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“TESIS” — 2018/8/31 — 9:22 — page i — #1 Hamas’ Statements A discourse analysis approach Pamela Murgia TESI DOCTORAL UPF / ANY 2018 DIRECTOR DE LA TESI Prof. Teun A. van Dijk (Universitat Pompeu Fabra), Prof. Nicola Melis (Università degli Studi di Cagliari) Departament Traducció i Ciències del Llenguatge “TESIS” — 2018/8/31 — 9:22 — page ii — #2 “TESIS” — 2018/8/31 — 9:22 — page iii — #3 Abstract Hamas, acronym for Islamic Resistance Movement, is a political movement that was founded in 1987 and has, since 2007, been in charge of the Gaza Strip. The movement was initially characterised by a language accentuated by tropes of po- litical Islam and, after the Oslo Accords, by a strong rejection of the institutions established by the Accords. Consequently, the movement refused to take part in the elections of the Palestinian Authority. The failure of the Accords in the early 2000s led the movement to take a turn, deciding to participate in the elec- tions. Hamas thus underwent a significant political development, that resulted in changes in rhetoric, ideological representations, and self-representation. The present work aims to study the movements ideological development and commu- nication strategies by the means of Discourse Analysis, with the analysis of the corpora of bayan¯ at¯ , the official statements issued by Hamas and published on their official website. Resumen Hamas, acrónimo de “Movimiento de Resistencia Islámica”, es un movimiento político que se fundó en 1987 y que desde 2007 controla la Franja de Gaza. El movimiento se caracterizó inicialmente por un lenguaje fuertemente marcado por los topoi del Islam político y, después de los Acuerdos de Oslo, por un rechazo radical de las instituciones resultado de los mismos Acuerdos. A raíz de esto, el movimiento se negó a participar en las elecciones de la Autoridad Palestina. La ruptura de los acuerdos hizo que en el 2004 Hamas partecipara en las elecciones. Por tanto, Hamas experimentó un desarrollo político significativo, que dio lugar a cambios en la retórica, en las representaciones ideológicas y en la autorrepre- sentación del mismo movimiento. El presente trabajo tiene como objetivo investi- gar el desarrollo ideológico del movimiento y de sus estrategias de comunicación a través del análisis del discurso del corpus de bayan¯ at¯ , es decir, los comunicados oficiales emitidos por Hamas y publicados en su página web oficial. iii “TESIS” — 2018/8/31 — 9:22 — page iv — #4 “TESIS” — 2018/8/31 — 9:22 — page 5 — #5 Contents Index of Figures 11 Index of Tables 14 Note on abbreviations and transliterations of Arabic characters 15 Part I: On the research and the object of analysis 1 1 INTRODUCTION 3 1.1 The issue of representation . 3 1.2 Hamas as a research object . 4 1.3 Theoretical framework and methodology . 6 1.3.1 Theoretical framework . 6 1.3.2 Methodology . 7 1.4 Context . 8 1.5 Concluding remarks . 8 2 HAMAS. SOCIO-POLITICAL CONTEXT 11 2.1 Introduction to the research topic . 11 2.2 Historical context . 12 2.2.1 The Palestinian question . 12 2.2.2 The Nakba as historical trauma . 19 2.2.3 Islamic roots . 21 2.3 History of Hamas . 27 2.3.1 Foundation of the movement . 27 2.3.2 Context of the first Intifada and Islamist movements in Palestine . 28 2.3.3 The first years of Hamas’ consolidation: the role of Is- lamic foundations and charities . 30 2.3.4 The Gulf War . 30 2.3.5 Peace Processes . 32 5 “TESIS” — 2018/8/31 — 9:22 — page 6 — #6 2.3.6 The Oslo Accords . 33 2.3.7 The suicide operations . 34 2.3.8 The elections . 35 2.3.9 The Arab uprisings and their aftermath . 36 2.4 Hamas’ communication . 37 2.4.1 English and Arabic . 38 2.4.2 Media communication . 39 3 STATE OF THE ART 41 3.1 Introduction . 41 3.2 Studies in socio-political field . 41 3.2.1 Hamas as a resistance movement . 41 3.2.2 Hamas as a terrorist group . 44 3.3 Studies on press releases and official statements . 46 3.4 Epistemological problems . 47 3.4.1 Exclusivity . 47 3.4.2 Arab and Islamist political discourses . 48 4 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 49 4.1 Analysing official political discourse and understanding power re- lations . 49 4.2 Critical (and non-critical) Discourse Studies . 51 4.2.1 General overview . 51 4.2.2 Approaches to discourse studies . 51 4.2.3 Discourse and society . 52 4.3 Ideology and the socio-cognitive approach . 53 4.3.1 Ideology . 53 4.3.2 Cognition . 54 4.3.3 Micro and macro levels . 55 4.4 Genre-oriented approaches . 55 4.5 Studies on Palestinian politics and discourse . 57 4.5.1 Theoretical approaches in the study of Hamas . 57 4.5.2 Settler Colonialism Framework . 58 4.6 Theoretical approach in the present study . 60 5 METHODOLOGY 63 5.1 Summary . 63 5.2 The corpora . 63 5.2.1 General and selected corpus . 63 5.2.2 Sample and corpus selection guidelines . 64 5.3 Results of the preliminary research . 65 6 “TESIS” — 2018/8/31 — 9:22 — page 7 — #7 5.4 Qualitative analysis . 66 5.4.1 Analytical categories . 67 5.4.2 Methodological Approaches . 67 5.4.3 Levels of textual analysis . 69 5.5 Quantitative Analysis . 73 5.6 Computer-mediated analysis . 74 5.6.1 Text Analysis software . 74 5.6.2 Electronic sheets . 74 5.6.3 Bash tool line commands . 74 5.7 Note on the numerical annotation of the statements . 76 Part II: Analysis 79 6 GENRES 81 6.1 The bayan¯ ................................ 81 6.2 Sub-genres in Hamas’ corpus . 85 6.3 Letters . 86 6.3.1 The sub-corpus . 87 6.3.2 Requests as macro-speech acts . 88 6.3.3 Politeness . 89 6.3.4 Argumentation . 90 6.3.5 Informative and pseudo-informative Content . 93 6.4 Memoranda . 94 6.4.1 Requests . 95 6.4.2 Informative content . 97 6.5 Commemorative statements . 98 6.5.1 Anniversaries and collective memory . 98 6.5.2 Commemorative statements as instrument of ideological consolidation . 100 6.6 Obituaries . 105 6.6.1 Obituaries in text and practice . 105 6.7 Calls to mobilization . 108 6.8 Concluding remarks . 110 6.8.1 Defining features of sub-genres . 110 6.8.2 Argumentation and legitimation . 112 7 PARTICIPANTS 115 7.1 Categories and methods of analysis . 115 7.2 Composition of in-group and out-group . 116 7.2.1 In-group . 116 7.2.2 Out-group . 117 7 “TESIS” — 2018/8/31 — 9:22 — page 8 — #8 7.3 Analysis of transitivity . 118 7.3.1 In-group . 118 7.3.2 Out-group . 126 7.4 Participants as social actors . 132 7.4.1 In-group . 133 7.4.2 Out-group . 140 7.5 Concluding remarks . 152 7.5.1 The ideological square . 153 7.5.2 Dominant and dominated discourse . 154 7.5.3 A note on language-specific variables . 155 8 VALUES 157 8.1 Introduction . 157 8.2 Values. Methodology of research . 159 8.2.1 Struggle related values: s. umud,¯ s. abr, martyrdom . 159 8.2.2 Character-related values: determination, dignity, courage 169 8.2.3 Justice-related values: rights and legality . 173 8.2.4 Nation-related values: wat.aniyya, qawmiyya, unity, democ- racy............................... 180 8.2.5 Religious values . 189 8.3 Concluding remarks . 194 8.3.1 Function and representation of values . 194 8.3.2 Stability and change . 194 9 INSTRUMENTS 197 9.1 Instruments as an analytical category . 197 9.1.1 Two faces of the same resistance: muqawama¯ and jihad . 198 9.1.2 Armed resistance and the question of self-image . 198 9.2 Resistance as muqawama¯ ....................... 200 9.2.1 Aspects of muqawama¯ .................... 201 9.2.2 Muqawama¯ : a frame analysis . 203 9.3 Resistance as jihad . 207 9.3.1 Jihad in context . 207 9.3.2 Changing representations and jihad . 208 9.3.3 Jihad in co-text . 210 9.3.4 A frame analysis of jihad . 212 9.4 Politics as instrument of resistance . 218 9.5 Concluding remarks . 221 8 “TESIS” — 2018/8/31 — 9:22 — page 9 — #9 10 GOALS 223 10.1 Social action as cooperation towards common goals . 223 10.1.1 Goals in Palestinian political discourse: from liberation to "political solution" . 224 10.1.2 Hamas.
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