over Iran Nuclear Plans,” Agence France Presse, November 7, 2011. 281 “Germany „Alarmed‟ at Iran Nuclear Drive, Supports Sanctions,” Agence France Presse, November 9, 2011. 282 “La France Préconise de Nouvelles Sanctions à l‟Encontre de l‟Iran,” Agence France Presse, November 22, 2011.

Iran‟s counter-narcotics efforts. This situation reinforces the paradox scrutinized. The results of our qualitative content analysis presented below are organized by donor countries and presented in a chronological order. This approach allows to better represent the positions of donor countries on the question of international drug cooperation with Iran.

2.1 Italy: Favourable to Strong Counter-Narcotics Cooperation with Iran

A total of four Italian statements on the topic of international drug cooperation with Iran were analysed. These utterances were made by two political figures: Franco Frattini and Giampaolo Ganzer. Franco Frattini was Italy‟s Foreign Minister from 2002 to 2011. Giampaolo Ganzer was the General of the Carabinieri, the military police, and the Commander of the Raggruppamento Operativo Speciale (ROS), the Carabinieri’s special unit on organized crime and terrorism. The four political statements analysed were all reported in the Italian press. During an interview with La Repubblica, an Italian daily newspaper, Italy‟s Foreign Minister was asked by a journalist named Nigro di Vicenzon: “How will the Berlusconi government view its relations with Iran?” A question to which Franco Frattini answered:

The same way as the Iranian government will view its relations with us. On the nuclear question, we take the same position as the European countries and the United States. But on issues such as the stabilisation of Iraq, drug trafficking from Afghanistan or the stabilisation in the Middle East, we can see common interests on which we can work together.283

The interview was related in a news article that was published on May 16, 2008. It was retrieved from the website of the Italian Foreign Ministry under the press archives section. It occurred after the Berlusconi government had announced a decisive change in its policy towards the Iranian nuclear issue and had demanded to join the P5+1. In 2003, the Italian government decided that it would not be part of the group of European negotiators that

283 Di Vicenzo Nigro, “Interview with Minister Frattini: „We Need to Prevent Tehran from Becoming a Nuclear Power‟,” Farnesina Ministero degli Affari Esteri, May 16, 2008, accessed April 7, 2013, http://www.esteri.it/MAE/EN/Sala_Stampa/ArchivioNotizie/Interviste/2008/05/20080516_TeheranPotenza.ht m.

would hold nuclear talks with Iran.284 As a result, Italy was left out of the negotiation process that occurred first between the E3 and Iran and, later on, between the five permanent members of the UNSC plus Germany (P5+1) and Iran. This situation allowed Italy to maintain good bilateral relations with Iran, particularly in the field of counter- narcotics cooperation. By 2008, Italy was the only Western country that had been allowed by the Iranian government to post Drug Liaison Officers (DLO) in Iran.285 Franco Frattini‟s statement illustrated the political will of the Italian government to engage in counter- narcotics cooperation with Iran and this, independently of developments on the Iranian nuclear dossier. A month later, Franco Frattini declared that Iran could play a positive role in the fight against the traffic of drugs that originate from Afghanistan [“l’Iran potrebbe giocare un ruolo positivo nella lotta al traffico di droga che parte dall’Afghanistan.286”] This statement was made on the occasion of a diner with the Group of Eight (G8) envoys held in Tokyo. It was reported by the Agenzia Giornalistica Italia in a news article that was published on June 26, 2008. In this speech act, Iran was explicitly represented by Italy‟s Foreign Minister as a positive actor in the fight against the Afghan drug trade. Throughout May and June 2008, the P5+1 and Iran had exchanged proposals for a new round of nuclear negotiations. In this context of revitalized diplomatic initiatives to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue, Franco Frattini‟s statement was an open invitation to G8 members to expand their counter-narcotics cooperation with Iran. In June 2010, General Giampaolo Ganzer declared: “L’Iran è un paese molto attivo nel contrasto al traffico di droga che avviene sugli oltre mille chilometri di confine con l’Afghanistan costato un elevato contributo di vite umane.287 [Iran is a country that is very active in the fight against the trafficking of illicit drugs, which takes place on the border with Afghanistan and has borne a heavy cost in terms of human lives.]” Giampaolo Ganzer‟s statement was made following the publication of an UN report on the globalization of crime. It was reported by the Agenzia Giornalistica Italia in a news article that was published on June 21, 2010. In June 2010, the UNODC office in Tehran had

284 Di Vicenzo Nigro, Op. Cit. 285 German Delegation, Op. Cit., (2009), 17. 286 “Afghanistan: Frattini, Coinvolgere Iran Control Narcotraffico,” Agenzia Giornalistica Italia, June 26, 2008. 287 “Droga: Ganzer, Iran Molto Attivo Contro Trafficanti,” Agenzia Giornalistica Italia, June 21, 2010.

launched consultations with the Iranian government and donor countries to design a new UNODC country program on Iran. Yet, concurrently to that, the UNSC had passed a new resolution, imposing a fourth round of international sanctions on Iran. Regardless of the nuclear context, Iran was presented in the General‟s statement as a country that played an active role in the fight against the Afghan drug trade, suggesting that Italy viewed counter- narcotics cooperation with Iran in a positive eye. In an interview with La Nazione, an Italian daily newspaper, Franco Frattini told reporter Giampaolo Pioli:

It‟s no secret that Italy is seeking to revive once strong bilateral relations with Iran. Above all with regard to direct collaboration on combating drug traffic and terrorism at the Afghan borders. The Americans know this. I spoke about it with Hilary Clinton but I also explained it to other nations, and there is broad consensus. Because Italy proved reliable when the challenge of sanctions arose, and in the later European phase of additional sanctions, where we were in the forefront and not on the sidelines. Our American friends also know that if we succeed in obtaining an Iranian commitment on Afghanistan, it will be in everyone‟s interests. Besides, what else is there to do? Negotiations have stalled, the nuclear programme is going forward, the Group of 5+1 is stuck. So any attempt at encounter with Iranian diplomacy becomes positive and it is no accident that Italy is doing it, well-known as Israel‟s best friend in Europe but perhaps also in the world, therefore an absolutely unexpected country.288

Franco Frattini‟s statement was made on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) held in New York in September 2010. It was reported in an article that was retrieved from the website of the Italian Foreign Ministry. During the week of the UNGA, the Italian Foreign Minister reportedly held intensive bilateral meetings with his counterparts from different nations to discuss Afghanistan, Iran and the Middle East and to expose Italy‟s position to them.289 In 2010, the Iranian nuclear crisis had reached new heights of tension: the negotiation process had stalled and a fourth round of international sanctions had recently been imposed on Iran. Yet, consultations had been underway between the Iranian government and the members of the Mini-Dublin Group (MDG)

288 Giampaolo Pioli, “Frattini: „Italy Seeks Dialogue with Iran. The US and Israel Trust Us‟,” Farnesina Ministero degli Affari Esteri, September 26, 2010, accessed April 7, 2013, http://www.esteri.it/MAE/EN/Sala_Stampa/ArchivioNotizie/Interviste/2010/09/20100927_IntervFrattiniNY.h tm. 289 Ibid.

regarding the implementation of a new UNODC framework on international drug cooperation with Iran. In this context, the Italian government saw counter-narcotics cooperation as an opportunity to engage with the Iranian regime and to restore the strong bilateral relations it once held with Iran. Our qualitative content analysis of these four political statements on counter- narcotics cooperation with Iran underlined that Italy positively perceived cooperation with Iranian authorities in the field of drug control and tried to convince other members of the international community of the merits of engaging in this type of cooperation with Iran.

2.2 Germany: Conveying Positive Representations of Iran‟s Counter- Narcotics Efforts

A total of four German statements on international drug cooperation with Iran were analyzed. Three of them were retrieved from annual reports prepared by the German Embassy in Tehran for the Dublin Group while the fourth one consisted in a speech act made by Bernd Erbel, the German Envoy to Tehran. In its 2009 country report to the Dublin Group, the German Embassy in Tehran made the following comment:

The trend in cooperation with Iran, although not linear, is positive. Given the scope of the drug problem and its international characteristics, cross-border cooperation in this field appears as essential as it is mutually beneficial. However, the intensity of cooperation can change with the overall political situation, Iran‟s relations with the international community and bilateral relations with single MDG-members.290

The German report was written in mid-2009. It regarded activities that were implemented throughout the year 2008-2009. This period was punctuated by failed nuclear talks, the adoption of an UNSC resolution and a return to the negotiation table. Despite political tensions, international drug cooperation with Iran was presented to the Dublin Group by the German delegation as “positive”, “essential” and “mutually beneficial.” In its subsequent report to the Dublin Group, the German delegation noted that:

290 German Delegation, Op. Cit., (2009), 11.

Following a promising first half of 2009, the MDG‟s activities in terms of cooperation with the Iranian government came to a standstill after the Presidential elections in June 2009. Even in the field of counter-narcotics, where both sides share the same goal, the mutual ability and willingness to interact constructively with the international community was reduced to zero. Meanwhile, the implementation of UNODC programs ensured a minimum level of continuity in cooperation.291

The German report was published in September 2010. It covered developments that occurred during the year 2009-2010. The year 2009-2010 was punctuated by a series of significant developments on the nuclear and counter-narcotics dossiers. In October 2009, the P5+1 renewed its nuclear talks with Iran. However, the diplomatic efforts were inconclusive due to domestic opposition in Iran to the conclusion of a nuclear deal. In June 2010, the UNSC passed Resolution 1929, which toughened the sanctions regime against Iran. Concurrently to that, the majority of projects undertaken under the 2005-2007 UNODC framework for international drug cooperation in Iran ended during this period. The German statement highlighted that international drug cooperation with Iran was highly politicized and that despite common interests between Iran and donor countries in countering the Afghan drug trade, by mid-2010, cooperation came to a standstill. The German delegation tried to salvage the situation by portraying Iran as an effective actor in the fight against the Afghan drug trade.292 However, the German efforts did not bear the expected result as the governments of France, the UK, Italy, Belgium and Ireland did not renew their assistance to Iran‟s counter-narcotics efforts after 2011. On January 24, 2011, the German envoy to Tehran Bernd Erbel praised Iran for its drug control efforts. Addressing a group of experts at an Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) meeting entitled “Campaign against Drug-Trafficking from and to Afghanistan,” Erbel said: “the Islamic Republic of Iran deserves gratitude since it has made heavy costs in the campaign against drug-trafficking.293” Iran was depicted by the German

291 German Delegation, Country Report from the mini-Dublin Group on Iran (Brussels, Council of the European Union, September 21, 2010), 7. 292 Ibid., 5. 293 “German Envoy Lauds Iran‟s Anti-Drug Efforts,” Fars News Agency, January 24, 2011.

Envoy as a “role model for the world in fighting illicit-drugs.294” Additionally, Erbel commented that drug trafficking was a problem so big that it could only be solved through joint cooperation.295 Erbel‟s statement was reported in news articles that were published by the Fars News Agency and the Thai News Services.296 It occurred two months before the UNODC launched its new country program on counter-narcotics cooperation with Iran. It was a clear recognition by Germany of Iran‟s importance in the fight against the Afghan drug trade and a call to other members of the international community to provide assistance to Iran‟s counter-narcotics efforts. Finally, in its 2011 report to the Dublin Group, the German delegation in Tehran noted:

International cooperation with Iran can be cumbersome, but is well worth the effort in the counter narcotics field. Cooperation with the MDG continues to be influenced by the political environment and the quality of bilateral relations, dialogue can rapidly improve or worsen against predictions. Cooperation is often strongly politicized and lacks sustainability.297

The German report was published on May 27, 2011. By then, a new round of nuclear talks between Iran and the P5+1 had failed and the UNODC was experiencing great difficulties in securing the funds required for the implementation of its new country program on Iran. In this context, Germany assessed that international drug cooperation with Iran was difficult to achieve but worth the trouble. Such a statement was meant to incite other members of the MDG to provide assistance to Iran‟s counter-narcotics efforts. Our qualitative content analysis of the German statements on international drug cooperation with Iran highlighted that Germany viewed counter-narcotics cooperation with Iran in a positive way and tried to exert international influence by encouraging MDG members to bolster their assistance to the country‟s counter-narcotics efforts.

294 “German Envoy Lauds Iran‟s Anti-Drug Efforts,” Op. Cit. 295 Ibid. 296 “German Envoy Lauds Iran‟s Anti-Drug Efforts,” Op.Cit.; “German Diplomat Praises Iran‟s Anti-Drug Record,” Fars News Agency, January 25, 2011; and “German/Iran: German Diplomat Praises Iran‟s Anti- Drug Record,” Thai News Service, January 27, 2011. 297 German Regional Chair of the Dublin Group, Country Report on Iran (Brussels: Council of the European Union, May 27, 2011), 2.

2.3 France: Careful Discretion Hinting at the Legitimacy of Multilateralism

Only one French statement on international drug cooperation with Iran could be analysed. This communicative event was retrieved from the website of the French Embassy in Tehran under the news section. It consisted in an announcement that the French Ambassador in Iran, Bernard Poletti, attended a ceremony held at the Iranian Anti-Narcotics Police dog- training center in Karaj on December 19, 2007. During this ceremony, 10 sniffer dogs recently delivered by France to the Iranian ANP were presented. The announcement was published on the website of the French Embassy in Tehran on December 24, 2007.298 The ceremony was held one year after the UNODC Iran Strategic Program Framework 2005-2007 was extended until 2010 and pledges were secured from donor countries such as France, Ireland, the UK and Belgium. Two weeks prior to the ceremony, the US government had released a new intelligence report, which concluded that Iran had halted its nuclear weapons program since 2003. The December 2007 intelligence report, by downplaying the threat posed by Iran‟s nuclear program, allowed for a relaxation of nuclear tensions. The website of the French Embassy in Tehran indicated that the sniffer dogs were sent to Iran via CIVIPOL, the consulting and service company of the French Ministry of Interior. CIVIPOL is a joint stock company that is 40%-owned by the French state. According to the website of the company, its mission is “to promote and market the Ministry‟s expertise among both foreign institutions and governments and French businesses.” CIVIPOL offers consulting, audit, technical support and training services in France and abroad in the areas of homeland security, civil protection and territorial administration.299 The sniffer dogs were reportedly trained in Iran for a month under the supervision of a French expert named M. Gillery. The announcement on the website of the French Embassy in Tehran underlined that “cette nouvelle étape s’inscrit dans le cadre du soutien renforcé de la communauté internationale aux efforts engagés par l’Iran dans la lutte contre le trafic de drogue.300”

298 “Coopération Anti-Drogue,” Op. Cit. 299 “Presentation,” CIVIPOL, accessed April 8, 2013, http://www.civipol.fr/en/presentation. 300 “Coopération Anti-Drogue,” Op. Cit.

Three pictures taken at the ceremony accompanied the announcement. Two of them are presented in figure 9.

Figure 1. French Ambassador attends a ceremony at an Iranian ANP dog-training center in Karaj

Source: French Embassy in Tehran

The picture to the left presents the French Ambassador Bernard Poletti and the Chief of the Iranian ANP General Hamid-Reza Hosseini-Abadi receiving explanations from the French expert M. Gillery. The picture to the right shows ANP officials standing in line with French sniffer dogs. We count 9 of them photographed above. These two pictures are a vehement illustration that counter-narcotics cooperation took place between the governments of France and Iran during the period under study. CIVIPOL was mandated to undertake a total of four missions to Iran from January 2007 to September 2011. None of them were documented by the French government. In January 2007, an audit mission was made by CIVIPOL to the ANP dog-training center in Tehran.301 It was followed by a mission for strengthening sniffer dog cooperation with Iran in September 2007.302 In September 2008, 20 sniffer dogs were delivered to Iran by CIVIPOL and the ANP received training from a French expert upon delivery of the dogs.303

301 “Mission d‟Audit en Iran,” CIVIPOL, accessed April 8, 2013, http://www.civipol.fr/en/node/2179. 302 “Coopération Cynotechnique,” Op. Cit. 303 “Coopération Cynotechnique pour la Lutte contre le Trafic de Stupéfiants,” Op. Cit.

Finally, another batch of sniffer dogs was delivered to the ANP by CIVIPOL in September 2011.304 The French government had been relatively quiet on the topic of international drug cooperation with Iran. If it wasn‟t from the announcement retrieved from the website of the French Embassy in Tehran, we could doubt that such cooperation ever took place. However, the 2007 announcement confirmed that France provided assistance to Iran‟s counter-narcotics efforts and that this assistance was conceived as part of multilateral efforts to counter the Afghan drug trade.

2.4 The UK, Japan, Belgium and Ireland: Complete Radio Silence

The British, Japanese, Belgian and Irish governments did not justify the assistance they provided to Iran‟s counter-narcotics efforts from 2007 to 2011. Not a single political statement by the aforementioned donor countries on international drug cooperation with Iran could be found. We looked at news articles, speeches and press releases on the websites of: 1) the British government gov.uk, which presents the policies, announcements and publications of 18 government departments including the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Home Office and the Ministry of Defence; 2) the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan; 3) the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation, the Federal Public Service Interior and the Ministry of Defense; and 4) the Irish Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the Department of Justice and Equality. No information could be retrieved to document their positions on counter-narcotics cooperation with Iran. Two trends were identified as a result of our qualitative content analysis of donor countries‟ political statements on international drug cooperation with Iran. On the one hand, there were the political statements of Italy and Germany that presented international drug cooperation with Iran in a positive light, advocating for further assistance to Iran‟s counter-narcotics efforts. On the other hand, there was the silence of France, the UK, Japan, Belgium and Ireland. The reasons behind their silence will be hypothesized in chapter 6.

304 “Lutte Contre le Trafic de Stupéfiants,” Op. Cit.

3. Qualitative Content Analysis of Iran‟s Response to Nuclear Isolation and Counter-Narcotics Cooperation

Iran‟s responses to both nuclear confrontation and counter-narcotics cooperation mirrored the political statements of donor countries. At times marked by lower levels of political tensions, Iran‟s nuclear rhetoric emphasized the peaceful nature of the country‟s nuclear program. At times of escalating tensions, Iran‟s nuclear rhetoric became increasingly more confrontational. Furthermore, Iranian authorities became more vocal about what they perceived as a lack of support on the behalf of the international community for their country‟s counter-narcotics efforts. The results of our qualitative content analysis presented below are organized by topics and presented in a chronological order.

3.1 Iran‟s Response to Nuclear Isolation: Increasing Confrontational Rhetoric

Iran‟s response to nuclear isolation had become increasingly confrontational between 2007 and 2011. Throughout the year 2007, Iranian authorities stressed the peaceful and legal nature of Iran‟s nuclear program in response to statements made by certain members of the international community regarding their fear of Iranian atomic bombs. As a matter of fact, President Mahmud Ahmadinejad declared on February 1, 2007 that Iran‟s nuclear program was peaceful, legal and transparent. The Iranian President was quoted saying: “To us, the nuclear issue is a legal and technical matter involving the exercise of rights (by states) but big powers have a politically motivated view of the issue. They have set up a front against us on the nuclear issue.305” Ahmadinejad‟s statement was made on the occasion of a press conference that was held at the mausoleum of Khomeini on the first day of the celebrations marking the victory of the Islamic Revolution. The UNSC had passed its first resolution that called for the imposition of international sanctions on Iran two months earlier. At the time, the Iranian government was still trying to convince the international community of the peaceful and civilian nature of its nuclear program. Accordingly, the representations of

305 “Iran‟s Peaceful Nuclear Program Transparent to all – Ahmadinezhad,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, February 1, 2007.

peacefulness and legality ran profound in Iranian political statements of the Iranian authorities. Six weeks later, Iran‟s Foreign Minister Manuchehr Mottaki made the following remark: “The United Nations Security Council is being abused to take an unlawful, unnecessary and unjustifiable action against the peaceful nuclear program of Iran.306” Manuchehr Mottaki‟s statement was a direct reply to the latest UNSC resolution adopted on Iran. Resolution 1747, which was passed a day earlier on March 24, 2007, tightened the sanctions imposed on Iran under Resolution 1737. These included an arms embargo and a freeze of Iranian assets. As Manuchehr Mottaki‟s statement pointed out, the Iranian government did not welcome the adoption of this new UNSC resolution on Iran. Iranian authorities reacted more favourably to the US intelligence report that was released on December 3, 2007. Iran‟s Foreign Minister declared on December 4: “We welcome it when a country that had questions about Iran‟s nuclear case in the past realistically corrects its view - regardless of its motives.307” The Foreign Ministry Spokesman Seyyed Mohammad Ali Hoseyni also underlined that the new US intelligence report was a proof of the peaceful nature of Iran‟s nuclear program and that previous US reports were “baseless and fakes.308” The December 2007 US intelligence report, by documenting that Iran had halted the development of its nuclear program since 2003, diffused tensions on both sides of the conflict. The peacefulness and legality of Iran‟s nuclear program remained central themes of the political statements of Iranian authorities throughout the year 2008. On March 26, 2008, Iran‟s Foreign Minister Manuchehr Mottaki sent a letter to the UN Secretary-General Ban- Ki Moon in which he complained about the unlawfulness of the measures taken by the UNSC against Iran. The Foreign Minister‟s letter said:

[…] the decisions made by the UN Security Council are illegal and against the principles and objectives of the UN Charter. Therefore, the Islamic Republic

306 “Resolution Unnecessary, Unlawful and Unjustifiable – Iran Official,” BBC Monitoring Newsfile, March 25, 2007. 307 “US Intelligence Report Proves Iran‟s Nuclear Activities Are Peaceful – Official,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, December 4, 2007. 308 “US Intelligence Report Proves Non-deviation in Iran‟s Nuclear Work – Spokesman,” BBC Monitoring Newsfile, December 4, 2007.

will, by no means, consider the said decision as part of Article 25 of UN Charter and will have no commitment towards implementing them.309

The Foreign Minister also warned that Iran might take legal actions against the UNSC for its “unfair and illegal” measures.310 Manuchehr Mottaki‟s letter to Ban-Ki Moon was issued 22 days after the UNSC had adopted a new resolution on Iran that demanded it to halt all of its uranium enrichment activities. The Iranian government therefore responded to UNSC resolutions by declaring them as “illegal” and by refusing to implement them. Iran also rejected UNSC Resolution 1835, which was adopted on September 27, 2008. On September 29, Iran‟s Foreign Ministry Spokesman Hassan Qashqavi declared that Resolution 1835 was unjustifiable. The Iranian official said: “No Security Council resolution is required as long as Iranian nuclear programme poses no threat.311” The Foreign Minister Spokesman reaffirmed Iran‟s right to pursue nuclear activities for civilian purposes, commenting: “We regard uranium enrichment as our legitimate right and believe that its suspension is an illegal demand.312” Throughout the year 2008, Iran‟s right to a peaceful and civilian nuclear program was the main response offered by the Iranian government to reject the claims that its nuclear activities were illegal and posed a threat to international security. A profound shift in Iran‟s political statements occurred in 2009. In response to comments made by Western governments following Iran‟s announcement that it was building a new nuclear plant near Qom, the Head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) Ali Akbar Salehi declared:

We have been studying the news and reports since last night. Now we have noticed that they were hatching a conspiracy against Iran. The plot was that the three big Western countries were to speak against Iran in the G20 summit. I have to say that I have understood this plot by studying New York Times and other Western media analysis. This is not our analysis. New York Times has clearly stated that they [Western countries] were planning to bring up the issue

309 “Iran Says UN Sanctions „Illegal‟, US Accountable for Any Damage,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, March 26, 2008. 310 Ibid. 311 “Resolution 1835 a Political Statement, Unjustifiable – Iran Spokesman,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, September 29, 2008. 312 “Iranian Spokesman Says Uranium Enrichment to Continue for Fuel Production,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, September 29, 2008.

at G20 and accuse Iran of hidden activities. They are telling the story somehow to make the world opinion united against Iran. Our announcement [that Iran is building a nuclear plant in Qom] is in lines with our responsibilities. The Islamic Republic of Iran has declared its faithfulness to its international responsibilities. Iran has behaved responsibly and talked responsibly. However, Iran would always defend its legal rights. Iran will stress on its rights. Now we understand that Iran has foiled the enemy‟s plot, according to themselves. Up to now the West was accusing Iran that it is not fully cooperating with IAEA. They were accusing Iran for keeping its activities secret and not informing the agency. We are acting within the framework of our own rights and international commitments. We have proved that we abide by our international commitments, and we shall never give up our absolute rights.313

The Iranian official continued:

We are duty bound to announce the existence of any nuclear facilities to the IAEA 180 days before nuclear material are taken to them. This time, as the honorable president mentioned, we are announcing this issue even more than a year prior to the 180 days. Despite all this we see that a lot of commotion is being made. We are really shocked and surprised. We do not know what to do. Are we supposed to announce our facilities or not. No matter what method we choose, we realize that Western governments apparently have no sense of appreciation.314

Ali Akbar Salehi‟s statement was made on September 26, 2009 during an interview with the state-run television Channel One. Iran‟s reaction to international criticism was to stress its right to nuclear energy and to underline that it announced the construction of the Fordo nuclear facility one year before it was legally required to do so in a confidence-building effort. Iran also blamed the West for distorting events in their political statements on the Iranian nuclear issue. The issue of the Fordo nuclear facility led to the adoption of an IAEA resolution on Iran on November 27, 2008. It was the first IAEA resolution on Iran to be adopted since

313 “Nuclear Chief Says Western Countries Speeches at G20 „Conspiracy Against Iran‟,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, September 26, 2009. 314 Ibid.

2006.315 The Iranian government responded to this new measure by announcing that it would build 10 new nuclear plants. The announcement was made by Ali Akbar Salehi during a press conference held in Tehran on November 30 2008.316 Salehi‟s statement illustrated that Iran‟s response to donor countries‟ political statements on the Iranian nuclear issue shifted to a confrontational mode. From late 2009 and onward, Iran responded to international pressure by announcing new developments to its controversial nuclear program. As a matter of fact, on December 1, 2009, MP Jafar Qaderi declared:

The world cannot halt the Islamic Republic of Iran‟s peaceful nuclear progresses by issuing (anti-Iran) resolutions. […] The Islamic Republic of Iran will pursue whatever is beneficial to the human community and such behaviors will just leave harmful impacts on bilateral ties between Iran and the international community.317

Jafar Qaderi‟s statement was made in reaction to the recent resolution adopted by the IAEA on Iran. Additionally, in letters sent to the foreign ministers of the member states of the IAEA Board of Governors on December 9, Iran‟s Foreign Minister Manuchehr Mottaki warned: “The illogical measure adopted by the countries which voted against Iran (at the International Atomic Energy Agency‟s Board of Governors) makes the Islamic Republic of Iran more steadfast in continuing the current path of developing peaceful nuclear technology.318” These two statements illustrated that, when faced with international pressure, Iranian authorities responded by reaffirming their firm resolve to continue along their nuclear path. On June 2, 2010, Iran‟s Parliamentary Speaker Ali Larijani declared: “We will firmly stick to our policy toward the nuclear issue and will not retreat, even if a hundred more resolutions are issued.319” Ali Larijani‟s statement was made a few days before the

315 Mark Heinrich, “IAEA Votes to Censure Iran over Nuclear Cover-up,” Reuters, November 27, 2009, accessed April 14, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/11/27/us-nuclear-iaea-vote- idUSTRE5AQ1BZ20091127. 316 “Salehi: Iran to Build 10 N. Plants in Response to West‟s Offensive Measures,” Fars News Agency, November 30, 2009. 317 “MP Downplays Western Pressures on Iran,” Fars News Agency, December 1, 2009. 318 “Mottaki Reiterates Iran‟s Resolve to Continue N. Progress,” Fars News Agency, December 9, 2009. 319 “Iran Will Not Back Down, Even if Sanctioned: Larijani,” Mehr News Agency, June 2, 2010.

UNSC adopted Resolution 1929, which imposed further sanctions against Iran. Shortly after that, President Mahmud Ahmadinejad made the remark that UNSC resolutions were “annoying flies” that were “useless as used tissues.320” The Iranian President added: “These resolutions are not worth a dime for the Iranian nation.321” Furthermore, on June 16, 2010, the Majlis (i.e. Parliament) called on the Iranian government to push ahead with its uranium enrichment program and on June 21 barred two IAEA inspectors from entering the country in retaliation for the new round of international sanctions imposed on Iran.322 The year 2010 was marked by Iran‟s active confrontation with the international community over the country‟s nuclear program. This trend followed into the year 2011. On November 11, 2011, Iran‟s Parliamentary Speaker Ali Larijani warned that any sanctions against Iran would be met with a “bitter response.323” Larijani‟s remark was made in reply to calls by Western governments to impose further sanctions against Iran. Twenty days later, Iran‟s Foreign Minister Spokesman Ramin Mehmanparast declared that the threats issued by European countries regarding new sanctions against Iran were in fact “psychological warfare.324” At a time when the European members of the P5+1 were calling for the imposition of further sanctions against Iran, the Iranian government responded by issuing vague threats, probably in a bid to deter them from taking such course of action. Iran‟s response to nuclear isolation had constantly evolved from 2007 to 2011. In 2007, Iranian authorities underlined the peaceful and legal nature of the country‟s nuclear program. In 2008, their political statements were centered on Iran‟s right to nuclear energy. Finally, from 2009 onward, the response of the Iranian government became increasingly confrontational. When faced with pressure to halt their nuclear activities, Iranian authorities accelerated the pace of the development of the country‟s nuclear program, to the most profound distress of the international community.

320 “Tehran Censures Security Council Sanctions Resolution,” Mehr News Agency, June 11, 2010. 321 Ibid. 322 “Tehran Insists on Continued 20% Uranium Enrichment,” Mehr News Agency, June 16, 2010; and “Two IAEA Inspectors Barred from Entering Iran,” Mehr News Agency, June 21, 2010. 323 “Any Sanctions on Iran Will Be Met with Bitter Response: Larijani,” Mehr News Agency, November 11, 2011. 324 “Official Says EU Threats of New Iran Sanctions Are Psy-War,” Mehr News Agency, November 30, 2011.

3.2 Iran‟s Response to Counter-Narcotics Cooperation: Reiterated Complaints About Poor International Assistance

From 2007 until late 2010, Iranian officials barely addressed the question of international counter-narcotics cooperation with Iran. Only two political statements on the issue could be analysed. The first statement was made by Iran‟s Deputy Foreign Minister Mehdi Safari, who expressed frustration with the lack of progress in drug cooperation between the governments of Iran and the UK.325 Mehdi Safari‟s discontent was documented in a news article that was published by The Guardian on September 11, 2008. The news report came out after a three-day meeting held in London between Iran‟s Deputy Foreign Minister and British Foreign Secretary David Miliband. The specifics of the meeting were not explained in details. However, it was reported that the Iranian envoy left the meeting with “little hope that the situation [drug cooperation] would improve.326” The meeting was held two months after nuclear negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 had stalled and 20 days before a new UNSC resolution on Iran was adopted. At the time, the UNODC IRN/I50 project, to which the UK had provided funds, was underway. Yet, it seemed from the perspective of the Iranian government that the United-Kingdom‟s assistance to Iran‟s counter-narcotics efforts was not sufficient and that Iran was wishing for a more significant contribution on the behalf of the British government. The second political statement on international drug cooperation with Iran was made by Hossein Moghaddam, the Vice Ambassador to Italy, who complained that Iran had not received “enough help” from the EU in combating drug trafficking and demanded further international assistance to stop the flow of drugs originating from Afghanistan.327 Hossein Moghaddam‟s statement was reported by the Azerbaijani Trend News Agency in a news article published on July 24, 2009. At the time, the P5+1 and Iran were engaged in discussions regarding the resumption of nuclear talks to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue. These positive diplomatic developments did not prevent Hossein Moghaddam from criticizing the EU for its poor record in providing assistance to Iran‟s counter-narcotics efforts.

325 Julian Borger, “Failed Afghan Drug Policy Harming Us, Says Iran,” The Guardian, September 11, 2008, accessed April 10, 2013, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/sep/11/iran.afghanistan. 326 Ibid. 327 “Iran: Senior Diplomat Calls for Help to Stop Drug Trade,” Trend News Agency, July 24, 2009.

From November 2010 onward, the number of critics addressed by Iranian authorities to the EU and other Western governments increased dramatically. These occurred at a time of heightened tensions over Iran‟s nuclear program and when the UNODC was finalizing the development of its new country program on Iran. On November 7, 2010, Fars News Agency reported that Taha Taheri, the Deputy Head of the DCHQ, told its reporter: “The UN, the European states and the US as well as other international circles have provided no financial assistance for Iran in the campaign against narcotics.328” The official commented that the UN and Europe only provided $2,000,000 of financial aid to Iran, which was allocated to “joint projects for the arrangement of workshops and other drug-campaign initiatives, and not for the confrontation and fight against narcotics at the country‟s border regions.329” Taha Taheri‟s statement was reportedly an answer to a remark made by Antonio De Leo, the UNODC representative in Tehran, that the US and the EU had provided considerable assistance to Iran‟s campaign against narcotic drugs in which the Deputy Head of the DCHQ openly criticized the form of assistance provided by the international community to support Iran‟s counter-narcotics efforts. Six weeks later, Iran‟s Interior Minister and Secretary General of the DCHQ Mostafa Mohammad Najjar made the following declaration:

Expanding international cooperation is high on the headquarters‟ agenda in order to curb drug abuse. Since the primary source of production of illegal drugs is in Afghanistan, international measures are needed to address this problem. […] Unfortunately the Islamic Republic of Iran must pay for preventing the transition of drugs to other countries in addition to the cost of preventing the transit and use of narcotics in our own country.330

Mostafa Mohammad Najjar‟s statement was pronounced on the occasion of a meeting held in Tehran between him and the Afghan Minister of Counternarcotics Ahmad Moqbel Zarar at the end of which an agreement on regional drug cooperation was signed between the two countries. Earlier that week, Iran and Russia had also signed a Memorandum of

328 “Official: No Foreign Assistance Rendered to Iran‟s War on Drug,” Fars News Agency, November 7, 2011. 329 Ibid. 330 “Iran, Afghanistan Agree to Boost Anti-Narcotics Cooperation,” Fars News Agency, December 30, 2010; and “Iran to Boost Int‟l Cooperation on Drug Campaign,” Fars News Agency, December 30, 2010.

Understanding (MoU) on cooperation in the campaign against narcotics and drug traffickers on December 26, 2010. Yet, at the time, international counter-narcotics cooperation with Iran to the field of counter-narcotics was declining due to the termination of the UNODC Iran Strategic Program Framework 2005-2007. Mostafa Mohammad Najjar‟s statement therefore contained a veiled criticism of Western governments‟ non- renewal of their assistance to Iran‟s counter-narcotics efforts. Two months later, the Interior Minister declared: “The West should change its attitude towards campaign against drugs and show a serious and practical partnership and cooperation with Iran.331” This political statement was made on the occasion of a meeting held in Tehran on February 20, 2011 between Mostafa Mohammad Najjar and the German Ambassador to Iran Bernd Erbel. It was published by the Fars News Agency on February 20, 2011. The German envoy in Tehran being the chair of the MDG, Mostafa Mohammad Najjar‟s statement was an unequivocal message sent to the members of the MDG demanding them to cooperate more actively with Iran in the fight against the Afghan drug trade. On the occasion of a meeting held in Tehran with the Executive-Director of the UNODC Yuri Fedotov, Iran‟s Interior Minister Mostafa Mohammad Najjar commented: “the equipment and possibilities which are needed for campaign against drugs and provided by the international community for Iran are insignificant. […] These aids and assistances have so far been little, and rather symbolic.332” The Interior Minister also reiterated his call on the international community to boost its support for Iran‟s counter-narcotics efforts. Mostafa Mohammad Najjar‟s statement was published by the Fars News Agency on July 18, 2011. It occurred four months after the UNODC had launched its new country program on technical cooperation with Iran, which, up to this date, has remained largely underfunded. The Interior Minister‟s statement therefore illustrated the increasing frustration of the Iranian government with the lack of international support for its counter- narcotics efforts. Finally, on September 16, 2011, Massoud Zahedian, the Director-General of the DCHQ, told Fars News Agency reporters that: “Europe should pay its share in Iran‟s

331 “Iran Calls for Change in West‟s Drug-Campaign Policies,” Fars News Agency, February 20, 2011. 332 “Iran Complains About World‟s Meagre Support for Anti-Narcotic Efforts,” Fars News Agency, July 18, 2011.

confrontation against narcotics since if Iran refrains from combating drugs, they (European countries) would be obliged to collect the smuggled drugs in their own countries kilo by kilo and that will inflict heavy costs on them.333” Massoud Zahedian also complained that international support for Iran‟s drug control efforts were “symbolic” rather than “fundamental.334” This last political statement, which contained a veiled threat that Iran could let the drugs originating from Afghanistan transit freely into the country if international drug cooperation was not improved significantly, represented the height of Iran‟s dissatisfaction with international drug cooperation over the years 2007-2011. Iran‟s response to international drug cooperation had become increasingly critical of the lack of assistance provided by the international community to support the country‟s counter-narcotics efforts. The Iranian government responded to international drug cooperation by remaining silent about it from 2007 until late 2010. It was noted that during this period, Iran received the greatest share of the international assistance pledged by donor countries to combat the Afghan drug trade. However, from November 2010 onward, the Iranian government answered to what it perceived as a lack of cooperation by becoming increasingly more critical of the role played by the international community in the field of drug control in Iran. The political context of nuclear confrontation and counter-narcotics cooperation having been defined as a result of our qualitative content analysis, we will now turn our attention to the presentation of the results of our discursive analysis of the political statements of donor countries on the Iranian nuclear issue and on counter-narcotics cooperation with Iran.

333 “Official Urges Europe‟s Stronger Share in Campaign against Drugs,” Fars News Agency, September 16, 2011. 334 “Official Urges Europe‟s Stronger Share in Campaign against Drugs,” Op. Cit.

CHAPTER 5 CONFLICTING REPRESENTATIONS OF IRAN

International relations, like any other social phenomena, are socially constructed and the Iranian nuclear crisis is an example par excellence to illustrate this position. Iran has yet to prove that it intends to acquire nuclear weapons. Yet, the members of the international community are obsessively worried about the potentially disruptive effects a nuclear Iran would bear on regional and international security. In absolute terms, Iranian nuclear weapons would not be any more or less dangerous than say, for example, Indian, French or American nuclear weapons. As our discourse analysis of donor countries‟ political statements on the Iranian nuclear issue illustrates, it is rather the ideas held by donor countries about Iran that constructs Iran‟s nuclear development into an existential threat to regional and international security.

1. Discourse Analysis of Donor Countries‟ Political Statements on the Iranian Nuclear Issue: Carrying Negative Representations of Iran

The discourses of donor countries on the Iranian nuclear issue conveyed negative representations of Iran and its nuclear program. These negative representations of Iran were built on five recurring frames, which are exposed in further details below. These discursive practices proved central to donor countries‟ justification their policy practices to counter the Iranian nuclear issue.

1.1 Frame 1: Iran‟s Nuclear Program as Security Threat

Iran‟s nuclear program was constructed as a security threat in the political statements of France, Germany and the UK. Officials from the three aforementioned countries were worried that Iran‟s nuclear program might have a convert military dimension. The military dimension of Iran‟s nuclear program is a theme that was recurrent in their speech acts. German Chancellor Angela Merkel, Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle and French

President Nicolas Sarkozy all talked about the threat posed by Iran‟s military nuclear program while British Foreign Secretary David Miliband, Prime Minister Gordon Brown, French Foreign Ministry Spokesman Eric Chevallier and President Nicolas Sarkozy referred to Iran‟s nuclear weapons program in their statements on the nuclear issue.335 Amidst the repeated claims made by Iranian officials that the country‟s nuclear program was purely civilian in nature, E3 officials feared that the Iranian regime was secretly trying to acquire atomic bombs.336 The terms intent and intentions were repetitively employed in the speeches of British officials to designate Iran‟s covert acquisition of nuclear weapons.337 The suspicions of the French, British and German governments arose from the fact that Iran had been pursuing a uranium enrichment program with no clear civilian applications.338 These fears were reinforced by the fact that Iran had failed to comply with its international obligations, had refused to address the demands of the international community and had not engaged in meaningful nuclear negotiations with the international community.339 The construction of Iran‟s nuclear program as a security threat was found only in the political statements of the three aforementioned countries. Although Italy had expressed its opposition to Iran‟s development of a military nuclear program and Japan had condemned Iran‟s secret nuclear activities, they never adopted the discourse on Iran‟s nuclear program as a security threat in their political statements on the Iranian nuclear

335 “Merkel Says Iran Must Meet all Demands over Nuclear Programme,” Op. Cit.; “Germany „Alarmed‟ at Iran Nuclear Drive, Supports Sanctions,” Op. Cit.; “Sarkozy: Bombe Nucléaire Iranienne, Menace Inacceptable pour la Stabilité du Monde,” Op. Cit.; “Iran Nuclear Threat „Serious‟: British PM‟s Spokesman,” Op. Cit.; “World Patience over Iran „Not Inexhaustible‟: British PM,” Op. Cit.; and “Les Essais de Missiles Iraniens Renforcent les „Inquiétudes‟, Selon Paris,” Op. Cit. 336 “Iran Nuclear Threat „Serious‟: British PM‟s Spokesman,” Op. Cit.; and “Les Essais de Missiles Iraniens Renforcent les „Inquiétudes‟, Selon Paris,” Op. Cit. 337 “Iran Nuclear Threat „Serious‟: British PM‟s Spokesman,” Op. Cit.; “Britain Labels Iran Missile Test „Unwelcome‟,” Op. Cit.; “IAEA Sends „Strongest Possible Signal‟ to Iran: Britain,” Op. Cit.; and “Britain Slams Iran‟s „Contradictory Rhetoric‟ on Nuclear Row,” Op. Cit. 338 “Nucléaire: Kouchner Juge „très Dangereux‟ que l‟Iran „s‟Entête‟ (Presse),” Op. Cit.; and “Britain Slams Iran‟s „Contradictory Rhetoric‟ on Nuclear Row,” Op. Cit. 339 “Britain Labels Iran Missile Test „Unwelcome‟,” Op. Cit.; “Nucléaire: Kouchner Juge „très Dangereux‟ que l‟Iran „s‟Entête‟ (Presse),” Op. Cit.; “Merkel Says Iran Must Meet all Demands over Nuclear Programme,” Op. Cit.; “Les Essais de Missiles Iraniens Renforcent les „Inquiétudes‟, Selon Paris,” Op. Cit.; “Germany Says „Worried‟ by Iranian Enrichment Plans,” Op. Cit.; “Germany Urges Iran to Stop „Sabre- rattling‟,” Op. Cit.; “Nucléaire: Téhéran n‟a „Pas Apporté la Réponse Attendue‟ (Paris),” Op. Cit.; and “West Has „No Choice‟ But to Pursue Iran Sanctions: Britain,” Op. Cit.

issue.340 This situation was particularly relevant in the case of utterances made by Japanese officials. The language employed in Japanese speeches to depict Iran‟s nuclear program and the international crisis it provoked was aimed to be neutral. The terms “nuclear issue”, “nuclear activities” and “the issue” were repetitively used by Japanese officials to represent the Iranian nuclear issue.341 These terms were never accompanied by adjectives or relative clauses that would have positively or negatively constructed Iran‟s nuclear program. The language employed by Japanese officials therefore neither contributed to the legitimization or the delegitimization of Iran‟s nuclear program. The construction of Iran‟s nuclear program as a security threat was found in the language used by officials from France, Germany and the UK during the first half of the period under study. From mid-2009 onward, the construction of Iran‟s nuclear program as a breach in the country‟s international obligations became the prime representation found in the political statements of E3 members. Yet, the discourse on the security threat posed by Iran‟s nuclear program resurged in late 2011 as German Foreign Ministry Spokesman Andreas Peschke and French President Nicolas Sarkozy both underlined the dangers Iran‟s nuclear program posed to international security and peace in statements they made in November 2011.342

1.2 Frame 2: Iran‟s Nuclear Program as a Breach in International Obligations

Iran‟s nuclear program was also constructed as a breach in the country‟s international obligations in the political statements of the three European nuclear negotiators. Multiple utterances made by French, German and British officials stressed that Iran was bound by a set of international obligations it had towards the international community.343 These

340 “Italy Backs Criticism of Iran‟s Secret Nuclear Site,” Op. Cit.; and “Japan Condemns Iran Nuclear Plant,” Op. Cit. 341 “Statement by Mr. Taro Aso, Minister for Foreign Affairs on the United Nations Security Council Resolution Concerning Iran‟s Nuclear Issue,” Op. Cit.; “Japan Says it Shares Global Concerns on Iran Nuclear Drive,” Op. Cit.; and “Japan Condemns Iran Nuclear Plant,” Op. Cit. 342 “Germany to Urge More „Pressure‟ over Iran Nuclear Plans,” Op. Cit.; and “La France Préconise de Nouvelles Sanctions à l‟Encontre de l‟Iran,” Op. Cit. 343 “Britain Labels Iran Missile Test „Unwelcome‟,” Op. Cit.; “Germany Says „Worried‟ by Iranian Enrichment Plans,” Op. Cit.; “Iran Plans for New Enrichment Plants a Serious Concern: Britain,” Op. Cit.;

included compliance with UNSC and IAEA resolutions.344 Iran‟s sensitive nuclear activities were framed as a violation of these obligations. As a matter of fact, a British Foreign Office spokeswoman underlined that Iran‟s plan to build 10 new nuclear facilities and to produce 20 per cent level of enriched uranium was a “deliberate breach” of the five UNSC resolutions.345 Similarly, Iran‟s nuclear activities were framed as “clandestine” and “forbidden” in the speeches of French officials.346 Finally, German officials underlined that Iran‟s nuclear program was contrary to the country‟s nuclear commitments and obligations.347 The language employed in the political statements of E3 officials therefore contributed to the construction Iran‟s nuclear activities as a breach in the country‟s international obligations. Italian and Japanese officials never employed the discourse on Iran‟s nuclear program as a breach in the country‟s international obligations in their political statements on the Iranian nuclear issue. They called on Iran to “clarify” its nuclear program and to take “positive steps” to resolve outstanding issues but never represented Iran‟s nuclear program as unlawful.348 The construction of Iran‟s nuclear program as a breach in its international obligations served as a discursive foundation for the imposition of international sanctions against Iran. British Foreign Secretary David Miliband, German Foreign Ministry Spokesman Andreas Peschke and the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs justified the imposition of international sanctions against Iran on the ground that Iran had failed to

“Germany to Urge More „Pressure‟ over Iran Nuclear Plans,” Op. Cit.; and “La France Préconise de Nouvelles Sanctions à l‟Encontre de l‟Iran,” Op. Cit. 344 “Iran Nuclear Threat „Serious‟: British PM‟s Spokesman,” Op. Cit.; “Iran Nuclear Activities Worrying Despite US Report: Germany,” Op. Cit.; “Germany Urges Iran to Stop „Sabre-rattling‟,” Op. Cit.; and “IAEA Sends „Strongest Possible Signal‟ to Iran: Britain,” Op. Cit. 345 “Iran Plans for New Enrichment Plants a Serious Concern: Britain,” Op. Cit.; and “Iran Enrichment Plans a „Serious Concern‟: Britain,” Op. Cit. 346 “Nucléaire/Nouveau Site Iranien: „Développement Grave et Révélateur‟ (Fillon),” Op. Cit.; and “La France Préconise de Nouvelles Sanctions à l‟Encontre de l‟Iran.” Op. Cit. 347 “Germany Urges Iran to Stop „Sabre-rattling‟,” Op. Cit.; “Germany Says „Worried‟ by Iranian Enrichment Plans,” Op. Cit.; and “Germany to Urge More „Pressure‟ over Iran Nuclear Plans,” Op. Cit. 348 “Italy Backs Criticism of Iran‟s Secret Nuclear Site,” Op. Cit.; and “Japan Says it Shares Global Concerns on Iran Nuclear Drive,” Op. Cit.

comply with its international obligations and to respond to the demands of the international community.349

1.3 Frame 3: Iran as a Cunning Actor

Iran was constructed as a cunning actor in the political statements of France, Germany and the UK. The adjective cunning is a quality attributed to an agent who achieves his ends with deceit and evasion. The term cunning itself was never employed in the statements of the three European nuclear negotiators to represent Iran. However, we contend that this concept best represents the construction of Iran as a deceitful and purposively misleading actor conveyed in the speeches of the three aforementioned countries. On the occasion of a speech made at the 43rd Munich Conference on Security and Policy, the German Chancellor Angela Merkel called on Iran to conform to the demands of the international community “without ifs and buts and without tricks.350” The expression employed by the German Chancellor to describe Iran‟s behaviour on the nuclear dossier is very interesting. The combination of the terms ifs, buts and tricks suggests that Iran was playing “childish” games with the members of the international community. At the time, despite an international consensus on the Iranian nuclear issue, Iranian authorities had rejected all of the UNSC resolutions on rhetorical grounds. Similarly, French President Nicolas Sarkozy called on Iranian authorities to express their “bonne foi” regarding the country‟s nuclear program.351 This demand was expressed on the occasion of a joint press conference held at the Élysée Palace with US President George Bush on June 14, 2008. Earlier that day, the P5+1 had presented a revised offer to Iran for a comprehensive dialogue on the country‟s nuclear program during a meeting held in Tehran between the EU Foreign Policy Chief Javier Solana and Iran‟s top nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili.352 The expression “bonne foi” conveys a meaning reminiscent of the one contained in the German expression “without ifs

349 “IAEA Sends „Strongest Possible Signal‟ to Iran: Britain,” Op. Cit.; “Germany to Urge More „Pressure‟ over Iran Nuclear Plans,” Op. Cit.; and “La France Préconise de Nouvelles Sanctions à l‟Encontre de l‟Iran.” Op. Cit. 350 “Merkel Says Iran Must Meet all Demands over Nuclear Programme,” Op. Cit. 351 “Sarkozy: Bombe Nucléaire Iranienne, Menace Inacceptable pour la Stabilité du Monde,” Op. Cit. 352 Kaveh L. Afrasiabi, “Iran‟s „Dance‟ of Nuclear Packages,” World Security Network, June 17, 2008, accessed June 24, 2013, http://www.worldsecuritynetwork.com/Iran/Afrasiabi-Kaveh-L-1/Irans-dance-of- nuclear-packages.

and buts and without tricks.” An actor with “bonne foi” is honest, transparent and respectful of his engagements. By underlying Iran‟s lack of “bonne foi” in resolving the nuclear issue, Nicolas Sarkozy‟s statement contributed to the construction of Iran as a cunning and deceitful actor. For its part, the British Foreign Office slammed Iran for its contradictory nuclear rhetoric.353 This statement was made on February 8, 2010, shortly after Iran announced it planned to produce 20 per cent level enriched uranium. Yet, one week earlier, President Mahmud Ahmadinejad had made remarks that suggested Iran would accept the UN-drafted nuclear deal proposed by the P5+1 during the October 2009 Geneva talks.354 The expression “contradictory rhetoric” represented what British officials perceived as a wicked attitude on the behalf of Iran in dealing with the nuclear issue. Finally, officials from all of the three European countries expressed their lack of confidence and trust towards Iran in their political statements on the nuclear issue. French Foreign Ministry Spokesman Eric Chevallier, German Government Spokesman Thomas Steg and a British Foreign Office Spokesman whose name is unknown called on Iran to restore trust by engaging in confidence-building measures, such as halting the development of its nuclear program and responding to the demands of the international community set in UNSC resolutions, in order to resolve the country‟s nuclear crisis.355 These demands for confidence-building underlined that France, Germany and the UK considered Iran as an unreliable actor and contributed to reinforce the construction of Iran as a cunning actor conveyed in their political statements on the nuclear issue.

1.4 Frame 4: Iran as Non-Cooperative Actor

Iran was also constructed as a non-cooperative actor in the political statements of France, Germany, and the UK. Iran was represented as purposively refusing to respond to the “legitimate” demands of the international community and to engage in meaningful

353 “Britain Slams Iran‟s „Contradictory Rhetoric‟ on Nuclear Row,” Op. Cit. 354 Ibid. 355 “Les Essais de Missiles Iraniens Renforcent les „Inquiétudes‟, Selon Paris,” Op. Cit.; “Germany Urges Iran to Stop „Sabre-rattling‟,” Op. Cit.; and “Britain Slams Iran‟s „Contradictory Rhetoric‟ on Nuclear Row,” Op. Cit.

negotiations to resolve the ongoing crisis.356 The discourse on Iran as a non-cooperative actor was constructed on the juxtaposition of two contrasting representations. On the one hand, the members of the international community were represented as benevolent actors who genuinely wanted to engage in a dialogue with Iran in order to resolve the crisis.357 The figure of speech of a hand stretched out to Iran was employed both by French Prime Minister François Fillon and British Foreign Secretary David Miliband to express the willingness of the international community to engage in a dialogue with Iran.358 Similarly, French President Nicolas Sarkozy employed the figure of speech of “la porte du dialogue qui est ouverte” to describe his country‟s attitude towards the Iranian nuclear issue.359 On the other hand, Iran was represented as an actor who refused to take the hand that was stretched out to it. The verbs refuse and reject were repetitively employed in the statements of French, German and British officials to depict the non-cooperative attitude of Iran.360 Additionally, British Foreign Minister Kim Howell underlined, in a speech made on August 6, 2008, that when faced with a choice between international engagement and isolation, Iran preferred to choose isolation rather than engagement.361 Italy and Japan never represented Iran as a cunning or non-cooperative actor in their political statements on the Iranian nuclear issue. Iran was rather constructed as a purposive and practical actor that had the “power” to resolve the nuclear issue.362

356 “Iran Nuclear Activities Worrying Despite US Report: Germany,” Op. Cit; “Nucléaire: Téhéran n‟a „Pas Apporté la Réponse Attendue‟ (Paris),” Op. Cit.; and “West Has „No Choice‟ But to Pursue Iran Sanctions: Britain,” Op Cit. 357 “Iran Nuclear Threat „Serious‟: British PM‟s Spokesman,” Op. Cit.; “Sarkozy: Bombe Nucléaire Iranienne, Menace Inacceptable pour la Stabilité du Monde,” Op. Cit.; “Les Essais de Missiles Iraniens Renforcent les „Inquiétudes‟, Selon Paris,” Op. Cit.; and “Nucléaire: Téhéran n‟a „Pas Apporté la Réponse Attendue‟ (Paris),” Op. Cit. 358 “Nucléaire/Nouveau Site Iranien: „Développement Grave et Révélateur‟ (Fillon),” Op. Cit.; and “IAEA Sends „Strongest Possible Signal‟ to Iran: Britain,” Op. Cit. 359 “Sarkozy: Bombe Nucléaire Iranienne, Menace Inacceptable pour la Stabilité du Monde,” Op. Cit. 360 “Nucléaire: Kouchner Juge „très Dangereux‟ que l‟Iran „s‟Entête‟ (Presse),” Op. Cit.; “Britain Slams Iran‟s „Contradictory Rhetoric‟ on Nuclear Row,” Op. Cit.; “Germany Says Iran „Not Prepared to Cooperate‟,” Op. Cit.; and “Germany „Alarmed‟ at Iran Nuclear Drive, Supports Sanctions,” Op. Cit. 361 “West Has „No Choice‟ But to Pursue Iran Sanctions: Britain,” Op. Cit. 362 “Japan Says it Shares Global Concerns on Iran Nuclear Drive,” Op. Cit.; and “Italy Backs Criticism of Iran‟s Secret Nuclear Site,” Op. Cit.

1.5 Frame 5: Nuclear Isolation as Inevitable and Necessary

The international isolation of Iran was constructed as inevitable and necessary in the political statements of France, Germany and the United-Kingdom. The imposition of diplomatic pressure and sanctions against Iran was represented as the only viable option left to deal with a cunning and non-cooperative Iran. As a matter of fact, French President Nicolas Sarkozy claimed that the imposition of international sanctions was “la seule solution” to persuade Iran to comply with the demands of the international community.363 British officials have reiterated on multiple occasions that they had “no choice” but to pursue international sanctions against Iran due to the country‟s unwillingness to comply with its international obligations and to engage in a meaningful dialogue to resolve the nuclear crisis.364 For his part, the German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle claimed that sanctions were “inevitable” given Iran‟s refusal to cooperate with the international community.365 The language employed by E3 officials therefore underlined the “inevitability” and “necessity” of Iran‟s nuclear isolation. The strength of the discourse on Iran‟s nuclear isolation shifted across time and actors. It was modelled on the overall political context. Prior to and during nuclear talks, the themes of sanctions, pressure and isolation were generally virtually absent from the utterances of French, German and British officials.366 However, following the stalling of nuclear negotiations, the discourse on the inevitability and necessity of isolating Iran resurfaced.367 In-between talks, the threat of international isolation was employed by the E3 to bring Iran back to the negotiations table or to induce Iranian authorities to halt their controversial nuclear activities.368 In the case of Germany, the discourse on the

363 “Sarkozy: Bombe Nucléaire Iranienne, Menace Inacceptable pour la Stabilité du Monde,” Op. Cit. 364 “Nucléaire: Téhéran n‟a „Pas Apporté la Réponse Attendue‟ (Paris),” Op. Cit.; “Iran Plans for New Enrichment Plants a Serious Concern: Britain,” Op. Cit.; and “World Patience over Iran „Not Inexhaustible‟: British PM,” Op. Cit. 365 “Germany „Alarmed‟ at Iran Nuclear Drive, Supports Sanctions,” Op. Cit. 366 “Les Essais de Missiles Iraniens Renforcent les „Inquiétudes‟, Selon Paris,” Op. Cit.; “Britain Labels Iran Missile Test „Unwelcome‟,” Op. Cit; “Germany Urges Iran to Stop „Sabre-rattling‟,” Op. Cit.; and “Nucléaire/Nouveau Site Iranien: „Développement Grave et Révélateur‟ (Fillon),” Op. Cit. 367 “West Has „No Choice‟ But to Pursue Iran Sanctions: Britain,” Op. Cit; “Germany „Alarmed‟ at Iran Nuclear Drive, Supports Sanctions,” Op. Cit.; and “La France Préconise de Nouvelles Sanctions à l‟Encontre de l‟Iran,” Op. Cit. 368 “Sarkozy: Bombe Nucléaire Iranienne, Menace Inacceptable pour la Stabilité du Monde,” Op. Cit.; “World Patience over Iran „Not Inexhaustible‟: British PM,” Op. Cit.; “Germany Says Iran „Not Prepared to Cooperate‟,” Op. Cit.

international isolation of Iran was almost always accompanied by references to Germany‟s willingness to engage in a dialogue with Iranian authorities.369 The discourse on the inevitability and necessity of the international isolation of Iran was therefore not static and inevitable, amidst the fact that it was constructed as so in the political statements of E3 officials on the Iranian nuclear issue. Italy and Japan never employed the discourse on international isolation as inevitable and necessary in their political statements on the Iranian nuclear issue. They condemned Iran‟s sensitive nuclear activities and called on Iranian authorities to respond to the demands of the international community but never threatened Iran to isolate it in retaliation for its nuclear activities.370 There were two discursive trends followed by donor countries to represent the Iranian nuclear issue. On the one hand, there was the discourse of France, Germany and the UK, which constructed Iran‟s nuclear program as a security threat and a breach in the country‟s international obligations and Iran as a cunning and non-cooperative actor. These discursive practices in turn contributed to the construction of the international isolation of Iran as inevitable and necessary. On the other hand, there were the discursive practices of Italy and Japan, which framed the Iranian nuclear issue as deplorable event but without ever advocating for the international isolation of Iran. The discourses of donor countries regarding the Iranian nuclear crisis stood in sharp contradiction with their discourses on the issue of drug control in Iran.

2. Discourse Analysis of Donor Countries‟ Political Statements on Counter-Narcotics Cooperation with Iran: Conveying Positive Representations of Iran

In sharp contrast to the Iranian nuclear issue, donor countries conveyed positive representations of Iran in their discourses on counter-narcotics cooperation with the country. These positive representations were built on three frames, which are exposed in

369 “Iran Nuclear Activities Worrying Despite US Report: Germany,” Op. Cit.; and “Germany Says Iran „Not Prepared to Cooperate‟,” Op. Cit. 370 “Japan Says it Shares Global Concerns on Iran Nuclear Drive,” Op. Cit.; “Japan Condemns Iran Nuclear Plant,” Op. Cit.; “Japan‟s Hatoyama Pressures Iran on Nuclear plans,” Op. Cit.; and “Italy Backs Criticism of Iran‟s Secret Nuclear Site,” Op. Cit.

further details below. These discursive practices contributed to the legitimization of donor countries‟ assistance to Iran‟s counter-narcotics efforts. Yet, only a minority of donor countries, namely Italy and Germany, endorsed such discursive practices.

2.1 Frame 1: Iran‟s Counter-Narcotics Efforts as Good Practices

Iran‟s counter-narcotics efforts were constructed as an emblem of good practice in the political statements of Germany on international drug cooperation with Iran. In a 2009 report to the Dublin Group, the German Embassy in Tehran hailed Iran for doing a “good job” in the field of drug control and depicted the country‟s counter-narcotics efforts as comprehensive, resolute and efficient.371 Numerous aspects of the country‟s drug control policy were also represented as instances of good practice in the 2009 and subsequent reports to the Dublin Group. These included border control, treatment services and international cooperation.372 The language employed to represent Iran‟s counter-narcotics efforts in the political statements of Germany illustrated the country‟s approval of these efforts. Of the seven countries that provided international assistance to Iran‟s counter- narcotics efforts between 2007 and 2011, Germany was the only one to construct Iran‟s counter-narcotics efforts as good practice. France, the United-Kingdom, Japan, Italy, Ireland and Belgium have not made a single statement in favour or disapproval of Iran‟s drug control policy. The discourse on Iran‟s counter-narcotics efforts as an emblem of good practice in the field of international drug control was constant in the political statements of Germany from 2009 onward. It did not change with the overall political circumstances and, more importantly, it was not altered in the face of escalating tensions over the Iranian nuclear issue.

371 German Delegation, Op. Cit., (2009), 3-6. 372 German Delegation, Op. Cit., (2009), 5-6; and German Delegation, Op. Cit., (2010), 7.

2.2 Frame 2: Iran as a Strategic Partner in the Fight against the Afghan Drug Trade

Iran was constructed as a strategic partner in the fight against the Afghan drug trade in the political statements of Italy and Germany. Iran was represented as an actor who played a positive role in the international fight against illicit drugs and who had the political will to cooperate with the international community in the field of drug control. On the occasion of an informal meeting held with representatives from the G8 in Kyoto on June 26, 2008, Italy‟s Foreign Minister Franco Frattini pointed out that Iran could play a “positive role” in the fight against the Afghan drug trade.373 In this statement, Iran‟s “positive role” arose from the fact that it was strategically located at the crossroads between Afghanistan and Europe and that, as one of the “principal victim” of the Afghan drug trade, it had the political will to combat illicit drugs.374 Earlier that year, Franco Frattini had noted that drug trafficking represented for the Italian government a “common interest” on which “we” can “work together.375” The language employed in this statement framed drug trafficking as a problem that was shared by Italy and Iran and counter-narcotics efforts as a collective solution to this problem. The use of the pronoun “we” to designate Italy and Iran inevitably brought the two countries together in Frattini‟s statement. Combined together, these two communicative events contributed to the construction of Iran as a strategic partner in the fight against the Afghan drug trade. For its part, the German Embassy in Tehran presented Iran as the “strongest counter-narcotics partner in the region” in its 2010 and 2011 annual reports to the Dublin Group.376 The language employed there was unequivocal: Iran was not only represented as a partner of the German government in the fight against the Afghan drug trade but it was also qualified as the “strongest” partner in the whole region. The political statements of Germany therefore constructed the counter-narcotics cooperation between Iran and Western governments into a strong partnership. Both Italy and Germany adopted a discourse that represented Iran as a strategic partner in the fight against the Afghan drug trade. This discourse was conveyed in Italian

373 “Afghanistan: Frattini, Coinvolgere Iran Control Narcotraffico,” Op. Cit. 374 Ibid. 375 Di Vicenzo Nigro, Op. Cit. 376 German Delegation, Op. Cit., (2010), 2; and German Regional Chair of the Dublin Group, Op. Cit., 3.

utterances made prior to 2009 while, in the case of Germany, it was conveyed in statements made after 2009. Contrarily to Italy and Germany, the UK, France, Japan, Belgium and Ireland did not depict Iran as a partner in the fight against the Afghan drug trade and this, amidst the fact that they were actual partners on the ground.

2.3 Frame 3: International Counter-Narcotics Cooperation with Iran as Positive yet Challenging

International counter-narcotics cooperation with Iran was constructed as positive in the political statements of Italy and Germany. In an interview with a journalist from La Nazione, an Italian daily newspaper, Italy‟s Foreign Minister Franco Frattini underlined that direct drug cooperation with Iran was a “positive” form of diplomacy that the Italian government was seeking to revive.377 Similarly, the German Embassy in Tehran noted in its 2009 annual report to the Dublin Group that drug cooperation with Iran was “positive.378” However, contrarily to Italy‟s Foreign Minister, the German Embassy nuanced that counter-narcotics cooperation with Iran was often politicized and not linear. That is to say that the scope and intensity of international cooperation with Iran changed with the overall political situation.379 In 2010, the focus of the German discourse on international counter-narcotics cooperation with Iran shifted away from the frame of “positive” cooperation towards one of “challenging” cooperation. The German Embassy in Tehran pointed out in its 2010 report to the Dublin Group that drug cooperation with Iran came to a standstill in 2009 following the controversial election of President Mahmud Ahmadinejad.380 Additionally, international drug cooperation with Iran was depicted in subsequent reports as “cumbersome,” “politicized” and unpredictable.381 However, in drafting their reports, German authorities were careful to stress that cooperation with Iran was “worth the effort” despite the many

377 German Delegation, Op. Cit., (2010), 2; and German Regional Chair of the Dublin Group, Op. Cit., 3. 378 German Delegation, Op. Cit., (2009), 11. 379 Ibid. 380 German Delegation, Op. Cit., (2010), 1. 381 German Regional Chair of the Dublin Group, Op. Cit., 2.

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challenges it presented.382 Counter-narcotics cooperation with Iran was therefore constructed as positive yet challenging in the political statements of Germany from 2010 onward. Once again, France, the United-Kingdom, Belgium, Japan and Ireland did not make a single statement on the issue of international counter-narcotics cooperation with Iran. We understand that the silence of Japan, Ireland and Belgium on the issue could have arisen from the fact that these three governments played a role of second order in providing international assistance to Iran‟s counter-narcotics efforts. However, the silence of France and the United-Kingdom is more puzzling. They both made significant contributions to Iran‟s counter-narcotics efforts. However, contrarily to Germany and Italy, they did not convey a discourse that justified the assistance they provided to Iran by constructing Iran as a strategic partner in the fight against the Afghan drug trade and drug cooperation with Iran as positive despite the many challenges it entailed. There were two discursive trends followed by donor countries to represent the issue of international drug cooperation with Iran. On the one hand, there were the discourses of Germany and Italy that constructed Iran as a strategic partner in the fight against the Afghan drug trade and counter-narcotics cooperation with Iran as positive yet challenging endeavour. On the other hand, there was the trend followed by the governments of France, the United-Kingdom, Japan, Belgium and Ireland, which was characterized by a virtual absence of any utterance on the topic of international drug cooperation with Iran. The discursive trends observed will now be explained in the subsequent chapter.

382 German Regional Chair of the Dublin Group, Op. Cit., 2.

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CHAPTER 6 THE PARADOX OF CONFLICTING DISCOURSES EXPLAINED: DISCUSSING THE IMPACTS OF STRATEGY, INSTITUTIONS, MANICHAEISM, POWER AND CONTEXT

Our discourse analysis of the political statements of donor countries on the Iranian nuclear issue and counter-narcotics cooperation with Iran highlighted the existence of conflicting discourses on the two issues. On the one hand, Iran was represented in an adversary on the nuclear question. One the other hand, Iran was framed as a partner on counter-narcotics issues. What are explanations for this puzzling phenomenon? Was this paradox voluntary, calculated and strategic or rather the accidental outcome of multiple political actors and institutions? Are the conflicting representations of Iran the necessary result of Manichean discourses? What about the position of donor countries in the international system? Could their status as middle powers have borne impacts on their discursive practices? What role played the global political context in shaping the discourses of donor countries on the Iranian nuclear issue and on counter-narcotics cooperation with Iran? Answering these questions prove central to our discussion on the paradox of international counter-narcotics cooperation and nuclear confrontation with Iran from 2007 to 2011.

1. Conflicting Representations of Iran: A Voluntary, Calculated and Strategic Paradox?

The representations of Iran‟s nuclear program as a security threat, of Iran‟s uranium enrichment activities as a breach in the country‟s international obligations and of Iran as a cunning and non-cooperative cooperative actor conveyed in the political statements of France, Germany and the UK constructed the Iranian nuclear issue in a way that inevitably conduced to confrontation with Iran. Additionally, the representation of the international isolation of Iran as inevitable and necessary permeated their nuclear policies towards Iran. By negatively constructing the Iranian nuclear issue, their discourse delegitimized Iran and

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its nuclear program and, concurrently to that, legitimized their own course of action against Iran. France, Germany and the UK were the sole of the seven donor countries to convey these negative representations of Iran in their political statements on the Iranian nuclear issue. Interestingly enough, these three European governments were all part of the diplomatic efforts to resolve the nuclear issue (E3 then P5+1). Our review of the literature on the history of EU-Iran relations underlined that, in the early stages of the Iranian nuclear crisis, the E3 favoured dialogue and engagement with Iran over confrontation and isolation.383 However, the political statements analysed during the course of the present research indicated that they adopted the latter during the period under study. Our explanation of this phenomenon is that, as Florent Pouponneau underlined in his article on France‟s foreign policy orientation towards the Iranian nuclear issue from 2003 to 2006, the E3‟s ability to resolve the nuclear issue without US support was null. In order to make even the smallest dent on the Iranian nuclear dossier, the three European nuclear negotiators had to rally the support of the US, which came at the price of adopting their policy of nuclear confrontation with Iran.384 Accordingly, the E3‟s negative representations of Iran conveyed in their discourse on the Iranian nuclear issue were deliberately adopted by the governments of France, the UK and Germany in order to secure a common strategic objective: preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. The governments of Italy and Japan adopted softer discursive practices than their E3 counterparts in their political statements on the Iranian nuclear issue. They never framed Iran‟s nuclear program as a security threat nor as a violation of the country‟s international obligations.385 Additionally, they never represented Iran as a cunning and non-cooperative actor.386 They adopted a discursive strategy that neither delegitimized nor legitimized Iran and its nuclear program. This strategy allowed them to avoid an all-out political confrontation with Iran and, as will be discussed in further details in sub-section 4 of the present chapter, to further their own foreign policy agendas.

383 Tom Sauer, Op. Cit., 273. 384 Florent Pouponneau, Op. Cit., 66. 385 “Statement by Mr. Taro Aso, Minister for Foreign Affairs on the United Nations Security Council Resolution Concerning Iran‟s Nuclear Issue,” Op. Cit.,; “Japan Says it Shares Global Concerns on Iran Nuclear Drive,” Op. Cit.; “Italy Backs Criticism of Iran‟s Secret Nuclear Site,” Op. Cit.; “Japan Condemns Iran Nuclear Plant,” Op. Cit.; and “Japan‟s Hatoyama Pressures Iran on Nuclear Plans,” Op. Cit. 386 Ibid.

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With regard to the issue of international drug cooperation with Iran, the discursive practices of donor countries were equally strategic. The construction of Iran as a key partner in the fight against the Afghan drug trade, the representation of the country‟s counter-narcotics efforts as an emblem of good practices and the positive portrayal of international drug cooperation with Iran conveyed in the political statements of Germany all served a purposive function: the legitimization of the German government‟s international assistance to and counter-narcotics cooperation with Iran. It will be illustrated later on that this strategic function was intimately linked to Germany‟s role as the leader of multilateral efforts against illicit drug trafficking in South West Asia. For its part, the discourse of the Italian government on international drug cooperation with Iran served a strategic function of unification. The Italian Foreign Minister Franco Frattini constructed Iran as a strategic partner in the fight against the Afghan drug trade by putting emphasis on the shared interests of the Iranian and Italian governments in combating illicit drugs in South West Asia.387 The purpose of the Italian Foreign Minister in engaging in such a discourse was ultimately to strengthen his country‟s bilateral relations with Iran and Italy‟s discursive practices were employed as a strategic tool to achieve this end.388 The silence of France, the United-Kingdom, Japan, Belgium and Ireland regarding their counter-narcotics cooperation with Iran were also voluntary, calculated and strategic. Although these five countries did not utter a single word on the issue of international drug cooperation with Iran, they provided the most significant assistance to Iran‟s counter- narcotics efforts from 2007 to 2011.389 It is argued that their silence performed a strategic function of “concealment”. In the words of Bahaa-eddin M. Mazid, their silence helped dissimulate “troublesome and controversial issues.”390 It allowed for counter-narcotics cooperation to take place between them and Iran without attracting public attention and great power wrath. The governments of France, the United-Kingdom, Japan, Belgium and Ireland were willing to cooperate with Iran during the period under review given, as it was underlined in Germany‟s political statements, the strategic location of the country, its

387 “Afghanistan: Frattini, Coinvolgere Iran Control Narcotraffico,” Op. Cit. 388 Giampaolo Pioli, Op. Cit. 389 International Harm Reduction Association, Op. Cit., 14. 390 Bahaa-eddin M. Mazid, “Presuppositions and Strategic Functions in Bush‟s 20/9/2001 Speech: A Critical Discourse Analysis,” Journal of Language and Politics 6, no. 3 (2007), 353.

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political will to actively fight drug trafficking and the good results its aggressive counter- narcotics efforts yielded. Yet, they were not willing to publicly endorse Iran as a partner in their fight against illicit drug trafficking due to the Iranian nuclear issue. Their strategic silence therefore allowed them to get the best of both worlds.

2. Conflicting Representations of Iran: A Paradox Due to the Multiplication of Political Actors and Institutions?

Italy‟s political statements on the Iranian nuclear issue and on counter-narcotics cooperation with Iran were both made by the Foreign Ministry and the Foreign Minister Franco Frattini. The political actors and institutions that uttered the statements analysed were therefore the very same. The paradox of Italy‟s nuclear isolation and counter-narcotics cooperation with Iran can therefore not be explained with regard to the multiplicity of political actors and institutions that formulated Italy‟s nuclear and counter-narcotics policies towards Iran. In fact, the Italian Foreign Minister, who was conscious of this paradox, tried to resolve it by declaring that he would not let the Iranian nuclear crisis prevent his country from engaging with Iranian authorities in counter-narcotics cooperation.391 Italy was the only donor country to expressively do so. In the case of Germany, there were notable differences between the actors and institutions that made political statements on the Iranian nuclear issue and those that made utterances on counter-narcotics cooperation with Iran. From 2007 to 2011, political statements on the Iranian nuclear issue were made by a variety of actors drawn from two institutions: the German Government and the Foreign Ministry. These actors included Angela Merkel, the German Chancellor; Ulrich Wilhelm, the Chief Government Spokesman; Thomas Steg, a Government Spokesman; Andreas Peschke, a Foreign Ministry Spokesman; and Guido Westerwelle, the Foreign Minister. Despite this diversity, there was no significant difference observed in terms of representations conveyed in their utterances. The construction of Iran‟s nuclear program as a security threat and as a breach

391 Franco Frattini, “Lectio Magistralis by the Hon. Minister at Berlin‟s Freie Universitat,” Farnesina Ministero degli Affari Esteri, April 20, 2009, accessed April 5, 2013, http://www.esteri.it/MAE/EN/Sala_Stampa/ArchivioNotizie/Interventi/2009/04/20090421_InterventoMinistr o_AfghanistanPakistan.htm.

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in the country‟s international obligations was equally present in the political statements of German Government and Foreign Ministry officials.392 Iran was also identically represented as a cunning and non-cooperative actor in the speeches of Government and Foreign Ministry officials.393 Finally, the discourse on the international isolation of Iran as necessary and inevitable was found in statements made by representatives of both institutions.394 There was therefore no difference between the utterances of the German Government and those of the Foreign Ministry regarding the Iranian nuclear issue. Political statements on international drug cooperation with Iran were either made by the German Embassy in Tehran or by Bernd Erbel, the German Envoy to Tehran. The German Embassy in Tehran is an institution that is affiliated to the German Foreign Ministry. The paradox of Germany‟s nuclear confrontation and counter-narcotics cooperation with Iran therefore seems to be located within the Foreign Ministry and not across political actors and institutions. Germany‟s conflicting nuclear and counter-narcotics policies towards Iran might have arisen from the fact that the German Embassy in Tehran and the German Foreign Ministry played very specific yet differentiated roles. As the regional chair of the Dublin Group, the German Embassy in Tehran was in charge of promoting international drug cooperation with Iran, maintaining dialogue with Iranian authorities and reporting on regional counter-narcotics developments.395 For its part, the German Foreign Ministry was in charge of designing and implementing Germany‟s foreign policy agenda, which has been centered on four pillars: European and transatlantic partnership, international security,

392 “Merkel Says Iran Must Meet all Demands over Nuclear Programme,” Op. Cit.; “Iran Nuclear Activities Worrying Despite US Report: Germany,” Op. Cit.; “Germany Says „Worried‟ by Iranian Enrichment Plans,” Op. Cit.; “Germany to Urge More „Pressure‟ over Iran Nuclear Plans,” Op. Cit.; and “Germany „Alarmed‟ at Iran Nuclear Drive, Supports Sanctions,” Op. Cit. 393 “Merkel Says Iran Must Meet all Demands over Nuclear Programme,” Op. Cit.; “Germany Urges Iran to Stop „Sabre-rattling‟,” Op. Cit.; “Germany Says Iran „Not Prepared to Cooperate‟,” Op. Cit.; “Germany Says „Worried‟ by Iranian Enrichment Plans,” Op. Cit.; and “Germany „Alarmed‟ at Iran Nuclear Drive, Supports Sanctions,” Op. Cit. 394 “Merkel Says Iran Must Meet all Demands over Nuclear Programme,” Op. Cit.; “Iran Nuclear Activities Worrying Despite US Report: Germany,” Op. Cit.; “Germany to Urge More „Pressure‟ over Iran Nuclear Plans,” Op. Cit.; and “Germany „Alarmed‟ at Iran Nuclear Drive, Supports Sanctions,” Op. Cit. 395 “Ambassador, Deputy Permanent Representative, Mr. Shigeki Sumi Becomes Chairman of the Central Dublin Group for a 2-Year Term,” Permanent Mission of Japan to the International Organizations in Vienna, accessed February 15, 2013, http://www.vie-mission.emb- japan.go.jp/old_webpage/news/NEWS20060323/NEWS20060323.html.

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globalization and human rights and humanitarian aid.396 The actions of the German Embassy in Tehran, as the Chair of the MDG, and of the German Foreign Ministry, as a promoter of international security, were therefore driven by diametrically opposed policy imperatives. They answered to the challenges they encountered by formulating discourses that allowed them to make sense of the political environments in which they evolved and provided them with the tools to confront and cooperate with Iran, thus creating the paradox of Germany‟s simultaneous nuclear confrontation and counter-narcotics cooperation with Iran. In the case of France, the United-Kingdom, Japan, Ireland and Belgium it is more difficult to assess whether or not the multiplicity of actors and institutions that formulated their nuclear and counter-narcotics policies explains the paradox of their nuclear confrontation and counter-narcotics cooperation with Iran. French statements on the Iranian nuclear issue were made by Nicolas Sarkozy, the French President; Eric Chevallier, a Spokesman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Francois Fillon, the Prime Minister and Bernard Kouchner, the Foreign Minister. British speeches on the nuclear issue were made by David Miliband, the Foreign Secretary; Kim Howells, the Junior Foreign Minister; two unnamed Foreign Office Spokesmen; and Gordon Brown, the Prime Minister. Similarly, Japanese statements were made by Foreign Ministers Taro Aso, Hirofumi Nakasone and Katsuya Okada and by Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama. The French, British and Japanese foreign ministries were therefore institutions at the forefront in the formulation and promotion of their governments‟ political discourses on the Iranian nuclear issue. These very same institutions were also in charge of providing counter-narcotics assistance to Iran from 2007 to 2011.397 The paradox of nuclear confrontation and counter-narcotics cooperation with Iran has therefore arisen from inconsistencies within the foreign ministries of France, the United-Kingdom and Japan rather than from differences across actors and

396 “Germany‟s Foreign Policy Parameters,” Federal Foreign Office, last modified March 28, 2013, accessed October 1, 2013, http://www.auswaertiges- amt.de/sid_B5DB567251CB303A4DF1AF6B600D1DF2/EN/Aussenpolitik/Schwerpunkte_Aussenpolitik_no de.html. 397 “La France et la Lutte contre la Criminalité Organisée,” France Diplomatie, accessed September 19, 2013, http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/politique-etrangere-de-la-france/defense-et-securite/criminalite-organisee/; “Policy: Establishing Stability in Afghanistan,” GOV.UK, last modified February 28, 2013, accessed September 19, 2013, https://www.gov.uk/government/policies/establishing-stability-in-afghanistan; and “Narcotics,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, accessed September 19, 2013, http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/narcotics/index.html.

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institutions within the three aforementioned governments. As for Belgium and Ireland, we cannot respond to this question since statements on both issues were not recorded.

3. Conflicting Representations of Iran: A Paradox Created by Manichean Discourses?

The discourse of the three European nuclear negotiators on the Iranian nuclear issue was constructed on a Manichean dichotomy. Iran‟s nuclear program was represented as a security threat and as a violation of the country‟s international obligations in the political statements of France, Germany and the United-Kingdom while Iran was framed as a cunning and non-cooperative actor. This discourse conveyed a dualism in which Iran was portrayed as the “bad” guy with “evil” intentions while the international community was portrayed as “good” and “virtuous.” The negative constructions of Iran and its nuclear program conveyed in the E3 discourse on the Iranian nuclear issue necessarily clashed with the more positive ones presented in the German and Italian discourses on international drug cooperation in South West Asia. On the one hand, Iran was depicted as an “enemy” and, on the other hand, the very same country was represented as a “partner.” At priory, it seems paradoxical for Iran to simultaneously be an enemy and a partner of donor countries. However, when one considers that the notions of “enmity” and “partnership” attributed to Iran arise from the discourses employed by donor countries to represent two distinct issues they were confronted to, the paradox looses some of its strength. Iran has been an enemy and a partner because it was constructed as so in the political statements of donor countries and, contrarily to Manichean categories, one construction does not exclude the other. The paradox of donor countries‟ nuclear confrontation and counter-narcotics cooperation with Iran therefore has arisen from the Manichaeism embedded in the discourses that constructed the “reality” of the Iranian nuclear crisis and of counter-narcotics cooperation with Iran.

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4. Conflicting Representations of Iran: The Distribution of Power

Middle powers are states that, without being great powers, can still exert an important degree of influence in international relations.398 In behavioural terms, middlepowermanship has been defined as: “[the] tendency to pursue multilateral solutions to international problems, [the] tendency to embrace compromise positions in international disputes, and [the] tendency to embrace notions of „good international citizenship‟ to … guide diplomacy.399” France, Germany, the United-Kingdom, Japan, Italy, Belgium and Ireland all classify as middle powers due to their political, economic and military resources. France, Germany and the United-Kingdom were all part of the P5+1, the group of countries in charge of conducting international nuclear negotiations with Iranian authorities. The P5+1 is composed of the five permanent members of the UNSC (France, the United-Kingdom, the United States, China and Russia) and Germany. It was established in June 2006, when the US, China and Russia joined the diplomatic efforts of the E3 (France, Germany and the United Kingdom) to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue.400 As illustrated in our comparative timeline of nuclear and counter-narcotics politics presented in Annex 1, the P5+1 and Iran have held four rounds of inconclusive nuclear negotiations during the period under study. Despite their diverging interests and policy orientations towards Iran and its nuclear program, the members of the P5+1 have presented a “unified” front, holding common positions in their negotiations with Iranian authorities. The political statements of the P5+1 on the Iranian nuclear issue were centered on the themes of dialogue, engagement, diplomatic negotiations and of Iran‟s nuclear rights and obligations. The representations of Iran‟s nuclear program as a security threat and of Iran as a cunning and non-cooperative actor were virtually absent from P5+1 statements.401 Yet, the three

398 David A. Cooper, “Challenging Contemporary Notions of Middle Power Influence: Implications of the Proliferation Security Initiative for Middle Power Theory,” Foreign Policy Analysis 7, (2011), 319. 399 Ronald M. Behringer, “Middle Power Leadership on the Human Security Agenda,” Cooperation and Conflict 40, no. 3 (2005), 307. 400 Holly Dagres, “Timeline: Iran‟s Nuclear Program,” The Cairo Review of Global Affairs, July 21, 2013, accessed October 1, 2013, http://www.aucegypt.edu/gapp/cairoreview/pages/articleDetails.aspx?aid=396. 401 E3+3 Statement on Iran’s Nuclear Programme (Brussels: Council of the European Union, September 23, 2009); Statement by the E3+3 with the Support of the EU High Representative Following the Adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1929 on the Iranian Nuclear Programme (Brussels: Council of the European Union, June 9, 2010); Catherine Ashton, Statement Delivered by EU High Representative Catherine Ashton

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European nuclear negotiators all portrayed Iran‟s nuclear program as a security threat, depicted Iran as a cunning and non-cooperative actor and represented the international isolation of Iran as inevitable and necessary in their political statements on the Iranian nuclear issue. This observation suggests that the E3 were profoundly influenced by the policy practices of the US. Indeed, their discourse on the Iranian nuclear issue is reminiscent of the one held by the US. Our review of the academic literature on the Iranian nuclear issue highlighted that the notions of security threat and international sanctions were key components of the US policy on Iran and that the US have actively pushed other members of the international community to adopt their policy of confrontation on the Iranian nuclear dossier.402 This US influence on the discursive practices of E3 governments is partly explained with regard to their status as middle powers. Ronald M. Behringer has pointed out that middle powers tend to support and follow great power leadership on global security issues.403 They traditionally act as supporters of the international system due to their commitment to “orderliness and security” in international affairs.404 That is to say that, despite their commitment to a mediated resolution of the Iranian nuclear crisis, they have chosen to come closer to the US policy of confrontation with Iran due to their fears of the potential destabilizing impacts a nuclear Iran could have on international security and, as discussed earlier, due to their inability to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue independently from the US.405 Furthermore, as security and economic partners of the US, they were strongly pressured by US government officials to adopt the stance of the US on the Iranian nuclear issue, hence the negative constructions of Iran and its nuclear program conveyed in their political statements on the Iranian nuclear issue.406 This situation was particularly

on Behalf of the E3+3 (Brussels: Council of the European Union, September 22, 2010); Catherine Ashton, Statement by EU High Representative Catherine Ashton on Behalf of E3+3 After the Talks with Iran, Geneva 6-7 December 2010 (Brussels: Council of the European Union, December 7, 2010); and Catherine Ashton, Statement by the EU High Representative Catherine Ashton on Behalf of E3+3 Following the Talks with Iran in Istanbul, 21 and 22 January 2011 (Brussels: Council of the European Union, January 22, 2011). 402 Reza Simbar, Op. Cit., 74; Arsalan Ghorbani Sheikhneshin, Op. Cit., 97; Adam Tarock, Op. Cit., 646-647; Brandon M. Boylan, Op. Cit., 96; Zehra Nilufer Karacasulu and Irem Askar Karakir, Op. Cit., 14; and Nikolay A. Kozhanov, Op. Cit., 149. 403 Ronald M. Behringer, Op. Cit., 308. 404 Andrew F. Cooper, “Niche Diplomacy: A Conceptual Overview,” in Niche Diplomacy: Middle Powers after the Cold War, ed. Andrew F. Cooper (Houndmills: Macmillan Press, 1997), 8. 405 Florent Pouponneau, Op. Cit., 52. 406 Stephen Fidler and Daniel Dombey, “US Pushes Europe on Iran Sanctions,” The Financial Times, January 25, 2007, accessed September 17, 2013, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/c29ee468-ac18-11db-a0ed- 0000779e2340.html#axzz2fAFB9fg8; Steven R. Weisman, “Europe Resists U.S. Push to Curb Iran Ties,” The

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manifest in the case of the UK. Indeed, as Andrea Ellner pointed out in her article on British policy responses to the Iranian nuclear issue, the UK‟s ability to have weight in the conduct of regional affairs was dependent on its joint-diplomacy with the US.407 Accordingly, the UK‟s discursive practices on the Iranian nuclear were tied by the country‟s transatlantic alliances. In the case of France, there were slightly different dynamics at work in explaining their discursive practices on the Iranian nuclear issue. Our review of the academic literature on France-Iran relations pointed out that during the period under study, France‟s policy towards the Iranian nuclear issue has grown even more intransigent than the US position itself.408 The explanation given by scholars to account for this situation was that France‟s nuclear policy responded to a number of imperatives and aspirations, such as playing a key role in international affairs, protecting the country‟s interests in the Middle East and preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons.409 Similarly to the UK and Germany, France was a middle power whose ability to play a significant role on the nuclear dossier was constrained by the US but who, contrarily to the UK and Germany, turned this constraint to its advantage by putting itself at the forefront and adopting a nuclear rhetoric that was, at times, even more aggressive than the US. Germany‟s negative construction of Iran and its nuclear program stood in sharp contradiction with its positive representations of Iran and its counter-narcotics efforts. Germany was the sole of the three European nuclear negotiators to represent Iran as a strategic partner in the fight against the Afghan drug trade in its political statements on counter-narcotics cooperation in South West Asia. This paradoxical situation is due to the fact that the government of Germany had developed a functional niche and exerted multilateral leadership in the field of counter-narcotics cooperation with Iran. Indeed, since its accession to the chairmanship of the MDG in Tehran in 2008, Germany had

New York Times, January 30, 2007, accessed September 17, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/30/washington/30iran.html?pagewanted=pri&_r=0; David Gow and Ewen MacAskill, “Washington Tells EU Firms: Quit Iran Now,” The Guardian, November 9, 2007, accessed September 17, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/nov/09/eu.iran; Vivienne Walt, “Is the U.S. Bullying Europe into Cutting Ties with Iran?” Time, October 28, 2010, accessed September 17, 2013, http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2028046,00.html; and Steven Mufson, “Familiar Hurdles for U.S. as it Ramps up Pressure on Firms Doing Trade with Iran,” The Washington Post, March 11, 2010, accessed September 17, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp- dyn/content/article/2010/03/10/AR2010031003881.html. 407 Andrea Ellner, Op. Cit., 228. 408 Clément Therme, Op. Cit., 30; and Pirooz Izadi, Op. Cit., 51. 409 Florent Pouponneau, Op. Cit., 52; Clément Therme, Op. Cit., 34; and Pirooz Izadi, Op. Cit., 40.

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demonstrated some degree of entrepreneurial and technical leadership by providing assistance to Iran‟s counter-narcotics efforts and by encouraging other nations to do so.410 It had also worked as a catalyst by positively advertising international drug cooperation with Iran and has played the role of facilitator by compiling reports on the drug situation in Iran, setting future priorities and agendas, convening meetings between Iranian authorities and MDG representatives, and coordinating international assistance to Iran‟s counter-narcotics efforts.411 The representations of Iran as a strategic partner in the fight against the Afghan drug trade and of international drug cooperation with Iran as positive yet challenging were vital to the maintenance and promotion of Germany‟s multilateral efforts, thus explaining why it was the sole of the three E3 governments to hold such a positive discourse on international drug cooperation with Iran. Germany was helped in its endeavour by the fact that the US were, contrarily to what common knowledge may suggest, strongly supportive of this endeavour.412 Italy followed a policy of soft nuclear confrontation and active counter-narcotics cooperation with Iran from 2007 to 2011. Indeed, our discourse analysis presented in chapter 5 highlighted that the Italian government never adopted the E3‟s Manichean discourse in its political statements on the Iranian nuclear issue. Although, as a member of the EU and a close ally of the US, Italy was strongly encouraged to adopt a stronger position on the Iranian nuclear issue, the Italian government resisted international pressure until mid-2008 in order to preserve the strong bilateral relations it had established with Iran.413 Indeed, prior to 2009, Italy was Iran‟s first European economic partner, with bilateral trade totalling over €6 billion in 2007 and in 2008.414 It was therefore very reluctantly that Italy joined its voice to the opponents of Iran‟s nuclear enrichment program and implemented economic sanctions against Iran, with the result that the volume of

410 German Delegation, Op. Cit., (2009), 11; and “German Envoy Lauds Iran‟s Anti-Drug Efforts,” Op. Cit. 411 German Delegation, Op. Cit., (2009); German Delegation, Op. Cit., (2010); and German Delegation, Op. Cit., (2011). 412 United States Department of State, Op. Cit., (2012), 277. 413 Barak Ravid, “Italy Joins EU Drive for More Iran Sanctions,” Haaretz, April 22, 2008, accessed September 18, 2013, http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/italy-joins-eu-drive-for-more-iran-sanctions- 1.244352; and Di Vicenzo Nigro, Op. Cit. 414 Barak Ravid, Op. Cit.; and “Italy, Iran‟s 1st Trading Partner in EU,” Fars News Agency, May 2, 2009, accessed September 18, 2013, http://english2.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=8802120745.

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bilateral trade was reduced to €4.5 billion in 2009.415 In this context of deteriorating bilateral relations, the Italian government instrumentalized its counter-narcotics cooperation with Iran in order to further its self-interested foreign policy agenda. As Italy‟s Foreign Minister Franco Frattini underlined himself, the positive representations conveyed in Italian political statements on counter-narcotics cooperation with Iran aimed at preserving and restoring the strong bilateral relations Italy had once established with Iran. Counter- narcotics cooperation with Iran was therefore a strategic tool employed by the Italian government to achieve this end.416 Italy could have provided assistance to Iran‟s counter- narcotics efforts out of concern for good international citizenship or of fear of the effects the Afghan drug trade could bear on its population. Yet, our discursive analysis of Italy‟s political statements on counter-narcotics cooperation with Iran suggested that its prime motive was rather politico-economic. Italy has therefore taken advantage of the multilateral efforts led by the German government in the field of counter-narcotics cooperation with Iran to further its self-interested foreign policy agenda. Similarly to Italy, the Japanese government never adopted a discourse that represented Iran and its nuclear program in pejorative terms. Our analysis suggests that Japanese authorities adopted a policy of soft nuclear confrontation with Iran in order to antagonise neither of their Iranian nor American counterparts. It was highlighted in our review of the literature on the history of Japan-Iran relations that the Japanese government faced an acute dilemma between energy security (i.e. access to Iranian oil and gas) on the one hand and military security (i.e. military alliance with the US) on the other hand.417 Japan‟s “neutral” policy towards the Iranian nuclear issue has allowed the country to reach a fragile equilibrium between these two conflicting security agendas. The Japanese discourse on the Iranian nuclear issue is therefore reminiscent of the one held by the Italian government in that it was partly motivated by economic concerns. However, contrarily to Italy, the Japanese government did not hold a discourse that justified its counter-narcotics cooperation with Iran. Our discursive analysis of donor countries‟ political statements on

415 Barak Ravid, Op. Cit.; “Italy Backs Criticism of Iran‟s Secret Nuclear Site,” Op. Cit.; and Stephen Fidler and Laura Stevens, “EU Targets Iran Despite Members‟ Trade Ties,” The Wall Street Journal, June 18, 2010, accessed September 18, 2013, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703650604575312840083258382.html. 416 Giampaolo Pioli, Op. Cit. 417 Yukikio Miyagi, Op. Cit., 306; Jonathan A. Czin, Op. Cit., 213; and Brendan Taylor, Op. Cit., 82

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counter-narcotics cooperation with Iran pointed out that Japan followed the path of France, the UK, Ireland and Belgium by remaining silent on the assistance it provided to Iran from 2007 to 2011. An explanation for this phenomenon is that the Japanese government did not want to antagonize its security ally, the US. Indeed, Japan had already been forced to reduce its stakes in the Azadegan oil field in 2006 due to US pressure.418 The Japanese government might have kept a sour taste of this experience and not have wanted to repeat it by publicly endorsing its drug cooperation with Iran. Another explanation is that Japan provided assistance to Iran‟s counter-narcotics efforts out of concern for good international citizenship and without seeing the need to positively advertise its drug cooperation with Iran in political statements on the issue. As Andrew F. Cooper pointed out, Japan has often acted as an international banker, making significant financial contributions to multilateral initiatives but without exerting multilateral leadership.419 As a matter of fact, Japan has provided US$4.797 billion of foreign assistance to Afghanistan since 2001.420 An estimated US$23 million of this assistance was attributed Afghanistan‟s counter-narcotics and border control efforts and this, despite the fact that Japan had not been significantly affected by the Afghan drug trade.421 The Japanese government could have simply conceived of its counter-narcotics assistance to Iran as an extension of its aid to Afghanistan, thus explaining its silence on the issue. Belgium and Ireland also qualify as middle powers due to their economic and military resources. However, our discourse analysis of their (absence of) political statements on the Iranian nuclear issue and on counter-narcotics cooperation with Iran suggests that these two European countries played a role of second order on both fronts. Indeed, the governments of Belgium and Ireland did not exert middle power leadership but simply embraced the multilateral efforts put forward by the E3 with regard to the Iranian nuclear issue and by Germany with regard to international counter-narcotics cooperation with Iran. In other words, Belgium and Ireland acted as passive middle powers during the

418 Yukikio Miyagi, Op. Cit., 306; Brendan Taylor, Op. Cit., 80; and Jonathan A. Czin, Op. Cit., 210. 419 Andrew F. Cooper, Op. Cit., 3. 420 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Japan’s Assistance in Afghanistan: Towards Self-Reliance (Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, March 2013), 2. 421 “Japan Contributes Nearly $23 Million to Support UNODC Work in Afghanistan and Region,” United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, March 5, 2012, accessed September 18, 2013, http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/2012/March/japan-contributes-nearly-23-million-to-support- unodc-work-in-afghanistan-and-the-region.html.

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period under study. The reasons that have motivated these two European governments to provide assistance to Iran‟s counter-narcotics efforts from 2007 to 2011 are difficult to assess given their silence on the issue. Our explanation is that they were wary of Afghan drugs flooding into Europe. As a matter of fact, around the time the seven donor countries initiated their counter-narcotics cooperation with Iran in 2007, the Irish press was flooded with alarming news reports on the imminent outbreak of a new heroin epidemic that would have been caused by the Afghan drug trade.422 These reports suggest that the Irish government made the calculation that providing assistance to Iran‟s counter-narcotics efforts would be an effective and cheap way to prevent such a dreadful event. The silence of France and the United-Kingdom on their counter-narcotics cooperation with Iran is more puzzling. The governments of France and the United- Kingdom are both significant middle powers that exert multilateral leadership on a variety of international issues.423 Yet, their behaviour with regard to the issue of international assistance to Iran‟s counter-narcotics efforts suggests that they did not want to exert leadership on this particular issue. Why is it so? This is a question to which we cannot provide a well-documented answer. What we do know though is that the governments of France and the UK had the political will to cooperate with Iran on drug control issues and that they took advantage of German-led multilateral efforts to provide assistance to Iran‟s counter-narcotics efforts from 2007 to 2011. The motives behind their assistance to Iran are difficult to assess. It could be that they wanted to act as good global citizens by providing assistance to a country that was gravely affected by the Afghan drug trade. As a matter of fact, Chris Kitchen and Rhiannon Vickers highlighted that the UK‟s nuclear policy towards Iran was informed by five core Labour traditions of international order, including the belief in an international interest towards which each state has a responsibility to work and need for collective security.424 Kitchen and Vickers analysis can be extended to the UK‟s counter-narcotics policies towards Iran. Accordingly, the argument could be made that the UK provided assistance to Iran‟s counter-narcotics efforts in order to uphold a shared

422 Lynn Jolly, “Hero in Horror,” Mirror, March 25, 2007. 423 “French Foreign Policy,” France Diplomatie, accessed October 2, 2013, http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy-1/; and “Foreign & Commonwealth Office,” GOV.UK, accessed October 2, 2013, https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/foreign-commonwealth- office. 424 Chris Kitchen and Rhiannon Vickers, Op. Cit., 300.

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international interest: preventing illicit drug trafficking and its adverse consequences. A similar logic could also apply to France, whose, as Florent Pouponneau pointed out, foreign policy agenda stressed the importance of “effective multilateralism” in international affairs.425 Yet, more realistically, it could be that they were concerned by the impacts the Afghan drug trade had on their very own populations. Indeed, the UK and France were among the top three European countries in terms of consumption of Afghan drugs, with annual consumption estimated at 19mt for the UK and 10mt for France.426 In comparison, Germany‟s annual consumption of Afghan drugs had only been estimated at 7mt, representing less than half of the United-Kingdom‟s.427 Addressing the Afghan drug trade has therefore been a high priority on their domestic and foreign policy agendas but a priority whose solution they did not want to publicly endorse. The middle power position of donor countries in the international system have borne different effects on their discursive practices regarding the Iranian nuclear issue and counter-narcotics cooperation with Iran. At times, it allowed them to exert multilateral leadership (Germany), to pursue their self-interests (Italy, France and the United Kingdom) or to act as good international citizens (Japan). At others, it constrained them to follow the policies of more powerful actors (E3, Belgium and Ireland). The paradox of nuclear confrontation and counter-narcotics cooperation with Iran is therefore partly explained with regard to the middlepowerness of the seven donor countries. Indeed, the inconsistencies between these two diametrically opposed courses of action resulted from the fact that certain donor countries rallied to the position of the US in order to make a dent on the nuclear dossier while trying to pursue their own foreign policy agendas on the counter- narcotics issues.

5. Conflicting Representations of Iran: The Effects of Context

The discourse of France, Germany and the UK on the Iranian nuclear issue was deeply affected by the nuclear context. At times of active efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation, the political statements of E3 governments were dominated by the representation of Iran‟s

425 Florent Pouponneau, Op. Cit., 64. 426 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Op. Cit., (2010), 41. 427 Ibid.

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nuclear program as a security threat. As a matter of fact, from 2007 to 2009, the discourse of these three European governments was centred on the threat posed by Iran‟s nuclear program to international and regional security.428 Our comparative timeline of the Iranian nuclear crisis and counter-narcotics cooperation with Iran, which is presented in Annex 1, illustrated that this period had been characterized by a “normalized” level of political tensions, alternating between international pressure and negotiation efforts. Between March 2007 and October 2009, a total of three UNSC resolutions were adopted on Iran. Additionally, two rounds of nuclear talks were held between Iran and the P5+1. Yet, the July 2008 and October 2009 Geneva talks both proved to be inconclusive as the conflicting parties failed to agree on pre-conditions to the conclusion of a nuclear deal. From November 2009 onward, the construction of Iran‟s nuclear program as a breach in the country‟s international obligations became the prime representation found in the political statements of France, Germany and the United-Kingdom.429 At the time, the diplomatic process had slowed down as only one USNC resolution and one round of nuclear talks were adopted and held from November 2009 to December 2010. This discursive shift indicates a deliberate attempt on the behalf of the E3 lure Iranian authorities back to the negotiation table. This “relaxation” of their nuclear rhetoric lasted until January 2011, period at which the negotiation process between the Iran and the P5+1 proved, once again, to be inconclusive. The representation of Iran‟s nuclear program as a security threat resurged in the political statements of France, Germany and the UK in November 2011.430 At the time, the Iranian nuclear crisis had reached new heights and European governments were preparing for the imposition of unilateral sanctions against Iran, which entered into force on January 23, 2012.431 The discourse of France, Germany and the UK on the Iranian nuclear issue was therefore fluid, adapting to the global nuclear context. The political statements of

428 “Merkel Says Iran Must Meet all Demands over Nuclear Programme,” Op. Cit.; “Iran Nuclear Threat „Serious‟: British PM‟s Spokesman,” Op. Cit.; and “Sarkozy: Bombe Nucléaire Iranienne, Menace Inacceptable pour la Stabilité du Monde,” Op. Cit. 429 “IAEA Sends „Strongest Possible Signal‟ to Iran: Britain,” Op. Cit.; “Germany Says Iran „Not Prepared to Cooperate‟,” Op. Cit.; “Iran Plans for New Enrichment Plants a Serious Concern: Britain,” Op. Cit.; and “Iran Enrichment Plans a „Serious Concern‟: Britain,” Op. Cit. 430 “Germany to Urge More „Pressure‟ over Iran Nuclear Plans,” Op. Cit.; “Germany „Alarmed‟ at Iran Nuclear Drive, Supports Sanctions,” Op. Cit.; and “La France Préconise de Nouvelles Sanctions à l‟Encontre de l‟Iran,” Op. Cit. 431 “EU Imposes Fresh Round of Sanctions on Iran – 23:01:2012,” European Union External Action, accessed June 24, 2013, http://eeas.europa.eu/top_stories/2012/230112_iran_en.htm.

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the E3 were constructed and manipulated to respond to the challenges they faced in handling the Iranian nuclear issue. The discursive practices of Japanese and Italian officials were also affected by the volatile nuclear context. Our discourse analysis of Japanese and Italian statements on the Iranian nuclear issue underlined that these two governments did not adopt the E3‟s Manichean discourse. Yet, they did not expressively reject it either. This ambiguity allowed them to manipulate their discourse on the Iranian nuclear issue to respond to the challenges posed by the development of Iran‟s nuclear program. At times when the Iranian nuclear crisis was escalating, Japanese and Italian officials voiced their concerns with Iran‟s nuclear activities and expressed their support of the initiatives put forward by the international community to resolve outstanding issues.432 At others, they limited their utterances to denouncing the international crisis generated by Iran‟s uranium enrichment activities.433 Although striving to preserve relatively good relations with both Iran and the international community at large, Italy and Japan could not totally escape the effects of the nuclear context. The discourse of Germany on international drug cooperation with Iran was less permeated by the political context. Our discourse analysis underlined that Germany‟s political statements on counter-narcotics cooperation with Iran were dominated by representations of Iran‟s counter-narcotics efforts as an emblem of good practice, of Iran as a strategic partner in the fight against the Afghan drug trade and of international drug cooperation with Iran as positive yet challenging. The German discourse on international drug cooperation with Iran did not significantly change with global political circumstances. The only change noticed was in 2010, when the German Embassy in Tehran noted that drug cooperation with Iran was “challenging” and “politicized” in its annual report to the Dublin Group.434 Yet, as the German Embassy underlined, this situation had more to do with the controversial re-election of President Mahmud Ahmadinejad in 2009 than with

432 “Italy Backs Criticism of Iran‟s Secret Nuclear Site,” Op. Cit.; and “Japan Condemns Iran Nuclear Plant,” Op. Cit. 433 “Statement by Mr. Taro Aso, Minister for Foreign Affairs on the United Nations Security Council Resolution Concerning Iran‟s Nuclear Issue,” Op. Cit.,; and “Japan Says it Shares Global Concerns on Iran Nuclear Drive,” Op. Cit. 434 German Delegation, Op. Cit., (2010), 1.

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escalating tensions over Iran‟s nuclear program.435 The absence of changes in the German discourse on international drug cooperation with Iran can be explained with regard to Germany‟s chairmanship of the MDG in Tehran. As the regional chairman of the MDG, the German Embassy in Tehran was in charge of coordinating international assistance to Iran‟s counter-narcotics efforts and of engaging in a dialogue with Iranian authorities to improve drug cooperation.436 It would therefore have been inconsistent with its role as the Chairman of the MDG in Tehran for Germany to modify its discourse that positively represented international drug cooperation with Iran. The discourse of the Italian government on international drug cooperation with Iran was more affected by the global political context than its German counterpart. Prior to 2009, Iran was represented as a strategic partner in the fight against the Afghan drug trade in the political statements of the Italian government. However, this positive representation was abandoned from 2009 onward. This shift in the discursive practices of Italian officials can be explained with regard to nuclear developments. Indeed, as observed during our qualitative content analysis of political statements made by Iranian officials, the year 2009 marked a turning point in the development of the Iranian nuclear crisis. In late 2009, the nuclear rhetoric of the Iranian government shifted towards active confrontation with the international community.437 This event negatively impacted on the bilateral relations between Iran and Italy as a setback in Italy-Iran relations was experienced at the time. As for France, the United-Kingdom, Japan, Belgium and Ireland, it is difficult to assess the impacts of the global political context on their discursive practices since no political statement on international drug cooperation with Iran could be recorded for the five aforementioned countries. It is hypothesized that they did not want to publicly endorse Iran as a partner in their fight against the Afghan drug trade in South West Asia in order not to reveal the inconsistencies between their policies of nuclear isolation and counter- narcotics cooperation with Iran. The assistance they provided to Iran‟s counter-narcotics

435 German Delegation, Op. Cit., (2010), 1. 436 “Ambassador, Deputy Permanent Representative, Mr. Shigeki Sumi Becomes Chairman of the Central Dublin Group for a 2-Year Term,” Op. Cit. 437 “Salehi: Iran to Build 10 N. Plants in Response to West‟s Offensive Measures,” Op. Cit.; “Mottaki Reiterates Iran‟s Resolve to Continue N. Progress,” Op. Cit.; “Iran Will Not Back Down, Even if Sanctioned: Larijani,” Op. Cit.; “Tehran Insists on Continued 20% Uranium Enrichment,” Op. Cit.; and “Any Sanctions on Iran Will Be Met with Bitter Response: Larijani,” Op. Cit.

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efforts indicates that they had a strong interest in drug cooperation with Iran but their silence on the issue suggests that this interest was subordinated to the Iranian nuclear issue.

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CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSION

The members of the international community have set well-defined outcomes they would like to see happen with regard to Iran. These include preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons on the one hand and preventing Afghan drugs from being trafficked into Europe on the other hand. The realization of the later objective requires a close cooperation between Iran and them. Yet, none of them really wants to be identified as Iran‟s partners due to the development of the country‟s controversial nuclear program. The governments of France, the UK, Germany, Belgium, Italy, Ireland and Japan managed to collaborate with Iranian authorities on counter-narcotics issues from 2007 to 2011 at the expense of transparency and accountability.

1. Findings: The Power of Silence and the Shield of Multilateralism

The governments of France, the United Kingdom, Japan, Ireland and Belgium relied on the power of silence to carry a simultaneous diplomacy of nuclear confrontation and counter- narcotics cooperation with Iran from 2007 to 2011. The five aforementioned countries provided the most significant financial and technical assistance to Iran‟s counter-narcotics efforts from 2007 to 2011, which altogether totalled US$4.12 million.438 Yet, with the exception of France, not a single political statement on their counter-narcotics cooperation with Iran could be analysed. The silence of these five donor countries performed a strategic function of “concealment,” allowing them to provide assistance to Iran‟s counter-narcotics efforts without having to publicly endorse Iran as a partner in their fight against the Afghan drug trade. This strategy proved central to the success of their simultaneous diplomacy of nuclear confrontation and counter-narcotics cooperation with Iran. Another important strategy employed by these four European governments and Japan was to follow the leadership of Germany, which had developed a functional niche in the field of international

438 International Harm Reduction Association, Op. Cit., 14.

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drug cooperation with Iran. The multilateral character of their counter-narcotics assistance to Iran provided them with a collective protection in the advent their initiative encountered great power wrath. France, the UK, Japan, Ireland and Belgium were very permeable to the effects of the nuclear context on their drug cooperation with Iran. Their silence highlighted that their counter-narcotics assistance to Iran was subordinated to the Iranian nuclear issue. Furthermore, our qualitative content analysis of their political statements illustrated that, due to the intensification of the Iranian nuclear crisis, they did not renew their assistance to Iran‟s counter-narcotics efforts after 2011. The German government could carry a simultaneous diplomacy of nuclear confrontation and counter-narcotics cooperation with Iran by exerting middlepowermanship in the field of international drug cooperation with Iran from 2008 to 2011. Our discourse analysis highlighted that, during the nuclear negotiation process, Germany, along with France and the UK, was compelled to adopt a strong confrontational discourse on the Iranian nuclear issue, which reflected the discursive practices of the US rather than those of European governments. Yet, the international crisis generated by Iran‟s nuclear enrichment activities did not prevent the government of Germany from deliberately and openly advocating for further international drug cooperation with Iran. The German government did so by developing a functional niche in the field of international drug cooperation with Iran and by exerting multilateral leadership in international efforts against the Afghan drug trade. Germany was helped in this endeavour by the fact that the US were, contrarily to what common knowledge may suggest, supportive of these efforts.439 Germany‟s assistance to Iran‟s counter-narcotics efforts was less permeable to the effects of the nuclear context than its European and Japanese counterparts. Despite the escalation of the Iranian nuclear crisis from 2007 to 2011, the German government maintained and renewed its financial and technical assistance to Iran in 2011 and continues, to this date, to exert multilateral leadership with regard to international drug cooperation with Iran.440 The Italian government could carry simultaneous diplomatic efforts to isolate and cooperate with Iran by subordinating its nuclear and counter-narcotics policies towards Iran to its foreign policy priorities. The Italian government adopted discursive practices that neither delegitimized nor legitimized Iran and its nuclear program. This strategy allowed

439 United States Department of State, Op. Cit., (2012), 277. 440 “Funds and Partnerships,” Op. Cit.

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Italy to maintain relatively good relations with both Iran and members of the international community at large. Concurrently to that, it adopted a discourse that positively represented Iran and its counter-narcotics efforts, the purpose of which was ultimately to restore strong bilateral relations with Iran. Despite its attempt at separating international drug cooperation with Iran from the nuclear issue, the Italian government could not totally escape the effects of the nuclear context. Due to the rapid escalation of the Iranian nuclear crisis in 2009, Italy‟s counter-narcotics cooperation with Iran became “hostage” of the political environment. As a result of the imposition of economic sanctions against Iran, bilateral relations between Italy and Iran were halted in 2009 and, up to this date, the Italian government has not been successful in restoring them to their 2008 level. Part of the paradox of donor countries‟ nuclear confrontation and counter-narcotics cooperation with Iran was created by their Manichean discourses on the two issues. The negative representations conveyed in the political statements of certain donor countries on the Iranian nuclear issue necessarily clashed with the more positive ones presented in their statements on international drug cooperation with Iran. These contradictory representations of Iran are a significant explanation of the political paradox that has been the object of the current study.

2. Contributions to the Field: Filling the Gaps

The present research uncovers a very interesting phenomenon that had not been previously examined. Its contributions to the field can be divided along two lines: 1) contributions to the IR literature; and 2) contributions to the criminological literature. Our research provided a perspective on the international community‟s relations to Iran that had not been explored prior to this date by IR scholars. We explored how members of the international community could have engaged in simultaneous policies of nuclear confrontation and counter-narcotics cooperation with Iran from 2007 to 2011 by analysing how seven donor countries framed their public discourse on Iran in order to justify both counter-narcotics cooperation with Iran and denunciation of the country‟s nuclear program. Our discursive analysis revealed that donor countries held contradictory representations of Iran, constructing it simultaneously as an enemy and a partner. These

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findings reinforced the constructivist approach to IR by outlining how nuclear confrontation and counter-narcotics cooperation with Iran resulted from the discursive practices of the states that provided assistance to Iran‟s counter-narcotics efforts, which contributed to the construction of ideational structures that permeated their policy responses to Iran‟s nuclear and counter-narcotics issues. Furthermore, our research highlighted how ideational structures shaped how international actors ought to behave and confirmed that ideas do matter in international relations and that the latter cannot be fully explained without a reference to the inter-subjective structures through which material forces and interests are mediated. The policy implications of our findings are that the Iranian nuclear crisis could be eased through a “reconstruction” of the discourses of the protagonists of the Iranian nuclear crisis. However, as long as the US will continue to push for the ascendency of their highly confrontational discourse on the Iranian nuclear issue, this outcome is unlikely to happen. The criminological literature on drug control in Iran has been limited to the extensive description of the problems posed by illicit drug trafficking and consumption in Iran and to the presentation of the policies implemented by the Iranian government to halt the country‟s pervasive drug problem. The international dimensions of Iran‟s counter- narcotics efforts had been understudied by criminologists. The current research, by documenting the politics of international drug cooperation with Iran, therefore bridged this gap. The purpose of our research was to: 1) systematically describe and contextualize the politics of international drug cooperation with Iran; and 2) to recreate and analyse the representations of Iran contained in the political statements of donor countries. We found that: 1) Iran was constructed as a strategic partner in the fight against the Afghan drug trade; 2) Iran‟s counter-narcotics efforts were hailed as an emblem of good practice; and 3) international drug cooperation with Iran was represented in positive terms in the political statements of Germany and Italy. We also found that five of the seven countries that provided assistance to Iran‟s counter-narcotics efforts from 2007 to 2011 did not openly endorse Iran as a partner in their fight against the Afghan drug trade and this, despite the fact that they were actively cooperating with Iranian authorities. Our findings illustrated that there was a political will on the part of four European governments and Japan to engage in drug cooperation with Iran but that the issue was, for the majority of donor

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countries, subordinated to the Iranian nuclear issue. With the exception of Germany, our research could only hypothesize on why these seven countries would be interested in the first place to provide financial and technical assistance to Iran‟s counter-narcotics efforts. Possible explanations included, among others, economic concerns, fears of addiction epidemics caused by the Afghan drug trade and enactment of good global citizenship. In the case of Germany, our qualitative content and discursive analyses underlined that the German government had developed a functional niche in the field of international drug cooperation with Iran and was eager to exert its international leadership by cooperating with Iran and encouraging other governments to follow suit. These findings represent a significant contribution to the field of Criminology as the politics of international drug cooperation with Iran had never been documented by criminologists before.

3. Avenues for Further Research

The topic of international drug cooperation remains an issue that is understudied in both the fields of International Relations and Criminology. There are therefore many avenues opened for further research, particularly with regard to Iran. A particularly interesting avenue for research would be to explore the leadership exerted by the German government with regard to international drug cooperation in Iran. Our research highlighted that German Foreign Ministry officials held a discourse that positively represented international drug cooperation with Iran. The discursive practices of the German government were then explained with regard to the functional niche it had developed in the field of international drug cooperation in Iran since 2008. It would therefore be interesting to further inquire into Germany‟s counter-narcotics leadership in South West Asia with the help of Middle Power Theory in order to gain empirical insights into the issue. Another interesting question would be to examine the phenomenon of international drug cooperation in South West Asia from the perspective of the Iranian government. Our study inquired into the international assistance provided by European governments and Japan to Iran‟s counter-narcotics efforts. It would be very interesting to reverse our research question and ask how could have the Iranian government accepted to cooperate with members of the international community on this particular issue. The international dimension of Iran‟s counter-narcotics efforts is a

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topic that has been too often forgotten by scholars and policy-makers alike due to their obsessive preoccupation with the nuclear issue.

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ANNEX 1 COMPARATIVE TIMELINE OF THE POLITICS OF NUCLEAR CONFRONTATION AND COUNTER- NARCOTICS COOPERATION WITH IRAN, 2005-2011

Presented in Table 7 below is a comparative timeline of the politics of nuclear isolation and international counter-narcotics cooperation with Iran. The timeline covers a historical period that extends from January 2005 to December 2011. Our qualitative content and discursive analyses of donor countries‟ political covered exclusively the period from 2007 to 2011 as the bulk of the international assistance to Iran‟s counter-narcotics efforts was provided during this period. However, we have included key nuclear and counter-narcotics developments that occurred during the years 2005 and 2006 in the comparative timeline presented below as a prelude to our presentation of the period 2007-2011. Our timeline presents key developments with regard to nuclear diplomacy and counter-narcotics policy, including UNSC resolutions on Iran, multilateral nuclear talks and UNODC projects in Iran. These key historical events are intermingled with political statements made by both Western government officials and Iranian authorities on the nuclear and drug control issues, thus constructing a comprehensive and intertextual narrative about the politics of nuclear isolation and international counter-narcotics cooperation with Iran. The timeline presented in table 7 proved to be a tool of critical importance in the conduct of our qualitative content and discourse analyses. It allowed us to locate the political statements analyzed within their overarching context and to assess its effects on the discursive practices of donor countries with regard to nuclear diplomacy and counter-narcotics policy.

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Table 7. Comparative timeline of the politics of nuclear isolation and international counter- narcotics cooperation with Iran, 2005-2011 COUNTER-DRUG NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENTS COOPERATION 2005 September 24  IAEA finds Iran in noncompliance  UNODC launches the Iran Strategic with the NPT. Programme Framework 2005-2007. 2006 February 4  IAEA votes to refer Iran to the  UNODC starts project IRN/I53 for UNSC for non-compliance with the the promotion of regional and NPT. international cooperation in drug control, which receives funding from Italy. February 5  Iran resumes its uranium enrichment activities at Natanz. July 31  UNSC passes Resolution 1696, which demands Iran to suspend its uranium enrichment activities within one month. December 23  UNSC passes Resolution 1737, which imposes sanctions against Iran for failing to comply with Resolution 1696. 2007 January  UNODC starts project IRN/I50 Phase I for integrated border control in Iran, which receives funding from France, the United Kingdom, Ireland and Belgium.  CIVIPOL completes an audit mission to the ANP dog-training center in Iran on the behalf of France. February 1  Iran‟s President Mahmud Ahmadinejad claims that the country‟s nuclear program is peaceful, legal and transparent. February 10  Germany‟s Chancellor Angela

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Merkel calls on Iran to conform with the demands of the international community. March 24  UNSC passes Resolution 1747, which bans the sale of arms to Iran. March 25  Iran‟s Foreign Minister Manuchehr Mottaki says UNSC Resolution 1747 is unnecessary, unlawful and unjustifiable. September  CIVIPOL completes a mission for strengthening dog-training cooperation with Iran on the behalf of France. December 4  US government publishes an intelligence report, which indicates that Iran halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003.  Iran‟s Foreign Minister Manuchehr Mottaki welcomes the US intelligence report.  UK‟s Foreign Secretary David Miliband warns that Iran‟s nuclear threat is serious. December 5 December 19  Germany‟s Chief Government  France‟s Ambassador to Iran Spokesman Ulrich Wilhelm Bernard Poletti attends a ceremony expresses concerns over Iran‟s at the ANP dog-training center in nuclear program. Karaj, Iran. 2008 March 3  UNSC passes Resolution 1803, which imposes further economic sanctions against Iran. March 26  Iran‟s Foreign Minister Manuchehr Mottaki sends a complaint letter to UN Secretary- General Ban-Ki Moon on UNSC measures against Iran. March 27  Japan‟s Ministry of Foreign Affairs welcomes Resolution 1803 and calls on Iran to resolve outstanding issues. May 13 May 16

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 Iran presents a proposal to the  Italy‟s Foreign Minister Franco P5+1 for constructive negotiations Frattini expresses the political over its nuclear program. willingness of the Italian government to cooperate with Iran in counter- narcotics efforts. June 12 June 26  P5+1 presents a revised package of  Italy‟s Foreign Minister Franco incentives to Iran in return for the Frattini advises G8 members that suspension of all its nuclear Iran could play a positive role in the enrichment activities. fight against the Afghan drug trade. June 14 June 27  France‟s President Nicolas  Germany becomes chairman of the Sarkozy says Iranian nuclear MDG in Tehran. bombs threaten international security. July 9  Iran makes ballistic missile test- firings.  France‟s Foreign Ministry Spokesman Eric Chevallier says Iran‟s ballistic missile test-firings reinforce the concerns of the international community over the country‟s nuclear program.  UK‟s Foreign Office unwelcomes Iran‟s ballistic missile test-firings.  Germany‟s Government Spokesman Thomas Steg calls on Iran to “refrain from any kind of sabre-rattling. July 19  P5+1 holds nuclear talks with Iran at Town Hall in Geneva to resolve outstanding issues. September 9  Iran‟s Deputy FM Mehdi Safari meets with British Foreign Secretary David Miliband in London to discuss counter-narcotics cooperation and complains about the lack of progress in the field. September 27 September  UNSC passes Resolution 1835,  CIVIPOL delivers 20 sniffer dogs to which reaffirms three earlier rounds Iran and trains the ANP on the behalf of sanctions imposed against Iran. of France. September 29  Iran‟s Foreign Ministry Spokesman Hassan Qashqavi rejects UNSC Resolution 1835.

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2009 May 2  UNODC starts project IRN/I52 for  Japan‟s Foreign Minister the promotion and strengthening of Hirofumi Nakasone expresses intelligence-led investigation concerns over Iran‟s nuclear capacities, which receives funding program. from France and the United Kingdom.  UNODC ends project IRN/I53 for the promotion of regional and international cooperation in drug control, which received funding from Italy. July 3  Germany‟s Embassy in Tehran publishes a report in which it assesses that the trend in international counter-narcotics cooperation with Iran is positive. July 24  Iran‟s Vice Ambassador to Italy Hossein Moghaddam calls for further international counter- narcotics assistance to Iran. September 9

 Iran presents a revised proposal for nuclear negotiations with the P5+1. September 25

 Iran reveals the existence of a secret nuclear plant near Qom.  Japan‟s Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada condemns Iran‟s Fordo nuclear plant.

 Italy backs international criticism of Iran‟s Fordo nuclear plant. September 26  The Head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) Ali Akbar Salehi stresses Iran‟s rights to peaceful nuclear energy. October 1

 Iran meets with the P5+1 in Geneva to discuss the nuclear issue.

 Iran approves the proposal of the P5+1 for nuclear fuel exchange. October 29  Iran rejects the offer of the P5+1 for nuclear fuel exchange due to domestic opposition.

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November 27  IAEA passes a resolution that calls on Iran to comply with its international obligations. November 29  The Head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) Ali Akbar Salehi announces that Iran will build 10 new nuclear plants and produce 20 per cent enriched uranium.  France‟s Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner warns that Iran‟s stubbornness is dangerous.  Germany‟s Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman says worried with Iran‟s enrichment plans.  UK‟s Foreign Office Spokeswoman says Iran‟s plans for new enrichment plants are a matter of serious concern. December 1  Iranian MP Jafar Qaderi warns that Iran will not halt its nuclear activities due to international pressure. 2010 February 8  UK‟s Foreign Office Spokesman  UNODC ends project IRN/I50 Phase slams Iran for its contradictory I for integrated border control in rhetoric on the nuclear issue. Iran, which received funding from France, the United Kingdom, Ireland and Belgium.  Germany‟s Government Spokesman Ulrich Wilhelm says Iran is not prepared to cooperate with the international community to resolve the nuclear issue. February 11  UK‟s Prime Minister Gordon Brown warns that the world‟s patience over the Iranian nuclear issue is not inexhaustible. February 21  Iran‟s President Mahmud Ahmadinejad announces that Iran produced 20 percent enriched uranium. February 24

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 Japan‟s Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama pressures Iran to resolve the nuclear issue. June 9 June  UNSC passes Resolution 1929,  UNODC, Iran and MDG members which toughened earlier sanctions launch consultations for a new against Iran. UNODC country program on Iran. June 11  Iran‟s President Mahmud Ahmadinejad says UNSC resolutions are “annoying flies” and “useless as used tissues.” June 21 June 21  Iran bars two IAEA inspectors  Italian General Giampaolo Ganzer from entering the country in praises Iran for its counter-narcotics retaliation for UNSC Resolution efforts. 1929. September 21  Germany‟s Embassy in Tehran publishes a report in which it assesses that international counter- narcotics cooperation with Iran came to a standstill following the 2009 presidential elections. September 26  Italy‟s Foreign Minister Franco Frattini tells a reporter that the Italian government seeks to revive strong bilateral relations with Iran through counter-narcotics cooperation. November 7  The Deputy Head of Iran‟s DCHQ Taha Taheri criticizes Western governments for their poor record of international assistance to Iran‟s counter-narcotics efforts. December 6 December 30  P5+1 resumes nuclear talks with  Iran‟s Interior Minister Mostafa Iran in Geneva. Mohammad Najjar complains about the lack of support from Western governments to Iran‟s counter-narcotics efforts. 2011 January 21  Nuclear talks between P5+1 and  UNODC ends project IRN/I52 for Iran end in a political stalemate. the promotion and strengthening of intelligence-led investigation capacities, which received funding

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from France and the United Kingdom. January 24  Germany‟s Ambassador to Tehran Bernd Erbel praises Iran for its counter-narcotics efforts during a meeting with ECO members. February 20  Iran‟s Interior Minister Mostafa Mohammad Najjar warns German Ambassador to Iran Bernd Erbel that Western governments should revise their policies of international assistance to Iran‟s counter-narcotics efforts. March  UNODC launches new country program on Iran. May 27  Germany‟s Embassy in Tehran publishes a report in which it assesses that international counter- narcotics cooperation with Iran can be cumbersome but worth the efforts. July 18  Iran‟s Interior Minister Mostafa Mohammad Najjar meets with UNODC Executive-Director Yuri Fedotov and complains about the lack of international counter- narcotics cooperation with Iran. September 16  The DG of Iran‟s DCHQ Massoud Zahedian complains about the lack of international counter-narcotics assistance to Iran and threatens to end the country‟s drug control efforts. September  CIVIPOL delivers sniffer dogs to Iran and trains the ANP on the behalf of France. November 8  IAEA publishes a report that says the agency has found no evidence that Iran has decided to build nuclear weapons. November 9  Germany‟s Foreign Minister

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Guido Westerwelle threatens to impose further sanctions against Iran. November 11  Iran‟s Parliamentary Speaker Ali Larijani warns against the imposition of further sanctions against Iran. November 22  France‟s President Nicolas Sarkozy calls on the international community to impose further sanctions against Iran. November 30  Iran‟s Foreign Minister Spokesman Ramin Mehmanparast says European governments engage in a psychological warfare against Iran.

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