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2019 Annual Report 2019 Rushydro | Annual Report 2019 15 YEARS — UNITING THE ENERGY ANNUAL REPORT 2019 ANNUAL REPORT 2019 REPORT ANNUAL RUSHYDRO | ANNUAL REPORT 2019 Contents 2 Responsibility statement 92 Economics and finance 2 Information on the report 102 Production and sales 4 Message from the Chairman 126 Procurement of the Board of Directors of 132 Innovative development 2 RusHydro 91 143 Ensuring good working conditions 6 Message from the Chairman PERFORMANCE 161 Social initiatives and contribution of the Management Board — RESULTS to the growth of local communities General Director 165 Environmental protection 8 About Сompany 182 Corporate governance system 33 2019 Milestones 188 Shareholders and investors 38 Key 2019 figures 196 Governing bodies 40 Awards and ratings 218 Audit and control 8 42 Geographical spread 181 224 Anti-corruption efforts RUSHYDRO`S 44 Markets served CORPORATE 231 Risk management PROFILE GOVERNANCE 243 Report on remuneration of the governing and control bodies 52 Business model 248 Auditor’s opinion 54 Development strategy 252 Opinion on public (stakeholder) 59 Key performance indicators assurance 63 Investment activities 254 List of subsidiaries and affiliates 51 73 Sustainable development 247 of RusHydro Group STRATEGIC ADDITIONAL 256 Defining materiality REVIEW INFORMATION 259 GRI SRS content index 265 FTSE Russell in EU content index 266 Glossary and list of abbreviations 267 Feedback questionnaire 268 Contacts ANNUAL REPORT 2019 OF PSJC RUSHYDRO, INCLUDING INFORMATION ON SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT Preliminary approved by the Board of Directors of PJSC RusHydro on August 20, 2020 Approved by decision of the Annual General Meeting of Shareholders on September 30, 2020 1 RUSHYDRO | ANNUAL REPORT 2019 Responsibility statement Compliance with the unit of financial and corporate Assurance of the standards and law management. [102-32] report Management's responsibility statement in respect Disclaimer: forward-looking information requirements [102-56] of the annual report and consolidated financial Content and statements The report contains information on RusHydro Group’s The report was prepared in boundaries of the The accuracy of data provided plans and intentions in the medium and long term. line with the principles and in the annual report has been We hereby confirm to the best of our knowledge that These plans and intentions are forward-looking and requirements of: report [101] confirmed by the Company’s the consolidated financial statements of PJSC their feasibility depends, among other things, on a Internal Audit Commission. RusHydro and its subsidiaries (RusHydro Group), number of economic, political and legal factors beyond Russian laws; The content of this report has been The accuracy of the financial prepared in accordance with the IFRS, give a true and the Company's control (the global financial, economic Moscow and London Stock determined in accordance with report has been confirmed fair view of the assets, liabilities, financial position and and political situation, key markets, changes in tax, Exchanges; the requirements of the applicable the Company’s independent profit or loss of RusHydro Group; customs and environmental legislation, etc.). As such, Disclosure Guidance and regulations and standards auditor opinion provided in this annual report includes a fair review of the actual future performance indicators may differ from Transparency Rules of the UK with inputs from RusHydro’s Appendix No. 16. development and performance of the business the forward-looking statements published in this Listing Authority; stakeholders. For more information and the position of RusHydro Group, as well as a annual report. Corporate Governance Code on the content determination Reliability of qualitative and description of the principal risks and uncertainties recommended by the Bank of process and the materiality matrix, quantitative information prepared affecting the operations of PJSC RusHydro and its Russia; see the Additional Information in accordance with the GRI subsidiaries. Global Reporting Initiative section. SRS (Selected Information) Sustainability Reporting has been verified in line with Standards (“GRI SRS”); The operational results of the Assurance Engagements Nikolay Shulginov, GRI Electric Utilities Sector RusHydro Group (including Other than Audits or Reviews of Chairman of the Management Board — The key topic of the 2019 Annual Report Supplement (GRI Electric Utilities financial and production ones) Historical Financial Information General Director is 15 years anniversary of PJSC RusHydro. (EU)); have been disclosed in line with of International Standard for Guidance on Core Indicators for the IFRS reporting boundaries1, Assurance Engagements (ISAE) Yulia Medvedeva, Chief Accountant Entity Reporting on Contribution unless otherwise specified in the 3000 (revised). The independent towards Implementation of the notes to the disclosure. auditor’s report on the audit UN Sustainable Development results, which provides limited Goals until 2030 (“SDGs”) of The boundaries of the GRI SRS disclosure assurance regarding the Selected the United Nations Conference are indicated in Appendix No. 22. Information, can be found in Information The appendices to this annual report are available on Trade and Development the Additional Information in the Appendices Book on the Company’s website (UNCTAD); RusHydro Group’s subsidiaries not section. The independent on the report http://www.eng.rushydro.ru/ International Integrated included in the boundaries of the audit was performed by Reporting Framework (<IR>); disclosure are not material for the JSC PricewaterhouseCoopers specific provisions of the purposes of reporting. Audit. This annual report of Public Joint-Stock Company AA1000 Institute of Social and Federal Hydro-Generating Company RusHydro See the Company’s annual reports for the previous Ethical Accountability Series The full list of legal entities Materiality, completeness (“PJSC RusHydro” or the “Company”) for 2019 is the years at http://www.eng.rushydro.ru/ of Standards (AA1000AP and belonging to RusHydro Group and balanced character of the 15th annual report prepared by the Company to AA1000SES); is available in the Additional reporting information have address a diverse range of stakeholders. The report Company’s internal regulations Information section. [102-45] been confirmed by the public has been prepared in an integrated format to include (including RusHydro’s Corporate (stakeholder) assurance of the comprehensive information on the financial, operational Governance Code, Information In 2019, there were no significant report. For more details, see See RusHydro's corporate social responsibility and and sustainability performance of RusHydro Group1 Policy Regulations, etc.). changes in the scale and structure the section titled Additional sustainability reports for the previous years on the in 2019, as well as the plans and forecasts for the of RusHydro Group’s operations Information. Company’s website at http://www.eng.rushydro.ru/ medium and long term. [102-50] The report has been prepared or fundamental changes in in accordance with the GRI SRS: the wording and calculation of The report has also taken This report publishes the information (marked by special for 2019: [EС] — taking into account recommendations Core option. [102-54] indicators, which could affect into account feedback and symbols) proposed for disclosure in previous reporting of the expert community; [OS] — taking into account the assessment of the Group’s recommendations from the campaigns, as well as in the process of interaction with recommendations of stakeholders other than the expert A representative of the senior key performance indicators as expert committees of the Moscow stakeholders in the preparation of the Annual Report community. management responsible for compared to the previous annual Exchange and Expert RA rating the preparation of the report is report. Additional comments (if agency judging the annual a member of the Management any) to indicator calculations are report competitions, as well Board — First Deputy General provided in the footnotes. [102-48] as recommendations of the 1 For the purpose of this report, RusHydro Group means a group of companies including PJSC RusHydro and its subsidiaries (controlled entities). Director, who is also in charge of [102-10] RSPP Council on Non-Financial The control is determined in accordance with Article 2 of Federal Law No. 39-FZ On Securities Market dated April 22,1996. Reporting. The report also includes references to the following segments: RAO ES East Subgroup (also “RAO ES East Holding”) means JSC RAO ES East and its subsidiaries engaged in electricity and heat generation, distribution and sales primarily in the Russian Far East, as well as transport, construction, maintenance and other supporting service companies; ESC RusHydro Subgroup means subsidiaries of RusHydro Group engaged in sales of electricity and heat to end consumers; RusHydro Subgroup (includes the headquarters of PJSC RusHydro, its branches and subsidiaries, except for RAO ES East Subgroup). 1 The report also covers information on PJSC Boguchanskaya HPP, which is not a subsidiary or part of RusHydro Group, but a joint venture of RusHydro Group and UC RUSAL. 2 3 RUSHYDRO | ANNUAL REPORT 2019 Message from the Chairman of the Board of Directors Dear shareholders, In 2019, RusHydro Group continued energy companies to improve The construction projects will has the highest ranking among to grow sustainably. Following the their efficiency
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