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SPECIAL EDITOR’S INTRODUCTION: THREE TENDENCIES IN

Devendra Tiwari

Going through the texts on Indian philosophical systems we find that the chief purpose of them is to find a solution against the conflicting ideas, digging out the problems, removing doubts of the opponents and getting freedom from them. Unless the thoughts are not clear they cannot be the part of our conduct. No problem is problem for itself; all problems are imposed at thought level and that is why they can be liquidated and removed by philosophical reflection. Removal of them provides bliss. The texts deal with cultivation of a wonderful capacity that accommodates conflicting situations for the greater purpose of living the life in harmony and peace. Great thoughts about the ways of life and the views of life dawn in and the classical texts. Philosophical systems originated as a safeguard for the maintenance and practice of those great ideas useful for the welfare of the universe. The history of great thoughts is at the same time the history of their critical observation, evaluation and refutation. Arguments in opposition and response in favour not only serve as breath of the protection of those thoughts but promoted Indian philosophical thinking to perfection of Indian culture that comprises the seed of almost all the reflective subtleties which serve as the novelty of the later thinking in . Three types of tendency in Indian philosophical thinking are apparently observed. First to analyze and reflect on all the arguments popular at a time and then to observe that no argument given for proving the subject and object is steady. Proofs and arguments do not prove what they intend to prove. Nāgārjuna, Srīharśa and Jairāśibhaṭṭa represent this trend. Nothing can be founded well by arguments and in the matter of conduct we follow the way it is followed in day to day conduct. Secondly, the tendency of establishing the ideology of one’s allegiance by refuting all other ideologies popular at the time. All the orthodox and heterodox systems adopt this tendency. These tendencies have wonderfully sharpened the argumentative, epistemological, analytic and logical skill of India. The third tendency tries to assimilate all the tendencies. It analyses and interprets all the ideologies popular at a time as different approaches venerable to the extent of their capacity and level of approaching the . This Philosophical systems whether they are heterodox – and except Cārvāka, that is, Indian materialism, and orthodox systems like - Sāmkhya, , Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Mīmānsā and Advaita , all are life affirming systems. They adopt a therapeutic methodology through which they very nicely discuss how the ills of body, corruption in the use of language causing confusion and improper misleading thought and thinking can be cured. They all begin

DEVENDRA NATH TIWARI, Professor of Philosophy and , Department of Philosophy & Religion, Banaras Hindu University, -221005, India. E-mail: [email protected].

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2 DEVENDRA NATH TIWARI

with the problem of suffering, analyze it, search out the means for eradicating it with its causes and finally affirm spirit as the goal. Not only these systems but other branches of learning like , , and also are philosophies intensively concerned with the cure of ills of body, language and thought respectively. All philosophical systems believe in the sources of knowledge in the matter of objects but in cases of those objects where the logic and epistemology fall short to be a source of knowledge, the primacy of authority of the masters of the tradition is the infallible source. and Heterodoxy of the Indian philosophical schools is decided on the basis of authority that is Veda. The discussion on authority is shifted to self- validity of authority which for some schools is knowledge by reliable persons. System of Vyākaraṇa provides such an importance to the authority that it accepts all knowledge is expressed by language and is veridical that serves as the cognitive ground of logical devices of validity and invalidity. Heterodox systems that do not accept Veda or scriptures as authority follow the teachings of the and Arhatas as authority in a way that it is difficult to relegate them from the main current of thinking; they supplement the unity of Indian culture. Philosophical schools perceive life as a continuous process of conducting the wisdom that culminates in realization of spirit. Ignorance and suffering caused consequently are the primary problem and freedom from them is the ultimate goal of Indian philosophy. It is philosophy in so far as it strongly in reflecting on the problems for clarity and wisdom and is religion in as much as it emphasizes wisdom for conducting, cultivating and fulfilling the human aspiration as well. Why Indian philosophy is spiritual? I am asked this question. The great feature that one can notice about Indian philosophy is that all of its system is ways to cultivation to the extent of self-realization which they designate differently as mukti, mokṣa, vivekakhyāti, keval jñāna, nirvāṇa, freedom from the ignorance that veils the true nature of spirit. The spirit is pure and after realization the impurity is removed and the pure nature is realized. It believes in freeing the thoughts from all veils earned and imposed and not real and that which is imposed can only be removed. It does not pursue any dogma; theological, religious-a prophet, a book. The spirit is naturally assigned pure knowledge and hence bliss that can be realized and thus it is life affirming philosophy. The Ideologies leading life negating are the cause of all conflict and problem. In giving utmost value to life; it philosophizes from all the barriers or limitations imposed on spirit. Knowledge is not only the guide to Spirit but is considered the spirit itself and thus any or all theological, religious, ritualistic and the authority dogmas have never been a motivating factor of the mind of Indian philosophical studies. Vedanta is the Philosophy of Prasthānatrayī comprising of Upaniṣads that is śruti prasthāna, Brahmasūtras that is Tarkaprasthāna and Gītā that is Smṛti prasthāna. Its influence on Indian life is such that it has got the primacy of . The Vedantic definition and character of the nature of , the ontological Reality is non- different from that of the liberation (mokṣa), the highest axiological value of life and the purpose of a dharmic life lies in the realization of this non-difference. This

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SPECIAL EDITOR’S INTRODUCTION 3

realization is known as jīvātmaikyabodha (the realization of individual as the spirit). This realization is negatively a state of freedom from ignorance and positively a state of affirmation of spirit. Though we give importance to knowledge as spirit we do not overlook the creativity of spirit. The creativity of spirit gives way to the concept of Rta, the cosmic law according to which the same law is acting on in the nature and in the intellect of human beings. By having command over or controlling the intellect one can command the nature and the realization of the same principle in individual and universe is the true realization of spirit. There is recurrence of the events, day after night, summer after cold, etc., and vice versa which we call creativity of nature and similarly birth, childhood, youth, old and death is a constant process run by the actions performed by men. This phenomenon is perceived by all the systems of Indian Philosophy except Cārvāka as operated by the law of . The fruits of the actions performed in present life is accumulated that act on for the future life and likewise the present life is an outcome of the fruits of the actions performed in the previous life. Nothing, nobody can undo the rule ‘as you sow so shall you reap’. This circle continues till Freedom from the circle that is liberation. The creativity of the spirit does not exhaust with the liberation, it is not falsified as illusion but non-different from the bliss, the ultimate nature of the spirit. There are so many conflicting theories on the creativity of the spirit in relation to creation of the universe and all the schools share this controversy. But there is no controversy on the spirit as one’s nature. By nature we mean that which is naturally assigned to one as consciousness on which anything and everything can be imposed and which can free from all those impositions or essences. This defines spirit as the possibility of all creativity –the possibility of bond and freedom from the bond. In between the bond and freedom from the bond it is the principle of karma and Sansāra. I am thankful to Professor Zijiang Ding, Editor in chief who entrusted me to edit the special issue of Journal of East-West Thought on Indian Philosophy & . It was a great event for me and I was very much enthusiastic about editing the issue to the extent of satisfaction of its distinguished readers. I invited almost all the distinguished scholars in the field. Great scholars are always awfully busy and it is very difficult to encroach upon their time for a work of other’s will and choice. Despite of all odds, I have succeeded in collecting some brilliant articles from some of them. I am well aware that modern technique of footnotes/references has been followed only by some of the contributors. However, each of the articles contains a complete sentence. I am thankful to all contributors for taking interest and contributing scholarly writing for the present issue of the Journal. The special issue on ‘Indian Philosophy & Religion’ is in your hand and I hope it is helpful in causing interest and inspiration to new researches in the field.

Journal of East-West Thought

ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO REALITY IN INDIAN THOUGHT

S. R. Bhatta

Abstract: Right from the dawn of civilization the reflective human mind has been grappling with attempts to comprehend Reality with wonder, curiosity and inquisitiveness. The Reality in its ‘proto’ and ‘manifested’ forms has always eluded human grasp resulting in alternative conceptions and at times conflicting accounts. There has been no unanimity or agreement in this regard. But human mind admits of no rest or finality in this enterprise. The exposure of Indian thought so far has been piecemeal and not complete and all-round. It is primarily based on interpretations of western Indologists of 18th and 19th centuries whom Prof. Radhakrishnan, Prof. S. N. Dasgupta, Prof. Hiriyanna etc. followed 80 years back in nineteen thirties under western influence. Thereafter new discoveries have been made and newer interpretations have been put forth. So there is a need to revisit Indian thought without being prejudiced by earlier interpreters. For theoretical analysis some Jain works provide good model. For applied dimension of Indian thought Saṃhitā is the best guide. A comparative study of such endeavors is helpful to enrich mutual understanding and may also open up newer vistas of approaching the rich and multi-faceted nature of Reality for universal well-being.

I

Traditionally there have been advocacy of nihilism, agnosticism, positivism and so forth. In terms of quantity there have been theories of monism, dualism and pluralism. Some have professed materialism, some , some dualism of both matter and mind/spirit and some neutralism. Within these again there has been variety of views. No two minds may fully agree in all details and there need not be any regimentation in this regard. It seems that the wide and variegated nature of Reality can best be apprehended in a ‘perspectival ‘approach which is holistic and integral. It can be named as ‘Organicism’ (śārīrakavāda). In this paper this approach which is characteristic of Indian culture has been adopted exemplifying it with the help of classical Indian thought. It is hoped that it may offer more profound understanding of the manifold nature of Reality in its diverse forms and facets, and multiple functions, at empirical and transcendental levels. As the subject is very vast, here conceptual and doctrinal analysis of some seminal ideas and views are presented exemplifying them by referring to different schools and systems of Indian philosophical thought.

S. R. BHATTA, Former Professor & Chair, Department of Philosophy, University of , India. E-mail: [email protected].

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II

Any approach to Reality has to spring from experience; it is embedded in experience and gets its culmination in experience. It thus begins from experience and ends in experience. It is rooted in experience and is tied down to experience. To be meaningful and useful it has to confine itself to the arena of experiences alone. Experience is the only gateway to Reality, its knowledge, life-values and their realization. They are apprehended in experience and there is no other way or means to have access to them. They are amenable to experience and genuine experience must pertain to them. To experience is to experience the real. An unreal is never experienced but only imagined or hypostatized and superimposed. Human mind has this capacity of abstraction, computation and superimposition. Ratiocinative mind can also discriminate between the real and unreal, the experienced and the mentally construed. Of course, the construed also has its significance, value and utility. It is given status of knowledge in a different capacity and in a different context (known as ūha in Indian thought). It is sometimes called speculation. A speculative enterprise begins from experience but it gets entangled in the labyrinth of imagination and becomes removed from Reality. It has importance but its role is ancillary and subservient to experience. So long as it helps experience in revealing the depths and subtlety of Reality it has meaning, value and utility.

III

The experienced Reality is a synthesis of unity and multiplicity. Both unity and multiplicity are given to us in our veridical experiences. Our experience vouchsafes that the multiplicity originates from, is situated and embedded in, and is sustained by one all-inclusive Reality. It is an organic unity, like that of a seed containing implicitly the whole tree, a multiplicity-in-unity, not unity brought about in, or superimposed on, multiplicity. Multiplicity issues forth from unity, is accommodated in an orderly way in unity and that is why the Ultimate Reality is a cosmos and not a chaos. (Of course we the human beings disturb that order). It is a universe and not multi-verse. It is universe in the sense that it houses ‘many’ in ‘one’ as parts of an organic whole. This is how the ontological issue of ‘One’ and ‘Many’ is to be resolved. Both ‘one’ and ‘many’ are inevitable facts of our experiences. In a satisfactory ontological both are to be recognized and accommodated in a holistic and integrated system, in a synthesis in which the two are not posed as opposites but as complimentary. This is the ‘organismic’ approach we have resorted in this paper, which fulfills this task by postulating a primordial unity that expresses itself in and through the multiplicity of diverse forms, facets and functions. There are two levels of experiencing Reality, in its transcendental form which is non-manifest whole and in its empirical form which is manifest as its multiple parts. Both are equally real and meaningful in their own spheres. No incompatibility or is to be envisaged between the two. The cosmic process represents its manifest form. This

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process constitutes the ontogenetic matrix of the individual subjective world of finite selves (saṃsāra) and the objective world (jagat). The richness and complexity of Reality cannot be apprehended in terms of exclusive ‘either-or’. Dichotomous or exclusivist approach is not conducive to comprehend its diversity and dynamism, openness and infinite expansion, perfect and yet ever-growing nature. It requires an approach which is all-inclusive and all- comprehending, which is not closed but open-ended, not static but dynamic. This approach regards all opposites as distinct. It is not negative and therefore it defies the logic of dichotomies. It accepts the logic of self-awareness at the transcendental level and a relational logic of complex interactions at the empirical level. One is depth level and the other is surface level. One is the level of the whole and the other is the level of parts within the whole. Such an approach can provide a synthetic coordination between ‘substantive’ and ‘non-substantive’ viewpoints. The Reality is basically unitary in nature and the entire multiplicity is situated in it as its creative transformation or manifestation. One becomes many and the many is the creative play of one. So the one is in many and the many is in one. As Hua-yen Buddhism following the Indrajālasūtra of the Avatamsakasūtra puts it, “In one is all, in many is one. One is identical to all, many is identical to one.” In this organismic view one has ontic or existential priority over many but it does not in any way imply its superiority in terms of value. The basic idea is that one and many are not incompatible but mutually reinforcing as they are two facets of the same Reality. With help of several analogies this dual nature of Reality can be illustrated. The most apt analogy is that of living organism given to us in our concrete experience which is basically a unity accommodating a multiplicity of organs all inhering, coexisting and cooperating in an intimate, inseparable, interdependent and harmonious existence. This analogy is best suited to explain this nature of Reality which is also an organism writ large. A living organism is neither an assemblage of scattered and unrelated multiple parts, nor is it a barren unity or an abstraction that is bereft of the multiplicity of its organs. It is a concrete unity that realizes itself in and through multiplicity. Just as part is not intelligible except through the whole of which it is a part and just as whole is also not conceivable without any reference to its constituent parts, in the like manner the organs are not understandable except as inhering in the organism and the organism also is not conceivable without its organs. Thus organicism regards ‘one’ and ‘many’ as members of an organic whole each is having a being of its own but a being that implies a relation to the other. The analogy of sea and its infinite waves may also enable us to understand the nature of Reality. The sea represents a unity in the bosom of which arise an infinite number of waves all having their origination, sustenance and absorption in the same vast sea. . There is tranquility at the bottom but turbulence at the surface. Both are real and both are natural. The sea cannot be just tranquility or just turbulence. The multiple waves coexist, cooperate, collide and vanish. But their essence is not destroyed. They merge back in their source which is their original self. The sea is at once ever changing many and never changing one. The analogy of space can also be resorted to bring home this fact. The space is one indivisible whole but we

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may put artificial barriers and feel it multiplied and divided by houses and other confinements. The Upaniṣads give a host of such analogies. This is the holistic approach based on the principles of interrelation and interdependence, mutuality and cooperation, reciprocity and coordination, mutual appreciation and mutual enhancement.

IV

Philosophy, as Darśana in Indian context, is a systematic reflection (ānvīkṣīkī) by a thoughtful human mind upon lived experiences in order to be benefitted by it for realization of material prosperity (abhyudaya) and spiritual enhancement (niḥśreyasa) which are also known respectively as preyasa and śreyasa in Indian thought.1 Right from the dawn of civilization the Indian mind has been given to philosophical reflections. It has been intuitive and argumentative, descriptive of the nature of Reality and prescriptive of the ideals of life, a life of perfection, wellness and bliss. So in our account which follows we shall take into account both the descriptive and prescriptive aspects of Reality. The philosophical thought in India has mainly oscillated between ‘substantialist’ (ātmavāda) and ‘non-substantialist’ (anātmavāda) view points, sometimes going beyond the two as in the Nāsadīya Sūkta of the Rgveda or synthesizing the two as in Jainism. The concepts of ‘Brahman’ or ‘Puruṣa’ represent the Reality as ‘Being’ and the concepts of ‘Buddhabhāva’ or ‘Buddhakṣetra’ express Reality as ‘Becoming’. The basic idea bifurcating the two tendencies is the issue of ontological status of ‘permanence’ and ‘change’ , both of which are given to us in our veridical and concrete experience and therefore both claim the status of truth. Accordingly the two approaches need not be viewed as mutually incompatible but as complimenting, each pertaining to one facet of Reality. So in the vast canvas of Indian thought we witness ‘substantialist’ position, ‘non- substantialist turn’ and ‘substantialist about-turn’ constantly recurring, sometimes leading to a symbiotic synthesis of the two in a reconciliatory attempt which can be named as ‘organicism’. This is the approach adopted in this paper.

V

As discussed earlier, the Reality is experienced in its two-fold forms, namely ‘proto’ and ‘manifested’. All systems of Indian thought in one way or other uphold this position, highlight this bipartite distinction and apply it to the levels of knowledge and values. The ‘proto Reality’ is variously named as , Sat, Padārtha, Paramārtha, Brahman, etc. In itself Reality is pure existence, homogeneous, difference-less, boundless, infinite, pure illumination and pure bless. It is tranquil wholeness. This form is experienced in intimate vision and intuitive realization, for example, in Yogic state of Samādhi where there is unity of existence and experience. The Māndūkya Upaniṣad describes it as ‘turīya’. It is not amenable to empirical senses, discursive

1See, Vaiśeṣikasūtra, 1/1/2.

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intellect and linguistic expression. When activated the ‘proto’ Reality gets differentiated and manifested. Then it is in the state of ‘Let be many’ intending and resolving to get bifurcated and differentiated. The Puruṣa Sūkta of the Rgveda and the Upaniṣads describe this phenomenon picturesquely.2 The manifested Reality is given to us in our day to day experiences and we have to reckon with it in multiple ways. It is wondrous and variegated, bewitching and engrossing, bewildering and entangling. It is experienced in manifold forms and relations and subsequently described in numerous ways. The Jain traditions avers, Anantadharmātmakamsat3” (The Reality has infinite qualities and modes). The Vedic sages state that the Reality is unitary but it is conceived (bahudhā kalpayanti) and expressed in multiple ways (bahudhā vādanti). So there can be multiple alternative approaches to reality. This can be named as ‘Bahuvidhavāda’. Though there is fundamental unity of all existences that unity expresses itself in multiple forms and becomes multi-faceted. Therefore there can be multiple ways of approaching and describing this multi-faceted Reality. In view of this rich diversity there should not be any insistence on uniformity or unanimity in our modes of thinking and ways of living. There cannot be any regimentation in this respect. Therefore it would be improper and unjust to insist that there can be only one way of approaching Reality and only one particular mode of philosophizing that has to be universally acceptable. Genuine philosophical activity has to stem from concretely lived experiences that are culturally conditioned and situated in specific spatio-temporal-causal locations and therefore ‘democracy in ideas has to be the guiding point. There should always be scope for healthy philosophical disagreement. The thoughtful and creative minds need not always agree or think along a fixed path. There has to be room for debate and discussion, mutual exchanges, give and take, to arrive at truth. “Vāde vāde jāyate tattvabodhaḥ” goes an Indian saying to bring home this fact. But this enterprise has to be rational, logical and methodical. Then only it is reasonable and acceptable. For this purpose the Nyāya, Buddhist, Mīmāmsā and Vedānta thinkers have developed elaborate systems of debate and theorizing known as ‘Vādavidhi’ and ‘Tantrayukti’ and there are many good works in this area. No school of thought originated in cultural vacuum and none developed in isolation or in closed compartments. It has been enjoined that truth can be approached, understood and expressed in diverse ways and therefore the game of philosophizing can be played by mutual supplementations and complementarities. The development of philosophical thought in each school has not been in exclusion but in intimate interactions so much so that one cannot understand much less appreciate the schools of Indian thought without at the same time well versed and steeped in the prevailing systems. There have been mutual borrowings and

2The problem of many-ness from one is discussed in almost all the Upaniśads. See, particularly Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad, Chapter 1, Brāhmaṇa 1-4. 3Anyayogavyavahārachedikā, p.22.

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corrections. There have been agreements to disagree. But there has not been mutual ignoring or overlooking. Buddhism has not been an exception to this rule of the game. There have been sharp and brilliant philosophical responses by and to Buddhism. Buddhist thinkers undertook close encounters with the then prevalent ideas, theories and viewpoints and ably defended Buddhist position. Not only there are ample evidences of lively exchanges and resultant literature, there are scores of treatises pertaining to Vādavidhi, art of debate and discussion so that exchanges are meaningful and fruitful. The Buddhist thinkers even developed and perfected the mode of debate. The point to be noted is that all strands are complementary in character. They belong to the same genus and differ only as species. These differences are significant and of great worth since they provide variety and richness and therefore they are to be valued. But they should not be exaggerated. There is mutual opposition but this is not to taken as hostility.

VI

The manifested Reality is experienced in three-fold forms, viz. the Supreme Reality above, the manifold world outside and the innumerable individual selves within. In technical language we call these three experiences as Urdhvamukhī (Upward), Bahirmukhī (Outward) and Antarmukhī (Inward). In Indian philosophical thought we find elaborate accounts of these experiences in multiple forms and all of them represent different facets of the same Reality. There is basic unity among all of them but in details they differ widely. In his work, ‘Six Systems of Indian Philosophy” Maxmuller rightly refers to this point. Reflections on the existence and nature of Supreme Self or , world and individual self may seem to be pointless to those who are engrossed in mundane matters or who are deeply entangled in the strife and struggles of worldly life or who are striving to manage for their food, clothing and shelter. To some extent this is true. But there are moments in their lives as well when they are led to some vague thinking about these supra-mundane matters. On the other hand, there are some persons who by their very nature indulge or made to indulge in pondering over the inner and outer dimensions of Reality given in experience and arrive at the tacit acceptance of a self within and a Supreme Self permeating and overseeing the entire universe. Only inquisitive persons get interested in problematic issues concerning the individual self, the world and the Supreme Self. However, in times of calamity or at an advance stage in life people tend to accept the reality of these entities and look for their locus in empirical experiences. In this entire exercise the role of culture they are environed with is tremendous and unmitigated. There cannot be any final say on these matters but some tentative and provisional conclusions may be of psychological satisfaction.

VII

Metaphysics is consideration of what is involved in the facts of experience. One of the most striking at the same time most controversial experiences about the veracity

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of which there are doubts and denials is the acceptance of the Supreme Self or God over and above the individual self. There are people who are stanch believers in the existence of such an entity which is higher than the individual self and which is divine in nature. They believe so on the basis of immediate apprehensions and tacit . For them the Ultimate Reality is Paramātman or God who is perfect, omniscient, omnipotent, omnipresent, infinite, kind and merciful. There are others who are willing to offer rational arguments to prove the existence of such a Self. Whether it is hangover of the cultural tradition or compulsion of the circumstances there are moments in our life when we do realize our finitude, our imperfection, our limitations, our helplessness etc. and feel that there is something beyond, something higher and something more powerful than our limited self which supervises and controls the cosmic process. We feel that we are helpless in this evanescent mundane existence. At the same time we also feel assured that there is some Supreme Power which is kind and merciful and who can provide succor and solace in trials and tribulations. In the strife and struggles of worldly life such feelings are universal, inevitable and natural. Consciously or sub-consciously we tend to believe in the existence of the Supreme Self. It seems that there is an innate necessity in us caused by our finitude and imperfection that we posit or accept that there is a Supra-human Power who can be approached for help. We do aspire for some help from such a Being with a strong will and wish that such a help could be and would be forthcoming. Thus the experience of such a Self is a matter of direct experience, whether spontaneous or per force. Sometimes we go by the experiences of persons whom we regard as ‘realized ’ and in every society at every time there has been an array of such realized souls. In Indian traditions they are called ṛṣi-muni (saints, sages, mystics). We may call them by any name but such gifted and realized souls are regarded to have visions and intuitive apprehensions of the Ultimate Reality or God. In fact they themselves are deified and treated at par with God or even as replacement or substitute of God. In every religious tradition there are scriptures or śrutis which deal with God. Their understanding of the nature of God may be different. These scriptures are records of the experiences of the realized souls. It is also said that given a particular type of sādhanā each one of us can reach to that state of supra-human existence or have that experience. First of all we have to be truly human and then cultivate divinity in us. In the Indian traditions we are told that we are progenies of the Divine or inherently divine and therefore we have innate capacity to reach to the divine state of existence or be Divine. In India with a few exceptions there is a tacit in the existence of Supra- human Being or beings. All those who subscribe to adhere to this belief. It is believed that in the universe there is an immanent order or teleology (Rta) and therefore spiritual power does operate. There are disorders in the universe no doubt but they are due to human conduct. The human has the prerogative of freewill and may act in a way which is conducive or detrimental to the order. Human being is prone to err, to be corrupt and to distort. In fact evil is alluring like gold and distracts human mind. With proper knowledge and sādhanā (methodical training) human mind can be put on the right track. According to some thinkers both

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(experience)and śruti (codification of experience) can be supported by tarka or yukti (reasoning) and can be put forth in a logical, coherent, cogent and systematic manner. Human being has the prerogative to use reasoning. Reasoning can be employed for abstract brooding. It can also be used to negate, to deny and to refute. Such an exercise is named as śuṣka and pratikūla, and it is not favored. What is needed is anukūla-tarka (corroborative reasoning). Nature has gifted us with this wonderful power of reasoning and it depends upon us how to use it and for what purpose. However, there are some thinkers who do not accept this subordination of reasoning and want to give autonomy to it. The history of humankind has witnessed several naturalistic thinkers who are agnostics, or skeptics or nihilists. They doubt or deny the existence of any Supra-human or power or Being. But it has been found that they also do not find any satisfaction or solace in their negative or vacillating stance. By and large belief in the existence of a Supra-human Being is either a matter of experience or on the basis of śruti and yukti. For the availability of this experience there are some prerequisites. For this śruti and yukti can offer only indirect help. Their role is corroborative and supportive and not primary. Only through sādhanā one can have that make-up which makes it a fit receptacle of that experience. This is what Vedas, Upaniṣads, etc. declare. But there are some schools and thinkers who relish in giving rational proofs for the existence of Supreme Being, particularly for a God who is Creator and Moral Governor of the universe. The Nyāya- Vaiśeṣika system is prominent among them and therefore deserves special mention. Barring the Cārvakas, who are stanch materialists, all other schools of philosophical thought believe in some conception of Paramātman. In Buddhism Lord Buddha and incarnations of Buddha as also bodhisattvas are Paramātman in one sense. But they are not to be equated with the idea of a Creator God. They are not ordinary worldly mortals. They are addressed as Bhagavāna or Ῑśvara, and are regarded as - able. They help the suffering humans to get liberation. In Jainism also such divine beings are accepted but they do not come to help. They are only to be worshipped and emulated. In both the schools there are mythologies and surrounding them. There is a plurality of and . All of them can be regarded as Paramātman. They are believed to have supra-human and supernatural attributes and powers. They are free from all evil and imperfection. They are holy beings to be emulated. The Yoga system also believes in God who is morally perfect but helpful in realizing release from worldly bondage. Similar is the view of theistic Sāṃkhya. In the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system and there is belief in a Creator God who is also Moral Governor. God is regarded only as efficient cause but in Vedānta God is believed to be both efficient and material cause. Here God is also believed to shower His grace on the devotees and therefore devotion to God plays a significant role in their life.

VIII

One of the perennial problems for a thoughtful mind is, “How the world has come to exist?” The earliest philosophical view with regard to Ultimate Reality appears to

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have arisen out of an attempt to answer the questions “Whence this universe and who caused it?” All cosmological thinking stem from these questions. The Vedic thinkers grappled with these issues and came out with the idea of one Ultimate Reality manifesting itself in this world of manifoldness out of its dynamic power inherent in it and this is due to its creative urge. Some of them even voice skepticism as human mind is incapable of knowing the truth. Later Indian thinkers elaborated this idea in different ways. Some thinkers like Cārvāka did not accept this view and advocated ‘accidentalism’ that the world is an outcome of chance occurrence due to combination of four material elements of earth, water, fire and air which are atomic in nature. The world is a complex of such happenings which may come to an end any time. However, this view did not find favor of Indian mind and alternative views were propagated. The cosmological views can be divided into two groups. Cārvakas, Buddhists and Sāmkya-Yoga thinkers advocate theory of evolution (sarga), stating that the world evolves from primordial matter or material elements whether atomic or non-atomic. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Jaina and Vedāntic thinkers believe in the theory of creation (sṛṣṭi). Whereas the Nyāya-Vaśeṣika and Vedāntic thinkers bring in the role of God, the Jaina thinkers take help of the principle of Karma. Whatever be the explanation the general opinion of Indian mind is that the universe is an undivided whole with an immanent order which the Vedic seers named as ‘ṛta’. There is an organic interrelation, interdependence, cooperative partnership, and supportive mutualism in corporate existence and community living. There is reciprocity between living beings and inanimate object and events. All living beings have to co-exist in the universe along with the inanimate things but for universal wellness it has to be regulated co-existence just like a nest (niḍa) of a bird wherein the young ones co-exist in a regulated way. The bird parents while tending them operate in just and equitable manner without favor and frown. They feed them with the spirit of distributive justice and self-less . The young ones also respond with mutual cooperation and co-sharing. Due to hunger they do cry for food but do not quarrel with one another. The parents see to it that their needs are satisfied but they do not feed their greed. The little put before us an ideal of co-existence to be emulated. So the guiding principles of communitarian life laid down in an Upaniṣadic are sahavāsa (corporate living), sahakāra (cooperative functioning) and sahabhoga (communitarian partaking with mutual care and share4). This is how the inmates in aśramas or gurukulas used to exist in good old days. The entire cosmic existence is corporate coexistence and therefore human progress and well-being coincides with cosmic progress and well-being. There has to be inclusive pluralism with mutual cooperation and supportive partaking. The world we live in is highly complex and complicated an inter-netting of several layers and relations bound by space, time and causality. Therefore it is

4The śāntipaṭha in the beginning of Kathopaniṣad, Tattirīyopaniṣad, Brahmānanda valli and several places in all the Upaniṣads we find the passages regarding this collective consciousness.

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bewildering and puzzle-some. This is māyā a term used both in technical sense by Vedānta and in loose sense by common Indian. We feel aghast at its essence-less- ness. We look for meaning and value of life, we strive for this but we find that something is missing, lacking and wanting. Things and relations of the world are evanescent and deceptive. Sooner or later we have this realization. But they are alluring and inviting and we get attached to them. We want to leave this world and yet we want to live in the world. This is the paradoxical state we are beset with. In the midst of suffering and agony we search for real happiness but we do not know what real happiness is and how to get it. However, in Indian thought the reality and phenomenal nature of the world is recognized and given its proximate value. The world is valuable to us as it provides the base and substratum for our existence. It has instrumental value. So we have to live in this world with good health, adequate prosperity and sufficient satisfaction. The doctrine of puruṣārtha has been put forth to regulate this requirement. This is a part of respect for Nature and the five material elements along with their regulating powers or forces are paramount in Indian conception of Reality. Ecological considerations, worship of natural objects and also of other living beings, and expression of gratitude and repayment of our indebtedness for their bounty and help are characteristic of Indian approach to reality.

IX

Nature has endowed human beings with the unique capacity of undergoing experiences and to reflect upon them. One of the most striking phenomena revealed in experience is the existence of individual spiritual entities. At least the existence of one’s own self is immediately experienced, directly felt and intuitively realized. Though we have direct apprehension of our own self we are not aware of its nature. We do not and perhaps cannot know its nature empirically. We try to do this but we fail. That is why in the history of human thought its nature has been an occasion of much speculation and sometimes skepticism bordering on nihilism. From a metaphysical point of view there may be several questions about its existence and nature. It can be asked if there is anything ‘Real’ experienced as self, or is it only wishful thinking or a mind imposition. It is experienced as conscious, but is consciousness its essence or its property. If it is a property, is it essential or adventitious? We are further led to such questions as what is the status and role of self within the system of reality and the scheme of the universe. Are individual selves ultimately many or get merged into one Ultimate? Are they real individuals existing in their own right and having an inalienable individuality or they are only transient modes of the Absolute which alone is real? In fact the question of destiny of the self is vital to a thinking mind as we feel concerned with our future. There are four basic issues which appear as corollary to the problem of self in the Indian mode of thinking. They are concerning karma, samsāra, and mokṣa. All of them demand philosophical inquiry. In Indian literature there are many words which are used for individual self as synonyms of or interchangeable with one another. Though strictly speaking they do not mean the same thing and there are subtle nuances of meaning

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associated with each one of them yet in a loose expression no precise distinction is drawn. Such words are , jīva, puruṣa, cit, cetanā, , bhūta, prāṇa, , sattva, etc. We shall first deal with the issue of the existence of the individual self and then turn to the issue of its nature. As this is very significant self- relating issue for a human being we discuss it in detail. Existence of self: The individual self normally exists as self-identical being with self-awareness. Generally it is addressed as ‘I’ in a personal reference. It is a reference to one’s own self and therefore we say “I am” in individual context and “We are” in a collective sense. As stated earlier, our own self is most intimately given to us. We have its direct apprehension. The existence of other selves is known indirectly and inferentially. Likewise the surrounding inanimate world is also given to us indirectly and inferentially. We may doubt or deny the independent existence of the other selves and the external world and on the analogy of dream experience we may tend to evaluate them as illusory. It has been argued that just as dream objects are not independently real on that very logic the world of waking experience is also not independently real. But this is only a stray line of thinking. Further, it is not clear what exactly is meant by ‘real’ here. In Advaita Vedānta the word, ‘mithyā’ is used for describing the status of the empirical world in which the individual self has its role to play but about its meaning also there are differences of opinion. In the Advaitasiddhi, for example, five definitions of are discussed. But one thing is certain that what is denied is the independent and autonomous existence of the individual self and not its existence as such. We do not say we do not exist, or we do not undergo experiences, or we have not experienced dreams. Likewise we do not deny worldly objects and worldly relations experienced by us. So far as one’s own self is concerned there is no scope or possibility of its denial. As Sri Śankarācārya has very aptly said that whosoever denies its existence, he or she is himself or herself the evidence of its existence. 5 Further, one cannot ask for the mode of knowing its existence because as the Upaniṣads have rightly stated that the self is itself the knower and therefore cannot be turned into a known object.6 It makes the instruments of knowing animated. If the self is not there the mind cannot function, nor can the senses and the body. This is the thrust of the Kenopaniṣad. The Kaṭha, Munḍaka and śvetāśvatara also aver the same. The self is to be intuitively experienced. Its existence is self-evident. Nobody can say “I am not” as it is self- contradictory. When we say “I am” it is perfectly intelligible and meaningful. Of course one may not be sure of or one may be mistaken about its exact reference and connotation. Some may identify the self with the body (Dehātmavāda), some with the senses (Indriyātmavāda), some with the vital breaths (Prāṇātmavāda), some with the mind (Manātmavāda) and so forth. In the Chāndogyopaniṣad we have its reference in the Prajāpati-- Virocana- samvāda. It could be that there were Cārvāka, Ājīvaka, Lokāyata and the

5Ya eva hi asya nirākartā tadeva tasya svarūpam . Brahmasūtrabhāṣya, II.3.7) 6Vijňātāram are kena vijāňiyāt, Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad 4/5/19.

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like who thought that way. We have references to their views in the Buddhist literature. The fact remains that the existence of the self is undeniable. It is not only given in experience, it is also supported by our logic and inherited by us through cultural traditions and racial subconscious. Our thinking has been so conditioned by our culture that right from the childhood we are told about our individual self. The mode of our thinking, the language that we use with ‘I’ and ‘we’ as self-referential words and our entire behavior is self-oriented contrasting ourselves with all that is not-self. All this can be taken as an evidence but real evidence, if at all evidence is required, comes from self-experience. Thus existence of self is to be regarded as a hard, incontrovertible and undeniable fact of our experience. And as Vacaspati has said, “Samvidevabhagavati vastupagame no ṣaraṇam” we have to rely upon experience only and the verdict of experience is in favor of unquestionable acceptance of the existence of the self. For some thinkers the existence of self is self-evident as they regard it to be self-luminous. Those who do not regard self as self-luminous and self- evident some of them may maintain that it is known in direct internal perception or in supra-normal yogic perception. For them it is an introspected datum of experience. Some others may hold that the existence of self is to be inferred as substratum of mental qualities, i.e., as the subject of volition, desire etc. or as the epistemological ground of consciousness and cognitive phenomena or on the moral ground as the agent of karma and the enjoyer of karmaphala. Some others may believe in the existence of the self on the basis of scriptural authority. Thus there can be many grounds if one looks for them. Nature of self: Though it is not logically possible to deny the existence of self, its nature may be viewed differently from different metaphysical and ontological perspectives. However, there seems to be unanimity in regarding the self as a living being meaning thereby as having consciousness. It is not inert or unconscious like matter. It is life-giving and animating element which enlivens matter in the form of live body etc. It may be spiritual and immaterial for some and psycho-physical for others. On this point there is a wide divergence of views. It seems that there cannot be any unanimity in this regard. From a logical point of view, all the schools of philosophical thought in India can be classified under two heads, viz., those which regard self as simple and therefore indestructible and immortal and those which regard it as composite or a conglomeration to be disintegrated. The Cārvāka or Lokāyata or Ājīvaka and Buddhism come under the latter group, and the rest of the schools fall under the former. Materialist views: The Cārvāka or Lokāyata or Ājīvaka schools are materialists. They assert that matter is the only ultimate reality. It is the fulcrum of all existence and therefore the self is nothing but an epiphenomenon of matter. It is a by-product of material elements of earth, water, fire and air. It is a temporal event that has evanescent being. The notion of a permanent self that is eternal and immortal is only a figment of imagination or wishful thinking. The self is destroyed with the death of body. Consciousness is the property of body. It arises in the body due to a particular combination of the four types of material elements. Consciousness is not found in the

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four types of material elements individually that constitute the body. Only when there is a combination or conglomeration of the four elements, self emerges and consciousness erupts. The self is a body-mind complex having emergence of consciousness. Since it is a by-product of matter it is perishable. It gets destroyed with the death of the body and therefore it is not eternal and immortal. There is no life after death. In a sense this view can be regarded as anātmavāda in so far as it does not believe in a permanent self, though traditionally this nomenclature has been reserved for the Buddhist view. Several positions may be ascribed to the materialist standpoint. In the tradition they have been described in different ways as dehātmavādin, indriyātmavādin, prāṇātmavādin, manātmavādin, etc. depending upon their identification of the self with body, senses, vital breaths, mind etc. respectively. We are not sure whether historically the upholders of these positions existed or not but philosophically this is immaterial as we are here concerned only with their metaphysical stances. The non- materialists do not agree with this position on logical, psychological and moral grounds. Life and consciousness cannot be reduced to a blind play of inert matter. The laws of matter cannot explain the phenomena of life and consciousness. Matter cannot have the properties of consciousness. It cannot initiate motion by itself. It does not have the capacity of self-animation. If the self is equated with the body then consciousness must be present all over the body but in case of paralysis, for example, consciousness is absent in that part of the body that is affected by paralysis. If it is argued that consciousness resides not in the body as a whole but in the constituents parts of the body, then there will be the predicament of there being many consciousnesses. But our experience is that consciousness is unified and therefore we say “I am conscious” and not that “My hand is conscious”. Further, if the body be the substratum of consciousness, then the phenomenon of memory will remain inexplicable. The body keeps on changing but the identity of self continues. It may be argued that when we say “I am fat” etc., it is an evidence of body being the self. The reply given is that this is only a mistaken view caused by faulty use of language. The correct expression should be “My body is fat”. Meaning of Buddhist Anātmavāda: The Buddhist approach to the problem of self seems to be psychological. Within Buddhism we find various differing views about the self. The utterances of Lord Buddha on this issue have been interpreted differently by different schools of Buddhist thought. Theodore Stcherbatsky in his work, “ Theory of The Buddhists” (which is a translation of one portion of the Abhidharmakośa of ) refers in the introduction to various such views in the light of Kaṭhavatthu. The translation part particularly deals with the views of Vatsiputriyas who admitted some unifying element as soul over and above the five conglomerated elements. However, the general Buddhist position is that the self is a continuous flow of the conglomeration of the series of five psycho-physical elements known as paňcaskandhas. There are two key Buddhist terms, viz, samghāta and santāna which explain the Buddhist notion of self. The five elements are rūpa, vedanā, saṁskāra, vijňāna and nāma. Of these the first alone is physical and the rest are psychical. These five constitute a conglomeration (samghāta) which is in constant

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flux in which the preceding gives rise to the succeeding (santāna). This process does not stop with the death of the body and continues in the next births till attainment of nirvāṇa. Rebirth is explainable in terms of a karmic link known as patisandhi which provides for the transition of saṁskāras from one birth to another. The entire effectuation follows the law of pratītyasamutpāda. There is nothing which endures. The real is non-eternal and momentary. Further, the Buddhists deny the reality of substance-attribute relation. So there is no substance called self which is a substratum of qualities. In this respect they differ from the materialists. , a Pali Buddhist text, provides a classical exposition of the notion of self in in the well- known Milinda- samvāda wherein, giving the analogy of a chariot which is a conglomeration of various parts, the self is also explained as a conglomeration of five elements which are always in flux. The Buddhist saying, “śabbe dhamma ” has been misunderstood as advocating no-soul theory. What it purports is not denial of self but denial of substance-hood of self. The Buddha exhorted us to get rid of the idea of ‘mine’ (mamatva). This gives rise to tanhā (volition) and dukkha (suffering). This coincides with the idea of parigraha (possessiveness). It is a practical ethics to give up attachment rather than a philosophical negation of ātman as Professor Hajime Nakamura in his works on Buddhism, particularly in “Buddhism in Comparative Light”, is at pains to explain. He examines such expressions as “attanam gavesati”, i.e., investigates into the nature of self (attanarakkhita7), i.e., self-guarded, attpiya, i.e., self-loving, attanam hiṃsam,i.e., hurting the self (hanti attanam8)i.e., kills the self by desires etc., and he points out that all these underline the importance of the self as a moral agent. He concludes that this idea of is almost identical with views in the old Upaniṣads, Jainism and in the philosophy of Ājīvakas. The point to be noted is that it is not the rejection of the existence of self but of the idea of self as an eternal entity known as satkāyadṛṣṭi. In fact it is not just the rejection of an eternal entity called the ātman but is a comprehensive theory of the non-essentiality (nissvabhāvatā) and contingent character (sūnyatā) of the universe. There is a particular Buddhist view that evolved later which needs a special mention. That is the view of Vijňānavāda or Yogacara School according to which vijňāna alone is really real. The self is vijňāna santāna (a series of ideas). Each self is one distinct series assuming oneness or unity among its conglomerates. As stated earlier, the Buddhists deny substance-attribute distinction in reality as it is not logically tenable and is not given to us in experience. All the attributes like cognition, pleasure, pain, volition etc. are not proved to be attributes necessitating postulation of a substratum for them in the form of an enduring self. In all these phenomena what we experience is a series of ideas coming into existence and ceasing to exist independently of a substance called self. All these experiences are nothing but forms

7Vinaya Pitaka, Mahāvagga, I.13,P.25. 8Suttanipāta, 583.

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of vijňāna s. Vijňāna s alone are real and they appear as external objects and internal sensations. There is oneness of a particular series which provides individual identity and continuity to that series. This is how memory, recollection, recognition etc. are possible. However, all the Buddhist formulations howsoever well-argued have not found favour with other schools of thought. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika conception of self: The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system differentiates between pure self and self in embodied state. The pure self is a simple, permanent, ubiquitous, spiritual substance which exists by itself. Only in embodied state it acquires qualities like consciousness etc. There are fourteen qualities, nine unique and five common, which the self acquires. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika texts deal with them in detail. The self is potentially knower (jňātā), doer (kartā) and enjoyer (bhoktā). This is possible when the self is in contact (sannikarṣa) with mind, senses and body which are different from the self. The texts give elaborate arguments to prove that the self is different from these. That it is different from the body is proved by the fact that the self remains the same in spite of the changes in the body and we feel no diminution of self even if parts of body such as legs or arms are cut off. Moreover, awareness like ‘my body’ or ‘my hand’ proves their separateness. The self is not identical with the senses, and this is proved by the fact that the deprivation in any sense-organ does not injure the self. Further, the multiplicity of senses would imply multiplicity of selves in the same body, and also multiplicity of experiences would not result in identity of consciousness. The self is different from the mind also because mind, being atomic, is incapable of simultaneously apprehending many objects. Each individual self is a unique centre of experience having an inalienable existence. All experiences belong to the self and inhere in it. Body, senses and mind cannot function without the self. It is their controlling, guiding and animating principle. It is the substratum of properties like pleasure, the possessor of generated knowledge and the subject of bondage and liberation. The existence of self is a matter of immediate experience and therefore some Naiyāyikas maintain that the self is perceived through mānasa pratyakṣa (mental perception) as the ‘I’ in cognition like ‘I am happy’. But it is perceived only as related to some perceptible attribute like cognition and pleasure. Vatsyayana distinctly states that the pure self, which is unrelated to a body or to attributes like consciousness, can never be perceived in a normal way, although it can be perceived in a supra-normal (yogaja) way. Even though it may be admitted that one’s own self can be perceived through mental or internal perception, the existence of other selves can only be inferred from their bodily actions. The self is to be inferred, for instance, as an animating principle of the sense-organs, and as an agent of knowledge. It is the self which imparts sentiency to sense-organs and body. The body has no sentiency, for it is not found in dead bodies. The sense-organs also do not have it, otherwise recollection, for example, could not have taken place when there is loss of organs. The mind too does not have it, as it is atomic and cannot have experience of composite objects. This system believes in multiplicity of selves, each self having its own body, mind and other individualizing elements. Because of multiplicity social life is possible and there can be arrangement in the form of separation of the subjects of

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knowledge, volitions, feelings and other forms of consciousness. This makes the operation of the law of karma possible. The individual selves are innumerable because of the fact that they are experienced to be so on account of the multiplicity of bodies with inalienably distinct experiences. However, the same individual self gets associated with different bodies in different births. This belief in transmigration and rebirth is based on the ground that there are certain impressions and habits which are derived from our experiences in previous births. From this phenomenon of transmigration it follows that the individual self is eternal and immutable, for otherwise it cannot pass through several births without losing its identity. The ultimate destiny of the self is to attain mokṣa by acquiring true knowledge of reality and by performing right actions (dharma). The dominant view among the thinkers of this view is that the self gets rid of all qualities in the state of mukti and therefore does not experience pain, pleasure etc. There is no consciousness and volition in the state of liberation. It is a state of pure existence. In the early Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika tradition it is taken to be devoid of consciousness in the original from but acquires consciousness as its adventitious property. Bhāsarvajña has however differed from this line of thinking and in the Nyāya tradition, particularly according to Raghunatha (AD 1475-1550), self is conscious and self-conscious essentially and remains so even in the state of mokṣa. Pūrva Mīmāmsā conception of self: The Mīmāṁsakas seem to be in broad agreement with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers regarding the nature of the self. They generally use the term puruṣa for it. According to them it is a spiritual substance which is eternal, omnipresent and simple without parts. It is imperishable and everlasting. It is knower, doer and enjoyer. Like the Naiyāyikas they put forth similar arguments for omnipresence, plurality and eternality of self. However Kumārila’s account of the destiny of self is different from that of Prabhākara and it is in line with Bhāsarvajña. For them in the state of liberation the self experiences pleasure. The Mīmāṁsakas differ from the Naiyāyikas, and also among themselves, with regard to the knowledge of the self. For Prabhākara self is self-luminous whereas for Kumārila it is revealed when it is known by the mind as an introspected datum of experience. Jaina conception of self: The Jaina system presents a syncretic view of self in so far as it has some commonality with all other systems. The self is essentially a sentient being. Life and consciousness are its essential attributes. In itself it is non- corporeal, living, eternal and everlasting substance. It has been described from the aspects of (substance), guṇa or bhāva (quality), kāla (time) and kṣetra (locus) in the Jaina literature. Therefore different views about self can be coordinated in a harmonious system. This is the peculiarity of the Jain view and also its strength. It is in accordance with its theories of anekāntavāda, nayavāda and syadvāda and with tripartite distinction of real as dravya, guṇa and paryāya. The self is different from the body etc. but it is intimately associated with it. It is infinite in number and it is different from one another on account of the difference of body. The selves differ on the basis of number of sense organs as numbering from one to five. Selves are in different bodies of different dimensions in their mundane state, but each has the capacity of expanding or contracting depending upon the size of the body. So it is said

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to be of madhyama parimāṇa (of middle size). This is because it is coextensive with the body. So in a sense and in a context it is both incorporeal and corporeal. The decrease and increase does not affect its essential nature which consists in life and consciousness. There is an interesting position of the Jainas that selves exist everywhere in the universe. There is no space where there is no self, subtle or gross. This view borders on panpsychism with this difference that according to it everything is not self but everywhere there is self. The self has the capacity of knowing, doing and experiencing. Consciousness (upayoga) is its essence. Though different from the body only in association with the body it can realize its capacities. The inherent capacity of every self is alike but in their manifestations there is a difference depending upon its puruṣārtha (efforts) and other factors. Not only selves are mutually dependent (upagraha), self and matter are also mutually dependent. The self is eternal, immortal and impenetrable. Its original nature is pure and simple but due to its association with matter it acquires impurity. Its properties are without limits but in embodied state they get limited. So the destiny of self is to restore its pristine purity. Sāṃkhya conception self: The Sāṃkhya view of self is radically different from all the preceding views. The Sāṃkhya system does not accept substance-attribute distinction. This apart it is uncompromisingly dualistic. It maintains that reality is two-fold. It is consciousness named as puruṣa and matter named as prakṛti. Both are independent and unassociated substances. The self is unborn, eternal, immutable and immortal substance. It is a unitary and self-identical being. It a subject of all experiences in the sense that it makes experiences possible, but it transcends all experiences. It is the adhiṣṭhātā (supervisor) of experiences. With the instrumentality of the evolutes of prakṛti experiences take place. It is inactive and therefore not a doer or agent of action. It is different from ego, a product of matter, which individualizes consciousness. In the Sāṃkhya kārikā of Ῑśvarakṛṣṇa we find a very illuminating account of the Sāṃkhya view, though it represents one of the varied Sāṃkhya traditions. There is a controversy whether the Sāṃkhya system believes in one self or in many selves. The popular view is that it maintains pluralism of puruṣas. There is also a tradition, though not well known, which maintains plurality of pradhānas, each individual self having its own pradhāna9. Vedāntic conception of self: The Vedāntic conception is generally accepted by the masses and is the dominant view in Indian culture. It may be due to the influences of Ramāyāṇa, , Puranas and Dharmaśāstras. The Vedāntic view is based upon the Upaniṣads, the Brahmasūtras and the Bhagvadgītā recognized as praṣṭhānatraya. But there have been varied interpretations of these texts and therefore there are many strands of Vedāntic thought both classical and modern. Two most prominent and philosophically significant views can be considered here pertaining to Śankara’s Advaita and ’s Viśiṣṭādvaita which present a vivid contrast. In

9Satdarśanasamuccaya, Guṇaratnaṭīka, Kārikā 36.

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Advaita absolutistic monism is advocated whereas in Viśiṣṭādvaita a sort of theistic monism is propounded. Advaitic view: According to Advaita Vedānta the individual self is the same as the Absolute in the ultimate analysis. Only due to (limiting conditioning) it appears to be individuated and differentiated. Then it is experienced as jīva, having psycho-physical conditionings. In itself it is pure consciousness, a witnessing consciousness (sākṣī) having superimposed adjuncts like antaḥkaraṇa (which is four- fold as mana, buddhi, ahamkāra and ), body etc. It is pure subject which cannot be objectified. It is self-luminous pure consciousness which is trans-empirical. It is infinite, sui generis, formless and quality-less existence. It is unalloyed bliss. It is eternal, immutable, immortal and eternally free. In this sense it is one with Brahman. In the form of jīva it is embodied having mind, senses and different forms of body like gross, subtle and causal. Jīva stands for anupraveśa of consciousness in the limiting adjuncts. It is then finite. Otherwise jīva is the same as Brahman. The difference is due to upādhis (superimposed conditions) and with the dissipation of upādhis non-difference is experienced. The followers of Śankara are split in three groups with regard to understanding Brahman vis-vis jīva. They are either ābhāsavādī, or pratibimbavādī or avacchedavādī. These are well known positions and therefore their treatment is not needed. As jīva the individual self is jňātā (knower), kartā (doer) and bhoktā (enjoyer). It leads a sense-bound empirical life and it is subject to pleasure and pain. It fabricates its own samsāra and is enmeshed in the series of life and death. In the process of transmigration it is repeatedly born and it dies again and again under the force of and this process comes to end when there is mukti. An embodied self is atomic in size but it is really infinite. Likewise empirical selves are many but the real self is one only. Empirically speaking again the self has five kośas, viz., annamāya, prāṇamāya, manomāya, vijňānamāya and ānandamāya, and it has three states of existence, viz., jāgrata, svapna and suṣupta. The real self is ānanda and turīya or turīyātīta. Thus in Advaita Vedānta the real self is regarded as eternal, infinite, indivisible, self-luminous, undifferentiated and unitary saccidānanda (Being-Consciousness-Bliss). In mundane state only it has different nature which is superimposed on it but which does not affect it in real sense. Ramanuja’s disagreement with Advaitic view: Ramanuja differs with this Advaitic view and declares that the individual self is the most palpable and concrete entity. Its reality is given in the facts of consciousness, for consciousness which is ever-changing requires a substratum. It is also given in the facts of memory and recognition, for recognition implies a conscious subject persisting from the earlier to the later moment. It is also implicit in inference, for it presupposes the ascertainment and remembrance of general propositions. Ramanuja supplements these empirical arguments by the testimony of the scriptures. In the first chapter of Śrībhāṣya he quotes Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad III. 7.22, Śvetāsvatara Upaniṣad I.6, I.9, VI.9, VI.16, VI.13 etc. in all of which the plurality of self is explicitly recognized and taught. He further derives support from the Gītā (II.12) which clearly teaches the reality of individual self and its eternal distinction from Brahman.

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ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO REALITY IN INDIAN THOUGHT 23

Ramanuja’s view of individual self: In the philosophy of Ramanuja the absoluteness of Brahman (God) is so qualified as to admit the existence of real finite selves within His concrete unity. From the fundamental ontological position of Ramanuja that God is a unity inclusive of infinite determinations, there logically follows the existence of real finite selves, which are individual centers of knowledge, will and action. They are entities in themselves, though they derive their substantiality and entire being from God. Being the eternal differentiations of God, they are called His modes, parts, body etc., yet they have their own individual nature and features. Ramanuja thus advocates the modal dependence of individual selves on the Supreme Self. He is quite emphatic and insistent in holding that the individual selves, being eternal differentiations of God, are as real as God Himself. They are real entities, and cannot be dismissed as illusory, or false and fictitious being due to some innate nescience associated with the nature of God. Therefore, he criticizes those who regard individual selves as ‘vain variations of the self-same Absolute’. Individual self as knower: According to Ramanuja each individual self is a real self-identical being. It is a spiritual being different from the material elements like mind, body, vital breathes, senses etc. He holds that the essential nature of the individual self is to be a knowing subject. It is not pure consciousness as the Advaitin maintains, but it is the substratum of consciousness. It is not mere knowledge but an individual who possesses knowledge as its essential characteristic. That the self is a conscious principle and not mere consciousness is emphasized by him in order to safeguard the individuality of the self against the Advaitic tendency of overlooking all distinctions between the finite self and Brahman. Individual self as doer: Ramanuja further maintains that the individual self is not only a knower, but also a doer and is thus a true self characterized by thought and activity. He declares that the agency of the self is implied in the Upaniṣadic doctrine of karma according to which each self reaps the fruits of its deeds. The agency of the self is denied by the Advaita and the Sāṃkhya. In the scriptures also at places agency is denied to the self. There it is maintained as though the self is inactive all activity being due to the guṇas of the body. Ramanuja explains this circumstance by saying that the self is an agent by virtue of its being associated with the karmic body in an embodied state. But it is the self only which is an agent and not the guṇas. Though the self is an agent, this does not mean that it is always active. It is provided with the capacity to act but it may act or may not act, as it pleases. Individual self as atomic: Ramanuja further declares that the individual self is atomic. It is not all-pervading because the scriptures speak of it as passing out of the body, going and returning, all these movements on the part of the self would clearly be meaningless if it were omnipresent10. The logical basis for Ramanuja’s rejection of the omnipresence of the self is that if it were so there would be everywhere and at all times simultaneously consciousness and non-consciousness, but this never is the case. Moreover, he points out against the Vaiśeṣika s that if the self were omnipresent all

10Ramanuja bases this view on Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad V. 8-9, and Munḍaka Upaniṣad III.1.9.

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24 S. R. BHATTA

the selves would be in permanent conjunction with all organs, and besides, the adṛṣṭas due to the actions of the different bodies would be entirely confused, for all selves would then be in contact with all bodies. Ramanuja further maintains that though the individual self is atomic and dwells in one part of the body, it is conscious of the sensations taking place in any part of the body. Thus it extends through the whole body by means of its quality, namely, consciousness. When the scriptures describe the self as all-pervasive they refer to its consciousness only. It, however, may be referred to as all- pervasive in the sense that being infinitely small it can penetrate all unconscious material substances. It has uniqueness like a monad, but is not exclusive and windowless because of its all-pervasive consciousness. So although the self is atomic it has knowledge as its invariable accompaniment, which can stream forth to any distance and is able to comprehend things even though they are far off. Individual self as eternal and immutable: Ramanuja further maintains that the individual self is eternal and immutable in the sense that it is sui generis and has its own intrinsic value. It is unborn and immortal. It is real, and the real, as the Gītā declares, never ceases to be. Therefore no dissipation of the individuality of the self can be admitted. When the scriptures speak of origination and destruction of the self they only point out the association with and dissociation from the body of the embodied self. But in all these births and deaths and rebirths, which continue up to release, there is no addition to or diminution of its essence and existence. Those texts which deny origination mean to say that the self does not undergo changes of essential nature. Comparative analysis of different views: The Cārvāka and Buddhist thinkers share the view that the self is of composite character but differ with regard to the nature of the components. For the Cārvāka the constituent elements are only material but for the Buddhists they are psycho-physical. The Buddhist doctrine of flux and belief in karma, samsāra and rebirth further differentiate the two. But both agree that the self is not eternal and everlasting entity. For both of them the empirical ego is the self. In a sense both are ātmavādī in as much as they accept the self whatever be its nature. In another sense both are anātmavādī in so far as they do not admit any eternal and immortal self. That the self is composite and therefore not eternal is a good contrast with the views of rest of the systems of Indian thought which regard self as a simple substance, non-composite and therefore eternal. They associate composite character with the self only in a subsequent mundane state when the self is empirical ego, a state that is real for some and not real for others. For them the self in its pure form is kūṭastha nitya (unchangeable and eternal). Among the rest of the schools on the basis of acceptance or rejection of dharma- dharmī-bheda (substance-attribute relationship) Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Pūrva Mīmāmsā, Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta and Jainism fall under one group and Sāṃkhya and Advaita Vedānta come under another group. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāmsā systems postulate dharma-dharmī- but regard that the dharma is not essential property of dharmī. The self is pure substance to begin with and acquires properties in worldly existence. The Sāṃkhya and Advaita Vedānta reject dharma-dharmī- sambandha which is regarded by them as false assumption due to avidyā. Jainism and

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ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO REALITY IN INDIAN THOUGHT 25

Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta accept dharma-dharmī-sambandha but unlike Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāmsā regard that the properties are essential to self. However, Jainism differs from Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta in postulating paryāya implying changes both in the self and its properties. A corollary of the acceptance or non-acceptance of dharma- dharmī-sambandha is that those systems which accept it regard self as knower, doer and enjoyer whereas those which reject it regard the self as pure consciousness and therefore devoid of these properties. The latter argue that the kūṭasthanityatā of the self preclude any mutability in the self. But mutability is involved in knowing, doing and feeling. The former group of systems regards all mutations as secondary and they strictly speaking do not affect the essence of self.

X

The ratiocinative human mind draws a distinction between two facets of Reality as fact (bhūtavastu) and value (bhāvya vastu). Fact is already in existence in the present or in the past. Value is to be brought into existence through our efforts. Experience of fact enables us to postulate value and engages us in the pursuit of its realization. When value is realized it becomes fact. So fact-value dichotomy is only apparent and for practical purposes only. Further we distinguish between value and disvalue. Within values again we distinguish between intrinsic and instrumental values, ultimate and proximate values and so forth. Consciousness of values and their planned and systematic realization is a unique feature of human life. There is an innate and instinctive necessity and urge in human beings to participate in the process of value-realization. No doubt human being is the highest product of the process of evolution, he is not the best product that has emerged so far or must have evolved. He is always conditioned by the feeling that he is missing something, lacking something and wanting something. He has the painful realization of his finitude and imperfection (alpatva) and dependent existence (ārtatva). He is also aware of the need to transcend his finitude and circumscription. Further, he has the unique capacity and capability to devise appropriate means and modalities for this transcendence. Quest for excellence leading to good quality of life has been the perennial human concern. It is not only prolongation of existence but also betterment of living that prompts all beings to carry out their day- to- day activities. Consciously or unconsciously, overtly or covertly, intentionally or instinctively value-pursuits are built in living beings. In fact it can be maintained that there is a built in telos or immanent teleology in the cosmic process. It is reflected and expressed in human beings in a more pronounced and systematic way. All human endeavors and all pursuits of culture and civilizations have been prompted by and directed towards this existential concern. The cultivation of arts and humanities, the development of science and technology, the undertaking of material production and its trade and commerce, the organization of human conduct, both individual and societal, and all manifestations of human potentialities have been stimulated by and engineered in this direction. The traditional Indian concept of ‘puruṣārtha’ is one of the prominent formulations of this concern for excellence and perfection. In the performance of

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26 S. R. BHATTA

puruṣārtha there are three steps of knowledge of the goal (sādhya =achievable and desirable), of the adequate and conducive means (sādhanā) and of skillful employment of modalities (itikartavyatā). The basis of choice of goal is its appropriateness (aucitya). It is appropriate if it is conducive to individual and universal well-being ( and not anartha), and it is realizable (not asādhya). The means has to be in accordance with the goal (anukūla). It should be available and accessible also (upalabdha). The modalities stand for proper knowledge and orderly and skillful employment of means (upāyakauśala) to realize the goal. Since the modalities have to be composite, it is necessary to know the different steps and their priority and posteriority (paurvāparva) while undertaking the performance. There is a quadruple principle underlying pursuit of puruṣārtha. It is Jňāna-icchā-- (knowledge-will-effort-result). All these four are to be properly harnessed in their symbiotic interrelationship. A puruṣārtha has to be collective and corporate enterprise. An isolated human individual never exits. He/she is a part and parcel of the total Reality and has no existence or meaning apart from this totality. There is reciprocal dependence, supportive co-existence, judicious cooperation and mutual caring and sharing. Of course, it is the individual who is the agent but this agency is possible only in a collectivity and therefore the motives and intentions of every act should be the well-being of the collectivity11. Traditionally four puruṣārthas have been conceived in the Vedic tradition and they are by and large accepted in other traditions as well. They are dharma, artha, kāma and mokṣa. But logically there is no fixity about it. What is important is that a human person should lead a planned life with proper knowledge and pursuit of proximate and ultimate goals of life. For this there can be different patterns of theorizing but the four-fold traditional schema seems to be universally desirable. In the four-fold schema dharma is the foundation and guiding principle, artha and kāma are preyas (i.e. worldly goals for earthly well- being), and mokṣa is niḥśreyas (i.e. beyond the two). Dharma, artha and kāma are to be pursued in the empirical life, and they are therefore put under one head of trivarga. Mokṣa is both this worldly (jīvanmukti) and otherworldly and therefore it is distinguished as apavarga.

XI

Any meaningful consideration of value-realization has to be in the context of nature and essence of human existence. This is because human being is bestowed with the capacity of reflective awareness and ratiocinative discrimination. He alone can consciously pursue in a planned way the process of value-realization. He has the ability to transform himself and the surrounding nature to his advantage. So in this planning one has to understand and take into account human nature, human potentialities, human capabilities, human needs and aspirations. Moreover, its

11The Gītā ideal of ‘loka samgraha’ is the guiding spirit of all theorizing about puruṣārtha.

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ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO REALITY IN INDIAN THOUGHT 27

meaning and scope is to be understood both constitutively in terms of actual realization that is gradual and graded, and by evaluating in terms of positing the ideals and striving towards the realization of the same. Thus till its final realization perfection or mokśa is not to be conceived as a position but as a normative process calling for constant evaluation; not as conquest but as a quest; not as one time endeavor but an ongoing enterprise until its complete fruition. The underlying idea is that life is meaningful in the pursuit of the ideal and not just in being satisfied with the actual. But this is not the denial of the actual for the pursuit of the ideal. It is, on the contrary, using the actual to realize the ideal. The ideal needs to be actualized and the actual should lead to the ideal. There is another point that has to be emphasized in understanding meaning and scope of value-realization. It pertains to the human individual as well as the total cosmos. Since the two are intimately interrelated, interdependent and interpenetrating and thus constitute a single whole, one cannot attempt to realize it keeping in view an isolated individual, or society, or region, or age. It cannot be solitary or piecemeal. It has to be a global vision, a holistic approach, a corporate endeavor and a universal realization. This is the Vedic view which constitutes the foundation of Indian culture. In the course of history it has received various formulations, sometimes in a truncated and distorted form as well. There have been aberrations also and sages and saints have at all times cautioned and corrected us about it. Our awareness of values is always prescriptive. It is different from the descriptive awareness concerning facts. A description can be true or false or doubtful but the logic of prescription has another set of values. A prescription can be good or bad or indifferent. It may be conducive to well-being or harmful or of no effect. A description has to be local with the possibility of ‘universalizability’ but a prescription has to be global with the need of being applied to local situations. Accordingly the mode of knowing prescription cannot be the same as the mode of knowing the description. Of course both are to be grounded in experience but the nature of experience cannot be the same. The ideals are conceived in and spring from actual situation but their source is not sense experience. Another point to be referred to is that norms are posited to be pursued (They are sādhya and not asādhya). In ideal situation they are to be practiced spontaneously as a matter of habit or by the force of conscience. That is why importance of value- education is accepted as it helps in cultivation of moral will. But more often than not because of moral infirmity built in human nature there is a need of external sanctions, social or political. That is why codes and laws are formulated. But this enforcement from outside is always feeble as moral weakness is ingrained in human nature. That is why there is greater need for moral education and constant vigilance. But it should not be overlooked that values are not to be taught but to be imbibed. There is always a gap between theory and practice and our endeavor should be to bridge it as far as possible. A moral norm may not be adhered to in its totality or fullness but this does not mean that it should be given up as impracticable or utopian. The distinction between mahāvrata and aṇuvrata in the Jaina tradition is a good guide in this regard. The mark of an ideal being actually perused is harmony between the inner and outer

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reality of the agent, between inner feelings and outward behavior. But this cannot be a fool-proof criterion. Public vigilance helps in norm –following. So far as the question of values in private life and public life is concerned, in a holistic and integral approach the public-private divide is not entertained. Values are to be posited and pursued for both the spheres and they are to be sought conjointly. Public life is more demonstrable and loss of values can be detected with greater ease. External sanctions can operate with greater force. But value-pursuit is a collective and corporate endeavor. It is not a single person enterprise. There has to be an all-round effort for this. It is physical-mental-spiritual exercise. It is a yajňa to be performed by the collectivity and for the collectivity.12 Quest for values, pursuit of values and realization of values have to be holistic and integral exercises. They have to pertain to different dimensions of human constitution, as for example, analyzed in the paňcakośa theory of the Taittirīya Upaniṣad.13 Each dimension of human existence is valuable and must be catered to in a balanced and graduated manner. This is the message of this Upaniṣad. There should not be lopsided endeavor, concentrating on one and excluding the rest. Similarly human existence is situated in multi-layered environment and all layers are to be catered. Human being exists in family, in social and natural surroundings. The Śāntipātha in the Upaniṣads refers to many such layers. Values pertain to each of these layers. The value schema should not be regarded as partite or divisible. All values in the schema are intertwined and possess inseparability. No one value can be realized without the rest. There is organic unity in the total Reality and this is reflected in value schema as well. In Classical Indian thought this organic understanding was built-in but now under the impact of western civilization we have neglected it. In our value considerations we have to go back to the classical thought if we are sincere and honest in our enterprise. We have talked a lot about values, particularly in the context of value-oriented education, without caring about the nature of Reality given to us in our concrete experience. The Reality we talk about is not the lived Reality but abstracted Reality, rationalized Reality and therefore we are far away from concrete Reality. It is high time that we shad away our bias against Classical thought, revisit Classical thought and do so in a positive and constructive frame of mind. The contemporary mind is looking for new intuitions, fresh insights and innovative thinking and Classical Indian Thought has the potentiality to provide the needed guidelines provided we understand it in its true spirits. The onus of responsibility for this guidance lies on young creative minds and it is hoped that they will prove to be worthy of this task.

12It is not according to the Upaniṣads and the Gītā. It is performance of self-less action). This is the message of the Vedas and the Upaniṣads. We have this cultural heritage available to us, and it is for us to look to it and be benefited by it. 13Tattirīyopaniṣad, Brahmānanda valli, Anuvāka 1-5.

Journal of East-West Thought

PHENOMENOLOGICAL REDUCTION AND YOGIC : COMMONALITIES AND DIVERGENCIES

Ake Sander

Abstract: Western philosophers and scholars have long maintained the assumption that there is a gulf of difference between “Western rational thinking” and “Eastern irrational, mystical-metaphysical brooding” (cf. Beinorius 2005; Carrette & King 2005; Halbfass 1990; Tart 1969). Among those that are reasonably familiar with both traditions, however, it is well understood that neither Chinese nor Indian thinking, for example, is in any way inferior to that which can be found in the West (cf. Fung 1966; Dasgupta (1922-1955; Radhakrisnan (1929-1931)). However, it is not the aim of this paper to make a general comparison of Eastern and Western thought relative to such criteria as level of achievement, rationality, scientific- mindedness and so forth. Rather, it’s more modest and specific aim is to compare Edmund Husserl’s (1859-1938) methods for achieving knowledge/truth (i.e., the phenomenological reduction(s)) with those often propounded by the Indian darśana1 or system of thought (i.e., yogic/jñānic) meditation);2 as to the latter of these, my primary source will be Patañjali’s Yoga Sūtras.3 More specifically, it

AKE SANDER, Professor of Psychology & , Dept. of Literature, History of Ideas and Religion, University of Gothenburg, Box 200405 30 Goteborg, phone + 46(o) 31 786 1561, fax + 46(o) 31 786 1560. E-mail: [email protected] . 1This literally means how something presents itself or is experienced from a certain perspective or school of philosophic thought. In ritual and/or pilgrimage: the “auspicious sight” of the deity. 2Clearly, even this more modest objective can only be scantily treated in a short paper such as this. 3Precisely when Patañjali lived has not been established. Although different sources have made very different assessments, it seems clear that it was somewhere between 200 BCE and 200 CE. It also seems clear that Patañjali was not the author, but rather the “editor” or “compiler” of the Sūtras s. The text consists of 194 short aphorisms, divided into four book or chapters (Pāda). It is believed by most that the manner of their current arrangement originated from around 500 CE. Book I (Samādhi Pāda (51 Sūtras s)) treats the theory of yoga; Book II (Sādhana Pāda (55 Sūtras s)) treats its practice, technique or discipline; Book III (Vibhūtipāda (56 Sūtras s)) treats the or super-natural powers that the practitioner can develop; and, Book IV (Kaivalya Pāda (34 Sūtras s)) treats kaivalya (“isolation”), meaning emancipation or liberation (the goal of the practice). Since the time of Patañjali, the yoga system has evolved to include a large number of philosophical, religious, self-improvement and self–realization schools and movements, and today there exists a large body of literature treating various types (and aspects) of this tradition that cannot be gone into here (Carrette& King 2005). The general opinion of these texts, however, is that Patañjali’s work is the foundational and most authoritative work about yoga. Regardless of their differences, all schools of yoga seem to consider Patañjali the founder of the practice, just as all movements within phenomenology more or less accept Husserl as their principal founder. In this paper, I use the translation by I.K. Taimnis (1961). How Patañjali’s method (jñānic - or concentration meditation) relates to other forms of meditation (e.g., modern Buddhism’s vipasayanā or insight meditation) cannot be treated here. (See Eliade 1959, kap. 5; King 1980, kap. 1; Goleman 1977; Sander 1988.)

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30 AKE SANDER

compares Husserl’s phenomenological reduction(s) and Patañjali’s yogic/jñānic meditation as a methodological tool (or technique) for achieving a form of higher knowledge or truth that each claims to be otherwise impossible to reach. In making this comparison I intend to draw attention to a particular similarity as well as a particular distinction between the two: on the one hand, Husserl’s epoché and phenomenological reductions 4 bear a striking resemblance to the method(s) advocated by Patañjali; on the other hand, although the epoché and the phenomenological reductions are often presented as being central to the phenomenological effort, 5 unlike Patañjali, few phenomenologists have had something meaningful to say about what one must practically do to acquire and execute the involved techniques.

According to Husserl, the epoché and the phenomenological reduction(s) are the most essential methodological tools in terms of conducting the radical reflexion of consciousness that is necessary to free us from the various conditioned presuppositions (needs, habits, hexis, etc.) that, in our “natural attitude” (natürliche Einstellung), largely determine and direct our experience of the world and ourselves, thus preventing us from seeing things as they “really” are—i.e., as “pure phenomena”. In other words, Husserl’s method aims to cleanse or purge the mind in such a way that one’s experiences are no longer affected by the various factors that separate the experiencing subject from “the things themselves” (die Sachen selbst).6

4Authors such as Goleman (1977, spec. part I and III), Johansson (1979, 1983), King (1980) and Ornstein (1971) have argued that this resemblance also applies to those meditational methods described in Buddhism’s Nikāya literature, which is perhaps most systematically described in Buddhagosa’s (‘The Path of Purification’). These authors also argue that the Buddhist “introspective” or – if we observe the distinction between introspection and reflexion (Zaner 1970; Idhe 1977) – reflexive descriptive psychological analysis, is the most detailed and complete empirical description and analysis of the mind and its structures, functions and processes that has been made before the birth of “modern” depth psychology (cf. also Carrette& King 2005). Moreover, as I see it, it has the strength of being practical and agent/participate-based, and not theoretical and observer-oriented (like most phenomenological theories). 5 It should be noted that there are many different schools (or directions) within the phenomenological movement (to use Spiegelberg’s term (1982)), and that these contain various ideas about what phenomenology is and how it ought to be performed. As such the understandings of Husserl, for example, differ in substantial ways from those of Heidegger, Sartre, Schütz and Merleau-Ponty, who, in their turn, differ from each other. These differences are identified by the use of terms such as “transcendental phenomenology”, “social phenomenology”, “phenomenological ontology” and “life-world phenomenology”. The emphatic claim that the epoché and the phenomenological reduction(s) are necessary components of the phenomenological method primarily applies to advocates of transcendental phenomenology. In the phenomenological theories of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, for example, these elements play only a very minor role (if any at all) (Sander 1988, part III). 6The fact that this Decartian/Husserlian (and, as we will see, Patañjalian) method is highly controversial is reflected in the following comment by Macintyre (1977: 462): “To say to oneself or to someone else ’Doubt all your beliefs here and now’ ... is an invitation not to

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Only when the mind is “purified” in this manner can the experiencer reach phenomenology’s goal of absolute freedom from presuppositions and prejudices (Voraussetzungsloskeit), which is a necessary precondition for the ultimate achievement of so-called apodictically true and certain knowledge.7 Arguing for what appears to be a very similar goal, the opening aphorisms of Patañjali’s Yoga Sūtras state that “yoga is the inhibition of the modifications of the mind [which establishes] the Seer in his own essential and fundamental nature. In other states, there is assimilation (of the Seer) with [those] modifications” (1:2-4). Miller (1996: ix) claims that Patañjali “… seeks a new perspective on the nature of knowing – a way to clear the mind of accumulated experiences and memories”, and such an observation can as readily be applied to Husserl. The paper ends by pointing out a dilemma (or, perhaps, inconsistency) that appears to come along with the serious acceptance of phenomenological theory and method as a means for achieving the type of “pure” absolute unprejudiced and apodictically true knowledge that Husserl claims to be his goal. This dilemma roughly consists of the fact that Husserl’s theory prevents him from continuing his reductions all the way to their inevitable (and unavoidable?) end. In other words, if one were to consistently carry phenomenological reduction to its natural end, it would logically bring one to the point of becoming freed from (or going beyond) the phenomenological-theoretical point of departure itself—an end that Husserl appears to have never achieved. Put a bit differently, although phenomenology should have been pure method, it became theory instead. This sort of dilemma, on the other hand, is one that the can potentially avoid.8

philosophy but to mental breakdown, or rather to philosophy as a means of mental breakdown”. Wittgenstein (1961) repeatedly makes the same point. 7It should be obvious that the attainment of this goal presupposes that the entirety of our consciousness—its various sedimentary experiences and their organizations (relevancy structures)—is accessible to its own reflective gaze, meaning that our consciousness is totally transparent relative to its own gaze. In other words, everything in our consciousness can be investigated by the reflexion of the intentional analysis. There cannot be any de facto inaccessible strata or layers of “sub-“ or “unconscious” “material” (that can affect our experiencing) anywhere in the consciousness (mind). Husserl (as well as Sartre) believed that every experience (every content of consciousness) is capable of being completely and perfectly explicated and “unveiled” by the phenomenologist, an uncovering in which all included moments (in their process of constitution) can be separated and isolated from each other and be objects for the “intuitive” gaze of the (transcendental or pure) ego (cf. 1950 (1973a), especially the Forth Meditation). As far as I can see, yoga and several other darśanas share the opinion that the properly trained subject can reflect all content of consciousness. As is well known, Freud and Jung, among others, were of a different opinion. Both Husserl and yoga seem to be of the opinion that real objectivity and truth can be had only from “nobody’s point of view”, or from God’s (if there is any difference). As has been noted by Nagel (1974), objectivity and truth presuppose “departure from a specifically human or even mammalian viewpoint”. 8To avoid any misunderstandings, let me emphasize that my aim here is not to prove that one or the other of these “schools” is better (more correct or true) than the other, or to argue that the phenomenologist should become a yogi (or vice versa); nor am I suggesting that one or the

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I. The Indian Tradition of Thought

Before entering the main topic of this article, let me set the stage by outlining my views on the principle theme of Indian thought, which from the Upaniṣads (approx. 700-500 BCE) onwards appears to have been largely existential (cf. Sander & Andersson 2010). By this I mean that throughout its history, Indian philosophy’s primary effort has been to describe, analyze and explain the human predicament, and especially the temporality and historicity of mankind. In this regard, human beings are viewed as entities that are conditioned by a multiplicity of inner and outer factors, with the central problem being to surmount (or become “liberated” from) these various “determinants” and achieve an unconditioned, non-temporal, non-historical state of existence (mokṣa).9 Here it should be noted that the primary aim of this sort of analysis was not to attain a precise, coherent theory of the human being, but rather to comprehend the extent to which consciousness 10 has been conditioned and, most significantly, to ascertain the nature of that which potentially exists beyond (or outside of) the determinations of the temporal world—i.e., what it would mean to be a wholly free and unconditioned living being. This is one reason that long before the Western development of deep psychology, Indian thinkers had already initiated a detailed functional examination of the human mind (or consciousness) and its formative role in our experience of self and world. What they discovered in this regard was that while the “outer” (cultural, social, etc.) determinants were relatively easy to identify, comprehend and overcome, the major challenge to the achievement of a completely liberated life (the goal of the yogi) involved understanding the structure and organization (vāsanās) of the normally unconscious, deeply rooted properties of one’s own mind (needs, dispositions, motivations, impulses, etc. (saṁskāras)) and then methodically transcending them.11 Here it is important to emphasize once again that among Indian thinkers, knowledge of the various characteristics of consciousness and its role in the determination of the self, its experiences and so forth was never an end in itself, something of only other school really has methods by which we can de facto obtain apodictically true knowledge. My opinion regarding this last matter can be found in Sander 1988. 9 According to Tart (1969: 3), one indication of Indian philosophy’s great interest in consciousness and other related problems is that has developed over 20 terms for describing various forms of consciousness. 10Whereas in Indian philosophy mind and consciousness are systematically distinguished, in phenomenology as well as in much of Western psychology they generally are not. In Indian philosophy, mind (manas, or in the yoga tradition, citta) is normally considered an individual “entity”, limited to one person, whereas consciousness (cetanā) is considered universal and unlimited. An individual mind is (considered to be) conscious due to universal consciousness, and yoga is the method by which that limited conscious mind is made to mingle with the unlimited, thus establishing a being in its “true” nature. 11For a more detailed discussion on the various factors that determine our experiencing, see Sander 1988, spec. part III, . 3.2.3.1., 3.3.3.8., part IV sect. 4.1.

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theoretical or academic interest. On the contrary, it was consistently pursued for practical use in the process of self-liberation. Knowledge of consciousness, in other words, was primarily of instrumental value, as a means for controlling and mastering the mind: mokṣa was the superior goal, and everything else was subordinate to this. As such, the main attraction for Western philosophers and psychologist that have looked to Indian thought has not been in its theories of consciousness, but rather in its methods and techniques for “de-conditioning” (Eliade), “de-automatizing” (Deikman) or liberating the mind from its normally unconscious, automatically operating determining factors and processes. Indeed, it is likely in this area that Western psychologists, phenomenologists and philosophers have most to learn from Indian thinkers. From this we now turn to the concept māyā, which, as is commonly known, holds great importance in Indian thought. While the term’s etymology and meaning has been much discussed, a dominating view seems to be that it originates from the Indo- European root ma, which means to make, produce, create, measure, form or build.12 Whatever the truth about its etymology, māyā has been used within many darśana to indicate “mirage”, “phantom”, “magic”, “coming into being”, “unreal(it)” and “(cosmic) illusion”. To my understanding, māyā is unreal or illusory primarily because it “comes into being” and is characterized by “changeableness” and “temporality”, and thus cannot be an aspect of Being. And because all temporal entities carry the seed of their own destruction, so to speak, they are incapable of providing complete satisfaction, at least according to most darśanas.13 Early on, Indian thinkers became aware of the relation between illusion, temporality and human suffering, making this one of their principal themes. Although this relation was often expressed in “cosmic terms”, a closer reading indicates that, as a rule, the problem of human suffering and disharmony was conceived as being determined by historic-temporal structures and categories of experience that prevented one from experiencing and living in harmony with “Reality”, or ens

12In which case it shares etymology with the Latin materia, materies, and the like. 13Cf. the platonic distinction between the world of changeable and perishable entities (the empirical world of our senses) on the one hand, and the world of unchangeable and imperishable entities (the world of ideas or forms) on the other. The former is relative and less real than the latter, which is absolute. That is why the only type of knowledge we can have about the former is doxa (belief, opinion), while we can have episteme (true, absolute, justified and apodictic knowledge) about the latter. As can be seen, it is not only an Indian idea that the only “thing” really and truly worth striving for, and the only “thing” we can really have knowledge about, is something eternal and unchangeable. We also find the same theme in the Bible (especially Ecclesiastes), where all our strivings for temporal, worldly “things” are described as follows: “vanity of vanities; all is vanity”. These are just two examples of what Eliade claims to be our human “ontological thirst”: “Religious man can live only in a sacred world, because it is only in such a world that he participates in being, that he has a real existence. This religious need expresses an unquenchable ontological thirst. Religious men thirst for being” (1959: 64). This type of essentialism was not attacked at its core before Sartre and his radical existentialism.

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realisimum.14 “Being in māyā” is thus roughly equivalent to what many Western thinkers have described as “being in false consciousness” or “being an ideological subject”, meaning being helplessly embedded in the thought and knowledge determinants 15 of one’s own epochal, geographical, social, cultural, etc. location. Māyā means, in other words, that the life-world we experience and exist in is only relative, contingent and not the really real thing.16 Accordingly, to live in māyā is to live with a “gap” between “what our senses receive” and “what our mind experiences”—between Reality As It Is and reality as we experience it through our historically, culturally and socially derived patterns of interpretation.17 It is not too difficult to imagine that those who seriously (existentially) embrace this perspective will likely experience a sense of dissatisfaction with mundane historic-temporal existence and long to experience and live within the framework of True reality. To summarize, although māyā clearly indicates cosmic illusion, the term also, and above all, indicates temporality and historicity: existence and coming into being not only on the scale of the eternal cosmos, but also in terms of mundane time and history.18

14Or by whatever term one desires to call it: Supreme Reality, Supreme Being, Brahman, , Mahadevi, Ground of Being, etc. 15These determinants of our thought and knowledge, the “mental” structures through which we constitute our identities and life-worlds, the structures that give us our specific understanding of the world, our self and our place and role in it, have many names in the literature, for example: Weltanschauung, definition of reality, preconception or Vorverständnis, belief/dis-belief system, stock of knowledge, pattern of interpretation, habitus and the like. Bourdieu (1977: 82- 83) describes them as a “system of lasting, transportable dispositions which, integrating past experiences, function at every moment as a matrix of perceptions, apperceptions, and actions and makes possible the achievement of infinitely diversified tasks, thanks to the analogical transfers of schemes permitting the solution of similarly shaped problems”. For reasons described in Sander (1988, 2000), I will here use the term “pattern of interpretation”, meaning the conceptual system (where "conceptual" is used in the broad sense of an element of a mental code) through which the individual selects, organizes, structures and interprets his/her experience, a conceptual structure through which the individual constitutes and perceives him/herself and his/her world. 16 Cf. Berger & Luckmann (1967: 61), who describe the basic thesis of the sociology of knowledge as follows: “Society is a human product. Society is an objective reality. Man is a social product”. Briefly, the sociology of knowledge is concerned with the relation between human thinking and its results on the one hand, and the social matrix in which it arises on the other—i.e., it is the science about “the determination of thought and knowledge”. Cf. Schütz 1976: 229f, 1973: 347f. For a more detailed discussion, see Sander 1988, sect. 3.5.3. 17This, of course, is only a social-psychological version of Lettvin’s et al (1959) famous “What the frog's eye tells the frog's brain” problematic. 18 It is more complicated than this, as different philosophical schools have developed the “general” concept māyā in different directions and ways. In the Yoga school of thought, māyā is understood as the five kleṣas (avidyā-asmitārāgadveṣa-abhiniveśaḥ and vidyāvṣetramuttareśamprasuptatanuviccinnodaraṇam (see Yogasūtra 2.3-4)), which means there are five kinds of ignorance that cause a living being see him-/herself as an individual, rather than in terms of his/her original universal nature. Here, avidyā is ignorance or false opinion about the objective world. Asmitā is identification of puruṣa and the citta. Rāga is the

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Given this, it appears that the problem that much of the Indian philosophy has been more or less grappling with over the centuries revolves around the following paradoxical situation: 1. On the one hand, we human beings are born into a world that in all relevant respects has been already “mapped out” for us by our predecessors, meaning that we enter into a situation containing pre-constituted historic-cultural patterns of interpretation that we then naively and unreflectively adopt via one or another process of socialization. In this way we are handed and deeply internalize a specific definition of reality that comes along with a host of equally specific (if relative) preconceptions, prejudices, beliefs, values, norms, rules and so forth, all of which remain largely invisible. This “invisibility” is one reason that it is so difficult to transcend our own pattern of interpretation: we are normally unaware that something is there that needs to be overcome! The pattern of interpretation, in other words, has become (in a Kantian sense) a transcendental structure of the mind (consciousness)—i.e., an a priori element of experience that conditions knowledge. This is why the contingent life-world that one naively experiences through one’s pattern of interpretation is normally experienced as “the world, or reality, itself”.19 In the natural attitude there is generally no consideration that the fundamental features of the world can be different than they appear to be through one’s pattern of interpretation, with most people uncritically, spontaneously and naively assuming that their perceptions and experiences are placing them in (more or less) direct contact with an independent, orderly and meaningful outer world that roughly corresponds with their own experience of it.20 They are, in short, prisoners of their historic-cultural-biographical situation; 2. On the other hand, we know (by way of the history of science, among other things) that we “doom” ourselves to ideology, irrationality, mistakes and delusion when we naively and unreflectively embrace and live in accordance with the historic- cultural pattern of interpretation that we have automatically inherited. Thus, one that seeks to escape this fate through the achievement of trans-historical, trans-cultural (or universal) Knowledge of self and world must acquire a method by which to become aware of, and free from, the mind’s contingent determinations. The serious seeker of truth, in other words, must find a means to a position from which he can “look back with wonder at the long and tedious journey which he has completed in the realm of emotional weakness of man, which prompt him to seek and to attach himself to things merely for the pleasure they are able to give. Dveṣa is man’s tendency to avoid and to hate what gives him pain. Abhiniveśa is attachment to life and fear of death. 19In more poetic language, Whitehead puts it like this: “Nature gets credit which in truth should be reserved for us, the rose for its scent, the nightingale for its song, and the sun for its radiance. The poets are entirely mistaken. They should address their lyrics to themselves and should turn them into odes of self-congratulation on the excellence of the human mind. Nature is a dull affair, soundless, scentless, colorless, merely the hurrying of material, endlessly, meaninglessly” (quoted from Ornstein 1977, s. 45. Cf. James 1950a, ss. 288 f). 20Sander 1988 (especially Part III) repeatedly notes that from a philosophical point of view this type of “everyday epistemology” is extremely dubious.

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Time while all the time he was living in the Eternal", as expressed by Taming (1961: xiii). To my understanding, both phenomenology and yoga constitute at least the attempt to create a pathway to what Husserl describes as “being without bias or prejudice” (Voraussetzungsloskeit), and thereby to “the pure – and, so to speak, still dumb – psychological experience, which now must be made to utter its own sense with no adulteration” (1950: 77)21—i.e., experience that is not structured or processed by “concepts” (the empirical prerequisite for apodictic knowledge).22

II. The Notion of the Observing Self

The attempt to establish a philosophical dialogue between phenomenology and yoga entails numerous challenges, and thus stands a good chance of leaving the adherents of both systems with some sense of disappointment.23 One such challenge is purely terminological in the sense that both traditions are rather fond of using particular (if not peculiar) technical nomenclatures that outsiders can perceive as being almost intentionally obscure, esoteric and as incomprehensible; as “the emperor’s new clothes” in H.C Andersen’s classic fable. My own and others view on this matter is that despite their apparent terminological conceits, both traditions have achieved important knowledge, understandings and discoveries that are worthy of attention and pursuit, including what many within these disciplines regard as their greatest discovery: “the mind (consciousness) as witness” or “the observing self” (to borrow a phrase from Diekman). The conception of the mind as witness emphasizes that “beyond” our experience (or the content of our consciousness) lays a “pure, transcendental consciousness” (or ego) that is liberated from all historic-temporal- biographic structures and determinants – the consciousness of the “enlightened” being. The experience of one that has emancipated his/her mind (consciousness) from this network of delimiting conditions, and thus tasted true freedom, is (in James’ words) “ineffable” (Sander 1988, sect. 2.9). It is this sort of conquest of consciousness—this absolute freedom, isolation and perfect spontaneity24—that, in

21… die reinen und sozusagen noch stumme Erfahrung, die nun erst zur reinen Aussprache ihres eigenen Sinnes zu bringen ist (Husserl 1950: 77). 22The matter of whether or not such (uniquely unmediated) experiences (or conscious events) are even possible has been much discussed (cf. Gennaro 2008). The outcome of this debate, however, is of little consequence relative to this paper (cf. Sander 1980: 315-322, spec. 539- 548). (For both private and philosophical reasons, I myself (if pushed) would opt for Patañjali, Stace and Forman over Katz and the like.) 23From the perspective of phenomenology, Zaner (1970: 30) notes that “the difficulties of introducing phenomenology are notorious, and quite sufficient to dissuade even the hardiest of souls”; and echoing this view, Schütz notes that “[the] attempt to reduce the work of [Husserl] to a few basic propositions understandable to an audience not familiar with his thought is, as a rule, a hopeless undertaking” (1973: 100). In my view, analogous statements could be made about the theory of yoga. 24Compare the concept of wowei within the Daoist tradition (for example Fung 1966: 100ff, 114ff; Kasulis 1981: 36ff, 138).

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my view, constitutes the ultimate goal of Indian philosophical as well as Husserlian phenomenological theories, methods and techniques. 25 And among these, the Sāṁkhya yoga darśana is certainly one of the earliest and most accessible examples.

III. The Phenomenological Reduction(s)26

The most essential ingredients of the phenomenological method27 are the epoché (the parenthesizing (einklammerung) of our ordinary knowledge, beliefs, etc. about the world) and the phenomenological reduction (the philosophical technique by which normally experienced realities become pure phenomena (bloße Phänomen)). Taken together, these two moments of the method can be said to constitute the transcendental phenomenological reduction.28 Beginning with his 1913 publication of Ideen I, Husserl would always emphasize that phenomenology is a reflexive activity. In light of this understanding, the transcendental phenomenological reduction can be conceived as the conversion of the natural, non-reflexive attitude (natürliche Einstellung) to one that is reflexive and counter-natural (widernatürlich), meaning a special kind of phenomenological reflexive attitude. Regarding the epoché, it can be basically conceived as the starting point of the radical reflexion of consciousness (and its roles and functions) that Husserl considered necessary to free the mind from the above-described conditions, presuppositions, assumptions and various other determinants that ordinarily (in the natural attitude) govern our experience of the world and ourselves. The aim is to problematize, “bracket” or de-activate our belief in a world that exists independently of our consciousness as well as in the various objects, laws, rules, theories, norms, value systems, etc. that ordinarily prevent us from experiencing, seeing or intuiting “the things themselves” (die Sachen selbst). Here it is important to emphasize that this constitutes not a denial of the objective world and its “content”, but merely a suspension of judgment concerning whether or not that world factually exists. In short, the epoché is a necessary step (or

25 Skjervheim (1971: 11f) expresses this idea as follows: “The transcendental ego is not something mystical; all of us are it, although we might not know it. It is in the transcendental ego, in the actual here and now, that we must search for the freedom of man. We can never find freedom as a fact. It is rather in freedom that we can find the facts. Freedom will in itself not be found as a fact” (my translation). 26A more detailed account of this very sketchy and simplified description can be found in Sander 1988 (esp. Part III.), where additional references can also be found. See also Sander 1999. 27 Which, according to most phenomenologists, constitutes the core or essence of phenomenological philosophizing (see, for example, Spiegelberg 1982, Introduction and Ch. xiv; Merleau-Ponty 1965: vii; Natanson 1973: 3; Haglund 1977: 8, 12; Cairns 1943: 3ff; Husserl 1950: 23ff; Farber 1943: 561ff). 28It is, of course, a bit more complicated than this. In the second “moment”, Husserl, for example, distinguishes between the phenomenological reduction, the eidetic reduction and the transcendental reduction. For present purpose, however, what has been said above should suffice.

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methodological tool) in the process of neutralizing, de-automatizing and/or cancelling the natural attitude, thus making it possible for us to experience things in a “pure” way, meaning exactly as they present themselves to us. The moment of the epoché is thus a prerequisite for the moment of the transcendental phenomenological reduction, which consists of reducing all mundane existences (the entire natural world) to “pure phenomena” (bloße Phänomene): those (irreal and ideal) entities of meaning (noemata)29 that are the phenomenologist’s true object of study. Thus, and once again, the phenomenological reduction consists of converting our naïve, natural, pre- analytical or pre-reflective attitude into one that is reflexive or counter-natural, something that is frequently depicted as seeing the world “with new eyes”, “from a new perspective” or “in a new light”, and can be described as the returning (or bringing back) of the world to our consciousness of it.30 Theoretically, when such a reduction has been properly executed, thus purifying our naïve experience of so-called independent reality, we have achieved what Husserl calls “a transcendental attitude or outlook”, which transforms (or better, reveals) all mundane existences as phenomena; what remains is only our consciousness of the world, which Husserl terms, “the transcendental.”31 The reduction, in other words, is “transcendental” because it causes a reversal in which all mundane existences are “meditatively” withdrawn onto consciousness and “phenomenological” because it transforms all mundane existences into “pure phenomena”. With this, according to Husserl, we should be able to intuit the pure meaning or essence (eidos) of every object in a direct and immediate way (cf. 1950 sect. 8, 1962: 155).32 Such essences are pure, self-evident universals, or general concepts, that present our consciousness with pure possibilities whose validity is independent of (normal) experience. In this way, the phenomenological reduction is the methodological tool that opens the phenomenological field for study; it is “the avenue of access to phenomenology and its objects”, to borrow a phrase from Gurwitsch (1966: 175). The new attitude arising from the phenomenological reduction contains a critical dimension as well, in that what was once (naively) experienced as clear, simply and unambiguous “reality” now turns out to be a complex of “mere possibilities” (bloße Möglichkeiten)—i.e.,

29And thus, in a sense, universals, essences or eidos. 30Cf. Farber (1943: 216) where he claim that Husserl considered his phenomenology as a method/technique to change and amplify his “seeing” within philosophy and psychology, thereby making it complete and perfect. 31 The terms “ranscendent” and “transcendental” are used differently in Husserl’s various writings. However, for him to be able to attain his epistemological goals, the transcendental must be used to denote everything that is completely genuine and adequately presented or given (and thereby completely available) in an act of intuition (Anschaungsakt), whereby the given is something that we can have presuppositionless and apodictic knowledge about. Every experience to which this does not apply is considered transcendent. For an explication of the term “transcendence”, see Sander 1980 sect. 2.5.1. 32The term “object” should here be interpreted in the widest possible sense. It denotes (for Husserl) everything that can appear for a consciousness, whether real or ideal, whether perceived, imagined, dreamt, felt or intuited.

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undetermined experiences in need of clarification. This reflexivity helps not only to uncover (or perhaps recover) the entire content of consciousness, but also to distinguish that which is “given in itself” (selbstgegeben) from that which comes only from “opinion” (Mitmeinung). In other words, it enables us to separate that which is genuinely given from components that are supplied (appresented) by our own consciousness via (pre-predicative) “interpretation” (appresentational filling) based upon earlier experiences, knowledge, expectations and so forth. In this way, we learn to distinguish between what our senses perceive and what our mind experiences, thus creating (by way of the reduction) a “universe totally without prejudice” (Universum absoluter Vorurteilslosigkeit) (1950 sect. 15). From this it should be clear that rather than diminishing, discarding or detracting from our experiences, the reduction factually enhances them, meaning that through its ability to uncover or de-automatize previously anonymous material, it provides us with both new and (perhaps more importantly) previously unnoticed data. In other words, one important function (or effect) of the method is to expose implicit aspects of consciousness that are normally invisible to the naïve experiencer; the method facilitates the “uncovering of the potentialities ‘implicit’ in actualities of consciousness” 33 (1950: 83, cf. sect. 20). Given this background, phenomenology can be roughly characterized as a descriptive study of the total contents or meanings (noemata) that constitute our consciousness (or mind) as well as its meaning-giving and other activities. According to Husserl, the most important discovery that comes along with making consciousness (or mind) the object of phenomenological examination is that it is always “directed towards something”: a tree, a stretch of time, a number, a feeling, a ghost, a devil or a god. In other words, consciousness is seen to always intend something other than itself (with a different mode of being than itself), but that it intentionally includes, encloses or contains. Every thought is a thought of something (has its “thought object”), every wish is a wish for something (has its wished-for object) and so forth. Husserl defines “intentionality” as “the unique peculiarity of [all human] experience ‘to be the consciousness of something’”,34 noting it to be “an

33 “ihre überall eigentümliche Leistung ist Enthüllung der in den Bewusstseinsaktualitäten implizierten Potentialitäten”. 34 "die Eigenheit von Erlebnissen, ´Bewusstsein von etwas zu sein´". These, at least, are all the experiences that need concern us here. It should, however, be noted that Husserl claims that there can be psychic phenomena without intentionality; he primarily refers to these as “sensory material” or hyle(See for example 1976 sect. 85, espec. pp. 193 f). It should also be noted that these non-intentional objects – if they exists – are something that we within the scope of phenomenology (as most phenomenologist understand it) cannot obtain any knowledge about. Being non-intentional, they simply cannot be experienced! (Sander 1988, part III, sect. 3.1.4.2). This is probably also the reason that Forman (1986) does not want to call “episodes” of pure consciousness (i.e., empty, interiorized awareness with no sensory affective, or epistemic content beyond the knowledge of being aware itself, or, with Forman’s own definitions: “the subject is awake, conscious, but without an object or content for consciousness – no thoughts, emotions, sensations, or awareness of external phenomena … Yet neither is the subject sleeping, for he may afterwards confidently report that he was not asleep” (Forman 1986: 49)

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essential peculiarity of the sphere of experience in general, since all experiences in one way or another participate in intentionality.…It is intentionality which characterizes consciousness in the pregnant sense of the term” (1976 sect. 84, s.187, cf. sect. 36, ss. 73 f, sect. 146, ss. 337).35 In Husserl’s view, this intentional (meaning- giving) moment must be acknowledged as a special and irreducible element of consciousness. Without this intentional moment, our perceptions (experiences) would be blind, as they would be empty without sensation (1984 V sect. 14). Husserl refers to mental phenomena that are “intentional” in the above sense as “acts of consciousness”—or, in short, “acts”. An intentional act is thus a mental phenomenon in which an object is intended or meant; every intentional act presents the subject with an object (a meaning or a noema). Given this, it follows that where there is an act that is characterized by certain determinable properties there will also be an object (a noema) that is characterized by those same determinable properties; and more importantly, the properties of the object are determined by the property of the consciousness in which it exists. In other words, to say that an act is directed towards (intentionally includes, is related to or “has”) an object (a noema) is only to say that the act in question has the properties in virtue of which the experience is just such as it is. To say that an act is directed towards (or has as its object) the deity , for example, can be viewed as a metaphorical way of expressing that the act in question has the specific properties by virtue of which the person who “has” the act can be correctly said to be thinking about or seeing the deity Śiva. 36 According to phenomenology, the key to accessing and understanding an object is to access and understand the structure and function of the consciousness that determines or constitutes that object. It is this “purifying” of consciousness from all (empirical) historic-cultural-biographical contingencies that the epoché and the reduction are ideally supposed to engender, thus affording one the possibility to create a “universe and “a condition of being entirely without any sensory or mental content … or without any intentional content for the awareness” (1999: 13)) “experiences of pure consciousness” but rather “pure consciousness events” (PCE). 35"Sie ist ... eine Wesenseigentümlichkeit der Erlebnissphäre überhaupt, als alle Erlebnisse in irgendeiner Weise an der Intentionalität Anteil haben ... Die Intentionalität ist es, die Bewußtsein im prägnanten Sinne charakterisiert.“ 36Kockelmans (1967 s. 34) express this as follows: “Intentionality, then, does not consist in an external object entering somehow into a relationship with consciousness nor in a relationship between two psychical contents in our consciousness. Intentionality has nothing to do with relations between `real´ objects, but is essentially an act that gives meaning. Thus the object of any act is an inseparable aspect of the meaning phenomenon itself. In Husserl´s philosophy the object appears as essentially determined by the structure of thinking itself; this thinking itself first gives meaning to the object and then continues to orient itself to the pole of identity which it itself has already created.” According to Husserl, no metaphysical conclusions can be drawn from the fact that acts (which are concrete, real psychic phenomena) “have”, intentionally include or are intentionally related to objects (noemata), which are entities of meaning and thereby ideal and irreal. From the understanding of noemata as entities of a different ontological type than the concrete acts that “have” them, it does not follow that it is necessary to postulate objects over and above (or in addition to) the concrete acts.

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absolutely free from prejudice”37—the precondition for the achievement of apodictic knowledge. Here, regardless of the objections of Husserl and others, it seems fairly clear that the distance from this to so-called transcendental idealism is not very great and that transcendental idealism is the logical end of the phenomenological project. Be that as it may, it nonetheless appears that it is this process of moving from the epoché to the intentional and constitutional analysis that constitutes the “transcendental phenomenological reduction”, which, in turn, allows us to access our pure, transcendental consciousness or ego. Instead of the universal doubt of Descartes, then, Husserl proposes this universal "epoché". A new scientific domain is thus determined. All the sciences that refer to the natural world are also eliminated: no use is made of their propositions and results. They may only be assumed in brack- ets, and not as propositions presuming validity. That which remains when the entire world is eliminated (including us with all ´cogitare´) is ´pure´ or ´transcendental´ consciousness. That is the phenomenological residuum (Farber 1943: 527). In other words, the transcendental phenomenological reduction culminates in the realization of pure subjectivity, and from there the task becomes to access and comprehend—via some form of immediate, direct and conceptually unmediated intuition (or insight)— how this pure self (this “transcendental ego”) constitutes objects and functions as the source of all objectivity.38 For phenomenology, then, the only existing objectivity is that which is constituted, experienced or, if you prefer, subjective (cf. Sander 1988a del III, spec. sect. 3.1.5, 3.5.3., 3.6.6. and 3.6.7). Accordingly, the endeavor of the reductions is to free (purify) consciousness from all the contingent contents and structures for the world that “imprison” us, so as to reach unprejudiced, presuppositionless and absolutely certain knowledge of the dumb (pure and true) essence (eidos) of reality. Husserl, however, never attempted to bring this purifying process to its natural, logical end: the ultimate purifying of consciousness from all activities and all content. For him, even the “pure” transcendental consciousness was an intentional (constituting) “consciousness of something”. Given Husserl’s point of departure and his aim of employing reduction not as end in itself, but rather as a means of achieving apodictic knowledge about something, this is both understandable and legitimate. This notwithstanding, it should be at least theoretically possible for the phenomenologist to pursue the reductions such that they enable her/him to move beyond intentional consciousness(consciousness of something) to wholly undifferentiated and empty consciousness—i.e., the “experience of emptiness” or, in the terminology of Forman, the “pure conscious event” (PCE) (cf. Sander 1988 part

37 "Universum absoluter Vorurteilslosigkeit" or "Voraussetzungsloskeit" 38It might be worth mentioning that it took Husserl a while to find the transcendental ego. In the first edition of Logische Untersuchungen (1900/II/1:361) he notes: “I am quite unable to find this ego”. In a note in the second edition (1913) he adds, however, that “I have since managed to find it, i.e. have learned not to be led astray from a pure grasp of the given through corrupt forms of ego-metaphysic”. Even if Husserl was aware of the fact that a pure, transcendental ego could never be experienced, he was from then on convinced of its “existence”, even its necessary “existence” (Husserl 1913, § 57).

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IV, sect. 4.4.1).39 Regardless of whether or not such an extreme reduction would be “useful” in terms of resolving Husserl’s original epistemological problem (the problem of explaining the relation between an act of knowing and its object), it appears philosophically indefensible to a priori delimit the Husserlian method by discounting the possibility of its’ enabling the achievement of such a “pre-reflexive” state. Indeed, it is just this pre-reflexive transcendental subjectivity, this experience of absolute emptiness, this cessation of all psychophysical activity, sensation and experience that appears to be the final aim of the yoga system we are about to discuss, meaning the condition (asamprajñāta samādhi) of total withdrawal () from the world.

IV. Yogic Meditation

The yoga system’s prescribed method for accessing one’s true nature (ātmasiddhi) and thereby achieving liberation (mokṣa) is rooted in Sāṁkhya philosophy’s conception of man and the universe, which asserts a basic dualism.40 The universe, it is said, consists of twenty-five elements, twenty-four of which are manifestations of prakṛti (from pra≈ before and kṛti≈ creation), an unconscious, indiscriminate and insentient material substance of which everything that exists within the causality of time and space consists or, rather, can be derived and explained. Prakṛti is the root cause of the perceivable material world; everything that we can experience has evolved or developed out of prakṛti—or “procreatix”, the intriguing Latin translation suggested by Veeraswamy Krishnaraj (2002: 12). And beyond prakṛti there is puruṣa, the twenty-fifth principle consisting of absolute, pure, unchangeable, unconscious and inactive consciousness (or subject), which is devoid of properties and characteristics.41Puruṣa, which constitutes the true “I”, “self” or “soul”, is described

39Husserl never went that far for the reason that non-intentional “entities” or “events” can never be something we can have knowledge about. He did, however, despite this, postulate the existence of a pure, transcendental Ego “as necessary in principle” – even if he accepted that “we shall never stumble across the pure Ego as an experience among others within the flux of manifold experiences which survives as transcendental residuum” (1976 § 57). It was deemed necessary because without it he could not explain, among other things, how the various “individual experiences” that constitute our stream of consciousness “hung together” “vertically” and “horizontally” to one unified consciousness. He needed, in other words, the pure Ego as “the glue” or synthesizing principle of consciousness. 40The Sāṁkhya philosophy, which was developed from approx. 500 BCE, claims to be both a complete and systematic worldview and a philosophy of life, both darśana and anu-ikṣiki (survey or summary of all things). 41The term “consciousness” is notoriously ambiguous and problematic, and even more so is the term “unconscious consciousness”. The general opinion seems to be that what makes a mental state conscious is that it is accompanied by some sort of higher order thought or awareness to the effect that “I am now in mental state M.” In other words, “a conscious state is a mental state whose subject is aware of being in it” (Lycan 2001: 3). With this definition, of course, it is difficult to talk about “unconscious consciousness”. Consciousness, however, is also spoken about in more general terms, such as when we make a distinction between conscious and non-

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by Radhakrishnan (1931 Vol. II: 313) as “mirrors with nothing to reflect”.42Prakṛti consists of pure, unconscious and inert material form, incapable of generating action and “energy” by itself. It is only when it comes in touch with the consciousness of puruṣa, the energetic principle, that it becomes productive. In this regard, prakṛti can be conceived as the objective principle of reality and puruṣa can be conceived as its subjective principle, with the important difference being that whereas prakṛti (as the basic cause of material reality) is said to manifest all the universe’s physical and mental objects and entities, puruṣa is said to neither transform nor develop, even though its involvement is absolutely essential to prakṛti’s transformational and developmental functions. Another difference is that unlike prakṛti, there are a vast, even “uncountable”, number of puruṣas. Indeed, each sentient being that is involved in the realm of saṁsāra (the endless cycle of repeated birth and death) has (or rather is) its own puruṣa. In this regard, it is the union of prakṛti and puruṣa that constitutes what we normally describe as an individual (sentient) being. An experience or a consciousness of something arises in the contact between puruṣa and prakṛti, meaning that everything real and ideal that one can experience in empirical reality (be it an object, a sound, a feeling, an emotion, a thought, a memory or a dream) is comprised of prakṛti. From this, of course, it follows that prakṛti is also the entirety of the empirical self, meaning the sum of our inborn abilities, dispositions, etc., in combination with all our various experiences and the manner of their organization in consciousness or the mind.43 Moreover, since puruṣa exists beyond and prakṛti exists within time, space and causality (at least in terms of its secondary manifestations), the two can neither affect nor “mix” with each other. Puruṣa is indeed conceived as being a totally isolated (kaivalya) and passive “witness” (sākṣin) (like a mirror that only reflects), while prakṛti is conceived as being all the phenomena that are being witnessed (or reflected). As such, puruṣa can be no more affected by prakṛti than a mirror can be affected by the images it reflects. Puruṣa, according to Sāṁkhya, is the “essence of consciousness”, that which forms the very foundation or basis for every “consciousness of something”. It is the pure “observing self” (or “subjective consciousness”), which exists beyond all contents, beyond our senses and intellect, and thus cannot be “observed” or “known” like an ordinary object of perception or conscious organisms, so-called “creature consciousness” (Rosenthal 1993). It is in the direction of this latter meaning that we must go in order to understand puruṣa. Of course, this kind of “pure consciousness” (nirbīja samādhi), like Husserl’s pure transcendental ego and Forman’s pure conscious event (PCE), cannot be experienced or known in any normal, rational, objective way. According to Forman (1993, 1998), however, it can be known in terms of the special kind of knowledge he calls “knowledge-by-identity” (which is distinct from William James’ “knowledge- by-acquaintance” and “knowledge-about”). 42Puruṣa is generally considered to be equivalent to the final principle Ātman or Brahman in the Upaniṣads. Sāṁkhya, however, is pluralistic with respect to its final principle, unlike the Brāhmanical systems. 43Or, in more phenomenological terms, in our “pattern of interpretation”, “stock of knowledge” (Schütz) or habitus (Bourdieu).

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experience. Ordinary consciousness is always a consciousness of something, but cannot observe itself (or be its own object of investigation), except, of course, in a retrospectively reflective manner; whatever meaning is ascribed to a PCE must be imposed after the experience has occurred (cf. Zaner 1970 ch. 3). The problem of the generally unenlightened is that through the workings of ahaṁkāra they are wrongly identifying with the reflection of prakṛti in puruṣa rather than with puruṣa proper. This is what provides them with the sense of being an empirical self within time and space and binds them to the cycle repeated birth and death, with its concomitant sufferings and dissatisfactions. The intention of the yoga system is to eliminate this ignorance (avidyā) through the achievement of genuine insight () into the factually nature of reality.44 Yoga’s fundamental purpose can thus be roughly restated as follows: to realize by the practice of a specific method that we are in reality puruṣa, the pure conscious observer, and are thus not really a self within prakṛti. It is only when we are enlightened as to the true condition of ourselves and the world that we can achieve liberation from our suffering (mokṣa). According to the Yoga Sūtras, the technique involves reining in and acquiring personal mastery over the mind and senses such that the “real” ego (puruṣa) is able to detach itself from everything extraneous, thereby discovering its true identity. To achieve such mastery and insight, however, requires great concentrative and meditative abilities, and thus the candidate (sādhaka) must first practice certain physical and mental exercises that enable the following of the various moral and other prescriptions that are required by the yoga system—e.g., bodily and mental purity, truthfulness, self-control, moderation, contentedness, non-violence, non-enviousness, non-covetousness and so forth. Taken together, these exercises and regulative principles are known as the yoga system’s first five “limbs” (aṅgas): (≈ death, regulation or abstention), (≈ observance, moral duties), 45 āsana (bodily posture), prāṇāyāma (≈ breathing regulation or technique), and pratyāhāra (≈ liberating the senses from their objects or internalization of the senses). Command of the first two limbs eliminates distractions arising from uncontrolled thoughts, desires and emotions. Āsana and prāṇāyāma remove disturbances caused by a lack of control over the physical body. The function of pratyāhāra is to free the consciousness or mind from distractions conveyed by the sense organs, to teach the mind not to be distracted by sense-impressions from the external world. According to Patañjali, when full command of the first five aṅgas has been achieved, the sādhaka will then be in a position to undertake the concentrative and meditative practices of

44See Sander 1988, espec. pp. 422-424 for a discussion with regard to this kind of knowledge. 45The are rules of conduct that will help bring a compassionate “death” to the ego or "the lower self"; they can be viewed as the “don’ts” in our dealings with the external world, whereas the can be viewed as the "do’s" in our dealings with the inner world: “ (ahiṁsā), truthfulness (), abstention from stealing (asteya), () and non-acquisition of possessions (aparigraha) are the restrictions (yamas)” (Patañjali Yoga- Sūtras s 2.30); “Cleanliness (śauca), contentment (santoṣa), austerity (tapasyā), study of the Vedic scriptures (svādhyāya) and surrender to God (īśvara-prāṇīdhāna) are the observances (niyamas)” (Yoga-Sūtras s 2.32).

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yoga: to see without hearing, hear without seeing, neither see nor hear and so forth. In my view, these preparatory yogic exercises basically correspond with the technique of suspending the natural attitude within phenomenology. When, through the mastery of the five aṅgas, the sādhaka is freed from all distractions, hindrances, obstacles and/or “afflictions of the mind” (kleśas)46, his/her consciousness is now prepared to direct its full and undistracted attention to any given object such that (s)he is able to purely comprehend and experience it. In order to reach this state of completely pure (transcendental) intuiting, however, (s)he must also learn to master the three levels of concentration that constitute the last three of Patañjali’s yogāṅgas: dhāraṇā (≈ concentration, fixating), dhyāna (≈ contemplation, meditation), and Samādhi (≈ absorption). The attainment of samādhi is the first, but not the final, goal of yogic meditation, despite the vast attention it receives in popular books on yoga. In reality, it is only a necessary step on the pathway to kaivalya (“detachment” or “perfection through integration”), alternatively known as mokṣa, or ultimate liberation from all afflictions of the mind. To attain this state, the yogi must first aspire to be free from all forms of desire, hankering and attraction, with the final aim of giving up even the desire to be free of desire: “By non-attachment even to that, on the very seed of bondage being destroyed, follows kaivalya” (Yoga Sūtras III:51). In the final Sūtras (IV: 34), kaivalya is described as “the state (of Enlightenment) following remergence of the Guṇas because of their becoming devoid of the object of Puruṣa: In this state the Puruṣa is established in his Real nature which is pure Consciousness.” The attainment of kaivalya entails first learning to master the eight levels of concentration (or jñāna)that precede the highest stage of nirodha (≈ cessation), the state of consciousness (or mind) in which all fluctuations (vṛtti)) of prakṛti have ceased. It is as a consequence of this state that one can achieve insight into the absolute separateness of puruṣa from prakṛti. Kaivalya, in other words, is that state in which puruṣa is entirely free from prakṛti—an ineffable state that is impossible to describe in propositional terms (Sander 1988, part II, sect. 2.9).47 At this juncture, some description about the three last yogāṅgas needs to be mentioned:

46Patañjali identifies five principal kleśas that prevent us from realizing our puruṣa as our true self: avidyā (a - not, vidyā – knowledge) – Ignorance, forgetfulness, not knowing; asmitā – ego or ‘I am-ness’; rāga – attraction to pleasurable experiences; dveṣa – avoidance of pain; and, duḥka, abhiniveśa – fear of death or clinging to life. “The problem, the obstacle to living the state of Self – which is total Sat Citānanda, total Truth, Consciousness, Bliss – the obstacles to living that is the kleśas.” 47Perhaps Patañjali’s best attempt at a description is found in Sūtras IV: 7, where he states that the karma of the yogi who has attained kaivalya is “neither white nor black”. The interpretation of this Sūtras has been discussed, but its “surface meaning” seems clear. White means good and black means bad. Further, according to Sāṁkhya-yoga, there are four (≈ actions): black karma, which is “demonic” ( karma); white karma, which is totally good (devas karma); both white and black karma, which is the karma of most people; and finally, neither white nor black karma, which is the karma of the perfect yogi. As I see it, the most reasonable interpretation of this is that the perfect yogi is (and acts) so completely in harmony with the physical and moral laws of the universe (Ṛta, Dharma) that it is no longer meaningful

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Dhāraṇā ("Concentration", “Holding Steady" or "Single Focus"). "Concentration is the confining of the mind within a limited mental area (object of concentration)" (Yoga Sūtras III: 1). In its normal condition, our mind wanders from object to object and is continuously associated with (and colored by) various judgments or “attitudes” (among other doxic and sentic positionalities (Sander 1988, part III, sect. 3.6.2.2)). The aim of dhāraṇā is thus to suspend all judgment while constantly fixing the mind on one object and promptly bringing it back under control whenever it inevitably wanders. The success of this vigilant practice is measured by how often one is distracted from the object of concentration; when the number of interruptions and the time it takes to return to concentration is greatly diminished, success in dhāraṇā is considered to have been achieved. Dhyāna (Contemplation, Meditation). "Uninterrupted flow (of the mind) towards the object (chosen for meditation) is contemplation" (Yoga Sūtras III: 2). The movement from dhāraṇā to dhyāna takes place after being able to uninterruptedly fix the mind on one object for a long period of time without its wandering. In understanding this, the concept of pratyaya can be helpful. Pratyaya refers to that which occupies the full focus of a subject’s attention at a given moment; it is the center or object of focus of a subject’s entire field of perception, such, and only such, as it is given to consciousness and appears in strict descriptive analysis. Pratyaya, in other words, rather than being the total content of a field of perception or consciousness, is only its object of focus.48 Here it will suffice to say that while the mind in its normal condition is constantly shifting from one pratyaya to another, in dhāraṇā this tendency is greatly diminished, and in dhyāna it is more or less diminished to nil. In dhyāna, “field” and “margin” data are severely restricted and not allowed to affect the meaning of the pratyaya. Although these data do not belong to the pratyaya proper and is only part of its background or context, they nonetheless exists in consciousness and, in normal acts, co-determines the meaning of the pratyaya (Sander 1988, spec. part III, sect. 3.2.7). The only relation these background data has to dhyāna is that they co-exist with the pratyaya and (in marginal acts) are experienced at the same time (in what Schütz calls “the counterpointal structure of mind” (1970: 12, 120)). For all practical purposes, the mind in dhyāna can be said to have one, and only one, content (object, meaning, noema). It should be noted, however, that while the mind continues to flicker and vary despite its strict focus and to say that it is (s)he that acts or does things. It is as if dharma works and expresses itself through the yogi. As such, both (s) he and his/her actions are beyond the right and wrong (or good and bad) of the mundane world. In other words, (s) he has transcended every normal (worldly, human) ethic-moral judgment and thus his/her actions no longer generate karma— i.e., they are neutral with respect to . 48The meaning and usage of the term pratyaya in yoga has a high correspondence with the meaning and usage of the term “theme” in Gestalt psychology. A discussion of “theme”, along with the closely related terms “thematic field” and “margin”, can be found in Sander 1988, part III sect. 3.2., espec. 3.2.7. There (espec. Sect. 3.3.3.5, 3.5.2.3.and 3.5.2.7), in this connection, the important phenomenon of “change of theme” is also discussed.

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restrictedness, this variability is occurring wholly within the frame of the chosen pratyaya—i.e., as various forms of pratyaya development.49 This should be viewed not as a deficiency in the practice of dhyāna, but rather as a means of examining the object of concentration in all its aspects (which is part of the practice). In sum, the state of dhyāna has been reach when one can uninterruptedly fix the mind on a chosen pratyaya for long periods of time without being distracted. The success of this practice can be measured by the degree of mental effort that is required to maintain one’s focus on the pratyaya and the promptness with which one is able to regain one’s concentration when it is lost. When the practice of dhyāna has matured to a point at which the mind has become basically unwavering in its concentration, one can be said to have mastered this level of the yoga process. Samādhi. (Absorption). "The same (contemplation) when there is consciousness only of the object of meditation and not of itself (the mind) is samādhi " (Yoga SūtrasIII:3). Because this Sūtras (together with Sūtras s I: 17 and I: 18) can be considered the most important in terms of understanding the ultimate objective of Patañjali’s yoga system, it is need of a somewhat lengthier discussion.50 Let me begin with the term itself. In general, samādhi refers to the process (coming after the mastery of dhyāna) by which one enters ever more deeply into the normally inaccessible regions or strata of consciousness, with the aim of ultimately transcending and liberating oneself from all the content of the mind (consciousness) and attaining total union with (or absorption in) pure consciousness (puruṣa) itself— the state that Sāṁkhya philosophy refers to as that which is really real (ens realisimum). In the progressive movement towards the goal of total liberation from all that conditions and limits the mind (consciousness), one is required to pass through various types (or stages) of samādhi. Once all saṁskāras have been transcended, the yogi’s consciousness attains the state of kaivalya and can function in perfect and absolute freedom. It is to achieve this end that the yogi must master the various levels

49Schütz discusses this type of development of a given object or “theme” and its various forms in: 1974: 190-195, 1974: 29-32. Cf. Sander 1988, part III, espec. Sect. 3.5.2.3. 50Apart from the Yoga Sūtras s’ strongly condensed, stylized, and aphoristic form, one of the major problems Western scholars face in studying them is their almost total lack of thematic organization. The Sūtras’ treatment of Samādhi, for instance, is not restricted to one specific portion of the text, but is rather spread throughout the whole work. Over and above that, the various discussions regarding this topic come in what appears to be a highly unusual order. For example, some of the most esoteric and difficult to comprehend theoretical aspects are treated early on in the text, while many of the preconditions for understanding them are treated in Book III. In terms of understanding Samādhi, perhaps the most important Sūtras (given in my preferred order) are as follows: 1. The three stages of meditation leading to samādhi. III:1 - 4. 2. Samprajñāta and asamprajñāta samādhi I:17, 18. 3. The content of the process of sabīja samādhi I:41 4. The different phases of sabīja samādhi I:42 - 50. 5. The technique of nirbīja samādhi I:51, III:8, IV:26 - 29. 6. The three stages of transformation involved in samādhi III:9 - 2.

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of concentration known as samādhi. For present purpose, I will here only discuss the two most important stages: samprajñāta and asamprajñāta samādhi.51 Samprajñāta samādhi literarily means “samādhi with prajñā” and (as the prefix “a” in Sanskrit generally indicates “not”) asamprajñāta samādhi means “not samādhi with prajñā”. This, however, should not be viewed as indicating that asamprajñāta samādhi is without prajñā, meaning that this stage of samādhi is also associated with prajñā (samprajñā), but in a way that is distinct from samprajñāta samādhi. The difference between the two is based upon whether or not a pratyaya exists in the sādhaka’s field of consciousness. In other words, the two forms of samādhi can be roughly characterized as differentiated samādhi with pratyaya and undifferentiated samādhi without pratyaya, respectively. Let us first examine samprajñāta samādhi. It begins with mastering the level of dhyāna (well described above), which culminates in the ability to wholly and undeviatingly fix the mind on a particular pratyaya, and to do so in a purely descriptive manner, without involving judgments, attitudes and/or “positings” vis-à-vis that object.52 This capacity, however, is still not enough to attain the “pure seeing” of the “pure essence” of the object that is the goal of samprajñāta samādhi. In order for the pratyaya to “shine in its pure existential originality” one hurdle remains to be overcome: the sādhaka’s awareness of him/herself as an experiencing subject. According to Patañjali (as well as Husserl and Schütz) not only do we ordinary experiencers naïvely, automatically, pre-reflexively and pre- predicatively infer that the objects of our experience have a real (transcendent) existence beyond our consciousness of them, we also as naïvely, automatically, pre- reflexively and pre-predicatively infer from the existence of the objects of experience that there is a thinking, perceiving subject, ego or “I” that is having the experience; in other words, we are having the experience that our experience is our experience. This sense of “I” (ahaṁkāra) is constantly present in the ordinary untrained mind, creating the distinction between subject and object, between “self” and “world”. It is this sense of “I” that is responsible for our constantly falling into the Cartesian fallacy and is moreover considered to be one of the most prominent causes of mundane disharmony

51In Sūtras I:17, we read: "Samprajñāta Samādhi is that which is accompanied by reason, reflection, bliss and sense of pure being" and in I:18: "The remnant impression left in the mind on the dropping of the Pratyaya after previous practice is the other (i.e. asamprajñāta samādhi)". 52In other words, the sādhaka has learned the difficult task of not drawing pre-predicative conclusions from the existence of objects of experience to the existence of a, in relation to the experiencer him/herself, transcendent object, and, on the basis of this pre-predicative conclusion, in a likewise normally pre-predicative way, constitute the experience as an experience of this transcendent object. In phenomenological terms, (s)he carried out the transcendental phenomenological reduction, meaning that (s)he has brought the whole world back on consciousness, reduced it to bloße Phänomene. His/her experience lacks, by virtue of its own inherent properties, every form of judgment about, or attitude to, the object regarding its (transcendent) existence or non-existence—i.e., it lacks every form of doxic positing. It also lacks any kind of evaluative or normative attitude towards the object, as well as any activation of any behavioral disposition to act vis-à-vis the object.

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and suffering. Due to ahaṁkāra, for example, we falsely identify with the temporal, changing empirical self and perceive its conditions as our own, with expressions such as “I suffer” and “I enjoy” being examples of this false identification. Here it can be noted that the movement from dhyāna to samādhi entails the removal of this last covering of ahaṁkāra, thus opening the door to ultimate truth or reality. It is this extinguishing of self-experience or self-consciousness that Patañjali terms svarūpa śūnyam iva, roughly, the “disappearance of the essential nature of mind, as if”.53 Let us describe in a bit more detail what this can mean. According to Patañjali, everything that appears before consciousness has two forms: rūpa and svarūpa. The former of these denotes the outer, superficial, temporary and non- essential aspect of the object while the latter denotes its inner, essential substance, form or nature. As applied to consciousness in the dhyāna process, it is the rūpa form (object consciousness) that constitutes pratyaya and it is through the rūpa form that pratyaya takes its expressions. The svarūpa form, for its part, consists of the mind's (residue) consciousness of its own role and activity in the dhyāna process, the mind’s consciousness of itself as mind (or subject), the pure subjective nature of consciousness. When the yogi passes from dhāraṇā to dhyāna, and concentration on the object of meditation increases, the mind’s consciousness of itself (as subject) decreases to a corresponding degree. The mind’s consciousness of its own svarūpa form is thus still present in the stage of dhyāna, if only in a weak form. It is only after entering the stage of samādhi that this last residue of self-, I-, or ego-consciousness completely disappears, allowing the object of concentration to entirely and unwaveringly absorb the mind (consciousness).54 This can be conceived as a “fusion” or merging of the mind (the subject) with its object, meaning that these two cease to exist as separate entities, leaving only pure object (or rūpa) consciousness, which cannot be characterized as an “object” in the normal sense of the term, the sense in which a subject is presupposed to stand out from or exist in relation to it. In this case, it is as if the structure of the subject and the structure of the object coincide. Such a state is described in much of the literature on as an experience of unity or a unifying vision.55

53Iva (≈ as if) is a commonly existing qualification in Yoga Sūtras as well as in Sāṁkhya Kārikā. 54 In Tractatus5.64, Wittgenstein notes: “Here it can be seen that solipsism, when its implications are followed out strictly, coincides with pure realism. The self of solipsism shrinks to a point without extension, and there remains the reality coordinated with it”. This seems to roughly mean that the more the self draws itself back, the more the world stand out. When the subjectivity becomes so “perfect” that it disappears, the only thing remaining is the object (reality) in its own perfect and unstained objectivity—i.e., pure, unmediated object consciousness. 55The problem of how to reach this union (or merge with our object of meditation), and, by virtue of this, to achieve special prajñā (knowledge) of its innermost, essential nature, cannot be tackled here. See, however, Sūtras 1:41 for the first of these problems, and Sūtras 1:51, III:8 and IV-26-29 for the latter.

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The term śūnyam can mean “emptiness”, “void”, “empty”, “nothingness” or “zero”. In relation to the discussion at hand, the last meaning is perhaps the most appropriate, since we are here referring to reducing something to its “zero limit” rather than emptying it of all content. What factually occurs in the transition from dhāraṇā to dhyāna is that the mind (consciousness) is constantly “filled up with” and not “emptied of” the object of meditation. What svarūpa śūnyam refers to is the reduction of “I-consciousness” (and thus the reduction of the activities of ahaṁkāra) to zero—i.e., to a “pure, uniquely unmediated object experience”.56 And within the framework of the activities of ahaṁkāra we include all the functions of the mind (consciousness) that are based upon it (e.g., manas, the mind’s registering function, and buddhi, its discriminating and judging function), along with their role in the constitution of the meaning of their objects. It is, moreover, to prevent us from concluding that svarūpa permanently disappears when we attain samādhi that Patañjali adds the word iva, “as if”. Samādhi, in other words, consists of a nullification of svarūpa that endures only for as long as one is in that state. As soon as one withdraws from the state of samādhi and returns to the normal plane of consciousness, one’s temporarily suspended sense of “I-ness” returns as well. According to Patañjali, the yogi in samprajñāta samādhi gains access to a supra- rational form of insight or wisdom57 regarding the chosen object of meditation. This “knowledge”, known as prajñā, is considered to be a “pure”, “direct”, “immediate” and conceptually unmediated apprehension of reality in itself that is completely free from the interference of linguistic factors and the normal constitutional processes of consciousness (including all of its retentional, protentional and appresentational functions).58 It consists, in other words, of direct and immediate contact with the true essence or “suchness” of Reality, in the sense that the experiencing subject, being free from all determinations and distractions (including the sense of “I-ness”), never goes beyond what is in itself given in the pure experience “as such”. This type experience can be conceived as one in which the subject remains or resides in the pure experience itself, in the sense that (s)he does not constitute the object “as such” as an experience of an object for a subject; neither does (s)he form any (existential, normative, etc.) opinions or judgments nor activate any dispositional reactions in its regard.59 This is typically described as “the experience unitary consciousness”, “the

56Which, phenomenologically (or purely descriptively), is an experience that nobody is having. If in a pain experience, for example, we reduce the involvement of the “I” or “ego” to zero, thereby becoming a pure observer of the pain (meaning that the distinction between “a pain” and “my pain” is nullified), it should be understandable why it can be claimed that all evaluations, dispositions, activities, etc. normally associated with a pain experience can be said to disappear as well. 57Cf. Forman’s knowledge-by-identity. 58I.e., without being affected or “processed by” the experiencer’s pattern of interpretation. 59For a somewhat more detailed discussion on this type of experiencing, see Sander 1988, part IV, espec. sect. 4.4.1. Most theories of meditation commonly contain the notion that by mastering some technique for “stopping” or “deactivating” the normally spontaneous (or pre- predicative) processes of constitution in our consciousness – and experiencing in what many

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fusion of subject and object” and the like. Here it should be clear that in proposing that one is able to reduce all the constitutive, appresentational, etc. functions of the mind (consciousness) to zero, Patañjali has moved beyond what Husserl ever claimed to be possible. What he proposes is an experience of an object in which nothing is hidden and nothing is supplemented or added. It is, in other words, an experience in which one obtains absolute, complete, evident and apodictic knowledge about the object, and not only about its “surface aspects”, but also about its “inner” essential nature. With this, the experiencer can be said to have transcended all physical and psychological as well as historic-cultural-biographical determinants and presuppositions regarding his/her experience. 60 Furthermore, the supra-mundane knowledge (prajñā) that is obtained in true samprajñāta samādhi is not merely a new theoretical understanding of the object,61 but rather a practical form of knowledge that has a concrete existential impact on the manner in which one experiences, thinks, feels and acts thereafter. Prajñā, in other words, is obligatory in the sense that it centrally affects and transforms the attitudes, commitments, behaviors and actions of those that have achieved it.62 It is of a type that once having been achieved it cannot be omitted from one’s personality and life—from one’s pattern of interpretation for the world and oneself. In some sense, the individual has become a new person in a new life-world. And because prajñā contains this practical dimension, the insight or realization it brings regarding the real existence of things is also said to liberate the individual from false opinions and conceptions and obliges her/him to apply this newfound “knowledge” and freedom within the framework of her/his concrete-

Buddhists call “bare attention” – we can reach the pure object in its suchness and, by doing so, obtain some sort of supra-rational knowledge.(See, for example: Batson, Shoenrade & Ventnis (1993); (1976); Conz (1969); Deikman (1969a, 1969b, 1980, 1982,1984); Goleman (1977); Kasulis (1981): King (1980); Naranjo & Ornstien (1971); Sundén (1966); Suzuki (many works); Thera (1962)—to mention only a few.) 60That is why it cannot be a conscious mental state in the normal sense. 61As I have argued, the sādhaka or yogi is not primarily looking for answers to a theoretical problem of knowledge about what or how something is. Such questions and their answers are only interesting for him/her in an instrumental sense, as the basis for answers to the more vital practical question about how (s) he should act and live in order to reach the final goal of becoming and being what (s)he really is—i.e., to realize his/her True Nature (ātmasiddhi) and thus achieve the final and permanent goal of liberation (mokṣa). One of the main points in my 1988 thesis is that this type of practical knowledge (cf. Aristotle’s phronesis) about life is the primary objective of “religious man”. 62A somewhat more detailed discussion of these obligations can be found in Sander 1988 (Part III, sect. 4.5.3.). Cf. Heidegger’s discussion on our knowledge about our own death. We all know that we will die, but that knowledge is normally only “theoretical” or inauthentic. According to Heidegger, when we really and authentically comprehend that we are finite and that death is our inevitable fate, this realization cannot fail to have a major impact on how we live our lives and occupy our time as well as on our attitudes towards ourselves, other people and the world (Heidegger 1962, espec. Part II, Chapter 1, Sections 45-53).

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practical life. According to Patañjali, prajñā is more of an agent’s than an observer’s knowledge.63 The sādhaka can select any object whatsoever to serve as his/her object of meditation (pratyaya) as well as that with which to merge in the samprajñāta samādhi stage. The more establish one is in his/her saṅyama (≈ inner discipline ≈ dhāraṇā, dhyāna and samādhi (Yoga Sūtras III:4)), the more abstract and subtle can his/her pratyaya be. According to Patañjali, within samprajñāta samādhi, when one who is well established in saṅyama has “exhausted” an object on a certain level of concreteness/abstraction, (s) he can move to one on a higher, more subtle, level—i.e., on a “deeper” level of consciousness. Central in this regard is the fact that this can be done without having to withdraw from the state of samādhi itself. In other words, during the time that elapses between abandoning a pratyaya at one level and establishing a new pratyaya on a higher, subtler level, the yogi is in an objectless state of samādhi or asamprajñāta samādhi.64 In this phase, the yogi remains fully aware despite the fact that his/her consciousness is without either object- or self-awareness, both having reached total emptiness (the zero level), like a “mirror with nothing to reflect”. Here it is important to note that this is an active and dynamic emptiness (śūnyam), and not the passive unconsciousness that characterizes deep, dreamless sleep or coma. Apart from the fact that it has no pratyaya, asamprajñāta samādhi is in every respect identical with samprajñāta samādhi. In terms of such features as clarity, level of concentration and alertness, for example, there is no difference, at least so Patañjali appears to claim. The ultimate aim of the yoga process is to proceed to subtler and subtler levels of consciousness in samādhi until one reaches the ātma level (the most subtle level of pratyaya). From here, the yogi is finally able to attain Dharma Meghaḥ (IV:29): the stage of asamprajñāta samādhi that constitutes his/her own outermost Reality, where (s)he can establish him/herself in pure puruṣa consciousness. Having achieved this highest level of samādhi, the yogi has completely freed him/herself from all identifications with prakṛti and is his/her own svarūpa, realizing puruṣa to be his/her True ego and identity. Of course, even after this realization the yogi continues to experience pain and pleasure; the difference is that such experiences are no longer experienced as his/hers! (S)he is absolutely and completely free from prakṛti, from the influence of ahaṁkāra, and from all fluctuations (vṛtti) in citta (cf. Koller 1985: 61). In summary, the path of yoga consists of a continuous transcending (or, perhaps, “involution” through) the “grosser” mental levels with their objects via intermediate experiences of emptiness to their most subtle level; and even this most subtle level must also be transcended, for it is only when all levels of samprajñāta samādhi have

63The distinction between observer and agent knowledge is explicated in Furberg 1975: 90-102. Patañjali, however, never precisely explicates the nature of the relation between insight or realization and liberation. The same can be said of Freud, who claims his own version of the thesis. In the Indian systems of thought, the relation mainly seems to be stated as some kind of empirical generalization. 64 Or, to again revert to the language of Robert Forman (1986, 1999), in a “pure conscious event (PCE)” state.

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been set aside and the yogi has established him/herself in his/her own svarūpa that the final goal of kaivalya has been reached, the state at which his/her individual consciousness has become one with his/her puruṣa consciousness. It is this (experience of) union with the puruṣa consciousness that constitutes the level of concentration/meditation that is termed nirodha—an absolutely pure state of mind (consciousness) that is free from every activity (vṛtti) and object (pratyaya), and thus cannot be a conscious mental state or a state having epistemic value. The state in question is, however, associated with prajñā, whereby it gives complete liberation from everything not included in it, from everything that is transcended by it (i.e., from all prakṛti).65

Conclusion

The above sketch should at least make it plain that there are various similarities between the systems of Husserl and Patañjali despite the fact that their motives and aims appear to have been quite different. Both systems, for example, aspire to achieve absolutely direct, unbiased, unmediated, unprejudiced, certain and self-evident (apodictic) knowledge, and both claim that such knowledge can be achieved by practicing a certain “process of purification”: for Husserl, the transcendental phenomenological reduction; and, for Patañjali, the eight limbs of yoga (yogāṅgas). Both, moreover, claim that the knowledge achieved through their specific method is different and superior to “normal” “rational” knowledge: it is available via a unique form of intuiting or “gazing” (Wesensanschauung) that is neither associated with nor “contaminated” by contingent theories, concepts, etc., as is “normal” empirical- scientific knowledge.66 Both also seem to argue that their respective forms of intuiting consist of some sort of non-, a- or supra-rational (although not irrational!) form of knowledge. “Supra-rational” is perhaps the best way of putting this, even though Husserl would probably not have been happy with the term. Although both projects also appear to have as their epistemological objective the attainment of a direct, evident and unequivocal intuition and revelation of all the various pre-conditions for knowledge as well as the achievement of absolutely certain (apodictic) knowledge about “the things themselves” (as and only as they are), I am in agreement with Kockelmans (1976: 223f), who considers Husserl’s own conviction to have been that “a consistent phenomenology must turn its back on every established theory, on all traditional, prejudiced, and ´metaphysical´ views in order to gain access to a pure and primordial experience in which the ´things themselves´ appear to us in a genuinely original way". In my view, this is as close to “the thing in itself” as it is possible to get. Husserl’s opinion also seems to be that it is this sort of knowledge that should be the basis and foundation of all sciences. Or, to quote Queintin Lauer: The novelty lies in Husserl´s insistence that intuition, in the full sense of the term, is the presence to consciousness of an essence, with all that that implies by way

65Cf. above regarding the karma of the full-fledged Yogī. 66Cf. Husserl 1976 sect. 3, 15; Yoga Sūtras I:49.

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of necessity and universal validity. Phenomenological intuition is essential intuition, which is to say an intellectual intuition, the impossibility of which Kant had so vigor- ously asserted. It is plain to see, then, that such an intuition must be something more than the simple view contained in perception or imaginative representation, even though these latter acts are the examples from which the notion of intuition is derived. For Husserl intuition means more than empirical contact with an object. On the other hand, it is not some sort of mystical penetration into a world of essences’ inaccessible to merely rational thought. (Quoted in: Kockelmans 1967: 153, (italics mine.)) At the beginning of this article I mentioned that phenomenology ends up in a dilemma that the theory of yoga is able to avoid; it is also probable that Husserl (like Lauer above) would dispute my claim that his intuition carries the potential of providing some sort of “mystical” knowledge. These two claims are connected. As I see it, the dilemma that Husserl and phenomenologist such as Lauer fall into is that, on the one hand, they ascribe to a particular conception of science (i.e., that it is meant to be rational, intellectually honest and so forth), 67 and on the other, they realize that their own epistemological aims and objectives fail to meet the test of this definition.68 To put it plainly, it seems that something like the yoga system is what many phenomenologists would factually like phenomenology to be, but without being able to say so out loud, lest they be accused of being unscientific and “mystical”. This dilemma can already be seen in relation to Patañjali’s description of samprajñāta samādhi: roughly, as indicated above, the contact between and merging of the transcendental subject and its object in their pure existences. With the exception of the “merging”, this, according to my understanding, is exactly what Husserl intends to achieve with his transcendental phenomenological reduction. It is intended, as we have seen, to reduce the subject to pure, transcendental subjectivity so as to make it possible for him/her to non-prejudicially and non-judgmentally intuit his/her object as well as the role of his/her own consciousness in the constitution of objects as they are “in themselves”. 69 For Husserl, however, even the transcendental subject is a

67This is not the place to discuss the Western “Enlightenment” view of science or measure its rationality or reasonableness (cf. Couvalis 1997; Dampier 1989; Hempel 1966). Suffice it to say that it exists and that it deviates from the view of many Indian darśanas. 68Cf. Sander 1988, Part III, sect. 3.1.4.2. 69Kockelmans (1967: 222f) expresses this as follows: "The phenomenological reductions make it possible for the mind to discover its own nature; originally lost in the world, the mind can find itself again by means of these reductions. Only when that discovery opens up the possibility of an entirely new task can the mind begin to interpret the world as a coherent system constituted as such by itself. The coherence and unity of the world are ultimately founded upon the unity of the ego, to which all elements of the world necessarily refer. The task of constitutive analysis is to clarify how the ego constitutes worldly Being and the world itself." He also notes: "Phenomenology becomes a self-explanation of the ego, even there where the original interest was in the constitution of the object, the realm of the physical or cultural. The ego is here no longer the subject-pole placed opposite an object-pole; it instead becomes that which encompasses everything. Everything now becomes constructum of and for the transcendental subjectivity; the whole world of reality becomes a mere product of the transcendental ego´s activity. Phenomenology as a whole becomes a `self-explanation of one´s

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reflecting subject, even if the reflexion it is involved in is a special “transcendental phenomenological reflexion” (Husserl 1950, sect. 15). For him, in other words, the objects always remain intentional objects, objects for a subject, and thus the subject- object dualism is never fully transcended or abolished within his system. This limitation appears to prevent Husserl from reaching all the way to an entirely and totally direct, immediate, unmitigated and unmediated intuition of an object: the thing itself (die Sachen Selbst). In this regard, it seems that the reason Husserl could not “bring himself” to carry his phenomenological reduction to the point at which noesis and noema “merge” into one unity,70 thus breaking down the doctrine of intentionality and making it impossible to talk about subject on the one hand and object on the other, is that he primarily viewed the reductions as a logical-epistemological tool in his attempt to establish a strict, unbiased science that would constitute the foundation for all other sciences.71 And since non-intentional experiences provide no knowledge and have no epistemological value (apart from what Forman has termed “knowledge- by-identity”), these were of little use in terms of Husserl’s overarching aim. Husserl’s shortfall in not carrying his reductions to what I consider to be their logical end (or “zero-limit”), however, need not necessarily be viewed as a shortcoming of the phenomenological project. As in all cases, the degree to which one considers it useful to apply a given theoretical-methodological tool is wholly dependent on the objectives that one has in mind. This notwithstanding, it is difficult to avoid thinking that the transcendental phenomenological reduction (and thus the entire transcendental phenomenological endeavor) involves the following (“can’t- have-your-cake-and-eat-it”) contradiction: On the one hand, Husserl’s theoretical aim of establishing a strict, foundational science can only be achieved within a matrix in which the subject-object distinction (or dualism) is upheld, and on the other, the method by which to accomplish this aim (the transcendental phenomenological reduction), when carried to its furthest limit, leads to the very collapse of that self- same distinction—and thus, in one sense, to mysticism. The yogi’s apparent avoidance of this dilemma seems based on the fact that both his theoretical-methodological aims and his criteria for “intellectual honesty” are different from those of the phenomenologist. As has been several times noted above, the yogi’s aim is the cessation (or negation) of reflexive consciousness in order to attain pure empty consciousness (nirvīja samādhi) and be able to achieve dharma- megha-samādhi and ultimately kaivalya and mokṣa—which are practical-existential rather than scientific-theoretical goals. In this sense, the yogi is free to traverse the reductive path to its very end, finally discovering (or so it is claimed) that just as (s)he has negated everything else, (s)he can also negate the last residue of (empirical) ego- involvement (or “I-ness”) in the object that is being experienced and unite with the

own ego taken as subject of all possible knowledge`" (1967: 230) (The quotation within the quotation is from Cartesian sect. 41). 70Whether or not this “point” exists, and if so, whether or not it is possible to reach by either Husserl’s or Patañjali’s method is irrelevant to the discussion at hand. 71To establishPhilosophie als strenge Wissenshaft (Husserl 1911)

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pure transcendental ego (puruṣa). And by doing so, (s)he is left with only the pure experience of pure consciousness “as such”. It is no longer an experience of something and there is nobody who is having it. When these “remnants of the experience” are reduced to nil, the yogi is said to have achieved asamprajñāta samādhi. A final matter that deserves attention concerns whether by halting the reduction at an earlier stage, the phenomenologist gains any advantaged over the yogi in terms of the intelligibility of his/her findings and the strength of his/her truth claims to others. Here again, however, it appears that the yogi is in the better position, since, from the outset, (s)he openly declares his/her intuiting to be “mystical” (supra- rational), and thus impossible to entirely comprehend, communicate72 and validate via the conceptual schemes and rational categories of any given mundane science (a fact the phenomenologist must to some degree fudge). This is not meant to suggest, however, that the yogi has nothing meaningful to say about the efficacy of his/her techniques. On the contrary, those interested in attempting to comprehend and validate the claims of the yogic process are invited to practice the techniques themselves, and judge them accordingly. The claim is, in other words, that the yoga system can be understood and validated only by practicing it, and fully comprehended only by the advanced practitioner. What then of the phenomenologists in this regard? Here I would argue that, unlike the yogi, their contradictory stance vis-à-vis phenomenology once again draws them into a dilemma: on the one hand they claim (like Lauer above) that phenomenology is, and must be, a rational, scientific discipline (if not a type of “super-science”) and on the other they claim (like Ihde and Heidegger73) that it is impossible to (completely) comprehend the transcendental phenomenological project and validate its results without practicing it oneself (i.e., without being a trained phenomenologist).74This, combined with the fact that phenomenologists are generally quite fastidious when it comes to describing their method in concrete, practical terms, gives phenomenology an air of “mysticism”, at least in the eyes of many non- phenomenological philosophers. In this particular area, whereas the yoga system

72For a more detailed discussion on relevant problems of understanding and communication in this regard, see Sander 1988, spec. sect. 2.9. 73Ihde (1977: 14) states this position as follows: “in the case of phenomenology, I would make an even stronger claim: Without doing phenomenology, it may be practically impossible to understand phenomenology. This is not to say that one may not learn about phenomenology by other means. ... Nevertheless, without entering into the doing, the basic thrust and import of phenomenology is likely to be misunderstood at the least or missed at most”. Cf. Heidegger (1972: 75-79); Spigelberg (1975); Husserl (1929: 209 f). See also Sander (1988, part III, sect. 3.1.1). 74The type of knowledge provided by the method is so-called hodological knowledge (Greek: hodos ≈ path, way, road), knowledge that we must reach and experience ourselves, experiences that are centrally involved in the key concepts of this knowledge. Phenomena such as , pain, orgasm and intoxication are often mentioned as examples of hodological concepts (Cf. Sartre 1969: 279; Furberg 1975: 97; Sander 1988, Part III, sect. 3.3.3.3).

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provides detailed descriptions and instructions regarding its methods and how to perform them (even to the point of holding courses), phenomenology remain basically silent, leaving it up to interested parties to find their own way. To the extent that both the yogic and the phenomenological schools are such that it is impossible to completely comprehend and validate the results of their methods without practicing them, and that yogic practice is described in far more explicit and systematic terms, the matter of which is the more scientific and which is the more mystical is not merely rhetorical. From my perspective, the primary difference between these two “schools” lies not in their respective methods or techniques, but rather in the ultimate aims and objectives they are endeavoring to achieve: for phenomenology, the aim is to achieve absolutely true, unprejudiced and apodictic knowledge so as to build an irrefutable and unshakable foundation for all rigorous science; and, for the yoga system, the aim is to alleviate what is perceived to be the root cause of human suffering and misery, to resolve the predicament of unenlightened human existence.

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Husserl, E. 1976. Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology, (övers. B. Bibbson, (övers, av Husserl 1976)), London & New York. Husserl, E. 1984. LogischeUntersuchungen. Zweiter Band. ErsterTeil, ochZweiterTeil, Husserliana Band XIX/1 och 2, Den Haag 1984 Idhe, D. 1977. Experimental Phenomenology, New York. James, W. 1950. The Principles of Psychology Vol. I & II, New York, Johansson, R. E. A. 1979. The Dynamic Psychology of Early Buddhism, London. Johansson, R. E. A. 1983. Buddhismens Psykologi Enligt De Äldsta Källorna, Lund. Kasulis, T. P. 1981. Action. Zen Person, Honolulu. Katz, S. 1978. “Language, Epistemology, and Mysticism”, in S. Katz (ed.), Mysticism and Philosophical Analysis, Oxford University Press. King, W.L. 1980. Meditation: The Buddhist Transformation of Yoga, University Park, Penn. & London. Krishnaraj, V. 2002. The Bhagavad-Gita. Translation and Commentary. Lincoln, NE: i. Universe. Kockelmans, J. J. (ed.) 1967. Phenomenology. The Philosophy of Edmund Husserl and Its Interpretation, Garden City, New York Lettvin, J. Y., H. R. Maturana, W. S. McCulloch & W. H. Pitts. 1959. “What the frog's eye tells the frog's brain,” Proc. Inst. Radio Engr. 47:1940–1951. Lycan, W.G. 2001. “A Simple Argument for Higher-order Representation Theory of Consciousness”. Analysis 61: 3-4. MacIntyre, R. & Smith, D.W. 1977. “Epistemological Crises, Dramatic Narrative, and the Philosophy of Science”. The Monist, 60, 453-472. Merleau-Ponty, M. 2002. Phenomenology of Perception, Routledge. Nagle, T. 1979. Mortal Questions, Cambridge. Nagel, T. 1986. The view from nowhere. New York: Oxford Univ. Press. Naranjo, C. & Ornstein, R.E. 1971. On the Psychology of Meditation. New York: Viking Press. Kockelmans, J.K. (ed.) 1967 Phenomenology. The Philosophy of Edmund Husserl and Its Interpretation, Garden City, New York. Kockelmans, J.K. 1967 Some Fundamental Themes of Husserl´s Phenomenology, in J.K. Kockelmans (ed.) 1967. Kockelmans, J.K. 1967. Husserl’s Phenomenological Philosophy in the Light of Contemporary Chriticism, i: Kockelmans (Ed). 1967 Koller, J.M (ed). 1985. Oriental Philosophies. New York: Scribner. Krishnaraj, V. 2002. The Bhagavad-Gita. Translation and Commentary. Lincoln, NE. iUniverse. Lauer, Q. 1967. On Evidence, i: Kockelmans (ed.) . Lettvin, J. Y., H. R. Maturana, W. S. McCulloch, and W. H. Pitts. 1959 “What the Frog’s Eye Tells the Frog’s Brain” Proc. Inst. Radio Engr. 1959, vol. 47; 1940-1951. Miller, B. 1996. Yoga: Discipline of Freedom. University of California Press. Nagel, T. 1986. The View from Nowhere. New York: Oxford Univ. Press. Naranjo, C. & R. Ornstein. 1971. On the Psychology of Meditation, London 1971. Natanson, M. 1973. Förord till Schütz 1973, The Hague: Nijhoff Ornstein, R. 1971. “The Esoteric and the Modern Psychology of Awareness,” in Naranjo & Ornstein (Ed.), On the Psychology of Meditation, Viking Press. Ornstein, R. 1977. The Psychology of Consciousness, San Francisco. Radhakrishnan, S. 1929-1931. Indian Philosophy. (2. Ed.) London: Allen &Unwin.

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Rosenthal, D.M. 1993. “State Consciousness and Transitive Consciousness” Consciousness and Cognition 2: 355-363. Sander, Å. 1988. En Tro - En Livsvärld. En fenomenologiskunder sökningavreligiöserfarenhet, religiöstmedvetandeochderas roller ilivsvärldskonstitutionen, VolI & II. Institutionenförfilosofi, Göteborg 1988 Sander, Å. 1999. “Edmund Husserls Fenomenologiska tradition”. In Allwood, C.M. & Erikson, M.G. (red.) Vetenskapsteoriförpsykologiochandrasamhällsvetenskaper. Lund: Studentlitteratur, pp.101-141. Sander, Å. 2000. “somförståelseimötetmellaninvandrareocholikatyperavvårdpersonal”. In C. M. Allwood & E. Franzen (eds.), Interkulturellpsykologi – migration ochkulturmöteniSverige. Stockholm: Natur&Kultur, 282-319 Sander, Å. & Andersson, D. 2010. “Hinduismensärende”. In Å. Sander & D. Andersson (eds.), India on My Mind. LIR, University of Gothenburg, Gothenburg. Sartre, J. 1969. Being and Nothingness: an Essay on Phenomenological Ontology. London: Routledge. Schütz, A. 1970. Reflections on the Problem of Relevance. R.M. Zaner (ed.), New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press. Schütz, A. 1973. Collected Papers of Alfred Schütz Vol. I: The Problem of Social Reality, M. Natanson (ed.), The Hague: Nijhoff. Schütz, A. 1976. Collected Papers of Alfred Schütz Vol. II: Studies in Social Theory, A. Brodersen (ed.), The Hague: Nijhoff. Skjervheim, H. 1971. Deltagareochåskådare: sex bidrag till debattenommänniskansfrihetidetmodernasamhället. Uppsala: Verdandi. Spiegelberg, H. 1975. Doing Phenomenology. Essays On and In Phenomenology, The Hague: Nijhoff. Spiegelberg, H. 1982. The Phenomenological Movement: a Historical Introduction. (3rd. Rev. and Enl. ed.) The Hague: Nijhoff. Stace, W. 1960. Mysticism and Philosophy, Philadelphia: Lippincott. Studstill, R. 2005. The Unity of Mystical Traditions: the Transformation of Consciousness in Tibetan and German Mysticism. Leiden: Brill. Sundén, H. 1966. Religionenochrollerna: ettpsykologisktstudiumavfromheten. (4., [utökade] uppl.) Stockholm: Diakonistyrelsen. Tamini, I.K. 1961. The Science of Yoga. The Yoga-Sūtras s of Patañjali in Sanskrit with transliteration in Roman, translation and commentary in English. Madras, India. Tart, C. (ed.) . 1969. Altered States of Consciousness, New York. Thera, N. 1962. The Hart of Buddhist Meditation. A Handbook on Mental Training Based on the Buddha´s Way of , London: Ryder & Company. Wittgenstein, L. 1961. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, (övers. D.F. Pears & B. F. McGuinness), London. Zaner, R.M. 1970. The Way of Phenomenology, New York: Western Publishing. Zimmer, H. 1969. Philosophies of India, J. Campbell (ed.), Princeton University Press.

Journal of East-West Thought

RELEVANCE OF META-NARRATIVES OF AND BHAGATGITA IN TRAVERSING POST-MODERN CONDITION

Matthew D. Stephen

Abstract: The paper argues that ancient metanarratives (Adhikaṭha) are relevant in meeting out the crisis of values brought on by the post-modernistic ideology. The paper defines post modernism and examines it. It argues that postmodernism’s rejection of a universal metanarrative (Adhikaṭha) is untenable. Secondly, the paper looks at how the ancient Adhikaṭha of Yishu in conversation with Indian classical philosophy (especially of Gītā) answers the crisis of postmodernism. The third section argues that rather than falling into the relativism of postmodernism, traditions of thought and values should identify their critical value. On the basis of their critical value respective traditions should then dialogue with one another persuasively.

I. The Position and Problem of Postmodernity

Postmodernism is fundamentally problematic because it is self-referentially untenable to its fundamental assertion that there is no universal metanarrative. Postmodernity is notoriously difficult to define.1However, Jean-Fran ois Lyotard argues that the basic definition of postmodernism is that it calls into question “metanarratives.” 2 The previous mood, intellectually and culturally in much of the world during the 20th century had been of modernism. Modernism was characterized by optimistic progress based on reason, science, and industry. However, the later third of the 20th century saw the largely reactionary rise of the postmodernism in philosophy and society. Postmodernism despaired of the pursuit of a metanarrative and rather focused on localized narratives. Bern Magnus writes that postmodernism is a “rejection of principles, distinctions, and descriptions that are thought to be unconditionally binding for all times, persons, and places; and a suspicion of grand narratives, metanarratives of the sort perhaps best illustrated by dialectical materialism.” 3 However, this position of postmodernism leads to two problems. The first problem is the jettison of a metanarrative and the second is the lack of a unified ethic. First, the problem with getting rid of a universal metanarrative is that postmodernism leaves its adherents with fragmentation. If one adopts the postmodern perspective they have no unified narrative for reality. However, this problem leads to a deeper problem.

MATTHEW STEPHEN. Email: [email protected]. 1“The term ‘postmodern’ is less clear in philosophy, its application more uncertain and divided than in some other fields, e.g., postmodern architecture.” Bern Magnus, “Postmodernism” in The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, 2nd ed. Edited by Robert Audi (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 726. 2 “Simplifying to the extreme, I define postmodern as incredulity toward metanarratives.”Jean Fran ios Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, trans. Geoff Bennigton and Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press, 2002), xxiv. 3Ibid., 725.

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Postmodernism cannot sustain its objection that there is no metanarrative. Metanarrative can be defined as an overarching explanation or story that explains reality that provides a framework for an individual or community to operate. Another way to define metanarrative is that it is a story of a worldview that gets at a person’s, or a community’s, or a society’s or even the world’s “ultimate concern” in the words of Paul Tillich.4 Postmodernism’s metanarrative is given the limitations of human person’s and communities no one can lay claim to a metanarrative. Nevertheless, this objection is postmodernism’s metanarrative. Postmodernism is therefore self- referentially untenable because it too has a metanarrative. Furthermore, the second problem is that since postmodernism has no metanarrative it is difficult to establish a unified ethic. Christopher Butler writes, “Although we may believe in the logic of promise-keeping, can we any longer truly believe in it, in the light of modern realpolitik, in anything like the sense in which Kant and Hume did?” 5 Butler continues, “These traditional principles, and the alternatives to them, now seem to lack a firm grounding.”6 Disagreements in ethics, Butler frankly admits, “But still, as a matter of fact often leads to bitter conflicts, which need to be resolved by something better than postmodernist principles.”7 The problem of the basis for making ethical decisions is a real problem for postmodernism. In Sanskrit, the term Adhikaṭha will be coined as an orienting concept. Adhikaṭha in this context means the great narrative.8 Postmodernism denies any Adhikaṭha or metanarrative. However, postmodernism cannot get away from the idea of Adhikaṭha. Should one jettison the quest for an Adhikaṭha and focus on local and personal narratives? Rather, the challenge of postmodernism can help one look more closely at one’s own Adhikaṭha and enters into dialogue with other Adhikaṭhas. However in contrast to postmodernism one does not need to apologize for the universality of those Adhikaṭhas. The next section will show the ancient Christian Adhikaṭha of Yishu in dialogue with the ancient values of Indian philosophy found in the Bhagavad Gītā answer the challenges of postmodernism.

II. Ancient Value of the Adhikaṭha of Yishu in conversation with the Ancient Values of Indian Philosophy

This section shows how the Adhikaṭha of Yishu addresses fundamental concerns in Indian philosophy. The concerns of Indian philosophy also similar to concerns found with other worldviews including first century Christianity. This section first looks at concerns found within the Bhagavad Gītā. Then it argues that the Adhikaṭha of Yishu addresses concerns in common with values in Indian philosophy and first century

4Paul Tillich, Systematic vol. 1, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), 211. 5 Christopher Butler, Postmodernism: A Very Short Introduction. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 120. 6Ibid., 120. 7Ibid., 120. 8Adhi here means superior and kaṭha should be understood at didactic narrative. An alternative to Adhikaṭha would be Mahāvṛtāmta.

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Christianity. At the same time the Adhikaṭha of Yishu is shown to answer the crisis of postmodernism. The Bhagavad Gītā addresses three areas of fundamental concern to human experience. These are the areas include knowledge, action and love. However, the Gītā seeks to relate these areas to the goal of human existence and address the concerns pertinent to Indian philosophy. The Gītā seeks to address the concerns in its worldview of dharma, karma and saṁsāra. The three ways that the describes to mokṣa are jñāna yoga, yoga and .9According to the Gītā if one achieves perfection in each of these three ways that one will attain mokṣa. The Gītā states, “Hear from me, in brief, O Son of Kuntī, how, having attained perfection, he attains to the Brahman, that supreme consummation of wisdom.”10 So in the Gītā’s terms, how is through each of these three ways one to attain mokṣa? This section on the Gītā will follow Bina Gupta’s interpretation in An Introduction to Indian Philosophy, who seeks to “examine the Gītā in its own terms.”11First, Gupta looks at karma yoga or the path of action. The gist of what Kṛṣna instructs Arjuna to do is to act in accordance with dharma and do this without attachment. Gupta writes, “In terms of action, Kṛṣna asks Arjuna to perform actions without any desire for the fruits of action for himself.”12 The Gītā states, “Therefore, without attachment, perform always the work that has to be done, for man attains to the highest by doing work without attachment.”13The expectation of the Gītā is that one will attain perfection in this work. The Gītā states, “Treating alike pleasure and pain, gain and loss, victory and defeat, then get ready for battle. Thus thou shall not incur sin.”14 Secondly, Gītā describes jn᷉āna yoga. In the context of the Gītā “(1) the knowledge of distinction between the lower or mortal self and the higher or the immortal self, and (2) the knowledge of Kṛṣna as the higher self, the lord of the universe.”15With correct knowledge the seeker can find liberation. The Gītā states, “Therefore at all times remember Me and fight. When thy mind and understanding are set on Me, to Me alone shalt thou come without doubt.”16 The goal of jn᷉āna yoga is perfection in knowledge. Thirdly, Bhakti “signifies an intense relationship with which one approaches the divine.”17 It goes on to explain, “Kṛṣna tells Arjuna that a jīva is saved by keeping in mind the highest lord, parames vara, “that human beings who are focused on my cosmic form, whose hearts are devoted to me and spend days and

9Prabhavananda argues for a fourth implicit way of found within the Gita. See Swami Prabhavananda, The Spiritual Heritage of India: A Clear Summary of Indian Philosophy and Religion, (Hollywood: Vedanta Press, 1979), 98. For the sake of simplicity I am following Gupta’s reading of the Gita’s own horizon which argues for 3 ways. 10XVIII:50, S. Radhakrishnan, The Bhagavadgita, (New Delhi: Harper Collins, 2006), 369. 11Bina Gupta, An Introduction to Indian Philosophy: Perspectives on Reality, Knowledge and Freedom, (New York: Routledge, 2012), 277. 12Ibid., 282. 13 III.19. S. Radhakrishanan, TheBhagavadgita 138. 14 II.38. Ibid., 114. 15 Gupta, An Introduction to Indian Philosophy, 285. 16 VIII.7 S. RadhaKrishnan, The Bhagavadgita, 229. See also the Gītā V.17. 17Gupta, And Introduction to Indian Philosophy, 285.

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nights in this state, in my opinion, are the best . Such persons offer all their actions to me, think of me as worth worshipping as the highest, their minds are entirely preoccupied with me, and these bhaktas are saved by me from the ocean of saṃsāra.”18Bhakti yoga expects perfect devotion of the devotee. Lastly, we should note that the Gītā sees these three paths as interrelated. “These three paths are not mutually exclusive alternatives; rather they complement each other.”19In fact, even from the statements above the unity of the paths should be evident.20 If the seeker starts on one path the other two are necessary though the emphasis may differ. The goal of the 3 paths is mokṣa in other words salvation or liberation. From what has been observed the Gītā calls those following the path to perfection in the three ways that it instructs. Even in the case of IX. 30, “Even if a man of the most vile conduct me with undistracted devotion, he must be reckoned as righteous for he has rightly resolved.”21 The idea here is that the devotee perfects themselves in their devotion, “undistracted devotion.” This way of perfection is rooted in following dharma. Dharma calls one to certain duties in accordance with the nature given to the person, that person’s place in society and that person’s relationships. 22 This is known as svadharma. 23 Nevertheless, even with the one seeking dharma as svadharma, perfection is demanded by dharma. The perfection of human nature in experience is frankly difficult if not impossible. The difficulty of following dharma is clearly seen in the ancient Sanskrit prayer which states, “I know what is dharma, but cannot will to do it, I know what is adharma but cannot will to desist from it.”24The prayer goes on to ask for divine assistance in performing the necessary duty. The first century ancient Christian values address the concerns of dharma, and this is rooted in the ancient traditions of the Hebrews. The difficulty of following dharma as it relates to the Hebrew concept of torah is central to the Adhikaṭha of Yishu. However, first the concept of torah needs some explanation, including the perfection demanded of torah.25 Torah as a concept is the law of God. According to the the narrative of Yishu, Torah would need to be followed perfectly.

18Ibid., 285. 19Ibid., 286. Note also his statement, “Thus the three paths come together irrespective of here one chooses to begin, consistently with his own nature.” 288. 20Gupta cites VII.14; IX.15; IV.23 from the Gītā as support for this conclusion. For example II.30 combines the ways of action and knowledge, “Surrendering all actions to me, Fixing your mind on your higher self Having no desires and selfishness; Fight, surrendering this fever” Gupta, An Introduction to Indian Philosophy, 287. 21S. RadhaKrishnan, The Bhagavadgita, 250. 22See Pravananda, The Spiritual Heritage of India, 103. 23Gupta, An Introduction to Indian Philosophy, 284. 24“Jaanaamidharmamnaca me pravṛttijaanaamiadharmamnaca me nivṛtti,” Bina Gupta, An Introduction to Indian Philosophy, 98. 25 Paul will show a humanistic understanding of keeping the law that contrasts with the perfection demanded with the law as clearly demanded from what follows. He at one point says that he is blameless according the law (Philippians 3:6). However this is from a human perspective and not actual or divine perspective.

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The Torah states, “For I am Yhwh your God. Consecrate yourselves therefore, and be holy, for I am holy.”26 Torah expects holiness. In this tradition Yishu taught his followers, “You therefore must be perfect, as your heavenly Father is perfect.”27In the Adhikaṭha of Yishu the expectation is nothing less than perfection, and does not lessen this requirement. The requirement is rooted in the perfection or holiness of God. Now the breaking of the law at one point would be one was imperfect and guilty of breaking it all. The brother of Yishu, James wrote, “For whoever keeps the whole law but fails in one point has become accountable for all of it.”28James’ basic point is that any imperfection destroys perfection.29The difficulty of following torah was well known in the Hebrew tradition and Paul of Tarsus, representative of Jewish and Christian perspectives of the first century provides a good example of this difficulty. Similar to the Sanskrit prayer above, Paul writes,

For I do not understand my own actions. For I do not do what I want, but I do the very thing I hate. Now if I do what I do not want, I agree with the law, that it is good. So now it is no longer I who do it, but sin that dwells in me. For I know that nothing good dwells within me, that is, in my flesh. For I have the desire to do what is right, but not the ability to carry it out. For I do not do the good I want, but the evil I do not want is what I keep on doing.30

Paul here is writing about the struggle internally about following the torah against indwelling sin. The law calls one to perfect obedience and yet that seems impossible. In summary, the ancient values of Indian philosophy and first century Christianity call for a perfection in relationship to dharma or law. In contrast, postmodernism has jettisoned the idea of standard and perfection. Sabina Lovibond writes, “Postmodernism does not condemn the pursuit of truth or virtue within local, self-contained discursive communities—the quest for ‘truth’ as distinct from ‘Truth,’ as Rorty might put it, or of ‘virtue’ as distinct from ‘Virtue’ (the latter meaning the excellence of a human being simply qua human and without reference to any particular social role).”31 So postmodernism would applaud the pursuit of excellence within a tradition, but not in a way that would be true for all. Lovibond continues, “It

26Leviticus 11:44. All verses based on the ESV. Torah or law was so central to Jews that the first five books of the Hebrew Bible were called the Torah. The Torah has been and remains the most revered part of the Bible for Jews. 27Matthew 5:48. 28James 2:10 29First century Christianity did not expect perfection from creatures in the same sense of perfection of the Creator. The Creator is the archetype and the creature the ectype. An ectype level of perfection is expected. 30Rom. 7:15-19. Law is translated from the Greek “nomos” which should be understood as a translation of the Hebrew concept of torah into Greek. Flesh here is not a mere body as in Greek soul/body dualism where the body as matter is evil. Rather, we should understand flesh in the sense of the present evil age, verse the new creation which is also physical. 31Sabina Lovibond, “Feminism and Postmodernism,” in Postmodernism: A Reader. Thomas Docherty ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 401.

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reserves its criticism for the idea that we should evaluate the activity of each of these communities by a universal standard…”32 And yet this criticism is applied universally by postmodernism. In contrast, the ancients were no strangers to a standard of excellence and perfection or the difficulties therein. In the Adhikaṭha of Yishu, the depth of difficulty of following the law and achieving perfection stems from the nature of transgression of that law. A human being has both the pollution of sin, and the guilt of it. Paul in the passage above is wrestling with the pollution of sin. However, when Paul writes, “both Jews and Greeks, are alike under sin” he is speaking about the guilt of sin.33Another way of looking at this is that the ancient Christian perspective is that sin creates debt. According to Indian philosophy it might clarify by using and defining the following terms in relationship to one another: dharma, Rta and ṛṇa. Dharma could be defined more narrowly as law.34 Dharma is rooted in Rta, or the cosmic order. For the ancient Christian values in the Adhikaṭha of Yishu this would be the created order. Dharma which is rooted in ṛta is ultimately rooted in the nature of God. According to the Adhikatha of Yishu, humanity violated and is violating dharma or law. This violation or transgression created debt or ṛṇa. Now, according to Indian philosophy the idea of ṛṇa is that the person owes debts in three ways: to the ṛṣis; to the devas; and to the pitṛ35 However, according to the Adhikaṭha of Yishu there is now a debt or ṛṇa that the person cannot work out themselves. It is ṛṇa to God in an ultimate sense which makes one unholy, imperfect and unclean. However, in the Adhikaṭha of Yishu, Yishu actually achieved perfection and brought resolution to the problem of ṛṇa as defined above. According to the Adhikaṭha of Yishu he fulfills perfection in the three areas of the human condition that the Gītā identifies. In each of these areas, according the values of ancient Christianity, humanity has failed.36 In each of these three areas humanity has incurred ṛṇa to God. Yishu received their ṛṇa and gave them his perfection. First, according to the Adhikaṭha of Yishu, he achieves perfection in jñāna yoga or the path of knowledge. Yishu is understood to grow in wisdom and knowledge in a way that amazed the scholars of his day.37In the Hebrew wisdom tradition Solomon achieved the heights of wisdom. However Yishu speaks about himself, “The queen of the South will rise up at the judgment with this generation and condemn it, for she came from the ends of the earth to hear the wisdom of Solomon, and behold, something greater than Solomon is here.”38 He is claiming a greater person than Solomon has come in himself. Furthermore, Paul of Tarsus writes that Yishu is the

32Ibid., 401. 33Romans 3:9. 34Dharma is a term with many meanings. Dharma can have a similar or synonymous meaning with Rta. See Gurcharan Das’ discussion of the word Dharma in The Difficulty of Being Good: On The Subtle Art of Dharma. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009)Loc. 5556. Also see John Grimes, A Concise Dictionary of Indian Philosophy, (Varanasi: Indica, 2009), 143-146. 35Ibid., 304. 36For these areas see Romans 1:18-23; 3:9-20. 37See Luke 2:41-52. 38Matthew 12:42.

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wisdom or jñāna of God.39 Secondly, according to the Adhikaṭha of Yishu he achieves perfection in through the way of devotion or love. Yishu instructs what the greatest act of love is to his disciples stating, “Greater love has no one than this that someone lay down his life for his friends.”40 Yishu teaches that the best one can give is one’s own life for another. There is nothing more precious. He also is indirectly referring to his own purpose. This act of love for his people which is giving up his life for them is where his life culminates. Reflecting on the life of Yishu, Paul of Tarsus writes, “For one will scarcely die for a righteous person—though perhaps for a good person one would dare even to die—but God shows his love for us in that while we were still sinners, Abhishikt died for us.”41 Furthermore the perfect love of Yishu is seen in the result and power of that love. Paul writes, “For I am sure that neither death nor life, nor angels no rulers, nor things present nor things to come, nor powers, nor height nor depth, nor anything else in all creation, will be able to separate us from the love of God in Abhishikt Yishu our Lord.”42 He achieves perfect love especially as he lays down his life for his people once and for all. The final way in the Adhikaṭha Yishu follows perfectly is the way of karma yoga. He perfectly and selflessly submits his will to God in obedience to torah, and the svadharma that God had given him.43During his baptism, his cousin John, tries to prevent him from being baptized. Yishu responds, “Let it be so now, for thus it is fitting for us to fulfill all righteousness.”44 Yishu again describes his own obedience, “Truly, truly, I say to you, the Son can do nothing of his own accord, but only what he sees the Father doing. For whatever the Father does, that the Son does likewise.”45 This is Yishu’s model of obedience. Yishu tells of the ‘spirit’ of his obedience, “…even as the Son of Man came not to be served but to serve, and to give his life as a ransom for many.”46 Yishu’s obedience to the law is selfless. Reflecting on the life and teaching of Yishu, Paul writes in the first century, “who, though he was in the form of God, did not count equality with God a thing to be grasped, but made himself nothing, taking the form of a servant, being born in likeness of men. And being found in human form, he humbled himself by becoming obedient to the point of death, even death on a cross.”47 Yishu selflessly follows the law for the benefit of his people. His action is not selfishly motivated. Yishu through the three ways achieves yoga with God, not for himself which he already had from eternity.48 In his human nature he achieves perfection in the areas of

39I Corinthians 1:24. See also verse 30. 40John 15:13. 41Romans 5:7-8. 42Romans 8:38-39. 43Yishu’s svadharma is his mission to free his people from the curse of sin. As the incarnation of God he has a unique svadharma. 44Matthew 3:15. 45John 5:19. 46Matthew 20:28. 47Philippians 2:6-8. 48John 17:5.

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knowledge, love and action for the benefit of his people. These three areas are seen in the commandment that summarizes torah or dharma according to the Adhikaṭha of Yishu. The law states, “You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your soul and with all your might.”49 The basic point of the verse is that the person should love God with all they are, internally and externally. This is where humanity failed. This is where in the Adhikaṭha of Yishu, Yishu succeeds in following dharma or Torah.50 Yishu in his sacrifice bears the curse of the law which is the consequence of ṛṇa and becomes sin for their sake.51 This releases them from the ṛṇa owed to God because of the violation of dharma.52 In this way Yishu then opens the way for mokṣa for his people. Yishu’s people according to the values of ancient Christianity participate in this Adhikaṭha through vis vas. His people, through vis vas, trust that he has perfectly obeyed the requirement of God and at the same time received the debt, ṛṇa or guilt of the violation of the torah or dharma of God.53 Through vis vas, his people achieve yoga or union with Yishu, and by him with God. The transformation that occurs at this point is very dramatic. It is described by Yishu as rebirth in the present life.54 This rebirth provides renovation and renewal for the mind, heart and will. 55In addition, vis vas is not a self-perfection, but a gracious perfection that comes from receiving Yishu’s perfection through vis vas. This grace is rooted in the nature of God. According to ancient Christian values, God defines love. “God is love” according to the author John.56 Looking at it in Indian philosophical values, the Adhikaṭha of Yishu is rooted in the karuna of . However, this finds deeper underpinnings in the ananda of nirguna Brahman.57 Through yoga with Yishu, his people are given the s akti for an ethic of love.58 The ethic of love as he has loved is the mark of his people.59 Yishu follows this up with the statement that love is the defining mark for his disciples. He says, “By this all people will know that you are my disciples, if you have love for one

49Deuteronomy 6:5. 50I Corinthians 1:30. 51Galatians 3:13, quoting Deuteronomy 21:23. Paul in this verse is citing Torah of Moses, the law of God. Also 2 Corinthians 2:5. 52Matthew 20:28. 53See Colossians 2:13 54John 3:3 55For knowledge Yishu’s people are given his mind (Philippians 2:5). For love, they are given the power to love like he loved (John 13:34). And for will, they are commanded to put to death the sinful nature and put on the virtues of the new life (Colossians 3). 56I John 4:8. 57See Julius Lipner and George Gispert-Sauch, The Writings of Brahmabandhab Upadhyay, (Bangalore: The United Theological College, 1991), 130f. 58The use of s akti here is different than the traditional understanding in Indian philosophy. S akti here means a power that is not inherent to the one welding it. It is power from the outside, through the Spirit of Yishu. It is renovative and restorative. 59John 13:34. The nature of the love he has loved them with includes the feet washing earlier in this passage but ultimately the giving of his life for his friends.

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another.”60This ethic of love is contrasted to the ethic of postmodernism which posits a mutual tolerance. Butler writes, “Tolerance is a principled willingness to put up with the expression and pursuit of beliefs that you know to be wrong, for the sake of some larger ideal, like freedom of inquiry or the autonomy of others in the construction of their own narrative or identity—provided, I would say, that they don’t harm others in the process.”61 There is a danger of having tolerance without much grounding. The danger is without that ‘larger ideal’ not provided by the postmodernist metanarrative because it lacks one, the tolerance can easily slip away. The ethic of love found in the Adhikatha of Yishu provides the grounding for tolerance for his people in society. However, it is not mere tolerance that the metanarrative calls for but love. Love goes beyond merely tolerating the existence of other perspectives but of wanting their good and taking a self-sacrificial stance in relationship toward others. Now, it is true that the contemporary followers of Yishu often have failed by falling prey to the ills of postmodernism, and materialism. Nevertheless, the ethic of love is at the heart of what Yishu’s people are supposed to be about. Another first century Christian perspective on this, John writes, “Beloved, let us love one another, for love is from God and whoever has been born of God and knows God.”62 When this love is operative it has a profound effect on others’ lives and often will impact society and the world progressively. The ancient Christian church was well known for its charity.63Martin Luther King Jr. and Mother Teresa would be recent examples of the s akti of this love. A contemporary example of this ethic would be Shane Claiborne and the Simple Way.64 The Simple Way is a movement of people in the most dangerous part of inner-city Philadelphia in the United States of America. The Adhikaṭha of Yishu provides the grounding metaphysically and the s akti for a unified ethic of love. This ethic also has provides for the definition of this love based on the actions of Yishu.

III. Postmodernism and Critical Values

Metanarratives will have critical values and if those values are removed with cease to characterize that metanarrative as distinctive. For Islamic thought it is the Koran.65 Perhaps for it is Brahman. 66 For the ancient Adhikaṭha or metanarrative of Yishu it is Yishu. Remove or replace Yishu and his central

60John 13:35. 61Butler, Postmodernism, 122. 62I John 4:7. The antithesis to this is verse brings out the ethical imperative rooted in the nature of God. Verse 8 has: “Anyone who does not love does not know God, because God is love.” 63The Shepherd of Hermas and the Apology of Aristides both record and instruct the early Christians to hold fasts for the purpose of redistributing food for those in need. 64See Shane Claiborne, The Irresistible Revolution: Living as an Ordinary Radical, (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2010) 65See Farid Esack, The Qu’ran: A User’s Guide. (Oxford: One World, 2005). 16. 66See Hervey DeWitt Griswold, Brahman: A Study in the History of Indian Philosophy, (New York, Macmillan Company, 1900)

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importance to this metanarrative and the whole narrative falls apart. This is seen in Yishu’s relationship to his people in his provision for their mokṣa and yoga with God. Returning to the question of postmodernism, how does one distinguish between worldviews? One could adopt a major worldview, for example, naturalism, agnosticism, monism, , Hinduism, Christianity, or Marxism.67 Now the problem is if one does not have a way to distinguish between metanarratives one sinks back into the relativism of post modernity. The Adhikaṭha of Yishu answers this with public testimony of a historical event, the resurrection of Yishu. 68 The Indian philosophical traditions of the and the Mīmāṃsā have understood the importance of testimony as valid under the right conditions.69 The testimony of the resurrection for the Adhikaṭha of Yishu is of central importance. Paul of Tarsus states it this way,

And if Abhishikt (Yishu) has not been raised then our presentation is in vain and your vis vas is in vain. We are even found to be misrepresenting God, because we testified about God that he raised Abhishikt from the dead…And if Abhishikt has not been raised your vis vas is futile and you are still in your sins. Then those also who have fallen asleep (died) in yoga to Abhishikt have perished. If in Abhishikt we have hoped in this life only, we are of all people most to be pitied.70

The criterion that Paul is using here is public testimony in a Jewish court that is rooted in torah.71 This testimony is what makes the compelling case for the Adhikaṭha of Yishu. Other metanarratives will have their respective critical value or values. The task then is for metanarratives to make a compelling case for their universal vision with their arguments based on their critical values. In pluralistic societies, there needs to be a tolerance of many metanarratives. This is a helpful contribution of postmodernism. However the negative side to this is the loss of truth capital T.

Conclusion

In the current climate of Postmodernism, it is necessary to reestablish metanarratives or an Adhikaṭha. Even Postmodernism cannot ultimately get away from some kind of

67 There are many more than these worldviews with meta-narratives. Agnosticism has a narrative that frankly admits ignorance to ultimate things. Nevertheless it still asserts that ultimate reality is unknowable at least at this point in time. 68Testimony is basic to an ancient Christian understanding. 69Gupta, An Introduction to Indian Philosophy, 117.Pandit Rajmani Tigunait, Seven Systems of Indian Philosophy, (Honesdale; Himalayan Institute Press), 91ff. The concept of s abda encompasses reliable testimony. The testimony is valid unless good reasons can be shown to disallow the testimony. 70I Corinthians 15:14-15, 17-19. 71This is clear from the way he lays out the crowd of witnesses in I Corinthian 15.

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back story that answers the fundamental questions of existence. The first century Christian critical value of the Adhikaṭha of Yishu provides a way forward through postmodernism by addressing the fundamental questions of existence. The questions are raised in the values seen in Indian philosophy. The Adhikaṭha of Yishu provides a way forward in the person of Yishu. He perfectly follows the dharma of God in his Adhikaṭha and removes the ṛṇa owed to God. He fulfills the three basic areas of the human condition where humans have failed. He opens up mokṣa to his people and provides for yoga with God for his people. They through vis vas can participate in his reality and find the s akti for an ethic of love.

References

Butler, Christopher. 2002. Postmodernism: A Very Short Introduction. New York: Oxford University Press,.. Claiborne, Shane. 2005. The Irresistible Revolution: Living as an Ordinary Radical. Grand Rapids: Zondervan Das, Gurcharan. 2009. The Difficulty of Being Good: On the Subtle Art of Dharma. New York: Oxford University Press, Esack, Farid. The Qu'ran: A User's Guide. Oxford: One World, 2005. Grimes, John. 2009. A Concise Dictionary of Indian Philosophy. Varanasi: Indica Griswold, Hervey DeWitt. 1900. Brahman: A Study in the History of Indian Philosophy. New York: Macmillan Company Gupta, Bina. 2012. An Introduction to Indian Philosophy: Perspectives on Reality, Knowledge and Freedom. New York: Routledge Julius, Lipner, and George Gispert-Sauch. 1991. The Writings of Brahmabandhab Upadhyay. Bangalore: The United Theological College Lovibond, Sabina. 1993. "Feminism and Postmodernism." In Postmodernism: A Reader, by Thomas Docherty (ed.), New York: Columbia University Press Lyotard, Jean Francios. 2002. The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge. Translated by Geoff Bennigton and Brian Massumi. Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press Magnus, Bern. 2001. "Postmodernism." In The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy 2nd Edition, edited by Robert Audi, 725-726. New York: Cambridge University Press Prabhavananda, Swami. 1979. The Spiritual Heritage of India: A Clear Summary of Indian Philosophy and Religion. Hollywood: Vendanta Press Radhakrishnan, S. 2006. The Bhagavadgita. New Delhi: HarperCollins Tigunait, Pandit Rajmani. 1983. Seven Systems of Indian Philosophy. Honesdale: Himalayan Institute Press Tillich, Paul. 1951. Systematic Theology. Vol. 1. Chicago: University of Chicago Press

Journal of East-West Thought

UNIVERSAL RELIGION OF VIVEKANANDA: A WAY OUT OF RELIGIOUS DISSENSION

Iti Chattopadhyay

Abstract: Religion is an important constituent of human culture and values. But it plays an ambivalent role in our lives and society. Though its core business is to build, sustain and promote peace and love throughout the globe, it can by deviation be a powerful source of violence. According to Vivekananda, the attitude of ‘exclusive right to live’ of different world gives birth to violence. He believes that though religions are divergent in various aspects, they are not contradictory, rather supplementary to each other. He defines religion as the realization of divinity within us and asserts that the main goal of all religions is to realize such divinity and this realization is the one universal religion. So, the key concept of universal religion is to love man is to love God. Hence, universal religion propounded by him deserves great importance and may be an ideal way out of religious dissension as it accepts all cultures, all views, all ways through which man quests the ultimate truth which is one without second.

Religion is one of the most important urges of human beings, because it addresses our existential issues such as salvation, death, fear, sacred, profane, etc., hence it cannot be banished or ignored. Moreover, many renowned scientists even Nobel Laureates also who consider that some religious or metaphysical explanation is necessary for the addressing of our existential issues. 1 Vivekananda says, “Religious thought is in man’s very constitution, so much so that it is impossible for him to give up religion until he can give up his mind and body, until he can stop thought and life. As long as a man thinks, this struggle must go on, and so long man must have some form of religion. Thus we see various forms of religion in the world.”2 But religion plays an ambivalent role in our life and society. On the one hand its core business is to build, sustain and promote peace and love throughout the globe; on the other, it can be a powerful source of violence. According to Johan Galtung, religion contains, in varying degrees, elements that contribute to both war and peace.3 Moreover, it has been found that after the end of the Cold War, religious conflicts have increased more

ITI CHTTOPADHYAY, Assistant Professor, Raiganj University College, Uttar Dinajpur, West Bengal, India. E-mail: [email protected]. 1 Townes, Charles H. 1995. Making Waves. New York: American Institute of Physics Press).web. http//nobelists.net &Marconi, Guglielmo. 1934. A scientific address to the International Congress of Electro-Radio Biology. September 10. Venice, Italy.] http//nobelists.net. 2The Complete Works of Vivekananda, Vol. IV, Advaita Ashram (publication Department), 5 Delhi Entally Road. Kolkata 700014, pp. 203-04. 3Johan Gultung, “Religions Hard and Soft”, Cross Currents, Winter 1997-98 (1997). Journal of East-West Thought

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than nonreligious conflicts. 4 Empirical research shows that “about two thirds of contemporary wars turn on issues of religious, ethnic, or national identity”. 5 The Crusades, the French Wars of Religion, the Muslim conquests are frequently cited historical instances. The question then arises: why is it that men kill each other in the name of religion whereas religion demands that we ought to love each other if we are truly religious in spirit. In this paper, I like to address this question following Vivekananda and attempt to show that his Universal Religion can be a potential way out of religious dissension. Vivekananda thinks that man has been searching the spiritual entities such as destiny, soul, God, etc., and this searching is being represented by different competing and quarrelling to each other by declaring the absolute empire in the arena of religion and consequently by claiming the ‘exclusive right to live’. It is this kind of attitude that gives birth to hatred, war, conflict, tension and so on. Vivekananda believes in the diversity of life and calls it the law of life without which variations in thought is not possible. Keeping this in mind, he says that though throughout the ages, people of different religions have been trying to prove their “exclusive right to live”, though they have been claiming that one’s own religion is absolutely true, but none of them has been able to make success in this matter. He firmly asserts that, it is a serious mistake and quite impossible to make all people think in a single mode about spiritual things. In his own words, “…any attempt to bring all humanity to one method of thinking in spiritual things has been a failure and always will be a failure”. 6 He emphasizes that though religions are divergent in various aspects, they are not contradictory, rather supplementary to each other. The differences amongst religions are external parts only which are due to our birth, education, surroundings and so on; but internally each religion bears the ideal which is its unique feature and soul; the soul of one may differ from that of other religion, nevertheless, they are not contradictory, both are parts of the same universal truth. He says: “Each religion, as it were, takes up one part of the great universal truth, and spends its whole force in embodying and typifying that part of the great truth. It is, therefore, addition, not exclusion. That is the idea. System after system arises, each one embodying a great idea, and ideals must be added to ideals. And this is the march of humanity”.7 In this way Vivekananda gives equal importance to all religions and thinks that each religion manifests a unique essence –something which is its soul and which is essential for the good of the world. For example, according to him, the soul

4Jonathan Fox, “Religion and State Failure: An Examination of the Extent and Magnitude of Religious Conflict from 1950 to 1996,” International Political Science Review. Vol. 25, No. 1, 2004, pp. 55 and 64. 5R. Scott Appleby, Ambivalence of the Sacred (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2000), p. 17. 6The Complete Works of Vivekananda, Advaita Ashram (publication Department), 5 Delhi Entally Road. Kolkata 700014. Vol. 2, p. 363. 7Ibid vol. 2, p. 365.

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of Islam is brotherhood among its followers which is excellent and needed for social harmony. He observes, “Islam makes its followers all equal-so, that, you see, is the peculiar excellence of Mohammedanism…and all the other ideas about heaven and of life etc. are not Mohammedanism. They are accretions.”8 The excellence of Hinduism is spirituality which is its ideal. Christianity also has its own ideal. All these ideals are very much needed for the existence and well-being of humanity. Under this circumstances, Vivekananda feels the need of universal religion which cannot be formed out of any of the world religions by converting all people of other religions into one, because, all religions bear ideals which are important and necessary for us. Hence, he suggests that universal religion should be broad enough so that it can be suitable to all religions, it should provide food to all types of minds. In this context, he observes that “our watchword, then, will be acceptance and not exclusion. Not only ….but acceptance…..I accept all religions that were in the past, and worship with them all; I worship God with every one of them, in whatever form they worship Him. I shall go to the mosque of the Mohammedan; I shall enter the Christian’s church and kneel before the crucifix; I shall enter the Buddhistic temple, where I shall take in Buddha and in his Law. I shall go into the forest and sit down in meditation with the Hindu, who is trying to see the Light which enlightens the heart of every one.”9 After establishing the need of Universal Religion, he defines religion as the realization of divinity within us. He thinks religion does not consist of doctrines, dogmas, , practices etc., it does not reside in temple, mosque, church and other religious places; these are non-essential and external parts of religion. The essential and inner core of religion is the divinity, the absolute truth, the oneness, lies in all religions. The main goal of all religions is to realize such divinity and this realization is the one universal religion. He expresses his view in this way: “The end of all religions is the realizing of God in the soul. That is the one universal religion.” 10 He stresses upon the fact that differences amongst religions are unavoidable, and not only that, in every religion, there are two forces working, namely, good and bad which he explains in the following way: “No other human motive has deluged the world with blood so much as religion, at the same time, nothing has brought into existence so many hospitals and asylums for the poor; no other human influence has taken such care, not only of humanity, but also of the lowest of animals, as religion has done. Nothing makes us so cruel as religion, and nothing makes us so tender as religion.”11 Moreover, several attempts have been made to make religion universal for centuries, but all efforts have been failed, because, every time, religion became ‘my father’s religion’,’ our nation’s religion’, ‘our country’s religion’ and so on in the hands of unscrupulous men. In this way, instead

8 Ibid vol. 2, p.371-372. 9Ibid. vol. 2, p. 373-374. 10Ibid, vol. I, p. 324. 11Ibid. vol. 2, pp.-375-376.

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of loving to each other, the followers of one religion started to hate, criticize and even persecute the followers of other religions. This practice has been the main impediment in the way of bringing religious harmony. To show the differences amongst religions, Vivekananda recognizes three aspects of all ‘great’ and ‘recognized’ religions which are very divergent. These three parts are- philosophy, mythology and rituals. Philosophy deals with the whole subject matter of religion, i.e. its basic principles, aim and means to achieve it. The second part is mythology that makes philosophy concrete through the legendary lives of men or supernatural beings. Ritual, the third part of religion, consists of worships, ceremonies, flowers, incense etc. and makes religion more concrete. All these three aspects differ from religion to religion and there is no universal philosophy, or universal mythology, or universal ritual accepted by religions. Each religion claims the superiority of its philosophy, mythology and rituals and sometimes compels the followers of other religions to accept them. Vivekananda sees this practice as fanaticism and compares it with the most dreaded disease of all diseases. In this way, he shows that it is very difficult to find out any unity amongst religions nevertheless, he assures that it exists. In order to show the unity in different religions he compares it with the ‘humanity’ which is an abstract in nature but which is common to all human beings irrespective of their differences in all fields of life. Likewise, there is a common element running through all religions and this common core is the idea of God, the ultimate reality the unity lies in all religions. He observes: “So it is with this universal religion, which runs through all the various religions of the world in the form of God; it must and does exist through eternity.”12 Vivekananda mentions that apparently there is diversity in the universe, but ultimately we all are the manifestations of the same great truth. He points out that there are differences amongst man, animal, plants and so on, but as existence, we all are one with the God as God is the universal existence; this is the one universal religion. But in manifestations, all these differences must exist. Hence, by universal religion he does not mean any universal philosophy, or any universal mythology, or any universal rituals. He observes: “Such a state of things can never come into existence; if it even did, the world would be destroyed, because variety is the first principle of life.”14 Vivekananda emphasizes on the matter that variety is as true as unity, because the same truth can be known in different ways. Both unity and variety are the obvious fact of the universe in his view. In this way he accepts all religions as the true paths leading to the same goal which is realization of the divinity already in us. He adopts a practical plan for bringing religious harmony which makes man realize the unity in diversity keeping his individuality intact. His maxim is instead destroying of anything man should build and the different religions are the different radii of the same centre where God exists and when all the radii will meet at the centre, all the differences will vanish. This state is called by him the realization of the

12Ibid. vol. 2, p. 382.

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divinity existing in all religions. He classifies human minds into four types according to their nature. 1. The active type who wants to do good works, 2.The mystic type who remains busy to analyze his own self, 3.The philosophic type who is busy to use his intellect even beyond the possibilities of all human philosophies and 4.The devotional type, who loves and enjoys the aesthetic side of the nature. All these four kinds of people think they are opposite and even exclusive to each other. They want to judge others through their own ideas and standards. For example, he says that a philosopher whose main goal is knowledge, thinks devotees as weak and sentimental beings, while a devotee whose main domain is love and devotion, considers philosophers as merely hair splitting talker; on the other hand, a worker sees both of them as very much impractical. All these persons think one’s own thinking is absolutely true and others are false; all these views are one-sided. In this way, they are always quarrelling with each other and this is the present scenario in the field of religion. Vivekananda proposes a religion which must satisfy all these sorts of minds and hence he asserts: “What I want to propagate is a religion that will be equally acceptable to all minds; it must be equally philosophic, equally emotional, equally mystic, and equally conducive to action.” 13 He considers a man as perfect who possesses all these four elements and to be balanced in all these four elements is his ideal of religion which can be attained by Yoga (communion). He regards: “To become harmoniously balanced in all these four directions is my ideal of religion.”14 He clearly mentions that though the aim of all religions is, but one-reunion with God, there are different methods suitable for different types of temperaments for attaining such goal. These methods are called yoga by which one can realize and manifest his/her divinity through selfless works, devotion, control of mind and knowledge respectively. Vivekananda emphasizes on the practice of these four through hearing, (śravaṇa) reasoning () and meditating (nidhidhyāsana) so that one can realize that religion does not consist of doctrines or dogmas, but it is pure realization. As he observes: “Religion is realization; not talk, nor doctrine, nor theories, however beautiful they may be. It is being and becoming, not hearing or acknowledging. It is the whole soul’s becoming changed into what it believes. That is religion.”15 Religious communities have suggested various models for religious harmony and Alan Race’s threefold typology is one of them which consists of exclusivism, inclusivism and pluralism.16 Exclusivism holds that one’s own religion alone is true and all other religions are false. This view necessarily fuels and cannot bring harmony among religions. According to Vivekananda, the view that only one religion is true and all others are false, is abnormal. Inclusivism belongs to the middle position in the threefold typology, too asserts that one’s own religion is true

13Ibid. vol. 2, p. 387. 14Ibid. vol. 2, p. 388. 15Ibid. vol. 2, p.396. 16Race A., 1983, Christian and : Patterns in the Christian Theology of Religions, London: SCM Press.

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and other religions are included into it. Inclusivism cannot be a suitable means to bring religious harmony as it involves the feeling of superiority. Gavin D’Costa claims inclusivism as a concealed form of exclusivism, because it does not consider other religions as they understand themselves and does not affirm them to be on the same level as the truth of their own religion. 17 Pluralism, which stands in direct opposition to exclusivism, advocates all religions are true and equally valid paths to salvation. Apparently, it seems that pluralism has potential for bringing religious harmony as it shows tolerance and does not affirm any religion as the center. But toleration involves the sense of superiority. In his own words “……..toleration is often blasphemy……..Toleration means that I think that you are wrong and I am just allowing you to live. It is not a blasphemy to think that you and I are allowing others to live? ”18 So only toleration is not sufficient for bringing religious peace. Moreover, like inclusivism, pluralism too is a covert form of exclusivism argues D’Costa. He claims that the affirmation of other religions always operates on the basis of one’s own tradition-specific viewpoint and “does not succeed in affirming the other in their own terms, always cutting across their own self-understanding and claims”19 He cites examples of Dalai and Dr. Sarvapalli Radhakrishnan. , thinks to get liberation one has to become a De Lug Buddhist monk and Radhakrishnan, a pluralist advocates without non-dual Advaitin experience of mokṣa, final release from the cycle of birth and death is not possible.20 These examples clearly show that though pluralism claims neutrality and equality, every pluralist has a tradition-specific viewpoint and hence is a concealed form of exclusivism. Moreover, as the three-fold model proposed by Alan Race towards interfaith relations is tradition specific and contains the best feeling attitude, or ‘frog-in-the-well’ mentality, there is no room for interreligious dialogue within the frame work of the said typology. But without such dialogue, religious harmony is not possible. So, as the said three-fold typology cannot be regarded as a proper way for inter-religious relations, his Universal Religion is a suitable attitude towards interreligious relations. There are two important elements in Vivekananda’s view, namely, respect for all religions and acceptance of religious diversity which are essential for our balanced and peaceful society. It may be said that he considers religious pluralism as natural forces which provides the essential ideals for the survival of the people of diverse temperaments and hence cannot be negated. Universal religion does not suggest anyone to change his/her faith for other, rather advocates accepting and assimilating

17Reconsidering the possibility of pluralism, Journal of Ecumenical Studies, accessed on 21-07- 2012. 18All the about TRUTH-D, accessed on 20-07-2012 & The Complete Works of Vivekananda, Advaita Ashram (publication Department), 5 Delhi Entally Road. Kolkata, 700014. , Vol. II, pp. 373-74. 19D’Costa, G., in a roundtable review in reviews in Religion and Theology, vol. 8, no.3, p. 247. 20 The Meeting of Religions and the Trinity, Orbis, NY, (2000) – Web.: Gavin D’Costa- Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia.

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UNIVERSAL RELIGION OF VIVEKANANDA 79

the best elements of other while remaining true to one’s own religion. He says, “The Christian is not to become a Hindu or a Buddhist, nor a Hindu or Buddhist to become a Christian. But each must assimilate the spirit of the others and yet preserve his individuality and grow according to his own law of growth.”21 Again, as the core of all religions is one and same, there is no scope for the feeling of superiority, inferiority and intolerance among different religions. So, the universal religion is free from the faults of threefold typology of Alan Race. We also find in the idea of universal religion that God is within us and we all are born to rediscover our own God-nature. So, it is crystal clear that universal religion of Vivekananda already exists and needs to be realized only. It is very much true that he brings a revolutionary change in the idea of religion by saying that there is no difference among religion, God and soul as all of these are divine in nature and whose realization only can remove all sorts of sufferings, be it religious or other kinds. We also find that universal religion is something which is beyond of all religions, but at the same time is underlying in all of them and endorses them as the valid path for attaining it. So, it transcends all religions as well as pervades all of them. If we understand, appreciate and promote the true essence of his Universal religion, we will definitely make a strong, prosperous and peaceful society and world. Summing up, we may say that universal religion may be a potential way out of religious dissension. It does not have any particular scripture, prophet, institution and superiority feeling; it is beyond of all these phenomena which every possesses and which give birth to religious tensions. In universal religion there is no room for hatred, jealousy, intolerance, conversion, bloodshed, persecution, hell and heaven which generate dissensions. It does not destroy any religion rather endorses the diversity of religions and appreciates the uniqueness of each religion; but at the same time shows them the unity that binds them together. Its foundation is unselfish love and that love is love for humanity which is nothing but the expression of oneness, it is the feeling of oneness. But as long as we will emphasize the external or non-essential part of religion, religious conflict will persist and when the spiritual or essential part of each religion will be realized, only then there will remain no room for conflicts. Again, his concept of potential divinity of the soul helps to prevent degradation of man on the one hand, and on the other, it divinizes human relationships, and makes life meaningful and worth living. Universal religion sees man in his/her true nature that is divine. And that’s why man is inseparable from God. So, its key concept is to love man is to love God. So, universal religion deserves great importance and may be an ideal approach for bringing peace and harmony as it accepts all cultures, all views, all ways through which man quests the ultimate truth. It teaches that truth is one without second and can be attained by different ways.

21The Complete Works of Vivekananda, Advaita Ashram (publication Department), 5 Delhi Entally Road. Kolkata, 700014. , vol. 1, p. 24.

Journal of East-West Thought

HOW TO DEAL WITH THE EQUAL-AND-UNEQUAL OTHER?: THE THERAVADA BUDDHIST APPROACH

Pradip Kumar Gokhale

Abstract: With the two basic premises that (1) man is an unsocial social animal and (2) the other is both equal as well as unequal to us in diverse respects, the paper explains the Buddhist doctrine of brahmavihāra as a systematic way of dealing with others in a moral way. The paper develops in three parts: 1) In the first part the author discusses the critical response of Buddhism to the Brahmanical approach to equalities and inequalities. Here the author explains how Buddhism criticizes the hierarchical approach of Brahmanism and in what sense the Buddhist approach can be called egalitarian. 2) In the second part the author discusses the constructive approach of Buddhism to equalities and inequalities which is manifest in the doctrine of four sublime attitudes called brahmavihāras. Drawing on the transactional psychological analysis of four life positions given by Thomas Harris in his book, I’m OK You’re OK, the author reconstructs these life positions as objective conditions and explains the four sublime attitudes as moral responses to them. 3) In the last part the paper raises some related issues. Here he compares the Buddhist doctrine of brahmavihāras with the Pātañjala-Yoga concept of four bhāvanās and juxtaposes the Buddhist doctrine with the doctrines of anattā and śūnyatā.

I. Stage-Setting

How to behave with the other is a problem. Should I simply deny the existence of the other? Can I do so? Some philosophers have tried to do that. They have shown that from a logical point of view we cannot establish the existence of the other. On the other hand the defenders of common sense would say that such a skeptical argumentation involves at least a pragmatic contradiction. But why are skeptics inclined to question the existence of the other in spite of a pragmatic contradiction? It is either because they believe that logic can be detached from life so that it is possible to conduct logical-intellectual exercises for intellectual satisfaction without any implications for actual life or may be some of them want to achieve some psychological satisfaction by isolating themselves from others at least for the few philosophical moments. The underlying conviction behind the latter may be that self- assertion or self-esteem is possible only by denying others at least temporarily or it may be that perfection in self-realization is possible only in a non-dualistic experience in which the other appears as illusion or does not appear at all. In the case of the other-negating self-realization, it may not be just the denial of the other persons or

PRADEEP KMAR GOKHALE, Research Professor, Central University of Tibetan Studies, , Varanasi, India-221007. E-mail: [email protected].

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other beings but it may be a part of the denial of external world as a whole. Such solipsistic-idealistic positions are seriously maintained by some philosophers by maintaining a distinction between different realms or levels of existence, by distinguishing between what is ultimately real and what is empirically or conventionally real. Here the difference between western and Indian philosophical traditions seems to be that in the former such an ultimate realm of existence, idealistic or solipsistic, was regarded as intelligible or thinkable by those who argued for it, but not empirically achievable, whereas in the latter such a realm of existence was regarded as achievable in a kind of mystical experience, a kind of meditative trance. But in both these cases when it comes to the level of common sense or to the level of ordinary experience and practice, the recognition of the external world and also of other persons becomes inevitable. However, the question of recognition of the other and denial of the other occurs even at this level though in a different way. At this level, recognition of the other would mean recognition of the other as someone equal to us, as someone with whom we can share things or ideas or plans and denying the other would mean denying such a status to the other. In fact recognizing and denying the other in this sense occur simultaneously in interpersonal relationship. I want to suggest further that this two-fold relation (of recognition and denial) with the other becomes possible because of the dual nature of a human being as an unsocial social being. Here I want to suggest that both socialness and unsocialness are natural to human person. They are inseparably related to each other and also, in a loose sense, imply each other. Because of socialness one mixes with others, communicates with others, assimilates oneself with others and tries to establish a sharing relation with others. But this sharing relation has serious limitations. Generally there are certain things, ideas and plans one has, that one does not like to share with all others. One likes to reserve them for oneself or for a selected few. Just as one likes to assimilate oneself with others, one also likes to differentiate oneself from others. One likes to realize oneself as unique in some important respects. This uniqueness implies inequality with others and taken in comparative or competitive spirit can indicate one’s superiority or inferiority to others. Hence social-ness which is indicated by sharing relation, sense of equality and communication is necessarily surrounded by a sense of inequality and uniqueness which indicates isolated-ness and unsocialness. But this unsocialness has a natural tendency to be communicated and shared in a social framework and hence it leads to a social manifestation. Social-ness and unsocial-ness in this way lead to each other, ‘imply’ each other (though not in a strict logical sense). This dual character can give rise to moral issues. For instance the feeling of equality with others may not always be healthy or morally sound. An envious or conceited person feels unhappy over equality, because he likes to see himself to be above others. The feeling of inequality too can give rise to moral issues. It develops envy or jealousy if the inequality amounts to superiority of the other and may cause conceit and sadistic pleasure if it amounts to inferiority of the other. In fact the issue of dealing with the other is more complex than this. It is not just the question of

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dealing with the equal or unequal other but with the equal and unequal other and the unequal other is not just superior or inferior other but superior and inferior other. In what follows I want to discuss the Buddhist approach to equalities and inequalities and the moral issues concerning them. This approach of Buddhism is a part of its more general approach, regarding the question as to how a person should look at the world at large consisting of things and beings and also at oneself. Secondly this approach has both a critical and a constructive dimension. At critical level it is a response to materialism, Brahmanism and . At constructive level it advocates a path leading to emancipation, the path which is variously described as middle path, noble eight fold path and the three fold training consisting of morality, meditation and insight. I will not be concerned with all these aspects in this paper, though they are all interconnected, but I will concentrate on the aspects most relevant to the issue of equality and inequality involved in interpersonal relation. The discussion will be divided into three parts: (1) In the first part I will discuss the critical response of Buddhism to the Brahmanical approach to equalities and inequalities. (2) In the second part I will discuss the constructive approach of Buddhism to equalities and inequalities which is manifest in the doctrine of four sublime attitudes called brahmavihāras. (3) In the last part of the paper I will raise some related issues and make some observations.

II. Buddhist Criticism of the Brahmanical Approach

The Brahmanical approach to the issue of equality was complex. In the Vedic literature itself we see a tension between Brāhmaṇa texts which advocate ritualism and the -dominated social order and the Upaniṣadic texts which criticize ritualistic way of life and assert Ātman-Brahman nature of all living beings. In spite of such a tension there is also a tendency to arrive at a compromise between hierarchy and equality. This is seen in mokṣa-centric schools of the Bramanical tradition such as Sāṁkhya and Vedānta. On metaphysical level they accept equality or unity among all living beings. While concerned with the nature of empirical or embodied selves, however, they emphasize inequalities governed by varṇa, caste, gender and other factors. Hence from the ultimate point of view all were equal, but from empirical point of view, which was important for all practical purpose, all were unequal. The inequalities among human beings were supposed to be created by Brahmā/Prajāpati or by the law of Karma. They were supposed to be determined by birth and unsurpassable in the present life. The Buddhist approach to equalities and inequalities was different from this in some fundamental respects. Buddhism did not accept ātman or any such eternal metaphysical mark of equality or unity among living beings. But it accepted equality among them in terms of their mental and physical constituents viz. Nāma and rūpa which were generally divided into five aggregates or . Buddhists also believe that Buddha addressed his first sermon not only to the five but to animals and celestial beings around him who understood it and benefited from it. Jātaka stories tell us that Gautama, the Buddha in his many previous births lived animal life

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but manifested and developed different moral-spiritual perfections, i.e., pāramitās. Such stories, however, are mythological and should be interpreted in some figurative way. The main thrust of the Buddha’s message which is relevant for our purpose, remains anthropocentric. Of course Buddhism is not anthropocentric in the sense in which Semitic religions are, according to whom humans have intrinsic value and animals have only instrumental value. have intrinsic value insofar as they can be reborn as humans and humans can be reborn as them. Hence there was an undercurrent of equality flowing through different species beings. However the main focus of attention in Buddhism was human beings mainly because of the intellect, communicative ability and the potential for nirvāṇa that they had and the animals lacked. Hence all living beings were treated as moral objects – as objects of mettā and karuṇā (i.e. loving kindness and comparison) whereas, human beings, unlike animals, were also moral agents, as potential extenders of mettā and karuṇā to all. Of course one can say that this idea of different realms of living beings with an undercurrent of equality and with a special emphasis on human beings as moral agents is a common feature of Brahmanical as well as the Buddhist tradition. But there are two impoṛtant points of difference between the two traditions. (A) The higher and lower status of species beings according to Brahmanism is supposed to be attained through good and bad actions respectively where goodness and badness of actions is determined according to the prescriptions and prohibitions of the scriptures such as Vedas and Smṛtis. Though those prescriptions and prohibitions included some moral principles such as truthfulness and non-violence, they were dominated by other principles and rules which were ritualistic, dogmatic and discriminatory. As against this Buddhism, while giving norms for good and bad actions, emphasized moral-spiritual, rational and egalitarian approach. (B) Brahmanical tradition imposed a hierarchical social order on the realm of human beings and this hierarchical order was treated as on par with the order of different realms of beings. Just as birth as a human being or an animal or as god is determined by karma, and then, it becomes binding throughout the respective life, the birth as a brāhmaṇa or kṣatriya or śūdra etc. is also determined by karma and is binding throughout the respective life. Just as transfer from one realm to another is not possible in the current life itself but is possible in the next life through rebirth which is determined by karma, similarly a transfer from one varṇa or caste to another is not possible in this life itself but is possible in the next birth which is determined by karma. This practical immobility or rigidity of the social order, as I have suggested before, was supposed to be laid down by God or Prajāpati/Brahmā through Vedas and subsequently elaborated by the sages like through the smṛtis. The Buddha through his different dialogues criticized this idea of hierarchical social order by pointing out that human species is one and different varṇas or castes are not different species which would rule out inter-caste mobility. Hence the so- called higher and lower status of ceṛtain varṇas and castes was the dogma of the brāhmaṇas imposed by them on the society. It is well understood here that when Buddhism held that human species is one and that in a sense all humans are equal, it was not advocating an order based on economic equality to be measured

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quantitatively. Though Buddhist economic approach was not egalitarian in the strict sense of the term, it did have an egalitarian implication insofar as the Buddha was in general opposed to oppression and exploitation. This is implied in Kūṭadantasutta, where the Buddha refers to a prescribed way of performing sacrifice, a sacrifice without oppression, exploitation and violence. Similarly though the Buddha did not directly advocate political equality of all humans, his view had a political implication because he emphasized the ideas of a righteous ruler (dhamma-rājā) and also supported the culture of communication and consensus when he praised the republic state of Vajjins. But the notion of equality which is central to the Buddha’s teaching is expressed through his wish of the form: “May all beings be happy, may all beings attain well-being (Sabbebhavantusukhino, bhavatusabbamaṁgalaṁ.).” Now the question is: how can such a wish imply egalitarianism? Can we say that all can be equally happy? Can happiness be measured? Can one’s happiness be compared with that of another? I suppose that here only qualitative judgment and qualitative comparison is possible and not quantitative one. Happiness here is not sum-total of pleasures acquired by fulfilling different desires; it is not a quantifiable happiness of Benthamian type. Happiness that Buddhism accepts as the goal of life is not derived by fulfilling egocentric desires; it is derived from ego-less-ness and freedom from cravings, i.e. from tṛṣṇā-kṣaya and the realization of anattā. Two persons living in different socio-economic conditions and having different material abilities can be egoless, craving-less and equally happy in this sense. Hence when we are talking of Buddhist egalitarianism, the question is not whether we are materially equal or unequal, but the question is: what is our attitude towards those equalities and inequalities? One can develop attitudes towards equal and unequal other which can make us as well as others unhappy. On the other hand one can develop attitudes towards equal and unequal other which can make us as well as others happy. One of the doctrinal contexts in which the Buddha elaborated on such an attitude was the doctrine of four brahmavihāras, i.e., the four sublime attitudes.

III. : Sublime Attitude to Equalities and Inequalities

The four sublime attitudes accepted in Buddhism are mettā, i.e. friendliness or loving kindness; karuṇā, i.e. ; muditā, i.e. gladness and upekkhā, i.e. detachment or equanimity. In the early Buddhist dialogues and also later works like Visuddhimagga these sublime attitudes are discussed as the objects of meditation. As objects of meditation they assume the form of wishes or thoughts that one is supposed to develop in one’s mind. For instance, meditating on ‘loving kindness’ towards someone means wishing and thinking in a concentrated way so that the other may be happy. Meditating on compassion towards someone means wishing or thinking consistently that the other’s suffering or deficiency may be removed. Meditating on muditā towards someone means thinking continuously that success or excellence that the other has achieved is welcome. Upekkhā towards someone is thinking that whether there is pleasure or pain in someone’s life, it is impermanent and insubstantial and hence not worth being attached to. Buddhism holds that these

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sublime attitudes are called immeasurable (appamāna or appamaññā) meaning thereby that they are to be addressed to all beings belonging to all directions indiscriminately and impartially. The practice of brahmavihāras in this way is a meditative practice, a practice in cultivation of mind. But since the general principle accepted in Buddhism is that mind is the fore-runner of all actions, these attitudes cultivated in mind are expected to be translated into speech and physical behavior as well. Early Buddhism not only gives the four general principles of sublime attitude as the four objects of meditation, it also gives a technique of developing the attitudes gradually, step by step, starting with the easiest objects, covering ultimately the most difficulty ones and consequently all objects making thereby the four attitudes truly immeasurable as given in Table I below. My main point here is to see how this fourfold model suggests to us a way of dealing with equalities and inequalities. I would like to discuss the issue with reference to the fourfold framework of interpersonal situations. Thomas Harris, a psychiatrist, in his book, I’m OK You’re OK, describes four life positions as: (1) I am OK, You are OK; (2) I am not OK, you are OK; (3) I am OK, you are not OK; (4) I am not OK, you are not OK. Harris’ treatment of the theme implies that these life-positions are subjective approaches to life one develops through the way one is brought up in the infancy and childhood. They are shaped by the treatment that a child gets (by way of stroking, scolding, negligence, etc.) from parents and the people around it. According to Harris ‘I am OK, You are OK’ is the ideal life position based on thought, whereas other life positions are based on feelings. Moreover, as he maintains, the ‘universal position of early childhood’ is ‘I am not OK, you are OK’ which the child may retain in later period or the child may develop one of the other positions depending upon the up- bringing it receives. Harris also holds that whatever life position one may develop, it need not be regarded as permanent or ultimate. An unsatisfactory life position can be transformed through efforts into satisfactory one or ideal one. The above fourfold framework is relevant for understanding Buddhist conception of interpersonal relations, but for that we may have to consider the ‘life positions’ of Thomas Harris as the four types of objective conditions. For example it is a fact that I am better that some other person is some respect and the other person may be better than me in ceṛtain other respect. Similarly I and the other may be both deficient in some respect and both are also well off in ceṛtain other respect. Here ‘being better’ or ‘wellness’ can be understood in a general sense including the aspects such as material wealth, power, intellectual success, moral strength and spiritual achievement. (In ultimate analysis Buddhism would regard moral-spiritual parameters of measuring wellness as superior to others.) In a way we have to accept these objective conditions of wellness /better-ness or otherwise as facts of life. But the matter does not end there. The main question is what should be our attitudes to these conditions. The doctrine of sublime attitudes is partly an answer to this question. Buddhist treatment of the fourfold framework would become different from that of Harris also in another respect. Harris discusses these life positions in the context of the psychological development of a child. From this point of view, ‘I am not OK, you are OK’ becomes the initial life position. Buddhism looks at these positions from

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moral and soteriological point of view. From this point of view the initial condition would be ‘I am not OK, you are not OK’. So let us begin with this condition and see how Buddhism deals with the fourfold framework. (1) ‘I am not OK, you are not OK’ is the condition implied by suffering as the first noble truth stated by the Buddha. According to this condition all are subject to suffering. Again the question is what should be our attitude to this universal condition. There can be healthy as well as unhealthy response to this condition. For example frustration, sadism, cynicism and pessimism would be unhealthy responses to the condition ‘I am not OK, you are not OK’. Buddhism advocates a healthy response to this condition according to which we should go to the root of the matter, which according to Buddhism is craving and misconception which exists in ourselves, throw away the root by following the and become free from suffering. Buddhist way includes efforts to make oneself as well as others happy. Hence developing mettā (loving kindness, friendliness) with others becomes an important part of it. (2) ‘I am OK, you are OK’ is similar to the earlier condition in that both refer to ‘equality’ between I and the other. But the equality of the earlier kind is not satisfactory or desirable, whereas the equality of ‘I am OK, you are OK’-type is apparently of satisfactory or desirable type. But even to this condition a healthy and an unhealthy response is possible. For example an ambitious person may not like to see that others are equal to him. He may develop ill-will or hatred to the other who is equal to him. As against this, mettā,i. e., loving kindness would be the healthy attitude to such a condition. In mettā we are wishing that the other be happy, we are rather sharing our happiness with the other. (3) Now the third and the fourth condition are uneven conditions; they are the conditions of inequality. The third condition is ‘I am OK, you are not OK’. One may respond to this condition in a healthy or unhealthy way. The unhealthy way would be unkindness, cruelty or sadistic pleasure. The healthy way would be compassion, i.e., karuṇā. Karuṇā can be regarded as a bridging principle which stimulates one to bring the deficient one near to oneself. Karuṇā in this sense can be called an extension of mettā to the situation of downward inequality (4) Now the fourth possible condition, again an uneven condition, is of the type ‘I am not OK, you are OK’. Again one can respond to this condition in a healthy way or unhealthy way. The unhealthy way would be jealousy or aversion. The healthy way would be muditā, i. e., gladness. Through muditā, one tries to develop a sharing relation with the other by appreciating the other’s excellence in success. Muditā in this sense can be called an extension of mettā to the situation of ‘upward inequality’. Though karuṇā and muditā seem to be two symmetrical principles, one being a response to downward inequality and the other to upward inequality, there is an, important difference between the two. Karuṇā is not just a passive response to the suffering of others or a deficiency of others but it is also supposed to lead to sincere efforts on the part of the agent to remove the deficiency in the other. In muditā on the other hand we are just accepting and welcoming the success or the excellence of the other but not trying to remove our deficiencies and bring ourselves (materially) to the

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level of others. This asymmetrical relation between karuṇā and muditā arises in Buddhism because of the emphasis on egolessness on the part of the agent. [Of course developing oneself, achieving successes and excellences (spiritually in bhikkhu’s life and materially as well as spiritually in ’s life) is a natural process and Buddhism does not seem to be against it. But such an activity of self-development in the framework of brahmavihāras is not to be performed with the spirit of unhealthy competition] An interesting question can arise about muditā. Through muditā we develop joy about the success of the other. But suppose we come to know that the other person has achieved success through unjust means. Should one still develop joy? Probably one should not. Because the use of unjust means is a moral defect in the person, which I should not certainly welcome. Here the proper attitude should be that of karuṇā rather than muditā. But the question is more complex than this. Because the person may not have used wrong means and only wrong means and he may not have used them willingly. Hence his success may have some aspects which can be welcome. A mixed attitude of karuṇā and muditā could be more appropriate in this context. In this way the first three sublime attitudes in the Buddhist doctrine of brahmavihāras can be understood as the healthy responses to the different conditions of interpersonal relations. The last sublime attitude viz. ‘upekkhā,’ which can be understood as detachment or equanimity, is a regulating principle in the sense that it defines and demarcates the scope of the other three principles. Here the idea is that mettā, karuṇā and muditā as the sublime attitudes are worth practicing only insofar as they are qualified by equanimity or non-attachment. In fact even their nature and scope is to be defined and demarcated in the light of the principle of non-attachment. Here the distinction between far-enemies and near-enemies of brahmavihāras made in Visuddhimagga (See the Table II below) is significant. Far enemies of the sublime attitudes are the unhealthy attitudes diametrically opposed to them. It is easy to distinguish the sublime attitudes from them. Near enemies of sublime attitudes, on the other hand, are un-sublime attitudes, but because of their close similarity with the sublime attitudes they can be confused with the sublime attitudes. For instance mettā is impartial, self-less love, but it can be easily confused with attached or sensuous love which is partial and self-centered. Similarly compassion, which, as a sublime attitude, is selfless and impartial, can be confused with mundane sorrow arising from the attached concern for some near and dear one. Muditā, the sublime joy, which is selfless and impartial, can be confused with joy as partial attitude expressed towards the success of a near and dear one. Hence the near enemies of the three sublime attitudes are attitudes similar to the sublime attitude in their content, but are not sublime because they are not qualified by upekkhā. Upekkhā in this way can be regarded as the higher principle which controls the other three principles. Now one can ask: is it advisable to practice just upekkhā irrespective of other principles? That does not seem to be so at least in the framework of brahmavihāras. In fact the trio of mettā-karuṇā-muditā and the fourth principle viz. upekkhā are complementary to each other in such a way that both are supposed to control and balance each other. Upekkhā as the principle of equanimity and detachment is a negative principle without a positive content. The trio on the other

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hand is the three-fold concern for others with a definite positive content. This concern, as we have seen, is expected to be regulated by upekkhā. Upekkhā on the other hand, which is without a positive content is expected to be filled up with the positive content of the other three principles. The near enemy of upekkhā, therefore, is supposed to be indifference, that is, equanimity or detachment without the concern for others. Hence the relation between the trio and the fourth principle viz. upekkhā can be said to be that between the content and the form of the sublime attitude towards the other. The trio gives the content to the sublime attitude, but this content without the form of equanimity will be unregulated, undisciplined and therefore unsatisfactory. Equanimity is the form of the sublime attitude but if it is practiced without positive concern for others as its content, it leads to indifference, isolated-ness, a sort of unsocial attitude I believe that Buddhism through the doctrine of brahmavihāra presents before us the dream of kingdom of brahmavihārins, the society which is based not on competition but co-operation, not based of selfishness but aiming at selflessness, based on concern for the other without attachment to the other. It provides us a way and also a technique to deal with equalities and inequalities in others in a moral and sublime way. How far this dream is practically possible is a question. The society in which we live is guided by different presuppositions according to which preserving and enhancing ego, progressing through competition, sensuous enjoyment and power struggle are regarded as essential to social life. A brahmavihārin in this society is as it were swimming against the stream. Hence establishing a society of brahmavihārins seems a utopia. But a peculiarity of this dream is also that it is possible for one to pursue it individually though the society at large is not for it. It is not paradoxical to talk about sublime individual life in an un-sublime society.

IV. Some Issues Arising from the Doctrine of Brahmavihāra

The Buddhist doctrine of four sublime attitudes, though interesting and appealing, can give rise to several issues. It is necessary to open up some such issues and seek for their answers. In what follows I would like to make a few observations in that direction. It is clear that though the doctrine of four sublime attitudes was first elaborated by the Buddha, it cannot be called a sectarian Buddhist doctrine. It is not surprising that the four-fold model of sublime attitudes was incorporated in some texts of Jaina Yoga and also in Patañjali’s Yoga system. [In Patañjali’s Yoga the four bhāvanās, i.e. the four meditative practices viz. Maitrī, Karuṇā, Muditā and Upekṣā are regarded as the means to tranquility of mind. The difference between Patañjali’s version and the Buddhist version is that the former restricts the objects of the four meditative practices to happy, unhappy, meritorious and de-meritorious respectively, whereas the latter makes the objects of the four sublime attitudes all-pervasive. ] The doctrine in its essence can be accepted irrespective of one’s religions affiliation or even without a sectarian affiliation. However, in spite of its general character, the doctrine can be called a religious doctrine. By a religious doctrine I mean that doctrine which essentially stems from the presupposition of human imperfection, and

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promotes the path of self-disciplining and self surrender as the way to perfection. Buddhism being an atheistic system does not teach humility or surrender before God, but a deep sense of humility and self-surrender is advocated through the doctrine of ego-less-ness or anattā. The religious import contained in this doctrine can come in conflict with, for example, a political approach which regards human being as essentially a power seeking animal or someone trying to assert oneself and one’s own rights. But this does not mean that Buddhism would be completely unsuitable for a political stand. Here I would like to suggest that the Buddhist doctrine of ego-less- ness should be read along with its egalitarian approach. It is true that while developing sublime attitudes one develops self-less love, but one also treats all as equal. Hence not only oneself it regarded as soul-less or anattā, everyone else is regarded to be so. Secondly though in the framework of sublime attitudes, human beings are not recognized as power-seeking, they are recognized as happiness- seeking. What could be the political implications of the doctrine of brahmavihāra? One thing is clear that the morality implicit in the doctrine of brahmavihāra is neither egoistic nor strictly altruistic but universalistic. This is reflected in the practice of brahmavihāra as well. For instance, when mettā is to be developed as a sublime attitude, it is not only to be developed towards all others but also towards oneself. In fact in the gradual development of mettā, oneself is the first object; and then it is to be extended to others including hostile beings. (See Table I below.) This universalistic egalitarian approach can lead to active politics of social justice. It will naturally support the concept of a just society in which all are happy and no one is tortured or exploited. One who develops mattā and karuṇā can work hard for removing exploitation and bringing about just social order. However, while doing so his emotions will be under control because he has also developed upekkhā. I have suggested that the Buddhist doctrine of four sublime attitudes emphasizes ego-less-ness which it derives from the doctrine of soullessness or anattā. The doctrine of soul-less-ness or anattā can give rise to many different questions. In Pali Buddhist literature we see a dual tendency towards attā or self. Sometimes ‘self’ is asserted when for instance it is said that one is the master of oneself “attevaattanonātho” or that “Be the island of yourself, be the refuse of yourself” “attadīpābhavataattasaraṇā” On the other hand self is denied when it is pointed out that I am not identical with any one of the five aggregates or all the aggregates together; neither I am beyond all these aggregates, nor someone who controls these aggregates. Here one can distinguish between the use of the term attā as reflective pronoun and its use as a noun. The Buddha seems to use the term ātman as a pronoun but denies its use as a noun. As a pronoun ‘attā’ means ‘oneself’. It stands for person, who is simply understood as combination of five aggregates. The Buddha seems to imply here that the I-notion arises in the combination of five aggregates which can be used for all practical purpose for distinguishing between I and the other. But the I- notion does not refer to any substance which holds this combination together. This trend continues in Vaibhāṣika-Sautrāntika and Yogācāra . For

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instance Vasubandhu in his early work Abhidharmakośa vehemently criticizes pudgalavāda, the doctrine of eternal person, but accepts the distinction between I and the other. In his later work he identifies person with a consciousness series, and accepts plurality of such series. The distinction between I and the other is strengthened in these systems further by the apoha or exclusion theory of meaning. In all these cases, where the distinction between I and the other is maintained, the question of relationship between them becomes impoṛtant and the doctrine of brahmavihāras is a part of the answer to this question. Contrary to this trend we find in Mādhyamika Buddhism an attitude to dissolve all dualities including the duality of I and the other. It is maintained that nothing has its own essence, and since there is no own nature, there is no otherness as well. Since there is no self-nature (svabhāva) there is no other-nature (parabhāva) as well because other-nature is nothing but the self-nature of the other (Madhyamakaśāstra, ‘Svabhāvaparīkṣā’, Verse 3). This is the Mādhyamika doctrine of pratītyasamutpāda – dependent origination or śūnyatā- essence-less-ness. It is difficult to see how the meditative practice of brahmavihāras will be possible in this framework. Probably all the objects of meditation will culminate into essence-less-ness as is generally done in Mādhyamika meditative practice.

Sublime Order of Meditative Application On ----- attitude ------(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Loving Oneself Revered and Dearly loved Neutral Hostile Kindness Respected friends persons persons ones Compassion Unlucky, Evil-doing Dear ones Neutral Hostile Wretched ones ones persons persons Gladness Companion, Neutral Hostile Rest------Dear ones persons persons Equanimity Neutral Dear ones Rest------persons Table I (Source: Nanamoli, Chapter IX, pp. 321-344)

Sublime attitude Near Enemy Far Enemy Loving Kindness Greed (), Selfish love Ill will Compassion Grief based on mundane life Cruelty

Gladness Joy based on mundane life Aversion

Equanimity Equanimity qualified by Greed or Resentment ignorance based on mundane life Table II (Source: Nanamoli, Chapter IX, pp. 345-6)

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References

Nanamoli, Bhikkhu. 1956. The path of purification, Singapore Buddhist meditation Center, Singapore. Harris, Thomas A. 1969. I’m OK You’re OK, Cox and Wyman Ltd. Reading, Great Britain. Vaidya P. L. (ed.). 1960. Madhyamakaśāstra of Nāgārjuna, The Mithila Institute, Darbhanga.

Journal of East-West Thought

THE MEANING OF MORAL LANGUAGE: INDIAN PERSPECTIVE

Devendra Nath Tiwari

Abstract: The value of language lies in expressing knowledge and that of knowledge in causing incentive to action. Different from language as representation and reference, the discussion herein takes language is expression that expresses itself its own nature first from which its meaning is revealed non- differently. Moral language equally expresses its meaning but different from other sort of uses, the knowledge revealed by moral sentences with should/ought mode provides specific impetus to the incentive to do the duty the incentive of which is expressed by the moral sentence. Language and meaning are only intelligible beings that flash in our mind; mind is consciousness, is ubiquitous and flashes equally in the speakers and hearers when instrumented through tokens-that is through sounds/scripts/gestures/perceived data, etc. Flashing means the cognition expressed by language from which incentive and there upon impetus to a duty is caused. The reason for doing some action opposite to or against the expression and incentive caused there upon lies in imposition of the knowledge expressed by the moral language on our allegiances comprising our desires, fruits of our interest, etc. This, in nutshell, is due to ignorance for removal of which one should value the knowledge expressed by moral language, incentive caused by it and the performance of duty in accordance with the incentive proper. If our performance of duty follows the knowledge expressed by the moral language and incentive caused by that knowledge, it is good and if otherwise there is deviation, it is bad. Follow up of the force proper or the impetus caused by the knowledge revealed by moral language is natural and imposition of it on our allegiances is artificial and evaluation of good and bad, moral and non-moral respectively is made accordingly. A duty is the action we perform towards others as a moral agent and that is evaluated as good and bad on the basis of actions performed in accordance with or in opposition to or different from the knowledge expressed, the incentive caused by that and a duty followed consequently. Positivist’s type Verification criterion of meaning is not applicable to the moral sentences which are expressive of duty, basically an object of evaluation and are verified by the duty performed on their basis.

I. Centrality of Duty in Scriptures

GOOD CONDUCT (dharma or sadācāra) is the basic concern of Indian Scriptures; they discuss values, a living according to which can not only satisfy the human desires for wealth and sex but treat them as values (puruṣārtha) also. Moral value occupies with actions/duties only; it makes the life valuable, that is, it gives meaning to one’s life. It is the fact in a rational living and a fact is not a construction that

DEVENDRA NATH TIWARI, Professor of Philosophy and Religion, Department of Philosophy & Religion, Banaras Hindu University, Varanasi-221005, India. E-mail: [email protected], [email protected].

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verifies itself but that of which it is a fact. It is verified on the basis of duties performed as per the incentive caused by the knowledge expressed by the moral sentences. Without cultivation a foolish is not rationally fit to follow the duties. If he is seen to follow in them in some actions it is because of stereotyped following up of the imperative/ order that are because of some abnormality. But a rational human being performs the duties as a part of his responsibility to follow the incentive caused by the knowledge revealed in his mind by the moral sentences. This is perhaps, one among several reasons because of which scriptures are regarded as authority. They are sentences about duty. One gets wisdom by following up the duty according to dharma. Dharma is the performance of duty as per the knowledge expressed by the sentences and the incentive caused by that without any deviation. Here, the good human conduct is established in such a way that it is difficult to differentiate religious conduct from the moral and individual morality from the social as well. For the conduct the term duty or dharmācaraṇa or sadācaraṇa is used that comprises religious and moral conduct in such a way that if you don’t follow morality you are doing demerit (pāpa) and if you don’t follow religious duty you are called immoral (vidharmī) as well. Fruit of moral duties as taken by the western moral thinkers belong to this life but in Indian philosophy it belongs not only to this but also to life after death. The duty theorists endorse a general belief that one should believe in the existence and utility value of not only one’s own but that of others also. The development and progress of one include that of others as well. The concept of unconditional performance of duty as sacrifice and analysis of different sorts of duties with their culmination into non-attached performance of duty has placed the scriptures like Upaniṣads and Gītā respectively as texts of perpetual relevance. In the first half of the present discussion I have argued as to how the logical device of verification misleads the theorist from coming to an amicably acceptable conclusion on meaninglessness of ‘ought’ sentences and also failure of the attempt in interpreting the meaningfulness of moral judgments by showing the possibility of translating the descriptive into factual or ‘ought’ into ‘is’ sentences and vice versa. I have tried to show that the logic of meaningfulness and the logic of verification are different; the two cannot be equated as the same and that the logic of translation of ‘is’ sentences in to ‘ought’ sentences and vice versa must not be a case of changing the meaning of ‘is’ into ‘ought’ but making the possibility of translation without changing the meaning. In the next half, I have discussed Indian view of Meaning as awareness expressed by language independently from external existence or absence of corresponding referents. An attempt is made to interpret the meaning of moral sentence in context of Sanskrit language. Since contemporary western theorists have discussed a lot on the issue and most of us are well aware of their deliberations, I think it convincing to proceed on the interpretation of moral expressions and determination of their meaning by pointing out the western controversy on it. Language has a specific purpose of communicating thoughts for performing our conduct () and cultivating the wisdom (sanskāra). All our human behavior is performed on the basis of knowledge expressed by language. Isolated from language, knowledge ceases to be so. There is nothing

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except language that determinates thought or cognition. It is not only determinater but expresser of knowledge also. Spirit can flash in all forms of things and thoughts- High Mountain to the tiny sand particle and is never limited to any of its flashings. Cognition is the flashing and the self- awareness of those flashings of spirit as well; only the intelligible beings i.e. concepts/ or ideas flash distinctly and external things are known by imposition as ontic substratum of these flashes and accordingly we categorize and value the sentences relatively as factual, moral, etc. Taking language as the foundation of knowledge that causes incentive to human conduct that Pāṇini has made aphorism of language the meaning of all units of which is conduct/duty or at least action oriented. Language is expressive of some or the other action/duty. Even in the analytical scheme, we like Mīmānsā, accept knowing also as an action for which verbs are used. Different from Mīmānsā, we believe in active theory of knowledge according to which manifested through the garbs including, verbal articulations/perceptual data acquired by senses/ gestures and script, the language reveals itself its own nature of awareness from which its meaning is revealed non- differently. According to our scheme, cognition is not only based on but is confined to the language and meaning that is to intelligible beings only. I have concluded that if language is reference/representation and meaning and referent are taken as the same, it will lead to cessation of all philosophical activities which are based on the meaning revealed directly by the judgments without any want of verification or empirical referents. Verification is an afterward logical effort for which the meaning directly expressed by the judgments serves as the cognitive ground a theory like verification will not be possible without a cognitive base of verification. The argument in the present discussion shows not only the deceptiveness of verificationist’s premises that moral language is nonsensical or meaningless but also that verification, as the term is taken popularly, is not a criterion of meaning which is directly expressed by language but is the criterion of correspondence between the reference and referent. It is not acceptable that all descriptive and all negative expressions are meaningless only because they cannot be verified. It is also not justified to accept it without the cognitive base on which verification is rooted or the cognition which serves as the ground of verification technique.

II. Critique of ‘is-ought’ dichotomy in Contemporary Ethical Theories

A great discussion centered to the dichotomy of ‘is –ought’ controversy in contemporary ethical theories of the meaning of moral language has attracted the scholars of our times. It is difficult to find any discussion on such a dichotomy in Indian philosophical tradition and much less has been written by the contemporary and recent scholars on the distinctive characteristic and function of moral sentences in Indian context. Therefore, for my present discussion on the issue of meaning of moral sentences, I think it useful to start with a survey of contemporary ethical thinkers. In connection with the meaning of moral judgment ‘is-ought’ dichotomy has been a viable contentious philosophical issue and a long standing debate in western Moral philosophy. They understand moral sentences different from factual sentences giving

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central importance to verifying possibilities they involve in a highly tricky problem of interpreting factuality of the moral judgments. This involvement has a purpose of observing meaningfulness of the moral sentences. They think that if they search a logical device to translate the moral judgments into factual they can well be in a position to search the meaning of ethical sentences like that of descriptive sentences. Is translation of ‘ought’ into ‘is’ sentences possible? Can ‘ought’ sentences be deduced from ‘is’ sentence? These questions attracted most of the thinkers in the west. David Hume (1988) takes it impossible to derive ‘ought’ from ‘is’ because moral sentences for him are just effects of emotional reaction that cannot be verified either as true or as false. He referred to morality as vulgar system presuming immense role of asylum of God and did not accept non-moral foundation of morality. No set of non- moral premises can entail a moral conclusion. G. E. Moore (1930 approached to the same conclusion but by a different analysis. According to him the ethical term good which is a non-natural, cannot be derived and defined in terms of descriptive /factual term which stands for natural. Any such attempt of deducing will amount to naturalistic fallacy. Putnam (2002) against the view of logical positivists, attempted to resolve the ‘is-ought dichotomy’ by claiming that ‘ought’ sentences can logically be deduced from is sentence on the basis of epistemological values that play role in determination of facts. The two sorts of sentences, for him, are not different because every description according to him represents evaluation which is based on empirical facts. Against Putnam’s view, Black Max (1969) was of the opinion that the two sorts of sentences are so different that there is no possibility of translating ‘ought’ sentences into ‘is’ sentences. Agreeing with Putnam’s view, Searle (1993) attempted to find out passages for deducing ‘ought’ sentences from that of ‘is’. Critique of Emotive Theory: Ayer, a staunch positivist, in his book ‘Language, Truth and Logic’ (1935) accepted language as reference and meaning as verification. According to his thesis ‘the meaning of a proposition is the mode of its verification ‘there must be a corresponding referent the language refers to; if not, the sentence is meaningless. Since ethical sentences do not refer to empirical facts or referents they are meaningless. Despite being factually meaningless, ethical sentence have been serving as guide to human societies, they are important type of meaninglessness. They possess non-factual meaning that he characterizes emotive meaning in contrast to other types of nonsensical meanings. One has a bad feeling for ‘killing’ and by passing on the sentence ‘killing is bad’ one intends to cause the same feeling in the audience and nothing more than that. Stevenson, another positivist, in his book ‘Ethics and Language (1944)’ has tried to modify the position expressed by Ayer. He takes the term emotive as a tool for use in a careful study, and not as a device for relegating the non-descriptive aspects of language to limbo. He attaches persuasive meaning to ethical sentences. It is on the basis of the persuasive meaning of the ethical sentences that he interprets the element of universality. The solution he provides for diluting the conflict of disagreement of attitudes may be useful for the cause of universality but the independence of one of the two -the persuader and the persuaded- is not only overlooked but is subordinated . This is against the freedom of

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will which is important for both of the parties. Here, universality ceases to be so. The role of reasoning, Stevenson prescribes for diluting the conflict of attitudes is not reasonable and ultimately it is useless if the conflicting persons are equally strong to their reasoning for disagreeing or if the other side is not ready to surrender his own reasons at variance.

III. Critique of Prescriptive Theory

R. M. Hare in his book ‘The language of Morals (1952)’ takes ethics as the logical study of the language of moral. The function of ethical principles is to guide human conduct and the best way to discover the moral principle operative in a man is to observe how he acts. Ethical Language according to him is a prescription for a duty. In fact, the issue of meaning is centered more to the issue of language. The nature of language one perceives is the boundary of his conception of meaning. If he does not care that boundary, his ideas may either be inconsistent or be arbitrary. The contemporary philosophers of the West accept language mostly either as reference or as representation of meaning and by meaning they understand referent or the things represented. Non-factual descriptive uses have no referent or thing represented in the empirical world and only on that basis they accept differences of language with difference of uses -factual, non-factual and again the non-factual as religious, moral, functional, fictional and likewise. They attach only emotive meaning to ethical language. No doubt R. M. Hare is most influential regarding his prescriptive theory of meaning. Ethical sentences can be attached with prescriptive meaning only to the extent the agent has right to follow or not to follow the prescription. Why the ethical sentences are prescriptive? Why should one choose to do according to prescription? One can respond that by not following to act according to prescription, the individual and society will not run in harmony; they will be ethically ill. The point is: if all will be free to claim their sentences as ethical prescription, then, there will be a clash and the prescription will fail to serve the purpose of a prescription. Each one will justify their own prescription against others as wrong. There are occasions that one changes his prescription as per the changes of the desires and circumstances and thus there will be a case of fighting about goodness of reasoning that will lead to controversy. For instance, a father can prescribe non-killing at a time to his child, another time, he may prescribe killing of someone lest he will kill him. The father may say that at the first instance he was not sincere because he looked at it merely conventionally. But this pretext shows Hare’s failure of explaining ‘to do what we ought to do’. This weakens his criticism of an imperative that it entails to the effect that one must carry it out. We cannot save this position by constructing two selves- the ideal self and the everyday self as A. C. Ewing (1947) does, that is, our everyday self is not subscribing the voice of ideal self. This position will not be different from emotivist’s ideology. Immanuel Kant was safe in defending his view on moral promises that is if once the non-killing is a moral duty it has to be followed by utmost effort otherwise a question against your being a rational will arise. The basic wrong with Kant was that he gave ultimate position to reason either it is in you or in me and not to the duty; in that case,

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duty must not be equal to reason. Reason itself in some cases is directed by the habitual practices of one in a milieu and the expertised skill required in an area. Moral judgments for R. M. Hare are prescriptions that can be translated into descriptive judgments and universalization on the basis of factual content of ‘prescriptive sentences translated into descriptive’ can be made possible. While accepting so, he does not care that there may be some prescription without fact. To accept that all sentences are either prescriptive or descriptive is arbitrary. The character and value of prescription after translation into factual cease to be prescriptive and lastly the logic that of non-difference of the descriptive and the prescriptive -translated into descriptive may have same value is not logically acceptable and moreover, religious sentences are also in ‘is’, ‘was’, ‘were’ mode but Hare will not feel free to translate it into factual sentences. The cause of the controversy does not lie in understanding a sharp distinction between sentences as analytic and synthetic, factual and non-factual, descriptive and moral but in understanding and interpreting different sorts of sentence in terms of empirical verifiability and to assume verifiability as only measure of meaning of all of them. If the two are different sort of judgments then no attempt is justified for verifying them through single criterion based on facts. If they are non-different, any criteria made for one sort of judgment must not be fruitful and logically useful for the other. To accept all sentences either as descriptive or as prescriptive is to negate distinct character of both of them. Conclusively, no theory will be steady in meeting out ‘is-ought’ dichotomy if it overlooks the difference of the two and underestimates the value of one from the perspective of the other.

IV. Expressive Theory of Moral Sentences

In my view all sentences are expressive by nature. Factual –non-factual, descriptive, emotive, prescriptive, all are expressions and they express their respective meaning because of which we know them so distinctly by the respective sentences. In such a cognitive background it is not necessary to deduce one from the other; rather, it is natural to accept them separate type of sentences expressive of their own meanings. Now, accepting the difference of descriptive and emotive expression and their descriptive and emotive meanings one can side with positivist’s conclusion but that is not the right way because searching for term about fact and non-fact and considering non-factual in the terms of fact may naturally lead to an arbitrary conclusion. Any questioning against the expressiveness of moral expression is not only a questioning against expression as such but overlooking the fact that cognition is always an expression that serves as the cognitive ground of all logical devices. A. J. Ayer type meaningful-meaningless and primitive data-type Boolean true- false may be the values of factual propositions according to which a proposition can have only one of the values: meaningful or meaningless, true or false. The same criterion is not applicable to the value of moral sentences. Testability thesis failed with the acceptance of falsifiability criterion of descriptive sentences and no new theory is emerging about the meaning of descriptive sentences. Why should one apply

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an arbitrary criterion of artificial skill of valuing concerning formal science and mathematics for verifying sentences of real skill which make great changes in life? Moral sentences are based on human conduct the performance of which is evidential for their value; their meaning is expressed by the sentences themselves and thus need not require verification based on corresponding fact in the empirical world. They are valued as right or as wrong, good or bad, meritorious or de-meritorious, and moreover all sorts of valuation are possible only if the expression whether factual or non-factual are expressed first by the sentences. It is not that factual sentences are only expressers of cognition. All sorts of sentences express their own meanings which are their value. Moral sentences are valued so because of the meaning they express and they effect they cause on moral agent. Consciousness cannot be verified as it is not a thing in the empirical world of verification but it cannot be denied because it serves as the veridical ground of denial also; it is known by the functions performed on its basis. A sentence is ‘ought’ because it recommends a duty to be followed must for the good/right conduct and violation of it is violation of duty and hence morally bad/wrong. The dogma of verification or type Boolean meaning of sentence is not required for duty. The important point is the awareness of duty: and for that awareness English terms ought, should, must or in Sanskrit loṭ and liṅ sentences are popularly uttered. The awareness expressed by moral sentences is the cause of incentive to duty and since man is rational animal, the moral mode of sentences intensifies the follow up of the incentive. Morally good and bad or moral and immoral of the duty is decided on the basis of follow up of the incentive and deviation or imposition of the incentive proper on the agent’s allegiances respectively. Meaning is of the nature of awareness that causes incentives (preraṇā) to do, not to do or to do otherwise which in some cases are imposed on our physiological, psychological, cultural and other allegiance and as per the persuasion by allegiances (pravṛttiyan) that in some persons are puṇyikā (good or right) and in others are pāpikā (evil or bad), in some others are indifferent (taṭasṭha) and in still others are non- attached (anāsakta) at a time but may vary at other times. In fact the issue of the duty be understood by putting the language, and not the things, in the centre and the language is estimated properly as expressive; it is of awareness in nature. Awareness caused by the sentences serves as the cause of incentive to duty. If we take a referent i.e., empirical fact, fruit of the desire, dispositions and psychological allegiances as the cause of cognition and incentive to duties, our premises will be void of cognitive ground, our evaluation of them as good and bad will be unwarranted and conclusion will be confusing.

V. Indian view of Action Oriented Language

Very like expression used in ‘was’, ‘is’ and ‘will’ mode, injunctions –prescription and prohibitions and moral expressions used in tenses (lakāra), do, should or ought mood, are also expressive by nature; they express their meanings which are of awareness in character. Prescriptions, commands, prohibitions, instructions, advices, directions, directives, suggestion, requests, courteous inquiries, invitations, permit,

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addressing, etc., are known so because the language presents them so; in this theory, meaning is non-different from the language that expresses. The concept of expressiveness of language and the centrality of action as the meaning of sentences have influenced Sanskrit grammarian to interpret the language in a way that each part of the sentence is cultivated with the suffices to make them fit for being attached with the verbs denoting action which is the central meaning of an expression. In a theory of meaning of moral sentences, a duty is not so because of it being categorical imperative but because of the cognition of duty and the cognition of the duty is the value by virtue of which incentive to that duty is caused. It is for that reason that moral duties are values for humans to follow without imposing it on the material needs and psychological factors. For the thesis presented herein, life is the constant process of action and the theorist give importance to duty to the extent that they provide subordinate importance to sentences lacking some or the other duty. They accept that all sorts of words are derived from verbs/ roots, recognize verbs as the central word and action as the central meaning of sentences. The purpose of sentence according to our view is to cause incentive to duty. This incentive contains three parts i. the duty to be formed (sādhya), ii. Means to that duty (sādhana) and iii. The sense of completeness of the duty (itikartavyatā) which together are called expression of duty (bhāvanā). Verbs of sentences with liň and loṭ tense cause bhāvanā to an action. This bhāvanā is always for a duty for welfare and not for otherwise and that is why it is called dharma. An action comprises of all the three parts of an action and never be meaningless. Despite the general view of meaning as action to be denoted specifically by verbs there is a difference between the actions denoted by expressions other than moral. The actions are moral not because they are caused by desires. In Indian perspective desire, expectancy, aspiration can cause bhāvanā which makes an action a duty. The action may be to oneself only and to oneself and others also; the term duty is used for duty for all the times and for all the people because it is for cultivation of human moral sense. Here, social morality is not differentiable from the individual and likewise the moral sentences express the duty for all with equal force. Here in, I want to point out the reasons briefly for accepting action as the central meaning of the sentences. 1. Verb in Grammar is called ākhyāta that expresses action without which communication cannot be accomplished by language. Use of mere nominal words/substantives cannot satiate the expectancy for a complete sense. For example if I say ‘dog’ it denotes universal and the expectancy for a complete sense is accomplished by it only if some verb-exists, is there, is black, is barking, etc., is added but if I say ‘barking’ the expectancy for a complete sense ‘dog is barking’ is accomplished; 2. An agent is called so because of being agent of an action; 3. Application of suffices for meaning - person, number, means, time, case-terminations follows action; 4. Translation of active into passive where nominals are emphasized, and vice versa is made possible only by taking action into consideration; 5. Indian Grammarians derive all sorts of words from verbal roots. Nominal words can be derived from verbal roots but not the vice versa; 6. Substantives/nominal words are in

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use because of some form and potency that is action which fit them for their naming and designating so. I am presenting some of the points here below from Sanskrit language that shows that action is the central spirit of language. The expressions for duty in Sanskrit are used in ten lakāras. It is clear that laṭ (present tense) laṅ (past tense), luṅ (Aorist),liṭ (past perfect tense), lṛṭ and luṭ (future tense) these six out of the ten lakāras are used in sense of tenses (time) and loṭ (imperative mood), vidhiliṅ (should/would-be mood), āśīrliṅ (benedictory), lṛṭ (conditional) are used in sense of vṛtti (moods) i.e. in ought, to, ought - not, should and should- not respectively are relevant equally for all the times and persons. All sentences whether used in sense of tense or in sense of moods stand for action. Duty can be expressed by any tense, but specifically the sentences having application of loṭ and liň tenses are taken popularly fit to express duty because of the impetus caused by the incentive. Apart from lakāras as the mode of expression of duty, we find the use of kṛtya suffices (kṛdantas). Kṛtya in the derivation ‘kṛtyate anena ityarthe kṛtyaḥ’ means that ought to be done, for example, it ought to be done (kāryaḥ), it ought to be known (jňeyam), one should not kill (hiṁsā mā karṇiyam), man should be protected (manuṣam rakṣaṇiyam), poor should be given money( dīnebhyaḥ dhanam deyam), trees should not be cut (vṛkṣyāḥ na chetavyam), it is edible (bhojyam) and likewise. The application of these suffices in respective sentences make us aware of the duty. All sorts of sentences in Sanskrit are classified into four of its kinds. (1) Based on form: They are further classified as simple having an agent and a verb(John reads), complex having one principle sentence with several sub-sentences(Yato dharmaḥ tato jayaḥ = where there is dhama, there is victory), and combined sentences having two simple or complex sentences joined with a conjunction (nipāta-ca, api, etc. = and, also, if, etc.) for example Johnaḥ paṭhati ahama’pi paṭhāmi = john reads, I do also read); (2) Based on meaning: They are classified as command (satyam vada = speak the truth), prohibition (Anṛtam mā vada = don’t speak lie), giving order (tvam paṭha= read), asking question (kiṁ tava nāma = what is your name), Exclaimation (hā, manavatābhaktam naram = ( Oh! Curse to the person who abuse humanity), showing desire (tava maṁgalam bhūyāt = wishing good to you), showing doubt (saḥ paṭhan bhaviṣyati = he might be reading) indication (cetatvam pariśramam kariṣyasi tarhi safalaḥ bhaviṣyasi = if you do labour you will get success); (3) Based on action: Classified as agent mode, object mode and action mode; (4) Centering verb: The sentence having a verb (John reads) and the sentence having no verb (vīra bhogyā vasundharā = the brave can only rule the earth, śaraṇāgatarakṣādharmaḥ = person taking refuge be protected). We find that the sentences either having verb or without verbs are so constructed in Sanskrit that they express action. Words are also taken to be formed from roots and even the nominal words are also taken with case-termination suffices (sup= in different seven cases namely nominative, accusative, instrumental, dative, ablative, genitive, locative, vocative cases) to have association with action. This shows that words, sentences are interpreted as framed and formed keeping primacy of action or duty in view and this is one of the reasons, I think, Sanskrit is called a cultivated language. The primacy of action is such that Sanskrit Grammarians accept that there

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is no sentence isolated from of verbs; it is not only that a ‘verb’ is sentence because the complete sense is expressed by it but also the use of a nominal word alone, if verb is implied with it, is a sentence. Not only that but the nominal words except verbs are constructed also in such a way that they have some meaning with suffices/ seven case –termination (śvānaḥ =dog when spoken singly for communication means agent ‘dog exists or there is dog’. There is no word without suffices. Suffices are added there which enable a root fit to be attached with some verb denoting action; they cannot denote a meaning independently of the action which is the meaning of a sentence. Added with suffices/case terminations, they stand for an agent, the object, etc. of a duty/ an action. Such suffices can be applied only because the words abstracted from indivisible sentence cannot be fitted to be added with verbs standing for action. Every one even the devils know about what is good to be done and what is bad not to be done or to be avoided. The moral issue arises about the true import of the expressions concerning moral action because that gives incentive to duty. Let me clarify the point with an example: ‘Speak the truth, speak the endearing, don’t speak the non-endearing truth’. The true import of the expression lies not in speaking the truth, not in speaking the endearing and not even in speaking non-endearing truth but in ‘speaking the endearing truth’. Likewise, when we make an ethical judgment ‘don’t kill’ we find that this judgment is not the premise but the conclusion decided well and spoken to follow up without any option and one’s rationality is decided in his promptness to its follow up. Let me put its premises- i. killing is bad, ii. ‘should not kill’ and lastly iii. Do not kill’. The sentence ‘killing is bad’ is in present tense (laṭ lakāra) used for expressing a fact or idea which is moral for all the three times – present, past and future. The sentence ‘should not kill’ is in approaching mood (liṅ lakāra) where one finds freedom to kill or not to kill and eventually he chooses his moral responsibility not to kill and therefore, the sentence ‘do not kill’ in prohibitive mood (loṭ lakāra) includes the whole process where the concluding activity about the import of the sentences that is duty is followed up. If it is otherwise that is, if one kills ignoring the incentive caused by the sentence, it is immoral act of the agent.

VI. Types of Vedic Sentences

Vedic sentences are classified into five categories: vidhi (injunction), (invocation), nāmadheya (name of a rite), niṣedha (prohibitive injunction) and arthavāda (explanatory). Action, prohibition to an action, inspiration and praise of duty is the meaning of the Vedic sentences. Injunctive sentences which prescribe different acts to be taken up or prohibitions which refrain the human being from taking up a particular duty are treated as central and primary of the five types of sentences. Injunctive sentences primarily prescribe an act as a means of obtaining desired result or refrain a human being from doing an act which may lead to some undesired result. Explanatory or praise sentences are narratives or the praise of a duty. The premise cannot serve the cause of the conclusion which is the real import of a moral sentence and which is the cause of incentive to duty. Even if any of the premises are spoken, the incentive is caused by the complete sense figured in the

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mind that is, injunction of non-killing or prohibition of killing. The important thing is not that how many subordinate sentences (syntactical sense) or words are spoken or written but the complete sense figured in by them because unless a complete sense figures the incentive to the duty proper will not be caused. It may figure even by a single word or a single sentence and may not figure even after speaking a series of subordinate sentences. Thus awareness is the central to an incentive to a duty and the incentive by the moral expressions is caused because of their figuring distinctly so. If we concentrate on and analyze the knowledge figured in by the language, we find that all sorts of expression express their own meanings and we know their differences as presented by language itself. Language expresses emotive, prescriptive and different meanings and on that basis it performs several functions. With these differences it is not philosophical to concentrate on any one out of its different sorts of functions as the only meaningful function of language and this will be a overlooking of the cognition that is expressed. All expressions express their meanings and this is so with the moral languages also.

VI. Expressive Meaning of Moral Language and the problem of validity

Contemporary ethical theorists partaking the discussion on ‘is’- ‘ought’ dichotomy limit meaningful language only to it as reference. They missed to view that language is for conduct and the language we use for conducting and communicating is not reference having a referent in the empirical world but expressions serving as the incentive for all sorts of conducts. This missing has caused great harm to understanding and analyzing the value of sentences. Natural urge for the use of language is to express action. The cognition figured in or expressed directly by the sentences whose factuality is to be verified serves as the cognitive ground for verification of the factual. The logic of factuality gets importance in theories which accept word as the original unit of language and give central importance to nominatives, substantives, proper names having referent in the empirical world. But the holists who accept the sentence as indivisible unit and the meaning non-different from it give secondary importance to words whose meanings are not decided independently of sentence. The sentence is indivisible flash which is revealed through different garbs like sentences we write, subordinate sentences, words, gestures, perceptual data and several instrumentalities and artificially analyzed into different kind of words and again the words are also analyzed into roots/suffices/prefixes, etc., and their meanings are decided accordingly in the analytical scheme and thus all the rich and wide scope of syntactical and semantic study of language becomes possible. My point is that it is not proper to limit our endeavor to the outcome of these devices and to concentrate on analyzing the indivisible knowledge flashed directly by the sentences. The whole device will be meaningful only if attached to the analysis of cognition expressed by the expressions. The sentences expressive of duty do not require formal or artificial intelligence of the verification for their verity. Validity and invalidity on the basis of availability or unavailability of referential facts is a second rate or logical device of validating the

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veridical cognition expressed by ‘is’ sentences and as i think the device for academic discourse is applicable to ‘ought’ sentences as well. If language is taken as reference or representation, sentences expressing non-accomplished or non- finished character having no referents or represented facts and the accomplished character of past and future and many of the present cannot be verified because of absence of referents outside the language. Verbs or all those expressive of non-finished character will not fall under referent category. Then their verifiability will be put in question and without verification all sentences concerning them will be meaningless. The great difficulty in the reference/representation theory of language is that it may involve all our endeavor in searching the referents for verification and meaningfulness, and that will cause a great harm to the creativity of reflecting on the knowledge by language. Education is life, respect the parents and elderly people, obey your teacher, treat others in the manner you want to be treated by others, sentences that do not need verification but count much for making a life meaningful. Almost all sentences except some of the artificial skill lack referents outside the sentence, and that is why in a talk to me Professor R. C. Pradhan, an old Wittgenstenian pointedly made me aware that we should not talk about a referent outside the language. If language is taken naturally fit to expresses some or other action then translation of sentences into finished facts will not be a problem. An action can be presented as substantive and a substantive as an action only though language. The active mode (John reads) may be translated into passive (Reading is being made by John) and vice versa. For example ‘he is batting’ and ‘he is on batting ’or ‘his batting is on’. It is true to accept that language is used in referential mode also but how can we deny that it is so because that mode is expressed by the sentence first and then we put into that category of modes. Verity of ‘ought’ sentences is also verified on the basis of the functions the agent performs. Pāṇini has written aphorisms to define the form of the words of finished character from the verbal roots and for the formation of verbs from words of finished characters (nāma) as well. ‘Is’ sentences expressing finished character ‘he is a man’ and ‘ought’ sentences expressing non-finished character ‘he ought to be a man’ cannot be translated from the view of language as reference. In case of it as reference, how can the finished be translated into non- finished character and vice versa? Referents are exterior and reference in no way can change in different capacities of finished and non-finished characters. Only language can present something as finished and as non-finished which are known thus as they figure so by language. Meaning is always a sense or a signified not a referent outside and independently of language. The meaning criterion in any language is not dependent on finding referent in the empirical world. It is true that referents are also included into the purview of meaning but it is only by proxy or through the device of imposition of meaning on referents. Therefore, it is a great mistake to identify meaning of a proposition with the method of its verification. Meaning is directly revealed by language; it is the flashing of mind, knowledge is the cognition of meaning and the cognition of that cognition also. There are several types of knowledge and it as justified belief is only one among them. The definition of ‘knowledge as justified

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belief’ is too narrow to justify the knowledge expressed even by this definition of knowledge. Although verity and validity both are concerned with the cognition by language, the two differs a lot in their signification. All cognition by expressions is veridical; they are directly expressed. Knowledge is value. Moral expressions expressive of duty are value-concerned ;it causes incentive for duty and the virtuous functions performed on that ground are evidential in their verity; they cause incentive to do, not to do or otherwise. It is a mistaken approach to evaluate the verity in terms of validity based on verification through the availability of corresponding things in empirical world and to claim that moral judgments are meaningless or nonsensical. While doing so the verification theorists overlook the cognitive ground that is the veridical knowledge expressed directly by the judgment which serves even in case of verification also as the basis of proving or disproving the veridical cognition through a logical device as valid or invalid.

Conclusion

The cognition expressed by moral expressions is veridical and their specific function lies in causing incentive to a duty and fastening the impetus to do that duty. Moral goodness and badness are decided on the basis of performing and willfully or ignorantly denying the performance as per the incentive caused by the cognition by the judgments respectively. I think consequentialists can never understand the value of morality. Even they do not follow their own voice that is the proper incentive to duty caused by knowledge by the moral language .They, like companies advertising very high of their products, always ignore the proper incentive caused by knowledge and translate that according to utility thesis. They care only one aspect of the moral duties that is our duty for others and justifying all the fair and foul or arbitrary actions as having utility and hence moral. They do something different from what they know and talk some other thing in utilitarian terms to justify their behavior; this is all a disguised behavior. I may be charged of favoring virtue ethics but if you love a life- affirming philosophy and desire that all should live in the same way because that is the way to life affirmation, there is no harm in favoring virtue ethics because it does not ignore the utility as well. Translation is a cognitive activity and the objects of knowledge that is intelligible beings can be only translated. Knowledge expressed by moral judgments having loṭ and liṇ tense or with different wordings for the same sense does not change, for example, ‘to follow morality is human’ and ‘morality ought to be followed by humans,’ ‘killing is bad’ and ‘one should not kill’,’ poor need your help’ and ‘you should help the poor’ and vice versa. Conclusively, we find that ‘should/ought’ sentences are eternally (in the sense of begininglessness) expressions of moral duties and are accepted universally for moral sense where there is a conscious responsibility understood by the mode of their use to follow them as one’s own duty as a human being. Where there is a case of deviation, the moral sense expressed by the moral expressions are imposed on a different sense of one’s own allegiance and thus the proper incentive caused by the knowledge of the moral expression is ignored

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and a deviated action is performed by the agents. If once the cognition by the expression is properly expressed, there is no problem of translating ‘should - ought’ sentences into ‘is’ sentences; they can be translated on the basis of the knowledge expressed by the judgment. The knowledge, strictly speaking the objects of knowledge that is intelligible beings are only translatable. Moral sentences are well distinguished by the ‘should/ought’ applications; it expresses its meaning non- differently. The knowledge expressed by them causes incentive to a duty, and a conduct following them is evidential in valuation of their meaningfulness. If the conduct follows the incentive caused by the knowledge expressed by the moral sentence, it is good, if there is deviation of the consequent performance of duty from the knowledge and proper incentive, it is bad. Referents if exterior to or transcendental to language cannot be translated because in that case the translation of language will not be the translation of the transcended signified.

References

A. J. Ayer. 1935. Language, Truth and Logic, London, Dover Publication, NY. A. C. Ewing. 1947. The definition of Good, Macmillan, NY. Black M. 1969. “The gap between ‘is’ and ‘should’,” in W. Hudson (ed.), The “is” and “ought” Question, Macmillan, London David Hume, A 1988. Treatise of Human Nature, Vol. III, edited by Selby-Biggie, Oxford University Press, NY. G. E. Moore. 1903. Principia Ethica, Cambridge. G. E. Moore. 1912. Ethics, Oxford University Press, London. Immanuel Kant, 1964. Groundwork of Metaphysics of Morals, tr. & analyzed by H. J. Paton, Harper & Row. L. J. Binkley. 1977. Contemporary Ethical Theories, Franklin & Marshal College, Lancaster. Mackie, J. L., Ethics, Penguin book. Mīmānsā Ślokavārttika. 1979. Tr. Hindi by Durgadhara Jha, published by Kameshwar Singh Sanskrit University, Darbhanga, Nyāyamañjarī, Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, with commentary Granthibhanga. 1983. Vol. I & II, Gaurinath Sastri (ed.), Sampurnanand Sanskrit University,Varanasi., Putnam, H. 2002. The Collapse of the fact/value Dichotomy, Cambridge, Harvard University press. R. M. Hare. 1952. The Language of Morals, Oxford. R. M. Hare. 1963. Freedom and Reason, Clarendon press, Oxford. Ross W.D. 1930. The Right and the Good, Clarendon press. Searle, J. R. 1993. The Construction of Social Reality, Penguine Book. Stevenson, C.L. 1944. Ethics & Language, New Haven, Yale University press. Stevenson, C.L. 1963. Facts & Values, New Haven, Tiwari, D.N. 2008. The Central Problems of Bhartṛhari’s philosophy, ICPR, New Delhi. Vākyapadīyam, Part I, II & III, with Ambākartrī by Raghunath Sharma, Sampurnanand Sanskrit University, Varanasi. Vyākaraṇa -Māhābhāṣya. 1968. first nine āhnikas, Tr.in Hindi by Cārudeva Śāṣtrī, Motilal Banarasi Dass, Varanasi.

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BOOK REVIEW

Environmental Ethics: Indian Perspectives, Edited by Devendra Nath Tiwari & Ananda Mishra, Banaras Hindu University, India, 2012, pp208.

Environmental Ethics is a recent branch of knowledge and from the very beginning it has attracted the mind of the scholars for exploring this branch of knowledge in Indian perspective. Department of Philosophy & Religion, Banaras Hindu University organized two seminars during 2012: one is International and another is National. In the continuation, University Administration funded a grant for the publication of the papers presented in those seminars. The anthology entitled ‘Environmental Ethics: Indian Perspectives’ under review is a collection of selected papers presented in those seminars. The book is edited by Devendra Nath Tiwari and Ananda Mishra. It contains thirteen essays written by distinguished scholars aiming to understand the man-nature relationship in various perspectives of Jainism, Buddhism, Sāṃkhya- Yoga, Vedānta and . The book starts with an introduction written by Devendra Nath Tiwari. He has touched almost all the aspects of Environmental Ethical theories, especially in relation with Indian thoughts and philosophy. From Veda to Purāṇa and Bauddha & Jain traditions, he has critically observed the glimpses of Environmental Ethics in all the Indian school of thoughts. The first essay is by Pradeep Gokhale who in his paper entitled “The problem of Anthropocentrism and Non-Anthropocentrism in Indian Ethical Approaches: Some Reflections” has discussed the environmental views in three different Indian models- the Brahmanical, the śrmaṇa and the Lokāyata model and tried to establish the fact that the Indian ethical approach is non-anthropocentric. He argues against the view that the root cause of the environmental crisis is anthropocentrism. In fact bio- centrism and eco-centrism also do not fare well in this regard. The second paper “Environmental Ethics and Human Freedom: An Indian Representation” is by Varun Kumar Tripathi. Varun advocates a revised kind of anthropocentrism which must be free from egocentricity. He found that present crisis is due to the wrong attitude of Human being and can be cured by transformation of our attitude towards nature. “Teleological Environmental Ethics” by R. C. Sinha pleads for teleological environmental ethics, which he claims is a form of anthropocentricism incorporating the consequentialists as well as deontological traits of a sound ethical system. Sinha does not find any unbridgeable gap between the anthropocentric and ecocentricm shows that the trends of anthropocentric teleological ethics are found in Hinduism, . Rana P. B. Singh’s paper “Ecospirituality in Indian Tradition: message for Global order” present his thesis of eco-spirituality or sacred . The paper unravels the significance of an environmental ethics of reverence based on a sacred worldview of nature. Rana finds in Hindu tradition an ecospiritual worldview – a spirit of wholeness, a sense of holiness- grounded on an evolutionary cosmology in the core of which lies the sanctity and faith- the vision of ecospirituality and harmonious coexistence: Kyosei. In the paper “Nature – Man Relationship: A Comprehensive Survey and Appraisal” Rajesh Ranjan Tiwari attempts to bring out

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the right perspective in which nature should be approached. Nature cannot be conceived a complete ‘Other’ for man. Neither should it be approached with only a cognitive or empirical outlook. The paper supports looking at nature with a sense of beauty and aesthetic. The next five papers represent the variant Indian schools of thought. Baleshwar Prasad Yadav’s paper “Ecological Philosophy of the Vedas and the Upaniṣads” confines itself to the worldview and ethics presented in the Vedas and Upaniṣads. Sanjay Kumar Shukla in his “Ecological Perspectives of Jainism” sheds light on the Jaina environmental ethics. K.C. Pandey’s paper “Ecological Interdependence in Buddhism” brings out the significance of Buddhist ecological ethics based on its central doctrine of pratītyasamutpāda. “Environmental Concerns and Granth Sahib” by Jodh Singh expounds the Sikh perspective of environmental ethics. In Ravindra K.S. Choudhary’s paper “Advaitic Attitude to Natural Environment” he discusses the Advaitic worldview and related environmental ethics. He finds environmental consciousness innate in the Advaita. In his paper “Ramchandra Guha and Vandana Shiva on Environment and Environmental Crises: A Critical Appreciation” Debashis Guha presents a thorough analysis of the concept of “Environment” and highlights the need for a philosophical study of environment. After this he engages himself in elaborating the positions of eco-feminism and and finally presents a critique of the philosophical perspectives of Vandana Shiva and Ramchandra Guha. Any ethical discourse is incomplete if it does not incorporate the legal perspective with it and this lack is beautifully met out in this book with the paper by Rana Navneet Roy titled “Protection of Environment through Precautionary Principle: Some Observation in Indian Perspective”. Roy discusses environmental jurisprudence in post- independent India. With the help of different court cases the author explores the meaning, definition, origin, development, and other legal aspects of precautionary principle within the Indian perspective. “Sri Dattātreya’s 24 : Learning from the World in Hindu Tradition” is the final essay and thought provoking paper of Martin J.Haigh. Martin studies resources in Vaiśṇava and Vedic scriptures containing the Environmental Education for Sustainable Development (EESD). Avadhūta Duttātreya discovered 24 gurus like- Earth, Wind, Sky, Water, Sun, Fish etc. and Martin Haigh discusses the teaching which Dattātreya got from these ;finding in them wonderful resources for EESD. Martin Haigh emphasizes that non-possession has ever been a central teaching of Indians from early Jaina Tīrthankaras to Gandhi. Since greed and attachment to possessions are the root cause of crisis, the recipe of simple living and high thinking coupled with a search for spiritual wealth and well being is a sure remedy. This book is excellent collective compilation. It fulfills the long needed comprehensive work on Indian Environmental Ethics. It is very useful for the scholars, researchers and students who have a keen interest in the area of Environmental Ethics. As well, it is very interesting for general readers who want to see this particular Environmental issue through the perspective or lenses of Indian philosophy and culture.

DHARMJUNG, Research Assistant, Banaras Hindu University, Varanasi-221005, India.

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