5. The Self-realization and Avidyd

The question on what the role of avidyd is for the realization of the identity between Brahman and Atman is the main concern of this chapter.

This question, however, seems to be unreasonable, since its realization does not depend on avidyd itself but jndna, though the removal of avidyd is the same as the realization of the Self. So far as the epistemological point of view is concerned, it is true that avidyd cannot have any role to attain the Self-realization, yet from the methodological point of view there is a certain possibility of avidyd being an indispensable expedient for liberation. If the roles of avidyd, which have been discussed in the previous two chapters, are related with the establishment and consistency of the text respectively so that the knowledge of the identity of Brahman and Atman is firmly understood in the textual level, it is in this chapter that its role is further expanded to the boundary between inside and outside the text, where avidyd itself is negated and moksa becomes real.

In the first section, The Nature of Moksa, the point of discussion is that moksa is an already established fact, and thus, no special effort is needed except the removal of avidyd. The text that contains the teaching of moksa is therefore bound to be sublated after revealing the knowledge of Brahman that removes avidyd. This is why Sankara makes an emphasis on immediate experience (anubhava or avagati), which is possible only through and after the Upanisads. In order to find out a certain method which leads to liberation, the second section. The

Method of Instruction, is devoted to the contention as to which method of instruction is central to Sankara’s philosophy. If the Upanisads are finally false, is it possible that the false means leads to the true result of the Self-realization? Saiikara solves this question by adopting the method of “false ascription and its subsequent negation” {adhydropa- apavdda), which starts from superimposition (adhydsa) and ends in “not this, not this” (neti, neti). Avidyd can at last be removed through that method that is surely operated within its own domain. Therefore, there is a seemingly contradictory procedure from avidyd to the Self-realization

(this consists of the third section), since avidyd is said to be the object of negation in the text, and again, the text as the creation of avidyd is useless after the Self-realization. As a result the methodological usage of avidyd is known by the fact that it implies its negation and paves the way for the Self-realization.

1. The Nature of Moksa

In Indian Philosophy there is a common presupposition of four aims

177 of human life ipurusdrtha), viz. desire (kdma), prosperity (artha), duty

(dharma), and liberation (moksa). Out of these four purusdrtha,

Advaitins take moksa to be the highest human goal {paramapurusdrtha), and say in general that it is attainable through knowledge alone. For them moksa, of which an equivalent term is mukti, initially means freedom from karma or samsdra (transmigration), as the word itself has a negative meaning, but it also connotes a certain kind of spiritual freedom.' Moksa is certainly “freedom from” something as well as

“freedom to” something, as it is that which is negation of something as well as attainment of something. However, from the point of view of the reality there is neither freedom from something to be given up (heya) nor freedom to something to be achieved {upddeya), for moksa is freedom itself in the sense that the individual self is always Brahman or Atman Itself.^ In this way we will see how Sankara describes moksa with reference to “freedom from”, “freedom to”, and “freedom itself”.

The transition from bondage {bandha or bandhana) to liberation in

Sankara’s Advaita Vedanta is thoroughly based on his epistemological and ontological doctrines. Bondage cannot be real because it is a superimposed idea of individuality on the real Self, and therefore, it has to be a creation of ignorance. Sankara says:

••• for on that view alone bondage is a creation of ignorance, so that the achievement of liberation through knowledge becomes justifiable. If on the other hand, it is understood that

‘Cf. Eliot Deutsch, Advaita Vedanta: A Philosophical Reconstruction, pp. 103- 104. ^Cf. Chandradhar Sharma, The Advaita Tradition in Indian Philosophy, p. J93.

178 the individual soul is under bondage in a real sense, and that it is a certain state of the supreme Self on the analogy of the snake and its coil, or a part of that Self on the analogy of the light and its source, then since a bondage that is real cannot be removed, the scripture speaking of liberation will become useless. And it is not a fact that the Upanisads declare both difference and non-difference as equally valid in the present case; on the contrary the Upanisads declare non-difference alone as the view to be established •••.’

For the consistency of the Upanisads {moksasdstra) which teach only non-difference, bondage should be regarded as unreal and a creation of avidyd. If bondage is real by the presumption that the scripture teaches difference too, then its removal through knowledge becomes an impossible task. If the reality is both difference and non-difference, there is no sublation of the false knowledge by true one. Sankara says:

Besides, from this point of view (that both difference and non­ difference are true) the attainment of liberation through knowledge cannot be justified, since (in this view) no such false ignorance is admitted as a cause of the transmigratory state that can be removed by right knowledge. For if both difference and non-difference be true, how can it be asserted that the knowledge of unity will falsify the knowledge of multiplicity?"^

^BSB 3.2.29, p.368, lines 19-23; Gambhira, p. 632: tathahyaviclyakrtalvdd- bandhasya vidyaya inoksa upapadyate. yadi punah parcimarthata eva haddhah kascidatmahikundalanyayena parasyatmanah samsthanabhiitah prokeisasrayanydyena caikadesabhuto’bhyupagamyeta tatah pdramarthikasya bandhasya tiraskartmn- asakyatvdnmoksasdstravaiyarthyam prasajyeta, net cdtrobhdvapi bheddbhedau iruti- stHlyeivadvyapadisati. abhedameva hi pratipddyatvena nirdisati, ‘*BSB 2.1.14, p. 198, lines 9-11; Gambhira. p. 329: na cdsmindarsane jndndn- rnoksa ityupapadyate, samyagjfidndpanodyasya kasyacinmithydjfidnasya sctnisdra- kdranatvendnabhyupagamdt. ubhayasatyatdydm hi kathamekatvajildnena ndndtvajnd- namapanudyata ityucyate.

179 In order to make liberation possible, the unity of Brahman alone has to be accepted as the metaphysical truth, and the opposite, i.e. the manifoldness of the world should be rejected. The attainment of liberation becomes actuality only through knowledge of that unity by removing knowledge of that manifoldness, which is conjured up by false ignorance, a cause of the transmigratory state. The non-difference and difference are the subject-matters of knowledge and ignorance respectively, and liberation and bondage are the effects of knowledge and ignorance respectively.^ Therefore, it can be said that Sankara’s distinction of liberation and bondage is the result of the division of knowledge and ignorance; in other words, liberation and bondage are dependent on the epistemological status on the ontological reality.

Bondage, according to Sankara, consists in the false knowledge on the Self that does not undergo the transmigratory state (samsdra). It is associated with all the products of avidyd, viz. desires, or action, its factors, and result, or means and ends, or sense and sense-objects, etc., and consequently, its root cause is nothing but avidyd. So far as the empirical point of view is concerned, the individual soul who is governed by ignorance cannot avoid the transmigratory state which is beyond doubt beginningless {anddi).^ However, it may be asked how the beginningless transmigratory state is created by the natural (naisargika) ignorance, and where the position of the individual soul between them is.

Sankara himself explains the logical background of the beginningless

^Cf. BrB 4.3.34, p. 633, lines 17-18; te caite moksabandhane sahetuke sapra- paiice nirdiste vidydvidyakarye "Cf. Chapter 2, fn. 69.

180 transmigratory state;

And it is logical for the transmigratory existence to have no beginning; for had it emerged capriciously all of a sudden, then there would have been the predicament of freed souls also being reborn here, as also the contingency of results accruing from non-existing causes, for the differences in happiness and misery would have no logical explanation.’

If the transmigratory state has beginning, then a freed soul may have a possibility to be reborn again, and there is no proper explanation of inequality of souls. Neither God nor avidyd alone is the direct cause of inequality, and accordingly, avidyd in accordance with the fruits of past works has to be the creator of inequality. Again, if the transmigratory state is not beginningless, it should be explained how action (karma) takes place without body (sarira), and how body is created without previous action. In order to avoid this fallacy of mutual dependence

Q {itaretardsrayatvaprasahga) between action and the subject of action, i.e. the body, the transmigratory state must be beginningless like the simile of the seed and the sprout.^ Thus that the transmigratory state is beginningless implies the fact that the individual soul (Jiva) is also

beginningless. It should also be noted that the transmigration has no beginning only in the empirical level, as Sankara makes an emphasis on

’BSB 2.1.36, p. 218, lines 21-23; Gambhira, pp. 364-365: upapadyote ca samsarasydnaditvam. adimattve hi samsarasydkasmddudbhutermuktdnamapi pitnah samsarodbhutiprasangah, akrtabhyagamaprasangasca, sukhaduhkhddivaisamyasya nirnimittatvdt. *The same logical fallacy between embodiedness and action (merit, or demerit) is indicated by Sankara in BSB 1.1.4, p. 22, lines 4-6. ®Cf. BSB 2.1.36, p. 219, lines 2-3: andditve tu bijdnkuranydyenopapattenui kasciddoso bhavati.

181 the logically possible explanation about it like the above passages. In the same way it is safe to say that though Sankara does not say that avidya is beginningless in his works, it cannot have beginning in the field of logic, for unless it has no beginning the beginningless transmigration is untenable. Like the analogy of the seed and the sprout the beginningless avidya and the beginningless transmigration are mutually implied,'^ though they are not dependent on each other. In fact, the terms such as anddi, naisargika, svdbhdvika for transmigration do not have significant terminological weight in Sankara’s writings since they are mostly used for the emphasis on the deep constraint or bondage in order to instruct an aspirant to liberation. The more significant thing is the confrontation with the state of bondage caused by ignorance now and here, and whatever logical problems there arise, it is enough to protect them by the same logical opposition. Freedom from bondage is possible through the removal of its cause, avidya, and for this it is necessary to emphasize how the transmigratory state, bondage, ignorance, etc. are deep-rooted in the individual soul. These are what the individual soul faces up to in this world, and yet once avidya is removed through the true knowledge of the reality, bondage is immediately replaced by liberation itself. This is why

Sankara continuously says that liberation lies in the removal of avidya which is what freedom from bondage stands for.

It is said that Sankara makes direct definition of moksa in various ways; (I) moksa is the destruction of bondage (bandhanandsa or

1 0'Cf., G. R. Malkani, Ajndna—Theory of Ignorance, p. 5.

182 bandhananivrtti),^^ (2) it is the cessation of avidyd (avidydnivrtti),^^ (3) it is eternal unembodiedness {asariratvam nityam),^^ (4) it is the state of identity with Brahman {Brahmabhdva),^'^ and (5) it is becoming the Self of all (sarvdtmatvaprdpta). The destruction of bondage and the cessation of ignorance are one and the same, because ignorance is the cause of bondage. Further, the cessation of ignorance really means the state of identity with Brahman in which the embodied soul becomes eternally unembodied and becomes the Self of all. As all these definitions indicate the same nature of moksa, so freedom from something and freedom to something have no difference at all. However,

“freedom from” and “freedom to” are not enough to describe moksa, since it is not an effect or product of anything but is “freedom itself”. As an example, Sankara says that: “liberation comes to be considered as a fruit merely from the point of view of the cessation of bondage and not from the standpoint of production of any fresh result.Thus “freedom from” and “freedom to” are valid only pedagogical level with which

“freedom itself” is finally reached. Sankara says:

No. for liberation is not an effect—it is but the destruction of

" Cf. BrB 3.3.intro., p. 422, lines 5-6: bandhancinasa eva hi niokso na karyabhutah. bandhanam cdvidyetyavocama. Also, see BrB 4.4.6, p. 662, lines 5-6; ••• bandhananivrttirmoksah syat. '^Cf. BrB 4.4.6, p. 662, lines 6-7; tasmddavidydnivrttimdtra moksavyavahdra Hi ■■■. Also, see USII 16.61-62, p. 197. Here, Sankara says that the destruction (ndsa) of non-discrimination (aviveka) that is a synonym of avidyd is what is called moksa. '^Cf. BSB 1.1.4, p. 14, lines 12-13; ata evdnustheyakarniaphalavilaksanam moksdkhyamasarlratvam nityamiti siddham. '“'Cf. ibid., p. 18, line 7; brahmabhdvasca moksah. '^Cf. TaB 3.10.6, p. 116, lines 3-4: sarvdtmatvaprdptennoksddastu ■ '^BSB 4.4.2, p. 504, lines 19-20; Gambhira, p. 897; phalcitvaprasiddhirapi inoksasya bandhonivrttimdlrdpeksd ndpurvopajanandpeksd.

183 bondage, not a created thing. ••• production, attainment, modification and purification are the functions of work. In other words, work can produce, or bring within reach, or modify, or purify something; it has no other function besides these, since nobody knows about it. And liberation is not one of these; we have already said that it is simply hidden by ignorance.

Moreover, in accordance with some peculiar efficacy belonging to the means of knowledge, they may (possibly) impart some excellence to knowledge itself, which is their result; but they cannot do so to liberation which is the result of knowledge. For we said it more than once that liberation cannot be a product of anything, it being realized through knowledge as a fact eternally present in its own right.'*

Moksa is neither an effect (karya) nor a product (sddhyam or phala) but it is in its own nature an eternally established fact (nityasiddha). It has no association with actions, which produce, attain, modify, or purify something, so “freedom from” and “freedom to” that imply those actions cannot be the final sense of moksa. Even when Sankara says that moksa is the result of knowledge, he does mean that “freedom itself” is caused by knowledge of the reality alone, but does not mean that it is the effect or product of knowledge like that of action. Knowledge simply removes

'^BrB 3.3.intro., p. 422, lines 5-11; Madhava, p. 312: tanna. anarabhyatvdn- moksasya. bandhananasa eva hi mokso na karyabhutah. ■■■ utpattyaptivikara- samskdra hi karmasdmarthyasya visaydh. utpddayitum prdpayitum vikcirtum samskartum ca sdmarthyam karmano ndto vyatiriktavisayo ’sti karmasdmarthyasya. loke’prasiddhatvdt. na ca moksa esdm paddrthdndmanyatamah. avidydmdtra- vyavahita ityavocdma. Also, see BrB 1.4.7, p. 145, line 9, 12. For that moksa is not production, attainment, modification, and purification, see Chapter 3, fn. 74. '*BSB 3.4.52, p. 458, line 26- p. 459, line 3; Gambhira, p. 811; api ca vidydsddhanam svavlryavisesdtsvaphala eva vidydydm kamcidatisayamdsanjayenna vidydphale muktau. taddhyasddhyam nityasiddhasvabhdvameva vidyayddhigamyata ityasakrdavddisma.

184 ignorance, which covers the real nature of the Self, and therefore, it may be said that what appears as bondage and what vanishes in liberation are only avidyd, and that the Self remains eternally free as It is. Moksa is said to be a result only in the sense that the knowledge of Brahman culminates in experience (anubhava) by removing ignorance, and it assumes to have a seen result (drstaphalatd)^'^ unlike an unseen one by the way of dharma. Just as the purport of the Upanisadic passages is determined by the seen result that is the final release, moksa is described as a result metaphorically, as the knowledge of Brahman and the removal of ignorance end in the realization of the Self.

According to Sankara, moksa is not parindminitya (changeful eternity) of which those whose identity is not destroyed though they may undergo changes, for example, the three gunas of the Samkhya.^° Moksa is kutasthanitya (immutable eternity) as Saiikara says:

But this (moksha) is eternal in the true sense, i.e. eternal without undergoing any changes {kutasthanitya), omnipresent as ether, free from all modifications, absolutely self-sufficient, not composed of parts, of self-luminous nature. That bodiless entity in fact, ••• is called release;

In this way, it is an unquestionable fact that Sankara’s moksa is the identity with the ontological reality, just as his ontological reality,

'’Cf. BSB 2.1.4, p. 184, lines 20-21: anubhavcivasdnam ca brahmavijnanam- avidvava nivartakam moksasadhanam ca drstaphalatayesyate. ' ^“Cf. BSB 1.1.4, p. 14, lines 13-16. ^'ibid., lines 16-18; Thibautl, p. 28: idam tii paramarthikam, kutasthaniiyam, vyoinavatsarvavydpi, sarvavikriyarahitam, nityatrptam, niravayavam, svayamjyotih- svabhdvam. ■■■ tadetadasarlratvam moksdkhyam.

185 Brahman, is often expressed as “eternal, pure, conscious, and free by nature” (nityasuddhabuddhamukta-svabhava). That moksa is the immutable eternal implies that it is never connected with changeful action, and if it is not eternal it cannot be called moksa. Since moksa is the identical state with ontological reality by means of removing false ignorance, it is not a new created thing, or the change into a different being. Sankara says:

Liberation becomes artificial and therefore transitory according the philosopher who holds that it is a change of one state into another on the part of the Self. Again it is not reasonable that it is a union (with Brahman) or a separation (from Nature). As both union and separation are transitory. Liberation cannot consist of the individual Self going to Brahman or of Brahman coming to it. But the Self, one’s own real nature, is never destroyed. For It is uncaused and cannot be accepted or rejected by oneself (or by others) while other things (e.g., states etc) are caused.

Moksa is not a change of being from the state of individual self to the state of supreme Self by way of union with the Self or separation from the non-Self, but it is the same as the Self Itself whose nature is never destroyed and is eternally as It is. It is only avidyd that covers the real nature of the Self and consists of the state of bondage, and that

^^Sankara declares that those who believe in moksa take its eternity for granted, cf. ibid., lines 23-24: nityasca moksah sarvairmoksavadibhirabhyupagamyate, ^^USII 16.39-41, pp. 194-195; Jagada, pp. 179-180: mokso 'vasthantaram yasya krtakah sa calo hyatah, na samyogo viyogo va mokso yiiktah kalhcinicana. saniyogasycipyanityatvadviyogasya tathaiva cci, gamandgamcine caiva xvanlpani Hi na hJyate. svarupasydniniittatvatsanimittd hi cclpare, aniipdttcim svarupcun hi svend- tyaktam tathaiva ca.

186 disappears at the dawn of true knowledge. Like the ontological reality,

moksa is already an established fact.

Moksa is a thing already established or accomplished, and need not

be done over again. 24 Sankara' says that “Brahman that is all-pervasive

like space remains ever attained by everybody”,a n d that “The result

of knowledge of the Self is the removal of an obstacle to moksa.”^^ The

knowledge of Brahman does not effect liberation; it removes only

ignorance that is the obstacle to liberation, for liberation is already

attained without regard to knowledge and ignorance. This is why

Sankara emphasizes the removal of ignorance for moksa from the

beginning to the end in his works, and why he does not say that the

world itself is to be annihilated. The apparent world of name and form is

superimposed on Brahman through ignorance like a double moon appears

through the eye-disease called timira. Ignorance can be destroyed by

knowledge just as the eye-disease by medicine. In fact, the whole

existing world cannot be annihilated, and if it could be done, the present

whole world is not existent because of previous annihilation by released

souls. The world is existent only within the dependence on the reality,

but it is finally false or illusory. Thus it is the cause of that

superimposed world that has to be removed; in other words, what is

sublated is avidyd which causes the apparent superimposition of the

BSB 3.2.21, p. 362, lines 15-16: naca krtameva punah kriyate. ^^BSB 1.1.4, p. 17, line 5: ••• sarvagatatvena nityaptasvcirupatvdtsarvena brahmanah, dkdsasyeva. ^‘’Ibid., p. 15, lines 14-15: ••• moksapratibandhanivrttimdtramevdlmajndnasya phalam darsayanti.

187 world on Brahman}^ The illusionism of the world in Sankara’s Advaita

Vedanta is simply the best way to lead moksa to an actuality rather than to a possibility.

For Sankara the actuality of moksa is embodied in the idea of jivanmukti, 28 which is liberation here and now, not after death, though he only uses the term once, and never directly characterizes the jivanmukta.^^ The conception of jivanmukti is the logical result of such view that knowledge is the sole means of release from bondage, and freedom should result the moment it is gained. There may be a question that if mukti means unembodiedness, how it is possible in the living individual (Jlvat). But as long as unembodiedness signifies only the absence of relationship with the body due to ignorance, liberation that is the removal of false idea of Selfhood on the body etc. can be an actuality while one is alive. This jivanmukti is achieved immediately after the emergence of knowledge of Brahman (Brahma-vidyd):

There are, moreover, a number of scriptural passages which declare release to follow immediately on the cognition of

the Bhagavadgita-bhasya it is said that the repudiation of the superimposed thing due to ignorance is the only necessary thing with regard to Brahman, and no effort is required to secure knowledge of Brahman, which is absolutely evident or completely established, cf. BGB 18.50, p. 261, lines 10-11; tasmddaviclyadhydro- pananirdkaranamdtrarn brahmani kartavyam na tu brahmajixdne yatno 'tyantapra- siddhatvdt. ^^Mukti can generally be classified in the Advaita Vedanta, according to the time factor, into sadyomukti (immediate) and kramamukti (gradual), and, according to the embodiedness, into jivanmukti (in life) and videhamukti (after death). However, the conception of mukti is slightly different in the view of each and every Advaitins. For the detailed discussion of varieties of mukti, see A.G. Krishna Warrier, The Concept of Mukti in Advaita Veddnta, pp. 475-487. ^’Cf. Andrew O. Fort, “Knowing Brahman while Embodied: Sankara on Jivanmukti", Journal of Indian Philosophy, vol. 19, p. 369. ^“Cf. M. Hiriyanna, Outlines of Indian Philosophy, p. 379.

188 Brahman, and which thus preclude the possibility of an effect intervening between the two; ••• in order to exclude the idea of any action taking place between one’s seeing Brahman and becoming one with the universal Self;

The knowledge of Brahman leads to the sublation of avidyd, and accordingly, moksa becomes true immediately without any intervention of action, or any interval of time. If there is any interval between the

Self-knowledge and the Self-realization, knowledge cannot be said to be

the sole means of the latter, i.e. liberation. Sankara says that there is no difference of time between freedom from the body and identification

with Existence.At any rate, his idea of jlvanmukti is based on the proposition that liberation is possible only by means of knowledge, and that it is an already established fact but hidden by ignorance. A liberated

soul, even though he has the body, never attaches him to desire and

action, for their cause, avidyd, is completely destroyed by perfect

knowledge.

If liberation is an already accomplished fact, the notion of bondage

itself cannot be real because it is a figment of avidyd. Moreover, the

notion of liberation itself too has to be treated as an empirical dealing,

for it is a superimposed idea on the ever-free Self. Sankara says:

To this we reply—It (i.e. what you say) is of course true. It is

^'BSB 1.1.4, p. 15, lines 5-8; Thibautl, p. 29; ■■■ sriitayo brahiuaviclydnan- taram moksam darsayantyo madhye kdryclntaram vdrayanti. id brahmadarsana- sarvdtmabhdvayormadhye kartavyantaravdrandyoddharyam. ^^Cf. ChB 6.14.2, p. 379, line 4: na hi dehamoksasya satscimpcittesca kcila- bhedo ■■■.

189 but only the Highest Self which comes to have finite determination (as it were), by reason of limiting adjuncts such as body, sense-organs, the mind and intelligence, and which is mistakenly and in a figurative sense accepted by the ignorant as the embodied Jzva-Self, just as the Akdsha (Nabha) which in fact is unlimited, appears as if it is limited, on account of limiting adjuncts such as a jar or a pot etc. And taking into consideration this difference with reference to it (i.e. the limiting adjuncts), the treating of the one as the object (i.e. the Highest Self) and the other as the agent (i.e. the Jzva-Self), is not contradictory, as long as a person has not received instruction about the Self (Atmd) being the only one, by such Scriptural passage as “That thou art” etc. When once the fact that the Self (Atmd) is but one only is grasped, then there is an end to all the notions about the conditions of bondage and Final Release.

Before the Self-realization the highest Self or supreme Self is appeared to be the individual self due to the limiting adjuncts (upddhi) conjured up by ignorance; just as the limitless space is delimited by the pot etc.

Since the difference between the two, namely, the supreme Self and the individual self is described as a process of instruction, there is no contradiction in their separate dealings. In reality there is no destruction of one soul (the individual) and no attainment of another soul (the supreme). When Sankara suggests the difference between two souls or selves, he just tries to explain the mechanism of bondage and liberation

^^BSB 1.2.6, p. 67, lines 9-14; Apte, pp. 99-100: atrocyate,—satyarnevciilat, para evdtmd dehendriyamanobuddhyupddhibhih paricchidyamdno bdlaih sdrira ityupacciryate. yathd ghatakarakddyupddhivasddaparicchinnamapi nabhah pari- cchinnavadavabhdsate, tadvat. tadapekisayd ca karmakartrtvddibhedavyavahdro no virudhyate, prdk ' tattvamasi' itydtmaikatvopadesagrahandt. grhlte tvdlmaikalve bandhamoksddiscirvavyavahdraparisamdptireva sydt.

190 with the help of the commonsense difference.^'* In consequence, once the unity of the Self is realized, all the notions of bondage and liberation which have been grounded on the difference come to an end. / Sankara declares:

As it is taught in the Sruti that the Self is different from both the known and the unknown, (It is other than the manifested and the unmanifested). The idea such as, bondage, liberation, etc. are likewise superimposed on the Self. Just as there is no day or night in the sun as it is of the nature of light only, so, is there no knowledge or ignorance in the Self which is of the nature of Pure Consciousness only.^^

As there is no knowledge or ignorance in the Self, so is there no bondage or liberation in the Self. It should be understood that the ideas of bondage and liberation are superimposed on the Self, and therefore, that the Self has completely no connection with empirical dealings of bondage and liberation. The discourses about bondage and liberation are necessary for the instruction of the aspirant after liberation, but after the

Self-realization no empirical thing remains in the pure Self.

Sankara’s conception of the Self-realization or moksa is thoroughly based on his theory of the reality that the Self is existent by Itself, or is self-established, and has no change or action in It. For the sake of the realization of this Self the difference between bondage and liberation is

BSB 1.4.10, p. 157, lines 19-20: na hiyam ksetrajfiabhedapratipipadayisd, kimtu bandhamoksavyavcisthdpratipipadayisa tvesci. prasiddham tu bhedamanudya bandhamoksavyavasthd pratipddyate. ^^USII 15.49-50, p. 189; Jagada, p. 165: viditcividitabhyam tadanyadeveli siisanat, bandhamoksddayo bhdvdstadvadatmani kalpitdh. ndhordtre yathd siirye prabhdrupdvisesatah, bodhariipdvisesdnna bodhdbodhau tathdtmani.

191 a necessary factor, and yet it is a provisional process but not a final reality, for after the Self-realization there are no such notions as bondage and liberation. If the difference between the two is real, it cannot be removed by any conceivable means. However, the difference is an inevitable process to instruct an aspirant for the realization of the Self, so its empirical validity should not be disregarded at any rate. Without knowing what bondage and liberation mean from the point of empirical view, there cannot be the emergence of knowledge as well as the cessation of ignorance. Therefore, it may be said that the instruction of the Self-realization is at work from the beginning to the end until all the empirical dealings are over in the final emancipation. Avidyd, which gives rise to empirical dealings is not a simple object to be discarded, but it is something that contributes to the final release or the Self- realization.

Another crucial problem pertaining to moksa is about the nature of cunibhava on which whether the position of sruti or the text is dependent or not. Most of modern Advaitin scholars are of the opinion that anubhava or experience is tjie final source of the knowledge of Brahman and sriiti is the expression of that intuitive and higher experience.

However, A. Rambachan doubts this general view of anubhava by saying V that writers who affirm the primacy of anubhava are generally vague on the actual nature of experience which is equated by them with “intuition”

S. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, vol. II, pp. 510-518. S. K. Belvalkar, Vedanta Philosophy, pp.16-18. R. P. Singh, The Vedanta of Sankara, vol. 1, pp. 202- 203. M. Hiriyanna, Outlines of Indian Philosophy, pp. 380-38 1. M. K. V. Iyer, Advaita Vedanta, pp. 151-155. N. K. Devaraja, An Introduction to Sankara's Theory of Knowledge, pp. 65-68.

192 and presented as a form of “direct insight”, “direct access”, or “direct acquaintance”.^’ He investigates Sankara’s own writing in order to prove fiis proposition that sruti is the ultimate means of knowledge of Brahman, and at the same time, it does not need to be verified by anubhava, and conclusively says: “There is no justification for the claim by modern commentators that Sankara posits a special experience {anubhava) as an alternative or ultimate pramdna of sriiti."^^ Does Sankara really not posit an intuitive experience as a final pramdnal The more fundamental question is: does Sankara not even make a decisive statement about anubhava and its nature? Indeed, he does not use the term anubhava frequently compared to other significant terms, and furthermore, he uses it at times in the sense of consciousness or knowledge.Of course, it is needless to say that Sankara does employ other terms than anubhava to indicate direct experience, for we have to bear such terms as avagati, avagarna, pratibodha, etc/^ in mind together with anubhava. In the case of avagati, although it is used in the sense of knowledge itself for the most part in the Upadesa-sdhasri, it also has the meaning of immediate

^’Cf. A. Rambachan, Accomplishing the Accomplished, p. 11. ^^Rambachan, “Sankara’s Rationale for Sruti as the Definitive Source of Brahmajnana: A Refutation of Some Contemporary Views”, Philosophy East and West, vol. 36, no. I, p. 37. ^’F or anubhava in the sense of consciousness or !

193 and direct knowledge or understanding in general.

Strictly speaking, there is only a single reference in Sankara’s works that anubhava is the means of the valid knowledge of Brahman. Sankara says in BSB 1.1.2:

It is not that the Scriptures alone are the means of the right knowledge of Brahma, as is the case about the right knowledge of religious duty, but the Scriptures, as also intuitional experience, so far as is possible, constitute the authoritative or valid means of right knowledge, because the knowledge of Brahma culminates in the realization of Brahma, and has an already existing entity as its object.'*'

Though sruti is the only means of the knowledge of religious duties

(dharma), so far as an existing entity (bhutavastu), i.e. the reality, is concerned, anubhava is another pramana of the knowledge of Brahman along with sruti. The expression of “because the knowledge of Brahman culminates in experience” {anubhavavasanatvdt)'^^ suggests the fact that sruti as a pramana should be vindicated by anubhava or experience that is the final pramana. A. Rambachan, however, is of the opinion that anubhava in the above passages is grouped along with all other pramdnas whose role are conceived by Sankara as only subordinate and

supplementary to sruti, for Sankara adds “and so forth” {ddi) after

“"BSB 1.1.2, p. 8, lines 5-8; Apte 11: na dharmajifiasciydmiva srutyddaya eva pramanam brahmajiiidsdydm, kimtu srutyddayo'nubhavddayasca yathdsamhhavaniiha pramdnam, anubhavdvasdnatvddbhutavastuvisayatvdcca brahmajfidnasya. ‘‘^A similar expression is seen in BSB 1.1.1, p. 6, line 4; avagatiparyantam jndiuim ■■■. (knowledge culminates in avagati.)

194 anubhava in the expression of anubhavddayasca. However, his assertion cannot be sustained because of two reasons. First, though

Sankara adds ‘"ddi” after anubhava, there is a strong possibility that ddi indicates something similar to anubhava but not other empirical pramdnas such as perception, inference, etc., just as he frequently uses the expression of avidyd-adi in the sense of avidyd and something similar to avidyd.^^ Further, insofar as Sankara also adds "'ddi” to the term sruti (srutyddaya) is it intelligible to insist that out of two cases only anubhava can be receptive to the sense of ''ddi" but not s r u til

Second, if Rambachan’s interpretation be correct, the phrase,

"anubhava-avasdna" would not make any proper sense, for the knowledge of Brahman can never culminate in the empirical means of knowledge. Thus anubhava is not one of empirical means of knowledge but is the final means of valid knowledge of Brahman. It is again confirmed in the passage of BSB 2.1.4: “It is held that the knowledge of

Brahman, culminating in personal realization, has a perceived (or tangible) result in the form of removing ignorance and leading to liberation.” Moreover, the following two passages show another significant point of anubhava in Sankara:

It is only such reasoning as is in consonance with the Scriptures that can be resorted to as a subordinate auxiliary to

‘'^Cf. A. Rambachan, “Sankara’s Rationale for Sruti”, pp. 35-36. ‘‘“'E .g . BSB 1.1.1, p. 6, line 6; Gambhira, p.11: "And the realization of Brahman is the highest human objective; for it completely eradicates all such evils as ‘ignorance etc.’ that constitute the seed of transmigration.” ‘*^BSB 2.1.4, p. 184, lines 20-21; Gambhira, p.308: anubhavavasanain ca brahmavijilanamavidydya nivartakam moksasadhanam ca drstaphalalayesyate.

195 46 experience.

We have said more than once, how the fruit of the knowledge (of the Self) is based on simultaneous actual experience, and is not, like the fruit of religious actions, something which results at some future time/^

If reasoning conforming to the scripture is the auxiliary to experience

(anubhavdhgatva), it is very natural to say that the scripture, which deals with the knowledge of Brahman culminates in the direct experience. Unlike the result of religious duties, the knowledge of

Brahman results in actual and immediate experience, and therefore the knowledge of Brahman is present to experience alone (anubhavdriidha).

The contention as to whether sruti or anubhava is the ultimate source of knowing Brahman has to be determined in the light of

Sankara’s two points of view. From the empirical point of view the scripture is solely the means and final source of the right knowledge, and yet from the transcendental point of view there should be another authentic rationale than the scripture, viz. immediate experience.

When Sankara says that anubhava is one of pramdnas, he does not mean that Brahman is known by anubhava without scripture, but that It has to

2.1.6, p. 188, line 22- p. 189, line 1; Apte, p. 290: srutyanugrhila eva hyatra tarko 'nubhavdngatvenclsrJyaie. 3.4.15, p. 438, lines 17-18; Apte, p. 736: anubhavarudhanieva ca vidyciphalam na kriyaphalavatkalantarabhavltyasakrdavocama. Also, see BSB 3.3.32, p. 407, line 14: anubhcivarudham tu jnanaphalam, ■■■. “'^Upadhyaya remarks: “It is in this context of the lower and the higher levels of knowledge or experience that the proper significance of Sankara’s statements concerning the role and value of scriptural authority (sruti) and intuitive experience {anubhava) can be understood.” He concludes that anubhava needs no proof by reason or scriptural authority, cf. K. N. Upadhyaya, “Sankara on Reason, Scriptural Authority and Self-knowledge”, Journal of Indian Philosophy, vol. 19, pp. 126-130.

196 be intuitively experienced or understood after the right apprehension of

the scripture. Whatever name is ascribed to this direct experience, it is possible through and after the scripture. On the other hand, all

discourses that the scripture is the rationale of knowledge of Brahman

must be restricted within the practical or relative point of view, since

that which is sublated at the end cannot be the ultimate ground of

knowledge of Brahman which immediately leads to liberation. Sankara

says:

Accordingly, all these injunctions as well as all the other means of knowledge have their validity till the realization, “I am Brahman'. For once the non-dual Self, that is neither acceptable nor rejectable, is realized, there can be no possibility of the persistence of the means of knowledge that become bereft of their objects and subjects."*^

In liberation there is no subject-object duality presupposed by all pramanas, and thus, pramdnas are valid till the experience of Brahman-

knowledge {Brahma-vidyd). Even the knowledge of “I am Brahman.”

does not belong to the Self but to the intellect (buddhi) alone.As far

as all scriptures are promoted by adopting the superimposition of subject

and object (itaretara-adhydsa), there must be a postulation of actual

experience of Brahman-knowledge after the scripture. The scripture or

‘‘'^BSB 1.1.4, p. 23, line 19- p. 24, line 1; Gambhira, p. 44; lasmadahum brahmasmUyetadavasana eva sarve vidhayah sarvani cetarani pranulnani. nahyaheydnupadeyddvaitatmdvagalaii nirvisaydnyapramdtrkdni ca pramdndni bhavituinarhcintiti. ^°Cf. USil 18.158, p. 231: adhyakso’hamili jndnam buddhereva viniscayah, nddhyaksasydvisesatvdnna tasydsti paro yatah.

197 sruti is the compilation of intuitive experience of Brahman for the purpose of Its instruction, and the knowledge is re-experienced through and after the scripture, just as an already liberated soul experiences his state of eternal liberation through the empirical scope of instruction which results in the removal of avidyd. Sankara’s statement that the scripture simply aims at removal of avidyd, which is the same as the emergence of knowledge of Brahman, also gives an inkling that its final destination is its own vindication by the experience of Brahman.

Therefore, liberation is an experience of the liberated Self outside the text, and is in itself direct knowledge and intuitive realization of

Brahman.

2. The Method of Instruction

It may be said that in Sankara’s system, as far as liberation is concerned, the instruction (upadesa) has a very suggestive role, since the knowledge of Brahman that gives rise to liberation is attained by means of that instruction. Although the term upadesa is not a technical one, its significant implication cannot be disregarded in connection with

Sankara’s special method for the emergence of knowledge. As is generally known, the instruction from the teacher and the scripture has been a vital factor to understand the traditional teaching of each philosophical system in general and of the Advaita Vedanta in particular.

For instance, the teachings of Sankara are treated to have been handed down, it is believed, through intellectual genealogy, in which Narayana

198 is the first preceptor and Govinda is the final one.^‘ In the writings of

Sankara we can also find emphasis on both the teacher and the scripture for the realization of Brahman, and especially on the indispensable role of the teacher. He says: “The emphasis in ‘only to a teacher’ implies that he should not seek for the knowledge of Brahman independently, even though he is versed in the scriptures.Then, how does a teacher impart the knowledge of Brahman, or what kind of instruction does he use for it? We will examine the traditional methods of instruction, which are not directly suggested by Sankara, but are clearly used by him.

The method of instruction becomes problematic because of the nature of Brahman, for which no words are proper to describe. Brahman is not an object (avisaya) that can commonly be described by words, but is a pure Subject and the inward Self (pratyagdtman) without qualities, actions, relations, etc. However, though Brahman cannot be described by language, there is no other way of knowing It except language itself.

This paradoxical relation of Brahman and language paves the way for the skillful method of instruction since the Upanisadic period, and

■"'‘C f. R. D. Karmarkar, Gaudapacla-Kclrikd, Introduction, p. i. According to the traditional salutation formula of the followers of Saiikara, nine preceptors arc recognized; they are Narayana, Brahmadeva, Vasistha, Sakti, Parasara, Vyasa, Suka, Gaudapada, and Govinda. ■‘'^See BrB 2.4.12, p. 357, lines 6-11, ChB 8.1.5, p. 444, lines 28-29; 8.7.1, p. 472, lines 1-5. ^■’M uB 1.2.12, p. 18, lines 9-10; Gambhira, p. 104; sastrajno 'pi svatantryena brahmajnananvesanam na kuryddityetadgurumevetyavadharanaphalam. Also, see BrB 4.4.19, p. 682, lines 5-6. KaB 1.2.7-9, pp. 37-42. A famous simile of the guru is that a man of Gandhara, who wants to go back to his country can return there with the help of instruction on how to go. Likewise an ignorant person can attain the knowledge of the reality through a teacher who is a knower of Brahman, see ChU 6,14.2 and ChB 6.14.2, p. 378, lines 6-28.

199 Sankara is also aware of the problem and tries to “show” Brahman in different ways.^"^ K. S. Murty suggests three ways of showing Brahman that are the solution of the relationship between Brahman and language in the Advaita Vedanta, and they are: (1) the method of adhyaropa and apavdda (false attribution and its negation), (2) the method of laksanii

(definition), and (3) netivdda (via negation). A. Rambachan, admitting these three methods for solving the problem of the limited words to show Brahman, treats them as modes of instruction for

Brahma-jndna, and yet he uses them respectively in the sense of (1) superimposition and de-superimposition, (2) implication, and (3) negation.We will use the Sanskrit terms directly in the following discussion, for the translation may cause a bias of one method against others, and show adhydropa-apavdda and netivdda in brief before anything else for convenience’ sake.

It is a well-known fact that the method of adhydropa-apavdda appears in the commentary on the Bhagavadgitd 13.13 in the sense of

“false attribution and its subsequent negation.” In the Bhagavadgitd 13.

c Q 12 it is said that Brahman is called neither being {sat) nor non-being

(asat), and the commentator says that It cannot be expressed by such

’“‘K. s. Murty says that Brahman can never be “described”, but can only be “shown” somehow approximately {aduraviprakarsena) by adopting the words of Wittgenstein, “describing” and “showing”, cf. K. S. Murty, Revelcitlon and Reason in Advaita Vedanta, p. 57. ■’^In fact, laksana does not mean “definition” but “implication”. However, K. S. Murty uses it in the sense of “definition”, of which an equivalent Sanskrit term is laksanam, throughout his explanation. ■‘'^Cf. ibid., pp. 58-64. ’’^Cf. A. Rambachan, Accomplishing the Accomplished, pp. 67-78. ■^*Cf. BG 13.12: jneyam yattatpravaksydmi yajjndtvamrtamasnute, anddimatpa- rain brahma na sattanndsaducyate.

200 words as being, non-being, etc. unlike the empirical objects of cow, horse, etc., for It has no link with conventional notions of class (Jdfi), action (kriyd), attribute (guna), and relation (sambandha).^'^ And the following verse, i.e. the Bhagavadgltd 13.13 and commentary run:

That (Knowable), which has hands and feet everywhere, which has eyes, heads and mouths everywhere, which has ears everywhere, exists in creatures by pervading them all.*'®

The existence of the Knower of the field is revealed through the adjuncts in the form of the organs of all creatures. And the knower of the field is spoken of as such because of the limiting adjuncts of the field. The field, too, is diversely differentiated as hands, feet, etc. All diversity in the Knower of the field, caused by the differences in the adjunct—the field—, is certainly unreal. Hence, by denying it, the nature of the Knowable has been stated in, ‘That is called neither being nor non-being.’ Although the unreal form is caused by the limiting adjuncts, still, for the comprehension of Its existence it is said, ‘(It) has hands and feet everywhere’, etc., by assuming this as a quality of the Knowable. Thus, as is well known, there is a saying of the people versed in tradition, ‘The Transcendental is described with the help of superimposition and its refutation’.^’

First of all, we come to know through these passages that adhydropa- apavdda is a traditional method to speak of Brahman. The Self that is

■”C f. BGB 13.12, p. 191, line 26- p. 192, line 7. “ BG 13.13; Gambhira, p. 532: sarvatahpanipadam tatsarvcitoksisiromukham, sarvatalnrutimalloke sarvamcivrtya tisthati. ‘■‘B G B 13.13, p. 192, lines 13-18; Gambhira, p. 532: sarvapranikaranopddhi- bhih ksetrajnastitvam vibhavyate. ksetrajnasca ksetropodhita ucyate. ksetram ca pdnipddadibhiranekadha bhinnam. ksetropddhibhedakrtom visesajdtam mithyaiva ksetrajiiasveti tcidapayanena jfieyatvamuktam na sattanndsaducyata iti. updyikrtam mithydrupamapyastitvddhigamdiya jneyadhannavatparikalpyocyate sarvatahpdni- pddamityddi. tathdhi sampraddyaviddm vacanam — "adhydropdpavdddbhydm nispra- pancam prapancyate ' iti.

201 the Knower of the field {ksetrajiia) is to be expressed diversely due to the limiting adjuncts (upddhi) of the field (ksetra) that is unreal form of the phenomena. Though all the qualities of the unreal world do not belong to the Self or Brahman, still, for the purpose of comprehension of Its hidden nature many qualities are ascribed to Brahman Itself. This false ascription of such qualities to Brahman is called "’adhyaropa", since the qualities of the non-Self are superimposed on the Self.

Adhyaropa is possible because the entire universe is dependent on

Brahman, and nothing is apart from It,*^^ as It pervades all the creatures.

However, the false ascription has to be sublated immediately after the dawn of true idea on the reality. Sankara makes a definition of apavada in BSB 3.3.9:

Ablation occurs where a thing has got fastened on to it a deep- rooted, persistent, unreal idea, and then the true idea dawns to drive away the earlier unreal idea. For instance, the idea of Selfhood persisting with regard to the assemblage of body and senses is driven away by the subsequent true idea of Selfhood with regard to the Self Itself springing up from the (instruction), “That thou art”; or a confusion about directions is removed by the true idea of directions.

A. Rambachan, Accomplishing the Accomplished, p. 69. 3.3.9, p. 382, lines 10-15; Gambhira, p. 658: apavddo nama—yotra kasmimscidvcistuni purvanivistdydm mithydbuddhau niscitdydm pascddupajdycimdnd yathdrthd biiddhih purvanivistdyci mithydbuddhernivartikd bhavati. yathd dehen- driyasamghdte dtmabuddhirdtmanyevdtmabuddhyd pascddbhdvinyd ' tatlvamasi' ityanayd yatharthabuddhyd nivartyate. yathd vd digbhrdntibuddhirdigydthdlmya- buddhyd nivartyate. We have also definitions of adhyaropa and apavdda in the Veddnta-sdra, and yet those do not imply inethodological senses but simply epistemological senses of superimposition and de-superimposition, cf. Sadananda, Veddnta-sdra, 2.32 and 4.137.

202 Adhydropa is in fact possible because of the ground of which a certain false ascription is made, and this ground or support that is something behind can be known through the negation of that false ascription, i.e. apavdda,^* just as the falsely ascribed idea of selfhood is grounded on the real Self, but when the latter is known through the instruction, the former is subsequently negated. In the process of adhydropa-apavdda the instruction relies on the semblance between the Self and the non-Self through the self-limited language accompanied by its complete negation.

Netivdda or the via negativa"^ that is another method of instruction / is found in the Upanisads exceedingly and in Sankara’s works as well. It is based on the complete discredit on the language to speak of Brahman, just as the Brhaddranyaka Upanisad conveys that there is no other and more appropriate description than this “not this”.“ Saiikara, in his commentary on the above Upanisad 1.4.7, explains the text, “One should meditate upon as the Self” {dtmetyevopdslta):

Hence the conclusion is that Self alone which is not possessed of single features is to be meditated upon, for It is complete. The use of the particle 'iti' along with the word ‘Self’, to which you referred, only signifies that the truth of the Self is really beyond the scope of the term and the concept ‘Self’. f Otherwise the Sruti would only say, ‘One should meditate upon the Self.’^^’

T. R. V. Murti, “Revelation and Reason in Vedanta”, Edited by H. G. Coward, Studies in Indian Thought, p. 67. K. Das says that the method of "neti, neti" is the only method Sankara could adopt in characterizing the trans-subjective subject which is indicated by the term '"Brahman". cf. S. K. Das, A Study of the Vedanta, p. 115. “See BrU 2.3.6; 3.9.26; 4.2.4; 4.4.22; 4.5.15, etc. ‘’^BrB 1.4.7, p. 142, lines 12-27; Madhava, p. 95; ato'nekaikavisistastvdtmd krtsnatvddupasya eveti siddham. yastvdtmaiabdasyetiparah prayoga dtmaiabdapra-

203 The term and the concept of Atman is not permissible with regard to the

Self, since the text says "'dtmd iti eva updslta” instead of ""dtmdnam updsita". The word “/n” indicates the fact that the superimposed characteristic of Atman can be the object of meditation but not the real

Self (dtmatattva), and consequently, the real Self must be beyond the term {sabda) and the concept (pratyaya) of Atman. The method of ""neti neti” is therefore an emphasis on the impossibility of describing

Brahman by means of language, even by the term and the concept of

^^Brahman" and ^^Atman".^^

Centering around these three means of instruction or teaching, adhydropa-apavdda, netivdda, and laksand, there has been a serious discussion recently on the method of Sankara. The point in question is focused on which method of instruction is central to Sankara, if, at any rate, he adopts all the three in the methodology of liberation. Regardless of whatever misunderstanding there is, several scholars are of the opinion that laksand is a principal method and the other two are supplementary. It is R. De Smet who first emphasizes the superiority of laksand to others in the Advaita Vedanta. He suggests three methods in stages by saying that adhydropa makes attention on the reality; then, adhydropa is contradicted and neutralized by netivdda', finally, laksand signifies the Absolute.A. Rambachan also writes that adhydropa-

tyayayordtmatattvasya paramdrthato'avisayatvajnapandrtham. anyathd”tmdnannipd- sltetyevamavaksyat. **See BrB 2.3.6, p. 334, line 25- p. 335, line 2. cf. fn. 92. The repetition of the word “neti” stands for “apposition of negation” but not “negation of negation” of which Shanti Joshi speaks, cf. Shanti Joshi, The Message of Sankara, p. 117. ‘’’Re-quotation from Michael Comans, The Method of Early Advaita Vedanta, p. 290. cf. R. V. De Smet, The Theological Method of Samkara, Rome; Pontifical

204 apavdda and netivdda are essentially negative in character and they are completed by the positive method of laksand.^^ Michael Comans, admitting Rambachan’s statement thoroughly, gives an example that in the snake-rope illusion, error or ignorance cannot be removed by instructing “not a snake, not a snake!”, but the substratum of snake must also be positively pointed out, like “this is not a snake, it is a rope!”.^'

However, some of their points are untenable because of wrong propositions. First, adhydropa-apavdda is an inseparable single method, though apavdda alone can be identical with netivdda,^^ and therefore it is not simply a negative method but is also positive. Second, adhydropa- apavdda is not mere epistemological “superimposition and de­ superimposition”, rather it is a method of instruction implying “false attribution and its retraction”. Third, Sankara is not so attentive to laksand as to what they want to insist. The first two points will be understood naturally when the focus of discussion is shifted to the method of adhydropa-apavdda, and here the third point is to be proved in detail.

The method of laksand is said to be found in Sankara’s commentary on the Taittirlya Upanisad 2.1, where the passage, ‘'satyam jndnamanantam brahma” occurs. Sankara’s argument can be

Gregorian University, Unpublished Dissertation, 1953, p. 289. ™Cf. A. Rambachan, Accomplishing the AccompIished, p. 72. It seems that his statement of laksand serves for the strength of his main assertion that the final source of knowledge in Sankara is not anubhava but sruti. We have already discussed this point in the previous section and rejected his assertion. ^'Cf. Michael Comans, The Method, pp. 289-290. Potter, while he emphasizes a negative step of liberation, i.e., the removal of ignorance in the Advaita Vedanta, sums up this negative means by the name of "apavada” or “neti-neti”. cf. Karl H. Potter, Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, vol. U I~Advaita Vedanta up to Samkara and His Pupils, p. 8.

205 summarized; each of satyam, jfidnam, and anantam is not an adjective

{visesana) but an adjective by way of definition (laksana) which

differentiates Brahman from everything else, and each of the attributive

words is connected with Brahman independently, and thus the passage

should be read ‘‘‘'satyam brahma, jndnain brahma, anantam brahma". On

the other hand, the most important passages pertaining to the method of

laksand appear at the end of Sankara’s argument. He says:

Hence, too. Brahman is not the agent of cognition. And because of this, again, It cannot even be denoted by the word jndna (knowledge). Still Brahman is indicated, but not denoted, by the word ‘knowledge’ which really stands for a verisimilitude of Consciousness as referring to an attribute of the intellect; for Brahman is free from such things as class etc., which make the use of the word (knowledge) possible. Similarly, Brahman is not denoted even by the word satya (truth), since Brahman is by nature devoid of all distinctions. In this way, the word satya, which means external reality in general, can indirectly refer to Brahman (in such expressions) as 'Brahman is truth’, but it cannot denote It.^^

Brahman cannot be “denoted” (ucyate) by such words as satya, jhdna,

etc, since It is in Itself free from all kinds of distinctions. It can be

“indicated” (laksyate) by the word jndna that stands for the attribute of

intellect, which is merely a semblance of Brahman, and by the word

^■’TaB 2.1, p. 52, li nes 17-21; Gambhira, pp. 314-315: ota eva ca na jnanakarir. tasmadeva ca na jnanasabdavacyamapi tadbrcihma. tatha’pi tadcibhdsavacakena buddhidharmavisayena jnanasabdena tallciksyate na tucyate. sabdapravrttihetu- jatyadidharmarahitatvdt. taya satyasabdendpi sarvavisesapratyastamitasvariipatvdd- brahmano bdhyasattdsdmanyavisayena satyasabdena laksyate satyam brahiiieti na tii satyasabdavdcyameva brahma.

206 satya, which designates the external being in general. However, this

indication of Brahman by satya, jiiana, etc. does not mean that Sankara

uses the method of laksand. Brahman is indicated by such words as

satya, jnana, etc., which contain the conventional meaning, in the sense

that they are at best an indicatory mark or defining mark to convey their

own direct meaning to Brahman. Brahman cannot be described by the

words of satya, jnana, etc., and yet, when such words are used in the

defining sense, It can be indicated as “satyani brahma", “Jndnain

brahma", etc. (e.g. brahmano laksyate satyam brahmeti na tu

satyasabdavdcyameva brahma). The method of laksand or implication is

generally applied to the case when the direct meaning of a word does not

make proper sense, e.g. “that fire (student) recites well (the Veda)"

but in this case of definition of Brahman satya, jnana, etc. directly make

sense without the presence of implied meaning of secondary sense.

Though Brahman is indescribable, still It can be indicated through the

definition for the sake of Its distinction from other objects. Though

Brahman is defined, still It is the indicatory or defining mark plus some

X, i.e. something more, for the world may be “indicative” of Brahman

without being constitutive of It.^^ Moreover, the definition of Brahman

is nothing but an ascription to Brahman as the basis of all empirical

’“'C f. Naiskarmya-siddhi 3.97, p. 164: agnissamyagadhlte'sau ■■■. The later Advaitins classify laksand into three types generally, viz. jahallaksana, ajahallaksana and jahadajahallaksana {bhdgatyagalaksana). All the three takes implied ineaning (laksand), but the primary meaning is abandoned in jahallaksand\ it is retained in ajahallaksand', it is partly abandoned and partly retained in jahadajahallaksana. The later Advaitins tend to accept the third type of laksand in order to interpret mahdvdkyas of the Upanisads. ^^Cf. T. R. V. Murti, “The Two Definitions of Brahman in the Advaita”, Edited by H. G. Coward, Studies in Indian Thought, P. 77.

207 dealings,and thus, this laksana (definition) is closer to adhyaropa than laksana. Furthermore, such indicatory marks altogether have special function towards the thing indicated {Brahman) for the purpose of completing the definition of Brahman. Sankara goes on to say;

Thus the words truth etc., occurring in mutual proximity, and restricting and being restricted in turns by each other, distinguish Brahman from other objects denoted by the words, truth etc., and thus become fit for defining It as well. So, in accordance with the Vedic texts, ‘Failing to reach which {Brahman), words, along with the mind turn back’, and ‘(Whenever an aspirant gets fearlessly established in this changeless, bodiless,) inexpressible, and unsupporting Brahman', it is proved that Brahman is indescribable, and that unlike the construction of the expression, ‘a blue lotus’, Brahman is not to be construed as the import of any sentence.

The juxtaposition of the words, truth, knowledge, and infinity, excludes the indescribability of Brahman by those words, and makes its definition possible by means of their mutual qualifications. The three adjectives in the sense of definition negate opposite senses of their respective primary meanings, namely, immutable entity, self-luminous knowledge, and all­ pervasiveness, since definition means distinction of the defiuiendiini from everything else. However, in order to avoid possible misapprehension of Brahman through each independent adjective, they

^‘’Cf. TaB 2.8.5, p. 94, lines 28-31. see Chapter 3, fn. 86. TaB 2.1, p. 52, lines 21-25; Gambhira, p. 315: evam satyadisahda itaretarasamnidhavanyonyaniyainyaniyamakah s ant ah satyadisabdavacyattannivar- taka brahmano laksancirthasca bhavantityatah siddham ‘yato vcico nivartante. aprdpya manasd saha', 'anirukte'nilayane' iti cdvdcyatvam nilotpalovadvdkyar- thatvam ca brahmanah.

208 are used in apposition with mutual qualification and being qualified.In consequence, for instance, satya qualified by jnana negates the idea that

Brahman is an insentient entity, and jfidna qualified by satya negates the idea that It is knowledge of the objects, etc. Thus the definition of

Brahman is possible by the negation of the opposite sense of each adjective, and at the same time, by the mutual qualification of each adjective. Above all, satya, jncina, ananta do not require secondary meanings in the definition, rather they do impart primary meanings to the definiendum or Brahman Those who insist on the use of laksand in the definition of Brahman therefore confuse Sankara’s own method with the Advaitins'. Though Sankara shows some inkling that he employs the method of laksand in the Upadesa-sdhasrl,^^ it cannot be the central method of instruction because of predominance of other methods, i.e. adhydropa-apavdda and netivdda through his whole works.

It is said to be a dilemma that the Upanisads as pramdna of

Brahma-vidyd may not be maintained if Brahman is inexpressible through words.®' It is not necessary for the solution of this dilemma to claim as if Sankara employs the method of implication {laksand), for all

^*Cf. Chapter 4, fn. 32, for the mutual qualification and being qualified between the terms Brahman and Atman. ^’Sarikara says that the word ananta becomes an adjective by the negation of finitude, while the words satya and jndna become adjectives by imparting their own meaning, see TaB 2.1, p. 50, line 30- p. 51, line 2. *“C o m a n s enumerates several evidences for Sankara’s usage of laksanci, but out of those, we believe, USII 18.29, 18.79 are related to the method of laksana. cf. Michael Comans, The Method, pp. 297-300. In the eighteen chapters of USII, "Tattvamasi", Sankara does say that the word tvam directly refers to the “ego”, but indirectly implies the Self. S. Mayeda writes that the very method adopted there is anvayavyatireka, which is replaced by jahadajahallaksana of the later Advaitins, and dose not say that Sankara uses the method of laksana. cf. Sengaku Mayeda, A Thousand Teachings, pp. 53-57. *‘C f. A. Rambachan, Accomplishing the Accomplished, pp. 75-76.

209 that the method of ascription (adhyaropa) is enough to solve the dilemma.

In fact, the indication of Brahman by way of Its definition as well as other ascriptions to It is a proper solution through which the Upanisads can fulfill their role as the only valid means of knowledge, though they are delimited by words. As an answer to the question as to how the knowledge of identity between Brahman and Atman can arise from the limited and unreal Upanisadic texts, Sankara gives an example:

So also, after declaring that when some evil omens come within the range of one’s direct perception, one should conclude, “Methinks I shall not live long”, it is said, “Then again, a black man with black teeth, if seen in a dream, causes the death of the dreamer”, which text shows that true death is indicated by that false dream itself. Moreover, it is a well-known fact in this world, that to people, well versed in the method of inferring from agreement and difference, a dream of particular type prognosticates something, while a dream of another type foreshadows something else. Similarly from the false perception of the presence of letters in some lines (drawn on paper) the true letters like ‘a’ etc. are grasped.

Though the Upanisads (vaidika) belong to the empirical level

(vydvaharika) along with the worldly dealings (laukika), they can convey the knowledge of Brahman without fail. Just as true death is indicated by the false dream itself, or the true sound of the letter is

*^BSB 2.1.14, p. 199, lines 11-17; Gambhira, p. 331: tatha pratyaksadarsanesu kesucidaristesu jdtesu ‘na ciramiva jivisyatiti vidyat' ityuktva ‘atha yah svapnc purusam krsnam krsnadantam pasyati sa enam hand’ ityadina tenci tencisatyenaiva svapnadarsanena satyam maranam siicyata iti darsayati. prasiddham cedani lake'nvayavyatirekakuicilanamidrsena svapnadarsanena sadhvdgamah sucyata idrse- ndsadlivdgama iti. tathd' karddisalyd ksarapra tipa ttirdrsla rekhdnrtdksarapratipatleh.

210 indicated by the false written letter, the nature of Brahman can be indicated by the Upanisads, through the definition of Brahman and the ascription of some characteristics to It. If this positive ascription is not supposed in the method of Sankara, he cannot make such a positive statement that the purport of the Upanisads is the unity of Brahman, or the identity between Brahman and Atman, and further, the instruction of liberation has no meaning because inexpressible Brahman can be known in no way. However, this positive description of Brahman in terms of adhydropa should always be negated by the method of “neti, netV' after all.

The central method of instruction in Saiikara’s Advaita Vedanta is adhydropa-apavdda despite of no direct mention by Sankara himself.*^’

The method that he employs for the textual harmony is in fact invariably related with that of instruction. As we have seen, for example, sagiina

Brahman is simply Brahman, which is conditioned owing to upddhi, and therefore, it is said to be the means for concentrating the mind on the unconditioned Brahman. For the necessity of two different instructions about two Brahman Sankara observes: “Therefore the division made by us of the (separate) instructions about Brahman with form and without form is more reasonable.”*'* Just as saguna Brahman has the validity within the domain of ignorance, its instruction is also reasonable for all

**’E x c e p t BGB 13.13. However, if we consider Sankara’s teaching techniques such as the use of examples, the telling of stories, inethods of progressive interiorisation, suggested by Hirst, it can be said that adhyaropa-apavada consists of the very essential of the framework of his teaching or instruction, cf. J. G. Suthren Hirst, “The Place of Teaching Techniques in Samkara’s Theology”, Journal of Indian Philosophy, vol. 18, p. 139. 3.2.21, p. 363, lines 21-22; Gambhira, p. 623: tasmddasmadukta eva vibhdga dkdravadandkaropadesdndm yuktatara iti.

211 that there is only nirguna Brahman. We can make out it in the followinj

statement of Sankara:

As for expressions like “(The Self) is to be seen” (BrU 2.4.5), which are met with in the context of the supreme knowledge, they are meant mainly for attracting one’s mind towards Reality, but do not aim mainly at enjoining any injunction about the knowledge of Reality. In ordinary parlance also, when such directive sentences as, “Look at this”, “Lend ear to that”, etc. are uttered, all that is meant is, “Be attentive to these”, but not, “Acquire this knowledge directly”. And a man, who is in the presence of an object to be known, may sometimes know it, and sometimes not. Hence a man who wants to impart the knowledge of the thing has to draw his attention to the object of knowledge itself. When that is done, the knowledge arises naturally in conformity with the object and the means of knowledge.

The passage like “(The Self) is to be seen” which seems to be an

injunction, does not aim at enjoining the knowledge of Brahman, but

merely at directing one’s attention to it. The instruction about Brahman

with form is therefore for the attention of one’s mind to the reality, while

that about Brahman without form is still for Its transcendental nature in

which all the empirical language turns back. The conditioned Brahman

or saguna Brahman has the function as the means for the end, but in

itself it has to be treated as the product of avidyd. Saguna Brahman is

^'ibid., p. 362, line 22- p. 363, line 1; Gambhira, p. 622: drastavycnlisabda api paravidyadhikarapathitastattvabhimukhikaranaprcidhana na tattvuvabodhavidhipru- dhana bhcivanti. loke'pldam pasyedamakarnayeli caivcimjcitiyakesu nirdesesu pranidhcinamatram kurvityucyate, na sciksajjndnameva kurviti. jneydbhimukhasydpi jnctnam kadcicijjayate kadacinna Jdyate, tasmdttam prati jiianavisaya eva darsayi- tavyo Jildpayitukdmena. tasmindarsite svaycimeva yathdvisayam yathdpramcinam ca jndnamutpadyale.

212 nothing but the application of adhyaropa of nirguna Brahman for the purpose of instruction, and its subsequent negation at the final stage is that of apavdda. Although the knowledge of the Self, which results in instantaneous release (sadyomukti), has no relationship with the various limiting conditions, yet its instruction has to be imparted with the help f of that relationship. In BSB 3.2.22 Sankara repeats discussion on the instructions with reference to two aspects of Brahman, and shows the method of adhydropa-apavdda:

And when after the two forms of Brahman have been elaborated, the curiosity arises to know the nature of the possessor of the forms, then commences the text with “Not so, not so”. ••• And the misconception has no scope here as to why the scripture itself should first show the two aspects of Brahman, only to deny them the next moment contrary to the popular adage, “Rather than wash away the mud, it is much better to avoid its very contact from a distance”. For this scripture does not present the two aspects of Brahman as subjects fit for being expounded, but it simply refers to these aspects that are superimposed on Brahman and are popularly well recognized; and this is done for the sake of denying them and establishing the real, pure nature of Brahman. ••• Hence the conclusion is that the phenomenal expressions, imagined on Brahman, are denied, and Brahman stands out as outside the 87 negation.

*‘'C f. BSB 1.1.12, p. 35, lines 19-20: evam sadyomuktikaranamapyatmajna- namupadhivisesadvarenopadisyamdnamapyavivaksitopadhisatnbandhavisesam . ®’B S B 3.2.22, p. 365, lines 16- p. 366, line 6; Gambhira, pp. 626-621 \ prcipan- cite ca tadlye riipadvaye rupavatah svcirupajijficisdyamidamupakrantam— ’’atliclla adeso neti neti' iti. na catreyamdsahkd kartavyd—katham hi sdstram svciyameva brahmano rupadvayam darsayitvd svayameva punah pratisedhati— 'praksdlandddhi pahkasya durddasparsanam varam' iti. yato nedcim sdstram pratipddyaivena brahmano rupadvayam nirdisati, lokaprasiddham tvidam rupadvayam brahmani kalpitam pardmrsati pratisedhyatvdya iuddhabrahmasvariipapratipddandya cell niravadyam. ■■■ tasmdtprapancameva brahmani kalpitam pratisedhati parisinasti

213 Sankara here explains why the scriptures deny the two aspects of

Brahman after showing them, or, why the scriptures first stimulate the curiosity of two forms of Brahman and again negate them by means of

'^neti, neti”. Just as it is better to avoid the dirt from a distance rather than bathing after touching it, is it also better to withdraw the distinction of two Brahman rather than negating them after distinguishing themselves? The point of Sankara is that the scriptures do not really set forth the two aspects of Brahman as the purport, but they simply refer to these aspects, which are fictitiously attributed to Brahman, in order to negate them and to establish the real nature of Brahman. Though

Brahman has nothing to do with two aspects which are falsely ascribed to It, It is explained with the help of them (adhyaropa) for easy recognition, and yet those ascriptions are finally negated (apavdda) for the purpose of accomplishing the true nature of Brahman, i.e. the transcendental Brahman. However, the thing, which is negated, is not

Brahman Itself but the phenomenal expressions and cosmic plurality iprapafica)^^ that are falsely superimposed on Brahman.

Another indirect statement on the method of adhydropa-apavdda is seen in BSB 1.1.12, where the “Blissful One” (dnandamaya) is the main topic. Sankara' starts discussion whether dnandamaya 89 indicates the supreme Self or secondary self, and concludes that it is the supreme Self

brahmeti nirnayah. **The term prapaiica stands for the multitude of phenomenal world in the sense of illusion, and its opposite term is nisprapanca, which is nothing but Brahman in the Advaita Vedanta. In BGB 13.13 we can find these two terms in connection with the method of adhyaropa-apavada. cf. fn. 61. *®The topic of dnandamaya is discussed in the dnandamaya-adhikarana, which includes the xutras from 1.1.12 to 1.1.19.

214 because of its repetition in the Upanisads (dnandamayo' bhydsdt).

Sankara insists dnandamaya as a primary Self in tiie following passages by presenting some other reason:

The objection that the Self consisting of bliss can only denote the secondary Self (the Samsdrin), because it forms a link in a series of secondary Selfs, beginning with the one consisting of food, is of no force, for the reason that the Self consisting of bliss is the innermost of all. The Sdstra, wishing to convey information about the primary Self, adapts itself to common notions, in so far as it at first refers to the body consisting of food, which, although not the Self, is by very obtuse people identified with it; it then proceeds from the body to another Self, which has the same shape with the preceding one, just as the statue possesses the form of the mould into which the molten brass had been poured; then, again, to another one, always at first representing the Non-Self as the Self, for the purpose of easier comprehension; and it finally teaches that the innermost Self, which consists of bliss, is the real Self.*^®

For easy comprehension or instruction of the Self the scriptures teach about dnandamaya as something other than the Self by adopting common notions which are superimposed ideas on the Self (adhydropa). In order to reach the knowledge of the Self some false ascription is given to something which is similar to the Self, and again , another ascription is given after grasping the first one, and finally the scriptures convey the

BSB 1.1.12, p. 37, lines 1-7; Thibautl, pp. 65-66: yatliiktamaiina- mayadyamukhyatmapravahapatitatvadanandainaycisyapyaniukhycitvamiti, nclsau dosah, anandamaycisya sarvantaratvat. iniikhyameva hyatmancunupadidiksu siislrcim luka- buddhimanuscirat, annamayam sanramanatmdnamatyantamudhanamdtmatvena praxi- ddhamaniidya musdnisiktadnitatamrddipratimdvattcito 'ntaram tato 'ntarcimityevarn purvena purvena samdnamuttaramuttaramandtmdnamdtmeti grdhayat, pratipattisau- karydpeksayd sarvdntaram mukhyamdnandamayamdtmdnamupadideseti slistataram.

215 true teaching that anandamaya is the primary Self. Sankara does not stop here but goes to another step in BSB 1.1.19, which consists of the concluding part of the anandamaya-adhikarana. He says that anandamaya is not Brahman and dnanda (Bliss Itself) should be

Brahman.'^^ Sankara again adopts the method of adhydropa-apavdda here by denying the previous ascription of anandamaya to Brahman and establishing the true nature of Brahman, i.e. dnanda. However, Brahman as dnanda is further negated (apavdda) at the end, and ‘‘neti, neti" alone is left as the only way of description. Sankara declares:

Brahman is described by means of name, form and action superimposed on It, in such terms as ‘Knowledge, Bliss, Brahman', and ‘Pure, Intelligence’, 'Brahman', and ‘Atman'. When, however, we wish to describe Its true nature, free from all differences due to limiting adjuncts, then it is an utter impossibility. Then there is only one way left, viz to describe It as ‘Not this, not this’, by eliminating all possible specifications of It that have been known.

Sankara compares this method of adhydropa-apavdda with the way of indicating the star Arundhatl which the priest has to direct the newly married couple to look at. The priest at first points to several stars, as if they are real Arundhatl while they are not, and at the end, he points to

®'Cf. BSB 1.1.19, p. 42, line 9: na tvanandamayasya brahmatvamasti, ■■■. see ibid., line 23. Also, see ibid., p. 43, line 1: ••• yuktamdnandasya brahmatvani. ’^BrB 2.3.6, p. 334, line 25- p. 335, line 2; Madhava p. 239: aclhydro- pitandmarupakarmadvdrena brahma nirdisyate vijndnamdnandam brahma vijfidnaghana eva brahmd" tmetyevamddisabdai h yadd punah svariipameva nirdidiksitam bhavati nirantasarvopddhiviiesam tadd na kenacidapi prakdrena nirdestum. tadd'yamevdbhyitpdyo yaduta prdptanirdeiapratisedhaddhdrena ricti netlti nirdesah.

216 the real Arundhatl by denying all the previous false ascriptions.^^ The star Arundhatl is so small that it cannot be perceived directly without the help of big stars pointed by the priest, so false ascriptions for attention are necessary and yet finally they are inevitably negated when the real Arundhatl is perceived. Similarly the transcendental Brahman which cannot be described by words can be known through the false ascription and subsequent negation.

It should be noted that even though false ascription is negated,

Brahman Itself can never be negated, for something unreal is always negated on the basis of something real. Sankara says that if everything is negated no entity remains, and if there is no entity, some other entity cannot be negated, and consequently, something real becomes a reality of which the denial itself is impossible. The Upanisads reveal distinctionless Brahman through the negation of other aspects

{pararupapratisedha)', in other words, the texts teach the transcendental Brahman through the method of adhydropa-apavdda, but the reality is not negated in any shape, just as the sun is never negated while it is reflected in water. Sankara runs over this view in the

Upadesa-sdhasrl:

This negation is not one of a reality, but is of a false

’^Cf. BSB 1.1.12, p.37, lines 7-9: yathdrundhatlnidarsane bahvlsvapi tcird- svamukhydsvarundhatlsu darsitdsu yd’ntya pradarsyate sd mukhyaivdriindhatl bha- vati, ■■■. Also, see BSB 1.1.8, p. 31, lines 23-25. ’‘‘Cf. BSB 3.2.22, p. 364, lines 20-22: ubhayapratisedhe tii ko’nyo bhdvah pariiisyeta. aparisisyamdne cdnyasminya itarah pratiseddhiimdrabhyate pratise- ddhumasakyatvattasyaiva paramdrthatvdpatteh pratisedhdnupapattih. ’^Cf. BSB 3.2.17, p. 358, line 13: darsayati ca srutih pararupapratisedhenaivci brahma, nirvisesatvdt. Also, see BSB 3.2.18, p. 358, lines 25-26.

217 superimposition only like the prohibition of the placing of fire on the highest region of the sky; for liberation would have surely been transitory if things really existing were negated.

The object of negation is what has not been acquired {aprapta), i.e. the superimposition on the Self, but not the Self that is an already acquired thing (prdpta). Just as a king who is hidden and unseen in the army is known after negating all others who are not the king,‘^’ the Self remains outside negation even after all empirical expressions are retracted. If the ground of negation, i.e. Brahman is negated, liberation becomes surely non-eternal, and therefore, there would be no real sense of liberation.

There is no clear distinction between the method of adhydropa- apavdda and that of netivdda in Sankara’s writings, although the former implies all the process of attribution and negation while the latter remains at the end as the only final description of Brahman. Since "''neti, neti" is the negation of something attributed to Brahman, this something should be the superimposition {adhydropa) of the non-Self on the Seif.'^^

Sankara says that the word “in'”, which generally indicates the thing proximate to it, refers to the phenomenal aspects or expressions of

Brahman, and the word “«a” has the sense of denial.^*’ That there is

’^USII 18.23, p. 214; Jagada, p. 225: praptascetpratisidhyeta mokso'nityo bhaveddhruvam, ato'prciptanisedho'yam divyagnicciyanadivat. ” C f. ChB 7.1.3, p. 393, line 24- p. 394, line 1. 98 Comans says that the Upanisad.s culminate in the “negation of superimposition” in order to reveal the self-evident Atman. This statement of Comans, as far as “negation of superimposition” means that of false attributes to Brahman or Atman, indicates that Sankara also follows the Upanisadic method of adhyaropa-apavada inclusive of netivada, although Comans himself continuously maintains laksana as the central method of Sankara, cf. Michael Comans, “Sankara and the Prasankhyanavada”, Journal of Indian Philosophy, vol. 24, pp. 55-56. '’’C f. BSB 3.2.22, p. 365, lines 14-15: tadetatsaprapaiicam brahmano riipain samnihitdlambanenetikaranena pratisedhakam nanam pratyupaniyata Hi gamyate.

218 nothing beyond Brahman, or separate from Brahman is understood by the word “neti, and thus, it is a certain fact that the object of denial or negation is the things which are proximate to Brahman, or the false ascriptions which are superimposed on Brahman. We have innumerable examples that Sankara connects “neti, neti” with adhydropa and uses it in the sense of apavdda:

It is by the elimination of these limiting adjuncts that the Sruti wishes to define the nature of Brahman negatively, saying, ‘Not this, not this.’'®'

Since, in spite of the truth being presented in a hundred ways, the Self is the last word of it all, arrived at by the process of ‘Not this, not this’, •••.

And Brahman is spoken of through Gdyatri because It, which is devoid of all qualifications and is attainable through the process of negation of attributes, in the form, ‘not this, not this’, etc. is difficult to be comprehended (as such).'”’’

This superimposition (of the ego on the Self) is negated on the evidence of the Sruti, ‘Not this, not this’, as if it were a reality,

'*’C f. ibid., p. 366, lines 9-11: neti netltyasya ko'rthah. na hyetasniadbrahmano vyatiriktamastityato neti netltyucyate, ■■■. 2.3.1, p. 320, lines 7-9; Madhava, p. 228: yadupadhivisesapanaya- dvdrena neti netlti brahmanah satattvam nirdidhdrayisitam. Also, see BrB 2.3.6, p. 334, line 25- p. 335, line 2; ibid., p. 335, lines 22-26. '°^BrB 4.5.15, p. 714, line 3; Madhava, p. 544; yasmdtprakdrasatendpi niriipya- indne tattve neti netydtmaiva nisthcl ■■■. '°^ChB 3.12.intro., p. 152, lines 7-8; Gambhira, p. 190: brahmanah sarvaviscsa- rahitasya neti netltyddivisesapratisedhagamyasya durbodhatvdt. "’“'U S II 18.21, p. 214; Jagada, p. 224: so'dhydso neti netiti prdptavatprati- sidhyate, ■■■.

219 With regard to the instruction of Brahman for the Self-realization, Its definition, Its creation or transformation. Its nature such as bliss, fearlessness, Its attainment, etc. are attributed to Itself, which is the ground of all empirical dealings (vyavahdravisaya), and yet with regard to Brahman Itself (paramdrtha) no such attribution or ascription is possible, for “neti, netV' is the only possible description. The following passages are the nutshell of Sankara’s method of adhydropa- apavdda which includes that of ‘'neti, neti":

It is to bring home this purport that the ideas of projection, maintenance, dissolution, etc., as well as those of action and its factors and results were superimposed on the Self. Again, by their negation—by the elimination of the superimposed attributes through a process of ‘Not this, not this’—the truth has been known. Just as, in order to explain the nature of numbers from one up to a hundred thousand billions, a man superimposes them on certain lines (digits), calling one of them one, another ten, another hundred, yet another thousand, and so on, and in so doing he only expounds the nature of numbers but he never says that the numbers are the lines; or just as in order to teach the alphabet, he has recourse to a combination of leaf, ink, lines, etc., and through them explains the nature of the letters, but he never says that the letters are the leaf, ink, lines, etc., similarly in this exposition the one entity. Brahman, has been inculcated through various means, such as the protection (of the universe). Again, to eliminate the differences created by those hypothetical means, the truth has been summed up as ‘Not this, not this’.’^*^

‘“ C f. TaB 2.8.5, p. 94, lines 28-31. ‘“^BrB 4.4.25, p. 704, lines 4-14; Madhava, p. 534: etasyciivdrthasya samyak- prabodhayotpattisthitipralayadikalpana kriydkcirakaphaladhyaropana c a” tin an i krtd tadapohena ca neti netityadhyaropitavisesdpanayadvdrena punastattvamdveditam. yathaikaprabhrtydpardrdhasamkhydsvarupaparijndndya rekhddhydropanam krtvaike- yam rekhd daseyam sateyani sahasreyamiti grdhayatyavagamayati samkhydsvariipaiu

220 As is seen in the two examples of “number” and “letter”, the false ascriptions do not really tell the thing itself, but they are merely the various hypothetical means (aneka updya, kalpita updya). The truth or reality is known by the negation of the superimposed attribution; the negation in which the process of ''neti, neti” takes place is itself culminated by "’neti, neti”. Therefore, so far as the instruction of

Brahman is concerned, adhydropa-apavdda is the only central method to show the indescribable Brahman, and “neti, neti” is a part of this method not only as a form of apavdda but also as the final stage of that very method.

The method of adhydropa-apavdda, according to Swami

Satchidanandendra, is the only traditional method of the Vedanta, which is embodied in the Upanisads and in the philosophy of Gaudapada as well.'*^^ He takes special notice of the Gaudapdda-Kdrikd 3.15 and 3.26, in which this method is actualized:

The creation that has been multifariously set forth with the help of the examples of earth, gold, sparks, etc., is merely by way of generating the idea (of oneness); but there is no multiplicity in any way. 108

Since by taking the help of incomprehensibility (of Brahman) kevalam samkhyaya rekhdtmatvameva yatha cdkaradJnyaksardni vijigrdhayihuii palramaslrekhddisamyogopdyamdsthdya varndndm satatlvamdvedayati na patramasy- ddydtmcitdmaksardndm grdhayoti tathd cehotpattyddyanekopdyaindsthdyaikciiu brahmatatlvamdveditam. punastatkalpitupdyaJonHaviieiaparisodhandrlliam iieli netlti tattvopasamhdrah krtah. '“’C f. Satchidanandendra Saraswati, The Method of the Vedanta, pp. 9-27; How to Recognize the Method of Veddiita, pp. 29-51; Misconceptions about Sankara, pp. 27-31; Suddha-Sdhkara-Prakriyd-Bhdskara, pp. 51-62. ^'^^Gaudapdda-Kdrikd 3.15, p. 23; Gambhira, p. 284; mrliohavisphulingddyaih srsfiryd coditdnyathd, updyah so'vatdrdya ndsti bhedah katharncana.

221 as a reason, all that was explained earlier (as a means for the knowledge of Brahman) is negated by the text, ‘This Self is that which has been described as “Not this, not this”’, therefore I rtrt the birthless Self becomes self-revealed.

It goes without saying that Gaudapada exposes the method of adhydropa-apavdda in some degree, though he does not make use of the method throughout his work unlike Sankara. At any rate,

Satchidanandendra sums up this method with a view that the negative process of the method generates the positive result:

The essence of the method of false attribution is that imaginary characteristics are first attributed to the Absolute, and this serves as a negation of whatever is incompatible with those characteristics; then later even the falsely attributed characteristics are negated. Efforts to abolish falsely attributed characteristics have to be continued till all are removed. In this way the true nature of the Absolute can become known through the mere negation of all false attributions.

For all that the process of false attribution and its negation has the negative aspect about the description of Brahman, it leads to the positive fruit of the Self-realization. So far as the philosophical aim of

Sankara is the realization of the Self, or liberation, adhydropa-apavdda is the best device which can bring it forth in actuality. The Upanisads are the integration of false attribution of Brahman and of its final negation for the purpose of liberation, and they are authoritative just

Gaudapada-Kdrikd 3.26, p. 26; Gambhira. p. 298: sa esci neti netJii vyakhvdtam nihnute yatah, sarvamcigrdhyabhdvena hetundjam prakdsate. '°Satchidanandendra Sarasvvati, The Method of the Vedanta, p. 43.

222 because they, as the means, are bound to be sublated after functioning to help the emergence of intuitive knowledge, or immediate experience of

Brahman. The goal of the scripture along with teacher lies in the logical and theoretical explanation of the reality, but more important is the actual and practical enlightenment through the right instruction.

Adhydropa-apavdda can fulfill these two sides of instruction, i.e. theory and practice, without distinguishing them.

There is an intimate relationship between adhydropa-apavdda and avidyd, for the former is the method of instruction and the latter has the methodological implication in Sankara. It is within the boundary of avidyd that the instruction of Brahman is made and operated, and therefore it can be said that the whole process of adhydropa-apavdda takes place under the scope of avidyd. Nothing can escape the scope of avidyd except liberation which is placed outside the empirical dealings as well as the texts. If everything belongs to the domain of avidyd except the Self-realization, there would be no instruction that is not bound to be sublated. Any kind of instruction should be the false attribution due to the influence of avidyd-, otherwise there must be no avidyd at all. Further, any kind of instruction should be subsequently negated on the ground of the reality, otherwise there must be no moksa at all. Therefore, as far as avidyd influences all empirical scopes, the method of adhydropa-apavdda is the only proper way of instruction so that liberation is attained by means of the removal of that very avidyd.

\\\,Cf. BrB 4.5.15, p. 721, line 15: moksamekam varjayitvci'nyasyavidyavi.su- vatvat.

223 3. From Avidyd to the Self-realization

One of the modern theological interpreters about the Advaita

Vedanta, Francis X. Clooney, seems to divide the truth of the Advaita

Vedanta into three: (1) the textual truth, (2) the referential truth, and (3) the post- and extra-textual truth.Since the ineffability of Brahman cannot consist of the content of the Upanisads and yet it has to be inscribed within the Upanisads, the truth of the text (textual truth) and the truth referred to by the text (referential truth) are simultaneous as well as differentiated from each other. This statement cannot be tenable unless there is another truth, post- and extra-textual truth, which consists in the realization of the reality, for liberation is not within the

Upanisads or the texts at any rate, even though it is possible only after understanding of the previous two truths. So long as Brahman is not realized, or so far as the empirical viewpoint is concerned, the validity of the Upanisads is unquestionable, yet the truth of the Upanisads must be actualized in the outside of the Upanisads', in other words, the referential truth must turn out to be the post- and extra-textual truth. We will examine how and why Sankara comes out of the text in order to attain the Self-realization, and what the final role of the text is in connection with avidyd.

According to Saiikara, all forms of worldly and Vedic dealings which are related with the means of knowledge (pramdna) including the scriptures (sabda), the object of knowledge (prameya), and the result

112, Cf. Francis X. Clooney, S. J., Theology after Vedanta, p. 82, p. 119.

224 (phala), are subject to superimposition, i.e. avidyd. Moreover, he says that those are real only before the realization of the Self, but after that realization nothing remains to be real except the pure and eternal Self.

Then, how can the Upanisads that are subject to ignorance and are

unreal {asatya) reveal the true and real (satya) knowledge of the identity

between Brahman and Atmanl^^^ Sankara’s answer to this question is, as

we have already discussed, that the false can indicate the real just as

that indicated in the false dream comes true in the actual world.There

are two seemingly contradictory facts that the Upanisads cannot

transgress the limits of their dependence on ignorance, and at the same

time, they lead to the Self-realization at the end. Again, the Upanisads

are at work only before the emergence of knowledge of Brahman, and at

the same time, they certainly remain intact and valid before that

knowledge. Sankara epitomizes the role of the scriptures from beginning

to end in the forms of compression of ideas in the commentary on the

Brhaddranyaka Upanisad 5.1.1:

Therefore the scriptures, taking the dualistic world as it is- created by ignorance and natural to everybody—first advise the performance of rites calculated to achieve the desired ends to those who are possessed of that natural ignorance and defects such as attachment and aversion; afterwards, when they see the well-known evils of actions, their factors and their results, and wish to attain their real state of aloofness, which is the

"■'’C f. BSB 2.1.14, p. 198, lines 24-25: katham tvasatyena vcdanutvdkyena satyasya brahmdtmatvasya pratipattirupapadyeta. " ‘'C f. fn. 82. The same example can be applied to the method of adhydropa- apavada as well as the relation of the scripture and liberation. The reason will be given at the end of this section.

225 opposite of duality, the scriptures teach them, as a means to it, the knowledge of Brahman, consisting in the realisation of the unity of the Self. So when they have attained that result—their real state of aloofness, their interest in the validity of the scriptures ceases. And in the absence of that the scriptures too just cease to be scriptures to them."^

The scriptures that deal with the dualistic world created by ignorance

are enjoined to those who are possessed of that ignorance which is the

cause of actions etc., but the same scriptures teach the aloofness

(udaslnyasvarupa) of the Self or the unity of the Self to those who see

such ignorance, and operate as a means to attain the Self. However,

when the knowledge of the Self or Brahman is attained, the validity of

the scriptures is not effective any more, and accordingly, the scriptures

themselves cease to be scriptures. For those who rise above actions etc.,

the Vedas are then no more Fec/a.s,‘“’ and “when the result, consisting in

full enlightenment, is achieved, no other effort can be prescribed, since

a man goes beyond the domain of scripture when he realizes the oneness

of the Self with Brahman.”^^^ Therefore, the Upanisads cease to be

5.1.1, p. 735, lines 21-27; Madhava, pp. 560-561; lasmddyotlulprdp- tameva dvaitamavidyakrtain svdbhavikamupadaya svabhdvikyaivdvidyayd yukldya rdgadvesddidosavate yathdbhimatapurusdrthasddhanam kannopadisatyagre paicdt- prasiddhakriydkdrakaphalaritpcidosadarsanavate tadviparltauddslnyasvarupdvasthd- naphaldrthine tadupdyabhutdmdtmaikatvadariandtmikdm brahmavidydmupadisati. athaivam sati tadauddslnyasvarupdvasthdne phale prdpte sdstrasya prdmdnyam pratyarthitvam nivartate. tadabhdvdcchdstrasydpi sdstratvam tarn prati nivarlala eva. “ ^Cf. BrB 4.3.22, p. 611, lines 17-18; ••• Icitkanndtikramanddetasminkdle vedd apyaveddh sampadyante. The passage “The Vedas are no Vedas {vedd aveddh)" is included in BrU 4.3.22, and Sankara again explains it BSB 4.1.4 by saying that in the state of realization there is absence of the Vedas themselves, see BSB 4.1.3, p. 465, lines 6-8. "’BSB 4.1.12, p. 471, lines 17-19; Gambhira, p. 833; nahi samyagdarsane kdrye nispanne yatndntaram kimcicchdsitum sakyam, aniyojyabrahmdtmatvapratipalteh sdstrasydvisayatvdt.

226 Upanisads in the state of liberation after instructing the knowledge of

Brahman, as the false means {Upanisads) can result in the true end

(moksa).

There can be a possible objection that if Brahman is a universal truth as the only reality, there would be nobody who is to receive instruction and who is to profit by it. Are the instructions of the truth, or the Upanisads themselves useless even in the beginning? Sankara argues:

For (if you contend on the ground that) actions are the result of many factors, (we have already refuted this point, hence) at whom is the objection levelled? (Surely not at us. If, however, your ground is that) when the transcendent Brahman is realised as the only existence, there is neither instruction nor the instructor nor the result of receiving the instruction, and therefore the Upanisads are useless—it is a position we readily admit. But if you urge that (even before Brahman is realised) instruction is useless, since it depends on many factors, we reply, no, for it will contradict the assumption of all believers

T I Q in the self (including yourself).

It is not before the realization of Brahman but after it that the instruction is useless, for the universal Brahman is known only through the Upanisads, and yet when It is known there are no more instruction, instructor, and the result of instruction. Even before the Self-realization

"*BrB 2.1.20, p. 311, lines 13-17; Madhava, p. 219: anekakcirakasadhyatval- kriydnam kascodyo bhavati. ekasminbrahmani nirupcidhike tiopadeso nopadesta na copadesagrahanaphalam. tasmddupanisaddm cd’narthakyamityetadabhyupagatanieva. athdnekdrakavisaydnarthakyam codyate. na. svato'bhyupagamavirodhdddtmavddi- n d m.

227 one is always Brahman and is eternally liberated, but because of ignorance one considers himself to be different from Brahman and to be bound in the transmigratory state. This is why the Upanisads are necessary to remove that ignorance, although they themselves are unreal from the point of view of the reality. The universal truth that Atman is

Brahman is simply unknown due to avidyd and is known through the scriptures which provide the knowledge for the destruction of avidyd by means of instruction.

The fact that the Upanisads are useless after liberation implies that they are still placed by Sankara within avidyd^^'^ and perish after the removal of that avidyd. When avidyd is completely destroyed by the knowledge of Brahman, the Upanisads that belong to the realm of avidyd must be abandoned simultaneously. Sankara says that everything except liberation is within the province of avidyd, and for example, he says: “even all such talk about the Self— starting with (the texts dealing with) self-luminosity and ending with emancipation—is within the range of ignorance.” Hence, here the question arises: how can what belongs to avidyd be a means to remove avidyd itself? In fact, this question is the same as the previous one on how the false Upanisads can result in the true end, i.e. liberation. Safikara is aware of this problem and shows it in the commentary on the Prasna Upanisad 6.3:

Similarly in the Vdjasaneyaka Upanisad it is shown elaborately

"^Cf. G. C. Pande, Life and Thought of Sail karocd ryn, p. 176. '^VrB 4.5, p. 37, lines 23-24; Gambhira, p. 458; yasmatsvayamjyotixtvadivya- vahdro'pydmokscintah scirvo' vidydvisaya eva ■■■.

228 how in the domain of ignorance which comprises things other than the supreme Reality, it is possible to do such things as the compilation of scriptures: ‘Because when there is duality, as it were, (then one sees something)’ etc.‘^'

The point at issue is that the scriptures are useful in the domain of ignorance, since there is only duality, which is nothing but the creation of ignorance, before liberation. As long as the duality persists, it is unavoidable that everything is done within avidyd. On the contrary, when there is the non-dual Self alone the problem that the scriptures are useful or useless does not even make sense any more. Therefore, there can be no conclusion other than that the Upanisads, in which false ascription and negation themselves are embodied, are false ascription and are negated at the end when the Self is realized. The Upanisads are false ascription in the sense that they are operative within the scope of avidyd as a means of the knowledge of Brahman. The process of false ascription and negation inside the text and outside the text are the same.

Just as the indescribable Brahman is known through the method of adhyaropa-apavada inside the text, the Self-realization is attained through the same method outside the text. Because of avidya the text cannot be real but false, but the false means can ironically lead to remove avidyd and produce the true result, i.e. liberation.

Sankara’s standpoint on the text is inevitably related with his / attitude on language. Karl Potter writes that Sankara is, on the one hand.

'^‘ibid. 6.3, p. 69, lines 7-9; Gambhira, p. 495; sastrapranayanadyiipcipattiin cct"hanyatra paramarthavastusvarupddavidydvisaye, "yatra hi dvaitamiva hhavati' ityddi vistarato vdjasaneyake.

229 suspicious of language, but on the other hand, he finds the mechanism of liberation ultimately in an act that requires speech.Even though language is false it can lead to the knowledge of Brahman, just as the true knowledge of Brahman can arise through the false Upanisads.

Sankara says:

••• though the action of being bitten by a snake or having a bath, experienced by a person dreaming, is no doubt untrue, the fruit of that action, viz. his experience of that action, is indeed true enough, because that experience is not effaced or removed even after such person awakens. No man, who after waking up from a dream considers the action of such a snake-bite or his own bath as experienced by him in his dream as unreal, ever considers his knowledge of the experience of that action also, as unreal.

The knowledge of Brahman which is attained from the false Upanisads cannot be sublated in the state of liberation because it is not the means but the end of that means. In this way language that never touches the reality and even contradicts to it cannot go beyond the text, though it plays a role for the knowledge of Brahman inside the text. This is why

Sankara emphasizes direct intuition or immediate experience (anubhava) that is freed from the taint of words or any of ordinary p r a m d n a s The final destination of language is ''neti, neti" only inside the text, but it

Karl H. Potter, Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, vol. Ill—Advaita Vedanta up to Samkara and His Pupils, p. 54. 2.1.14, p. 199, lines 4-7; Apte, p. 307: yadyapi svapnadarsanavasthasya sarpadamsanodakasnanadikaryamanrtam, tathdpi tadavagatih satyameva phalam, pratibuddhasyapyabadhyamanatvdt. nahi svapnddutthitah svapnadrstam sarpadamsa- nodakasndnddikdryatn mithyeti manyamdnastadavagatimapi mithyeti manyate kascit. Karl Potter, Encyclopedia, p. 54. Also, see Harold Coward, Derrida and Indian Philosophy, p. 97.

230 links the text with the realization of the Self outside the text. Thus as far as language which consists of the Upanisads is solely the product of avidyd, there is again a paradoxical situation that the removal of avidyci is discoursed “within” avidyd, and the Self-realization is achieved

“after” avidyd.

As a matter of fact, the false ascription to Brahman is possible because the world is the manifestation of Brahman, and therefore, it shares the nature of Brahman to some extent. Apart from the reality the world does not exist, and yet the world is identical with the reality from the absolute point of view. This makes the Upanisadic statement such as:

“(He) transformed Himself in accordance with each form; that form of

His was for the sake of making Him known.Because of the identical nature between Brahman and the world. Brahman can be known by knowing Its manifested world of name and form. Sankara comments on this Upanisadic passage:

Were name and form not manifested, the transcendent nature of

however, name and form are manifested as the body and organs. it is possible to know Its nature.’"*^

These statements justify not only the method of adhydropa-apavada but also the role of avidyd that operates in all the empirical world of name

'^■"’BrU 2.5.19, p. 211; Madhava, p. 280: riipamrupam pratirupo habhiiva lacl- asya riipam praticaksandya. '“B i-B 2.5.19, p. 384, lines 7-9; Madhava, p. 281: yadi hi ncimarupe net vydkri- yate tadci'syd"tmano nirupddhikatn ritpcuu prajndiuighandkhyaiu na praIIkhydyela. yadd punah kdryakarandtinand ndmariipe vydkrte bhavatastadd'sya riipani prali- khydyeta.

231 and form. The starting point of any aspirant after liberation is limited by avidyd. However, this limitation makes one’s desire to know Brahman

(Brahmajijndsd) go forward through the indispensable adhydropa- apavdda. As the discourse about Brahman is not free from avidyd, avidyd may be understood to be the discourse about Brahman^^^ in the sense that it causes the method of adhydropa-apavdda which is

discourse about Brahman, just within its own domain. The only way out from impossible discourse about Brahman, or the domain of avidyd is

'‘neti, neti”, which is the only possible discourse as well as the

provisional terminal-point of avidyd, and which is also called “the Truth

of truth” {satyasya satyam) in the Upanisadic phraseology.

Saiikara makes use of the Upanisadic expression "'satyasya satyam"

several times with regard either to "neti, neti", or to the transcendental

nature of Brahman. The expression is derived from the Brhaddranyaka

Upanisad 2.1.20:

As a spider moves along the thread (it produces), and as from a fire tiny sparks fly in all directions, so from this Self emanate all organs, all worlds, all gods and all beings. Its secret name {Upanisad) is ‘the Truth of truth’. The vital force is truth, and It is the Truth of that.'^*

'^^Arapura writes that maya must be understood fundamentally as discourse about Brahman, for Brahman is indiscoursible yet is the philosophical aim of the Vedanta, cf. J. G. Arapura, Hermeneutical Essays on Veddntic Topics, p. 27. '^*BrU 2.1.20, p. 202; Madhava, p. 202: sa yathonavabhistantunoccared- yathcl'greli ksudrd visphulingd vyuccarantyevamevdsmdddtmanah sarve prdndh sarve lokdh sarve devdh sarvdni bhQtdni vyuccaranti. tasyopanisat sa/yasya sciivaiuili. prdnd vai satyam tesdmesa satyam. For the occurrences of “the Truth of truth” in Saiiicara’s commentaries, see BSB 3.2.22. BrB 2.1.20; 2.3.6; 3.6.1; 3.8.11.

232 Those which are manifested from the Self or Brahman is called “truth”

{satya) in condition that the Self is presupposed to be their reality or the

Truth, and accordingly, the Self is called “the Truth of truth”.Sankara comments on the above mentioned Upanisadic passages by saying that since the Truth of truth which is the secret name (upanisad) has a transcendental meaning (alaukikdrthatva), it is very difficult to understand.If we read another Upanisadic passage in which the Truth of truth is again expressed, the implication of a transcendental meaning is clarified; “Now therefore the description (of Brahman)'. ‘Not this, not this’. Because there is no other and more appropriate description than this ‘Not this.’ Now Its name; ‘The truth of truth.Just before these passages there are several examples about the description of the nature of “truth”, which show the particular forms of the Truth of truth, and because of this the passages pertaining to the description of the Truth of truth start with “Now therefore” (athdta). The only way of description of the Truth of truth, or Brahman is “not this, not this”, which eradicates all possible specifications superimposed on It {nirasta-sarva-upddhi- visesa), or all already known description of truth {prdpta-nirdesa- pratisedha). Then, is this description of Brahman by "neti, neti" enough

E. Hume translates "satyasya salyam" in the sense of “The Real of the real”, cf. R. E. Hume, The Thirteen Principal Upanishads, p. 95. P. Hacker says that satya means in ordinary usage a true statement corresponding to that which really exists {sat), but as far as for the Advaitins there is only one existence, i.e. Brahman {sat), satya and sat collapse into one. cf. P. Hacker, “The Theory of Degrees of Reality in Advaita Vedanta”, p. 139. Here, we do prefer the translation of “the Truth of truth” to that of “the Real of the real” due to the more intimate connection with the present topic, although both translations do not make any difference after ail. '^“Cf. BrB 2.1.20, p. 286, line 16: sa hi sarvatra copanisadalaiikikarthatvdcl- durvijiieydrtheti '^'BrU 2.3.6, p. 205; Madhava, p. 234: athdta ddeso neti neti. na hyetasmdditi netyanyat paraniasti. atha ndmadheyam satyasya satyamiti.

233 to fulfill the desire to know Brahman completely? Sankara says:

These two negative particles are for conveying all- inclusiveness through repetition so as to eliminate every specification whatsoever that may occur to us. Such being the case, the doubt that Brahman has not been described is removed. If, on the other hand, the two negative particles merely eliminated just the two aspects of Brahman that are being discussed (viz the gross and subtle), then other aspects of It than these two would not be described, and there would still be a doubt as to what exactly Brahman is like. So that description of Brahman would be useless, for it would not satisfy one’s desire to know It. And the purpose of the sentence, ‘I will instruct you (about Brahman)', would remain unfulfilled. But when through the elimination of all limiting adjuncts the desire to know about space, time and everything else (that is not Brahman) is removed, one realises one’s identity with Brahman, the Truth of truth, which is homogeneous like a lump of salt, and which is Pure Intelligence without interior or exterior; his desire to know is completely satisfied, and his intellect is centred in the Self alone. Therefore the two negative particles in ‘Not this, not this’ are used in an all- inclusive sense.

The point of these passages is that the two negative particles, “«a” and

in ''neti, neti" are used in all-inclusive sense, i.e. the negation of

all which are not Brahman, but not that both are the negation of the two

2.3.6, p. 335, lines 17-26; Madhava, pp. 239-240: idam nakaradvayam vipsavyaptyartham. yadyatpraptam tattannisidhyate tathd ca satyanirdistdscihka brcihmanah parihrta bhavati. anycithd hi nakdradvayena prakrtadvayapratisedhe yadanyatprakrldtpratisiddhadvayddbrahma tanna nirdistam kldrsam tii khalvitya- sanktd na nivcirtisycite tathd cdnarthakasca sa nirdesah purusya vividisdyd anivartakatvdt. brahma jnapayisydmiti ca vdkydmaparisamdptdrtham sycll. yadd tu sarvadikkdlddivividisd nivartitd sydtsarvopddhinirdkaranadvdrena tad cl saindhava- dhanavade karasam prajndnadhanabhanantaramabdhyam satyasya xatyamaham brahmdsmlti sarvato nivartate. vividisd "tmanyevdvasthita prajnd bhavati. tasmdd- vipsdrthain neti netiti nakaradvayam.

234 aspects of Brahman, i.e. the gross and subtle. However, the more important message in these passages has bearing on the fact whether

“neti, neti” provides complete description of Brahman for the satisfaction of one’s desire to know It. Sankara says that if ''neti, neti” negates all the specifications whatsoever that are superimposed on the real Brahman, one realizes one’s identity with Brahman, i.e. the Truth of truth. In consequence all-inclusive sense of "neti, neti” is the final description or instruction (nirdesa) of Brahman, which is enough to fulfill the desire to know Brahman. By the way of the elimination of all possible specifications of Brahman, or truth, the Truth of truth that is appropriate name of the supreme Brahman can be instructed. If "neti, neti” is the final description of Brahman, or if the Truth of truth results in the negation of everything but Brahman,^^^ there must be something that is beyond description or beyond negation outside the text too. The

Truth of truth is the negation of the superimposed truth, and yet it implies its own negation and also indicates something already existent outside the text. The eternally liberated soul is already free from everything else even including the expression of "neti, neti”, or the

Truth of truth. Sankara’s negation never stop until the Self-realization is reached from inside to outside of the text.

Sankara’s process of negation does not culminate in the affirmation of Brahman, since Brahman is eternal truth that is free from negation and affirmation. Negation and affirmation takes place through the text,

‘^^Cf. BSB 3.2.22, p. 366, lines 17-18: abhdvdvasane tu pratisedhe kim satya- sya satyamityucyeta. tasmddbrahmdvasdno'yam pratisedho ndbhdvasdna ityadhyava- s vd in a h.

235 viz. within avidya. False ascription and its retraction are methodological

“negation after affirmation” for the knowledge of Brahman-, such expressions as “neti, neti", “the Truth of truth” further convey the idea of negation of the affirmed text and that of affirmation of outside the text. We may formulate these processes of negation and affirmation within avidya: (1) Brahman is imagined or superimposed as non-

Brahman due to avidya, (2) Brahman is described in the texts as non-

Brahman but similar to It through adhydropa for the temporary knowledge of It, (3) Brahman is described as not x\ox\-Brahman or as real

Brahman for the true knowledge of It, (4) Brahman is even not Brahman by the logic of apavada or '‘neti, neti”, and (5) “It is” beyond negation and affirmation, and “is” outside the texts in the form of the Self- realization. The process starting from avidya ending in the Self- realization is thoroughly through the text and within the scope of avidya, and therefore, negation and affirmation as instructions are completely false from the point of view of the real realization of Brahman

{anubhava), or liberation. If there is no text there is no instruction that one is Brahman and is deluded by avidyd\ no instruction, no liberation.

There is absolutely no change in one’s ontological position; the change consists in the epistemological position from avidya to Brahma-vidya. In this way it may be said that the text and liberation are well-planned events,for there is only epistemological transformation within the

'■^“Ciooney states that the “system” of Advaita is a well-planned event, not a theory. He insists that Advaita is a kind of elitism in the sense that only educated reader of Advaita texts can take part in the process of realization, though the truth is known as “universal”, cf. Francis X. Clooney, S. J., Theology after Vedanta, pp. 102, 119-121.

236 scope of avidyd and by the removai of the very avidyd, but in reality nothing happens. The false construction in the false area is falsified within that false area; however, when the false events are well completed there is no false thing left but true liberation alone.

237