Fire Management Today Volume 62(3), the Article “Thirtymile Fire: Fire Behavior and Management Response” by Hutch Brown Made Some Incor- Rect Statements

Fire today ManagementVolume 65 • No. 1 • Winter 2005

LLARGEARGE FFIRESIRES OFOF 2002—P2002—PARTART 11

United States Department of Agriculture Forest Service CORRECTIONS ON THIRTYMILE

In Fire Management Today volume 62(3), the article “Thirtymile Fire: Fire Behavior and Management Response” by Hutch Brown made some incor- rect statements:

• p. 26, col. 1, para. 2: The statement that the fire management officers (FMOs) on Thirtymile “had no recent experience with initial and extended attack” is false. In fact, the FMOs had recent experience on dozens of fires with various initial- and extended-attack resources, including smokejumpers, helirappelers, contractors, and ground resources. Those involved in formulating strategy and tactics on Thirtymile, including the FMOs, incident commander, and hotshot supervisor and foreman, had decades of fireline experience among them. • p. 26, col. 3, para. 3: The statement that engines arriving on the fire drove past the fire crew “[w]ithout checking in with the IC” has been proven to be false. The assigned incident commander remembers that engine 701 did check in at the lunch spot. • p. 29, col. 1, para. 1: The reference to media stories as “independent investigations” is misleading in a journal for the international wildland fire community. Newsprint journalism should not be confused with a formal accident investigation following a tragedy fire.

We apologize to readers for the inaccuracies in the article and especially to those who might have been affected by them.

Fire Management Today is published by the Forest Service of the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Washington, DC. The Secretary of Agriculture has determined that the publication of this periodical is necessary in the transaction of the public business required by law of this Department.

Fire Management Today is for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, at: Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: 202-512-1800 Fax: 202-512-2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-0001

Fire Management Today is available on the World Wide Web at http://www.fs.fed.us/fire/fire_new/fmt

Mike Johanns, Secretary Melissa Frey U.S. Department of Agriculture General Manager

Dale Bosworth, Chief Robert H. “Hutch” Brown, Ph.D. Forest Service Managing Editor

Tom Harbour, Director Madelyn Dillon Fire and Aviation Management Editor

Delvin R. Bunton Issue Coordinator

The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) prohibits discrimination in all its programs and activities on the basis of race, color, national origin, sex, religion, age, disability, political beliefs, sexual orientation, or marital or family status. (Not all prohibited bases apply to all programs.) Persons with disabilities who require alternative means for communication of program information (Braille, large print, audiotape, etc.) should contact USDA’s TARGET Center at (202) 720- 2600 (voice and TDD).

To file a complaint of discrimination, write USDA, Director, Office of Civil Rights, Room 326-W, Whitten Building, 1400 Independence Avenue, SW, Washington, DC 20250-9410 or call (202) 720-5964 (voice and TDD). USDA is an equal opportunity provider and employer.

Disclaimer: The use of trade, firm, or corporation names in this publication is for the information and convenience of the reader. Such use does not constitute an official endorsement of any product or service by the U.S. Department of Agriculture. Individual authors are responsible for the technical accuracy of the material presented in Fire Management Today. Fire Management today Volume 65 • No. 1 • Winter 2005

On the Cover: CONTENTS The Southwest: A Record–Breaking Fire Year ...... 4 Paul Keller Arizona’s Rodeo–Chediski Fire: A Forest Health Problem . . . 7 Paul Keller Rodeo–Chediski: Tribal Loss ...... 10 Paul Keller Rodeo–Chediski: Some Underlying Questions ...... 13 Doug Beal

An airtanker dropping retar- The 2002 House River Fire ...... 16 dant on the Rodeo–Chediski Cordy Tymstra, Bruce MacGregor, and Bruce Mayer Fire, the largest in Arizona his- Hayman Fire Impacts ...... 19 tory, as it engulfs Mule Canyon Russell T. Graham, Mark A. Finney, Jack Cohen, Peter R. Robichaud, on the Apache–Sitgreaves William Romme, and Brian Kent National Forest. For more on the fire and its aftermath, Forest Fire ...... 23 see the articles by Paul Keller Larry Scott beginning on page 4. Photo: Washington’s “Awful Conflagration”—The Yacolt Tom Schafer, Show Low, AZ, Fire of 1902 ...... 24 2002. Rick McClure "Transition": What Does the Word Mean? ...... 28 Steve Munson and Chad Fisher On Parallel Tracks: The Wildland Fire and Emergency Management Communities ...... 30

The FIRE 21 symbol (shown below and on the Jeremy A. Keller cover) stands for the safe and effective use of wildland fire, now and throughout the 21st century. Its Author Index—Volume 64 ...... 35 shape represents the fire triangle (oxygen, heat, and fuel). The three outer red triangles represent the basic functions of wildland fire organizations Subject Index—Volume 64 ...... 37 (planning, operations, and aviation management), and the three critical aspects of wildland fire man- SHORT FEATURES agement (prevention, suppression, and prescrip- tion). The black interior represents land affected by fire; the emerging green points symbolize the Websites on Fire ...... 15 growth, restoration, and sustainability associated with fire-adapted ecosystems. The flame represents fire itself as an ever-present force in nature. For Guidelines for Contributors ...... 42 more information on FIRE 21 and the science, research, and innovative thinking behind it, contact Photo Contest Announcement ...... 43 Mike Apicello, National Interagency Fire Center, 208-387-5460.

Firefighter and public safety is our first priority.

Volume 65 • No. 1 • Winter 2005 3 THE SOUTHWEST: A RECORD-BREAKING FIRE YEAR

Paul Keller n 2002, the parched Southwest was drier than it had been in If you lived in New Mexico or Arizona during the I100 years. For the first time in fire season of 2002, nothing was normal. 50 years, the Salt River Project in Arizona—the water supply for the entire Phoenix area—shut down all Not a Drop to Drink In July, a water specialist with power generation at its main dam the USDA Natural Resources The region’s winter 2002 snow pack due to frighteningly low water levels. Conservation Service, doing main- was 5 percent of normal. Runoff into Measurable precipitation in Arizona tenance at a wintertime snow mea- the Colorado River, part of Arizona’s from June 2001 through May 2002 surement site on Arizona’s Coconino water supply, was expected to be only was at the lowest level since record- National Forest, dug a hole 3 feet 24 percent of normal. Lakes were keeping began in 1895. (1 m) deep. The soil was bone dry. literally drying up. The dusty, sun- scorched ranching counties west of Paul Keller, a former hotshot and jour- Ranchers and their cattle were nalist, is a contract writer/editor for the Tucson, AZ, were designated Federal USDA Forest Service, Fire and Aviation disaster areas. suffering the effects. When the Management Staff, Washington Office, Southwest’s usually dependable Washington, DC.

Aftermath of the Rodeo–Chediski Fire in Arizona. “I’d never seen a landscape-scale stand replacement fire in ponderosa pine,” said Jim Youtz, supervisory forester for the Fort Apache Agency, USDI Bureau of Indian Affairs. Photo: Tom Iraci, USDA Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Region, Portland, OR, 2002.

Fire Management Today 4 • Soil moisture levels in northern 2002 Fire Season Outlook for the Arizona were the driest since 1932. Southwest* • The previous year’s dead grass was still standing and could carry fire • Expect initial attack activity through April, May, and June to be above much earlier than usual. normal at all elevation levels. • Early March had high or extreme • Large fire potential will be above normal all season. fire danger conditions for most • Annual and perennial fuels will be more susceptible to carrying sur- locations below 8,500 feet (2,600 face fire than normally expected. m) lacking snow cover. • Given the expected state of both herbaceous and dead fuels, a higher probability of ignition will exist from any ignition source. The team predicted a high poten- • By May, it is expected that 1,000-hour fuel moisture will reach near- tial for fires escaping initial attack record-low values. and transitioning into crown fires. * Posted in February 2002 by the Southwest Interagency Coordination Center, Albuquerque, NM. “Any escaped fires will be extremely resistant to control, more likely to range grass completely vanished, the and intelligence coordinators ana- transition to plume-dominated and high cost of transporting water and lyzed special fire behavior predictive exhibit the potential for long-range feed bankrupted many cattle own- models, examined satellite imagery, spotting.” ers, while others had no choice but and combed through volumes of cur- to sell their stock and ranches. “In rent and historical data—from snow Severe Fire Effects the cattle business you can’t haul water equivalents, to energy release Setting the tone for what was to both water and feed without eventu- components, to standardized precipi- come, a 5,000-acre (2,000-ha) fire ally going beyond your resources,” tation indexes. They found that: lamented C.B. “Doc” Lane, director broke out on February 21. Two more large fires followed before the end of of natural resources for the Arizona • Eastern Arizona’s mountains were the month, with several more igni- Cattleman’s Association. experiencing extreme precipitation tions in March. deficiencies. Some areas had abso- Nothing was normal. Heat-stressed lutely no snowpack. scrub jays in Arizona’s pinyon pine By the end of July, 1,234 fires in the • New Mexico’s mountains had lost Southwest had burned a record- forests abandoned their young. A from 50 to 90 percent of snow homeowner reported coming home breaking 435,000 acres (174,000 cover on south-facing slopes by the ha)—almost five times more than to find a drought-punished, heat- end of February. crazed black bear sitting in his kitchen what usually burns in 10 years. The sink eating a bowl of apples.

Moisture levels within trees plum- meted. In some areas, the moisture level of the parched forest floor’s big logs dropped to a scant 2 percent of normal. The drought conditions primed the region for its most destructive fire season ever.

Fire Risk Assessment The wildland fire community in the region foresaw possible trouble (see the sidebar).

A special team of fire meteorologists, climate forecasters, wildland fire analysts, fire management officers, Pinecrest Lakes Estates in Arizona, where the Rodeo–Chediski Fire incinerated many homes. Photo: Tom Iraci, USDA Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Region, Portland, OR, 2002.

Volume 65 • No. 1 • Winter 2005 5 “Dear Firefighters, Thanks for doing a good job. We will be praying for you.” –Schoolchild in evacuation center previous record-breaking fire season For the Southwest, it was a fire year resilient ecosystems. Another mes- in the region was in 1996, when—by to remember. One lesson hit home sage also came out: Through the contrast—a “mere” 217,000 acres hard: After decades of wrangling National Fire Plan, we can do some- (87,000 ha) burned. over the deteriorating condition of thing, both to protect communities southwestern forests, it’s time to get at risk and to restore fire-dependent By the end of fire season, some on with the job of restoring healthy, forests to health. ■ 940,000 acres had burned on public lands, including 435,000 acres on national forest land. Both Arizona and New Mexico experienced their largest fires in history—respectively, the Rodeo–Chediski (about 467,000 acres [187,000 ha]) and the Ponil (about 92,500 acres [37,000 ha]). Some 530 homes were also lost.

But it could have been much worse. Despite all the horrendous fires, no serious accidents occurred, pointed out Edy Williams-Rhodes, Director of Fire and Aviation Management for the USDA Forest Service’s Southwestern Region during the 2002 fire season.

“In addition,” she said, “many com- Photo: Tom Iraci, USDA Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Region, Portland, OR, 2002. munities at risk were successfully protected by a host of cooperating The Colors Tell the Story agencies. In fact, in terms of firefighting effectiveness, 98 percent of The road in the photo separates the Chuck Box Management Unit all wildland fire occurrences were on the right, which was commercially harvested and treated before successfully contained with initial Arizona’s Rodeo–Chediski Fire, from the Chediski Management Unit attack actions.” on the left, which had yet to be managed or treated. The colors tell the story: The treated (green) area survived the fire, whereas the untreated National Fire Plan (brown) area did not. Success She attributed the successes to the “Hundreds of acres of treated areas protected untreated areas within National Fire Plan. “Analysis shows the fire’s perimeter,” said Jim Youtz, supervisory forester for the U.S. that the aggressive planning, pre- Department of the Interior Bureau of Indian Affairs, Fort Apache paredness, and prepositioning of Agency. The photo shows Youtz (right) surveying the fire’s effects with resources resulted in an estimated timber sales administrator Manuel Cruz. Through larger, landscape- savings of $65 million in suppression scale type treatments, Federal agencies are trying to restore southwest- costs.” Fuels reduction and ecologi- ern ponderosa pine forests to something more resembling their historical restoration projects before the cal condition. “Our fuel treatments aren’t going to stop fires,” Youtz fire season also helped protect forest explained. “But they will change the fire’s behavior.” stands and communities (see the sidebar).

Fire Management Today 6 ARIZONA’S RODEO–CHEDISKI FIRE: A FOREST HEALTH PROBLEM

Paul Keller

Arizona’s White Mountains are not what they used to be, easily hosting the largest conflagration in Arizona history.

rizona’s White Mountains were The onslaught of high-density veg- the setting of the biggest wild- etation patterns came during the Climate fluctuations also figured in; Aland fire in Arizona’s history, the past century in the White Mountains rainfall in many areas was higher than Rodeo–Chediski conflagration in the and throughout much of the West. normal in the late 20th century, sup- summer of 2002. If conditions don’t Researchers point to public atti- porting exceptional plant growth in improve, this anomaly could become tudes, needs, and desires, leading the arid Southwest. Couple all this the norm. at various times to overgrazing, fire with declining timber removals in the exclusion, and the selective removal last 20 years and a return to more nor- Despite 23 helicopters, 9 air tankers, of large, centuries-old trees—what mal aridity, and the stage was set for 237 fire engines, 89 dozers, 95 water loggers call “high-grading.” extreme and unusual fire behavior. trucks, four incident management teams, and 1,900 wildland firefighters (including 400 hotshots), Rodeo– Chediski chased 30,000 residents from their homes, gobbled up almost half a million acres of forest lands, and vaporized 450 residences.

Too Many Trees How did it happen? Drive any White Mountain road, and you will see herds of homes tucked deep into the surrounding, overgrown woods. Historically, 2 to 20 ponderosa pines per acre climbed into the sky from open, grass-covered ground. Now, a mix of 150 to 200 smaller trees per acre choke the forest floor. There’s no question that the abundance of trees, coupled with a parching drought and fire-conducive weather conditions, fueled the Rodeo–Chediski explosion.

Paul Keller, a former hotshot and jour- nalist, is a contract writer/editor for the USDA Forest Service, Fire and Aviation Management Staff, Washington Office, Washington, DC.

An overabundance of fuel—trees—coupled with a parching drought and fire-conducive weather conditions fueled the explosive Rodeo–Chediski Fire. Photo: Tom Iraci, USDA Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Region, Portland, OR, 2002.

Volume 65 • No. 1 • Winter 2005 7 Thinning the trees in overgrown ponderosa pine forests benefits both ecosystems and communities.

Unhealthy Conditions Just ask the Arizona residents along the Active Management Mogollon Rim, who watched Rodeo– As our forest and range managers Needed Chediski’s approaching fire front spew now realize, the problem is rooted in Open ponderosa pine normally nightmare-orange flames hundreds human activity. For many years, we doesn’t burn severely, but a large fire of feet into the air. The fire destroyed simply interrupted Mother Nature’s could happen in any ponderosa pine hundreds of homes, costing property plan. Now it’s time to make amends; forest overcrowded with brush and owners millions of dollars. The White simply sitting back and doing noth- small trees. Although fuel treatments Mountain Apache Reservation lost coming can only make matters worse usually won’t prevent a wildfire, they mercial timber valued at hundreds of (see the sidebar). will change the fire’s behavior and millions of dollars. keep it from becoming so destruc- For thousands of years, small light- tive. Rodeo–Chediski showed it again “These conditions can lead to cata- ning-sparked fires frequented the and again: Fire effects tended to be strophic losses from wildfire as well southwestern ponderosa pine for- relatively light in open areas treated as from insects and disease,” observed ests. For the most part, the flames before the fire, whereas neglected Forest Service District Ranger Ed Collins, crept and jumped along the ground overgrown areas often burned with whose Lakeside Ranger District on the through open stands of trees, which uncharacteristic severity. Apache–Sitgreaves National Forest was helped thin the smaller, encroaching 20 percent burned by the fire. “The very vegetation. This natural process also The answer is clear. Despite the best trees people most want protected—the produced fertile ash that stimulated of intentions, people did things in large old-growth trees—are at risk. These the growth of grasses and wildflow- the past that put many southwestern areas need restoration.” ers, many of which fixed nitrogen ponderosa pine forests in their pres- in the soil, helping to maintain the ent poor condition. That makes it Jim Youtz, supervisory forester forest’s overall health. our responsibility today to do what for the Fort Apache Agency, USDI we can to restore these forests to a Bureau of Indian Affairs, said he had At the turn of the 20th century, as healthy, resilient condition. As our never before seen the scale of devas- more people began settling western public land managers now realize, tation caused by the Rodeo–Chediski landscapes, forest health began to working together we must do the Fire. “We knew this was a potential decline. Today, an overabundance right thing for the future of our for- year for it,” he assured. “But what of trees and brush is strangling our ests and communities. ■ this fire did—taking out an entire southwestern forests, with devastat- landscape—completely amazed us.” ing effects for communities.

Aftermath of the Rodeo–Chediski Fire in untreated (left) and treated (right) areas on the Black Mesa Ranger District, Apache–Sitgreaves National Forest. Thick ladder fuels, historically atypical in southwestern ponderosa pine, supported high-severity burning with unusual fire effects (left). Where fuels were reduced before the fire to levels more consistent with historical conditions, fire effects were more typically light (right). Photo: Tom Iraci, USDA Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Region, Portland, OR, 2002.

Fire Management Today 8 What Comes From Doing Nothing?

By 1994, forest health was thinning at least 20,000 acres [8,000 also respond to time-consuming clearly declining on the Black ha] per year. But we’re only thinning appeals and lawsuits. It’s so frus- Mesa Ranger District of the 3,000 [1,200 ha].” trating.” Apache–Sitgreaves National Forest. Alarmed, forest managers and Hampered by staffing cuts and col- In May 2002, drought conditions resource specialists launched a lateral duties for remaining employ- and extreme fire danger temporar- 4-year intensive environmental ees, the Black Mesa Ranger District ily shut down the Baca project. analysis on 28,000 acres (11,000 struggled to complete the project. In June, the Rodeo–Chediski Fire ha) known as the Baca Ecosystem “We’re all doing double duties,” burned about 90 percent of the Management Area. In 1999, the Richardson said. “We’re trying to Baca Ecosystem Management forest supervisor finally approved a run our programs. But we must Area, ending the project for good. plan of action.

The goal was to restore the ponderosa pine forest to something like its historical condition. The plan called for a combination of thinning and burning to remove small trees and allow the big- ger ponderosa pines to flourish, thereby reducing fire danger. About a quarter of the project area was explicitly allocated for old-growth management.

Interested citizens, groups, tribes, and government officials all par- ticipated in the planning process. However, 5 weeks after project approval, the decision was appealed by a Tucson-based organization. The appeal was denied after 6 more weeks, but that wasn’t the end of it. In May 2000, the same group litigated to stop the project. Three months later, the plaintiff finally agreed to allow thinning of trees up to 6 inches (15 cm) in diameter on 306 acres (124 ha).

Foresters questioned whether the “diameter cap” would allow the canopy to be opened enough to reduce fire danger and restore forest health. “To keep up with this abundance of regeneration in our Ponderosa pine forest in the Baca Ecosystem Management Area in untreated (top) and mixed conifer and pine areas,” treated (bottom) areas. Treatments remove thickets of small, weak trees, leaving behind lamented Gayle Richardson, a silvi- the largest trees to grow in open forests more resembling those at the time of European settlement. In treated areas, fire is far less dangerous than in untreated areas. Photo: culturalist, “this district should be Tom Iraci, USDA Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Region, Portland, OR. 2002

Volume 65 • No. 1 • Winter 2005 9 RODEO–CHEDISKI: TRIBAL LOSS Paul Keller

ven before the devastation of the Rodeo–Chediski Fire, unemploy- “With no logs to saw, with no timber to harvest, Ement among the 12,000 members we’re facing some new realities here on the of Arizona’s timber-dependent White reservation.” Mountain Apache Tribe was 60 percent. Arizona’s Navajo and Apache –Colette Altaha, White Mountain Apache Tribe Counties were already the State’s most impoverished. The tribally supervisor of the Fort Apache Agency, Jacob Henry. “We’ve relied on this owned and operated Sunrise Park USDI Bureau of Indian Affairs, put the timber economy for so many years. Ski Resort had also been hit hard by value of the timber lost at $237 million. But in time we will recover and go drought-affected snow seasons. After on to something else that will bring the 2001/2002 ski season, the resort The tribe’s two sawmills—once this tribe back up.” was again in the red. employing 450 people—were soon closed. Although the tribe intended Spiritual Loss Economic Loss to salvage as much timber as pos- The Apache people lost more than Then, in June 2002 up roared the sible, the losses seemed likely to the dollar value of their trees. Their Rodeo–Chediski Fire, a monster con- affect other mills in the region as ancestral homeland also has a vital flagration that scorched about 467,000 well. “The Rodeo–Chediski fire has spiritual significance. These cultural acres (187,000 ha), including more become a new crisis we must face,” values were also lost. than 200,000 acres (81,000 ha) on the said tribal member Colette Altaha. Ft. Apache Indian Reservation—half of “With no logs to saw, with no timber “This is our home,” said Apache the tribe’s timber lands. Ben Nuvamsa, to harvest, we’re facing some new Tribal Chairman Dallas Massey. “It is realities here on the reservation. It’s very special to us. It is a very special Paul Keller, a former hotshot and jour- unreal; it’s frightening.” place. I know the scar from this fire nalist, is a contract writer/editor for the is going to be with us for a very long USDA Forest Service’s Fire and Aviation “Our economic mainstay is gone,” Management Staff, Washington Office, time. The fire has damaged so many Washington, DC. confirmed Apache tribal member of our sacred sites.”

Up on the Mogollon Rim to the north of the reservation—on nontribal lands—450 homes were destroyed by the Rodeo–Chediski conflagration. Luckily, no homes on the reservation were lost. Yet, at a postfire community meeting, several tribal people spoke of losing their home.

“The magnitude of this fire destroyed our house. Our dwelling,” said Ronnie Lupe, Apache tribal council member. “While all the rest of the communities beside the north end of our reservation have long since rebuilt—have long since gone on with their lives—our anguish and Aftermath of the Rodeo–Chediski Fire on the White Mountain Apache Tribe’s ancestral lands. anxiety will have just begun.” The fire destroyed valuable timber and damaged sacred sites with deep spiritual meaning for the Apache people. Photo: Tom Iraci, USDA Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Region, Tribal member Jacob Henry said that Portland, OR, 2002.

Fire Management Today 10 Sign on the Ft. Apache Indian Reservation expresses tribal gratitude for the wildland firefighters who battled the Rodeo–Chediski Fire. Photo: Tom Iraci, USDA Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Region, Portland, OR, 2002. Apaches view their tribal lands as something that they cherish, take management kept the fire in some loss. “We recognize the tremendous pride in, and want others to see and areas from spreading into communi- loss to the Apache Tribe in terms of the experience. ties and burning more homes (see timber,” assured Gene Kelley, mayor the sidebar on page 12). of Show Low. “But we must not forget “But today, “he explained, “That is that the forest is also very sacred to the gone. No matter what words are said After the fire, tribal members empa- tribe. This is a loss that we—as non- or how people put it, I will never thized with nonreservation com- Indians—will never be able to totally see this again—not in my lifetime. munities to the north, where so analyze and understand.” Where my people have traditionally many homes were lost. “Yes, we have gone to find inner peace with the suffered a great deal from this fire,” The Apache people are certain to creator—either through Christianity said Jacob Henry. “But so did the recover, but it will take time. “We or our traditional religion—these communities of Forest Lakes and are a proud people. We are a compas- places are no longer there.” Heber–Overgaard. Let them know sionate people. But we are also very the Apache people are praying for strong at heart,” said tribal council Signs of Hope them. Hopefully they will recover. member Ronnie Lupe. “It will take us Yet there were also signs of gratitude The scar of their suffering will heal. more than 150 years to completely and hope. During the fire, tribal We need to walk this road of recov- recover from this fire. Our economy members expressed thanks for the ery together.” has been destroyed. Pray for us.” ■ bravery of the firefighters who risked their lives to protect ancestral lands. Moreover, a tribal history of active Members of those communities expressed similar regret for the tribal

Volume 65 • No. 1 • Winter 2005 11 Apache Fuels Management Success

In a lead editorial on June 27, 2002, at the height of Agency. “At that time, he and his policies were viewed the Rodeo–Chediski Fire, the Arizona Republic told as very radical.” of ferocious fire runs south of Show Low, AZ. Local communities were threatened, the paper noted, but Since 1945, the Apaches have conducted com- each time “the flames met forest land managed by the mercial logging and forest thinning followed by Apaches and instantly died.” prescribed burns on an average of 30,000 acres (12,000 ha) per year. They understand the impor- What was the secret to Apache success? tance of landscape-scale treatments for restoring historical ponderosa pine forest conditions. Where In the 1940s, Harold Callender, a forest manager for treatments had recently occurred, the effects of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, was assigned to the Ft. Rodeo–Chediski were less severe. Apache Agency in Arizona. He understood that the local ponderosa pine forests were fire-adapted, thriv- Land management officials believe that these ing under a regime of frequent low-severity fires. treatments, coupled with around-the-clock fire- Callender started an aggressive program of prescribed fighting efforts, helped keep Rodeo–Chediski burning on Apache tribal lands, a tradition that con- out of the forested Pinetop–Lakeside communi- tinues to this day. ties near Show Low, saving the homes of some 10,000 residents. “He took a lot of criticism back in those days,” said Jim Youtz, supervisory forester for the Fort Apache

Precommercial thinning helped deprive the Rodeo–Chediski Fire of surface and ladder fuels. The fire through this unit stayed on the ground and the trees survived. Photo: Tom Iraci, USDA Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Region, Portland, OR, 2002.

Fire Management Today 12 RODEO–CHEDISKI: SOME UNDERLYING QUESTIONS Doug Beal

Editor’s note: The fires of 2002 revived a fierce debate over who or what is to blame for uncharacteristically severe wildland fires in the Interior West. Some say it’s too little active management, and others say it’s too much, or maybe not the right kind. In the wake of the Rodeo–Chediski Fire on Arizona’s Apache–Sitgreaves National Forest, Fire Management Today (FMT) discussed such questions with Doug Beal, a silviculturalist for the USDA Forest Service, Apache–Sitgreaves National Forest, Springerville, AZ.

FMT: It’s sometimes said that fires like Rodeo–Chediski are “unnatural.” The reductions in crown density and fuel loading Does the biological/paleoecological needed to improve current conditions simply cannot record suggest a history of similar be achieved without management intervention. fires in the region? For example, can ponderosa pine stands be identified by age class, perhaps suggesting a rather than to stand-scale or land- Forest Service 2002). They show history of stand replacement fires scape-scale replacement events. about 28 percent in the high-sever- under severe drought conditions? Although great variation occurred ity class for national forest land and historically in the size and distribu- 32 percent for the entire fire area. Beal: Prevailing science tells us tion of these relatively small events, Other classes show similar small that the Rodeo–Chediski Fire was there is little evidence that stands differences, which are probably not outside the historical range of vari- of ponderosa pine on the Apache– statistically significant. ability for southwestern ponderosa Sitgreaves National Forest originated pine ecosystems (Cooper 1960; from a single widespread event like FMT: A postfire report by several Covington 1994; GAO 1999; Johnson the Rodeo–Chediski Fire. environmental organizations (CBD 1996; Moore and others 1999; Steele and others 2002) suggests that the 1994). Field observations on the FMT: The Rodeo–Chediski Fire area of the Rodeo–Chediski Fire Apache–Sitgreaves National Forest burned both tribal and Federal land, that is national forest land had been support research findings that our where management histories and heavily logged in the 1990s, and that southwestern ponderosa pine—and strategies might have been quite dif- the fire’s severity therefore shows most other low-elevation, dry forest ferent. Were there clear differences the failure of active management. Is types in the Interior West—has an in fire severity across jurisdictions? that correct? ecological history of frequent low- intensity fire. Beal: No. Mapped polygons of fire Beal: Unfortunately, CBD and others severity do not show a clear dis- (2002) confused the issue by com- The very anatomy of ponderosa tinction in distribution or size of paring apples to oranges. The heavy pine—thick bark; protected buds; and intensely burned areas on tribal and regeneration cuts of the 1980s and long, resinous needles forming a litter national forest lands. Fire severity early 1990s—including the ones list- layer conducive to surface fires—sug- was equally variable across jurisdic- ed by CBD and others (2002)—were gests a species adapted to surviving fire. tions, depending on variations in designed to increase the representa- By contrast, lodgepole pine—with its topography, fuel conditions, stage of tion of younger age classes under a serotinous cones—has a strategy for the fire, and burning period. land and resource management plan replacing itself after large fires that kill for the Apache–Sitgreaves National entire forest stands. If you look at the entire area burned Forest that called for even-aged by severity class, the percentages in stand management. Adequate treat- The patchy nature of ponderosa pine each class do not differ significantly ment of slash and other fuels result- also suggests a species that responds across jurisdictions. Rough calcula- ing from timber harvest was always to a pattern of small disturbances tions based on preliminary maps are an objective, but landscape-level reflected in the Apache–Sitgreaves management for fuels reduction—let Doug Beal is a silviculturist for the Apache– National Forest’s summary report on alone ecological restoration—was Sitgreaves National Forest, Springerville, AZ. Rodeo–Chediski fire effects (USDA not yet on the radar screen. At the

Volume 65 • No. 1 • Winter 2005 13 time, aggressive suppression action was still a satisfactory strategy for Prevailing science tells us that the Rodeo–Chediski dealing with large fires. Fire was outside the historical range of variability for southwestern ponderosa pine ecosystems. Since then, our management pre- scriptions have changed. In 1996, an amendment to the forest’s land and areas where treatments allowed fire- and logging practices that triggered resource management plan shifted fighters to safely attack it? and released forest regeneration. ponderosa pine management into an uneven-aged/thin-from-below Beal: We correlated fire behavior Such activities “built the West,” and regimen for northern goshawk habi- with treatment histories in our they were not necessarily wrong, tat. The Forest Service’s Cohesive fire effects summary report (USDA given the context and knowledge of Strategy in 2000 and the National Forest Service 2002). The results the time. Sure, knowing what we do Fire Plan then refocused our man- suggest a picture that is far more now, we might have done things dif- agement on landscape-level fuels complex than what CBD and others ferently. But the mantra of CBD and reduction, especially in or near the (2002) would have you believe. others (2002) that a ban on logging wildland/urban interface. The cor- and grazing would somehow magi- responding projects are just now [as Based on postfire systematic samples cally undo the legacy of overstocking of late 2002] emerging through the of treated versus untreated transects, is far more shortsighted than the planning pipeline. we found benefits from every type activities they denounce. of forest treatment studied except It seems rather misleading for CBD for precommercial thinning. Areas The reductions in crown density and others (2002) to characterize where fuel treatments, commercial and fuel loading needed to improve logging as all one thing—the liqui- timber harvest, and prescribed fire current conditions simply cannot dation of the largest trees in a forest. occurred within 15 years before the be achieved without management In reality, vegetation removal comes fire showed significantly less burn- intervention. Ecological restoration in a variety of shades and hues. ing intensity than untreated areas. does not necessarily mean that graz- It can accomplish a whole range Treatments in the Hop Canyon area, ing must stop, so long as pastures of land management objectives, for example, allowed suppression are rested and the grazing rotated to depending on what your purpose is. forces to hold the eastern flank of allow for the necessary maintenance the fire and stop it from advancing burns. Grazing can even be used as a We make no apology for our past into the town of Show Low. tool for managing the vegetation in management purposes and prac- certain areas. tices. CBD and others (2002) might FMT: In ponderosa pine ecosystems disagree with them, but that does typical of the Southwest, thick grass- To ban all grazing, fire suppression, not change the fact that our timber es and forbs suppress tree seedling and logging just because these prac- management was, and still is, the growth and, after curing later in the tices historically contributed to the execution of the congressional will season, carry low-severity fires that problem makes no more sense than for the public good. Our land and keep many surviving seedlings from banning the use of a scalpel in the resource management plans are maturing into saplings. CBD and operating room simply because the developed with full public engage- others (2002) allege that overgraz- patient has a stab wound. To prevent ment, including participation by the ing disrupted the process, promoting future Rodeo–Chediskis, we need to organizations that sponsored CBD the dense forest regeneration that reduce crown density, increase cano- and others (2002). Their disagree- contributed to the severity of the py height, and diminish fuel loading. ment with the outcome does not Rodeo–Chediski Fire. Is that correct? For that, we need the right manage- invalidate the lawful fulfillment of ment tools. our commitments under the plan. Beal: It’s true that overgrazing a century ago contributed to the irrup- The sponsors of CBD and others FMT: Can fire behavior on the tion of trees in the numbers we have (2002) profess the same goal of Rodeo–Chediski Fire be correlated today. Other factors included our restoring our southwestern pon- with certain treatment histories? For aggressive fire suppression policy derosa pine ecosystems that we do. example, was the fire controlled in I believe that a sincere, meaning-

Fire Management Today 14 ful dialogue with them and anyone Western national forests: A cohesive else who might be interested on the Areas with prefire strategy is needed to address catastrophic wildfire threats. GAO/RCED–99–65. best way to use the tools we have to treatments such Washington, DC: GAO. achieve our mutual goals would be as timber harvest Johnson, M.A. 1996. Changed Southwest far more productive than scoring forests: Resource effects and management and prescribed fire remedies. Presentation at conference: political points by condemning past Forest Ecology Working Group, Society management practices. showed significantly for American Foresters; 9–13 November; less burning intensity Albuquerque, NM. Moore, M.M.; Covington, W.W.; Fule, P.Z. References than untreated 1999. Reference conditions and ecological CBD (Center for Biological Diversity); Sierra restoration: A southwestern ponderosa Club; Southwest Forest Alliance. 2002. areas. pine perspective. Ecological Applications. Prelude to catastrophe: Recent and historic 9(4): 1266–1277. land management within the area of the Steele, R. 1994. The role of succession in for- Rodeo–Chediski Fire. tech. eds. Sustainable ecological systems: est health. In Sampson, R.N.; Adams, D.L., Cooper, C.F. 1960. Changes in vegetation, Implementing an ecological approach eds. Assessing forest ecosystem health in structure, and growth of southwestern pine to land management. Gen. Tech. Rep. the inland West. New York: The Haworth forests since White settlement. Ecological RM–247. Fort Collins, CO: USDA Forest Press, Inc.: 183–190. Monographs. 30(2): 129–164. Service, Rocky Mountain Research Station: USDA Forest Service. 2002. Rodeo–Chediski Covington, W.W. 1994. Implications for 92–97. fire effects summary report. Springerville, ponderosa pine/bunchgrass ecological GAO (General Accounting Office). 1999. AZ: Apache–Sitgreaves National Forest. systems. In Covington, W.W.; DeBano, L.F.,

WEBSITES ON FIRE* Wildland Fire: Home expressed, issues are raised, and can also read what firefighters of the Wildland questions are answered—all with have to say about fire-related Firefighter confidentiality ensured. FireChat, books and take a look at associa- This Website provides a forum a new addition to the site, gives tions, training, and equipment for communication and informa- firefighters real-time chat space recommended by firefighters. tion exchange in the wildland to “talk” to all users or just one Links to relevant sites—Federal, fire community. Opinions are person. Even firefighter family State, world, weather, and aviation—are extensive and current. * Occasionally, Fire Management Today briefly members have a special area for describes Websites brought to our attention by the conversation. The News Page helps wildland fire community. Readers should not con- strue the description of these sites as in any way keeps firefighters aware of current Found at http://www.wildland- exhaustive or as an official endorsement by the USDA events and information using stan- fire.com Forest Service. To have a Website described, contact the managing editor, Hutch Brown, at USDA Forest dard search terms. Website visitors Service, Office of the Chief, Yates Building, 4th Floor Northwest, 201 14th Street, SW, Washington, DC 20024, 202-205-0878 (tel.), 202-205-1765 (fax), [email protected] (e-mail).

Volume 65 • No. 1 • Winter 2005 15 THE 2002 HOUSE RIVER FIRE Cordy Tymstra, Bruce MacGregor, and Bruce Mayer

he House River Fire raged out of control for almost a month, from Driven by strong southeast winds and low relative TMay 17 to June 7, 2002, consum- humidity, the House River Fire was a classic spring ing about 613,000 acres (248,000 boreal fire. ha). As the second largest wildfire to hit Alberta, Canada, since 1961, the House River Fire influenced how cipitation. The forecasted Drought Due to the early spring fire hazard, large fires would subsequently be Codes* (300 to 424) for April 1 sug- Alberta’s Department of Sustainable managed in the Province. gested that Alberta was in for a bad Resource Development, for the third fire season. consecutive year, declared an official The Weather start for the fire season 1 month For almost a year before the fire, Spring wind-driven fires in the early, on March 1. Cold Lake, Alberta, suffered from boreal forest pose unique chal- drought. The area received only 56 lenges for fire managers. Little or no Fire Behavior percent of the 30-year average pre- nighttime recovery usually results When the House River Fire was reported at 3:50 p.m. on May 18, 2002, the Department of Sustainable Resource Development immediately dispatched air tankers. By 4:15 p.m., the fire’s intensity had exceeded the capability of the initial-attack resources.

The House River Fire was a classic boreal fire driven by spring winds. When the gusty southeast winds arrived at noon on May 18, the fire blew up. The winds fanned the blaze through the night and into the third day. By then, the House River Fire had traveled 43 miles (70 km) and burned about 148,000 acres (60,000 ha).

The enormity of the fire and its long, narrow shape (fig. 1) challenged The House River Fire racing up a hill near Base Lake, Alberta. Photo: Shawn Milne, efforts to construct control lines Department of Sustainable Resource Development, Fox Creek, Alberta, Canada, 2002. along the perimeter, and to communicate effectively. An area command Cordy Tymstra is the fire science supervisor, in active burning throughout the structure was therefore established Forest Protection Division; Bruce MacGregor evening. Frozen lakes limit the use using four incident command teams is the wildfire manager, Lac La Biche of amphibious air tankers, and the Wildfire Management Area; and Bruce Mayer aligned geographically. Incident is the consultation team leader, Policy lack of “green-up” increases the command teams were located on and Planning, Department of Sustainable potential for extreme fire behavior, the north and south perimeters and Resource Development, Edmonton, Alberta, particularly in mixed-wood stands. east of the fire, and the hamlet of Canada. High crowning potential also occurs Conklin hosted a community protec- * Drought Code is one of the fuel moisture code outputs during spring, when needle moisture tion team. from the Fire Weather Index subsystem of the Canadian content is low. Forest Fire Danger Rating System.

Fire Management Today 16 The House River Fire renewed emphasis on fire prevention, education, and community relations.

manage the efforts of multiple agencies, government departments, and industry partners to meet the fire’s threat. Good coordination helped to safely evacuate Conklin residents and protect their property.

Although the Alberta Department of Sustainable Resource Development is responsible for suppressing wildfires within its forest protection area, the regional municipality of Wood Buffalo is charged with protecting structures in Conklin. Because authorities overlapped, a unified command was established in Conklin; and, for the first time, the incident command team included a wildland/urban interface coordinator.

The House River Fire prompted the first springtime boreal forest clos- ings ever issued in Alberta. Highway closures also occurred. The fire command organization issued permits to employees of forestry, oil, and gas industries traveling within the closed Figure 1—Origin and daily progression of the House River Fire. Wind-driven fire runs, typi- areas. To facilitate communication, cal of Alberta’s springtime boreal fires, account for the long, narrow shapes. Illustration: an industry liaison was added to the Department of Sustainable Resource Development, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada, 2004. fire command organization. The new Suppression efforts included the of Wood Buffalo declared a state position was so effective that inci- aerial ignition of strips along the of emergency and evacuated the dent command teams on Alberta’s flank of the fire (fig. 2). Five aerial community of Conklin. large fires now routinely have one. ignition specialists worked on the fire—a record number. They con- Community Protection Lessons Learned ducted extensive burnout operations Firefighting forces worked hard The successful evacuation and pro- utilizing linear disturbances on the to protect Conklin. Dozers built tection of the community of Conklin landscape, such as seismic lines. control lines west and south of during the House River Fire were Conklin, applied backfires, and used largely due to lessons learned after Despite shifting winds, both direct sprinklers to protect structures. The the 2001 Chisholm Fire, which and indirect fire suppression fire command organization worked burned about 287,000 acres (116,000 efforts were succeeding. Then, on in collaboration with the regional ha) and destroyed 10 homes. An May 28, a strong west wind began municipality of Wood Buffalo to independent review committee to blow. The regional municipality

Volume 65 • No. 1 • Winter 2005 17 identified the need to improve plan- urban and rural fire protection most in Alberta’s history. About ning and communications between resources to work together toward $343 million worth of merchant- agencies, strengthen community a common goal. Establishing a able timber burned. protection, and enhance strategies to center for emergency operations is reduce the occurrence and impact of also an important communication Because large fires are so costly, fire large fires. link for exchanging information managers use financial and stan- between stakeholders and for iden- dard operating procedure audits to With each large fire, the Alberta tifying any issues requiring imme- control costs and innovative tech- Department of Sustainable Resource diate resolution. nologies to provide better decision Development has learned that effec- support. Incorporating FireSmart* tive communication with clients, Incident command teams on the practices and principles within com- partners, stakeholders, and the House River Fire utilized a beta munities in cooperation with com- public is essential. Adjustments and version of Prometheus, a spatially munity stakeholders has also become modifications to improve commu- explicit wildland fire growth simu- a strategic priority for Alberta’s nication and use innovative com- lation model designed to work in Department of Sustainable Resource munication tactics are continuously Canadian fuel complexes. The Development. made. On large complex fires, it is “what-if” scenarios produced by important to delineate responsi- Prometheus helped firefighters The Department is striving to find bilities clearly—all partners need to assess the potential threat to struc- better ways to manage large, com- understand their respective roles and tures and other values and provided plex wildfires effectively and effi- responsibilities. support for aerial ignition special- ciently. The 2002 House River Fire ists. Based on the House River Fire challenged managers and provided Another important lesson was the experience, the model received many an opportunity to implement innova- value of establishing a unified com- enhancements and changes. tive ways to reduce fire damage. ■ mand center. The center in Conklin * FireSmart is the Canadian equivalent of Firewise. For helped coordinate the shared What’s Next? more on FireSmart, see http://www.partnersinprotection. responsibilities for community pro- The House River Fire cost ab.ca/spot/news.shtml. tection. A unified command allows approximately $49.3 million, the

Figure 2—A 9-mile (14-km) line on the southeast flank of the House River Fire near Logon River was ignited by aerial ignition specialists. The burnout operation took advantage of an existing linear disturbance from a seismic line created by Alberta’s oil and gas industry. Photo: Shawn Milne, forest officer, Department of Sustainable Resource Development, Fox Creek, Alberta, Canada, 2002.

Fire Management Today 18 HAYMAN FIRE IMPACTS

Russell T. Graham, Mark A. Finney, Jack Cohen, Peter R. Robichaud, William Romme, and Brian Kent Hayman Fire Impacts* The Hayman Fire near Denver, CO (fig. 1), was the largest in Colorado history. First reported on June 8, 2002, the fire did not stop its destructive march until 20 days later. Fuel conditions, coupled with dry and windy weather, produced the ideal wildland fire medium. Ecological, social, and economic impacts were colossal and will haunt the local community for years, perhaps centuries. Perfect Firestorm Conditions Since 1998, Colorado had been experiencing below-normal precipitation and unseasonably dry air. The predominantly ponderosa pine and Douglas-fir forests were becoming drier with each passing season. When the spring of 2002 arrived, Figure 1—On June 8, 2002, the Hayman Fire ignited just south of Tarryall Creek and County Highway 77 near Tappan Mountain on the Front Range of the Rocky Mountains fuel moisture conditions were drier between Denver and Colorado Springs, CO. It ultimately affected some 138,000 acres (46,000 than any in the previous 30 years. ha), making it the largest fire in Colorado history. Illustration: USDA Forest Service, Rocky The moisture content of large dead Mountain Research Station, Ft. Collins, CO, 2002. logs and stems along the Front Range was less than 10 percent. pine and Douglas-fir. For thousands windspeeds increased to 51 miles of years, a mix of nonlethal surface (82 km) per hour, forcing the fire Fire exclusion, forest succession, and fires and lethal, stand-replacing fires to the northeast. vegetation development all contrib- had burned at approximately 50- uted to dense stands of ponderosa year intervals. But for the previous Fuels were generally continuous, both hundred years, no major fire had horizontally and vertically, for at least Russ Graham is a research forester and occurred in the area, and forest den- 10 miles (16 km) downwind from the Peter Rochichaud is a research engineer for sities had dramatically increased. point of ignition, with little variation the USDA Forest Service’s Rocky Mountain in structure and composition. Surface Research Station (RMRS), Forestry Sciences On June 8, when the Hayman Fire fuels consisted of ponderosa pine duff Laboratory Moscow, ID; Mark Finney is a research physical forester and Jack Cohen was first reported, the air mass and needle litter, short grasses, and is a research physical scientist for the over Colorado was extremely dry. occasional shrub patches, which were RMRS’s Fire Sciences Laboratory, Missoula, An upper level low pressure system easily ignited by blowing embers (fig. MT; Brian Kent is a research forester for the RMRS, Fort Collins, CO; and William centered over eastern Washington 2). Crowns of ponderosa pine, Douglas- Romme is a professor for the Department brought sustained southwest winds fir, and blue spruce were low, helping of Forest, Rangeland, and Watershed exceeding 15 miles (24 km) per the fire move from the surface into the Stewardship, Colorado State University, Fort Collins, CO. hour, with gusts of up to 30 miles canopy. (48 km) per hour. On the follow- * The article is based on technical reports by the authors ing day, with the relative humidity After the Hayman Fire was reported, (Graham 2003a, 2003b). For copies of the reports, visit http://www.fs.fed.us/rm/main/pubs/order.html. hovering at about 5 to 8 percent, an aggressive initial attack involv-

Volume 65 • No. 1 • Winter 2005 19 The Hayman Fire was the largest and most expensive fire in Colorado history.

encountered Cheesman Reservoir and the adjacent Schoonover Fire site, which forced it to fork (fig. 4). Burning as a crown fire, the eastern head stopped when it encountered fuel conditions created by the Polhemus prescribed burn of October 2001 (fig. 5). Similarly, when the fire was intensely burning on June 17, it was prevented from becoming a crown fire along a 2-mile (3-km) front when it encountered fuel conditions created Figure 2—The fuels downwind from the ignition point were continuous, consisting of trees by the 1998 Big Turkey Fire and with low crowns, shrubs, and a deep layer of needles on the forest floor. Photo: Charles adjacent prescribed fires in 1990 McHugh, USDA Forest Service, Fire Sciences Laboratory, Missoula, MT, 2002. and 1995 (fig. 4). ing air tankers, helicopters, engines, a broad front, overwhelmed most On the afternoon of June 10, the and ground crews failed to subdue of the fuel treatments, prescribed high winds decreased and the relative the flames. Within hours, torching burns, and previous wildfire sites humidity climbed above 10 percent, trees and prolific spotting advanced that existed within the final perim- a weather pattern that persisted for the fire to the northeast, allowing it eter. The majority of fuels burned several days. During this period, the to burn several hundred acres. On were similar in age, composition, fire advanced mostly to the south and the morning of June 9, the fire was and structure. These uniform condi- several miles to the east. Surface fire estimated at 1,000 to 1,200 acres tions facilitated rapid fire growth, predominated, although torching and (400–490 ha). which in turn limited the effective- some crown fire occurred along slopes ness of isolated forest treatment and in drainages. Under the moderate Fire Behavior units in affecting fire behavior. wind and humidity conditions, recent The combination of fuels, weather, prescribed burns lowered burn sever- and topography positioned the fire The Hayman Fire was perhaps ity more than older burns. for a major run on June 9. In a 20,000 acres (8,000 ha) when it single day, the fire traveled 16 to 19 On June 17, low humidity returned, miles (26–31 km) along the South accompanied by high west and Platte River, burning some 60,000 northwest winds. Fire intensity acres (24,000 ha). The fire burned increased along the eastern flank with extreme intensity, accompanied (fig. 4), pushing the fire eastward for by long runs through tree crowns 4 to 6 miles (6–10 km) until mon- and spotting a mile (1.6 km) or more soon conditions arrived on June 18. ahead of the fire front. Fire spread Ten days later, firefighters finally rates averaged more than 2 miles contained the Hayman Fire. (3.2 km) per hour, with pryocumulus clouds developing to an estimated Figure 3—A day after ignition, pyrocumu- Ecological Effects and 21,000 feet (6,400 m) (fig. 3). lus clouds tower above the Hayman Fire Rehabilitation as high winds, supported by low humidity, The record-breaking Hayman Fire On June 9, the Hayman Fire, burn- push the fire out of control. Photo: Mark Finney, USDA Forest Service, Fire Sciences affected 138,000 acres (46,000 ha), ing with extreme intensity along Laboratory, Missoula, MT, 2002.

Fire Management Today 20 Weather and fuel conditions came together to promote extreme fire behavior.

Where preburn vegetation was dominated by aspen, cottonwood, and other sprouting species, a rapid return to prefire conditions is expected. Areas with low to moderate burn severity that are dominated by ponderosa pine and Douglas-fir should also recover within the next few years. However, large patches of severely burned ponderosa pine and Douglas-fir will not rapidly recover because the fire damaged seed sourc- es. Natural reforestation in these areas might take centuries.

The speed at which slopes and riparian vegetation recover will determine how quickly aquatic environments improve. The recovery of aquatic systems will depend on their con- nection to unburned or aquatically diverse habitats, which could provide the aquatic plants and animals needed for recolonizing.

Some opportunistic species, such as woodpeckers, will benefit from Figure 4—Hayman Fire perimeter. The Cheesman Reservoir (top center) and the relatively recent Schoonover Fire site (the unburned area northeast of Cheesman) caused the Hayman new habitats created from the fire. Fire to form two fronts. The eastern front was stopped by the relatively recent Polhemus pre- Although severely burned tree scribed fire site (to the lower left of the compass point). The 1998 Big Turkey Fire and adja- crowns will provide habitat for new cent prescribed fires in 1990 and 1995 (the green patches southeast of the eastern front) also lowered fire severity. Illustration: USDA Forest Service, Rocky Mountain Research Station, species, species that require mature Ft. Collins, CO, 2002. conifer forests will find their habitat diminished. including 47,900 acres (16,000 ha) and soil erosion during peak flows. that were severely burned (fig. 4). Treatments were applied as soon as Throughout the area of the Hayman Areas where the surface soil organic fire suppression activities allowed, Fire, nonnative invasive species are layers were consumed might not including soil scarification, grass a serious threat. Species such as return to prefire conditions for seeding, aerial and ground-based hawkweed, spotted knapweed, and decades or perhaps centuries. In hydromulching, and aerial dry cheatgrass can adversely affect nutri- addition, where the soil surface was mulching. These measures were ent cycling, hydrologic processes, severely burned, hydrophobic layers designed to prevent or reduce the native plant abundance, and fire might persist for years. projected sediment load expected regimes. In the first 5 years after the for the Cheesman and Strontial fire, riparian areas will likely suf- Postfire rehabilitation efforts were Springs Reservoirs and the South fer the most from invasive species, designed to reduce surface runoff Platte River. and rehabilitation activities might

Volume 65 • No. 1 • Winter 2005 21 Hayman destroyed so much habitat for a threatened butterfly— the Pawnee montane skipper—that its future is uncertain.

Region from 1992 to 2001. Colorado and other Federal agencies spent an additional $6 million on suppression and related activities. Rehabilitation expenditures are expected to cost another $74 million.

The Hayman Fire had a profound Figure 5—Border of the Polhemus prescribed burn (October 2001) and the Hayman Fire. impact, both locally and nation- The Hayman Fire moved as an intense surface fire and crown fire up the slope from the ally. The more we can learn from southwest (lower right to upper left) but did not burn into the adjacent Polhemus pre- this fire, the more we can use it to scribed fire area (top center). Photo: Karen Wattenmaker, USDA Forest Service, National Interagency Fire Center, Boise, ID, 2002. inform future debates about forest and fire management strategies. For inadvertently facilitate their spread. estimated at $5 million. The Hayman more information, visit http://www. Unless controlled, nonnative plants Fire destroyed 132 out of the 794 fs.fed.us/rm/main/fire_res/fire_pubs. might persist in riparian areas, open- homes (17 percent) within its final html. canopy areas, and along roads and perimeter. Homes were destroyed trails for 50 to 100 years following where the fire burned severely as References the fire. well as where it was less severe. Graham, R.T., tech. ed. 2003a. Hayman Fire Their fate likely depended on build- case study. Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS–GTR– 114. Ogden, UT: USDA Forest Service, Social and Economic ing characteristics in relation to fuel Rocky Mountain Research Station. Impacts characteristics within 30 to 60 yards Graham, R.T., tech. ed. 2003b. Hayman (27–55 m) (fig. 6). Fire case study: Summary. Gen. Tech. Social and economic effects of a Rep. RMRS–GTR–115. Ogden, UT: USDA large fire like Hayman are complex Forest Service, Rocky Mountain Research In addition to real property losses, and far reaching, especially in the Station. ■ wildland/urban interface. Those alive the fire caused $880,000 in dam- during the Hayman Fire will prob- age to transmission lines and $37 ably not see the total recovery of the million in damage associated with Hayman burn area in their lifetimes. water storage loss. About $34 mil- People who previously recreated in lion worth of timber was destroyed. the burn area will be forced to look Concessionaires of developed recre- elsewhere, and local economies will ation sites estimated their revenue suffer. Businesses dependent on pre- loss for 2002 at $382,000. fire resources will possibly lose their clientele. On a cost-per-acre basis, the fire was not that expensive (about $275 per The fire stripped many people acre). But because of its size, the Forest Service spent $38 million in Figure 6—Surviving home on the Hayman of their homes—600 structures Fire where fire severity was low. Home burned. Real property losses totaled suppressing it—more than three survival is expected if fire severity is low $24 million, total insured private times the average annual suppres- and surrounding fuels are sufficiently controlled. Photo: Jack Cohen, USDA Forest property losses are estimated at $39 sion expenditure for all of the Forest Service’s five-State Rocky Mountain Service, Fire Sciences Laboratory, Missoula, million, and uninsured losses are MT, 2002.

Fire Management Today 22 FOREST FIRE Larry Scott

Editor’s note: This fictional piece captures the author’s mood following the 2002 Big Elk Fire, part of which he witnessed from his home near Colorado’s Roosevelt National Forest. The setting is in nearby Rocky Mountain National Park, not far from Estes Park, CO. o anyone other than a park needles still soaked with retardant of crystal water at the far edge of the ranger, the orange sun would chemicals was the edge of the fire- meadow. Tomorrow, from the lake’s Thave been a moment of spectacu- line where the holocaust had made depth the Rainbows would float to lar beauty as it rested on the spiny its final death leap. Beyond, to the the top, rimming its shores with north shoulder of Mount Zebulon. west, still venting small gasps of their cadavers. Each evening from his steel fire steam, lay the vale where, only days tower he had watched with reverence before, he had watched a family of There was no joy in this sunset for as it slipped behind the far edge of deer and a single elk graze quietly the park ranger. the Mummy Mountain range. Those across the summer meadow grass. moments of golden light had always What had been a grandmother’s He stood silently trying not to draw been a quiet benediction to the life variegated quilt of grass and flowers into his lungs the stench of the last that was his and the occupation he now spread in a dense black carpet of 24 hours. The sun fell behind the had chosen. destruction extending to the clogged mountain and darkness hurried into stream that circumscribed the base the crevasses and shadows around But not tonight. of the mountain. him. There was a stirring, and from a short distance behind him crept Before him, in a death shroud of Fitfully, the brook attempted to a small, darkly furred animal. The black embers and sputtering charred regain its ancient role as sculptor of marmot raised itself and with the logs, lay what remained of his stew- the universe as it pushed the detritus ranger stared into the sadness that ardship. In the mush of forest pine of the fire into what had been a basin yesterday was their home.

The historic Eightmile Lookout on the San Juan National Forest, CO, was used until the Larry Scott has worked as a banker and an 1970s. Photo: Mark Roper, USDA Forest Service, San Juan–Rio Grande National Forest, attorney. He lives in Loveland, CO. Pagosa Ranger District, Pagosa Springs, CO, 2002.

Volume 65 • No. 1 • Winter 2005 23 WASHINGTON’S “AWFUL CONFLAGRATION”—THE YACOLT FIRE OF 1902 Rick McClure

he late 19th and early 20th centuries brought settlers and Since the 1950s, fire frequency in the old Yacolt Ta perpetual smoky haze to Burn has markedly declined, owing to reforestation Washington’s southwestern foothills. and advances in fire protection. Settlers normally took the smoke from their homestead-clearing fires as “a sign of progress” (Holbrook Hazy Origins these men served as the sole protec- 1945), but the haze was thicker At the time of the Yacolt Fire, tive force for more than 2 million than normal during the hot and Federal forest lands in the area were acres (800,000 ha), including the dry summer of 1902. In August and part of the Mount Rainier Forest area that is now the Gifford Pinchot September, more than 80 separate Reserve. Created by executive order National Forest. Horace Wetherell, wildfires burned through the region, in 1897, the Reserve extended from a homesteader living near Carson in ultimately consuming some 700,000 Mount Rainier south along the Skamania County, WA, was the ranger acres (283,000 ha) of timberland. Cascade Range to the Columbia assigned to the entire southern half River. It was administered by the of the reserve. Wetherell was the sole The largest was the Yacolt Fire. General Land Office in the U.S. agency witness to events surround- USDA Forest Service records indi- Department of the Interior. Tacoma ing the origin of the Yacolt Fire. His cate that a strong southeast wind politician Dave Sheller served as account, told decades later (Shepeard on September 11 drove one or more superintendent of the three forest 1938), is the closest to an official gov- abandoned slash fires near Carson reserves in Washington. ernment record of the fire that exists. and Stevenson, WA, into the adjacent forests. The resulting crown In 1902, Sheller hired three forest According to Wetherell, the fire was fire roared westward, reaching the rangers for field administration of started by Monroe Vallett, who was town of Yacolt, about 30 miles (48 the Mount Rainier Forest Reserve burning slash east of Stevenson. km) away (fig. 1). The town barely (McClure and Mack 1999). Together, The slash fire burned out of control, escaped incineration. From there, the firestorm shifted north, merg- ing with another fire that had swept down the Lewis River.

Both fires combined covered 350 square miles (900 km2) in 3 days, leaving devastation in their wake. When finally extinguished by fall rains, the Yacolt Fire had burned 238,920 acres (96,685 ha) in Clark, Skamania, and Cowlitz Counties. It remains Washington’s largest recorded wildfire.

Rick McClure is the heritage program manager for the USDA Forest Service, Gifford Pinchot and Mt. Hood National Forests, Figure 1—The town of Yacolt following the great fire of 1902. Snags at the edge of town Vancouver, WA. mark the western boundary of the “awful conflagration.” Photo: Weyerhaeuser Company.

Fire Management Today 24 spreading through the timber to the top of nearby Stevenson Ridge, where the east winds blowing down 12, September 1902 the Columbia River Gorge drove the blaze west. Neither Vallett nor Wetherell took action to stop the fire. Wetherell had only recently been rep- Lives Lost in Awful Forest Conflagration rimanded by Superintendent Sheller All Western WashingtonFlames and Oregon Under Pall of Smoke Reaching for spending Government money to From Far Reaching Flames 12, September 1902 hire men to fight a small local fire, and he wanted no further trouble. Smoke of Forest Fires Turn Midday Vallett was eventually arrested and into Blackest N tried in Walla Walla, WA, but never ight Dense Volume of Smoke, Miles in height hangs over the northwest— convicted. According to Wetherell forest fires in neighboring counties and in the cascades the cause of (Shepeard 1938), Vallett “possessed a it—fires are still destroying timber of great Value —end not in sight. very unenviable reputation about the community.” Government witnesses refused to testify for fear of reprisal. 12, September 1902

Other rumors, stories, and theories abound about the origin of the Yacolt Fire. A Weyerhaeuser Corporation Run it its Wake history (Jones 1974) asserts that the Fire ravages wide stretch of country. fire began either in the Washougal LOSSES IN THE THOUSANDS River Valley or somewhere on the Farmers fight to save their burning homes. Lewis River. The Weyerhaeuser Many Flee to save lives account suggests that the fire originated from loggers burning slash, farmers clearing stumps, or fisher- Figure 2—Headlines from newspapers announcing the Yacolt Fire. men leaving campfires unattended. Hood. Chickens roosted at midday, buildings that comprised Yacolt,” Another source indicates a slash and people had to light their lamps reported Holbrook (1945). “Some of fire origin near Yacolt, and yet at noon. A steamer on the Columbia the elder folk looked at the terrifying another attributes the Yacolt Fire to River was compelled to use search- spectacle and said it was the end of embers drifting across the Columbia lights for navigation at 11 a.m. the world, sure enough. The entire River from a fire at Bridal Veil, OR (Morris 1934). Newspaper headlines population went to a near-by creek (Stearns 1960). By one account, a cried that smoke had turned “mid- and stayed there all night. Next small fire smoldered unnoticed for day into blackest night” (fig. 2). morning they found Yacolt blistered more than a month in the Silver So-called “dark days” occurred as here and there, but intact. The main Star Mountain area until fanned by far north as Seattle, WA, and as far fire had stopped less than half a mile strong east winds into the Yacolt west as Astoria, OR. Ridgefield, WA, from the settlement and had been Fire. In all probability, there were reported total darkness at 3:00 p.m. hot enough to make paint run from multiple points of ignition—several on September 17, 6 days after the that distance.” fires moving at once and in slightly fire had started. different directions. The official death toll from the fire U.S. troops were dispatched to help stands at 38 (Holbrook 1945). Several “Dark Days” and protect property near Vancouver, but early newspaper accounts and later Devastation attempts to fight the fire were usu- reminiscences describe the harrowing The fire so darkened skies over ally minimal—most people simply escapes of survivors. At least 146 fam- southwestern Washington that fled. The terror in Yacolt was typi- ilies lost their homes to the fire, and many believed a volcano had erupt- cal. “The fire tore down the hill and many more lost barns and livestock. ed—either Mount St. Helens or Mt. paint began to blister on the fifteen Schools and churches were destroyed,

Volume 65 • No. 1 • Winter 2005 25 as were mining and logging camps within the Washougal River drainage. The fire burned an estimated 12 bil- lion board feet of Douglas-fir, western hemlock, and western redcedar.

At the same time, fires burned throughout forests east of Portland, OR, and in the vicinity of Gresham, OR; Damascus, OR; Orient, WA; Fairview, WA; and Troutdale, OR (Morris 1934). Other fires burned in the western Columbia River Gorge, the largest at Bridal Veil, OR, where it destroyed a mill complex and many homes. Other devastating fires were raging in the Oregon Coast Range, Willamette Valley, Umpqua River Valley, and the headwaters of the Figure 3—Douglas-fir reproduction on the Yacolt Burn. Photo: Forest Service Photograph Rogue River. Fires also burned to the Collection, Beltsville, MD (1926 or 1927; 215522) north in the Washington Cascades much. Additional rangers were hired H.O. Stabler (1910) warned of great and on the Olympic Peninsula. to patrol the forest reserves, which fire hazards in the Yacolt Burn, became the national forests in 1907. especially with so much slash burn- A Call to Action Forest supervisors compiled monthly ing still going on in the region. The Yacolt Fire spurred govern- reports on fire frequency and cause, He called for creating firebreaks ments to take wildland fire protec- but not until the Big Blowup of throughout the burned area. tion and prevention more seriously. 1910 did the Forest Service begin to In 1903, the Washington State develop a highly specialized fire sup- Stabler’s fears were borne out: From legislature appointed the first State pression organization. 1910 to 1924, the Yacolt Burn expe- fire warden. In 1905, the legislature rienced 16 separate reburns. The established authorities for fire pre- The Forest Service was concerned largest, in 1919, covered 26,800 vention and suppression on State about reburns in the standing dead acres (10,800 ha). Still larger fires and private lands. timber left by the Yacolt Fire (fig. 3). followed, including the Rock Creek The burned area was so vast that the Fire of 1927 (48,000 acres [19,000 In 1902, the Federal Government Columbia National Forest (today’s ha]) (fig. 4) and the devastating Dole had spent a total of $2,036 fight- Gifford Pinchot National Forest) Fire of 1929 (208,000 acres [84,000 ing 48 wildfires on forest reserves was often jokingly referred to as ha]). The Dole Fire destroyed most throughout the West (USDI 1904); the “Columbia National Burn.” In a of the young forest that had grown the following year, it was twice as special fire report, Forest Supervisor up in the area burned in 1902. Many homes were also lost.

From 1910 to 1930, the first fire lookouts were built on mountaintops within the Yacolt Burn. In the 1930s, the Forest Service finally got sufficient manpower for fire protection through the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC), one of President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal programs. Several CCC camps were established in the Yacolt Burn for conservation work under Forest Service supervi- Figure 4—The 1927 Rock Creek Fire, one of the largest Yacolt reburns. The fire is reaching the edge of the Wind River Nursery. Photo: USDA Forest Service. sion. From 1933 to 1941, thousands of

Fire Management Today 26 “CCC boys” were stationed in the area of the Mount Rainier Forest Reserve. References for fire protection and reforestation In his final report, Plummer (1900) Felt, M.E. 1977. Yacolt! The forest that would (McClure and Mack 1999) (fig. 5). summarized the potential causes not die. Olympia, WA: Washington State of fire as “ignorance, carelessness, Department of Natural Resources. Holbrook, S.H. 1945. Burning an empire: The last big Yacolt reburn was in 1952. and lightning,” including “[s]ettlers The story of American forest fires. New Spread by 60-mile-an-hour (100-km/h) [who] start fires for the purpose of York, NY: The MacMillan Company. east winds, the fire torched 15,000 clearing the land for cultivation.” Jones, A. 1974. From Jamestown to Coffin Rock: A history of Weyerhaeuser operations acres (6,100 ha) (Felt 1977). As a in southwest Washington. Tacoma, WA: result, the Washington State Division Plummer’s words seem prophetic. Most The Weyerhaeuser Corporation. of Forestry began the Yacolt Burn early-day settlers viewed burning as an McClure, R.; Mack, C. 1999. “For the greatest good”—Early history of Gifford Pinchot Rehabilitation Project in 1955. The ancient prerogative, even after legal National Forest. Seattle, WA: Northwest project included snag felling, construc- restrictions were imposed by State and Interpretive Association. tion of access roads, and large-scale county governments. Prohibitions and Morris, W.G. 1934. Forest fires in western reforestation on some 110,000 acres season closures were rarely enforced. Oregon and western Washington. Oregon Historical Quarterly. 35: 313–339. (45,000 ha) of State and private lands Pinchot, G. 1947. Breaking new ground. in the burn. The Forest Service fol- All that changed within a few short Seattle, WA: University of Washington lowed suit with reforestation projects years. With the advent of the Forest Press. Plummer, F.G. 1900. Mount Rainier Reserve, in the 1960s and 1970s. Service in 1905, forest officers began Washington. 21st annual report, U.S. to take their orders from Gifford Geological Survey. Washington, DC. Since the 1950s, fire frequency in Pinchot, the first Forest Service Shepeard, R.B. 1938. History notes on Wind River District. Memorandum to forest the old Yacolt Burn has markedly Chief. Pinchot (1947) urged “utmost supervisor. January 24. Vancouver, WA. declined, owing to reforestation and tact and vigilance” in dealing with Stabler, H.O. 1910. Special fire report, advances in fire protection, including settlers accustomed to using fire to Columbia National Forest. Report to aerial surveillance, satellite imagery, clear land, but he was clear. “Settlers district forester, USDA Forest Service, District Six, Portland, OR. 5 November. and sophisticated communications. should be shown the injury to their Unpublished report on file, Gifford Pinchot The few small fires of recent years, own interests, as well as to the pub- National Forest, Vancouver, WA. virtually all human caused, have lic, which results from forest fires,” Stearns, G.V. 1960. Personal reminiscences of the fire of 1902. Clark County Historical been quickly contained. he wrote. “…a man who builds a fire Quarterly: 63–66. and leaves it before it is completely USDI (U.S. Department of the Interior). Looking Back out might go to jail for a year, or pay 1904. Report of the Secretary of the Interior for the fiscal year ended June Three years prior to the Yacolt a thousand dollar fine, or both.” 30, 1904. Washington, DC: Government Fire, Fred Plummer of the U.S. Printing Office. ■ Department of the Interior undertook It was a new no-nonsense approach the first comprehensive assessment to fire control—a big change from the policies of the past.

Figure 5—Civilian Conservation Corps crew planting trees in the Yacolt Burn. Photo: USDA Forest Service.

Volume 65 • No. 1 • Winter 2005 27 “TRANSITION”: WHAT DOES THE WORD MEAN? Steve Munson and Chad Fisher

he 2002 Thirtymile Accident Prevention Action Plan (USDA A transfer of command should not be confused TForest Service 2001) highlighted with a transition in fire behavior or in situational the need to improve recognition of transition indicators from ini- complexity on a fire. tial attack to extended attack. The indicators help firefighters quickly recognize the need to scale up man- When a transfer of command deployments, and fireline burnover agement and resources to more occurs, communication can break fatalities. effectively and safely suppress a down among firefighters, between fire. Thirtymile illustrated the risk and within crews, and between Other problems identified in acci- involved to firefighters during a command and resources (Mangan dent reports are the failure to antici- transition. Safety reports indicate 1999). Critical information might pate and recognize potential changes that this period often results in fire- be lost and command structure, in fire behavior and the failure to fighter entrapment and fatalities. roles, and responsibilities might be communicate the information to fire confused. In addition to commu- crew members. Most accident inves- However, in the firefighting world, nication problems during transfers tigation reports indicate that fire the word “transition” is often ambig- of command, accidents can occur behavior should have been predicted uous and misleading. It can refer to: between the time it takes to recog- and carefully considered (Munson nize the need to transfer command 2000). However, failure to do so has • A transfer of command, and the time it takes for the new nothing to do with transferring command and everything to do with lim- • A change or escalation in fire team to take control. ited firefighting knowledge. behavior, or However, when looking at actual fire • An increase in situational complex- Change in Fire Behavior ity (concerns, hazards, and risks). data, there is little evidence to suggest that transfers of command con- Replacing the word “transition” with Transfer of Command tribute to increased risk. Although the phrase “change in fire behav- Munson (2000) identified command ior” is appropriate because rapid In the current Fireline Handbook transfer as a contributing factor change in fire behavior can create (PMS 410–1), the word “transition” during the Dome Fire (New Mexico, immediate safety hazards. In the was replaced with the phrase “trans- 1996) and Dude Fire (Arizona, 1990), management evaluation report on fer of command” (Broyles 2002). The it is unclear whether transfers of the Thirtymile Fire (USDA Forest new term helps readers distinguish command contributed to actual Service 2001), the authors organized between a change in fire behavior entrapments, shelter deployments, the causal factors into five phases, associated with the transition from or fire-related fatalities. including “the escalation of the fire initial to extended attack and the to a higher level of complexity.” process of transferring management Perhaps transfers of command are of a fire to a new incident manage- not the problem; instead, perhaps It is critical for firefighters to antici- ment team. the issue is poor communication. pate, recognize, and adapt to chang- Poor radio communication, inad- es in fire behavior and to communi- Steve Munson is the assistant fire manage- equate or nonexistent briefings, cate that knowledge to crew mem- ment officer for the USDA Forest Service, Clearwater National Forest, Powell Ranger and lack of weather information are bers. This, and not a change in com- District, Lolo, MT; and Chad Fisher is a examples of ineffective communica- mand, is what primarily influences fire management specialist for the USDI tion. Accident reports indicate that firefighter safety. A practical way to National Park Service, Fire Management Program Center, National Interagency Fire poor communication is a common reassess a firefighting situation is to Center, Boise, ID. factor during entrapments, shelter use the risk management process in

Fire Management Today 28 Recognizing potentially deadly changes in fire behavior should begin on the first day of fire season.

Tracking key fire danger indexes early and continuously improves the ability of fire personnel to understand the potential situation. Firefighters should carry pocket cards, updated weekly, to illustrate key indicators of fire behavior potential. Discussing indicators during daily briefings and providing information to visiting fire crews will also help personnel stay apprised of the Airtanker 22 drops a load of retardant on the 2002 Missionary Ridge Fire, San Juan–Rio current situation. Grande National Forest, CO. Photo: Ben Croft, USDA Forest Service, Missoula Technology and Development Center, Missoula, MT, 2002. References Broyles, P. 2002. Personal communication, the Incident Response Pocket Guide cerns, risks, and hazards. Situational member of the Interagency Operations (NWCG 2002). Following the five- awareness, like the fire itself, is Standards Working Team, National Wildfire dynamic and constantly changing. Coordinating Group, January 14. National step process lets firefighters identify Interagency Fire Center, Boise, ID. trigger points for initiating a change Cook, J. 2002. Personal communication, in operations and requires that the New Tools training projects coordinator, USDA Forest decisionmaker maintain situational Service, March 7. National Interagency The 2002 Incident Response Pocket Fire Center, Boise, ID. awareness. Guide includes a section on extended Mangan, R. 1999. Wildland fire fatalities in attack transition analysis. The sec- the United States, 1990 to 1998. Gen. Tech. Increase in Situational Rep. 9951–2808–MTDC. Missoula, MT: tion has been updated in the 2004 USDA Forest Service, Missoula Technology Complexity version of the guide and renamed and Development Center. Changes in a firefighter’s environ- incident complexity analysis. The Munson, S. 2000. Wildland firefighter entrapments, 1976 to 1999. Tech. Rep. ment might include an increase or guide is a useful tool for incident 0051–2853–MTDC. Missoula, MT: USDA decrease in situational complexity. commanders when evaluating a Forest Service, Missoula Technology and For example, if a backcountry fire situation and assessing the need Development Center. for an incident management team. NWCG (National Wildfire Coordinating reaches the wildland/urban interface, Group). 2002. Incident response pocket the situation becomes more com- A short course called “Entrapment guide. PMS 461, NFES 1077. Boise, ID: plex, because homes are now threat- Avoidance: It’s Your Call” emphasizes National Interagency Fire Center. entrapment avoidance based solely USDA Forest Service. 2001. Thirtymile ened. Even a decrease in fire severity Fire Investigation: Accident investigation can bring increasing situational on fire behavior. The course is avail- factual report and management evaluation complexity if hazards increase, such able on compact disk with instruc- report, September 26, 2001. USDA Forest as weakened snags and rolling rocks. tors’ notes, a PowerPoint presenta- Service, Washington Office, Washington, tion, and a student notebook. Course DC. ■ Firefighters must stay vigilant, information is available at http:// attuned to the changing situation. www.nifc.gov/safety-study/annual- They must be aware that their own refesh/refmat.htm. situational awareness can change. For example, situational awareness Recognizing potentially deadly can go down as firefighters grapple changes in fire behavior should with specific safety or resource con- begin on the first day of fire season.

Volume 65 • No. 1 • Winter 2005 29 ON PARALLEL TRACKS: THE WILDLAND FIRE AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT COMMUNITIES Jeremy A. Keller he emergency management community, including the Federal The use of wildland fire incident management TEmergency Management Agency teams for nonfire emergency management (FEMA) and corresponding State and is rapidly spreading. local government agencies, has bor- rowed heavily from the wildland fire community in recent years. FEMA tions (NFPA 2002). Standing inter- until the 9/11 terrorist strikes and has enthusiastically adopted and agency incident management teams the Columbia space shuttle disaster promoted the Incident Command (IMTs) are beginning to appear in shocked the nation. For many, these System (ICS) as “the model tool for nonfire, State, and local govern- events stretched the definition of command, control, and coordina- ment settings. The teams allow what “all-risk” means. tion” for emergency and disaster agencies to quickly pool staff and management” (FEMA 1998). expertise and seamlessly respond to To most wildland fire professionals, large incidents that are beyond the emergency management is still a ICS defines the roles and respon- scope of individual organizations. somewhat nebulous concept involv- sibilities of incident personnel and ing large natural disasters, such provides operating procedures for The use of wildland fire IMTs for as hurricanes and earthquakes. the management and direction of nonfire emergencies—old news in However, just as the emergency emergency response and other func- some States—is quickly spreading. management community has adopt- Years ago, few IMTs or hand crews ed valuable techniques from the Jeremy Keller is the wildland/urban inter- might have thought that they would wildland fire community, wildland face fire coordinator for the USDI Fish and Wildlife Service, Southeastern Region, be involved in nonfire incidents— fire managers can learn from the Atlanta, GA. expertise of FEMA and its State and local counterparts. This article offers an introduction to the emergency management community.

Mitigation Basic Concepts All wildland fire managers should know a few basic emergency management concepts so they can interact effectively with partners in Emergency Recovery Preparedness the emergency management com- Management munity. In emergency management parlance, all incidents are classified as either emergencies or disasters. These terms have rough parallels to wildland fire incident complexity lev- Response els (table 1), and they also have strict legal definitions related to qualifying for Federal disaster assistance under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (42 USC 5121, et seq.). Figure 1—The comprehensive emergency management cycle (adapted from Godschalk 1991).

Fire Management Today 30 The comprehensive emergency man- operations to save lives and prop- account all the hazards that could agement (CEM) model is a cycle of erty by taking action to reduce face a community and then estab- four phases (fig. 1), with each phase the hazard to acceptable levels (or lishes priorities. Careful analysis being equally important: eliminate it entirely). and planning ensure that mitiga- 4. Recovery: Rebuilding communities tion efforts for different hazards 1. Mitigation: Taking sustained actions so that individuals, businesses, and are complementary. The program to reduce or eliminate long-term governments (as well as ecosystems) also emphasizes the importance of risk to people and property from can function on their own, return to mitigation by integrating mitiga- hazards and their effects. normal, and protect against future tion activities into the other phases, when possible. 2. Preparedness: Building the emer- hazards (FEMA 2003a). gency management function to respond effectively to, and recover Ideally, each CEM phase progresses Federal Emergency from, any hazard. smoothly to the next phase, overlap- Management Agency ping with some of its characteris- 3. Response: Conducting emergency FEMA, formerly an independent tics. A true CEM program takes into agency, is now a bureau within the Table 1—Comparison of the National Wildfire Coordinating Group's wildland fire incident complexity levels and the Federal Emergency Management Agency's incident classifications.

Wildland Fire Incident Complexity Levels FEMA Incident Classification Levels

Type 1 Incidents Major Disaster • Total incident personnel often in excess of 1,000, or Any natural catastrophe that causes damage of suffi- 500 per operational period cient severity and magnitude to warrant major disaster • All command and general staff positions are filled assistance. • Number of divisions/groups may require establish- ment of branches

Type 2 Incidents Disaster • Large numbers of resources A dangerous event that causes significant human and • Multiple operational periods economic loss and demands a crisis response beyond • Written Incident Action Plan the scope of local and State resources. • Most or all command and general staff positions are activated Disasters are distinguished from emergencies by the • Well-developed logistical support greater level of response required.

Type 3 Extended Attack Incidents Emergency • Firefighting resources vary from several single A dangerous event that normally can be handled resources to several task force/strike teams at the local level • Expected to be controlled/contained in first operational period • Generally no written Incident Action Plan • Some command and general staff positions may be filled • Staging areas and possibly a small Base may be used Type 4 & 5 Initial Attack Incidents • Firefighting resources vary from one to a few single resources • Normally limited to one operational period • Normally does not require a written Incident Action Plan • incident commander performs all command and general staff functions

Volume 65 • No. 1 • Winter 2005 31 Department of Homeland Security. municipal level and many large cities professional practices and the need It is the lead agency for emergency have emergency management agen- to share resources exists. management in the United States. cies or offices within their jurisdic- The U.S. Fire Administration, part tions. These range from one-person Federal Response Plan of FEMA, is to structural fire what operations to large, well-staffed and The Federal Response Plan is the the National Wildfire Coordinating well-funded organizations. At a mini- mechanism through which FEMA Group is to wildland fire. mum, some official will have col- issues mission assignments to lateral responsibility for emergency Federal agency resources for federal- Functioning as a coordinating agency, management functions within a local ly declared disasters (table 2) (FEMA FEMA directs the mobilization of government. 2003b). The Federal Response Plan is resources from other agencies in the world’s largest mutual aid agree- response to specific disaster needs. State and local emergency management. The wildland fire community FEMA relies on contracted private ment agencies ultimately report to is primarily interested in Emergency sector resources, resources from their respective executive officials. Support Function 4 (firefighting), other government agencies, and a Although there is no direct com- although it also plays supporting pool of disaster reservists to rapidly mand-and-control relationship with roles in several other functions. create a response organization tai- FEMA, a cooperative, voluntary rela- State agencies have mechanisms lored to an emergent disaster. tionship based on mutually shared mirroring the Federal Response Plan for their own mission assignments. FEMA sponsors networks of specialized resources, such as urban search and rescue teams and disaster medical assistance The Professional Development teams, drawn from the staffs of various Series—An Emergency agencies and deployed in response to specific disaster needs. FEMA also sponsors Management Primer disaster management response teams that are similar to the wildland fire com- FEMA’s Emergency Management Institute offers a certificate program in munity’s type 1 and type 2 IMTs and area emergency management fundamentals free to all members of the emer- command organizations (FEMA 2002). gency management community. The program consists of seven courses that can be taken in a classroom or through independent study. Upon At FEMA’s National Emergency completion of all modules, FEMA and your State’s emergency manage- Training Center in Emmitsburg, ment agency will award a Professional Development Series certificate, MD, the Emergency Management suitable for framing. Institute and the National Fire Academy sponsor extensive, high- The courses, in recommended order of completion, are: quality training curricula delivered • IS–230, Principles of Emergency Management in classroom and distance-learning • IS–235, Emergency Planning formats (see sidebar). • IS–242, Effective Communication • IS–241, Decision Making and Problem Solving State and Local • IS–240, Leadership and Influence Agencies • IS–244, Developing and Managing Volunteers • IS–139, Exercise Design By law, each State and territory maintains an agency corresponding Course materials are available for downloading in Adobe Acrobat (.pdf) or to FEMA, with emergency manage- Microsoft Word (.doc) files at http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/PDS.Hard ment responsibility at the State copies of course materials are no longer provided by the Emergency level. The size and capability of each Management Institute. Final exams are taken online. agency varies with the population and needs of each State. Emergency Some of the above courses are also available in 2- and 3-day classroom management organizations also exist versions offered by State emergency management agencies’ training sec- within tribal governments. tions. Links to the State EM agencies are at http://www.fema.gov/fema/ statedr.shtm. Similarly, each county or equivalent

Fire Management Today 32 Table 2—Emergency support functions (ESFs) identified under the Federal Response.

Emergency Support Activity Lead Agency Function

ESF–1 Transportation U.S. Dept. of Transportation (DOT)

Federal Emergency Management Agency ESF–2 Communications (FEMA)

ESF–3 Public Works and Engineering U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

ESF–4 Fire Fighting USDA Forest Service Federal Emergency Management Agency ESF–5 Information and Planning (FEMA)

ESF–6 Mass Care American Red Cross

ESF–7 Resource Support General Services Administration (GSA)

ESF–8 Health and Medical Services U.S. Public Health Service (USPHS)

Federal Emergency Management Agency ESF–9 Urban Search and Rescue (FEMA)

ESF–10 Hazardous Materials Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)

ESF–11 Food USDA Food and Nutrition Service

ESF–12 Energy U.S. Dept. of Energy (DOE)

For successful mitigation planning, just as firelines must have a secure The wildland fire community inter- interaction with the emergency anchor point. The overriding acts with the emergency management management community at local emphasis on safety is common to community at every government and State levels is critical. all emergency operations. level. The most common interaction is at the local level, because most Wildland Fire However, wildland fire manage- large wildland/urban interface fire Emergencies ment is not always an emergency incidents involve local emergency When wildland fires threaten life situation. The wildland fire pro- management authorities, especially and property, they become emer- fession includes an ecosystem when an evacuation is ordered. gencies that must be managed. management component absent in A wildland fire operations chief other emergency management dis- Interaction outside ongoing inci- pressed into service on a flood ciplines. A prescribed hurricane is dents is also becoming common, incident will quickly see the paral- impossible, but prescribed fire is a particularly with the large number of lels. For example, temporary levees routine management practice with hazardous fuels mitigation projects must be anchored to high ground, a variety of purposes. as a result of the National Fire Plan.

Volume 65 • No. 1 • Winter 2005 33 IS–292. Emmitsburg, MD: National Nevertheless, seeing our wildland The wildland fire and emergency Emergency Training Center. FEMA (Federal Emergency Management fire community as part of the larger management communities have Agency). 2003a. Principles of emer- family of emergency management made significant progress toward gency management. EMI course IS–230. disciplines can help us function in common goals. However, staying Emmitsburg, MD: National Emergency Training Center. all aspects of the interagency hazard on a parallel track with the larger FEMA (Federal Emergency Management management community. The emer- emergency management commu- Agency). 2003b. Federal response plan— gency components of wildland fire nity will require continued com- Interim. FEMA Publication 9230.1–PL. Washington, DC: FEMA. management—wildfire mitigation, mitment in all phases of emergency Godschalk, D.R. 1991. Disaster mitigation prevention, and suppression—fit management. Understanding how and hazard management. In: Drabek, T.E.; neatly into the CEM model (fig. 2). the emergency management com- Hoetmer, G.J., eds. Emergency manage- munity functions, and our role in ment: Principles and practice for local government. Washington, DC: International Parallel Track that community, will help us bet- City Management Association. During the wildland fire communi- ter manage ecosystems and protect NFPA (National Fire Protection Association). communities. 2002. Standard on emergency services ty’s history of interagency coopera- incident management system. NFPA 1561. tion in the wildland/urban interface, Quincy, MA: NFPA. our primary focus has been on References NWCG (National Wildfire Coordinating Group). 1998. Fireline handbook. NWCG preparedness and response. As a FEMA (Federal Emergency Management Agency). 1998. Basic incident command Handbook 3. PMS 410–1. NFES 0065. community, however, we are also system. EMI Course IS–195. Emmitsburg, Boise, ID: National Interagency Fire beginning to take a more cooperative MD: National Emergency Training Center. Center. approach to aspects of mitigation FEMA (Federal Emergency Management and recovery. Agency). 2002. Disaster basics. EMI course

Mitigation Fules Managenent Fire Prevention Public Education Community Planning

Recovery Preparedness Detection Wildland Planning Dispatch Fire Training Initial Attack Maintenance Extended Attack Management Interagency Agrements

Response Detection Dispatch Initial Attach Extended Attack

Figure 2—Wildland fire management in the context of the comprehensive emergency management cycle. BAER = burned area emergency rehabilitation.

Fire Management Today 34 AUTHOR INDEX—VOLUME 64

Agner, Jon P. Got clearance? Brown, Hutch. Early voices for C. Vortex turbulence—Its effect 64(4): 12. light burning. 64(3): 23–24. on fire behavior. 64(1): 45–48. Alexander, M.E.; Thomas, D.A. Brown, Hutch. Reports of Davis, Rollo T. Atmospheric sta- Forecasting wildland fire behav- American Indian fire use in the bility forecast and fire control. ior: Aids, guides, and knowl- East. 64(3): 17–22. 64(1): 56–58. edge-based protocols. 64(1): Butler, Bret W.; Cohen, Jack D. Eckert, Stephen A.; Alexander, 4–11. Firefighter safety zones: How Martin E. “Brewer Fire mystery” Andrews, Patricia L. Estimating big is big enough? 64(1): 82–85. discussion. 64(2): 56–57. slope for predicting fire behav- Byram, George M. Some prin- Editor. Blackfeet fire use in battle. ior. 64(1): 62–63. ciples of combustion and their 64(3): 9. Baily, April. Fifth annual Franklin significance in forest fire behav- Editor. Websites on fire. 64(1): 28. Awards ceremony. 64(3): 39–40. ior. 64(1): 37–44. Editor. Websites on fire. 64(2): 38. Barrett, Stephen W. Altered fire Chan, Daniel W.; Paul, James T.; cycles in the Northern Rockies. Dozier, Alan. Keetch–Byram Editor. Websites on fire. 64(3): 29. 64(3): 25–30. Drought Index: Can it help pre- Editor. Websites on fire. 64(4): 45. Barrett, Stephen W. Fire regimes dict wildland fires? 64(2): 39–42. Fazzino, Amanda. NASA honors in the Northern Rockies. 64(2): Colson, DeVer. Meteorological Texas Forest Service incident 32–38. problems associated with mass management team. 64(3): 41. Beighley, Mark. Beyond the safety fires. 64(1): 34–36. Galyardt, Matthew; Queen, Lloyd; zone: Creating a margin of safe- Connor, Jeff. The ying and yang Ward, Laura. Improving a ty. 64(1): 78–81. of wildland firefighting. 64(3): wildland fire situation analysis Benefield, Mike. The fire below: 32–35. through GIS. 64(4): 39–43. Suppression tactics from above. Countryman, C.M. The concept of Gisborne, H.T. Fundamentals of 64(4): 37–38. fire environment. 64(1): 49–52. fire behavior. 64(1): 15–23. Bennett, Billy. Safety alert: Watch Cramer, Owen P. Recognizing Gleason, Paul. LCES—A key to out for aircraft turbulence! weather conditions that affect safety in the wildland fire envi- 64(1): 86–87. forest fire behavior. 64(1): ronment. 64(1): 70–71. Borzik, Joette. Developing the fire 29–33. Gray, Bill. A new tool for mopup service workforce through men- Crosby, John S. Vertical wind cur- and other fire management toring. 64(4): 48–49. rents and fire behavior. 64(1): tasks. 64(4): 46–47. Bosworth, Dale. Living with fire 24–26. Greear, Nick. Wildland fire deci- isn’t so simple. 64(4): 4–6. Crosby, John S.; Chandler, Craig, sionmaking. 64(4): 31–33. Brauneis, Karl. Fire use during C. Get the most from your Haines, Donald A. Air tanker the Great Sioux War. 64(3): 4–9. windspeed observation. 64(1): vortex turbulence—Revisited. 53–55. Brown, A.A. Warning signs for 64(1): 64–65. fire fighters. 64(1): 27–28. Cuoco, Christopher J.; Barnett, Haines, Donald A. Downbursts James K. How IC’s can get max- Brown, Hutch. “The Air Was and wildland fires: A dangerous imum use of weather informa- combination. 64(1): 59–61. Fire”: Fire behavior at Peshtigo tion. 64(1): 72–77. in 1871. 64(4): 20–30. Davis, James B.; Chandler, Craig

Volume 65 • No. 1 • Winter 2005 35 Harvey, Bruce; Fitzgerald, Susan. Murphy, Kathy. Visualizing the Students of Wildland Fire Ecology Is Florida’s prescribed fire pro- Ten and Eighteen—With humor. and Management. What is fire? gram something to get choked 64(2): 4–5. Eleven ways of seeing fire. up about? 64(4): 16–18. Patterson, Sara. A tribute to 64(3): 30–31. Hayes, G.L. Forest fires and sea Engine 804. 64(4): 19. Sturm, Sandi; Weaver, Matt. breezes. 64(1): 12–14. Paul, James T.; Chan, Daniel; Wildland fire education: Going Hof, John. Diversifying fuels man- Dozier, Alan. Fire preven- the distance in Alaska. 64(2): agement to offset uncertainty. tion team shows its worth in 51–53. 64(2): 22–23. Georgia. 64(2): 43–47. Weir, John R. Probability of spot Keeley, Jon E. American Indian Robertson, S.L.; Roose, H. New fires during prescribed burns. influence on fire regimes in interagency fire program analy- 64(2): 24–26. California’s coastal ranges. sis system. 64(2): 12–14. Wheeler, Jim. Testing for deck 64(3): 15–16. Robichaud, Peter R.; Bilskie, Jim. material flammability. 64(4): Lee, Bill. Building group cohe- A new tool for fire managers— 13–15. sion in type 2 fire crews. 64(2): An electronic duff moisture Williams, Gerald W. American 48–50. meter. 64(2): 15–18. Indian fire use in the arid West. Leuschen, Tom; Frederick, Ken. Rohde, Michael S. Fires in the 64(3): 10–14. The consumption strategy: wildland/urban interface: Best Williams, Jerry. A changing fire Increasing safety during mopup. command practices. 64(2): environment: The task ahead. 64(1): 88–92. 27–31. 64(4): 7–11. Martin, Ed. The Pocket PC can St. John, Paul; Alexander, Martin Williams, Jerry. Managing fire- increase your productivity. E. Canadian Fire Weather Index dependent ecosystems: We need 64(4): 44–45. System: Training now available a public lands policy debate. Mojeramane, Witness. Wildland on CD-ROM. 64(2): 54–55. 64(2): 6–11. fires in Botswana. 64(4): 34–36. Steensland, Paul T. Wildland fire Woodall, C.W.; Holden, G.R.; Morse, Gene A. A trend analysis of investigation standards. 64(3): Vissage, J.S. Fuel mapping for fireline “Watch Out” Situations 36–38. the future. 64(2): 19–21. in seven fire-suppression fatality accidents. 64(1): 66–69.

Fire Management Today 36 Laura Ward. 64(4): 39–43. SUJECT INDEX—VOLUME 64 A new tool for fire managers—An electronic duff moisture meter. Alaska Botswana Peter R. Robichaud; Jim Bilskie. Wildland fire education: Going Wildland fires in Botswana. 64(2): 15–18. the distance in Alaska. Sandi Witness Mojeramane. 64(4): A new tool for mopup and other Sturm; Matt Weaver. 64(2): 34–36. fire management tasks. Bill 51–53. Gray. 64(4): 46–47. California The Pocket PC can increase your American Indians American Indian influence on fire productivity. Ed Martin. 64(4): American Indian fire use in the regimes in California’s coastal 44–45. arid West. Gerald W. Williams. ranges. Jon E. Keeley. 64(3): 64(3): 10–14. 15–16. Fire Behavior American Indian influence on fire Fires in the wildland/urban inter- “The air was fire”: Fire behav- regimes in California’s coastal face: Best command practices. ior at Peshtigo in 1871. Hutch ranges. Jon E. Keeley. 64(3): Michael S. Rohde. 64(2): 27–31. Brown. 64(4): 20–30. 15–16. Air tanker vortex turbulence— Blackfeet fire use in battle. Editor. Canada Revisited. Donald A. Haines. 64(3): 9. Canadian Fire Weather Index 64(1): 64–65. Fire use during the Great Sioux System: Training now available Altered fire cycles in the Northern War. Karl Brauneis. 64(3): 4–9. on CD-ROM. Paul St. John; Rockies. Stephen W. Barrett. Reports of American Indian fire Martin E. Alexander. 64(2): 64(3): 25–30. use in the East. Hutch Brown. 54–55. Atmospheric stability forecast 64(3): 17–22. and fire control. Rollo T. Davis. Cooperation 64(1): 56–58. Beyond the safety zone: Creating Art American Indian influence on fire a margin of safety. Mark Visualizing the Ten and regimes in California’s coastal Beighley. 64(1): 78–81. Eighteen—With humor. Kathy ranges. Jon E. Keeley. 64(3): A changing fire environment: Murphy. 64(2): 4–5. 15–16. The task ahead. Jerry Williams. Building group cohesion in type 64(4): 7–11. Aviation 2 fire crews. Bill Lee. 64(2): The concept of fire environment. Air tanker vortex turbulence— 48–50. C.M. Countryman. 64(1): 49–52. Revisited. Donald A. Haines. Fire prevention team shows its Downbursts and wildland fires: A 64(1): 64–65. worth in Georgia. James T. Paul; dangerous combination. Donald Safety alert: Watch out for aircraft Daniel Chan; Alan Dozier. 64(2): A. Haines. 64(1): 59–61. turbulence! Billy Bennett. 64(1): 43–47. Estimating slope for predict- 86–87. Got clearance? Jon P. Agner. ing fire behavior. Patricia L. Vortex turbulence—Its effect on 64(4): 12. Andrews. 64(1): 62–63. fire behavior. James B. Davis; Wildland fire education: Going Firefighter safety zones: How big Craig C. Chandler. 64(1): 45–48. the distance in Alaska. Sandi is big enough? Bret W. Butler; Sturm; Matt Weaver. 64(2): Jack D. Cohen. 64(1): 82–85. Awards 51–53. Forecasting wildland fire behav- Fifth annual Franklin Awards cer- ior: Aids, guides, and knowl- emony. April Baily. 64(3): 39–40. Equipment and Engineering edge-based protocols. M.E. NASA honors Texas Forest Service Alexander; D.A. Thomas. 64(1): incident management team. Improving a wildland fire situ- 4–11. Amanda Fazzino. 64(3): 41. ation analysis through GIS. Forest fires and sea breezes. G.L. Matthew Galyardt; Lloyd Queen; Hayes. 64(1): 12–14.

Volume 65 • No. 1 • Winter 2005 37 Fundamentals of fire behavior. Fire Ecology and Management. Early voices for light burning. H.T. Gisborne. 64(1): 15–23. 64(3): 30–31. Hutch Brown. 64(3): 23–24. Get the most from your wind- Wildland Fires in Botswana. Fire use during the Great Sioux speed observation. John S. Mojeramane, Witness. 64(4): War. Karl Brauneis. 64(3): 4–9. Crosby; Craig C. Chandler. 34–36. Reports of American Indian fire 64(1): 53–55. The ying and yang of wildland use in the East. Hutch Brown. How IC’s can get maximum firefighting. Jeff Connor. 64(3): 64(3): 17–22. use of weather information. 32–35. Christopher J. Cuoco; James K. Fuels/Fuels Barnett. 64(1): 72–77. Fire History Management Meteorological problems associ- Altered fire cycles in the Northern American Indian fire use in the ated with mass fires. DeVer Rockies. Stephen W. Barrett. arid West. Gerald W. Williams. Colson. 64(1): 34–36. 64(3): 25–30. 64(3): 10–14. Probability of spot fires during American Indian fire use in the The consumption strategy: prescribed burns. John R. Weir. arid West. Gerald W. Williams. Increasing safety during mopup. 64(2): 24–26. 64(3): 10–14. Tom Leuschen; Ken Frederick. Recognizing weather conditions American Indian influence on fire 64(1): 88–92. that affect forest fire behavior. regimes in California’s coastal Early voices for light burning. Owen P. Cramer. 64(1): 29–33. ranges. Jon E. Keeley. 64(3): Hutch Brown. 64(3): 23–24. Safety alert: Watch out for aircraft 15–16. Got clearance? Jon P. Agner. turbulence! Billy Bennett. 64(1): Fire regimes in the Northern 64(4): 12. 86–87. Rockies. Stephen W. Barrett. Fuel mapping for the future. Some principles of combustion 64(2): 32–38. C.W. Woodall; G.R. Holden; J.S. and their significance in forest Vissage. 64(2): 19–21. fire behavior. George M. Byram. Fire Prevention Fundamentals of fire behavior. 64(1): 37–44. Fire prevention team shows its H.T. Gisborne. 64(1): 15–23. A trend analysis of fireline “Watch worth in Georgia. James T. Paul; Keetch–Byram Drought Index: Out” Situations in seven fire- Daniel Chan; Alan Dozier. 64(2): Can it help predict wildland suppression fatality accidents. 43–47. fires? Daniel W. Chan; James T. Gene A. Morse. 64(1): 66–69. Forecasting wildland fire behav- Paul; Alan Dozier. 64(2): 39–42. Vertical wind currents and fire ior: Aids, guides, and knowl- Managing fire-dependent ecosys- behavior. John S. Crosby. 64(1): edge-based protocols. M.E. tems: We need a public lands 24–26. Alexander; D.A. Thomas. 64(1): policy debate. Jerry Williams. Vortex turbulence—Its effect on 4–11. 64(2): 6–11. fire behavior. James B. Davis; Fuel mapping for the future. A new tool for fire managers—An Craig C. Chandler. 64(1): 45–48. C.W. Woodall; G.R. Holden; J.S. electronic duff moisture meter. Warning signs for fire fighters. Vissage. 64(2): 19–21. Peter R. Robichaud; Jim Bilskie. A.A. Brown. 64(1): 27–28. Got clearance? Jon P. Agner. 64(2): 15–18. 64(4): 12. Some principles of combustion Fire Ecology Keetch–Byram Drought Index: and their significance in forest Altered fire cycles in the Northern Can it help predict wildland fire behavior. George M. Byram. Rockies. Stephen W. Barrett. fires? Daniel W. Chan; James T. 64(1): 37–44. 64(3): 25–30. Paul; Alan Dozier. 64(2): 39–42. American Indian influence on fire Georgia regimes in California’s coastal Fire Use Fire prevention team shows its ranges. Jon E. Keeley. 64(3): American Indian fire use in the worth in Georgia. James T. Paul; 15–16. arid West. Gerald W. Williams. Daniel Chan; Alan Dozier. 64(2): What is fire? Eleven ways of see- 64(3): 10–14. 43–47. ing fire. Students of Wildland

Fire Management Today 38 Keetch–Byram Drought Index: A trend analysis of fireline “Watch Forest fires and sea breezes. G.L. Can it help predict wildland Out” Situations in seven fire- Hayes. 64(1): 12–14. fires? Daniel W. Chan; James T. suppression fatality accidents. Get the most from your wind- Paul; Alan Dozier. 64(2): 39–42. Gene A. Morse. 64(1): 66–69. speed observation. John S. Vortex turbulence—Its effect on Crosby; Craig C. Chandler. Hazard/Risk fire behavior. James B. Davis; 64(1): 53–55. Assessment Craig C. Chandler. 64(1): 45–48. How IC’s can get maximum Air tanker vortex turbulence— Warning signs for fire fighters. use of weather information. Revisited. Donald A. Haines. A.A. Brown. 64(1): 27–28. Christopher J. Cuoco; James K. 64(1): 64–65. Barnett. 64(1): 72–77. Atmospheric stability forecast History NASA honors Texas Forest Service and fire control. Rollo T. Davis. “The air was fire”: Fire behav- incident management team. 64(1): 56–58. ior at Peshtigo in 1871. Hutch Amanda Fazzino. 64(3): 41. Beyond the safety zone: Creating Brown. 64(4): 20–30. A trend analysis of fireline “Watch a margin of safety. Mark American Indian fire use in the Out” Situations in seven fire- Beighley. 64(1): 78–81. arid West. Gerald W. Williams. suppression fatality accidents. The concept of fire environment. 64(3): 10–14. Gene A. Morse. 64(1): 66–69. C.M. Countryman. 64(1): 49–52. Blackfeet Fire Use in Battle. Warning signs for fire fighters. The consumption strategy: Editor. 64(3): 9. A.A. Brown. 64(1): 27–28. Increasing safety during mopup. Early voices for light burning. Tom Leuschen; Ken Frederick. Hutch Brown. 64(3): 23–24. Investigations 64(1): 88–92. Fire use during the Great Sioux Wildland fire investigation stan- Downbursts and wildland fires: A War. Karl Brauneis. 64(3): 4–9. dards. Paul T. Steensland. 64(3): dangerous combination. Donald Reports of American Indian fire 36–38. A. Haines. 64(1): 59–61. use in the East. Hutch Brown. Firefighter safety zones: How big 64(3): 17–22. Personnel is big enough? Bret W. Butler; A trend analysis of fireline “Watch Building group cohesion in type Jack D. Cohen. 64(1): 82–85. Out” Situations in seven fire- 2 fire crews. Bill Lee. 64(2): Forecasting wildland fire behav- suppression fatality accidents. 48–50. ior: Aids, guides, and knowl- Gene A. Morse. 64(1): 66–69. Developing the fire service work- edge-based protocols. M.E. A Tribute to Engine 804. force through mentoring. Joette Alexander; D.A. Thomas. 64(1): Patterson, Sara. 64(4): 19. Borzik. 64(4): 48–49. 4–11. Fire prevention team shows its LCES—A key to safety in the Incident Management worth in Georgia. James T. Paul; wildland fire environment. Paul Air tanker vortex turbulence— Daniel Chan; Alan Dozier. 64(2): Gleason. 64(1): 70–71. Revisited. Donald A. Haines. 43–47. New interagency fire program 64(1): 64–65. analysis system. S.L. Robertson; Atmospheric stability forecast Policy H. Roose. 64(2): 12–14. and fire control. Rollo T. Davis. A changing fire environment: Recognizing weather conditions 64(1): 56–58. The task ahead. Jerry Williams. that affect forest fire behavior. A changing fire environment: 64(4): 7–11. Owen P. Cramer. 64(1): 29–33. The task ahead. Jerry Williams. Managing fire-dependent ecosys- Safety alert: Watch out for aircraft 64(4): 7–11. tems: We need a public lands turbulence! Billy Bennett. 64(1): Downbursts and wildland fires: A policy debate. Jerry Williams. 86–87. dangerous combination. Donald 64(2): 6–11. Some principles of combustion A. Haines. 64(1): 59–61. Wildland fire investigation stan- and their significance in forest The fire below: Suppression tac- dards. Paul T. Steensland. 64(3): fire behavior. George M. Byram. tics from above. Mike Benefield. 36–38. 64(1): 37–44. 64(4): 37–38.

Volume 65 • No. 1 • Winter 2005 39 Preparedness/Planning Recognizing weather conditions Laura Ward. 64(4): 39–43. The concept of fire environment. that affect forest fire behavior. A new tool for fire managers—An C.M. Countryman. 64(1): 49–52. Owen P. Cramer. 64(1): 29–33. electronic duff moisture meter. The consumption strategy: Warning signs for fire fighters. Peter R. Robichaud; Jim Bilskie. Increasing safety during mopup. A.A. Brown. 64(1): 27–28. 64(2): 15–18. Tom Leuschen; Ken Frederick. What is fire? Eleven ways of see- Some principles of combustion 64(1): 88–92. ing fire. Students of Wildland and their significance in forest Estimating slope for predict- Fire Ecology and Management. fire behavior. George M. Byram. ing fire behavior. Patricia L. 64(3): 30–31. 64(1): 37–44. Andrews. 64(1): 62–63. The ying and yang of wildland Vertical wind currents and fire Firefighter safety zones: How big firefighting. Jeff Connor. 64(3): behavior. John S. Crosby. 64(1): is big enough? Bret W. Butler; 32–35. 24–26. Jack D. Cohen. 64(1): 82–85. Fires in the wildland/urban inter- Prescribed Fire Safety face: Best command practices. Early voices for light burning. Air tanker vortex turbulence— Michael S. Rohde. 64(2): 27–31. Hutch Brown. 64(3): 23–24. Revisited. Donald A. Haines. Forecasting wildland fire behav- Estimating slope for predict- 64(1): 64–65. ior: Aids, guides, and knowl- ing fire behavior. Patricia L. Beyond the safety zone: Creating edge-based protocols. M.E. Andrews. 64(1): 62–63. a margin of safety. Mark Alexander; D.A. Thomas. 64(1): Probability of spot fires during Beighley. 64(1): 78–81. 4–11. prescribed burns. John R. Weir. The consumption strategy: Fuel mapping for the future. 64(2): 24–26. Increasing safety during mopup. C.W. Woodall; G.R. Holden; J.S. The concept of fire environment. Tom Leuschen; Ken Frederick. Vissage. 64(2): 19–21. C.M. Countryman. 64(1): 49–52. 64(1): 88–92. Get the most from your wind- Downbursts and wildland fires: A speed observation. John S. Research/Technology dangerous combination. Donald Crosby; Craig C. Chandler. The concept of fire environment. A. Haines. 64(1): 59–61. 64(1): 53–55. C.M. Countryman. 64(1): 49–52. The fire below: Suppression tac- How IC’s can get maximum Keetch–Byram Drought Index: tics from above. Mike Benefield. use of weather information. Can it help predict wildland 64(4): 37–38. Christopher J. Cuoco; James K. fires? Daniel W. Chan; James T. Firefighter safety zones: How big Barnett. 64(1): 72–77. Paul; Alan Dozier. 64(2): 39–42. is big enough? Bret W. Butler; Keetch–Byram Drought Index: Downbursts and wildland fires: A Jack D. Cohen. 64(1): 82–85. Can it help predict wildland dangerous combination. Donald Forecasting wildland fire behav- fires? Daniel W. Chan; James T. A. Haines. 64(1): 59–61. ior: Aids, guides, and knowl- Paul; Alan Dozier. 64(2): 39–42. Firefighter safety zones: How big edge-based protocols. M.E. Meteorological problems associ- is big enough? Bret W. Butler; Alexander; D.A. Thomas. 64(1): ated with mass fires. DeVer Jack D. Cohen. 64(1): 82–85. 4–11. Colson. 64(1): 34–36. Fires in the wildland/urban inter- LCES—A key to safety in the New interagency fire program face: Best command practices. wildland fire environment. Paul analysis system. S.L. Robertson; Michael S. Rohde. 64(2): 27–31. Gleason. 64(1): 70–71. H. Roose. 64(2): 12–14. Get the most from your wind- Recognizing weather conditions A new tool for fire managers—An speed observation. John S. that affect forest fire behavior. electronic duff moisture meter. Crosby; Craig C. Chandler. Owen P. Cramer. 64(1): 29–33. Peter R. Robichaud; Jim Bilskie. 64(1): 53–55. Safety alert: Watch out for aircraft 64(2): 15–18. Improving a wildland fire situ- turbulence! Billy Bennett. 64(1): Probability of spot fires during ation analysis through GIS. 86–87. prescribed burns. John R. Weir. Matthew Galyardt; Lloyd Queen; A trend analysis of fireline “Watch 64(2): 24–26. Out” Situations in seven fire-

Fire Management Today 40 suppression fatality accidents. Martin E. Alexander. 64(2): 64(2): 32–38. Gene A. Morse. 64(1): 66–69. 54–55. Visualizing the Ten and Developing the fire service work- Weather Eighteen—With humor. Kathy force through mentoring. Joette Atmospheric stability forecast Murphy. 64(2): 4–5. Borzik. 64(4): 48–49. and fire control. Rollo T. Davis. Warning signs for fire fighters. Fire prevention team shows its 64(1): 56–58. A.A. Brown. 64(1): 27–28. worth in Georgia. James T. Paul; Canadian Fire Weather Index Wildland fire investigation stan- Daniel Chan; Alan Dozier. 64(2): System: Training now available dards. Paul T. Steensland. 64(3): 43–47. on CD-ROM. Paul St. John; 36–38. Fundamentals of fire behavior. Martin E. Alexander. 64(2): H.T. Gisborne. 64(1): 15–23. 54–55. Suppression Got clearance? Jon P. Agner. Downbursts and wildland fires: A The fire below: Suppression tac- 64(4): 12. dangerous combination. Donald tics from above. Mike Benefield. LCES—A key to safety in the A. Haines. 64(1): 59–61. 64(4): 37–38. wildland fire environment. Paul Forest fires and sea breezes. G.L. Forecasting wildland fire behav- Gleason. 64(1): 70–71. Hayes. 64(1): 12–14. ior: Aids, guides, and knowl- Visualizing the Ten and Fundamentals of fire behavior. edge-based protocols. M.E. Eighteen—With humor. Kathy H.T. Gisborne. 64(1): 15–23. Alexander; D.A. Thomas. 64(1): Murphy. 64(2): 4–5. Get the most from your wind- 4–11. What is fire? Eleven ways of see- speed observation. John S. Fundamentals of fire behavior. ing fire. Students of Wildland Crosby; Craig C. Chandler. H.T. Gisborne. 64(1): 15–23. Fire Ecology and Management. 64(1): 53–55. A new tool for mopup and other 64(3): 30–31. How IC’s can get maximum fire management tasks. Bill Wildland fire education: Going use of weather information. Gray. 64(4): 46–47. the distance in Alaska. Sandi Christopher J. Cuoco; James K. A trend analysis of fireline “Watch Sturm; Matt Weaver. 64(2): Barnett. 64(1): 72–77. Out” Situations in seven fire- 51–53. Meteorological problems associ- suppression fatality accidents. Wildland fire investigation stan- ated with mass fires. DeVer Gene A. Morse. 64(1): 66–69. dards. Paul T. Steensland. 64(3): Colson. 64(1): 34–36. Vortex turbulence—Its effect on 36–38. Recognizing weather conditions fire behavior. James B. Davis; that affect forest fire behavior. Craig C. Chandler. 64(1): 45–48. United States—East Owen P. Cramer. 64(1): 29–33. The ying and yang of wildland “The air was fire”: Fire behav- Vertical wind currents and fire firefighting. Jeff Connor. 64(3): ior at Peshtigo in 1871. Hutch behavior. John S. Crosby. 64(1): 32–35. Brown. 64(4): 20–30. 24–26. Reports of American Indian fire Warning signs for fire fighters. Texas use in the East. Hutch Brown. A.A. Brown. 64(1): 27–28. NASA honors Texas Forest Service 64(3): 17–22. incident management team. Wildland/Urban Amanda Fazzino. 64(3): 41. United States—West Interface Altered fire cycles in the Northern A changing fire environment: Training/Education Rockies. Stephen W. Barrett. The task ahead. Jerry Williams. Building group cohesion in type 64(3): 25–30. 64(4): 7–11. 2 fire crews. Bill Lee. 64(2): American Indian fire use in the Fires in the wildland/urban inter- 48–50. arid West. Gerald W. Williams. face: Best command practices. Canadian Fire Weather Index 64(3): 10–14. Michael S. Rohde. 64(2): 27–31. System: Training now available Fire regimes in the Northern Got clearance? Jon P. Agner. on CD-ROM. Paul St. John; Rockies. Stephen W. Barrett. 64(4): 12.

Volume 65 • No. 1 • Winter 2005 41 GUIDELINES FOR CONTRIBUTORS Editorial Policy title(s), affiliation(s), and address(es) of the etc.). At the end of the manuscript, include Fire Management Today (FMT) is an inter- author(s), as well as telephone and fax num- clear, thorough figure and photo captions national quarterly magazine for the wildland bers and e-mail information. If the same labeled in the same way as the correspond- fire community. FMT welcomes unsolicited or a similar manuscript is being submitted ing material (figure 1, 2, 3; photograph A, B, manuscripts from readers on any subject elsewhere, include that information also. C; etc.). Captions should make photos and related to fire management. Because space is Authors who are affiliated should submit a illustrations understandable without reading a consideration, long manuscripts might be camera-ready logo for their agency, institu- the text. For photos, indicate the name and abridged by the editor, subject to approval by tion, or organization. affiliation of the photographer and the year the author; FMT does print short pieces of the photo was taken. interest to readers. Style. Authors are responsible for using wildland fire terminology that conforms Electronic Files. See special mailing Submission Guidelines to the latest standards set by the National instructions above. Please label all disks Submit manuscripts to the general manager Wildfire Coordinating Group under the carefully with name(s) of file(s) and at: National Interagency Incident Management system(s) used. If the manuscript is word- System. FMT uses the spelling, capitaliza- processed, please submit a 3-1/2 inch, IBM- USDA Forest Service tion, hyphenation, and other styles recom- compatible disk together with the paper Attn: Melissa Frey, F&AM Staff mended in the United States Government copy (see above) as an electronic file in one Mail Stop 1107 Printing Office Style Manual, as required by of these formats: WordPerfect 5.1 for DOS; 1400 Independence Avenue, SW the U.S. Department of Agriculture. Authors WordPerfect 7.0 or earlier for Windows 95; Washington, DC 20250-1107 should use the U.S. system of weight and Microsoft Word 6.0 or earlier for Windows tel. 202-205-0891, fax 202-205-1272 measure, with equivalent values in the met- 95; Rich Text format; or ASCII. Digital pho- e-mail: [email protected] ric system. Try to keep titles concise and tos may be submitted but must be at least descriptive; subheadings and bulleted mate- 300 dpi and accompanied by a high-resolu- Mailing Disks. Do not mail disks with elec- rial are useful and help readability. As a gen- tion (preferably laser) printout for edito- tronic files to the above address, because eral rule of clear writing, use the active voice rial review and quality control during the mail will be irradiated and the disks could be (e.g., write, “Fire managers know…” and printing process. Do not embed illustrations rendered inoperable. Send electronic files by not, “It is known…”). Provide spellouts for (such as maps, charts, and graphs) in the e-mail or by courier service to the managing all abbreviations. Consult recent issues (on electronic file for the manuscript. Instead, editor at: the World Wide Web at ) for placement separate file using a standard interchange USDA Forest Service of the author’s name, title, agency affiliation, format such as EPS, TIFF, or JPEG, accom- Attn: Hutch Brown, Office of the Chief and location, as well as for style of paragraph panied by a high-resolution (preferably laser) Yates 4th Floor Northwest headings and references. printout. For charts and graphs, include the 201 14th Street, SW data needed to reconstruct them. Washington, DC 20024 Tables. Tables should be logical and under- tel. 202-205-0878, fax 202-205-1765 standable without reading the text. Include Release Authorization. Non-Federal e-mail: [email protected] tables at the end of the manuscript. Government authors must sign a release to allow their work to be in the public domain If you have questions about a submission, Photos and Illustrations. Figures, illustra- and on the World Wide Web. In addition, all please contact the managing editor, Hutch tions, overhead transparencies (originals are photos and illustrations require a written Brown. preferable), and clear photographs (color release by the photographer or illustrator. slides or glossy color prints are preferable) The author, photo, and illustration release Paper Copy. Type or word-process the are often essential to the understanding of forms are available from General Manager manuscript on white paper (double-spaced) articles. Clearly label all photos and illustra- April Baily. on one side. Include the complete name(s), tions (figure 1, 2, 3, etc.; photograph A, B, C,

CONTRIBUTORS WANTED Fire Management Today was established in 1936 to give you a chance to share anything in your “thinking or work [that] would be interesting and helpful to others.” Subjects include:

Aviation Fire science Preparedness Communication Fire use (including prescribed fire) Prevention/education Cooperation Fuels management Safety Ecosystem management Firefighting experiences Suppression Equipment/technology Incident management Training Fire behavior Information management (including sys- Weather Fire ecology tems) Wildland/urban interface Fire effects Personnel Fire history Planning (including budgeting) No matter how long or short, you can give something back to the wildland fire community. To help prepare your submission, see “Guidelines for Contributors” in this issue.

Fire Management Today 42 PHOTO CONTEST ANNOUNCEMENT

Fire Management Today (FMT) invites Rules name, professional affiliation, town, you to submit your best fire-related • The contest is open to everyone. You state, year image captured. images to be judged in our annual com- may submit an unlimited number of • A panel of judges with photography petition. Judging begins after the first entries taken at any time. No photos and publishing experience determines Friday in March of each year. judged in previous FMT contests may the winners. Its decision is final. be entered. • We will eliminate photos from com- AWARDS • You must have the right to grant the petition if they are obtained by illegal All contestants will receive a CD with Forest Service unlimited use of the or unauthorized access to restricted the images and captions (as submitted) image, and you must agree that the areas; lack detailed captions; have date remaining after technical and safety image will go into the public domain. stamps; show unsafe firefighting prac- reviews. Winning images will appear Moreover, the image must not have tices (unless that is their express pur- in a future issue of Fire Management been previously published. pose); or are of low technical quality Today and will be publicly displayed at • We prefer original slides or negatives; (for example, have soft focus or show the Forest Service’s national office in however, we will accept duplicate camera movement). Washington, DC. slides or high-quality prints (for exam- • You must complete and sign the ple, those with good focus, contrast release statement granting the USDA Winners in each category will receive: level, and depth of field). Note: We Forest Service rights to use your • 1st place—Camera equipment worth will not return your slides, negatives, image(s). Mail your completed release $300 and a 20- by 24-inch framed or prints. with your entry or fax it to 970-295- copy of your image. • We will also accept digital images if 5815 at the same time you e-mail your • 2nd place—A 16- by 20-inch framed the image was shot at the highest digital-image files. copy of your image. resolution using a camera with at • 3rd place—An 11- by 14-inch framed least 2.5 megapixels or if the image Mail entries to: copy of your image. was scanned at 300 lines per inch or USDA Forest Service • Honorable Mention—An 8- by 10-inch equivalent with a minimum output Fire Management Today Photo Contest framed copy of your image. size of 5 × 7. Digital-image files should Madelyn Dillon be TIFFs or highest quality JPGs. 2150 Centre Avenue Categories • You must indicate only one Building A, Suite 361 • Wildland fire competition category per image. To Fort Collins, CO 80526 • Prescribed fire ensure fair evaluation, we reserve or • Wildland/urban interface fire the right to change the competition e-mail images and captions to: • Aerial resources category for your image. [email protected] and • Ground resources • You must provide a detailed caption fax signed release form to • Miscellaneous (fire effects; fire weath- for each image. For example: 970-295-5815 (attn: Madelyn Dillon) er; fire-dependent communities or A Sikorsky S–64 Skycrane delivers species; etc.) retardant on the 1996 Clark Peak Fire, Postmark Deadline Coronado National Forest, AZ. Photo: First Friday in March

SAMPLE PHOTO RELEASE STATEMENT

Enclosed is/are ______(number) image(s) for publication by the USDA Forest Service. For each image submitted, the contest category is indicated and a detailed caption is enclosed. I have the authority to give permission to the Forest Service to publish the enclosed image(s) and am aware that, if used, it/they will be in the public domain and appear on the World Wide Web.

Contact information:

Name ______

Institutional affiliation, if any ______

Home or business address ______

______

Telephone number ______E-mail address ______

Volume 65 • No. 1 • Winter 2005 43