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The ocS iety for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter
10-1976 Epicurus' Scientific ethoM d Elizabeth Asmis University of Chicago, [email protected]
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Recommended Citation Asmis, Elizabeth, "Epicurus' Scientific eM thod" (1976). The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter. 157. https://orb.binghamton.edu/sagp/157
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Epicurus1 Scientific Method (1) 1
by Elizabeth Asmis (Octob er ,. 19/,6)
I con cede right away that Epicurus was not interested in scientific discovery for its own sake. But I cl:�.im that he did have a method by which he developed his conclusions about nature and that this method qualifies as a scientific method. As I shall try to show, his method consists in deducing what is non-apparent (a6n>.ov) from the phenomena. This procedure was, I p:ropose� derived by Epicurus from the early atomists, who developed it in opposition to Parmenides' method of deducing what there is from ;1it is".
I shall first.offer a brief summary of Epicurus 1 method of investigation and I shall then illustrate it by analyzing a.section of argument from the Letter to Herodotus� starting with Epicurus1 first deduction about what is non-apparent (that nothing comes to
be from non-being) and ending with the deduction' that there is .• · void (Her. 38-40)
Ep icurus proposes tv10 rules of investigation. These rules are stated in a short procedural note which is prefixed by Epicurus to the summary of his physical do ctrines in the Letter to Herodotus (37-38). The two rules state the two condi tions which must be satisfied if an investigation is to occur; they jointly form an answer to the problenn posed by Plato in the Meno. The first rule is the requirement fo r initial concepts; the second is the requirement for observation ·1.c.onducted in accordance with one's perceptions and feelings. Concepts are needed to serve as objects by reference to which proposals are judged. Observation is needed to provide evidence C1signsH) crnµe:ta) for what is not manifest. Diogenes Laertius (10.33) illustrates the first requirement by noting that we must have a concept of a horse (or an ox) to begin with in order to be able to judge, by proposing an answer� whether the thing in the distance is a hors e (or an ox). The second requirement may be
(1) I am grateful to David Furley� Terence Irwin, John Rist� and Michael Stokes for criticisms of earlier versions of some of the ideas.presented here. I am especially indebted to Michael Stokes for his many valuable suggestions. H
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or the 11clear view'; bypreference to the rest of perception as a standard of truth. This is� I think� quite mistaken. What has been termed the 11near;1 or "clear11 _perception is simply the appearanc e that matches an expectation� no matter what the expectation. A standard example used by the ancients.to illustrate Epicurusv method of verification for expectations .ie the round and square tower (Sextus Empiricus� adv. · math. 7 .. 20ch-9; .cf Lucretius 4.353-363� Diogenes Laertius 10.34). It appears round from a distance and square from closeby. Is the perception of a square tower true or reliablej and the perception of a round tower not true or reliable? Not at all� ?S Sextus carefully explains (see also Lucretius 4.379ff). If upon seeing a round tower I form the opinion that when I will be twenty yaards from the tower I will see a square tower; and subsequently at twenty yards away I see a square tower, my opinion is proved true. It has been confirmed by a near view� which has replaced a distant and. less distinct view� but the confirmation has nothing to do with the intrinsic properties of the appearance but is due entirely to the fact that the appearance matches the e�rpectation. If I had previously seen a dark object on the horizon and had ventured the opinion that upon coming a little closer I would see a round tower� and if I had then seen ·a round; tower, my opinion would have been equally true. As Lucretius explains in connection with sight, perception does not present the llnature ·of thingsii (4.3�:5). It makes no sense to demand from perception confirmation of whether the round tower is really a round tower; what is perceived as a round tower is a round tower� and if one would know t.he underlying .nature of what. is perceived, one must go to reason� - reason . relying to be sure entirely on perception. Perception can confirm only an expectation cif what will be perceived. Displaying exactly.what is presently experience� each pe rception is as clear$ as Plutarch says (adv� Colotem 112la), as another.
The p Q'3ition of the Epicurean investigator is indeed similar to that of the prisoner in Plato's cave. That poses a serious difficulty for. the validity of Epicurus' conclusions about what is non-apparent; but this difficulty should not obscure the fact that Epicurus does propose taking all phenomena alike as evidence of what is non-apparent. More will be saidabout this difficulty in connection with Democritus.
The scientist� then� will use as signs of what is non-apparent observations gathered in accordance with present appearances. These observations are phenomena; and all phenomena and only phenomena serve as signs. There is some question about the place of 1'feelings11 (na-tJn)) which Epicurus mentions together with the perceptions as a standard of observation� in Epicurus1 method. Diogenes (10.34) identifies the feelings as pleasure and pain� and says that they are a criterion of choice and avoidance (that is� of action). Diogenes' report is unlikely to be the whole truth; for in.his .procedural note Epicurus does assign to the feelings a role in the cognition of future occurrences and of what is non-apparent� and he mentions them Ã
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Indeed Epicurus tells us this much by adding� in the case of. generation, ''.not requiring seeds"� and .in. the case of destruction, "there not being [things] into which it would. be dissolved51• The seeds are to generation as the remnants of dissolution are to destruction: the seeds are the ungenerated starting-point of generation which make it false to say that a thiµg> considered in its entirety, is generated from what it is not, and the remnants of dissolution are the undestroyed end fir oduct o-f destruction which make it false to say that a thing, considered in. its entirety�· is destroyed into what it is note In his first h7o opinions� then� Epicurus places a limit upon generation and destruction. Though to the perception something is generated from what it is not and is destroyed into what it is not, an examination of the whole nature of what is generated and what is destroyed reveals that a thing is not generated from what it is not and is not destroyed into what it is not. With respect to its ultimate constituents, as· recognized by reason,,a thing that is generated is not generated and a thing that is destroyed is not destroyed. Epicurus1 two opinions are paradoxical; what saves them from being self-·contradictory, giv,en the reality of phenomena, is that Epicurus is considering .the� · underlying, non-apparent nature of the phenomena. It is co1:mnonly said that "nothing is generated from non-being'' and nothing is destroyed into non·-being11 are Eleatic principles; and that Epicurus took his first two opinions from the Eleatics·; I don't think that the two principles are at all Eleatic as Epi�urus sees them. Rather, if we look closely� I think it will appe.ar 'that Epicurus1 conclusions on generation and destruction are developed in a manner that is opposed to the way in which the Eleatics derived their o conclusions. T o examine only generation, Parmenides:J1�d argued-. n the assumption �'it is0 that it is not generated. Epicurus by contrast argues on the assumption that things are generated that nothing is generated from non�being. According to our text of Parmenides ,, Parmenides argued for his conclusion by supposing in addition that if it were generated, it would be generated from non-being. This claim follows indeed upon the assumption ''it isn; for being would not be generated at all if it were generated from non-being. Parmenides accepts on the basis of his initial assumption what Epicurus argues against. Epicurus has no quarrel with Parmenides1 logic; he might well admit that if '1it is1: � it would be generp,ted· from non-being. As it is� Epicurus uses an initial assumption that leads him to the opposite view. To press the comparison further, Parmenides argues) first, that. since it would be generate� from non-being, but non-being is inconceivable, it is not generated. For Epicurus� who sets out with the assumption that the phenomena are real3 non-being is not at all inconceivable� hence Parmenides' argument wi.11 not do for him. Parmenides argues, secondly� that even supposing that it would start from 1'nothing11, there would be no need for it to be generated at this time rather than at that time (I shall not defend this interpretations which is 7 widely accepted, except by reference to the corresponding Epicurean argument). At this point� I think.9 the opposition between the Epicurean and the Parmenidean arguments on generation becomes conspicuous. Epicurus, as supplemented by Lucretius� replaces Parmenides' ; nothing;: by 11everything"' and Parmenides' 0no timei; by ''every time". If .something were generated from non-being, this is the Epicurean argument, everything would be generated from everything (the unstated assumption being that.there would be no reason why anything should be generated from this rather than that),and further� since everything would be generated from everything, everything would be generated at every time (for there would be no reason why a thing would be generated at this time rather than that). Epicurus uses the principle · of sufficient reason as though he had directly modeled his argument on Parmenides; but since he starts with the assumption that there are generated things, the use of the principle yields him results which · .are opposed to those of Parmenides. Consider now Epicurus' third opinion: ''the all ('ro nav) was always such as it is now and always will be such'; (Re!_. 39). Epicurus provides a proof which is likely corrupt as it stands in the text. The text reads; 1'for there is nothing into which it changes; f'or there is nothing besid.es the all which by entering into it would make the Change11• Lucretius omits this third opinion9 but he indicates elsewhere (2.303-7, and 5,361-63 = 3.816-18) that there are two complementary possibilities, change by loss to something elses and change by acquisition from something else. Epicurusv text is easily emended to provide two complementary explanations rather than one explanation subordinate to another. In either case, however, the conclusion follows upon the first t:w·o' opinions and the concept of na11n. Since there is nothing apart from 1;all11 that there is. and since, as just demonstrated� nothing is generated from non-being and nothing is destroyed into non-being, what is ;all1; is unchanging in time, Epicurus is not denying change in general. (far from it)� but rather change in the sum total of ·what there is• In Epicurus' third opinion� the nall" has replaced Parmenides1 11beiniz( as that which is unchanging. Epicurus uses the ordinary concept of ,, .all" as that which indeed has 1"'nothing;; outside it to provide a subject of changelessn�ss; he makes no assumption about nbeing" and whether there is something (this would be 01non-being:) ap art from nbeing11• Epicurus1 first two deductions have provided him with his first .conclusion on changelessness, - the persistence in time of what there is. Thi.s changelessness will be filled out ·. in the deductions that follow by further conclusions on changelessness, ending with the conclusion that the motions in the "alr' are ever the same. This finally elaborated changeless 1"alr' is� I think, Epicurus 1 answer to Parmenides 1 11beingn. After showing that the 1 all1' is unchanging� Epicurus continues his series of deductions by showing that the 11a11iu is bodies and void (Her. 39-40; I accept the addit.ion of '.•bodies and void11 � or better "bodies and touchless nature10 (see Pyth 86) in the first sentence of this section). That there are bodies� Epicurus claims� is attested directly by perception. That there is void is a conclusion obtained by calculat:ion, as Epicurus indicates; to be precise, the existence of void is proved by calculating the nature of perceptible bodies. Epiciirus offers tHo proofs of the existence of V.oid: first, if there were no void, bodies would not have anywhere to be; and secondly� if there were no void, bodies would not have anywhere to move through as they are observed to move. What I have called Hvoid11 is presented by Epicurus under three different names, the Hempty'1 (or 11void'i proper, ltEVOV)' Hspacei• (or "roomH' xwpa)' and ·'1 touchless nature1' (ava�ns �uo�s). These names correspond to different' aspects of the same thing :(compare Sextus Empiricus) adversus math�maticos 10. 2) � and under each of these aspects� the voi.d contrasts with body (viewed as fully bodily): it is :iemptyt! as opposed to ;'full"; it has room for another as opposed to not having room; and it can neither touch nor be touched, as opposed to being able to touch and be touched (see Lucretius 1.304� also 1. 434). The void (as I call it) is non-body. Epicurus pro·ceeds by taking the existence of bodies as known directly by perception and then considering whether these existents� - perceptible bodies -·, are entirely bodily or whether they are in part non-bodily, If they are- in part nori:-body � it must be concluded that what exists is both body (now fully body) and non-body. Epicurus' procedure is the same as that \.1hich he used in hiS earlier investigation of generation and destruction. There he took.generation and destruction to be immediately known by perception, and he inquired whether what is generated is generated in its entirety or whether there are urtgenerated primary elements of generation» and similarly for destruction� and he concluded that generated things_are not generated in their entirety, and likewise for destruction. Now he takes the existents of perception, - bodies -� and asks.the question� - which makes sense only insofar as it concerns the non""apparent nature of these presumed existents -� wheth,er what exists is in' part what_ does pot:_ e1dst. His answer will be that what exists (bodies) is in part what exists (what is fully body) and in pa rt what does not exist (non-body). In this, Epicurus limits the existence of bodies as before he limited gen eratiori: and destruction . Epic;urus1 analysis of the void offers for the first time in his series of deductions an opportunity to compare his method of argument directly with that of the early atomists. 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K͝ ͝ ͝ :.ȰW͝ eǵIJ͝ ̞͝ ͝ "7 svd ¨ÿq* ̑Ț0͝ '7 7 ¥Ew ͝ ͝ ͝ "+7 5͝ ʪɴʑBɵ ã¦͝ gĉ ͝ Ƕ͝ ď(͝ 7 ɶ&͝ ©͝ Ɠ͝ aƣ͝ %͝ )͝ T5 Ū/͝#͝ Ƿ ]Ɣ˃ ͝ =͝ ijE9Ĵ͝ ʫʬƕĵ# ͝ ͝ JJ˄-< ͝ ̹Ǹ͝ ʭ#mcS͝ |ˠ ͝ T"P͎͝ #Lêë͝ 7 Ƥ$+̓:Ɩ ͝ ǹ͝ Ȥʒf ūNJ͝ l,͝ ͝ ͔͝ "͝ 11 covered in darkness and unauthentic (oxoTCns B 11), that sweet, bitter, and so forth$ are \iby convention'' whereas "in truth there are atoms and void" (B 9)i and further that man is "separated from the truth19 (B 6) and that •:either nothing is true or what is true is non-apparent to us0 (Metaphysics 1009b). The clue to how these varied testimonies may be reconciled is provided, I think, by Sextus' report that while Democritus in his book Confirmations promised to assign the power of proof to the perceptions, he is nonetheless found to condemn them (B 9), along with the excerpt from Galen in which Democritus has the senses accuse the mind� uMiserable mind who after taking the proofs from us overthrow us; our fall is your overthrow11 (B 125). Democritus' attested faith in the senses and his rejection of them, and his despair of discovering the truth together with the claim that truly there are atoms and void have, I think� this explanation: Democritus initiate s his investigation into what there is by assuming the phenomena to be real; subsequently, the theory deduced from the phenomena shows that the phenomena are not real, and by overthrowing the phenomena destroys itself. Epicurus begins in the same way by assuming the phenomena to be real, but in contrast to Democritus continues to defend the reality of the phenoma, in spite of the atomic theory.