NOTES CHAPTER I 1. Cordovez, Diego and Selig S. Harrison: Out ofAfghanistan (Oxford: Oxford Uni­ versity Press, 1995), p. 26. 2. Lifschults, Lawrence: Pakistan Times, Islamabad, February 12, 1989, p. 23. 3. Wakmen, Mohammed A.: Afghanistan, Non-Alignment and the Super Powers (New York: Radiant Publisher, 1985), p. 5. 4. UNDP, Action plan for immediate rehabilitation of Afghanistan (New York: UN Publication, 1993), vol. 1, p. 7. 5. Wilber, Donald N.: Afghanistan (New York: Human Relation Press, 1980), p. 56. 6. Jawad, Nassi: Afghanistan: a Nation of Minorities (London: The Minority Rights Group, Brixton, 1992), p. 9. 7. Dupree, Louis: Afghanistan in the 1970s (New York: Praeger Publisher, Inc., 1974), p. 14. 8. The Holy Qur'an (Al Madonna: Madonna Publication, 1986), Surah 42, Aya 38, Aya 159, and Sura 3. 9. Ghobar, Ghulam Mohammed: Afghanistan dar Massir Tarikh (Kabul, Matba'ah Daulati, 1978), p. 80. 10. Ibid., p. 90. 11. Ibid., p. 277. 12. Anthony, Arnold and Rosanna Klass: "Afghanistan Communist Party and the Fragmented PDPA," in Afghanistan, the Great Game Revisited (New York: Free­ dom House, 1987), p. 13 5. 13. Hugh, Beattie: Afghanistan Studies (London: Society for Afghanistan Smdies, British Academy, 1982), vol. 3 and 4, p. 44. 14. Interview with Mr. Abdul Wassil (Wardak), the former woleswal of Enjeel, Herat, and the former governor of the Province of Parwan. He now resides in Con­ necticut. 15. Klass, Rosanna: Afghanistan, the Great Game Revisited (New York: Freedom House, 1987), p. 205. 16. Dupree, Louis: Afghanistan in the 1970s (New York, Praeger Publisher, Inc., 1974), p. 4. 17. Hugh, Beattie: AfghaniJ-tan Studies (London: Society for Mghanistan Smdies, British Academy, 1982), vol. 3 and 4, p. 44. 18. Ghobar, Ghulam Mohammed: Afghanistan dar Massir Tarikh (Kabul: Matba'ah Daulati, 1978), p. 468. 19. Kakar, Hassan: Trends in Modern Afghan History (1974), p. 4. 20. Vartan, Gregorian: The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan: Political Reforms and Modernization (California: Stanford University Press, 1969), p. 361. NOTES 233 CHAPTER 2 1. Ilpyong, KimJ.: Mass Mobilization Polities and Teehniques Developed in the Period of the Chinese Soviet Republie C\Vashington: University of Washington Press, 1996), p.86. 2. Fischer, Louis: The Lift of Mahatma Gandhi (New York: Harper and Brothers Press, 1985), p. 14. 3. Green, Philip: "Democracy," Robert Michael, "Politieal Parties" (New Jersey: Hu­ manities Press, 1993), p. 68. 4. My personal notes, Mghanistan, Herat, 1982-1984. 5. UNDP, Aetion plan for immediate rehabilitation of Afghanistan (New York: UN Publication, 1993), vol. 1, p. 34. 6. There are two words that people, particularly, Dari (Farsi) speaking communi­ ties, pronounce similarly: 1) "Ghazi" with ghain; 2) Ghazi with ghaf. Ghazi with ghain means victor. Historically, the term "Ghazi" has a deep root in the tradi­ tionallife of Mghans. During the three Mghan-British wars (1884-1919), the term Ghazi became very popular, and individuals like Amir Akber Khan, the son of Dost Mohammed Khan,became the head of the Ghazian (plural of Ghazi) against the British. At that time individuals who committed to be Ghazian be­ came professional freedom fighters and a handful of these crossed the border from Mghanistan into India to take part in the Indian people's struggle against British rule in this subcontinent. 7. From 1988 to 1992, the situation was a continuous civil war in Mghanistan be­ tween the former Mujahideen groups and Soviet supported government. From 1992-1994, the fight between the Islamic Government of Mghanistan and the opposition riyal groups, particularly the Islamic Party of Hekmatyar, prevented a nationalleadership. From 1996 to 2000, the war between the Taliban forces and the High National Defense Council under General Abdul Rashid Dostam and Ahmed Shah Massoud prevented the formation of a uni ted politicalleadership in Mghanistan. 8. Cordovez, Diego and Selig S. Harrison: Out ofAfghanistan (Oxford: Oxford Uni­ versity Press, 1995), p. 34. 9. Hobbes, Thomas: Leviathan or the matter, form and power of a Commonwealth, ed. Michael Oakeshott (New York: Collier Books, 1962), p. 138. 10. Ibid., p. 138. 11. Anthony, Arnold and Rosanna Klass: "Mghanistan's Divided Communist Party," inAfghanistan, the Great Game Revisited, ed. Rosanna Klass (New York: Freedom House Press, 1987), p. 13 5 . 12. "The Truth About Mghanistan" (Moscow: Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1986), p. 4A. CHAPTER 3 1. Anthony, Arnold and Rosanna Klass: "Mghanistan's Communist Party: the Frag­ mented PDPA," Afghanistan, the Great Game Revisited (New York: Freedom House, 1987), p. 13 5. 2. Wakmen, Mohammed: Afghanistan, Non-Alignment and the Super Powers (Pak­ istan, Islamabad, 1985), p. 4. 3. Ibid., p. 5. 4. The People's Democratic Party of Mghanistan (Kabul, Mghanistan: State Pub­ lishing House, 1978). 234 THE RISE OF THE TALIBAN IN AFGHANISTAN 5. Watkins, Mary: Afghanistan, Land in Transition (New Jersey: Princeton, 1963), p. 29. 6. According to local and international sources, the Soviet secret operation in Mghanistan was comprised of two sections: 1) the civilian operation led by the KGB that concentrated on civil officers of the Mghan government and non­ government elements; and 2) the military operation led by GRU that concen­ trated on the military officers, in particular, those who were sent 1:0 military schools and training programs in the East Block. These operations also were di­ vided into two major mechanisms: 1) recruiting Mghans as individuals and polit­ ically and ideologically preparing them to work toward the regional interest of the Soviets. This did not mean that these individuals were involved in intelli­ gence operations and became spies. Many of these individuals had their own po­ litical ambitions and personal characteristics with strong nationalist sentiments. But being apart of the general Soviet operation in the region in the long run cat­ egorized them on the side of the Soviets. Therefore, the KGB and the GRU, at­ tempting to benefit from the work of an individual by direct connection, were thought to have the political and ideologicalloyalty to the Soviet leadership. In this case, there were individuals like Hafizullah Amin, who had their own circIe in Mghanistan, and individuals who were working not as a group, like Colonel Abdul,Qader, who'was nurtured by the GRU (Cordovez and Harrison, 1995, p. 26), and Jallalar, a long-term high-ranking official of the Mghan government. In many circumstances, these individuals had a great deal of experience in public af­ fairs and were highly qualified professionals able to have significant influence on the shape of government policies. 2) The KGB and GRU were Recruiting indi­ viduals who were able to establish their own circIe within the party or their eth­ nic and linguistic groups. Among the Pushtons was Hafizullah Amin; among Hazaras, Abdul Karim Missaq; and among Tajiks, Babrak Karma!. 7. Ibid., p. 138. 8. Ibid., p. 141. 9. Amold, Anthony and Rosanna Klass: "Mghanistan's Communist Party: the Frag­ mented PDPA," in Afkhanistan, the Great Game Revisited (New York: Freedom House, 1987), p 141. 10. Ibid., p. 135. 11. Ibid., p. 46. 12. After the Soviet army withdrew from Mghanistan, PD PA changed the title and ideological agenda of the party to "Homeland Party" and tried to represent the modern and traditional, elements of nation politics. But this reform happened after more than a decade of bloodshed, especially, and thePDPA leaders con­ tributed directly to the destruction of the country and also were responsible for the death of one and a half million Mghans. Therefore, such political reform could not rescue the deterioration of the PDPA's regime. 13. Amold, Anthony and Rosanna Klass: "Mghanistan's Divided Communist Party," in Afghanistan, the Great Game Revisited, ed. Rosanna Klass (New York: Freedom House Press, 1987), p. 13 5. 14. Sen Gupta Bhabani: Afghanistan Politics, Economics and Society (London: 1985), p. 33. 15. Ibid., p. 34 16. Ibid., p. 58. 17. Arnold, Anthony and Rosanna Klass, "Mghanistan's Divided Communist Party," inAfghanistan, the Great Game Revisited, ed. Rosanna Klass (New York: Freedom House Press, 1987), p. 142. NOTES 235 18. Ibid.,p.143. 19. Ibid.,p.I44. 20. To the best of my knowledge, I have not seen any evidence that there were finan­ dal ties between the Soviet regime and the PDPA before the 1978 coup. But there is evidence that the Soviet operation espedally provided financial support to groups such as the PDPA before seizing government power directed through secondary connections. In the case of PDPA, if it was not direct, it may have hap­ pened through the Indian Communist Party (ICP), National Party in Pakistan, and the Revolutionary People Party of Iran. In general, the finandal support by the Soviets to the parties who believed the Soviet Union to be the center of the socialist world was dependent on 1) the geopolitical importance of the country and 2) the influence of the party among the people. These two issues would be the indicators for the Soviet planners in this particular matter to support the party financially either as a whole or just the leaders. 21. Ibid., p. 144. 22. Siddg, Noorzoy M: "Soviet Economic interests and Policies in Mghanistan," in Afghanistan, the Great Game Revisited, edited by Rosanna I<Jass (New York: Free­ dom Huuse Press, 1987), p. 7. 23. Arnold, Anthony and Rosanna I(!ass: "Mghanistan's Divided Communist Party," in Afghanistan, the Great Game Revisited, ed. Rosanna I(!ass (Ncw York: Freedom House Press, 1987), p. 145. CHAPTER 4 1. Cordovez, Diego and Selig S Harrison: Out ofAfghanistan (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 17. 2. Ibid., p. 18. 3. Ibid., pp. 17-24. 4. Ibid., p. 27. 5. Hyman, Anthony: Afghanistan under Soviet Domination (New York: Macmillan Academic & Professional, Ltd., 1992), p. 77. 6. Arnold, Anthony and Rosanna I(!ass: "Mghanistan's Communist Party: The Fragmented PDPA," in Afghanistan, the Great Game Revisited, ed.