Etymology and Meaning of Προαίρεσις in Aristotle's Ethics

Etymology and Meaning of προαίρεσις in Aristotle‘s Ethics

Maciej Smolak abstract Institute of Philosophy Abstract: In NE III.2 1112a13 Aristotle Department of Ethics raises the following question: “What Jagiellonian University is προαίρεσις?”. But προαίρεσις has Grodzka 52 different meanings and it is practically 33 332 Cracow untranslatable into modern languages, Poland as are most crucial terms of classical [email protected] Greek. In this article, the author attempts to explain what προαίρεσις is for Aristotle. The author first presents the etymology of the term προαίρεσις based upon Aristotle’s remarks in his ethical treatises and shows that the term does not reflect what προαίρεσις is for him. Second, the author outlines characteristics of the uncontrolled person and indicates, on this ground, what Aristotle’s προαίρεσις is not. Finally, the author points out that προαίρεσις in the full sense involves two elements – the orectical-deliberative element and the decisional-functional element – and sketches out their features.

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Introduction Greek2. However, it does not mean that In NE III.2 1112a13 Aristotle raises προαίρεσις cannot be understood. Thus, the following question: “What is an attempt at interpreting Aristotle’s προαίρεσις?”, whereas in EE II.10 προαίρεσις is not a completely hopeless 1225b19-20, he notes that one might task. Nonetheless, one must be careful be in doubt about the genus to which not to be tempted to replace προαίρεσις προαίρεσις belongs. But contemporary with one word or to narrow its many commentators have bigger doubts as to what προαίρεσις is. For this term has 2 It should be noted that the main Greek 1 terms are in principle untranslatable into several meanings and it is practically modern languages: ἀρετή, εὐδαιμονία, untranslatable into modern languages, ψυχή or just προαίρεσις are examples of as are most crucial terms of classical such terms. This is due to the fact that they occur in a different and temporally distant cultural reality. The practice 1 The term προαίρεσις occurs in different contexts and may mean, for example, of using a one-word equivalent for the “choice”, “decision”, “purpose”, “under- Greek notion is essentially an obstacle to taking”. On the notion of προαίρεσις becoming acquainted with semantic var- and the number of appearances of it in iability of it in different contexts. Thus, Greek writing or language, see Gauthier some commentators think that basic and Jolif (in Aristotle (1959), pp. 189-190). Greek terms should be left in transliter- See also Formichelli (2009), pp. 21-32 who ation or in Greek font and they ought to additionally presents the occurrence of be treated as tool words with different προαίρεσις in the Aristotelian Corpus. meanings, see e.g., Adkins (1972), p. 4.

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meanings down to only one3. That is why προαίρεσις of ἀκρατής is decent, it will I will not translate this term throughout be a problem to distinguish between the the paper and leave it in the original character of the uncontrolled person and version4. the character of the decent person or the This article consists of three sec- serious one. Therefore, I outline features tions. In the first section, I present the of the uncontrolled person, especially, etymology of the term προαίρεσις based of the melancholic and weak one. Next, upon Aristotle’s remarks in his ethical I consider an example of an uncontrolled treatises and show that etymological behavior that can be useful for under- comments do not reflect whatπροαίρεσις standing προαίρεσις. I try to indicate, is for Aristotle himself. on that basis, what Aristotle’s προαίρεσις In the second section, I refer to the is not. I put forward a suggestion that passage NE VII.10 1152a15-24 in which προαίρεσις in the full sense, accord- Aristotle claims, among others things, ing to Aristotle, is none of the things that ἀκρατής or the uncontrolled per- included in a list of features, nor their son has a decent προαίρεσις. This raises arrangement. Hence, προαίρεσις can- a question, because he insists in another not be reduced to any of these features: place that προαίρεσις verifies human char- setting a goal nor to thoughtful under- acters better than actions (III.2 1111b6)5. taking nor to preferential choice, i.e., Thus, there is the following puzzle: If choice of one course of action rather than another, nor to deciding about proceed- 3 See e.g., Nielsen (2011), p. 385, note 6) ing with the realization of a thoughtful who suggests that προαίρεσις is a tricky term. undertaking or a preferentially chosen 4 Commentators differently translate the course of action nor to deciding about term προαίρεσις used by Aristotle in proceeding with what is chronologically Ethics. See e.g., Aquinas, Thomas (in Ar- istoteles (1949)) – electio; Irwin (in Aris- first in the sequence of steps which lead totle (1985)) – decision; Crisp (in Aristotle to reaching the set goal. At all events, (2000)) – rational choice; Dirlmeier (in Ar- προαίρεσις ought to be something more istoteles (1962)) – Entscheidung; Gauth- ier i Jolif (in Aristote (1958)) – décision; than the configuration of them, that is, if Gromska (in Arystoteles (1956)) – pos- προαίρεσις is to be understood as a better tanowienie (in English – resolution); Ken- ny (1979) – purposive choice or choice; Os- verifier of human characters than actions. twald (in Aristotle (1962)) – choice, but see In the third section, I attempt to also Glossary – choice, or moral choice; demonstrate that προαίρεσις, as inter- Sorabji (1980) – deliberative choice; Tricot (in Aristote (1959)) – choix préférentiel; preted by Aristotle, consists of two Wróblewski (in Arystoteles (1977)) – pos- elements – the orectical-deliberative tanowienie, czyli świadomy wybór (in element and the decisional-functional English – resolution, that is, conscious choice); Zanatta (in Aristoteles (2012)) – element – and I try to sketch out their scelta deliberata. features. 5 Cf. EE II.11 1228a2-3 and 1228a11; but see also 1228a15-17: “Furthermore, it is because it is not easy to discern what to verify from the deeds what sort of per- sort of προαίρεσις it is that we are forced son someone is”.

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I. The etymology of the doing what is chronologically first in the term προαίρεσις in Aristotle’s deliberated sequence of steps which lead Ethics to achieving the set goal9 – temporal as The term προαίρεσις consists of an “first in action”. adverb πρό (before) and a noun αἵρεσις However, it must be added that there (choosing or taking, seizing, grasp- is another understanding of the adverb ing with the hand). Literally, it means πρό. It is underlined by Nielsen ([2011]: “choosing one thing before another” or 408) that the preferential and temporal “taking one thing before another”. The understanding are not exhaustive. The adverb πρό, however, can be understood adverb πρό can emphasize that the agent preferentially or temporally6. picks out the act for the sake of a specific The first interpretation would sug- goal and takes the position in front of gest that προαίρεσις is a preferential it with the purpose to defend it10. Thus, choice, i.e. a choice of one thing in πρό in προαίρεσις can also accentuate preference to another or a choice of one the idea that the agent is about to pro- course of action in preference to an- tect a certain goal in order to achieve other7. Thus, προαίρεσις would require it11. What, however, does Aristotle him- a comparison of alternatives. self say about the etymology of the term In the case of the second interpreta- προαίρεσις? tion the point can be understood in two In EE II.10 1226b2-8 – after empha- ways: a] the adverb πρό can underline sizing προαίρεσις is neither belief (δόξα) the point that προαίρεσις is made on nor wanting (βούλησις)12 – Aristotle the basis of deliberation that is prior to 9 The partisan of the second temporal action8 – temporal as “before the action”; understanding of the adverb πρό is e.g., b] the adverb πρό can stresses the point Joachim (1955), pp. 100-101. that προαίρεσις means to decide about 10 “This is a use of ‘pro’ that is evident in expression such as ‘stēnai pro Trōōn’: 6 See e.g., Brown (in Aristotle (2009), p. 220) standing in front of, and hence in defense who maintains that the adverb πρό – in of, the Trojans. Latin uses ‘pro’ in a sim- προαίρεσις – means both “before” and ilar sense in expressions such as ‘pro “in preference to”. However, she suggests bono’ (an abbreviation of ‘pro bono pu- that the first meaning emphasizes what blico’, for the common good)”, Nielsen happened before the action. She says (2011), p. 408, note 39. See also Bostock that “choice is of one course of action (2000), p. 39, note 21 who insists that rather than another, but it also […] is what “‘choice-for-the-sake-of’, i.e., a choice has been decided by an earlier delibera- made with some definite end in view” fits tion (i.e. before the action)”. to Aristotle’s account of προαίρεσις. 7 The partisan of preferential understand- 11 Nielsen (ibidem), p. 408 thinks that ing of the adverb πρό is, e.g., Aquinas, Aristotle wants us to hear all three senses Thomas (1949), p. 128. of the adverb πρό in προαίρεσις. 8 The partisan of the first temporal under- 12 A few lines earlier Aristotle excludes standing of the adverb πρό is e.g., Irwin the possibility that προαίρεσις could (1999) who points out in his comment to mean appetite (ἐπιθυμία) or spirited- NE III.2 1112a15-17 that “what is decided is ness (θυμός), because both types of what has been previously deliberated (to desire are typical for animals, whereas probebouleumenon)”. προαίρεσις does not occur in animals (EE

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comes to the conclusion that προαίρεσις Aristotle poses the question whether is the result of the combination of both the object of προαίρεσις is what has these things. For they are present dur- been obtained by prior deliberation ing realization of προαίρεσις. And he (τὸ προβεβουλευμένον;; a15). The ques- underlines that it is also shown, if only tion seems rhetorical, as Aristotle adds to a certain extent (δηλοῖ δέ πως; b6), in “προαίρεσις is connected with calcula- the name itself for “προαίρεσις is choos- tion and thought – and even the name ing/taking; not simply, but one thing appears to signify that the object of before another, and this is not possible προαίρεσις is in fact choosing/taking without examination and deliberation. before another”15. Therefore,προαίρεσις is the outcome of In MM16 I.17 – after underscoring that deliberative belief”13. προαίρεσις is not the same as βούλησις In NE III.2 1112a13-17 – after un- (1189a12-13)17 – the Author states that derlining that προαίρεσις is not one προαίρεσις is as its name suggests: of the things discussed before, i.e. “Therefore, whenever wetake the better in ἐπιθυμία, θυμός, βούλησις, δόξα14 – exchange for the worse – when it is a matter of choice – the term ‘τὸ προαιρεῖσθαι’ II.10 1225b26-27). Indeed, προαίρεσις is 18 a distinct feature of human beings. And would seem to be correctly used” . probably for this reason too, Aristotle thinks that προαίρεσις can be a human true or false (see EE II.10 1225b26-1226b2 trait on the basis of which people’s char- and NE III.2 1111b12-1112a11). acters are better fixed. 15 ἡ γὰρ προαίρεσις μετὰ λόγου καὶ διανοίας. 13 ἡ γὰρ προαίρεσις αἵρεσις μὲν ἐστίν, οὐχ ὑποσημαίνειν δ’ ἔοικε καὶ τοὔνομα ὡς ὂν ἁπλῶς δέ, ἀλλ’ ἑτέρου πρὸ ἑτέρου· πρὸ ἑτέρων αἱρετόν; NE III.2, 1112a15-17. τοῦτο δὲ οὐχ οἷόν τε ἄνευ σκέψεως καὶ 16 There are disputes as to the authentici- βουλῆς. διὸ ἐκ δόξης βουλευτικῆς ἐστιν ἡ ty of the MM. Some commentators argue προαίρεσις; EE II.10 1226b6-9. that MM is the work of Aristotle (see e.g. 14 In both Ethics Aristotle indicates certain Schleiermacher (1835), Düring (1966)). features of προαίρεσις based on the out- Others claim it is not (see e.g. Jaeger lined distinctions between προαίρεσις and (1923), Kenny (1978). Bobonich (2006) re- four other phenomena of ψυχή, namely marks that some ethical analyses in MM appetite (ἐπιθυμία), spiritedness (θυμός), differ from analogical analyses in EE and wanting (βούλησις) and belief (δόξα). By NE. And this is – in my opinion – the case juxtaposing προαίρεσις with ἐπιθυμία with etymology of προαίρεσις. For in MM the explanation is founded on the and θυμός, he concludes that προαίρεσις preposition ἀντί, while in EE and NE it is concerns the “good” or “bad”, whereas founded on the adverb πρό (see, howev- ἐπιθυμία and θυμός concern the “plea- er, note. 19). sure” or “pain”. Against the background of the distinction between προαίρεσις and 17 A few lines earlier the author of MM βούλησις, he shows that προαίρεσις has declares that προαίρεσις is not desire only to deal with things that depend on (ὄρεξις) by referring to an argument, us and are doable, whereas βούλησις may which is analogical to the argument in EE also refer to things that do not depend (see note 12). But there is a difference, for on us and are not doable. In turn, when in EE II.10 1225b25-26 ὄρεξις is the general it comes to the discrepancy between term for three types of desires, i.e., appe- προαίρεσις and δόξα, he argues that tite, spiritedness and wanting, while in προαίρεσις is classified on the basis of MM ὄρεξις refers rather to the first two. whether it is good or bad, whereas δόξα 18 ὅταν οὖν ἀντικαταλλαττώμεθα τὸ βέλ- is classified on the basis of whether it is τιον ἀντὶ τοῦ χείρονος ἐν αἱρέσει ὄντος,

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Etymological notes do not exclude goal. It is true that he permits situations preferential nor temporal meanings of in which a given goal can be achieved the adverb πρό19. But Aristotle clearly in many ways. Then, in such circum- emphasizes that προαίρεσις remains stances, the task of deliberation is, in close relation with calculation and first of all, to find the easiest and finest thought20. So, there are reasons to way to do so (1112b17). In this sense, assume that the adverb πρό refers pri- προαίρεσις could take the form of a pref- marily, in the case of προαίρεσις, to de- erential choice and to be a choice of one liberation (βούλευσις), that is, to prac- of several alternatives that have been tical thought which precedes an action previously considered. But it does not that ought to lead to achievement of a set follow that it must be so and thus, that goal. Indeed, the deliberation consists a preferential choice is the constitutive in discovering and developing a reliable component of προαίρεσις. There are way to the realization of the established also situations in which the established goal. However, it does not follow that goal can be achieved through only one προαίρεσις involves the consideration means. In such circumstances, the task of alternatives and choosing only one of deliberation is to consider how it will of them. come about through this means and In NE III.3, where Aristotle stud- how this one can be obtained (b17-18). ies deliberation, it is shown that it is Thus, προαίρεσις does not have to take a search which relies on finding the the form of a preferential choice. It does means needed to achieve the designated not have to be “choice of one thing in preference to another or of one course ἐνταῦθα τὸ προαιρεῖσθαι δόξειεν ἂν οἰκεῖον εἶναι; MM I.17 1189a14-17. of action in preference to another”. What 19 In MM the adverb πρό appears in I.17 is required for προαίρεσις is to perform 1189a34, where the author points out some sort of intellectual work, that is to an inseparable connection between προαίρεσις and thought: “If, then, make an investigation combined with προαίρεσις is certain desire, [that is] analysis (ζητεῖν καὶ ἀναλύειν; b20) and determined by deliberation, [that is] finally to discover εὑρεῖν( ; b19) the way acompanied with thought (Εἰ τοίνυν ἡ προαίρεσις ὄρεξίς τις βουλευτικὴ μετὰ that guarantees the accomplishment of διανοίας), the ‘voluntary’ cannot be iden- designated goal. But it is necessary to tical with ‘προαιρετόν’. For we do many things voluntarily before thinking and add that the process of seeking may be deliberating about them (ἑκόντες γὰρ successfully completed, when such a way πολλὰ πράττομεν πρὸ τοῦ διανοηθῆναι is possible at all and the discovered way καὶ βουλεύσασθαι) – for instance, we sit down and stand up, and do many other is possible for the person who was look- things like that voluntarily but without ing for it. having thought about them – whereas each action taken in accordance with Thus, the preferential interpretation προαίρεσις is in connection with thought” of the adverb πρό can be misleading. (1189a32-1189b1). For προαίρεσις does not have to include 20 On the matter of close relation between προαίρεσις and deliberation in MM, see the choice of one thing in preference note 19. to another. In this sense, the temporal

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interpretation of the adverb πρό is more reflect what it is for him. Admittedly, the promising, because πρό can stress that Greek term does not reflect the relation a thoughtful undertaking has come into between deliberation and desire in real- play in προαίρεσις and therefore, it could ized προαίρεσις. Furthermore, it does simply be taking on something after not indicate the connection between prior deliberation. However, it may well προαίρεσις and action. suggest that it is about taking on some- Let’s repeat again, Aristotle under- thing that was indicated by deliberation lines the point that προαίρεσις means as chronologically first in the sequence desire qualified by deliberation of steps which lead to the achievement (βουλευτικὴ ὄρεξις; 1113a11). This could of the goal laid down. suggest that προαίρεσις signifies desire The temporal interpretation of the which has gained an imprimatur of rea- adverb πρό seems to be confirmed by son23. Hence, it becomes a real desire the summary note of III.3. Aristotle to achieve a goal in accordance with an underlines that προαίρεσις is desire, algorithm elaborated in the framework determined by deliberation, for some- of deliberation. After all, wanting a goal thing that is up to us21. The statement is equivalent to wanting reliable means draws attention to the connection of to achieve it, but only those that are in προαίρεσις, βούλευσις and ὄρεξις, and our power. it is also important because of this con- I think, however, that Aristotle is nection. However, it does not follow that interested in something more. I will it is impossible to maintain the prefer- try to demonstrate that Aristotle’s ential interpretation of the adverb πρό. προαίρεσις consists of: a] setting the Rather, the point is that the application goal; b] thoughtful undertaking or of the adverb πρό is not limited to its preferential choice, where both assume preferential understanding. Thus, given deliberation about how to achieve the situations in which various alternatives designated goal but second requires of action must be considered, it may be suggested that in some contexts the pref- 23 See e.g., Charles (2011), p 204 who sug- erential understanding of the adverb gests that προαίρεσις (‘preferential choice’ in his translation) is not “a com- πρό is not wrong. bination of intellect and desire but rath- However, it must be added that er a distinctive type of state: intellectual desire or desiderative intellect”. It Aristotle introduces his etymological could be added that in EE II.10 1225b20 remarks using phrases22 that seem to Aristotle raises the following question: suggest that the explanation of the ori- “Where to locate προαίρεσις?” and he does not answer this question. In NE he gin of the term προαίρεσις does not fully does not even pose a similar question. Perhaps this is because προαίρεσις ful- fills the function of the link which merges 21 ἡ προαίρεσις ἂν εἴη βουλευτικὴ ὄρεξις the rational and irrational dimension of ; τῶν ἐφ’ ἡμῖν EN III.3 1113a10-11. ψυχή into a harmonious whole. Thus, it 22 See δηλοῖ δέ πως; EE II.10 1226b6; ἔοικε is difficult to formulate an unambiguous [...] ὡς; NE III.2 1112a16-17; δόξειεν ἂν; MM answer to the question “Where to locate I.17 1189a17. προαίρεσις?”.

INTERNATIONAL ISSUE NO. 5/2018 Maciej Smolak 85 Etymology and Meaning of προαίρεσις in Aristotle‘s Ethics deliberation on alternative courses of both what they are doing and for the action; c] making the decision about sake of what they are doing it – they are proceeding with a thoughtful under- not wicked; their προαίρεσις is decent. taking or preferentially chosen course of As a consequence, they are only half- action; d) proceeding with the realiza- wicked. They are not unjust either, since tion of the determined course of action, they do not draw up an action plan of that is, taking on what has been deter- their bad deeds. One type of the uncon- mined by deliberation as chronologically trolled person is not apt to abide by first in the sequence of steps that lead the results of their deliberation, while to the achievement of the designated another, the melancholic type is not goal; e] continuation of action that leads even apt to deliberate at all. So, the un- to the achievement of that goal. Thus, controlled person is like a city-state that Aristotle’s προαίρεσις in the full sense passes all the indispensable decrees and ought to contain these five moments has serious laws, but it makes no use of or features. This claim can be shown them”25. through the study of προαίρεσις in the case of the uncontrolled person. Aristotle points to general features of the uncontrolled person. They act II. The uncontrolled voluntarily, because they are aware of person and προαίρεσις what they are doing and in a way for In NE VII.7 1150b19-28 Aristotle shows what goal. Thus, they are responsible two basic kinds of uncontrolled per- for their acts. Furthermore, they do bad son: the impetuous uncontrolled per- things. But they are not unjust, even son (προπετής ἀκρατής) and the weak though they do unjust things. For they one (ἀσθενής ἀκρατής). He addition- lack vicious dispositions or acquired ally distinguishes within the first type states of being able to act unjustly26. the melancholic uncontrolled person So, if they act unjustly, they will not (μελαγχολικός ἀκρατής) and the swift do it deliberately. Indeed, they are not one (ὀξύς ἀκρατής)24. When it comes to plotters27. He also maintains that they Aristotle’s interpretation of προαίρεσις, are not wicked, but only half-wicked it is NE VII.10 1152a15-20 that deserves 25 οὐδὲ δὴ ὡς ὁ εἰδὼς καὶ θεωρῶν, ἀλλ’ ὡς attention: ὁ καθεύδων ἢ οἰνωμένος. καὶ ἑκὼν μέν (τρόπον γάρ τινα εἰδὼς καὶ ὃ ποιεῖ καὶ οὗ “So the uncontrolled person is not like ἕνεκα), πονηρὸς δ’ οὔ· ἡ γὰρ προαίρεσις ἐπιεικής· ὥσθ’ ἡμιπόνηρος. καὶ οὐκ ἄδικος· those who know and have regard for οὐ γὰρ ἐπίβουλος· ὃ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν οὐκ their knowledge, but like those who ἐμμενετικὸς οἷς ἂν βουλεύσηται, ὃ δὲ μελαγχολικὸς οὐδὲ βουλευτικὸς ὅλως. are asleep or drunk. Although they act καὶ ἔοικε δὴ ὁ ἀκρατὴς πόλει ἣ ψηφίζεται voluntarily – for they know in a way μὲν ἅπαντα τὰ δέοντα καὶ νόμους ἔχει σπουδαίους, χρῆται δὲ οὐδέν; NE VII.10 1152a14-21. 24 On the matter of typology of uncontrolled persons, see e.g. Charles (2011), 26 See e.g., NE V.8 1135b24 or VII.8 1151a10-11. pp. 187-209. 27 See e.g., NE V.8 1135b20.

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(ἡμιπόνηρος; a18). We can surmise why drunk when they are doing something. they are wicked from the expression Thus, they surrender to desires of irra- “half-wicked” – their actions are bad. tional psuchē and do not follow their But why are they only half-wicked? Are selves as rational beings. As a result of they only half-wicked, because they the lack of self-control, they listen to lack vicious dispositions or acquired another aspect of themselves which does states of being able to do bad things? not fulfill, however, the function of an Possibly, but Aristotle insists that their authoritative element in the structure of προαίρεσις is decent (ἐπιεικής). a human being. Nonetheless, Aristotle In this passage προαίρεσις is, at first speaks about two different types of the glance, a general goal. That is what the uncontrolled person and the difference analogy with a state’s laws refers to. between them that can throw light on For the uncontrolled person possesses our understanding of προαίρεσις. knowledge about things they ought to The lack of self-control ἀκρασία( ) is never do in their life28. In other words, brought on by excessive desire in the it seems that in this context Aristotle case of the melancholic uncontrolled understands προαίρεσις either as a gen- person. And for this reason, they do eral policy in life reflecting the person’s not deliberate at all. In consequence, understanding of eudaimonia or as a goal they do not deliberate before acting. that leads us in pursuit of eudaimonia. Thus, it is not possible to observe dis- After all, the uncontrolled person is like sonance between the elaborated action a city-state that has serious laws, but plan and the actual course of action in makes use of none of them. Indeed, they their case. In fact, they do not take any possess knowledge – the equivalent of action plan because of their impulsive- serious laws – but they do not use it. ness. That is why they act on the spur of For they are like being in a dream or the moment29. Thus, in the matter of the melancholic uncontrolled person, when 28 See e.g., NE IX.8 where Aristotle studies an aporia as to whether one ought to love Aristotle says that the lack of self-control oneself or someone else more (πότερον is contrary to one’s προαίρεσις he prob- δεῖ φιλεῖν ἑαυτὸν μάλιστα ἢ ἄλλον τινά; ably has in mind προαίρεσις as a gen- 1168a28-29.). He shows that people criticize those who love themselves most and con- eral goal. And since προαίρεσις of every demn them as “self-lover” in general (a29-30). uncontrolled person is decent, we can And he stresses that they also accuse them of doing nothing apart from what concerns their assume that a general policy of life will own good (a31-33). So, those who make a val- ue judgement in saying this, must possess knowledge that selfishness is a bad thing. But at the same time he underlines that such peo- 29 It should be noted that the swift uncon- ple or most of them do not use that knowl- trolled person is also guided by emotion edge and satisfy their appetites or non-ratio- (see e.g. NE VII.7 1150b21-22). But they are nal aspect of their psuchē at the expense different from the melancholic uncon- of others (1168b15-22). And it ought to be trolled person for they deliberate to some added that they satisfy their non-rational extent, though, as a result of an impet- aspect of their psuchē at their own ex- uous desire, they are unable to complete pense as rational beings. it. See e.g., Charles (2011), p. 194.

INTERNATIONAL ISSUE NO. 5/2018 Maciej Smolak 87 Etymology and Meaning of προαίρεσις in Aristotle‘s Ethics be decent in the case of the melancholic practical, though they finish their delib- uncontrolled person. eration and reach the good result from The lack of self-control of the weak the point of view of some goal held fixed uncontrolled person is brought on by in mind. In other words, they do not weak desires. But they are able to delib- realize what they have planned because erate (βουλευτικός). In fact, they can of their unstable character, that is to deliberate before taking action that say, on account of their vulnerability ought to lead to realization of the des- to be affected by non-insistent πάθη. ignated goal. And they are capable of There are discrepancies between their deliberating by using a “moving back” action plan and what they actually do. strategy. They can begin the calculation Thus, the weak uncontrolled person is from the desired situation and finish it not so bad as to reach the level of inter- after they get to the initial situation. nal integrity that would confirm that Thus, they commence with the goal and they focus their life on an evil goal and move backwards through means, until strive for it deliberately32. And when they arrive at the first cause, which is Aristotle says that the lack of self-control the last in the process of discovery. As is contrary to one’s προαίρεσις he must a result, they discover the sequence of have something more in mind about steps that they are to follow, where the προαίρεσις than it was in the case of the last is the first one to take. Indeed, those melancholic uncontrolled person. Since who deliberate ought to investigate and the weak uncontrolled person deliber- to analyze as with a geometrical figure30. ates before taking action and reaches Nevertheless, they do not stand by what the conclusion, their προαίρεσις will they have deliberated as a result of their include a thoughtful undertaking or susceptibility to relatively weak affective reactions (πάθη)31. Thus, they fail to be καὶ οὐκ ἀπροβούλευτοι ὥσπερ ἅτεροι· ὅμοιος γὰρ ὁ ἀκρατής ἐστι τοῖς ταχὺ μεθυσκομένοις καὶ ὑπ’ ὀλίγου οἴνου καὶ 30 “For the person who deliberates seems ἐλάττονος ἢ ὡς οἱ πολλοί). It is clear, that to investigate and to analyze [...], as he Aristotle has in mind the weak uncon- would in the case of a geometrical figure” trolled person when he declares that the (ὁ γὰρ βουλευόμενος ἔοικε ζητεῖν καὶ latter are overcome by less pathē than ἀναλύειν τὸν εἰρημένον τρόπον ὥσπερ most people. ; διάγραμμα NE III.3 1112b20-21). 32 For Aristotle, a truly bad person has a cor- 31 See e.g., NE VII.8 1151a1-5: “Among uncon- rupt character (κακός, πονηρός). They trolled people those who are excitable are characterized by an inner harmony are better than those who have [action] between rational and sensorical-orectical plan but do not stand by it. For the lat- functions of ψυχή. A sign of this harmo- ter are overcome by less affective reac- ny is a combination of character defects tion and, unlike former, are not without (ἠθικαί κακιαί), i.e. competences of ψυχή prior deliberation. For the [latter] uncon- in sensorical-orectical function, and cun- trolled person is like those who are ning (πανουργία), i.e., competence of rea- quickly drunk and after little wine, that son in practical function. In fact, persons is, after less than most people” (αὐτῶν with a corrupt character are the master δὲ τούτων βελτίους οἱ ἐκστατικοὶ ἢ οἱ of evil, because they take actions based τὸν λόγον ἔχοντες μέν, μὴ ἐμμένοντες on προαίρεσις and for themselves (see δέ· ὑπ’ ἐλάττονος γὰρ πάθους ἡττῶνται, e.g., NE VII.7 1150a20).

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a preferential choice, depending on the proceeding with the realization of the situation. And since προαίρεσις of every determined course of action, that is, uncontrolled person is decent, we can taking on what has been determined assume that both a general policy of life by deliberation as chronologically first and a thoughtful undertaking or prefer- in the sequence of steps that lead to ential choice will be decent in the case of the achievement of the designated goal the weak uncontrolled person. within the framework of the action plan As a consequence, προαίρεσις of developed. To show it, I will consider the melancholic uncontrolled person a certain example of behavior of the differs from προαίρεσις of the weak uncontrolled person. uncontrolled person, although both We can imagine the uncontrolled are decent: προαίρεσις of the first will person who realizes that they have an be limited to the setting of some goal obesity problem. And we can assume (which is not bad); προαίρεσις of the sec- that they deliberate before acting and ond is something more, because delib- consider possible action plans that eration is always a search for the means would help them lose weight. For exam- in light of having set down the goal. And ple, they take into account eating less since they conclude their deliberation, sweets or jogging regularly, or following they will end it with a thoughtful under- a slimming diet combined with physical taking or preferential choice. activity33. Major characteristics of the weak Let us assume that our uncontrolled uncontrolled person allow to assume person comes to the conclusion, as that προαίρεσις is the combination of a result of their own deliberation, that setting some goal and result of delib- the last possibility is the most prom- eration about how to achieve it. How- ising. They are going to change their ever, the deliberation is ended when it is eating habits and start exercising reg- completed by a thoughtful undertaking ularly. However, they know little about or preferential choice. Consequently, diets and slimming exercises. So, they we could assume that προαίρεσις of the plan to seek advice of a dietitian and to weak uncontrolled person includes such consult with a personal trainer. Thus, an undertaking or choice. they make the preferential choice of one But it can be shown, against the background of the uncontrolled per- 33 Thus, there will be a preferential choice son’s behavior, that could only apply to in the proposed example. However, it is already known that a preferential the weak one, that Aristotle’s προαίρεσις choice does not have to be an element of is not limited to a thoughtful undertak- προαίρεσις. Of course, the example could ing or preferential choice. I am going be modified, because we could assume that our uncontrolled person considers to show that προαίρεσις of the uncon- only one way to lose weight – for exam- trolled person could include making ple, a slimming diet combined with physical activity – and ends the deliberation the decision about proceeding with the with the thoughtful undertaking and not realization of an action plan or even with the preferential choice.

INTERNATIONAL ISSUE NO. 5/2018 Maciej Smolak 89 Etymology and Meaning of προαίρεσις in Aristotle‘s Ethics course of action and decide to start the not surprising, since the uncontrolled weight loss process from what is chron- person goes against προαίρεσις (see e.g., ologically first in the sequence of steps NE VII.8 1151a7). that will lead to the achievement of the However, what type of uncontrolled goal. In consequence, they try to register person is in our example? No doubt, it in a diet counseling center. is not the melancholic one, because they Hence, we can acknowledge that our do not deliberate before acting. But is it uncontrolled person comes to the decent the weak one? It might be, though it is προαίρεσις, which is not reduced only not clear, since our uncontrolled person to the setting of the goal, that is, the makes the decision about proceeding losing weight (the goal that harmonizes with a preferentially chosen course of with the general policy in life reflecting action and even tries to take on what person’s understanding of eudaimonia). has been determined by deliberation as But their προαίρεσις also includes the chronologically first in the sequence of preferential choice, making the deci- steps that lead to the achievement of the sion about proceeding to the realization designated goal. Nonetheless, if a person of the action plan and even proceeding is not serious, there will be room for the with the realization of the determined lack of self-control, because it is caused course of action. by conflict within the desires of psuchē Let us imagine that they could not between what is good and what is pleas- register in a diet counseling because of ant (EE VII.2 1237a7-9). an objective reason – it is, for instance, But it is significant that Aristotle too late and the counseling center is attributes προαίρεσις a special role. He already closed. Thus, they put off the be- emphasizes that human characters are ginning of the weight loss process until better verified by προαίρεσις than by the next day. But the next day they do action (NE III.2 1111b6). This is why, we not keep their preferential choice and judge who someone is on the grounds do not put what they decided to do the of προαίρεσις (EE II.11 1228a2-3). But previous day into action – they do not it is hard to accept that it is possible to proceed with fulfilling the action plan say “they are the uncontrolled persons”, and do not register in a diet counseling if we only consider their προαίρεσις – center. But they abandon it not because it after all, their προαίρεσις is decent. In is beyond their power. It is rather caused fact, we will be able to recognize that by their characteristic instability – in- someone is the uncontrolled person if stead of reaching for a telephone, they we take into account not only their gen- grasp something sweet. Consequently, eral policy in life, but also their prefer- their προαίρεσις is decent, but what they ential choice or thoughtful undertaking actually do does not follow their plans and even their decision about proceed- and even their decision about proceeding with realization of designated goal ing with realization of a preferentially in line with accepted action plan. Our chosen course of action. The result is example ultimately has a gap between

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what has happened before the potential to be limited to setting a goal nor to beginning of realizing the designated a thoughtful undertaking nor to a pref- goal and the actual beginning or imple- erential choice nor to the configuration mentation of that goal. When there is of them. But it also seems to imply that no such interval, it is difficult to deter- προαίρεσις can be something more than mine what the scope of the activity of deciding about proceeding with real- προαίρεσις is. So, it is not clear whether ization of what has been thoughtfully the activity of προαίρεσις ends before undertaken or preferentially chosen. the action starts or whether it overlaps If such a view was wrong, it would be with the action. But the occurrence of questionable that human characters the interval allows us to assume that are better defined by προαίρεσις than the activity of προαίρεσις does really by action36. We would have a prob- overlap with action and it is a specific lem with distinguishing between the moment of it, at least in the sense that uncontrolled person and the decent προαίρεσις starts the action. Ultimately, person (ἐπιεικής) or the serious one Aristotle underlines the point that (σπουδαῖος), since προαίρεσις of second “προαίρεσις is the origin of action – and third person is also decent. After that from which the motion begins”34. all, Aristotle often identifies the decent But we could add that προαίρεσις is the person with serious one37. beginning to a higher degree than the moment of starting something, because III. What is προαίρεσις for προαίρεσις not only begins the action, Aristotle? but it is also responsible for its course. I have suggested, at the end of section 1, For the adverb πρό in προαίρεσις can that προαίρεσις in the full sense, accord- also point out that the agents pick out ing to Aristotle, ought to consist of: the act for the sake of a specific goal and a] setting the goal; b] thoughtful under- take the position in front of it with the taking or preferential choice, where purpose of defending it, which means both assume deliberation about how to they aim to achieve the set goal to the achieve the designated goal but second best of their ability35. requires deliberation on alternative Thus, the example seems to sug- courses of action; c] making the decision gest that Aristotle’s προαίρεσις is not 36 It does not have to be understood that human characters are defined solely 34 πράξεως μὲν οὖν ἀρχὴ προαίρεσις—ὅθεν with reference to προαίρεσις, and the ἡ κίνησις; NE VI.2 1139a31-32. actions do not matter. Of course, they are 35 Thus, there is the question – whether the important. But the actions themselves activity of προαίρεσις extends only to the are insufficient (see e.g.,NE V.8 1135b2-8). commencement of action or does it go And there would be also a problem with on during the action and eventually ends distinction between the uncontrolled with (successful) completion of it. As person and the truly bad person (see Broadie (1991), p. 212 notes, “a prohairetic note 32) without taking into account response […] is always […] posed for pos- προαίρεσις. sible revision”. 37 See e.g., NE IX.4 1166a12-33.

INTERNATIONAL ISSUE NO. 5/2018 Maciej Smolak 91 Etymology and Meaning of προαίρεσις in Aristotle‘s Ethics about proceeding with a thoughtful Next, I have considered an example undertaking or preferentially chosen of an uncontrolled behavior and against course of action; d) proceeding with the the background of it I have shown that realization of the determined course of Aristotle’s προαίρεσις can also include action, that is, taking on what has been making the decision about proceeding to determined by deliberation as chrono- the realization of an action plan and even logically first in the sequence of steps the attempt to take on what has been that lead to the achievement of the des- determined by deliberation as chrono- ignated goal; e] continuation of action logically first in the sequence of steps that leads to the achievement of that that lead to achieve the goal within the goal. Thus, Aristotle’s προαίρεσις can framework of the action plan developed. not be reduced to any of the moments But Aristotle attributes προαίρεσις included in points a], b], c] and d], nor a special role, because he emphasizes to their arrangement. that human characters are better veri- To show that προαίρεσις consists of fied byπροαίρεσις than by action. How- these five moments listed above, I have ever, the above-mentioned moments outlined features of the uncontrolled in points a], b], c] and d] as well as person, especially, of the melancholic the configuration of them can belong and weak one, based on the passage to a certain kind of the uncontrolled NE VII.10 1152a15-24. Aristotle under- person38. So, if προαίρεσις of ἀκρατής lines the fact that προαίρεσις of every is decent, it will be a problem to dis- uncontrolled person is decent. Since tinguish between the character of the the melancholic uncontrolled person uncontrolled person and the character does not deliberate before acting I have of the decent person or the serious one. demonstrated that προαίρεσις is limited Thus, Aristotle’sπροαίρεσις ought to be to a general policy of life in the case of something more, if it is to be understood them. But it turned out that προαίρεσις as a better verifier of human characters of the weak uncontrolled person is than actions. something more, because they deliber- According to the interpretation ate before taking action and conclude given at the end of section 2 “something it, i.e., they end deliberation with the good result. Therefore, theirπροαίρεσις 38 Of course, it is not the melancholic one, because they do not deliberate before may include a thoughtful undertaking acting. Nor it is the swift one, because or a preferential choice, depending on they do not conclude the deliberation situation. Indeed, major characteris- process. However, it remains the open question whether it is the weak one. tics of the weak uncontrolled person Anyway, the uncontrolled person, in our has allowed to assume that προαίρεσις example, tries to take on what has been determined by deliberation as chron- of the weak uncontrolled person is the ologically first in the sequence of steps combination of setting some goal and that lead to achieve the goal within the framework of the action plan developed. a thoughtful undertaking or a prefer- It may be that Aristotle’s typology of the ential choice. uncontrolled person is not complete.

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more” indicates that the activity of I can not fail to owe a debt of gratitude προαίρεσις overlaps with the action. to Petrycy, Sebastian z Pilzna (old print But the activity of it is not limited to [1608]; reprint [in:] Arystoteles [2011]: the start of the action. The uncontrolled 205-217) who translates προαίρεσις by person, in our example, tries to begin “choice or undertaking”. In my opin- the action with what is chronologically ion40, the expression is not used acci- first in the sequence of steps which lead dentally. I think he tries to demonstrate to reaching the set goal. Therefore, that Aristotle’s προαίρεσις in the full προαίρεσις must be the beginning to sense consists of: 1] “undertaking” in the a higher degree than the moment of sense of the set goal41; 2] “own choice” starting something. It not only begins in the sense of the preferential choice the action, but it is also responsible for and decision about proceeding with the its course. And that is why προαίρεσις process of realization of the set goal in takes also into account the third un- accordance with accepted action plan42; derstanding of the adverb πρό, that 3] “undertaking” in the sense of starting is, “πρό” as standing in front of, and and continuation of the action that leads hence in defense of something. Indeed, to the achievement of the set goal43. Thus, προαίρεσις in the full sense, accord- one can get the impression that Petrycy ing to Aristotle, must also include attempts to show that: i] Aristotle’s the continuation of action that leads προαίρεσις is a kind of the link between to reaching the set goal. Thus, I think “choice” and “undertaking”; ii] “choice” Aristotle’s προαίρεσις is constituted by

two elements: the orectical-deliberative 40 See Smolak (2018), pp. 327-348. element and the decisional-functional 41 See Petrycy (in Arystoteles (2011), p. 217) element39. and my comments with respect to that in Smolak (ibidem), pp. 344-345. 42 See Petrycy (in Arystoteles (2011), 39 I was inspired by Formichelli’s distinction pp. 208-209). Petrycy distinguishes two (2009), p. 147 to look at προαίρεσις in this kinds of “choice”: “common choice” and way. For he distinguishes dispositional “own choice”. The first is “taking some- and occurrent προαίρεσις. The first accen- thing” caused by an affective reaction. tuates the fact that we have deliberated Thus, it is not made on the basis of delib- about the specific situation we are fac- eration. The second is the immanent ing, the second underlines the fact that principle of the realization of thoughtful the deliberation is effectively realized in actions, and as a consequence it is made action at that time. Furthermore, I am in on the basis of deliberation. The person debt to other commentators. As Kenny (in who makes own choice must be auc- Aristotle (2011), p. 159) suggests, “carry- tor agendi. Indeed, προαίρεσις of such ing out a monastic vow or a New Year’s a person ought to consist of preferential resolution seems to be the closest thing choice and making the decision about in modern life to making an Aristotelian proceeding with a preferentially chosen προαίρεσις (‘choice’ in his translation)”. course of action. I present my interpreta- In turn, Price (2011), pp. 309-310 notes that tion of Petrycy’s “own choice” in Smolak προαίρεσις (‘choice’ in his translation) “is (ibidem), pp. 338-342. more than a desire: when the time is due 43 See Petrycy (in Arystoteles (2011), p. 217) it becomes an attempt, and (if all goes and my comments with respect to that in well) an action”. Smolak (ibidem), pp. 345-347.

INTERNATIONAL ISSUE NO. 5/2018 Maciej Smolak 93 Etymology and Meaning of προαίρεσις in Aristotle‘s Ethics and undertaking” are specific aspects of undertaking or to a choice of the best Aristotle’s προαίρεσις44. But it must be course of action, and both ought to lead added that each one of “understanding” to the achievement of the designated is in a different relation to “choice” of goal. Indeed, in several places Aristotle action plan. “Undertaking” in the sense indicates that προαίρεσις is “desire of 1] is prior to it; “undertaking” in the qualified by deliberation” (βουλευτικὴ sense of 2] is after it. Thus, “undertak- ὄρεξις). ing” sets boundaries for προαίρεσις. And The decisional-functional element “choice” is made within these bound- emphasizes that auctores agendus must: aries. But the boundary of “undertak- a] make the decision about proceeding ing” in the sense of 2] is movable and with realization of what they have under- it changes jointly with carrying out the taken or chosen; b] proceed with realiza- action that aims to achieve the goal al- tion of the action plan and continue on ready laid down. this path. Thus, the decision-functional So, what are the constitutive ele- element highlights two things. ments of Aristotle’s προαίρεσις in my Firstly, it accentuates that auctores interpretation? The orectical-deliber- agendus decide about proceeding with ative element underlines the fact that realization of what they have under- προαίρεσις is either a general policy in taken or chosen after deliberation and life reflecting the person’s understand- carry out what they have decided. It is ing of eudaimonia or a goal that leads important, because it may happen that us in pursuit of eudaimonia. But it also to make a decision does not have to stresses that προαίρεσις is a thoughtful result in proceeding with action. How- undertaking or a preferential choice. ever, it can not concern the situation in Thus both are preceded by deliberation, which an action is not started, because that is, by intellectual work that con- it is impossible to take such an action at sists in searching for the best course of a given moment or it is necessary to ver- action and in discovering a reliable way ify the accepted action plan as a result to accomplish the designated goal. And of the current difficulties or new data. such an examination is founded on the It is rather about the situation in which “moving back” strategy. According to it, auctores agendus do not act, even though what is at the end of the calculated way is it is up to them and failure to take an the starting point of the process which action undermines the opportunity to leads to the achievement of that goal. achieve the goal set by them. Thus, the Hence, within the orectical-deliberative decisional aspect of the decisional-func- element of προαίρεσις, the auctores agen- tional element underlines the fact that dus set the goal and come to a thoughtful the decision is fulfilled. Secondly, it shows that προαίρεσις 44 It is confirmed by Old-Polish language begins the action and defends it in its at the turn of the XVI century, because the conjunction “or” is not limited to an course. Thus,auctores agendus carry out alternative. the action which is chronologically first

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in the sequence of steps of the adopted requires deliberation on alternative action plan and they take responsibility courses of action; c] making the deci- for the realization of it. Indeed, they sion about proceeding with a thoughtful begin the realization of the action plan undertaking or preferentially chosen and also continue to implement it. There- course of action; d) proceeding with the fore, they guard against any kind of realization of the determined course of problems that could thwart the reaching action, that is, taking on what has been the set goal. Of course, it is about prob- determined by deliberation as chrono- lems that the avoidance is up to them. logically first in the sequence of steps Thus, the functional aspect of the deci- which lead to the achievement of the des- sional-functional element underlines ignated goal; e] continuation of action the fact that the sequential phases of the that leads to the achievement of that action plan are implemented. goal. In other words, προαίρεσις also The decisional-functional element overlaps with the action and take care complements the orectical-deliberative of its course. one. Hence, it seems that Aristotle’s This interpretation is not without προαίρεσις in the full sense takes place foundation, because the points a], b], when auctores agendus carry out the c] and d] are insufficient for a full as- line of action they have planned and de- sessment of human characters based cided to realize it. If indeed προαίρεσις on προαίρεσις. For Aristotle underlines better determines human characters the fact that προαίρεσις of every uncon- than actions, then it will be questiona- trolled person is decent. Meanwhile, the ble whether this criterion of προαίρεσις above-mentioned moments in points a], will be fulfilled without the deci- b], c] and d] may belong to προαίρεσις sional-functional element. of the uncontrolled person: “setting the There are also additional advantages goal as a general policy of life” (a]) is to this interpretation of προαίρεσις. It common for all kinds of the uncontrolled includes three understandings of the person; “thoughtful undertaking or adverb πρό – that is, preferential, tempo- preferential choice” (b]) appears or can ral and as standing in front of, and hence in appear as moment of προαίρεσις in the defense of something. Moreover, it makes case of the weak uncontrolled person; that such understanding of προαίρεσις “making the decision about proceeding covers its various meanings. with a thoughtful undertaking or preferentially chosen course of action and Conclusion even trying to take on what has been As I have argued, προαίρεσις in the full determined by deliberation as chrono- sense, according to Aristotle, consists of: logically first in the sequence of steps a] setting the goal; b] thoughtful under- which lead to the achievement of the des- taking or preferential choice, where ignated goal” (c] and d]) is present in the both assume deliberation about how to examined example of the uncontrolled achieve the designated goal but second behavior. But “continuation of action that

INTERNATIONAL ISSUE NO. 5/2018 Maciej Smolak 95 Etymology and Meaning of προαίρεσις in Aristotle‘s Ethics leads to the achievement of the set goal “choice”, in the sense of liberum arbi- in accordance with accepted action plan” trium46, does not have to be the key com- (e]) requires the agent acts from a firm ponent of προαίρεσις. and unshakeable character (NE II.4 Furthermore, it can be added that 1105a30-33). If a person is not serious, “undertaking” means “przedsięwzięcie” there will be room for lack of self-con- in the Polish language. And it contains trol (EE VII.2 1237a7-8). Indeed, the se- in itself three moments from the orec- rious person is the measure in the field tical-deliberative and decisional-func- of human affairs NE( IX.4 1166a12-13), tional elements, that is, deliberative, and thus, in terms of προαίρεσις. decisional and functional. Thus, “przed- I would also like to remind the reader sięwzięcie” is: i] determined by delib- that I have mentioned, in Introduction, eration; ii] taken on the basis of deci- that the term προαίρεσις has different sion; and iii] carried out in accordance meanings and is practically untranslat- with action plan that is determined by able into modern languages, as are most deliberation. crucial terms of classical Greek. But Besides, the term “przedsięwzię- Aristotle often uses terms drawn from cie” (przed-się-wzięcie) combines ele- common language in the treatises and ments similar to those constituting reinterprets them or assigns them tech- the προαίρεσις. For it consists of the nical meanings. That is also the case of adverb “przed” – in English “before” – προαίρεσις. Thus, if I were to be tempted which has inter alia preferential and to translate προαίρεσις, I would probably temporal meaning, i.e., in principle, use the expression proposed by Petrycy, equivalent of the adverb πρό, and of Sebastian z Pilzna, that is, “choice or the noun “wzięcie” – in English “tak- undertaking”, or I would limit myself ing” – i.e., in principle, equivalent of to using the term “undertaking” 45. For the noun αἵρεσις.

45 See e.g., Rowe (in Aristotle (2002)) who renders προαίρεσις by “undertaking” in Brodie (in Aristotle (2002), p. 262) notes in several places of NE. See e.g., I.1 1094a1-2: commentary to I.1. 1094a2, Aristotle will “Every sort of expert knowledge and give προαίρεσις a stricter meaning, that every inquiry, and similarly every action is, “decision” in the context of his theo- and undertaking (προαίρεσις; a2) seems ry of deliberate action in III.2-3. Further- to seek some good”; I.4 1095a14-16: “[...] more, in the Introduction, she points out since every sort of knowledge, and every that “as we find it (that is, προαίρεσις) in undertaking (προαίρεσις; a14), seeks the non-philosophical writings of some after some good, let us say what it is of his (that is, Aristotle’s) contemporaries that we say political expertise seeks, is usually translated by ‘undertaking’ or and what the topmost of all achievable ‘policy’” (ibidem), p. 42. goods is”; I.7 1097a20-21: “[...] in every 46 See Arendt (1978), p. 62 who claims that activity and undertaking (προαίρεσις; προαίρεσις, the faculty of choice “is the a21) it is the end” [it needs to be add- arbiter between several possibilities” ed that he uses “undertaking”, when he and “In Latin, Aristotle’s faculty of choice translates tōn praktōn hapantōn (of all is liberum arbitrium”. But it must be practical undertakings) in the next line]. recalled that it is not necessary to take But it seems that προαίρεσις is not used into account “to choose between alter- as technical term in these phrases. As natives” as a part of προαίρεσις.

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abbreviations

Aristotle NE Nicomachean Ethics EE Eudemian Ethics MM Magna Moralia

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