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Brandeis University Crown Center for Middle East Studies Crown Paper 5 April 2011 “We Serve the People” Hamas Policing in Gaza Yezid Sayigh Crown Papers Editor Naghmeh Sohrabi Consulting Editor Robert L. Cohen Production Manager Benjamin Rostoker Editorial Board Abbas Milani Stanford University Marcus Noland Peterson Institute for International Economics William B. Quandt University of Virginia Philip Robins Oxford University Yezid Sayigh King’s College London Dror Ze’evi Ben Gurion University About the Crown Paper Series The Crown Papers are double-blind peer-reviewed monographs covering a wide range of scholarship on the Middle East, including works of history, economics, politics, and anthropology. The views expressed in these papers are those of the author exclusively, and do not reflect the official positions or policies of the Crown Center for Middle East Studies or Brandeis University. Copyright © 2011 Crown Center for Middle East Studies, Brandeis University. All rights reserved. Table of Contents Glossary Chronology Chapter 1. Hamas in Gaza: Law and Order, Security, and Political Power 1 Hamas’s Learning Curve 6 Islamic Policing? 11 Sources and Interpretation 19 Chapter 2. The Normative Framework of Hamas Policing 26 Human Rights in Discourse and Practice 28 Law and Order Versus Human Rights: “We don’t want citizens to cower before policemen, so long as they obey the law.” 37 Chapter 3. Hamas as a Learning Organization 43 “We are the sons of the Muslim Brotherhood” 44 The Origins of Hamas Policing: Contending with the Law-and-Order Vacuum 48 Rough-and-Ready Policing 54 Security Sector Reform and Restructuring, Hamas-style 62 Training 63 Planning 67 Administrative Upgrading and Public Service Delivery 69 Chapter 4. Pious Policing 75 The Criminal Justice System: An Integrated Approach 76 The Conciliation Committees 77 The Statutory System 81 Sharia Courts 82 Military Justice 84 Pious Policing as “Social Technology” 86 Institutionalizing Islamic Policing 89 Morals Enforcement and Gender 94 “Compliant” Policewomen 99 Surveillance Society 101 Avoiding the Temptations of the Devil 102 Information Technology: Moral and Security Threats 103 Chapter 5. Authoritarian Transformation 106 Authoritarian Dynamics 107 The Striving for Hegemony 109 Combating Collaboration 112 Chapter 6. Conclusion: “This is Hamas’s Era!” 118 Hamas: Changing from Within 119 Between Erdogan’s Turkey and the Taliban’s Afghanistan 120 Whither the IQB? 123 Implications for the Future 128 Endnotes 130 About the Author 177 Glossary DFLP Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine EU European Union EF Executive Force GoI Government of Israel ICHR Independent Commission for Human Rights IDF Israel Defense Forces IQB Izz-ed-Din al-Qassam Brigades ISA Internal Security Apparatus MoI Ministry of Interior (West Bank) MoINS Ministry of Interior and National Security (Gaza) NSF National Security Forces PA Palestinian Authority PASF Palestinian Authority Security Forces PFLP Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine PIJ Palestinian Islamic Jihad PLC Palestinian Legislative Council PLO Palestine Liberation Organization SPA Security and Protection Apparatus UNRWA United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees USSC United States Security Coordinator Chronology of Main Political Events August 1988 Formal launch of the Islamist Resistance Movement, Hamas, by the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood Society September 13, 1993 PLO and Government of Israel sign the Declaration of Principles (Oslo Accords) 1994 Establishment of Palestinian Authority 1994 Establishment of Palestinian Authority Security Forces January 1996 First Palestinian Legislative Council elections July 2000 Camp David peace summit September 2000 Outbreak of second intifada March-April 2002 Operation Defensive Shield, Israel Defense Force reoccupies most PA autonomy areas in West Bank June 2002 “Rose Garden speech” by U.S. President George W. Bush 2003 Palestinian Legislative Council approves constitutional amendment establishing post of Prime Minister in PA April 2003 Quartet issues “Roadmap for Peace” December 2004 First round of Palestinian Authority municipal elections March 2005 United States Security Coordinator appointed August 2005 Israeli disengagement from Gaza November 2005 European Union Mission for the Palestinian Territories established December 2005 Fourth round of Palestinian Authority municipal elections (final, fifth round never held) January 25, 2006 Second Palestinian Legislative Council elections March 2006 Formation of 10th PA government under Hamas Prime Minister Ismail Hanieh March 2006 Quartet announces three “principles” for dialogue with Hamas government, imposes financial boycott May 2006 Establishment of Executive Force June 2006 Corporal Gilad Shalit abducted into Gaza February 2007 Mecca accord between Fatah and Hamas March 2007 Formation of 11th PA national unity government under Hamas Prime Minister Ismail Hanieh June 8-14, 2007 Hamas takeover of Gaza June 15, 2007 Formation of “emergency” government under Prime Minister Salam Fayyad December 28, 2008 Start of Gaza War (Operation Cast Lead) January 18, 2009 Israeli ceasefire ending Gaza War January 2009 Term of PA President Mahmoud ‘Abbas ends, according to both independent constitutional experts and Hamas January 2010 Term of PA President Mahmoud ‘Abbas ends, according to him and Fatah January 2010 Term of PLC ends – Hamas and allied members of legislature continue to meet in Gaza, with Hamas members in West Bank participating by teleconference; Fatah and other blocs meet in parliamentary committees in West Bank 1 Chapter 1. Hamas in Gaza: Law and Order, Security, and Political Power Unarmed policemen direct traffic at major intersections. The general administration for road patrols and rescues, judicial police, anti- narcotics, and other police sections each issue weekly activity reports. The public is able to make online requests for passports, for birth, marriage, and death certificates, and for other documents; to notify the population registry regarding changes of address or changes in marital status; and to submit inquiries and complaints through the Ministry of Interior website. Nongovernmental organizations may also register themselves in the same way. A newly established Police College has inducted 150 cadets into a three-year program from which they will graduate with the rank of second lieutenant and a BA degree. Community-based committees provide a social arbitration and judicial mechanism that works closely with the police. A security sector that once included a dozen or more branches and a hugely bloated payroll of nearly 57,000 men now comprises a compact four branches with some 15,000 personnel. The place is the Gaza Strip in the spring of 2011, nearly four years after the Islamist Resistance Movement, Hamas, brought what it calls al-falatan al-amni, the “security anarchy,” to an abrupt end. Lawlessness had been endemic in the Strip since at least 2004, when the Palestinian Authority (PA) took on the characteristic features of a failed state: the inability of central authorities to perform basic functions and provide essential public goods, especially security. Gunmen extorted local businesses or assaulted government facilities, demanding jobs in the PA. Armed clans turned their neighborhoods into no-go areas for the police and often overlapped with criminal networks. Unruly firing in the air at funerals and weddings left a 2 steady stream of casualties. Most of the gunmen and clans involved were more or less loosely affiliated with Fatah, the nationalist movement that had dominated Palestinian politics since the late 1960s (and the PA since it was established in 1994) until the upset victory of Hamas in the general elections of January 2006. Over the following year, Fatah and Hamas militias frequently traded fire, turning entire city blocks into rival strongholds. Fatah commanders of the various branches of the Palestinian Authority Security Forces (PASF) refused to reimpose law and order or to take orders from the new Hamas government—and the Fatah-led Preventive Security Apparatus and, to a lesser extent, the General Intelligence Department conducted a “dirty war” of abductions and assassinations against Hamas, to which Hamas responded in increasingly lethal kind. When Hamas finally went on the offensive, routing its rivals and wresting exclusive control over Gaza in a matter of days in mid-June 2007, its detractors argued that it had swallowed “a poison pill” in taking over the “lawless, anarchic entity” that the Strip had become.1 Clearly this has not happened. Quite the reverse, as “[w]ithin a month of [Hamas’s] taking over the security sector, crime, including criminal kidnapping, clan and family clashes, drug smuggling and car theft, had gone into rapid decline.”2 The government of Hamas Prime Minister Ismail Hanieh has showcased its success in delivering law and order ever since.3 e Ther is much to justify this boast, for although Hamas enjoyed a significant advantage in inheriting PASF structures and manuals, it had to build a new police force largely from scratch. It did so, moreover, while enduring an Israeli siege that continued without a break from June 2006 to June 2010, when it was partially eased; the sweeping boycott imposed by the international Quartet (comprising the United States, European Union, Russia, and the United Nations); and Israel’s Operation Cast Lead in December 2008 and January 2009, in which 1,385 Palestinians, 762 of them noncombatants,
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