Police Management of Mass Demonstrations: Identifying Issues and Successful Approaches

Home , Chief police officer, Mounted police, National Police (France), National Police Corps, Police ranks in Canada, State Police (Latvia)

CHIEF CONCERNS P o l i c e M a n a g e m e n t o f M a s s D e m o n s t

We are grateful to Motorola for its support of this project. r a t i o n s : I d e n t i f y i n g I s Police Management s u e s

a of Mass n d S

u Demonstrations: c c e

s Identifying Issues and s f u l

A Successful Approaches p p r o a c h e s

Police Executive Research Forum 1120 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Suite 930 Washington, DC 20036 Tony Narr Malcolm McFarland 202-466-7820 202-466-7826 fax Jessica Toliver Joshua Ederheimer www.PoliceForum.org Jerry Murphy Police Management of Mass Demonstrations: Identifying Issues and Successful Approaches

Tony Narr Jessica Toliver Jerry Murphy Malcolm McFarland Joshua Ederheimer This publication was supported by Motorola, Incorporated. The points of view expressed herein are the authors’ and do not necessarily represent the opinions of Motorola, Inc., or individual Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) members.

Websites and sources listed provide useful information at the time of this writing, but authors do not endorse any information of the sponsor organization or other information on the websites.

Police Executive Research Forum, Washington, D.C. 20036

Printed in the United States of America

ISBN: 1-878734-95-4

Cover and interior design by Dave Williams.

Cover photograph by Robert Kaufmann, courtesy of the United States Federal Emergency Management Agency. Photograph altered by Dave Williams. Contents

1 5 Foreword...... i Introduction ...... 1 Roles and Responsibilities . . .41 Acknowledgments...... iii The Meaning of Mass Demonstration...... 3 Overview ...... 41 Appendix A: Links to The Project ...... 3 Command and Control...... 42 Documents on the Key Mass Demonstration Issues...... 4 Strategic Command ...... 42 World Wide Web ...... 77 Operational Command ...... 43 Appendix B: Seattle Tactical Command...... 43 Police Department 2 Practitioner Perspectives ...... 43 Planning Checklist for Command Protocols ...... 44 Special Events ...... 79 Planning and Preparation . . . .7 Crime Investigation ...... 44 Overview ...... 7 Specialized Units ...... 45 Appendix C: Presidential The Process of Planning ...... 8 Communications ...... 46 Inauguration Task ARTICLE: National Special Security Events...... 9 Policies and Procedures...... 48 Force MOU...... 83 Tony Narr Citizen Complaints ...... 48 References ...... 89 Mutual Aid and Multi-Agency ARTICLE: Communication During About the Authors...... 91 Coordination ...... 15 Mass Demonstration Events ...... 49 Logistics ...... 16 Malcolm McFarland About the Police ARTICLE: Planning for the DNC ...... 17 Conclusion ...... 51 Executive Research Mary Jo Harris Forum ...... 95 Conclusion ...... 19 About the PERF 6 Center on Force and Crowd Control and Accountability...... 96 3 About Motorola...... 97 Training ...... 21 Use-of-Force ...... 53 Overview ...... 53 Overview ...... 21 Crowd Control ...... 53 Training To Make Plans Work ...... 22 Formations ...... 54 Incident Management Systems ...... 22 Mass Arrests ...... 55 Training as a Team ...... 23 Use-of-Force ...... 56 Training with Partner Agencies ...... 23 Pre-Event Briefings ...... 57 Consistent Terminology ...... 24 Equipment and Tools...... 58 Practitioner Perspectives on Protective Equipment Considerations ...... 58 Mass Demonstration Training ...... 24 Less-Lethal Devices ...... 59 Conclusion ...... 28 Barriers ...... 60 Conclusion ...... 61 4 Intelligence and Information 7 Management ...... 31 Media Relations ...... 63 Overview...... 31 Overview ...... 63 Intelligence Gathering and Assessment ...... 32 Media Strategy ...... 64 Managing Information During an Event. . . . . 34 Public Information ...... 65 Post-Event Intelligence ...... 36 Joint Information Centers...... 65 After-Action Reporting ...... 36 Press Conferences...... 67 ARTICLE: After-Action Reporting ...... 37 Post-Event Activities ...... 68 John Gallagher ARTICLE: Media Embedding in Miami ...... 69 Conclusion ...... 39 Tony Narr Conclusion ...... 71 8 Conclusion ...... 73

Foreword

Perhaps there is no greater challenge for po- grew out of Seattle. I recall Chuck Ramsey, Chief lice officers in a democracy than that of manag- of Police in Washington, D.C., and John Timo- ing mass demonstrations. It is here, after all, ney, then-commissioner of the Philadelphia where the competing goals of maintaining order Police Department (and who later became Chief and protecting the freedoms of speech and as- of Police in Miami), listening carefully to those sembly meet. Police in the United States have a lessons. Both chiefs would later be tested by long history of handling mass demonstrations. major mass demonstration events in their own During the 1960s and throughout the Vietnam cities. War era, American law enforcement was tested Since the events in Seattle, we have endured time and again on how to best manage mass the events of September 11, 2001. These, too, protest demonstrations. Often the police suc- have had an impact on how police handle mass ceeded brilliantly in peacefully managing hun- demonstrations. If our concern before focused dreds of thousands of demonstrators. At other primarily on out-of-control demonstrators or times, the actions of the police became the unin- anarchists, today police executives must be mind- tended focus of protesters and the centerpiece of ful that large-scale events may represent an op- media coverage of the event. Tough lessons were portunity for terrorists to carry out their own learned during this period. In the relative calm agenda in a very public and dangerous way. that followed for almost twenty years, police at- As such, the challenge of policing mass tention to preparedness for mass demonstration demonstrations highlights a number of issues for events assumed a lower priority than it had in today’s police executive, including previous decades. n How to effectively manage police resources The 1999 Seattle World Trade Organization to deal with large numbers of people who (WTO) protest changed all that, sending shock may be either expressing their fundamental waves felt by police agencies around the world. By constitutional right to protest or who sim- all accounts, the events that took place in Seattle ply are gathering spontaneously after a and the reactions of the police became a vital les- major sports victory; son for police everywhere—learn from this experience or risk repeating it. In fact, then-Chief of n How to work with business/community Police Norm Stamper came to a Police Executive members who are not involved in the Research Forum (PERF) meeting shortly after the demonstration/celebration but who have WTO demonstration and shared the lessons that an expectation that the police will protect

Foreword — i them and their property from unlawful or These questions and many more are the destructive behavior; focus of this publication. This report is not so much a detailed, operational guide as it is an n How to effectively gather information for a overview of the major issues to consider when planned or spontaneous mass demonstration; planning the police role in managing a mass n How to integrate local, state and federal re- demonstration. While most police chiefs will be sources—and maintain accountability; aware of a great many of the issues raised, this report sheds light on a number of issues that are not n How to identify the policy issues and what as easily recognized for their potential to derail procedures and safeguards should be in the efforts of police. Our hope is to offer police place for mass arrests; executives and operational commanders a snap- n Determining what level of force should be shot of lessons already learned and a roadmap used when demonstrators become unruly through the steps they will take in preparation for and who gives the command to use it; and future major mass demonstration events. This report is part of the PERF Critical Issues publica- n Clarifying the role of the agency’s chief exec- tion series, and we are very grateful for Motorola, utive before, during and after an event. Who Inc.’s, support of this effort. We are especially is in charge of managing the demonstration? grateful to the police chiefs and their staffs who contributed their time and ideas to this project.

Executive Director Police Executive Research Forum

ii — Foreword Acknowledgments

We thank the many people who have Los Angeles Police Department; Alfred Broad- worked so hard on this report. It has been a col- bent, Director of Security, Amtrak; Captain John laborative effort, made possible by the collective Brooks, Broward County Sheriff's Office; Cap- experience and insight offered by all those in- tain Steve Carter, Denver Police Department; Su- volved. We enjoyed working with police execu- perintendent Philip Cline, Chicago Police De- tives, subject matter experts, and others commit- partment; Commander David Commins, ted to improving police services throughout the London Metropolitan Police Department; Chief United States and around the globe. It is our hope Richard Easley (retired), Kansas City (MO) Po- that this book will aid police leaders and their lice Department; Lieutenant Eladio Estrada, New staffs in making informed decisions when devel- York City Police Department; Chief Julian Fanti- oping and executing plans that govern the police no (retired), Toronto Police Service; the late response to mass demonstration events. Deputy Commissioner James Fyfe, New York Thanks are due to our partners at Motorola City Police Department; Assistant United States for their support of the Critical Issues in Policing Attorney John Gallagher, U.S. Attorney's Office, Series. Motorola has been a steadfast supporter of Eastern District of Pennsylvania; Superintendent PERF for many years. We are grateful to Mr. Greg Terry Hillard (retired), Chicago Police Depart- Brown, CEO and President of Government & En- ment; Assistant Chief James Pugel, Seattle Police terprise Mobility Solutions; James A. Sarallo, Se- Department; Chief Gil Kerlikowske, Seattle Police nior Vice President, Government & Enterprise Department; Chief William Lansdowne, San Mobility Solutions; Richard P. Neal, Vice Presi- Diego Police Department; Chief Edward Lohn, dent, and General Manager; and Mark Moon, Cleveland Police Department; Assistant Chief Bill Vice President and General Manager. Maheu, San Diego Police Department; Chief We also thank the police professionals from Robert McNeilly, Pittsburgh Bureau of Police; around the United States, as well as Britain, Chief Constable Hugh Orde, Police Service of Canada, Israel and Northern Ireland, who gath- Northern Ireland; Chief Charles Ramsey, Metro- ered in Chicago and provided critical guidance politan Police Department of the District of Co- and focus for this project. They were Major Gen- lumbia; Major Cyril Ritter, Kansas City (MO) Po- eral Shachar Ayalom, Israel National Police; lice Department; Staff Inspector Wes Ryan, Commander Linda Barrone, Pittsburgh Bureau Toronto Police Service; First Deputy Daniel of Police; Deputy Chief Michael Berkow, Los An- Starks, Chicago Police Department; Assistant geles Police Department; Chief William Bratton, Chief Philip Turner, Louisville Metro Police

Acknowledgments — iii Department; Chief Robert White, Louisville individuals who were interviewed or who re- Metro Police Department; and Chief Gerald viewed various sections of the book. Their con- Whitman, Denver Police Department. tributions and insights are greatly appreciated. Additionally, subject matter experts from An international forum in San Diego al- around the United States, as well as from the lowed PERF to highlight promising approaches United Kingdom and Canada assembled at PERF from around the world. Many thanks to our con- headquarters in Washington, D.C., to provide ad- ference speakers: Assistant Chief Constable Ian ditional insight into the topic of mass demon- Arundale, West Mercia Police, United Kingdom; strations. Among these were Superintendent Deputy Chief Michael Berkow, Los Angeles Po- Malcolm McFarland, Police Service of Northern lice Department; Chief William Bratton, Los An- Ireland; Major Thomas Cannon, Miami Police geles Police Department; Chief Michael Butler, Department; Captain Mike Stanford, Seattle Po- Longmont (CO) Police Department; President lice Department; Lieutenant John Incontro, Los Chris Fox, Association of Chief Police Officers, Angeles Police Department; Inspector Barry UK; Reverend Reginald G. Holmes, Pastor, New Clark, Calgary Police Service, Canada; Captain Covenant Christian Church, Denver; Major Steve Victor Brito, Washington, D.C. Metropolitan Po- Ijames, Springfield (MO) Police Department; lice Department; Assistant U.S. Attorney John Chief Gil Kerlikowske, Seattle Police Depart- Gallagher, U.S. Attorney's Office—Philadelphia; ment; Chief Stanley Knee, Austin (TX) Police De- retired Deputy Superintendent Robert O'Toole, partment; Commander Cathy Lanier, Metropoli- Boston Police Department; and Stewart Richard- tan Police Department, D.C.; Major General son, CENTREX, United Kingdom. Mickey Levy, Former Commander, Jerusalem Superintendent Malcolm McFarland, Police Police District, Israel; Superintendent Malcolm Service of Northern Ireland, as a PERF Fellow, McFarland, Police Service of Northern Ireland; oversaw and guided the initial development of Chief Robert McNeilly, Pittsburgh Bureau of Po- this publication. Superintendent McFarland pro- lice; Chief Bernard Melekian, Pasadena (CA) Po- vided invaluable research and support while tak- lice Department; Chief Inspector Richard Prior, ing a lead role in writing the content for this Metropolitan Police Department, United King- book. We are grateful to Chief Constable Hugh dom; Chief Thomas Streicher, Cincinnati Police Orde from Northern Ireland for allowing Super- Department; Deputy Superintendent Assan intendent McFarland to work on this project at Thompson, Jamaica Constabulary Force; Chief the PERF office in Washington, D.C. John Timoney, Miami Police Department; Chief In addition, the articles by the following Gerry Whitman, Denver Police Department; contributing writers have helped provide valu- David Wilkinson, United Kingdom Home Office, able perspectives and are essential elements of Police Scientific Development Branch; and Exec- this book: Tony Narr, PERF Director of Manage- utive Director David Wood, Police Ombudsman, ment Education; Bryce Kolpack, Assistant Direc- Northern Ireland. tor of Management Services; Terry Chowanec, Special thanks to Commissioner Kathleen Senior Associate, Management Services; Cliff Di- O’Toole, Boston Police Department; Chief John amond, then Senior Associate, Management Ser- Timoney, Miami Police Department; Chief Syl- vices; and Captain Brett Patterson, then PERF vester Johnson, Philadelphia Police Department; Fellow, of the West Palm Beach, FL, Police De- Chief Gil Kerlikowske, Seattle Police Department; partment. Also playing a critical role were many and Chief Charles Ramsey, Metropolitan Police

iv — Acknowledgments Department of the District of Columbia for shar- guided this project from start to finish, providing ing their experiences and lessons learned in man- insights and resources. Thanks for editing and aging and handling mass demonstrations. organizational help to Jim Cronin, Martha Of course, this book could not have been Plotkin, Kevin Greene, Leif Picoult and Anna produced without the incredible efforts of our Berke. And thanks to Jennifer Brooks, Andrea talented and dedicated PERF staff and support Harris, Ken Hartwick, Ismaila Kane and Raquel personnel. Executive Director Chuck Wexler Rodriguez for excellent administrative support.

Acknowledgments — v PHOTO BY JEFF LEUNG

Introduction

The 1999 World Trade Organization (WTO) nearly 500 arrests, implementation of curfews, protest in Seattle was a defining moment in how and the use of pepper spray and tear gas on pro- local law enforcement manages mass demonstra- testors and residents alike (CNN.com 1999). tions. Even the most memorable demonstrations, Seemingly, the actions of the protestors were not including the 1968 Democratic National Con- as highly criticized as the department’s response vention (DNC) in Chicago and the anti-war to them. protest at Kent State University, were not organ- More recently, the World Trade Center attack ized or carried out with the intent to cause injury in New York has dramatically heightened police or large-scale destruction. However, in Seattle, awareness of the potential for terrorist activity, in- clearly organized anti-globalization groups and cluding at major demonstrations. Balancing the anarchist protestors conducted a determined concern for adequate security against the respon- program of property destruction and violence sibility of police to ensure the rights of individuals against law enforcement officers. City residents, to assemble and express their points of view is a media and civil liberty groups heavily criticized formidable challenge for police executives. the Seattle Police Department for its manage- This report examines recent mass demon- ment of the demonstration, which included stration events that have taken place in the United

Chapter 1. Introduction — 1 States, starting with the 1999 WTO demonstra- police in the Bayfront Park Amphitheater tion. It provides an overview of the experiences of (CNN.com 2003). law enforcement agencies that have weathered major mass demonstration events, specifically ex- In addition, spontaneous disorder incidents amining their planning, training, intelligence, erupted after several sporting events in a number communications and information-sharing, event of cities. Disorder events, often fueled by alcohol, management and media relations practices. It followed Super Bowl and Major League Baseball shares the lessons learned and practices adopted victories in Boston in 2004 and 2005, as well as by law enforcement agencies to create better after wins and losses by college teams in Virginia processes to anticipate and plan for large-scale Beach, Virginia; La Crosse, Wisconsin; Chicago, events—events that could potentially consume Illinois; College Park, Maryland, and both Boul- their every resource. der and Denver, Colorado, where celebrations es- Since the Seattle WTO demonstration, calated into violence and attacks on property and other mass events have resulted in disorder that police. required tactful management and necessitated a At the same time, there have been other large and coordinated police response. Examples mass events that were relatively calm. The June of such events include 2004 G8 Summit of world government leaders in

n Mardi Gras disorder in Seattle in 2001, as Sea Island, Georgia, and the July 2004 Democra- well as similar violence in Philadelphia, tic National Convention (DNC) in Boston took Austin and Fresno. In Seattle, the Mardi Gras place without serious criminal misconduct. activity led to rioting, vandalism and as- Protests at the Republican National Convention saults. One media outlet headline described (RNC) in New York in August 2004—while larg- it as “Chaos Consumed Pioneer Square on er than those during the G8 Summit or the ‘Fat Tuesday’ and One Man Was Mortally DNC—were more peaceful than expected. How- Wounded Before Police Dispelled the ever, a mass-arrest decision by police was criti- Crowds” (Seattle Post-Intelligencer 2001). cized and led to one State Supreme Court Justice ordering the release of nearly 500 protestors and In Washington, D.C., in 2002 mass arrest n imposing a $1,000 fine against the city for every tactics during the International Monetary protestor held after a set deadline (New York Fund (IMF) and World Bank demonstra- Times 2004). tions became the cause of criticism after World political gatherings and summits numerous people were arrested, including have become targets for protesters in America non-violent protestors and bystanders.1 and abroad. Serious disturbances have occurred n Rioting during an international meeting in Sweden, Belgium, Ireland, France and Italy in proposing a Free Trade Area of the Americ- recent years. Within the United Kingdom, envi- as (FTAA) in Miami in 2003 led to arrests ronmental protests have produced a plethora of and injuries to both demonstrators and both violent and non-violent protester tactics

1. For more information see Council of the District of Columbia Draft Report, “Report on Investigation of the Metropolitan Police Department’s Policy and Practice in Handling Demonstrations in the District of Columbia.” Available at: http://www.dcwatch.com/police/040311.htm.

2 — Chapter 1. Introduction that challenge law enforcement agencies. Other of a demonstration of support. This may be be- extremely violent demonstrations and protests in cause some groups, including extremist or anar- Northern Ireland have reached the lethal stage, chist groups, have instigated violence at organ- with firearms and improvised explosive devices ized protests in an attempt to gain publicity or to being directed against law enforcement agencies further their political aims. Such organized trying to restore and rebuild peace. Though the protests often create an inherent risk to public focus of this examination is recent mass demon- safety and civil liberties and pose particular chal- stration events in the United States, events lenges to law enforcement agencies tasked with around the world have contributed to the body of protecting life and preserving the peace. knowledge from which American police agencies The protest definition therefore—with a have developed policies and practices. negative connotation—is possibly the common Accordingly, this report will provide practi- perception of the term demonstration, though the tioner perspectives from those police depart- definition is much wider and does not assume ments in the United States that have had exten- breaches of the peace. For the purposes of this sive experiences managing and handling mass document, we will focus on those mass demon- demonstration events: Boston, Miami, New York, stration events for which there is an expectation, Philadelphia, Seattle, and Washington, D.C. It is through specific intelligence or other sources, hoped that by sharing their experiences and les- that the normal rule of law will be significantly sons learned, and by reviewing successful indus- challenged, or that violent action is likely. try approaches, that law enforcement leaders will be better equipped to protect the public while also protecting citizens’ rights. THE PROJECT Recognizing that police executives from Los An- geles to New York need to gain more perspectives THE MEANING OF about ways to better protect their communities MASS DEMONSTRATION and departments, the Police Executive Research The dictionary defines a demonstration as a pub- Forum (PERF) began a project to explore critical lic display of feeling toward a person or cause. This issues facing today’s law enforcement agencies. description applies to a wide array of occasions on This research was supported through a partner- which large numbers of people come together for ship with Motorola, Inc. In March 2004, a group a common purpose (e.g., a political convention; a of police chiefs from selected areas were invited labor dispute; or even a major sporting or social to Chicago, Illinois, to discuss critical issues fac- event). Even when demonstrations are peaceful, ing law enforcement. Two issues were identified managing the large numbers of people attending for further study: the use-of-force, and managing creates a unique law enforcement challenge. mass demonstrations. A 2005 PERF publication Protest, on the other hand, is defined as an organ- entitled Chief Concerns: Exploring the Challenges ized public demonstration objecting to a policy or of Police Use of Force addressed use-of-force is- course of action. Protests commonly occur when sues. This report addresses mass demonstrations. persons assemble to express opposition in re- This report is based, in part, on a PERF- sponse to local or world events, particularly polit- convened consortium of police executives from ical events or government actions. Sometimes, numerous agencies who met at PERF headquar- there is a perception that a protest is the antithesis ters in Washington, D.C., to help frame the most

Chapter 1. Introduction — 3 salient issues regarding mass demonstrations and when planning for and managing mass demon- police response.2 Police practitioners included strations. Moreover, it identifies the key issues representatives from Britain, Boston, Miami, Cal- managers and planners should consider as they gary, Los Angeles, Northern Ireland and Seattle. prepare for mass events. While this report should Furthermore, PERF gathered more than 100 in- not be viewed as a comprehensive manual on mass vited practitioners and stakeholders at an inter- demonstrations, it does provide valuable addition- national forum in San Diego in December 2004 al information and perspectives, thus serving as a to highlight issues related to mass demonstra- roadmap to other detailed information. tions and use-of-force. At this event, Los Angeles Police Chief William J. Bratton set the scene for a lively interaction as he discussed the changing KEY MASS DEMONSTRATION ISSUES nature of protests and mass demonstration During a panel discussion on mass demonstra- events. He recalled that in the 1960s the issues tions at the December 2004 forum,3 Executive leading to demonstration events tended to be Director Chuck Wexler moderated a discussion more community-centered and that the police in which participants shared myriad lessons and focus was largely tactical. He noted that today, new response tactics. In addition to the issues demonstrations are sometimes orchestrated by identified by meeting participants, PERF’s exam- far-reaching national and international organiza- ination of recent mass demonstration events has tions, coalitions and informal groups subscribing highlighted several key elements noted below: to anarchistic methods. To be effective, the police response must go beyond operational matters to n Mass demonstrations remain a major chal- include establishing community ties and sup- lenge to law enforcement agencies and will port, and maintaining open lines of communica- continue to raise significant concerns in the tion with the media and the public. post-9/11 world; In compiling this report, PERF reviewed n The reality that large events cannot be han- mass demonstration events that have occurred dled by any single agency makes coopera- since 1999 in the United States. High-profile tion and effective communications the demonstrations in which the responding police de- most essential aspects of mass demonstra- partments produced after-action reports were par- tion event management; ticularly useful. The project team carefully studied these reports to identify common themes and les- n Critical planning issues and processes must sons learned. This report highlights many of the be addressed by all agencies prior to an critical issues that departments should consider event;

2. Particular thanks are due to Major Thomas Cannon, Miami Police Department; Inspector Barry Clark, Calgary Police Service Lieutenant; John Gallagher, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Philadelphia; Lieutenant John Incontro, Los Angeles Police Department; Deputy Superintendent Robert O’Toole, Retired, Boston Police Department; Chief Inspector Stewart Richardson, Centrex, United Kingdom; and Captain Mike Sanford, Seattle Police Department. 3. Mass demonstration panel members: Chief Gil Kerlikowske, Seattle Police Department; Commander Cathy Lanier, Metropolitan Police Department, D.C.; Major General Mickey Levy, Former Commander Jerusalem Police District, Israel; and Superintendent Malcolm McFarland, Police Service of Northern Ireland.

4 — Chapter 1. Introduction n “What ifs,” worst-case scenarios and plans n Operating procedures should address the for mid-course corrections must be includ- issue of when it is appropriate or necessary ed in the planning and training processes; to utilize full body armor or to issue special weapons, recognizing the possible negative n There is a balance to be struck between, on effect their appearance can have on a crowd; the one hand, First Amendment rights and other civil liberties, and on the other hand, n The agency must make the best use of real- the interventions required to protect public time and strategic intelligence, managing it safety and property; both internally and via the media; and n Recognizing the serious potential risk to of- n The agency must determine how to best ed- ficers’ safety, policies must be in place to ucate and reassure citizens about police pro- guide officers on the degree of force that fessionalism and proportionate responses. may be used in response to perceived risks;

Chapter 1. Introduction — 5 PHOTO BY ANDRES BALCAZAR

Planning and Preparation

“There are no secrets to success. It is the result of preparation, hard work, and learning from failure.”

C OLIN P O WELL U .S. S ECRETARY OF S T A TE, 2001–2004

VERVIEW for an agency to respond quickly to unexpected O events. For those events that are anticipated well The key to effectively managing mass demonstrations and other major events is planning and in advance, agencies have the opportunity to de- preparation. Certainly there is a vast difference velop in-depth operational plans, but will still between planning for a demonstration that will rely upon standing plans as a foundation. The occur months in the future and reacting to a following pages contain some of the critical steps spontaneous event. Agencies must continually departments need to take to increase their pre- assess their ability to handle demonstrations of paredness. The section begins with a discussion all manners and sizes. Contingency plans, trained of the planning process, provides a detailed plan- officers and mutual aid agreements are essential ning checklist and concludes with a discussion of

Chapter 2. Planning and Preparation — 7 the importance of planning for multi-agency co- greater safety and security for both officers and ordination and logistics support. the public. The process should operate in an environment where information becomes a key commodity as planners and organizers seek ways THE PROCESS OF PLANNING to justify and marshal adequate resources. Agencies with recent experience managing mass For large-scale events, some agencies have demonstrations strongly emphasize the need for committed up to one year or more to the plan- early and effective planning. A thorough planning ning process, depending on the nature, complex- process lays the foundation for informed and ity and size of the event. Planning for the 2005 competent decision making. Those agencies rec- UK G8 summit in Scotland began more than a ognized for their successful management of a year in advance, and preparation for the policing demonstration all credited careful planning for of the 2010 Winter Olympics in Vancouver was their success, but also emphasized that additional already underway in 2005. planning would have been helpful. Conversely, Good working relationships—at a multi- agencies that experienced difficulty managing a tude of levels—are essential to facilitating a pro- demonstration all agreed that better planning ficient process to acquire, analyze and interpret could have avoided some major problems. The vital information that must be woven into the Seattle Police Department has managed some of ever-evolving planning process. The federal gov- the most widely publicized mass demonstrations ernment emphasizes such partnerships for spe- in recent years. The following excerpt, from their cially designated events (see box on National World Trade Organization Ministerial Conference Special Security Events, on page 9). A lack of in- After-Action Report, highlights their findings: formation, or significant misinformation, can Although the WTO Planning Unit did a re- negate the value of otherwise well-thought-out markable job with the time and resources avail- plans. Information and intelligence manage- able, logging some 11,600 hours on planning ment—a topic addressed in greater detail later in with a very small team, insufficient depth and detailing of contingency plans represents a seri- this document—must be ongoing and must co- ous flaw the responsibility for which must ulti- incide with the earliest stages of the planning mately be borne by senior commanders. This process, continuing even after the event has after action report recommends preparation of ended. detailed contingency plans to support future operations. In addition, the establishment of a Planners must recognize that a certain permanent Major Event Planning Unit in the amount of unpredictability will accompany any new Special Operations Bureau of SPD is in- event. An effective planning process will expressly tended to provide an ongoing source of institu- recognize the need for plans to be flexible in the tional memory and organizational expertise for future undertakings of this kind (Seattle Police face of rapidly changing circumstances. The plan- Department 2000). ning process should employ a discipline of continually challenging assumptions—considering all A properly executed planning process helps the “what ifs” and worst-case scenarios. Officials an agency to prepare its internal resources for a and planners should be cautioned not to underes- variety of contingencies, and to secure coopera- timate the level of coordinated effort that some tion among partner agencies that will be sharing protest groups are capable of putting forth. Even resources and knowledge during the event. The after contemplating extreme potential scenarios, planning process is recognized as the key to some police officials have been left reporting that

8 — Chapter 2. Planning and Preparation box 2.1 National Special Security Events

by Tony Narr events into Levels I, II, III and IV, corresponding with the internal FBI Special Events Readiness In May 1998, President Clinton issued Presiden- List (SERL). The factors that contribute to the tial Decision Directive 62 (PDD-62), which in part level designation include federal participation, lo- included a classified document dealing with the cation of event, available threat assessment and coordination of federal counterterrorism assets state and local resources available. At this writing, for events of national interest that are deemed DHS is expected to publish a Special Event Stan- National Special Security Events (NSSEs). The dard Operation Procedure in the near future. designation of an NSSE allows the U.S. Secret Local law enforcement agencies must work Service (USSS), the lead agency for designing and with their governors to request an NSSE designa- implementing the operational security plan, to action. A governor can ask that an event be consid- cess ample resources and ensure public safety by ered an NSSE by formal request to the Secretary forming partnerships with other federal, state and of DHS. The request is reviewed by the NSSE local law enforcement and other security and pub- working group, composed of representatives lic safety agencies. from the USSS, FBI and FEMA. These representa- There are only a few events that the Depart- tives gather facts and make a recommendation ment of Homeland Security (DHS) designates as to the Secretary, who makes the final decision. NSSEs each year. Recent designated events in- A number of factors are considered when desig- clude the 2004 Democratic National and Repub- nating an NSSE. First, the USSS determines how lication National Conventions and the G8 Sea Is- many dignitaries are expected to attend the event. land Summit. These events were good examples Any event that may be attended by government of effective coordination and cooperation among officials or foreign dignitaries may create an inde- federal, state and local homeland security and law pendent federal interest in ensuring safety and enforcement resources. The DHS and its many increasing resources. Second, the size of the component agencies have provided tremendous event may increase the need for additional securi- support to local law enforcement charged with ty measures. Large events may draw the attention ensuring the safety of the masses who gather for of terrorists or other criminals, increasing the these types of large events in their cities. For attractiveness of the forum as a target for employ- events that do not meet NSSE standards, DHS’s ing weapons of mass destruction. Third, the Operations Integration Staff (I-STAFF) estab- significance of the event may be historical, politi- lished an Interagency Special Events Working cal and/or symbolic, which may also heighten Group (SEWG) to develop federal consolidated concern about terrorist acts or other criminal security plans. This new system categorizes activity.1

1. More information on National Special Security Events can be found at the U.S. Secret Service website: http://www.secretservice.gov/nsse.shtml, and at the DHS fact sheet website: http://www.dhs.gov/ dhspublic/interapp/press_release/press_release_0207.xml.

Chapter 2. Planning and Preparation — 9 demonstrations, even celebrations, resulted in blueprint for a rapid mobilization capability unprecedented brazen violence for which they when policing spontaneous events. When there is were not prepared. no time to develop a plan, they provide a basic The 2001 Mardi Gras celebrations in Seattle level of guidance and operational consistency. It caused the police to evaluate their response has been said that a workable plan within the through a detailed and insightful post-event cri- available timescale is preferable to a perfect plan tique. Most markedly, their Mardi Gras 2001 too late (Richardson 2002). After-Action Report identified a key distinction Those with experience in handling demon- between “Pre-planned” and “Emergency” plan- strations agree that effective planning not only ning styles (Seattle Police Department, 2001). At prepares the agency for the pre-event and event its basic level, the distinction noted in Seattle was phases, but also, and equally important, for the that pre-planning permits the opportunity to test post-event phase. The following outline serves as and validate responses to a variety of scenarios, an overview of the particular considerations, is- whereas, in the emergency-planning scenario, sues and tasks that should be addressed in each testing and validation of tactics do not occur. As phase of a comprehensive planning process. its name implies, emergency planning is predom- Many of these issues will be expanded upon in inantly responsive to situations under ad hoc subsequent chapters. It is useful to refer to this command conditions. In Seattle, the police de- outline throughout the planning process to con- partment identified a need to develop a series of firm that all of these critical and necessary issues standing plans, which will henceforth provide a and steps have been addressed.

10 — Chapter 2. Planning and Preparation Pre-Event Planning (External)

n Hold formal meetings with event organizers n Contact police agencies that have prior expe- as early as possible before the event; rience with similar events and with the same organizers. Send observers to other similar n Identify potential protest groups. Attempt to events. In return, plan for visiting police ob- meet with them and advocacy groups such as servers to use your agency for the same learn- the American Civil Liberties Union and the ing purpose for future events; National Lawyer’s Guild. (Consider the benefits of inviting such representatives as part of n Establish a media strategy for managing the police planning team); media representatives, maintaining community contact and disseminating information; n Consider NSSE applicability; n Develop MOU with partner and/or assisting n Identify partner law enforcement agencies agencies; and (local, state, federal and others that may be applicable) and meet to discuss mutual aid, n Secure a commitment to provide uniform the possible roles for each agency and Memo- pre-event training for all support agencies and randa of Understanding (MOU) issues. Con- at all levels—command to supervisors and sider cross-jurisdictional issues; front-line officers. n Specify equipment and uniform MOU so that commanders are aware of the abilities of mutual aid agencies and how they will be deployed in the field; n Hold formal meetings with all stakeholders who can provide support; including

o Local leaders and elected officials

o Business/private sector individuals

o Public transportation personnel

o Public utility officials

o Medical facilities and the local Red Cross

o Venue managers (hotels, meeting halls, convention centers);

Chapter 2. Planning and Preparation — 11 Pre-Event Planning (Internal)

n Determine command and control; n Outline crime investigation protocols;

o Appoint operational and tactical com- o Determine how the department will re- manders spond to the investigation of event-related

o Outline the circumstances in which com- crimes mand and control transfer to another level o Familiarize appropriate personnel with

o Determine when the organization will rely unique aspects of arrest of foreign nation- on a team approach to decision making ver- als, if likely

sus sole responsibility for decisions n Address intelligence issues;

o Review the rules of engagement for a hostile o Establish an intelligence component or response, i.e., rules of conduct, force op- “task force” consisting of intelligence offi- tions, level of authorization required, levels cers from each participating agency of force to be engaged, etc. o Develop overall parameters and guidelines o Consider who will be authorized to deviate for event intelligence gathering, such as from the pre-determined rules of engage- – Responsibility for gathering and processing in- ment and under what circumstances formation

o Review parameters for declaring an “unlaw- – Impact, if applicable, of laws limiting intelli- ful” assembly gence collection/maintenance – Acceptable information-gathering methods n Plan for media contact; and tactics – Developing productive sources o Establish procedures for information dissemination (routine, press releases, inquiries) – Reliability analysis – Community-sentiment assessments o Affix primary responsibility for informa- – Dissemination/sharing of intelligence tion dissemination, and identify Public In- – Information retention formation Officers for each agency involved. Determine who will speak on n Assess resources;

particular issues o Identify and arrange for special support

o Establish procedures for media credential- (canine, mounted, bicycles, other special ing and preferential access vehicles, air or marine support)

o Meet with the media (local and national o Plan for sufficient resources to be at the when appropriate). Outline the overall ready for the “what ifs” and the worst-case media policy and how it will be managed scenarios

o Determine whether provisions of the appli- n Monitor the demonstration permit procedure; cable labor contracts or agreements will im- o Meet with the agency responsible to deter- pact the availability/flexibility of the officers mine the details and status of event approval. needed to properly manage the event (scheduling, overtime and relief issues)

12 — Chapter 2. Planning and Preparation o Ensure adequate specialized training of po- n Support police operations;

lice officers before the event o Set up logistical support for officers (nutri- o Arrange for adequate administrative/ tion, water, replacement uniform articles, support personnel for stepped-up opera- weapons and ammunition, other weaponry tional activities (communications, trans- and force alternatives, mass arrest supplies, portation, booking, records, detention) spare vehicles and fuel, property/evidence

o Identify and confer with other city/county/ control) state agencies that can contribute to pre-event o Consider interoperability issues (individual planning for logistical support; including communications—radios, cell phones) – Fire department o Identify available translators when needed – EMS/ambulances o Arrange for other equipment (barriers, – Public works fencing, containment alternatives) – Sanitation – Coroner o Arrange for heavy equipment and opera- – Prosecutor tors, and vehicle removal/towing capability – Courts n Establish evaluative responsibility, including – Legal affairs – Corrections o A system to record decisions and information – Parks and recreation flow in order to maximize effective event – Finance/procurement management, support the department’s ability to review events for after-action reporting n Maintain service continuity; and respond to legal challenges o Develop protocols for responding to non- o Guidelines for the department’s photo/ event related calls for service video journal of events o Establish call response alternatives (telephone n Follow MOU for equipment standardization reporting, delayed responses by appointment) among supporting police agencies.

Chapter 2. Planning and Preparation — 13 Post-Event Planning

n Develop procedures for a post-event stand- n Confirm the commitment from all necessary down system to return to normal operational parties to produce a written after-action re- status; port outlining lessons learned, next-event planning and additional training opportuni- n Identify a method for post-event debriefing, to ties; and include the solicited input of event organizers; n Review standing plans in light of their effec- n Undertake citizen/public surveys to rate the tiveness during the demonstration event. effectiveness of police and overall handling of the event;

14 — Chapter 2. Planning and Preparation MUTUAL AID AND be addressed through stipulations prior to a MULTI-AGENCY COORDINATION multi-organization event agreement. They in- Mass demonstrations—because of their size, po- clude the following:

tential for violence, and the sheer demands they n Mission can place on an agency—often require the host agency to call upon neighboring law enforcement n Direction—joint philosophical framework

agencies for assistance. A significant challenge n Supervision facing the lead department is the coordination, n Assignment of personnel training and deployment of a multi-agency force in a crowd management situation. For example, n Authority (deputation) the Boston Police Department; the Federal Bu- n Joint organizational structure reau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explo- sives (ATF); and other agencies involved in the n Equipment planning and handling of the 2004 Democratic n Funding, payment and financial processes National Convention recognized they could not handle the event without collaboration. Under- n Joint facilities agreements standing that shared responsibility and unprece- n Internal and external communication plan dented cooperation would be essential to a successful police operation, the Boston Police n Liability and legal services

Department sought and received the assistance of n Documentation and tracking system scores of outside agencies to manage the event. agreement (See article by Boston Police Department legal advisor Mary Jo Harris, later in this section.) n Operational plans

As mentioned earlier, because large-scale n Use-of-force policy events often take place in a variety of venues that n Duration span jurisdictional lines, multi-agency cooperation is a key factor. As such, one initial goal of the An example of a comprehensive MOU was external planning process should be to develop created by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police written agreements that outline the roles and (RCMP) and the Calgary Police Service (CPS), rules for each of the agencies involved in the joint and can be found in the 2002 G-8 Summit After- endeavor. The general content of Memoranda of Action Report produced by the Calgary Police Understanding (MOU) between public safety or- Service (Perry and Kerr, 2002). Another example ganizations can be thought out and structured in is an MOU defining relationships between the advance, but experience has shown that there are Metropolitan Police in Washington, D.C. often unanticipated last-minute issues. In order (MPDC), and several federal and local agencies. to mitigate such issues, several topic areas should

Chapter 2. Planning and Preparation — 15 LOGISTICS ammunition, chemicals and munitions, and Basic logistics also are an essential part of mass more. The ability to manage such supplies— demonstration management and must be inte- including storage, transportation and distribution grated into the planning process. The lessons in the field—is just as important as procuring the learned from Hurricane Katrina highlight the necessary supplies for an event. Communication need for effective logistics planning. Experienced is essential, and some experts recommend allocat- logistics experts stress the importance of planning ing a radio channel exclusively for logistics. This for a longer-than-anticipated event. Field units allows supervisors and managers ready access to will need food and drink, access to lavatory facili- those who can meet their needs, while reducing ties, replacement vehicles, fuel, replacement unnecessary traffic on operational frequencies.

box 2.2 Logistics Teams

During the FTAA meetings in Florida, the Miami Police Department appointed a logistics team to coordinate ordering, acquisition and delivery of approximately 3,000 meals for officers per day. In addition, the team obtained 25 pallets of water, 10 pallets of Gatorade® and 10,000 PowerBars®. Six mobile logistic vans per shift were used to deliver food and water, with ten golf carts rented for the same purpose in case traffic congestion prevented the use of larger vehicles. For those who could leave their posts, the team set up two de-escalation posts, where officers could go to “cool down, physically from the heat and emotionally from the in- cessant taunting and provocation” (Timoney 2004).

16 — Chapter 2. Planning and Preparation box 2.3 Planning for the Democratic National Convention

by Mary Jo Harris free-speech grounds. This decision forced L.A. officials and federal agencies to dramatically re- Municipalities are permitted to regulate the time, vise the plans for the demonstration just weeks place and manner of speech in public fora, pro- before the event was scheduled to begin. vided those regulations are content neutral (i.e., Boston’s hope was to create a public demon- imposed without regard to the message of the stration plan that would both withstand the in- speaker), are narrowly tailored to serve a signifi- evitable First Amendment challenges and provide cant governmental interest and leave open ample sufficient access and protection for protestors alternative means of communication. The key to and delegates alike. We did so. A preliminary in- managing mass demonstrations successfully— junction brought by a coalition of protestors in including protecting the plan from legal chal- the days before the DNC began was rejected by lenge—is to be fully aware of the successes (and the United States District Court of the District of failures) other agencies have experienced, and to Massachusetts. The First Circuit affirmed that de- integrate those lessons learned into your agency’s cision. See Bl (A)ck Tea Society v. City of Boston, mass demonstration response. 378 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2004). The City of Boston hosted the Democratic Na- This success can be attributed to several key tional Convention (DNC) in July 2004. This was the actions taken by the Boston Police Department. first major political party convention held in the First, Boston officials explored the relevant expe- United States since the attacks of September 11, riences of sister cities. By reviewing the events in 2001. The public safety challenges of protecting the L.A. (and in cities like Philadelphia, Chicago and delegates, former presidents, members of Con- Seattle), Boston knew that asking groups like the gress and the public at large were unprecedented. American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and Na- Numerous law enforcement agencies—state, fed- tional Lawyers Guild (NLG) to give feedback on eral and local—were involved in developing the the pros and cons of the mass demonstration public safety plan for this event. However, the pri- plans would minimize the chances of surprise lit- mary agency responsible for anticipating and re- igation on the eve of the convention. Therefore, sponding to public protests and mass demonstra- Boston included these likely challengers in the tions was the Boston Police Department. planning process. A full year before the event was Boston’s officials reviewed the after-action scheduled to begin, the ACLU and NLG were in- reports of the cities that had most recently host- vited to review and offer suggestions about pro- ed the political conventions. They learned that posed planning. The city’s final demarcation of in Los Angeles, host of the 2000 DNC, the feder- a “demonstration zone” was then based, in large al district court threw out the public safety plan part, on the critiques of the ACLU and NLG. This after a number of protest groups challenged it on made it possible for Boston to argue, without

Chapter 2. Planning and Preparation — 17 rebuttal, that there were no possible alternative that its regulations are narrowly tailored to the sites for the demonstration zone to be located. challenge it faces, and, thus, may be viewed more Although the district court found that the ACLU favorably by the court. In either case, the agency and NLG brought their suits within a reasonable is taking proactive steps to successfully protect it- period of time (a mere five days before the event self and its decision makers from legal challenge. began), the First Circuit Court of Appeals seemed to weigh the timing factor against the plaintiffs Since 1998, Mary Jo Harris has been the Legal Advi- (especially in light of the ample advance notice sor to the Boston Police Department, where she ad- given by the city). vises the Police Commissioner and Command Staff Traditionally, police departments have been in all aspects of legal issues affecting policing. She unwilling to engage with advocacy groups such as was co-chair of the Legal Subcommittee for the the ACLU in the creation of public safety plan- DNC Planning Group. The subcommittee included ning. I suggest that this reluctance is misplaced. counsel for the FBI, Department of Homeland Secu- In the best scenarios, advocacy groups can bring rity, Secret Service, Democratic National Conven- fresh perspective to policing decision making. tion Committee, as well as a host of state and local Even when they do not, an agency that can show law enforcement agencies. She was lead counsel for it invited advocacy groups to weigh-in on the de- the City of Boston in Bl (A)ck Tea Society v. City of cision making is more likely to successfully prove Boston, 378 F.3d 8 (1st Cir.2004).

18 — Chapter 2. Planning and Preparation CONCLUSION post-event damage control. When agencies have Of all the issues identified by those with experi- advance knowledge of demonstrations, they ence managing mass demonstrations, planning should begin planning as early as possible. But not and preparation were cited as the most important. all demonstrations are announced in advance. Every practitioner emphasized the need for Many occur spontaneously or with little notice. plans—standing, operational, tactical and contin- For that reason, it is essential that agencies develop gency—and a flexible planning process. Practi- plans, make preparations and train officers on an tioners agree that time and effort at the planning ongoing basis so they can respond as effectively as stage results in better police service and protection possible to changing conditions. of the public, as well as reduced time spent on

Chapter 2. Planning and Preparation — 19 PHOTO BY SEAN GRAHAM

Training

VERVIEW Training together is what makes this happen. O Mass demonstration training should approxi- Training is an ongoing process in every law en- mate the conditions associated with the event. Ef- forcement agency throughout the nation. From fective police training should be linked to the entry-level academy training, through in-service host agencies’ core values and should always rein- and career development training, police officers force ethical policing practices, particularly the train throughout their entire careers. Multi- commitment to respect and uphold civil liberties. agency training for large-scale demonstrations, This chapter discusses the importance of however, is a fairly new, yet critical component of training in preparing an agency to manage a mass successful demonstration management. Com- demonstration, including the importance of de- manders, supervisors and officers alike must be veloping training programs that are consistent proficient at carrying out their role in the various with plans. The chapter addresses issues such as tactical and contingency plans that may be put incident management systems, training in teams, into operation during a mass demonstration training with partner agencies and using consis- event. Moreover, when a multi-agency operation tent terminology. The chapter concludes with ex- is initiated, everyone involved must be able to amples of how agencies have used training to en- perform in concert and up to expectations. hance preparedness.

Chapter 3. Training — 21 TRAINING TO MAKE PLANS WORK n A strong statement that any officer’s failure The most carefully crafted plans to address a to comply could result not only in failed po- wide range of contingencies, “what ifs” and lice tactics, but also employee discipline; worst-case scenarios are effective only if the po- and

lice are proficient at carrying them out as intend- n Instruction on de-escalation techniques. ed. From the top command to the officers on the ground, everyone should be trained to a common As vital as classroom training is, only standard. This does not mean that commanders through practical training, tabletop exercises and and officers should receive the same training other simulation efforts does the agency create an (they should not since their roles will be quite opportunity to actually test its contingency plans. different), but their training should reflect the Tabletop Incident Management System (IMS) same mission, strategy and terminology. Event training exercises are an excellent and inexpensive commanders must be in agreement on their mis- training tool for mass demonstration prepared- sion and the overall approach behind the plans ness. The scenarios can be designed to include they are charged to carry out. personnel from communications, jails, fire/EMS Pre-event training can be in the form of and emergency management departments, public classroom lectures, classroom-based simulations works, and other government agencies. All are or practical exercises in the field. Classroom lec- likely to be involved in a real event and should tures are ideal for bringing personnel up to date participate in the pre-event practice. on issues that can be expected to surface during an event. Demonstration management training—for personnel at all levels—should include INCIDENT MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS the following: All levels of the organization should have a work-

n A review and reinforcement of applicable ing knowledge of Incident Command Systems federal laws, state statutes and department (ICS) or Incident Management Systems (IMS) policies; that will be used during the demonstration. The terms are utilized somewhat interchangeably; n A review of civil liberties issues inherent in however, IMS is the emerging national model and mass demonstration events; is tied to federal funding for events. IMS are uti-

n A uniform understanding of rules of en- lized to plan, track and manage resources at a crit- gagement, use-of-force policies and mass ical event. The techniques are easily taught and arrest procedures; applicable to everyday police responses. IMS training instructions are available on the Internet Clear instruction on the need for self-control, n through the Department of Homeland Security, teamwork and adherence to commands; Federal Emergency Management Agency.1 IMS n Stated expectations for highly disciplined classroom training should be supplemented by behavior, self-control and restraint; tabletop exercises to ensure understanding and

1. For more information on IMS training go to: http://www.fema.gov/nims/nims_training.shtm.

22 — Chapter 3. Training proficiency and to build officer and commander n Evaluating the situation and available intel- confidence. ligence to choose appropriate options;

n Making decisions based upon the current situation, intelligence, the overall strategy, TRAINING AS A TEAM department policies and legal constraints; Unlike typical training programs in which officers are randomly scheduled so as not to deplete n Implementing the decisions through a for- unit strength, demonstration management train- mal plan; ing should be conducted in a group setting, n Maintaining an audit trail of those deci- preferably with officers assembled in the sions for the after-action report; and squads/teams in which they would likely be deployed. This “team-practice” approach facilitates n Understanding the legitimate objectives of proficiency in tactical skills, establishes individ- the media. ual and team expectations, helps promote use-of- force awareness and promotes teamwork over Law enforcement agencies should build potentially counter-productive individual ac- demonstration management training into their tions. This is especially important, as most police regular training schedule. Then, when the de- officers are accustomed to working alone or in partment learns of an upcoming event, the focus pairs, not in squads and larger platoons. can turn to refresher and “dry-run” training Team leaders/supervisors and commanders rather than to starting from scratch. must be knowledgeable about the skills and resources that are available to them, and about the TRAINING WITH PARTNER AGENCIES limitations of both. They should train and drill in formation with their squads to ensure familiarity Consideration also should be given to conduct- with overall team tactics, such as commands and ing joint exercises with neighboring and overlap- hand signals, tactical rescue and arrest techniques. ping police jurisdictions to familiarize each other Field scenarios should be developed to demon- with common protocols and ensure consistent strate readiness and proficiency. Teams should be methodologies. Preparations for recent mass exposed to situations that require them to practice demonstrations show this training is invaluable squad formations, mobile response techniques, in preparing officers for the event. It provides an mass movement exercises, protestor extraction early opportunity for familiarity with a “single rulebook” as to use-of-force and making arrests. methods and other field exercises.2 Training spe- Moreover, well in advance of civil unrest, it allows cific to team leaders and commanders should in- various processes to be worked out, including the clude all of the following points, with added dis- details of command and control authority, the cussion and training emphasizing the supervisory passing of command and control in multiple ju- role and its responsibilities. risdiction environments, and the authority and n Taking control of the situation; processing of arrests in other jurisdictions.

2. The Office of Domestic Preparedness Basic Course Manual for Managing Civil Actions in Threat Incidents offers a full lesson plan.

Chapter 3. Training — 23 CONSISTENT TERMINOLOGY Miami There is considerable disparity in terminology The Miami Police Department reported that its across the many operational plans developed by training initiatives for the 2003 Free Trade Area police agencies, thus increasing the potential for of America (FTAA) meetings commenced nearly misunderstanding when a multi-agency response a year before the event. In addition to a 40-hour is required. In such circumstances, the host Managing Civil Actions in Threat Incidents agency must ensure that all supporting agencies course3 that the Miami police department pro- know and understand in advance the terminolo- vided to its commanders, tabletop exercises were gy to be used. For example, there are several in- held regularly to test various plans. These exercis- terpretations of the use-of-force continuum in es pointed out areas of concern and, in some in- agency policies nationwide. Each interpretation stances, led to plan modifications. Furthermore, holds significant implications for the application two weeks before the event, the department of force. If a support agency and host agency do brought together 167 representatives from all of not have a common understanding, communica- the agencies that would be participating in the tion breakdowns are possible, with potentially management of the actual event for a compre- catastrophic results. hensive tabletop exercise. Led by trainers from Standardizing oral commands and termi- the Office of Domestic Preparedness (ODP) and nology throughout pre-event training ensures di- the Miami police designated FTAA training com- rectives will be understood by all responding mander, this exercise tested the multi-agency ca- agencies. In addition, it is recommended that oral pability to address threat incidents. Once again, commands be given in two parts: a preparatory plan modifications resulted. Miami’s training command, which directs what is to be carried out regimen did not focus only on plan testing at the and mentally prepares line officers for execution command level. Legal training and instruction of the order, and a command of execution, which on “Rules of Engagement” were formally present- is given when it is time to carry out the directive. ed to all Miami officers and participating agen- Hand signals can be used in conjunction with cies to provide a uniform understanding of legal verbal commands to overcome crowd or other and illegal protestor conduct and to ensure con- noise issues. sistency among officers in abiding by strict, self- imposed use-of-force guidelines. Training was delivered to the department’s lieutenants, ser- PRACTITIONER PERSPECTIVES ON geants and officers as well as to those from sur- MASS DEMONSTRATION TRAINING rounding agencies that would collectively form In order to provide additional perspectives for patrol response platoons during the demonstra- police leaders, PERF examined mass demonstration. A preliminary ten-hour lesson plan, with tion training experiences from several cities: primary emphasis on team tactics, was followed by ten more hours of drill and practice with their

3. For more information go to: http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/docs/CDP072005.pdf.

24 — Chapter 3. Training commanders to further bolster team and man- of both the planning and the training processes. agement confidence. The lesson plan was derived After-action lessons learned by the department from the ODP 40-hour course previously men- included the following: tioned, and included the following: n Resist donning riot gear unless officer safety n Discipline; is in jeopardy. Media images of officers in full gear can appear intimidating. All agencies n Group action; participating in a demonstration event n Demonstrator tactics; should be required to agree to this condition.

n Protection of First Amendment rights; n Multiple agencies can operate as one team, one entity, especially in the application of n Rapid deployment; force. n Line formations;

n Verbal and hand commands; In 1980, Miami was the site of civil unrest that resulted in eighteen deaths, several hundred n Squad movements; injuries and millions of dollars in destroyed

n Equipment familiarity; property. From that experience, the police department developed what is now known as the Arrest techniques; and n “Mobile Field Force Concept,” which provides a n Use of baton. rapid and organized response to crowd control and civil disturbances in urban settings. The con- Specialized training, drilling and practice cept emphasizes team movement rather than in- were mandated for groups of officers with special dividual actions. Actions taken by a field force are responsibilities and their commanders to further under the direct command, control and respon- build endurance and stress the importance of sibility of the field force leader. A field force can team tactics. Bicycle, extraction, SWAT, aviation be deployed to restore order, move crowds, rescue and marine teams were all provided with training victims and isolate problem areas. Recognizing unique to the functions they would undertake that this runs counter to the typical police cul- during the event. A required training program on ture, where officer individuality and discretion “safe positioning,”and what they might expect to are the accepted norm, thorough training and encounter, was prepared for representatives of practice are essential to the success of a field force the media who would be embedded with police deployment. The mobile field force has been suc- units. Once all of the command, specialized and cessfully adopted by many agencies worldwide. generic training had been delivered, the department orchestrated a massive, nighttime practical training exercise in three venues around the city. Seattle Several scenarios were posed to various response The Seattle Police Department, in its early prepa- teams. Each commander and team was required ration for the 1999 World Trade Organization to rely on the previously delivered training and (WTO) Ministerial Conference, established sev- practice to meet their challenges under realistic eral subcommittees with specific responsibility conditions. This was the ultimate pre-event test for event activities. Each subcommittee was

Chapter 3. Training — 25 charged with the responsibility for identifying n Demonstration management training was training needs. The Demonstration Management vital to officers “holding the line, exercising subcommittee assumed responsibility for train- great restraint, and using only the mini- ing needs related to crowd control the police mum force necessary to accomplish objec- use-of-force. The training agenda ultimately tives.” It was recommended this training be adopted included the following: instituted as an annual refresher for all Op- erations Bureau officers; n Crowd management techniques—initial

training, weekly squad-level practice and n Chemical agent response team training periodic platoon-level and multi-platoon proved to be effective in controlled delivery formation practice; of irritants, thereby lessening injuries. It was recommended this training be expand- n Basic commands, formations and tactics. Scheduled twice a week for one month. ed to operational personnel;

Officers and supervisors participated; n With too few exceptions, outside agencies were not included in demonstration man- n Chemical agent protective mask and personal protective gear training for 900 officers; agement training. It was recommended that joint annual training be conducted to pro- n Crisis-incident decision making for super- vide a standardized regional approach to visors and commanders; demonstration management; and

n Weapons of mass destruction training and in- n Demonstration management training was cident command training for SWAT officers; commendable and of high caliber, but also

n Dignitary protection, escort training, and disjointed, hurried and short. It was recom- area orientation training for motorcycle mended that departmental and regional officers from Seattle and neighboring training goals be enhanced—by means of a jurisdictions; and training subcommittee led by a high-ranking official—and that training of sufficient n Two intensive tabletop exercises for Inter- length and depth, with periodic refreshers, jurisdictional Public Safety Committee rep- include a progressive approach to building resentatives, held by the Secret Service and skill and competency over time. the FBI. Some two years after the WTO conference, In total, the Seattle Police Department de- the Seattle Police Department was again challenged livered almost 20,000 personnel-hours of mass with a mass demonstration event. This time it was demonstration-related training, using in-house a Mardi Gras celebration that escalated beyond ex- and guest instructors. Despite this significant pectations. Previous years’ celebrations had result- training effort, training lessons and issues were ed in little more than a few disorderly conduct prominent in the after-action training recom- arrests and some small-scale property damage. But, mendations. They included the following: in 2001 crowds became unruly, turning to violent n Coordinated, multi-agency traffic manage- behavior and destruction of property. In the end, ment training proved valuable and should there was one death as well as many injuries. This be continued; occurrence provided an opportunity for learning

26 — Chapter 3. Training that can benefit other law enforcement agencies. aspects of the event. The Secret Service was re- The police department’s after-action report offers sponsible for the interior of the Fleet Center the following three training recommendations: where the DNC convention was actually held. The U.S. Capitol Police assisted with dignitary n Exercise standing contingency plans and protection. The Massachusetts Bay Transit Au- orders—including a worst-case scenario— thority Police provided security at key locations for all unusual occurrences; and throughout the transit system. Others pro- n Continue squad-based crowd control train- tected innumerable venues around the city. The ing and expand to include large unit forma- Massachusetts State Police agreed to provide two tions and special tactics for crowd entry and public order platoons and one mobile field force. victim evaluation; and The final two public order platoons came in the form of two regional response teams already or- n Establish a specialized Anti-Violence Team to perform high-risk insertion and extrac- ganized in the Boston area: the Metro Law En- tion operations and to serve as an expert forcement Council (Metro-LEC), and the North- training resource in these tactics. eastern Metropolitan Law Enforcement Council (NEMLEC). Years earlier, police chiefs who recognized that their departments individually Boston could not effectively deploy response teams for The Boston Police Department began planning any significant event formed these consortia, and training some eighteen months before the comprised of representatives from Boston-area Democratic National Convention. The depart- police departments and including 40 member ment readily recognized that the DNC was of departments. The regional response teams pro- such a large scale that, even with a year and a half vided stand-by SWAT and mobile response of advanced planning and training, it could not teams, as well as canine and crisis negotiation handle the event alone while continuing to police team services. Each consortium provided two the city. Based on the anticipated size of the event, public order platoons (a combined 240 officers) it was determined that between six and eight pub- to the overall effort. With this contribution, the lic order platoons of 100–150 officers should be at desired eight public order platoons had been the ready. Recognizing that calls for service and reached. everyday police activity would continue to con- A year before the convention, Boston Police sume the bulk of the patrol force, the department met with the leaders of NEMLEC and Metro- sought creative ways to assemble the necessary LEC, inviting them to play a vital role in the de- platoons. Internally, two smaller public order pla- partment’s contingency plan. The Boston Police toons were assembled from non-patrol units. The Department included the State Police, NEMLEC, bulk of the department’s convention-dedicated and Metro-LEC in their operational plans, but field strength consisted of those public order pla- they did not hold regular joint training. Each toons along with two motorcycle platoons, the group was large enough to serve as a self-suffi- SWAT team, a bicycle unit, and a mobile field cient, independent public order platoon. Boston force comprised largely of academy recruits. officials found them to be already well-trained Outside assistance would be called upon to and well-disciplined teams. Each had significant address the remaining need. A number of law experience responding to events in the region, enforcement agencies were responsible for key and NEMLEC had been called to Washington,

Chapter 3. Training — 27 D.C., on three occasions to assist with mass In the end, this event went well, with only a demonstrations and presidential inaugural few arrests and no significant problems. Public events. Boston police commanders and some order platoon deployment was rare, and much of support staff were assigned liaison roles to ensure the training did not come into play. However, maximum coordination between the department there is no doubt that this scenario is preferable to and the consortia. During the actual event, NEM- being under-trained when the worst-case scenario LEC and Metro-LEC liaisons would be posi- actually develops. The following recommenda- tioned in the Boston Tactical Operation Center to tions surfaced after the DNC: further ensure coordination. Boston officials at- n Look at available resources realistically. Do tended all demonstration-related training that not underestimate the number of officers took place. The training requirement for consor- needed for non-demonstration activities tium membership already called for an eight- (e.g., to continue the operation of routine hour commitment each month. Since their mis- police services); sion was to be available for major incident response, their ongoing training agenda was in n Establish a clear understanding about the line with their potential DNC responsibilities. number of officers actually on restricted Once the groups were alerted to their upcoming duty; and role in the DNC, their training curriculum was n Throughout the deployment plan, look for enhanced to include topics like Boston’s Rules of gaps that will consume officers. Engagement as well as working with mounted police and fire department tactical units. Three months before the event, training was increased CONCLUSION to 16 hours per month. The effectiveness of any plan depends on the abil- Training for Boston’s own officers took two ity of field commanders and officers to execute it paths. Training for the two Boston police public properly. That ability demands that officers know order platoons started a year before the event what to do under a variety of circumstances. In with a five-day block of instruction on mission, addition to that knowledge, they also need to be strategy and expectations. Over the following proficient in their respective roles. Officers need months, training increased from one day a to hone their individual skills, but equally impor- month to two days a month, with increased em- tant is their performance as members of a phasis on formation deployment, crowd control, team—officers and supervisors together. Offi- team tactics and “blackboard sessions.” Every cers, supervisors and commanders all need to other month, platoon-level practical exercises know what to expect from each other and to be were staged to bring realism to the training. At the confident in their performance as a cohesive unit. same time, the department recognized the poten- The same requirements apply to multi-agency tial for patrol officers—who had not been previ- plans. The key to these performance expectations ously trained or considered for platoon deploy- is training and practice. ment—to be called upon in the event of a “worst-case scenario.” Therefore, some 800 patrol officers were exposed to introductory mass demonstration training.

28 — Chapter 3. Training Chapter 3. Training — 29 PHOTO BY MUGUR GEANA

Intelligence and Information Management

VERVIEW Among the easiest pieces of information to O collect are routine data; declassified information; Information processing is another component of effective planning. Mass demonstration manage- and accounts from dispatch, operational com- ment demands careful attention to managing in- manders, various governmental departments, formation before, during and after the event. other law enforcement agencies and the public. Gathering and thoroughly analyzing information Despite the ease of gathering such information, it or intelligence about the activities of demonstra- can be critical to directing the event and to com- tors can dramatically strengthen a police depart- municating with the media. The term “intelli- ment’s demonstration management plan. Howev- gence” conjures up visions of undercover opera- er, for a variety of reasons, accomplishing this is tives and covert information gathering. not always easy. Reasons include limited experi- Sometimes this is accurate, but intelligence also ence gathering intelligence, secretive preparations means countless hours poring over websites, un- by demonstrators, or a lack of incorporation of derground newspapers and any other potential gathered information into the planning process. sources of information. This chapter addresses Nonetheless, most agencies are already adept at the need for and process of gathering and assess- gathering useful intelligence and information. ing intelligence and information before, during

Chapter 4. Intelligence and Information Management — 31 and after an event. The section stresses that veri- preposterous. Events like the WTO invariably fication, assessment and timely introduction to attract doomsayers and extremist rhetoric. The challenge is to separate disinformation and fal- the planning process—not the ease or difficulty lacious reports from potentially authentic data. of gathering—are what make such intelligence In hindsight, it is clear that fragments of infor- and information valuable. mation gathered during this period were accurate and predictive.”

INTELLIGENCE GATHERING AND Intelligence gathering can be overt and ASSESSMENT combined with other pre-event planning initia- The process of intelligence gathering is a con- tives. For example, it is recommended that, as tentious one. To gain a strategic perspective of an early as practical in the police planning process upcoming event, credible sources with links to for a mass demonstration event, protest leaders the information sought should be identified and be contacted (via letter, email, telephone or in- person) to solicit their support in ensuring a safe, tasked to provide information. On rare occa- violence-free protest. Though some groups may sions, usually during the height of an event, raw not respond, many others, whose groups have le- information may be so compelling that it must be gitimate objectives, will be interested in cooper- considered for deployment and other tactical de- ating and appreciative of the offer to help facili- cisions. However, it remains vitally important to tate a lawful, peaceful protest. This outreach analyze all information in the context of the effort not only creates the possibility of a positive event, the organizers and the environment as well and cooperative relationship, but also serves to as political, economic and social issues to permit inform protest leaders of police expectations and planning personnel to develop the most appro- objectives. Furthermore, it can provide police of- priate response or modification to existing plans. ficials with new information useful to developing The importance of committing to a com- an appropriate response. Police efforts to work plete and thorough intelligence process cannot with protestors toward a violence-free event, and be overstated. A process to produce meaningful all information obtained as a result, should be and useful intelligence requires holding regular documented for future reference. meetings at which information is shared and Of all the methods utilized to obtain infor- compared in hopes of cross-confirmation of de- mation, the use of covert means, either the details and sources. This helps analysts to distin- ployment of undercover officers or the use of guish rumor from corroborated accounts, and to technological (audio or video) equipment, will separate criminal intent from legal acts of be most likely to attract scrutiny and criticism. protest. Recognizing these differences is crucial The overwhelming concern is that police are col- when translating intelligence for consideration. lecting, maintaining and sharing with other law However, some intelligence is difficult to put into enforcement groups intelligence files on persons perspective. The Seattle Police Department re- conducting lawful and peaceful protest activities ported after the WTO Conference, protected by the First Amendment. For example, “In August and September, the frequency and the ACLU report on the 2002 WTO protest in virulence of rumors and reports of planned and Washington, D.C., criticized the use of undercov- spontaneous disruptive acts increased, princi- pally via the Internet and other media. Most of er police intelligence sources and pre-emptive these reports were alarming and many were operations against protest groups based on such

32 — Chapter 4. Intelligence and Information Management 1 intelligence. The ACLU cited a number of con- n Assessment to separate truth and accuracy cerns: specifically, that police should limit intelli- from rumors, rhetoric, exaggerations and gence operations to a legitimate law enforcement half-truths; and purpose. There should be a reasonable suspicion n Systems to record and retain the assessments that the targeted group is planning or about to arising out of the intelligence function. engage in criminal activity, not just civil disobedience, based on explicit intelligence and not There is a continuum of intelligence gather- simply on the content of their political speech or ing, from nonintrusive public sources of informa- ideology. There is a recognized need for clear tion to more-intrusive and less-clear areas of police policies outlining operational limitations to in- authority. Some proven sources of information, telligence collection, adequate training for intelli- and their limitations, include the following: gence officers and an oversight mechanism to review ongoing activity for continued justification. n Internet searches: many advocacy organiza- Some jurisdictions are governed by very re- tions either have their own websites or share strictive legislation or ordinances designed to a talk site with affinity groups. There are protect privacy. In these instances, law enforce- several problems with information gleaned ment agencies may be impeded in their efforts to from websites. Protest groups in their zeal gathering helpful intelligence. In jurisdictions to generate interest may overstate expecta- where such intelligence gathering is legally re- tions. More sophisticated protestors may stricted, police departments, being aware of the even post disinformation. While the Inter- applicable limitations, must consider these rami- net can suffer from reliability issues, it also is fications early in the planning process. Other a valuable resource to groups needing to get states have transparency laws that consider most out their message—and tactics—to their police policies and manuals as public records. followers and should not be overlooked; However, in Florida, for example, where this is n Public postings and publications: informa- the case, there also are exemptions for certain tac- tion on planned events, the tone of the de- tical and operational policies and for intelligence bate, a list of participants and preparatory of an open investigative nature.2 Agencies faced gatherings can be collected from these with these issues report that it sometimes delays, sources. Each represents an “intelligence but rarely thwarts legitimate intelligence collec- lead”; tion. Whether collected during an early stage of the planning process or after the event has com- n Assigning plainclothes officers to mingle menced, new intelligence is often responsible for among the crowds: this is commonly done, both small and large adjustments to the execu- but it poses a potential risk to officers. Offi- tion of the plan. Therefore, considerations relat- cers should have a mechanism to report ing to intelligence should include the following: developments back to the agency in a timely fashion; an electronic monitoring device Systems to communicate intelligence in a n may help address these safety concerns. timely manner;

1. For more information go to: http://www.dcwatch.com/police/040311.htm. 2. The Miami Police Department successfully blocked the public dissemination of the FTAA Operational Plan. The court agreed that such tactical information was exempt under existing “Sunshine Laws.”

Chapter 4. Intelligence and Information Management — 33 However, care must be taken to assure that the existing plan. Planners should remain in a con- the operative is in a place where electronic stant state of evaluation to ensure the plan remains monitoring, without a court order, does not an appropriate response, consistent with the cir- violate a legal expectation of privacy; and cumstances. The intelligence function at this stage transitions to a more tactical approach, where in- n Undercover activity within an organization: formation received is quickly assessed to offer this is extremely controversial. An under- timely input to commanders and other decision cover officer can be pulled into the work of makers. Though there is still a strong focus on an organization and become a trusted fel- gathering intelligence, there is now also a need to low traveler. Once an undercover officer be- manage a wide range of information. A formal comes a group member, there is a risk that information/data collection system should cap- he or she may be asked to engage in group ture and record critical information during the activities of questionable legality. Officers event. Key events, decisions and actions (including must be extremely careful not to initiate or their rationale) should be documented to create a encourage illegal behavior from within the historical record of all that took place. Some of the group. Police managers must also under- important elements for command-level personnel stand the importance of recognizing when a to consider in this stage include group is not a threat to public safety and when the operation should be curtailed. Be- n Chronology of the event—maintaining a fore undertaking this type of activity, ap- running account of occurrences; proval should be obtained from the depart- n Information tracking mechanisms—record- ment’s legal advisor or the jurisdiction’s ing the source of information and the time office oflaw. obtained and relayed to command;3

n Command decision recording processes— MANAGING INFORMATION a chronology of decisions, to include when, DURING AN EVENT by whom and the rationale; and The operational aspects of the demonstration n Active deployment of personnel—mapping management plan have gone into effect at this and recording time when deployments were point. All resources are presumably in place, and directed, and other related observations/ the event should be managed according to plan. As outcomes, such as with the pre-event stage, interagency cooperation o Crowd behaviors; and a continuous flow of information are critical- o All pre-arrest warnings; ly important and will determine the event man- o All arrests and detention times of detainees; agement’s success. The planning process should and remain active and flexible as new information o Use of tools, less-lethal munitions or informs the scope and nature of adjustments to other weapons.

3. Source information should not identify confidential sources, but rather officers who have obtained such confidential information.

34 — Chapter 4. Intelligence and Information Management It is desirable to have the documentation support- The department’s use-of-force reporting ed by video where available. This allows the team criteria must be followed during mass demonstra- to maintain an audit of its actions and provide a tion events. It may not be reasonable to expect an rationale for responding to circumstances in a officer to abandon ongoing, front-line, opera- particular way. This practice is especially effective tional tasks to complete a use-of-force report; where officers are deployed for an extended peri- however, after-action reports should include od of time under pressure, when recollection becomes compressed and when incident overload n A detailed account of why force was necessary; leads to memory fatigue. n The type of force used; Documentation, however, need not be limited to handwritten or audio notes. Other accept- n The tools utilized; able methods of documentation include the fol- n Whom the force was directed against; lowing (from the California Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training 2003): n The resultant response of the crowd or

individual; n Still photography

n Any arrests; n Audio recording

n Any injuries observed (to officers, demon- n Video recording strators or bystanders); n Written/log journal n Communications (internal and external)— Reports (including after-action reports) transmitted and recorded; and n n Media reports/footage n Risk management systems activated where 4 needed. n Communication and dispatch tapes/printouts

These details will become critical in prepar- These documentation methods also are ing after-action reports, developing lessons suitable for documenting the following: learned and defending the agency against any al- Public disruption legations of police misconduct. n Police in the United Kingdom recommend a n Property damage practice they have found to be useful and effec- n Injuries (public and police) tive: each field team designates an officer to document, as circumstances permit, a chronological n Collective and individual behavior log of events, orders and decisions affecting the n Individual arrests team. The documentation can be either written or recorded via a handheld audio recording device. n Physical evidence

4. Risk management in this sense refers to the systems and personnel required to respond to issues where use-of-force has occurred. The systems include the accountability measures that were addressed in the plan, investigative functions, health and safety functions and legal support.

Chapter 4. Intelligence and Information Management — 35 POST-EVENT INTELLIGENCE AFTER-ACTION REPORTING Even after a mass demonstration event has con- The importance of early preparation for the cluded and the participants have departed, there after-action report cannot be overemphasized. A is an abundance of information that needs to be process to record key events, decisions and ac- collected. Some is intelligence related: verifying tions should be developed and implemented in reliable sources for future use; identifying intelli- the early stages of event planning, and followed gence shortfalls; and identifying ongoing activity. throughout each event-management phase. Other information includes costs of providing Event managers will benefit from maintaining police services (pre-established accounting pro- certain core documents to assist in countering cedures to isolate event costs) and damages in- post-event criticism or litigation. Two effective curred (procedures to estimate event-related methods of recording event decision making are damage). Details such as these will be critical to the “decision log” and “event file.” The decision an effective after-action critique of the plan and log is a record of the process for arriving at key of the department’s management of the event. It decisions during the event. An Event File con- also may prove vital in preparing for the litiga- taining all relevant documents, emails, corre- tion that is likely to follow such events. spondence and media information will assist in describing the unfolding events in detail. Access to these records will facilitate the speedy produc- tion of the report and give a clear rationale as to why police responded in a particular style. It also will provide a clear audit trail of the rationale behind decision making for any post-event litigation that could occur several years down the line.

36 — Chapter 4. Intelligence and Information Management box 4 After-Action Reporting

by John Gallagher When your department first learns it will be policing a mass demonstration event, a person or The marchers have come and gone. The chanting, group should immediately be tasked with tracking the speeches and even the cleanup are all behind the history of the event. Start at the initial plan- you. But this mass demonstration event is not ning meeting. Throughout the planning process, over just because the protestors have left your your department will undoubtedly engage in a town. Now begins a coordinated effort by some concerted effort to create a forum that respects individuals and groups to shape the history of the and encourages lawful protest. Intensive police previous days. From the moment your police de- planning and training for the event will focus on partment begins to plan for a mass demonstra- restraint, professionalism and the respect of civil tion event, you should also begin developing your liberties. Your department will spend months “post-game” plan. The best event preparation, meeting with protest groups, negotiating with the best efforts at protestor accommodation and their lawyers and offering countless accommoda- the best plan implementation will be forgotten if tions to those seeking to express their First you claim victory too quickly and move on to Amendments rights. Your department leadership other ever-present crises demanding your atten- will take numerous steps to calm the concerns of tion. From your first planning sessions, many residents, protestors and even police officers who months prior to a mass demonstration event, you will be bombarded with media images of chaos at should begin your after-action report. previous protest events in other cities. However, In recent years, the police departments of like a tree falling in the forest, the enormous ef- Philadelphia and the City of Miami have managed forts undertaken by the police department to pro- mass demonstration events. In 2000, Philadel- vide a venue that is safe and inviting will go unno- phia was host to the Republican National Con- ticed in the face of an organized campaign to vention. In 2003, the City of Miami was host to rewrite the story of the event. the conference of the Summit on the Free Trade In both Philadelphia and the City of Miami, Area of the Americas. In each city, the planning the police departments prepared for the after- for these events was initiated more than a full math of the events while simultaneously prepar- year in advance. In each city, the events them- ing for the events themselves. Those who later selves lasted approximately one week. In each claimed that the police showed “deliberate indif- city, the initial response, from the public and the ference” to constitutional rights had a tough sell media alike, consisted of overwhelming praise for due to the fact that the departments had a com- the efforts of the police department. And, in each prehensive record of all the planning undertaken city, informational campaigns, lawsuits and other and all the accommodations provided. In post-event efforts to change that positive impres- Philadelphia, for example, the police department sion will keep those cities busy for years to come. arranged visits to the holding cells by leading civil

Chapter 4. Intelligence and Information Management — 37 rights attorneys during the Republican National in a meaningful and lawful manner. The enormous Convention. Documented records of those visits, efforts to accommodate and protect such protes- summarized in the after-action report, immedi- tors must be documented in a timely after-action ately deflated the manufactured claims of some report. An honest, critical self-assessment in your who sought to project an image of inhumane jail after-action report will help your department and conditions. In the City of Miami, an after-action others avoid repeating mistakes at future events. report was completed within 60 days following At the same time, the rapid documentation of po- the close of the Summit on the Free Trade Area of lice efforts and activities in an after-action report the Americas. The rapid publication of the report shall provide a balance to those who undertake a has inserted the police department’s record into campaign of myth and distortion to mold the his- the informational vacuum that follows the close tory of the event. of such an event—a vacuum that is often filled by those with an interest in portraying the police re- John Gallagher is a federal prosecutor and former sponse in an unfavorable light. White House Fellow. He also has served as a police Your after-action report must not be an after- officer in the NYPD, as legal counsel to the Philadel- thought. The vast majority of protestors at mass phia Police Commissioner and as an Assistant Chief demonstration events are seeking to exercise their in the Miami Police Department. cherished constitutional right to free expression

38 — Chapter 4. Intelligence and Information Management CONCLUSION Information is crucial to managing mass demonstrations. Gathering intelligence from myriad sources prior to the event can help an agency prepare for a host of possible scenarios. Staying aware of developments and breaking events during the demonstration and communicating that information to those who need it can contribute greatly to effective management of the demonstration event. After-action assessments may help agencies examine what worked and what needs to be improved. However, effective information management requires that the agency consider these issues well before a mass demonstration begins, when they can still make a difference in the outcome.

Chapter 4. Intelligence and Information Management — 39 PHOTO COURTESY OF PHOTOS.COM

Roles and Responsibilities

VERVIEW was a major impediment to maintaining and O restoring order. In Boston, the management of In mass demonstrations, as in other law enforcement activities, it is important to clearly delineate mass demonstrations after the Red Sox American the roles and responsibilities of officials, includ- League Championship Series victory over the ing the incident commander, operational com- New York Yankees was significantly impeded be- mander, tactical commander and others. When cause of uncertainty over roles and responsibili- roles and responsibilities are not clear, an agency ties and the absence of a central command center. dramatically reduces its chances of effectively Indeed, it was concluded that this played a role in managing the demonstration. Orders may be in- the death of a young celebrant who was killed by consistent, contrary or not followed. The recent a projectile fired from a police less-lethal weapon experiences of agencies that have managed mass (Stern et al. 2005). demonstrations highlight how imperative it is This chapter focuses on the importance of that everyone knows the “what,” “when” and determining and adhering to roles and responsi- “where” of the expectations placed on them. bilities during a mass demonstration. A signifi- The Seattle Police Department, in its Mardi cant part of the chapter addresses command and Gras after-action report, noted that a breakdown control, while other portions address the roles of a centralized command and control function and responsibilities of specialized units.

Chapter 5. Roles and Responsibilities — 41 COMMAND AND CONTROL STRATEGIC COMMAND Practitioners agree a well-defined, minimal chain The strategic commander, typically the chief of of command is essential when dealing with mass police, establishes the strategic goals for the man- demonstrations. The benefits include better un- agement of the event. It is imperative that the chief derstanding of responsibilities, clarity of decision have an in-depth understanding of the critical is- making and, ultimately, timely actions in re- sues that will arise at the strategic, tactical and op- sponse to developing events. A unified command erational levels to ensure that all strategic decision structure consisting of three levels—strategic, making is based upon informed judgment. The operational and tactical—has proven effective in strategic commander or chief executive also must the field. be able to develop, plan and implement, through The strategic level, involving the incident appointed managers, a coordinated multi-agency commander (e.g., the police chief), is ultimately operation. By approving the operational orders for responsible for the event. The operational level, the event, the chief executive formally acknowl- involving the operational commander, refers to edges overall ownership of the event. the person responsible for managing the actual Mass demonstration events can provide a deployment and response to the event. The tacti- challenge for the agency chief executive. The chief cal level, involving the field commander, manages is ultimately responsible for events, officer behav- the application of resources according to the op- iors and crowd conduct, even though there is erational commander’s plan. This minimal com- usually minimal front-line, direct control over mand chain also is endorsed in the United King- street-level events. The chief executive is operat- dom’s Association of Chief Police Officer’s ing at a strategic command level, with command- (ACPO) guide, Manual of Guidance on Keeping ers and team leaders responsible for controlling the Peace, as an effective practice in protest man- and redirecting officers in ways that can influence agement.1 Department plans may have different crowd behavior. It is thus important that the chief names for these levels of command; however, the executive be involved at the earliest of planning main emphasis is on a clear understanding of the stages. The chief executive also should be keenly role, rather than the name. It is useful to use the aware of the training that has taken place; the term commander or command only in these three available tactics, tools and other resources; and roles to ensure clarity as to who the decision the capabilities and deficiencies of field personnel. makers are. Supporting units or groups should Many believe the chief executive also should not have the term command in their title to avoid lead the pre-event media strategy, providing the any misunderstanding or encroachment into the focus for public inquiry and information. This actual command function. This terminology role in factual communication and reassurance is should be introduced and reinforced in pre-event vital in maintaining a sense of security where planning, training and briefings to ensure that uncertainty exists and in preparing for the post- the role of support agencies is clearly understood. event stage of the media strategy.

1. For more information go to: http://www.acpo.police.uk/policies.asp.

42 — Chapter 5. Roles and Responsibilities OPERATIONAL COMMAND PRACTITIONER PERSPECTIVES At the operational level, guidance and direction ON MASS DEMONSTRATION in accordance with established policy helps en- ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES sure that the operational plan reflects overall The Miami Police Department and the other law strategic objectives, while setting the operational enforcement agencies preparing for the FTAA felt and tactical parameters for the police response. the establishment of a single command center At this level, the operational commander is re- was an absolute necessity. To ensure clear lines of sponsible for reinforcing existing policy or devel- authority and communication, and to provide oping new policy to guide how the police re- real time information for decision making, they sponse is managed. During the event, it is the followed the Incident Command System (ICS) operational commander’s responsibility to assess model. They established an incident commander the situation, consider new intelligence, assess who was supported by the operations, planning, available resources and balance competing de- logistics, and finance sections. As the event grew mands to best achieve the desired outcome. nearer and specific needs and roles became more defined, other support functions (intelligence and hard perimeter) were added. TACTICAL COMMAND Event management included some 40 agen- Tactical issues relate directly to the application of cies that were represented at the Joint Law En- front-line measures that are employed to imple- forcement Operations Command (JLEOC). The ment the operational plan. In most instances, the JLEOC became the operational “nerve center,” direction and guidance here will be adequately staffed by a command team 24 hours a day with covered in strategic objectives and operational the authority to make tactical decisions in re- policy. On occasion, however, specific tactical sponse to unfolding events. In addition to the policy is needed to support front-line decision command team, there was a JLEOC Support making and tactic application. The operational Room where stand-alone work areas offered ac- commander—in response to unfolding events— cess to phones and computers to the representa- will usually direct general tactical policy. On tives of the law enforcement agencies participat- other occasions, usually at short notice, the tacti- ing in the FTAA operation. The presence of these cal commander (field officer or other superviso- representatives and the opportunity for constant ry designee) will be called upon to decide on spe- communication ensured that decisions would cific actions or deployments. When short-notice not be delayed due to the inability to contact a decisions or changes to policy are in order, the di- particular agency. Agencies were tasked with du- rection is more often verbal than written. This in ties that best fit their ability to contribute (e.g., itself adds another dimension and poses chal- marine, air or traffic assignments were relegated lenges to post-event analysis of police response. to those with such capabilities). The primary venue, downtown Miami, was then divided into three tactical commands.

Chapter 5. Roles and Responsibilities — 43 The Boston Police Department and all of its conflicting demands often compete for available federal, state and local law enforcement partners personnel and equipment as well. The key princi- prepared for the 2004 DNC using a multilayered ple for any command protocol policy is that each command structure. The Multi-Agency Commu- commander involved knows the following: nications Center (MACC) was established to n His/her role, responsibilities and objectives; serve as a Strategic Center staffed by top or very high-level personnel from the representative n What resources are allocated to meet those agencies. This was the “big picture” command, responsibilities and objectives; where overall event management was centered. n His/her geographical or functional area of Critical decisions such as requesting major exter- operation; and nal resources or approval to deploy chemicals, for example, would be addressed by the MACC. n The contingency plans for transfer of com- The Joint Operations Center (JOC), where mand when there is: another command-level group of representatives o Federal intervention, if a major/terrorist from participating agencies was housed, was re- incident occurs sponsible for executing and modifying the re- o Specialist team deployment (e.g., a firearms or hostage incident within the sponse and contingency plans. All field reports, main operation). intelligence and other information were coordinated there. Using all sources of input, the JOC In an operation involving mutual aid with determined if course corrections were in order other police or support agencies, there must be and communicated those orders to the tactical an agreement that this command protocol will level. extend to those additional agencies. The Tactical Operations Center (TOC) is where those directions from the JOC are translat- ed to actions in the field. While keeping both the CRIME INVESTIGATION MACC and JOC informed and carrying out their Studies on recent mass event disorders show that designated roles, the TOC commanders were rein many well-publicized events, protesters seek- sponsible for directing field units. ing to direct negative media attention toward the event or the police have developed deliberate COMMAND PROTOCOLS programs intended to force confrontations with law enforcement agencies or other protesting Command protocols are necessary to inform and groups. Operational plans, therefore, should em- direct decision making so that strategic, opera- phasize the potential need for a proactive crimi- tional and tactical commanders know what they nal investigation to detect and address suspicions are expected to achieve and how they will do it. or signs of unlawful activity aimed at physical Command protocols also must address potential- confrontation. The early assignment of a senior ly competing demands. For example, the senior investigator to manage the investigation is valu- investigating officer may require time to investi- able. Likewise, personnel dedicated to gathering gate a crime scene during an incident, and these information and intelligence must be in place to demands might conflict with the operational support the strategy. A detailed policy guide to commander’s ability to protect the scene. These

44 — Chapter 5. Roles and Responsibilities general investigative policing can be found in the control of the incident commander—during those U.S. Department of Justice publication, The At- hours in which the largest crowds were expected. torney General’s Guidelines on General Crimes, Hoping to maximize their former training and ex- Racketeering Enterprise and Terrorism Enterprise isting experience, all the CART team members Investigations.2 were current or former SWAT officers. Each team consisted of a sergeant and three or four officers with specific experience in the use of chemical ir- SPECIALIZED UNITS ritants or other less-lethal impact munitions. Specialized units can fill critical roles during mass demonstrations. Some agencies have learned that the careful deployment of special- Cut Teams ized units can have a significant positive effect on At recent events protestors have been known to managing the demonstration. They are often bet- employ “sleeping dragons” to disrupt traffic or to ter able to move among the crowds, allowing create a diversion. Protestors link themselves to- them to collect intelligence and even dissuade gether by placing their hands into hollow piping criminal activity. Below are examples related to with metal or cement fortification on the outside the use of specialized units during mass demon- of the pipe. In order to separate or remove the stration events. protestors, the pipes must be cut. The Miami Po- lice Department staffed, trained and fielded four “cut teams” to handle such actions. They were Bicycle Patrols staged and scheduled in staggered shifts to pro- The Miami Police Department opted to organize vide maximum coverage throughout the event, a bicycle patrol to escort all major parades and but were instructed to remove these individuals rallies during the FTAA meeting week. They only if they posed a threat to health or safety. For- worked in two teams or platoons, each with radio tunately, the cut teams were never called to ac- access to high-level supervisory personnel. Bicy- tion. The FTAA after-action report notes that cle officers could not only provide a rapid re- protestors may have decided against the use of sponse (unlike cars or vans that would be imped- sleeping dragons “due to media coverage of the ed by heavy vehicular and pedestrian traffic), but expertise developed by those officers charged also present a nonthreatening image to protestors with removing such devices (Timoney 2004).” and the media.

Mounted Teams CART Teams Both the Boston Police Department and the Miami The Seattle Police Department deployed four Police Department deployed mounted units for Chemical Agent Response Teams (CART) to sup- crowd control. The elevated position of the mount- port demonstration management platoons at the ed officers provides a better vantage point from WTO. CART teams were deployed—under the which to observe crowd size, movement and

2. For more information see: http://www.usdoj.gov/olp/generalcrimes2.pdf.

Chapter 5. Roles and Responsibilities — 45 actions, and establishes a highly visible, imposing expressly for the purpose of identifying and arrest- police presence. Though there have been times ing protestors who would turn to violence, looting when demonstrators have attempted to harm po- or property destruction. Thirty members strong, lice mounts, crowds are usually quick to move the team included both plainclothes and uni- when horses are employed to direct them to a spe- formed officers who were responsive to observed cific area. With the help of the Metro-Dade Police acts of criminal misconduct as well as leads devel- Mounted Unit, Miami deployed a team of a dozen oped through intelligence and confidential mounts as a single task force to monitor the down- sources. town area. At the DNC in Boston, mounted units trained with and prepared to deploy with Public Order Platoons, including those from other partic- Arrest (Transport/Booking) Teams ipating agencies. The arrest and processing of persons taken into custody at mass demonstrations and protests can differ from agency to agency just as they do for SWAT Teams everyday arrest situations. Some departments For most police departments, Special Weapons have the luxury of central booking facilities that and Tactics (SWAT) teams represent a ready force focus on getting the arresting officer back on the of expertly trained specialists. As such, their de- street, while others require the arresting officer to ployment during mass demonstration events is a handle all arrest and processing tasks. However, foregone conclusion. For the DNC in Boston, for mass arrest situations, agencies share the pri- SWAT teams from the city and neighboring re- ority of keeping arresting officers on the front- gional teams were deployed at the Fleet Center, line. This typically translates to the creation of the primary event venue, essentially for dignitary transport teams that take control of prisoners and protection. During the Seattle WTO conference, their property and relocate them to processing the SWAT team’s role evolved from demonstra- locations where booking teams complete finger- tion management to readiness for Weapons of prints, photographs and charging documents. Mass Destruction response. The Miami FTAA plan included two internal and seven mutual-aid SWAT Teams at the ready. The two Miami teams COMMUNICATIONS were deployed in 12-hour shifts to maintain Maintaining effective radio communications dur- around-the-clock, stand-by status at police staging a major event is always challenging. The capac- ing areas where they could quickly respond to ity of communications systems and personnel in any critical event, while the other teams were ge- many departments is stretched on a daily basis ographically deployed at key locations around by routine police operations. Add the complexity the city. of a multijurisdictional mass demonstration event, and it can be overwhelming. During the event there will be two systems operating; one Violence Abatement Teams dealing with nonevent calls for service; the other These are special-purpose teams that can be de- dealing with tactical units and support units work- ployed as particular circumstances arise. In Seattle, ing the event. In either a multiagency or single- they were created prior to the WTO conference host event operation, access and technology

46 — Chapter 5. Roles and Responsibilities strategies should be designed to address the fol- There are several options to help mitigate the lowing considerations: problem. These options range from purchasing additional radios for support agencies to technical n The need for a dedicated communications patches for managing otherwise non-compatible channel for strategic, operational and tacti- systems. cal commanders; The Miami Police Department, in prepara- n One or more channels for field officers; tion for the 2003 FTAA, recognized the difficulty that 40 different radio systems/frequencies would n A separate channel for “normal” police pose for effective tactical operations. They as- service continuity; sessed each participating agency’s radio system n A separate channel for logistics; for compatibility well in advance of the event. A dozen participating agencies used systems that n Common terms and procedures across could interface with the Miami radio system. units and agencies. (This should be resolved Through a series of MOU supported agreements, at pre-event training, or in regular major these agencies were able to share their confiden- incident training among partner agencies); tial Motorola key codes, thereby allowing them to and operate on the Miami police radio system. An- n The use of clear, concise English in place of other six agencies were able to install “patches” radio codes. allowing them also to access the Miami police system. These actions gave radio access to nearly Coordinating resources effectively to re- half of the agencies participating in the manage- spond to crisis situations is especially daunting ment of the event. The remaining 22 agencies when disparate radio systems are used by partici- were operating on radio systems that were simply pating agencies. Recent events—from Columbine not compatible. The Miami Police Department to 9/11 to Hurricane Katrina—have demonstrat- was able to assemble some 191 spare radios that ed how incompatible radio systems can cripple were distributed to the operational personnel operations. Those in law enforcement are fully from those agencies. Through effective planning aware of the need for interoperable communica- and cooperative agreement, an unusually high tions systems, but funding constraints and an in- percentage of participating officers were afforded formal territorialism impede such progress in unified radio communications during the event. many jurisdictions. A limited and fragmented The newly created radio network was vastly en- radio spectrum serves as an additional impedi- larged, thus demanding greater airtime disci- ment. At the WTO in Seattle, the FTAA in Miami, pline. To establish better order, eight talk groups the G8 Summit in Savannah, the DNC in Boston, were created along functional lines, and trans- and nearly every other multi-agency operation, it missions were limited to command and control has been highlighted repeatedly that a single com- and emergency situations. Fearing the potential munications system, compatible to all, does not that verbal codes vary from agency to agency, exist. The implications of this fact become readily codes were abandoned in favor of simple every- apparent early in event-management planning. day language.

Chapter 5. Roles and Responsibilities — 47 POLICIES AND PROCEDURES CITIZEN COMPLAINTS Whenever a multi-agency operation relies on of- A formal process and investigative protocol ficers from different police departments to per- should be established to handle complaints from form in situations that may include containment, the public. The public and all participating agen- order maintenance and arrest duties, use-of-force cies should be advised of the process, and all the and rules of engagement, there is a risk that the participating agencies should agree to hold their policies and procedures governing officers will officers accountable for their actions. Each agency vary. Much of this concern can be addressed can investigate only allegations brought against through MOUs and unified training, but there members of its own department. So, after estab- should be a clear understanding by all involved lishing the complaint protocol, participating that the operational policies of the host agency agencies also should agree to submit their find- provide the primary direction to the various ings to the internal affairs division or civilian re- work teams. These policies should be clearly un- view panel of the host jurisdiction for a final tally. derstood by all participating agencies.

48 — Chapter 5. Roles and Responsibilities box 5 Communication During Mass Demonstration Events

by Malcolm McFarland the region. The Federal Joint Operations Center (JOC) was situated close to Sea Island and was During June 6–10, 2004, PERF staff visited the G8 on standby to take control of any critical or terror- summit in Sea Island, Georgia, as part of our on- ist incident. Representatives of the FBI, U.S. Se- going Motorola-sponsored research to develop cret Service, and many other federal agencies with state-of-the-art responses to critical issues facing counterterrorism and mass-destruction responsi- law enforcement. bilities staffed the JOC. The JOC complex also Previous G8 summits (composed of the lead- housed the agencies that had “consequence man- ers of the United States, United Kingdom, Cana- agement” responsibilities (e.g., U.S. Federal Emer- da, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and Russia) and gency Management Agency, U.S. Department of World Trade Organization (WTO) conferences Health and Human Services, U.S. Department of have been the target of organized protest by envi- Energy). ronmental and anti-globalization groups. Many of The day-to-day operations for most state and the protestors were committed to peaceful local agencies were coordinated in the Multi- protest. However, past G8 and WTO protests also Agency Command Center (MACC) at Hunter have attracted violent protests. The last WTO Army Airfield in Brunswick. Staffing mirrored that summit to be held in the United States was in at the JOC and also included federal agency per- Seattle in 1999. The scenes of violent protest re- sonnel. Direct communications with the JOC main vivid in our memory. Protestors caused in allowed timely information and intelligence flow excess of $3 million dollars in damages, and 600 between the two command centers. Of particular arrests were made. G8 summits in Europe also interest was the on-screen display of concurrent have experienced organized violence. In 2001, vi- incident management at both venues, allowing olence in Genoa, Italy, resulted in a fatal police for a speeding up the information process. The shooting and 300 arrests. software program allowed all participants to see With this history in mind, security prepara- the particular events requiring their attention as tions for the Sea Island, Georgia, G8 summit well as the specific agency tasked with respond- began twelve months before the July 2003 event, ing to that event. The JOC and the MACC had with an intensive planning operation and security large-screen displays that could be viewed from program involving 62 law enforcement agencies. any desk in the building. Both centers had im- The lead agency for the Georgia Governor’s Office pressive logistic support, including continuous was the Criminal Justice Coordinating Council. food and beverage service. Focusing specifically on interagency commu- The respective sheriff’s departments coordi- nications, the management of the event was coor- nated the policing deployment and protest re- dinated from a number of command centers in sponse activity in Brunswick and Savannah. These

Chapter 5. Roles and Responsibilities — 49 departments also were linked to the MACC to en- there a determined protest along the route by sure uninterrupted information and intelligence approximately 80 protestors. No incidents were re- transfer. In all, more than 2,700 local, state and ported, and police deployment was not significant. federal officers, as well as more than 5,000 mili- In Brunswick, police officers easily marshaled tary personnel, were engaged in the operation. a small number of protestors. It is fair to say that The build-up to the event was closely covered the extensive and thorough security plans were in the local and international media. A Joint Infor- never seriously tested during the G8 summit peri- mation Center was established where public in- od and that the highly trained and skilled immedi- formation officers assembled in a one-stop shop ate response teams and field reaction force units for G8 security information. were not significantly deployed. Brad Brown, the In Savannah, protestors were permitted to Mayor of Brunswick, best summed up the G8 gather in Forsyth Park, a short walk from the center event with this statement, “We prepared for the of town, and a four-mile protest route was author- worst and we got the best.” ized. As it turned out, the number of protestors never exceeded 100; there were much fewer pro- Malcolm McFarland is the Superintendent of the testers on most occasions. They were inevitably Police Service of Northern Ireland. In 2004 Malcolm outnumbered by the media and even more so by was a PERF Fellow, bringing his considerable experi- security personnel. Only on one occasion was ence in demonstration management to this project.

50 — Chapter 5. Roles and Responsibilities CONCLUSION During mass demonstrations, law enforcement personnel from chiefs to officers need to understand their roles and responsibilities and adhere to them. Determining these roles ahead of time will help individuals better understand what is expected of them during the event. To the extent possible, roles should not be changed mid-event, and every person should have one role to assume, thus avoiding various, and sometimes conflicting, duties.

Chapter 5. Roles and Responsibilities — 51 PHOTO BY GAVIN MACVICAR

Crowd Control and Use-of-Force

VERVIEW nature of these three issues, including the needs O to develop clear policies and procedures, as Crowds can vary dramatically in size, composition, intentions and behaviors. Crowds can be well as to specify the equipment and tools that small, large or larger than expected. They can be will enhance the agency’s ability to control composed of one group with one goal or multi- crowds, makes mass arrests and use force, if ple groups whose goals can be similar or in oppo- necessary. sition. Crowds can be completely peaceful or law- abiding, or they can contain disruptive and CROWD CONTROL destructive elements. The possible combinations The following key principles should be consid- are almost limitless, thus creating an enormous ered during the planning, briefing and deploy- number of contingencies law enforcement agen- ment stages of any policing operation involving cies must identify and handle effectively. Whatev- the management of crowds: er the contingencies, agencies must carefully con-

sider three issues: crowd control, mass arrests and n Intelligence. Prior to any event, the police use-of-force. This chapter discusses the critical should identify groups who might be

Chapter 6. Crowd Control and Use-of-Force — 53 involved—their intentions, tactics, notions FORMATIONS of acceptable behavior and views of other Police formations—such as columns, skirmish groups. Intelligence also may indicate the lines, wedges, half-step movements, and con- proportion of activists within a crowd and trolled rushes—when properly employed against how homogenous that crowd might be in a large gathering are among the most practical its intention, or the balance of those prone methods of crowd control. Formations may be to violence and those who are peaceful; employed to disperse, contain, move or block n Facilitation. The police should seek to facil- large numbers of people. The use of formations is itate any lawful and legitimate aims of particularly effective when attempting to disperse groups who are present—especially when crowds in urban areas because they enable the conflict breaks out. The aim should be to police to split a crowd into smaller segments. permit the pursuit of lawful actions while Though smaller crowds may be easier to deal dealing with groups acting illegally; with, it cannot be assumed they have been capit- ulated. The resultant smaller mobs are entirely Communication. The police should com- n capable of initiating riotous acts such as sniping, municate to the crowd how they are seeking looting and burning. Commanders must realize to facilitate the crowd’s legitimate aims and both the value and the limitations of formations. how the illegitimate actions of some in the In the Seattle Mardi Gras demonstration, for ex- crowd may serve to impede those aims. ample, police found that the growing size of the Communication should be through indi- crowd, accompanied by increasing violence, con- viduals respected by crowd members. Meet- stituted sufficient cause for officers to retreat for ing and establishing communication with their own safety. However, it was not possible to protest groups at an early stage in the plan- reinsert these officers later. ning process should help; and Once the determination has been made to n Recognition. Officers must be mindful that deploy police in formations, appropriate support a crowd can consist of a variety of persons, must be in place to provide a suitable measure of present for a range of reasons. When vio- officer safety. Since officers in the formation will lence starts, there is the risk of dealing with be focused on the crowd before them, other offi- all those present as if they are hostile protes- cers must be in place to protect the formation tors. However, especially in such situations, line from an attack on a blind side. Rooftops it is crucial to treat people with respect and must be secured to help prevent assault from win them to law enforcement’s side, not the these vantage points. Helicopter observation is side of those already promoting conflict. It one method of visually securing rooftops. De- may be necessary to facilitate the desires of ploying officers as spotters on rooftops is another. the many, such as the wish to peacefully However, when officers are stationed in high protest, so that the demonstrators may as- buildings or on rooftops, all other officers must be sist the police with their overall intention, informed of this to avoid the possibility of control which is to prevent disorder. force members being mistaken for hostile actors. In the 2004 American League Championship

54 — Chapter 6. Crowd Control and Use-of-Force Series demonstration, Boston police were unable Litigation has included criticism of under- to place observers on rooftops. This greatly hin- staffed prisoner processing operations that, when dered their efforts to control the crowds that sub- overwhelmed, led to inordinate detention with- sequently did gain the high ground and used it to out charge. This occurred at the Republican Na- frustrate police efforts. tional Convention in 2004 and led to court in- When the use of formations is no longer an structions and fines for inordinate delay in effective control option and a crowd refuses to processing detained persons (New York Times comply with the lawful and necessary orders of 2004). Research into recent mass-arrest opera- the police, other techniques such as mass arrests tions shows that arrests are easily accomplished. or controlled use-of-force (e.g., chemical agents) The areas where problems arise with sudden, but may be needed. If the decision is made to arrest now predictable, regularity are crowd members, formations may be useful to control further movement of the crowd. Arrest n The quality of evidence available to pursue teams can then escort arrestees back and out prosecution against each individual; through the formation. n The logistics of transporting and handling large numbers of prisoners;

MASS ARRESTS n Allowing legal and medical access;

We have seen from police after-action reports and n An inordinate delay in arranging for release third-party reviews of police practices that the or bringing persons to court; mass detention of protestors not actively engaged Not enough police on duty to cope with the in violence can create significant problems for law n enforcement agencies (New York Civil Liberties above—process centers are frequently over- Union 2004). Mass arrests during demonstrations whelmed at an early stage due to lack of rein Washington, D.C., New York City and other sources; and major locales have been criticized. In some cases, n In some cases, the courts have ruled that top the protest activity, while unlawful, was not neces- police officials can be held personally liable sarily violent. Complaints included that law-abid- for damages or actions. ing protestors and passersby were rounded up and detained along with violators in overly broad Mass arrests are generally advisable only sweeps. The negative impact of these media im- when all alternative tactics have either been tried ages damages the public perception of the police unsuccessfully or are unlikely to be effective operation, as it draws into question the reason- under specific circumstances. When mass-arrest ableness and proportionality of the police re- tactics are used, evidence against each individual sponse. Subsequent litigation has proven to be prisoner must be available to support the particularly costly. In most instances only a tiny charges. Arrest tactics training is a critical com- number of those arrested actually appear in court ponent of mission success. The training must ad- and most of those are charged with offenses that dress the spectrum of event types: non-violent would not normally attract an arrest or detention protest, non-violent civil disobedience, passive (Temple 2003). Law enforcement agencies need to resistance (including the use of chains, sleeves ensure that operational commanders have a clear and other devices to impede arrest) and violent and uniform understanding of the mass-arrest policy to be followed.

Chapter 6. Crowd Control and Use-of-Force — 55 confrontation. Training must recognize the dif- the media covers mass demonstration events. ference between two arrest scenarios: Needless to say, it is the goal of some protesting factions to provoke the official use-of-force, know- n Arrest tactics where police are in control of ing full well that the incident will be broadcast the environment and have time to plan and around the world. implement the arrests or dispersal in a con- Every police agency is governed by policies trolled manner, (e.g., at a sit-down protest); regulating use-of-force. The agency’s use-of-force and continuum or model should not be adjusted or n Arrest tactics where police do not control modified for mass demonstration events. The the environment (e.g., when police are try- rules of engagement need to be consistent among ing to re-establish control of the environ- participating agencies. The theory of a graduated ment by arresting violent demonstrators). use-of-force in response to escalating disorder is based on what is both reasonable and propor- Pressure point techniques, in conjunction tionate to the threat. An appropriate response with empty hand control, efficient handcuffing, must be stressed at all times, especially given the and arrestee escort methods should be included amount of media attention that focuses on police to remove protesters humanely while minimizing when disorder erupts during mass demonstra- risk of injury to protestors and police. Such tactics tions, and how this attention affects the public should be part of ongoing and regular refresher perception of the department. Chief executives training to ensure officers maintain efficiency. should review department policies governing the Tactical commanders present at many of use of less-lethal munitions to ensure consistency the demonstration events reviewed by PERF in application in mass demonstration events. In agreed that unless the actions of certain protes- particular, the appropriate level of authority to tors necessitate their removal, the better course of approve deployment and use of these weapons action is not to expend resources on arrests. For should be agreed on by all participating agencies example, in instances where sleeping dragons are at an early stage. It is incredibly difficult to de- situated so as to disrupt traffic, it may be less of a fend conflicting levels of force application. drain on already-thin operational resources to For the FTAA demonstration, the Miami simply monitor them and reroute traffic. More- Police Department chose the pepper ball round over, protest organizers have on occasion sched- as the less-lethal method to be deployed against uled “officer intensive” diversions just before they individuals disturbing the peace. The pepper ball undertake more violent or destructive actions is designed to strike the target and deliver an irri- elsewhere, calculating that the police would be tating blast of pepper spray that temporarily too busy handling the mass arrest to respond to hampers the target’s breathing and vision with- further actions. out causing long-term negative effects. However, the tool was found to be less effective than expected. SWAT members reported that five or USE-OF-FORCE more rounds had to be fired at an individual be- The use-of-force by police against the public, fore it achieved a deterrent effect. In their after- no matter the need or justification, usually con- action report, the Miami Police Department in- veys a disturbing appearance. The prospect of cap- dicated a need to evaluate other methods for turing such confrontations is part of the reason future operations to determine if the desired

56 — Chapter 6. Crowd Control and Use-of-Force effect can be achieved more efficiently. The that non-arrest methods of crowd control are to Boston Police Department conducted a critical be the first and preferred options. In fact, the pol- review of its training and use of less-lethal icy specifies that, absent safety concerns, arrests weapons after police fired a plastic, pepper-spray- and applications of force should be carried out filled projectile that killed a young woman in and documented by units at the specific direction 2005. The FN303 firing device is often used be- of a Metropolitan Police Department assistant cause it was designed to avoid causing bodily in- chief. Moreover, any use of chemical agents must jury. However, instructions indicate that it should be authorized by the chief of police or his de- not be aimed above the waist. The young woman signee. The policy establishes a specific reporting who was killed was unintentionally struck in the requirement to ensure that all use-of-force inci- eye. Police professionals should not necessarily dents are promptly reported by the ranking com- abandon the use of this type of device, but should mand officer to the department’s Joint Operations be aware of incidents such as this and provide Command Center (JOCC), where they are for- proper training in order to avoid similar mally documented and initially reviewed. Subse- tragedies. quent review will take place in the official after- After the experience of managing major action report. The department clearly establishes mass demonstration events in Washington, D.C., and defines various levels of force and the use-of- Metropolitan Police Department managers in force continuum that is applicable only to crowd 2003 recognized that the reporting, documenta- control situations. Additionally, the department tion and investigative aspects of existing use- identifies the various circumstances in which force of-force policies were not fully practical for civil may be necessary during crowd control situations. disturbance situations. Factors that presented As in all use-of-force investigations, the de- unique obstacles to force investigations during a partment’s office of professional responsibility is civil disturbance included safety concerns for charged with conducting a thorough investigation force investigators; logistical challenges relating to of force incidents that take place during mass securing the scene; challenges to collecting evi- demonstration events. Within the limitations of an dence in a fluid situation; and the documentation ongoing demonstration event, a force investigation of events in a hostile environment. As a result, the team, headed by a captain, is tasked with maintain- department developed a new, more-responsive ing a rapid-response capability to allow them to policy to be implemented only when the chief of gather as much information as possible (on-site police declares a civil disturbance condition. In evidence, video footage, medical reports, etc.). A those instances, the Civil Disturbance Use-of- member of that team is assigned to the JOCC to Force Reporting and Investigation Protocol ap- coordinate the flow of force-related information plies not only to the Metropolitan Police Depart- necessary to conduct a full investigation. ment, but also to all officers from agencies working under contract with them during the de- clared condition. The policy clearly spells out the PRE-EVENT BRIEFINGS responsibility to preserve the peace and to arrest Pre-event briefings of personnel should include those who engage in criminal misconduct, all the a discussion of the rules of engagement; the use- while protecting demonstrators’ rights to peaceful of-force policy; and the authority to direct the assembly and free speech. Officers are instructed use-of-force, specialized tools and weapons. It

Chapter 6. Crowd Control and Use-of-Force — 57 is recommended that potential scenarios be reveals that special consideration should be given discussed and practiced in advance of each oper- to two additional equipment-related issues: ation to ensure a uniform understanding of the n Image. Experience shows that the appear- level of force to be used at the outset. This must ance of heavily protected “Robocop” offi- then be communicated to all officers likely to be cers sends a clear message to assembled involved in the response to a particular scenario. protestors. Its use has had a deterrent effect For example, if a sit-down protest is encountered, on most persons and has assisted in main- officers should be pre-briefed that the initial re- taining public confidence that police are in moval tactic will be a verbal warning followed control. However, this image also can have a by a specifically identified use-of-force action. negative effect on the public. Media accounts Additional use-of-force, if necessary, would then of protected officers facing off against peaceful be applied at the discretion of the field officer in demonstrators can lead to a public perception accordance with existing departmental policy. that the police are being heavy handed and This practice reduces some of the last-minute overreacting, thus generating criticism of the planning and communication that can easily lead department; and to less-effective event management. n Deployment. The deployment of protected officers needs careful thought. They are a EQUIPMENT AND TOOLS necessary part of the police response, but The list of the tools and equipment available for the timing and nature of their deployment proactive crowd management and officer protec- should be carefully balanced against the po- tion is extensive. The focus of this section will be tential negative effect of such action. It is on those items and issues that are most relevant to recommended that any decision to deploy recent situations or that have been identified as protected officers be fully recorded in an particularly useful or controversial. Some of the event log for reference in the after-action tools fall into both categories, in which case em- report. phasis is on the appropriate use of such equipment to maximize effect and minimize the possibility of The use of standard-issue equipment, such negative outcomes and criticism. The issues high- as straight- or side-handle batons, hand-held lighted are protective equipment, less-lethal op- pepper spray and conducted-energy devices tions and barriers. (tasers, stunguns, etc.) should be reviewed for applicability, proper utilization (both technique and placement within the use-of-force continu- PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT um) and officer proficiency. Training should CONSIDERATIONS include both a review of the use-of-force policy Officer safety is an inherent goal of any mass and a hands-on demonstration of officer profi- demonstration event, particularly where disorder ciency. Specialized tools such as long batons and is expected or anticipated. Protective equipment riot shields will require regular training to ensure for officers comes in a variety of forms. When officer proficiency, even as the value of such tools choosing gear, it is important to balance flexibil- is debated. Some view them as necessary to pro- ity of movement against level of protection. tect front-line officers from debris and missiles; A review of recent mass demonstration events others view them as a hindrance, as they can limit

58 — Chapter 6. Crowd Control and Use-of-Force an officer’s ability to make an arrest or maneuver officers are attempting to accomplish (e.g., quickly to avoid injury. contain, make arrests, quell disorder);

n The option should be used only until the desired effect is achieved; LESS-LETHAL DEVICES The deployment and use of less-lethal equipment n Use should be frequently reassessed to en- is normally a response to escalating disorder and sure continued need for deployment;

violence. Less-lethal methods for restoring order n The deployment and use should be author- are always contentious, whether referring to en- ized at the agreed supervisory/command gaging in physical contact; discharging projec- level; tiles, gases and chemicals; or using conducted- n The decision and the circumstances leading energy devices.1 to the use should be documented to sup- There are two critical questions police offi- port after-action reporting and any subse- cials must ask themselves before deploying such quent inquiry or litigation; equipment: Is the equipment best suited to remove the threat to front-line officers and enable n The incident commander, operational com- them to maintain or regain their objectives? Is its mander, tactical commander, and public in- use reasonable, balanced and proportionate in formation officer must be kept accurately light of the above? informed on use to allow them to update A review of recent mass demonstration media spokespersons and to maintain the events provides numerous positive examples of media initiative; the appropriate use of less-lethal equipment in n The incident commander, operational com- crowd control. The public, media and judicial mander, tactical commander, field officers system, it has been shown, will readily support and supervisors must have detailed knowl- the proper application of force under such cir- edge of the effect and limitations of each cumstances. However, the same review also re- option to assist in authorizing use; and veals that when inappropriately used, such op- n Officers deployed in the field with less- tions have, at best, led to severe criticism and, at lethal options must, without exception: worst, to loss of life and injury, considerable o Be fully trained in their use, including damage to the department’s reputation and sig- regular refresher training nificant litigation. The following guidelines are o Be fully aware of the capabilities of the based on lessons learned and best practices option known to exist when determining deployment o Be fully aware of the limitations of the and use of less-lethal options: option o Be empowered to make the final decision n The use must be balanced against the threat to use, or not to use, the option as cir- faced by front-line officers and the goal cumstances dictate.

1. Additional equipment currently used to support law enforcement initiatives are listed in: “Department of Defense on Non-lethal Weapons and Equipment Review: A Research Guide for Civil Law Enforcement and Corrections.” Available at: http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/200516.pdf#search=’Department% 20of%20Defense%20on%20Nonlethal%20Equipment%20and%20Weapons%20Review%3A%20A%20 Research%20Guide%20for%20Civil%20Law%20enforcement%20and%20Corrections%E2%80%99’.

Chapter 6. Crowd Control and Use-of-Force — 59 Police managers must ensure, through a included to allow police to cross barriers in re- system of checks and balances, that any use of sponse to crowd dynamics, or to allow crowds to less-lethal options are necessary and proportion- cross barriers for safety reasons (e.g., to escape a ate, and can be supported in after-action inquiry major catastrophe). Though barriers must be through sufficiently detailed records. When staffed, their use is highly recommended to allow properly applied, less-lethal weapons can be ef- a smaller number of officers to control a much fective tools in accomplishing the police mission. larger area. In mass demonstration events, absent a specific Multi-agency operations frequently raise an and immediate need for self-defense, less-lethal issue of equipment parity. This was particularly use-of-force directed at a crowd should occur evident during the 2004 G8 Summit in Savannah only at the direction of a supervisor. and the DNC in Boston. On both occasions, differences in equipment type and deployment policies were identified at an early stage, with plan- BARRIERS ners quickly realizing that these differences could Physical barriers are commonly used to assist in have a detrimental effect during the operation. crowd management and can take many forms. Effective management and pre-event training al- Barriers can extend police resources when de- lowed the hosts to specify exactly what equip- mand is high, but should be considered a support ment would be carried by participating agencies option and not a substitute for personnel. The and how and at what level it would be authorized primary purposes of barrier use are to for use. In the event an equipment variance could not be unified, the command levels recognized n Control crowd movement (e.g., in the case the nature of the variance and deployed the re- of enclosing/defining legal protest areas); sources with full knowledge of their exact capabilities, thus avoiding potential for conflict with n Prevent street/building access to restricted or vulnerable areas; and event policy and command. The Miami Police Department, a day before n Channel or guide protestors along a partic- the FTAA conference, erected a fixed barrier to ular route. contain a “restricted area” that could be accessed only with the appropriate credentials. A security Barrier type should reflect the intended use. fence, rented at a cost of approximately $200,000, One excellent example of an effective, flexible was installed (Timoney 2004). This patented de- and positive image barrier involves the use of po- sign fence is constructed of interlocking steel lice bicycles to screen crowds and control access. panels with tight mesh to prevent protestors from However, barriers to prevent determined access gaining a handgrip to climb or pull on the fence. should be more substantial. Three such barriers It also has a metal plate attached at the bottom already have proved effective at mass events in that extends approximately three feet toward the Savannah, Boston and New York: thirty-six-inch crowd. This was found to be a very effective fea- perimeter fencing (bike-rack style); 6’-8’ fencing ture because in order to get close enough to the to prohibit access to areas; and K-rail cement di- fence to attempt to tear it down, protestors had to viders. A crucial consideration when placing bar- stand on the plate, thereby making it impossible riers, particularly those that are more robust and to lift. static, is that sufficient exits and gates must be

60 — Chapter 6. Crowd Control and Use-of-Force CONCLUSION Law enforcement agencies should be aware of the various types of behaviors associated with demonstrations, and determine the law enforcement response appropriate for each behavior. The ability of law enforcement to maintain or restore order is highly dependent upon a thorough understanding of the factors surrounding the purpose of the gathering, the type of crowd and its potential behaviors.

Chapter 6. Crowd Control and Use-of-Force — 61 PHOTO BY KENN KISER

Media Relations

VERVIEW partnering with the media, the potential increas- O es for all parties to win, public confidence to be Recent experiences clearly demonstrate the media’s increasing attention to mass demonstra- maintained and the reputation of the law en- tions. Contributing to this heightened news cov- forcement agencies to be enhanced. In short, it is erage is the fact that well-organized demonstra- about getting the right message out at the right tors often tip media sources as to the locations time, in the right place and by the right person. and timeframes of their activities in order to Police can work with media outlets to dissemi- maximize publicity. Media saturation means that nate planning information, and the media can be law enforcement operations are increasingly in assured they will receive timely and factual infor- the spotlight and that police chiefs are subject to mation as the demonstration progresses. It is im- criticism for their actions, or lack thereof. As a portant that the police take a proactive stance; result, event management must include a media without a clear media strategy, police operations strategy. will likely be forced onto a reactive footing. An integrated media strategy seeks to man- Under such a scenario, the police would forfeit age and harness the media attention in order to their ability to manage the release of information help achieve the overall policing objectives. By and the opportunity to provide accurate details.

Chapter 7. Media Relations — 63 This chapter focuses on the need to develop equipment available to the media’s photogra- a comprehensive media relations policy for mass phers and film crews. The more the police can demonstrations. This includes working with anticipate and address the media’s needs in ad- media representatives before, during and after an vance, the more accurate and thorough the re- event. Particular attention is devoted to ports will likely be. spokespersons, joint information centers and In order to avoid misunderstandings, the press conferences. police department’s standing media policies as well as special procedures relating to a specific event need to be disseminated to and discussed MEDIA STRATEGY with media representatives well in advance. The Prior to the event, the police should prepare a aim of such polices should, at a minimum, in- press release, or even a press briefing, to assure clude the following: the public they are adequately staffed and have n Promote police integrity and professionalism; properly prepared to maintain public order and keep the community safe. The information pre- n Reassure citizens that the law will be en- sented should outline the following: forced and that their safety is paramount to the police; n Anticipated protest activities; n Deter criminals by reinforcing the depart- Efforts undertaken to ensure a peaceful n ment’s resolve to arrest those who commit outcome; crimes; n A commitment to uphold civil liberties for n Minimize disruption of the routine of the all, commensurate with the challenges to be public; and faced; n Ensure a timely flow of accurate informa- Specific parade or protest routes; n tion to the public about the event. n Locations subject to disruption of normal business or traffic; On-scene supervisors and managers will likely be too busy to grant interviews, but should The extent of disruption expected; and n be well versed in the department’s media policies n Alternative routes and/or mass transit and practices. They should be able to refer news alternatives. outlets to an appropriate source for timely com- mentary. As has been stressed throughout these Also, leaders should reiterate that the police guidelines, agencies must begin planning as early are well prepared, and call for the public to re- as practical. In preparation for the 2004 DNC, the main calm. Whenever possible, hard copies out- Boston Police Department initiated the planning lining specific details should be prepared for dis- process more than a year in advance of the actual tribution to the media to help ensure accurate event. A media subcommittee was established reporting later. Recognizing that the media, ide- early in the process. It was determined that the ally, needs current photos and video footage to Boston Police would be sharing event responsibil- accompany their stories, the police should make ity with the Secret Service, which would be re- the department’s chief executive, event com- sponsible for security and operations inside the mander, mounted units, canine teams and special Fleet Center (the actual event venue). Therefore,

64 — Chapter 7. Media Relations these two agencies spearheaded the media sub- usually handled by the PIO. A Level 2 release is of committee. The group held monthly meetings, an unusual nature, such as mass arrests or opera- which were attended by representatives of the 14 tions resulting in injury. Operational commanders agencies thought to be best suited to address an- most often handle these releases. The most serious ticipated media inquires. In Miami, home to the are Level 3 releases, which could inform of deaths 2003 FTAA conference, the police department’s or a major impact to the city and are handled by planning process also preceded the event by a the chief of police and sometimes the mayor. Re- year and involved input from as many as 40 agen- gardless of the press-release strategy determined cies (including surrounding police departments) by the police, it is imperative that all staff members that would supply public information officers understand who is authorized to speak on various during the event. topics. Additional points to remember when engaged in media interviews include

PUBLIC INFORMATION n Focus on key messages; Some feel the release of information concerning n Never criticize partner agencies; an event is deemed more reliable and seamless n Always protect intelligence sources; and when a single public information officer (PIO), guided by advisors, is selected for this role. Other n There is no such thing as “off the record.” departments have been successful, however, in training a larger number of officers to serve as the department’s on-camera representative. In either JOINT INFORMATION CENTERS case, the person(s) chosen for this role should be A Joint Information Center (JIC) is a common qualified (by rank or experience), well informed feature among police departments that have suc- and comfortable in media interview situations. cessfully prepared for large-scale events. The pur- There is no set or minimum rank or level of ex- pose of the JIC is to provide a single point of con- perience for a PIO, but persons recognized for tact that the media and public can call to receive their expertise or supervisory/command level routine information and seek the answers to spe- among members of the department can offer the cific questions they may have. The operational public a considerable degree of confidence. format of the JIC varies from agency to agency, Many departments believe the public—and but most agree that the JIC should be in a secure the media—have greater confidence in the accu- location that is not physically accessible to the racy of information when it comes from the “face media during the event. of the department” they have come to know and In Boston, the JIC was set up in a secure trust. This familiarity and trust is developed over area within the Boston Police Headquarters, time. In Washington, D.C., for example, Sergeant apart from the everyday public information of- Joe Gentile has been the police department’s on- fice. Representatives of the 14 agencies were avail- camera representative for over three decades and able from 8:00 a.m. to midnight throughout the has earned an enormous amount of respect and event. By having a member from every involved trust from the media. police agency (and other appropriate govern- The police in Seattle categorize press releases mental entities) in the JIC, there was an expecta- according to the importance of their content. tion that the most appropriate agency representa- A Level 1 release is routine information that is tive could quickly research any inquiry. Realizing

Chapter 7. Media Relations — 65 that the bulk of activity and media investigation between field units and operational command- would not take place after midnight, overnight ers, the communications/dispatch centers and staffing was limited to the Boston Police, the top departmental officials. JIC managers unani- Massachusetts State Police and the Secret Service. mously agreed that their most vital link to accu- Also, a large-screen monitor was positioned in rate information was with the operational and/or the JIC for all participants to view transcribed tactical centers. This provided real-time access to text of incoming calls for service related to the information “from the street” or other hub of ac- event. This monitor included important infor- tivity. Typically, these centers also are the recep- mation concerning threats, suspicious packages tion points of live feeds from aerial support and and general data such as the number of arrests. stationary cameras. In Boston, for example, some Each member of the JIC staff also was outfitted twenty cameras were positioned around the with a telephone and a home agency-linked com- event area to monitor key points relative to the puter. In Miami, officers from every participating Democratic National Convention. Operational agency were present in the JIC and were connect- commanders also benefited from a live feed from ed by radio and telephone to their respective the Massachusetts State Police helicopter. The JIC agencies. There, field information was further en- also should be outfitted with televisions tuned to hanced by means of an ongoing flow of commu- the local and national news channels covering the nications from roving public information teams event. Monitoring media outlets permits an op- deployed in the streets. portunity for prompt correction or rebuttal In Miami during the FTAA meetings, rather when the media supplies erroneous information. than centralizing all of public information re- Failure to respond quickly and accurately when sources in the JIC, three multi-agency teams, the department’s actions are criticized has proven each consisting of three specifically trained pub- to be costly to police departments and their chief lic information officers, were deployed to the executives. It is vital that the department be fully areas of activity to provide immediate informa- aware of what is being reported, and by whom. In tion release and control as events unfolded. These the event the department itself has released mis- teams monitored police radio traffic to deter- information, a prompt correction is vital. mine hot spots and where they might be needed. When Seattle activates a JIC, at least two in- Operational commanders had the option of dividuals are assigned exclusively to monitoring fielding questions and conducting interviews, or media reports. Major news services and local they could call in a public information team. print media websites also should be monitored. In addition to the public information staff This level of monitoring—around the clock dur- assigned to the JIC and placed in roving field ing the event—is vital to ensuring that the de- teams, departments agreed on the vital impor- partment’s public information officials and top tance of tasking a PIO with disseminating re- administrators are aware of what is being report- leasable information in a timely manner. It also ed, both accurately and inaccurately. JIC opera- has been suggested that the PIO should have tions in Seattle also include a formal briefing at ready access to the department’s legal advisor. Be- shift change to communicate relevant informa- fore personnel assigned to the JIC can release in- tion to the incoming staff. formation, they must have access to the informa- In keeping with the primary objective of the tion of interest. This implies the need for an open JIC—to collect and disseminate accurate and time- and accurate flow of information among and ly information—it is critical to develop procedures

66 — Chapter 7. Media Relations to facilitate the release of information and to transmissions, mass email and website postings. make sure the media understands these proce- During the FTAA, the Miami Police Department dures. Well in advance of the event, the media maintained a requirement to release an update of must be informed of what type of information information every three hours. They arranged to expect and what methods for accessing that with the U.S. Coast Guard to be given access to a information to use. computer program through which they could To address reporters’ specific questions post news updates on the Coast Guard website. about the DNC, the Boston Police Department By continually posting and updating information released “media only” telephone numbers for the about the number of protestors, arrest numbers JIC. The numbers were released only to pre-iden- and locations, fire and rescue calls, traffic issues tified media and only a few days before the event. and commuter information (subway or road clo- The Boston Police Department employed this sures), and answers to frequently asked ques- method because once the JIC becomes active, the tions, many general inquiry calls from the media telephone number provided to the media should were precluded. be staffed around the clock. Additionally, depart- In addition to the ongoing flow of informa- ments have found it valuable to have each media tion, news agencies need sound bites, photos and agency provide one point of contact (for the po- video footage. To meet this need, and to demon- lice) at their news desk during the event. Finally, strate openness and accessibility, the police de- it is agreed that every telephone transaction that partment may wish to establish a daily briefing occurs within the JIC must be documented. De- and question-and-answer opportunity with the tails of every inquiry and answer provided should chief executive and other appropriate representa- be fully captured and retrievable. Not only is this tives. If the event and the police response become important in the event of future litigation, but more newsworthy, it may be necessary to host also it can be useful in identifying lessons multiple briefings each day. Miami officials felt learned. the pre-arranged press conferences, as well as Miami’s PIO teams in the field, provided the department an opportunity to show its officials and PRESS CONFERENCES officers in “soft” and familiar uniforms, which PIOs and media professionals agree that when helped balance the sometimes heavily armored “pushing information,” the police department images often shown in media reports. has the opportunity to include details and per- Press conferences need not be exclusively spectives it feels are worthy of the public interest. reactive and focused on the police response to in- Though the media can, and will, edit what the cidents. They also can serve as a vehicle for the police release, it is far better for the department department to push good news. A thorough pub- to put out information rather than simply re- lic information staff working through a large- spond to inquiries. In the interest of furthering scale event can uncover human-interest stories this goal, the Seattle Police Department policy, that humanize the police and highlight their ef- for example, requires the PIO to schedule press forts. Understandably, the media is on the hunt conferences at regular intervals throughout large- for action stories, but there also are opportunities scale events. to air or print “lighter” news. These opportunities Regular updates and specific releases are should be maximized. Most importantly, don’t typically handled by means of broadcast fax change the rules. Once the media is prepared to

Chapter 7. Media Relations — 67 work with the department’s policies, change can the event; the chief executive and key spokesper- be viewed as indecisiveness and, in some in- sons should be prepared with an initial assess- stances, as favoritism. If something is not work- ment and a media exit strategy. This requires the ing and change is necessary, it is vital that every- spokespersons to be fully informed of summary one be informed before the change takes place. information (i.e., facts related to injuries or deaths, numbers of arrests, ongoing conditions, and the like). This is an excellent opportunity for POST-EVENT ACTIVITIES the department to demonstrate its awareness and Without question, the media will focus on the control throughout the event. happenings they find most newsworthy. Howev- In the post-event phase, the policy direction er, their reporting can serve to restore calm. For will be the benchmark against which police activ- example, as things begin to return to normal, the ity will be assessed. Commanders can clearly reporting and imagery of roadblocks being taken audit why they took particular action, and their down, streets being reopened and buses depart- decisions can be measured against the stated ing the event area can calm the public and further strategic and operational objectives established help to restore normalcy. There surely will be under the same policies. From a public perspec- considerable ongoing media attention well after tive, displaying a high professional standard will any mass demonstration event. The actions of the enhance the community’s confidence in the po- police, demonstrators and the public will be ex- lice’s ability to manage mass events. Looking amined, critiqued and criticized, sometimes for ahead to successfully contesting potential post- weeks and months afterward. The police should event litigation, significant factors include clear utilize the brief opportunity they will have to policies, reasoned decision making, thoughtful summarize their perspective immediately after implementation and a clear audit record.

68 — Chapter 7. Media Relations box 7 Media Embedding in Miami

by Tony Narr the police side of a confrontation can capture a more comprehensive view than if the cameras are The positive response by the American public to only on the protestors’ side. Nevertheless, em- media embedded with military units in Iraq—and bedding demands that reporters and the police with police on “ride-along” television programs— have a clear agreement on the nature of informa- has filtered its way to mass demonstration operation that is deemed too sensitive for release. Gen- tions. Prior to the FTAA, the Miami Police Depart- erally, restricted information should be limited to ment developed a policy to address the that which could compromise police operations embedding of recognized media representatives or endanger the safety of the public or officers. In with certain operational units (Timoney 2004). Miami, restricted information was identified as The policy specifically permitted the local televi- n Specific numbers of officers in a unit; sion and print media, national news services and minority news outlets to travel with the units on n Specific numbers of units participating in these frontline units: the bicycle squad, response an event; teams and cut teams. They even went aboard the n Specific numbers regarding equipment of U.S. Coast Guard Cutter docked at the Miami critical supplies; Harbor. The opportunity was specifically extended to n Specific geographic location of units during pre-identified news organizations, not individual an event (including identifiable imagery reporters. Actual assignments were made on a ro- video); tating basis via a lottery system administered by n Information relative to future operations; the PIO. Embedded reporters were required to release the department from liability and were held n Information relative to protective measures; to strict uniform dress code and safety gear re- n Information relative to rules of engagement; quirements (helmets and gas masks), which were Information relative to intelligence collec- to be provided by the news outlets. The embed- n tion activities, compromising tactics, tech- ded reporters also were required to attend a train- niques or procedures; and ing session on what to expect, what officers were trained to do and how various circumstances n Operational information (e.g., entry points would be addressed. or estimated response times). The intent of embedded reporter programs is to provide the media—and ultimately the public— Unit commanders should be encouraged to with timely and interesting first-hand informa- facilitate opportunities for embedded media to tion. It also is noteworthy that camera shots from observe and report on events and operations.

Chapter 7. Media Relations — 69 Those same commanders, however, must be au- not embedded. Though they may not be afforded thorized to temporarily hold the transmission of the same access as embedded reporters, they restricted information, or terminate a reporter’s have a legitimate right to undertake their work; assignment when necessary. It also is important alienating them or over-restricting their access to remember there will be freelance and other can prove counter-productive. news agency reporters covering the event who are

70 — Chapter 7. Media Relations CONCLUSION The new relationship between law enforcement and the media is complex, and in the case of mass demonstrations, it can prove especially challenging. Police executives should understand that the relationship deserves an investment—in building trust, ground rules and expertise to make the most of a positive arrangement with the media. The media can be an ally and can tell the police’s side of the story, too, provided they are engaged early in the event preparations.

Chapter 7. Media Relations — 71 PHOTO BY DOUG NELSON

Conclusion

“It’s not the plan that is important, it’s the planning.”

G ENERAL D WIGHT D. EISENHOWER

ver the past fifteen years, mass demon- all of whom are armed with video cameras. These Ostrations have created significant challenges for developments exert sustained pressure on law en- law enforcement agencies. From spontaneous forcement to “get it right.” disorder after athletic events to highly organized Agencies must balance a number of con- protests against international monetary policies, flicting demands when managing demonstra- local law enforcement agencies have encountered tions. These include allowing legitimate groups demonstrations that require seemingly every to express their First Amendment rights; protect- available resource to contain. In addition, police ing innocent bystanders; safeguarding municipal actions seem to be the subject of increased mon- and private property; ensuring unimpeded com- itoring by third parties, including news agencies, merce and traffic; containing unruly protestors amateur reporters, and civil rights organizations, with the appropriate type and amount of force;

Chapter 8. Conclusion — 73 preventing injuries to officers; and, all the while, Information management also is a compo- projecting professionalism and proficiency. nent of effectively controlling a demonstration. This report has drawn on the experiences of Mass demonstration management calls for care- several agencies that have had experiences—good ful attention to managing information before, and bad—managing mass demonstrations. The during and after an event. Both gathering and prominent message that emerged from the re- thoroughly analyzing information and intelli- search, discussions and interviews conducted for gence about demonstrators’ activities dramatical- this project is the importance of early and com- ly strengthen a police department’s plan. A for- prehensive planning for mass demonstration mal information/data collection methodology events. Planning a police response is not limited should be put into place to record critical infor- to organized demonstrations, but is possible for mation during the event. Documentation of key many spontaneous ones, such as those associated events, decisions and actions (including their ra- with sporting events. The planning does not stop tionale) allows the agency to create an historical with the “plan.” It is a live process designed to record of all that took place. A process to record avoid a potential crisis, while allowing com- key events, decisions and actions should be devel- manders the flexibility to meet unforeseen cir- oped and implemented in the early stages of cumstances. The true measure of the planning event planning, and followed throughout each will be seen in the post-event period, during event management phase. It is especially impor- which critical reviews from both internal and ex- tant to stress the necessity of strictly following the ternal sources may occur, either as investigations, department’s use-of-force reporting criteria dur- media reports or law suits (or any combination ing mass demonstration events. thereof). It is, therefore, necessary to invest time The recent experiences of agencies that have and effort early in the planning process. It also is managed mass demonstrations highlight the ne- vital to build relationships and to maximize cessity of making certain that everyone knows training and preparation to ensure the police re- the “what,” “when” and “where” of expectations sponse will be effective on the day of the event. assigned to them. Roles and responsibilities must Agencies also should pay particular attention be clear, or an agency will dramatically reduce its to several measures that can significantly impact chances of effectively managing the demonstra- the successful management of demonstrations. tion. Practitioners agree that a well-defined, min- Training for managing a mass demonstration is imal chain of command—consisting of strategic, essential to success. Commanders, supervisors and operational and tactical levels—is effective when officers alike must be proficient at carrying out managing mass demonstrations. Agencies also their respective roles. Training should begin in the must consider the responsibilities of units that classroom and expand to tabletop and simula- will support the larger effort to manage the tions. Mass demonstration management training demonstration, including criminal investigation should be conducted in a group setting, preferably units and specialized units, such as SWAT, with officers assembled in their assigned squads or mounted units and bicycle patrols. teams. This “team practice” approach facilitates Because crowds at mass demonstrations proficiency in tactical skills, establishes individual can vary dramatically in their size, composition, and team expectations, helps promote use-of- intentions and behaviors, crowd-control policies force awareness and promotes teamwork over po- and tactics are essential. Closely related to crowd tentially counterproductive individual actions. control are the use-of-force and mass arrests. All

74 — Chapter 8. Conclusion three issues are critical to keeping a demonstra- event, working with the media covering the tion under control. If mishandled, they can en- event, designating agency spokespersons, estab- danger officers, innocent bystanders and demon- lishing joint information centers and holding strators. Third parties are especially sensitive to press conferences. how law enforcement agencies handle these is- Mass demonstrations create significant sues. If an agency mismanages them, it can dam- challenges for law enforcement leaders and offi- age the agency’s reputation and even result in cers. They can lead to injuries, loss of life and ru- litigation. Agencies must maintain clearly articu- ined careers. This report has identified many of lated policies, and ensure that every officer is the critical issues that departments should con- familiar with them prior to a demonstration. sider when planning for and actually managing Recent experiences clearly demonstrate that mass demonstrations. The experiences detailed media attention has increased and will continue herein are significant because they involve agen- to do so. Media saturation means that law en- cies that have managed some of the nation’s most forcement operations are increasingly in the recent high-profile demonstrations. Still, there are spotlight and that police chiefs are all the more other examples, lessons learned and manuals to subject to criticism for their actions, or lack guide agencies as they prepare for mass demon- thereof. To maintain and increase public confi- strations. By investing time and effort early in the dence, as well as to manage the reputation of the planning process, building relationships and law enforcement agencies involved, agencies maximizing both training and preparation, law must develop an integrated media strategy that enforcement agencies can position themselves to will help achieve overall policing objectives. Im- manage mass demonstrations successfully. portant aspects to consider include developing media messages before, during and after the

Chapter 8. Conclusion — 75 76 Appendix A. Links to Documents on the World Wide Web*

Association of Chief Police Officers. “Manual of Police Assessment Resource Center. Commission Guidance on Keeping the Peace.” Available at: Investigating The Death of Victoria Snelgrove. http://www.acpo.police.uk/asp/policies/Data/ Available at: http://www.parc.info/. keeping_the_peace.pdf. The New York Times. “Judge Keeps City on Notice CNN.com article. “24-hour Seattle Curfew Near Over Convention Protest Arrests.” Available at: WTO site.” Available at: http://www.cnn.com/ http://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/10/nyregion/ 1999/US/12/02/wto.03/. 10detain.html?ex=1252468800&en=288572afb358 a3ba&ei=5090&partner=rssuserland. CNN.com article. “Police, Protesters Clash Near Miami Trade Talks.” Available at: http://www. U.S. Department of Homeland Security Center for cnn.com/2003/US/South/11/20/miami.protests/. Domestic Preparedness. Available at: http:// www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/docs/CDP072005.pdf. Council of the District of Columbia Draft Report. “Report on Investigation of the Metropolitan Police U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Department’s Policy and Practice in Handling Emergency Management Agency. “National Inci- Demonstrations in the District of Columbia.” Avail- dent Management System Training.” Available at: able at: http://www.dcwatch.com/police/040311.htm. http://www.fema.gov/nims/nims_training.shtm. National Security Research, Inc. “Department of U.S. Department of Homeland Security. “National Defense on Non-lethal Weapons and Equipment Special Security Events Fact Sheet.” Available at: Review: A Research Guide for Civil Law Enforce- http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/interapp/press_ ment and Corrections.” Available at: http://www. release/press_release_0207.xml. ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/200516.pdf#search=’ U.S. Department of Justice. “The Attorney Gener- Department%20of%20Defense%20on%20 al’s Guidelines on General Crimes, Racketeering Nonlethal%20Equipment%20and%20Weapons% Enterprises and Terrorism Enterprise Investiga- 20Review%3A%20A%20Research%20Guide%20 tions.” Available at: http://www.usdoj.gov/olp/ for%20Civil%20Law%20enforcement%20and%20 generalcrimes2.pdf. Corrections%E2%80%99’. U.S. Secret Service. “National Special Security New York Civil Liberties Union. “NYCLU Supports Events.” Available at: http://www.secretservice.gov/ Council Hearing On Police Practices During The nsse.shtml. RNC.” Available at: http://www.nyclu.org/rnc_ police_hearing_pr_091404.html.

* All resources were available at the indicated links as of 10 January 2006.

Appendix A. Links to Documents on the World Wide Web — 77 78 Appendix B. Seattle Police Department Planning Checklist for Special Events

Planning Checklist for Special Events

Event Name ______Special Event #______Event Date ______

COMMAND E q Event Commander ______notifiedL by ______q Field Commander ______P notified by ______q SPOC Activated ______Commander ______notified by ______q Lead Planner ______M q Planning meetings scheduledA ______weekly – bi-weekly – monthly______Dates: ______S ______q Ops Plan written by ______q Required attendance by ______q Fire ______q Sea Tran ______q Public Health ______q Event Promoter ______q S.P.U. ______q City Light ______q School Security ______

q Warning Order – Yes No Information ______Frequency ______monitored ______

Appendix B. Seattle Police Department Planning Checklist for Special Events — 79 INTELLIGENCE / PLANNING notified by ______q Commander ______Situation Report ______

q Threat Analysis Received ______q Contingency Plans ______

PERSONNEL / FINANCE / ADMINISTRATION On Duty Resources notified by ______utilized ______available______q Task Force Commander ______o First Watch ______o Second Watch ______o Third Watch ______o Precinct ______o Bikes ______N ______S _____ E ______W ______o Footbeat ______E q Demobilization Plan ______PL OPERATIONS Precinct Resources Utilized M o CPT______N ______A S _____ E ______W ______o ACT - Days N _____ W _____ NightsS N _____ S ______E _____ W ______

Special Resources Anticipated Tasks q PORT One notified by ______q PORT Two notified by ______q PORT Three notified by ______q PORT Four notified by ______q Long Rifles notified by ______q EMT’s notified by ______q Traffic notified by ______o AM ______o Motors ______o PM ______q Prisoner Processing notified by ______q ART – T1, T2 notified by ______

80 — Appendix B: Seattle Police Department Planning Checklist for Special Events OPERATIONS continued Special Resources Anticipated Tasks q SWAT – D, N notified by ______q SAT notified by ______q Mutual Aid-see Logistics notified by ______q ABS notified by ______q Radio Crisis Response Team notified by ______

LOGISTICS q Commander ______notified by ______Tasks ______q Support Staff ______q Vehicle Rentals ______q Feeding Plan ______o SPD ______o Mutual Aid ______q Determine / Assign Radio Frequencies / Call Signs ______E ______L

Anticipated Needs for Event P q Vehicles ______M q Mobile Precincts ______CV ______N ___-_____ S ______E ______SW ______q Demo Van ______A q 40’ buses ______S q Dart Vans ______q Chemical Agents ______q Barrier tape ______q Fencing ______q Parking ______Staging Area ______

Anticipated Communications Needs for the Event q Communications needs ______Freqs. ______q Other needs ______

Special Logistical Needs ______

Appendix B. Seattle Police Department Planning Checklist for Special Events — 81 MUTUAL AID *The Logistics Section Chief should handle notification of Mutual Aid resources and provide Staging location for response during the event.

q Washington State Patrol notified by ______o Uniform notified by______o CDAT notified by______o WSP SWAT notified by______q King County Sheriff notified by ______o CDU notified by______o KC SWAT notified by______q Snohomish County notified by ______q Snohomish County ALERT notified by ______q Valley Crowd Control notified by ______q Valley SWAT notified by ______q Bellevue Police notified by ______E q Bellevue SWAT notified by ______Kirkland Police notified by ______L q o CDU notified by______P q Redmond Police notified by ______o CDU notified by______M q Everett Police notified by ______o CDU SnotifiedA by______NOTES: ______

82 — Appendix B: Seattle Police Department Planning Checklist for Special Events Appendix C. Presidential Inauguration Task Force MOU

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

This Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) is executed by the United States Attorney for the District of Columbia, the Metropolitan Police Department of Washington, D.C. (MPD) and the (Outside Agency Name). I. PURPOSE E The purpose of the MOU is to outline the mission of the PresidentialL Inauguration Task Force (PITF) in the Washington, D.C. area from January 19, 2005 to January 21, 2005. Additionally, this MOU will define relationships between the U.S. Marshal Service, MPDP and the (Agency Name), as well as other participating agencies with regard to policy, guidance, utilization of resources, planning, training, public relations and media in order to maximize interagencyM cooperation, during this period. II. MISSION A The mission of the PITF is to achieve maximum coordination and cooperation in bringing to bear combined resourcesS to effectively implement measures to ensure the safety of the President of the United States, inaugural participants, the public, visitors and residents while allowing individuals and groups to exercise their rights. Additionally, all units that are participating agencies will coordinate their activities and be considered a member of the PITF, sharing information and coordinating investigative and law enforcement efforts which result from apprehensions originating from the PITF.

III. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE A. Direction The (Agency Name) acknowledges that the PITF is a joint operation in which all agencies, including the Metropolitan Police Department of District of Columbia, Office of the United States Attorney for District of Columbia, United States Marshals Service, United States Secret Service, United States Federal Bu- reau of Investigation, National Park Service, (Agency Name) Police Department and other agencies, act as partners in the operation of the PITF. The Command Center for the operations will be located at the Met- ropolitan Police Department (MPD) Headquarters and will be staffed by members from United States

Appendix C. Presidential Inauguration Task Force MOU — 83 Marshals Service, MPD, U.S. Park Police, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. These officers will serve as the Executive Council for this operation. B. Supervision The day-to-day operation and administrative control of the PITF will be the responsibility of a Tac- tical Team Commander selected from one of the participating agencies. The Tactical Team Commander will coordinate with supervisory personnel of the United States Marshals Service as the sponsoring agency for Special Deputation (federal) and with MPD as the lead agency for the operation. The daily management of the PITF will be closely monitored by the MPD. Responsibility for the conduct of the PITF members, both personally and professionally, shall remain with the respective agency directors subject to the provisions in Section IX (Liability). C. Unilateral Law Enforcement Action There shall be no unilateral action taken on the part of any participating agency relating to PITF activities. All law enforcement action will be coordinated and conducted in a cooperative manner under the direction of the Executive Council and the MPD.

IV. PROCEDURES A. Personnel E Continued assignment of personnel to the PITF will be based upon performance and will be at the discretion of the respective agency. Each participating agency will be providedL with reports as necessary regarding the program, direction, and accomplishment of the PPITF. B. Deputation All local and state law enforcementM personnel designated to the PITF will be subject to background inquiry and will be federally deputized, with the United States Marshals Service securing the required deputation authorization. These deputationsA will remain in effect throughout the tenure of each officer’s assignment to the PITF or until termination of the PITF, whichever occurs first. Each individual deputized as a Spe- cial U.S. Marshal willS have all necessary law enforcement authority as provided by 28 U.S.C. 566(c) and (d); 28 U.S.C. 564, 18 U.S.C. 3053, 28 C.F.R. 0.112, and the deputation authority of the Deputy Attorney Gener- al. The Special Deputy U.S. Marshals will be responsible for 1) performing necessary law enforcement steps to keep the peace of the United States; 2) enforcing federal law (e.g., 18 U.S.C. 112, 1116, and 878, as well as other provisions of that title); 3) protecting visiting foreign officials, official guests, and internationally protected persons; 4) taking necessary law enforcement steps to prevent violations of federal law, and; 5) enforcing District of Columbia law as a result of the deputation (see D.C. Code and 28 U.S.C. 564). Individuals deputized as Special Deputy U.S. Marshals pursuant to this MOU who suffer a disabil- ity or die as a result of personal injury sustained while in the performance of his or her duty during the assignment shall be treated as a federal employee as defined by Title 5 U.S.C. Section 8101. Any such individuals who apply to the U.S. Department of Labor for federal workers’ compensation under Section 3374 must submit a copy of this MOU with his or her application. All applicants will be processed by the U.S. Department of Labor on a case by case basis in accordance with applicable law and regulation.

84 — Appendix C: Presidential Inauguration Task Force MOU C. Law Enforcement Activities Since it is anticipated that almost all cases originating from PITF arrests will be prosecuted at the state or local level, the law enforcement methods employed by all participating law enforcement agencies shall conform to the requirements of such statutory or common law pending a decision as to a change of venue for prosecution. D. Prosecution The criteria for determining whether to prosecute a particular violation in federal or state court will focus upon achieving the greatest overall benefit to law enforcement and the community. Any question that arises pertaining to prosecutorial jurisdiction will be resolved through the Executive Council. The U.S. At- torney’s Office for the District of Columbia has agreed to formally participate in the PITF and will adopt policies and seek sentences that meet the needs of justice.

V. ADMINISTRATIVE A. Records and Reports All records and reports generated by PITF members shall be routed through the Tactical Team Commander who shall be responsible for maintaining custody and proper dissemination of said records as he or she deems appropriate. E B. Staff Briefings Periodic briefings on the PITF law enforcement actions will be providedL to the Directors of the participating agencies or their designees. Statistics regarding accomplishmentsP will also be provided to the participating agencies as available.

VI. MEDIA M All media releases pertainingA to the PITF law enforcement activity and/or arrests will be coordinated by all participants of this MOU. No unilateral press releases will be made by any participating agency without the prior approvalS of the Executive Council. No information pertaining to the PITF itself will be released to the media without mutual approval of all participants.

VII. EQUIPMENT A. PITF Vehicles Each participating agency, pending availability and individual agency policy, agrees and authorizes PITF members to use vehicles, when available, owned or leased by those participating agencies, in connec- tion with PITF law enforcement operations. In turn, each participating agency agrees to be responsible for any negligent act or omission on the part of its agency or its employees, and for any liability resulting from the misuse of said vehicles, as well as any damage incurred to those vehicles as a result of any such negligent act or omission on the part of the participating agency or its employees, subject to the provisions of Sec- tion IX (Liability). Participating agency vehicles assigned to the PITF are subject to funding availability, are provided at the discretion of the supervisor of the providing agency and will be utilized only by the PITF members. Vehicles provided by participating agencies will be used only during working hours and will not be used for

Appendix C. Presidential Inauguration Task Force MOU — 85 transportation to and from work by task force members or used for any other purpose. Participating agencies will provide maintenance and upkeep of their vehicles consistent with each agency’s policy. Vehicles provided as pool vehicles for PITF use will be parked at the end of each shift at a location determined by the Tactical Team Commander or his/her designee. B. Other Equipment Other equipment furnished by any agency for use by other agencies’ participating personnel shall be returned to the originating agency upon termination of the PITF or this MOU.

VIII. FUNDING The (Agency Name) agrees to provide the full-time services of its respective personnel for the duration of this operation, and to assume all personnel costs for their PITF representatives, including salaries, overtime payments, and fringe benefits consistent with their respective agency policies and procedures. Re- imbursement for the cost of such personnel will be made by the District of Columbia, with funds provided by the United States and from general revenue.

IX. LIABILITY Unless specifically addressed by the terms of this MOU, the parties agree to be responsible for the negligent or wrongful acts or omissions of their respective employees. Legal representationE by the United States is determined by the Department of Justice on a case-by-case basis. There is no guarantee that the United States will provide legal representation to any federal, state or localL law enforcement officer. Congress has provided that the exclusive remedy for the negligent or wrongfulP act or omission of any employee of the United States government, acting within the scope of employment, shall be an action against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 2679(b)(2). For the limited purpose of defendingM claims arising out of PITF activity, state or local law enforcement officers who have been speciallyA deputized as U.S. Marshals and who are acting within the course and scope of their official duties and assignments pursuant to this MOU, may be considered an “employee” of the United States governmentS as defined in 28 U.S.C. 2671. It is the position of the Department of Justice Civil Division Torts Branch that such individuals are federal employees for these purposes. Under the Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988 (commonly known as the Westfall Act), 28 U.S.C. 2679(b)(1), the Attorney General or his designee may certify that an individual defendant acted within the scope of employment at the time of the incident giving rise to the suit. ID., 28 U.S.C. 2679(d)(2). The United States can then be substituted for the employee as the sole defendant with respect to any tort claims. 28 U.S.C. 2679(d)(2). If the United States is substituted as defendant, the individual employee is thereby protected from suits in his official capacity. If the Attorney General declines to certify that an employee was acting within the scope of employment, “the employee may at any time before trial petition the court to find and certify that the employee was acting within the scope of his office or employment.” 28 U.S.C. 2679(d)(3). Liability for any negligent or willful acts of PITF employees, undertaken outside the terms of this MOU, will be the sole responsibility of the respective employee and agency involved. Liability for violations of federal constitutional law rests with the individual federal agent or officer pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), or pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 for state and local officers or cross-deputized federal officers.

86 — Appendix C: Presidential Inauguration Task Force MOU Both state and federal officers enjoy qualified immunity from suit for constitutional torts insofar as their conduct does not violate “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). PITF officers may request representation by the U.S. Department of Justice for civil suits against them in their individual capacities for actions taken within the scope of employment. 28 C.F.R. 50.15, 50.16. An employee may be provided representation when the actions for which representation is request- ed reasonably appear to have been preformed within the scope of the employee’s employment and the At- torney General or his designee determines that providing representation would otherwise be in the interest of the United States. 28 C.F.R. 50.15(a). A PITF officer’s written request for representation should be directed to the Attorney General and provided to the Civil Division of the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia, which will then forward the representation request to the Civil Division of the United States Department of Justice together with a recommendation concerning scope of employment and Department representation. 28 C.F.R. 50.15(a)(3). If a PITF officer is found to be liable for a constitutional tort, he/she may request indemnification from the Department of Justice to satisfy an adverse judgment rendered against the employee in his/her individual capacity. 28 C.F.R. 50.15(c)(4). The criteria for payment are substantially similar to those used to determine whether a federal employee is entitled to Department of Justice representation under 28 C.F.R. 50.15(a). E X. DURATION L This MOU shall remain in effect until terminated as specified above, unless that date is modified as set forth in Section XI. Continuation of the MOU shall be subjectP to the availability of necessary funding. This agreement may be terminated at any time by any of the participating agencies. The (Agency Name) may withdraw from this MOU at any time Mby providing a seven-day written notice of its intent to withdraw to the MPD. Upon the terminationA of the MOU, all equipment will be returned to the supplying agencies. XI. MODIFICATIONSS The terms of this MOU may be modified at any time by written consent of all parties. Modifica- tions to this MOU shall have no force and effect unless such modifications are reduced to writing and signed by an authorized representative of each participating agency.

XII. LIMITATION Nothing in this MOU is intended to, or shall be construed to, create enforceable rights in third parties.

Appendix C. Presidential Inauguration Task Force MOU — 87 (AGENCY NAME)

______City Manager/Authorized Designee

WASHINGTON, D.C. METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT

______Chief of Police

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY FOR THE DISTRICT OFE COLUMBIA ______L MU.S.P Attorney SA

88 — Appendix C: Presidential Inauguration Task Force MOU References

California Commission on Peace Officer Stan- Organization Ministerial Conference, Novem- dards and Training. 2003. “Crowd Management ber 29–December 3, 1999.” Seattle, Washington. and Civil Disobedience Guidelines.” March 15. April 4.

CNN.com. 1999. “24- hour Seattle Curfew Near Seattle Police Department. 2001. “Seattle Police WTO Site.” Rusty Dornin. Available at: http:// Department After Action Report: Mardi Gras www.cnn.com/1999/US/12/02/wto.03/. 2001.” August 1.

CNN.com. 2003. “Police, Protesters Clash Near Seattle Post-Intelligencer. 2001. “Mardi Gras task Miami Trade Talks.”Available at: http://www.cnn. force says more events need city supervision, per- com/2003/US/South/11/20/miami.protests/. mits.” Available at: http://seattlepi.nwsource. com/specials/mardigras/. New York Civil Liberties Union. 2004. “NYCLU Supports Council Hearing On Police Practices Stern, Donald; Raymond Downs; Robert P. Git- During The RNC.” Available at: http://www. tens; Janice W. Howe; Steve Ijames; Patrick J. nyclu.org/rnc_police_hearing_pr_091404.html. King; and Christopher E. Stone. 2005. “Report of the Commission Investigating The Death of Vic- The New York Times. 2004. “Judge Keeps City on toria Snelgrove.” Boston, Massachusetts. May 25. Notice Over Convention Protest Arrests.” Avail- Available at: http://www.parc.info/. able at: http://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/10/ nyregion/10detain.html?ex=1252468800&en=28 Temple, Ralph. 2003. American Civil Liberties 8572afb358a3ba&ei=5090&partner=rssuserland. Union of the National Capital Area. “The Polic- ing of Demonstrations in the Nation’s Capital: A Perry, Debi and Guy Kerr. 2002. “G-8 Summit: Misconception Of The Mission And A Failure Of After-Action Report.” Calgary Police Service. Leadership.” Available at: http://www.aclu-nca. Richardson, Stewart. 2002. “Senior Command org/pdf/PoliceDemoReport.pdf. Course 2002—Managing Operations: Interna- Timoney, John F. 2004.“F.T.A.A. 2003 After-Action tional Students’ Handbook.” Centrex (Central Report.” Miami Police Department. January 30. Police Training and Development Authority), 57.

Seattle Police Department. 2000. “Seattle Police Department After-Action Report: World Trade

References — 89 90 About the Authors/Contributors

Tony Narr Prince George’s County Fire Department. He Tony Narr is PERF’s Director of Management Ed- holds an undergraduate degree from the Univer- ucation. He administers the Senior Management sity of Maryland in technology and management Institute for Police and is responsible for other and a master’s degree from Central Michigan management services programs, research and University in personnel administration. special projects. He has headed a variety of major PERF projects, including Police Response to the Jessica Toliver Homeless; the Development of Model Polices and an Investigative Protocol for Domestic Elder Jessica Ingenito Toliver joined PERF as a Research Abuse; the Americans with Disabilities Act proj- Associate in April 2005. Ms. Toliver’s work focus- ect; and The PERF Report—Violent Crime and es on criminal justice and homeland security re- Murder Reduction in Kingston, Jamaica. Since search, analysis and technical assistance. Prior to 1986, when he was selected as PERF’s first Man- joining PERF, she served as a policy analyst in the agement Services Fellow, Mr. Narr has participat- Homeland Security & Technology Division at the ed in over 100 PERF management studies of law National Governors Association. There, she de- enforcement agencies. veloped, executed and publicized the Anniversary Prior to joining PERF’s full-time staff in Survey project; managed homeland security 1992, Mr. Narr served as a Captain with the Prince grant programs; and organized policy academies George’s County, Maryland, Police Department. to provide technical assistance to state teams. He was the department’s accreditation manager, During a 2003 fellowship in the office of responsible for national accreditation in 1991. He Michigan Governor Jennifer M. Granholm, Ms. also has served as an accreditation assessor for the Toliver conducted a cost/benefit analysis of the Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforce- Michigan State Police’s DNA forensic labs and is- ment Agencies, Inc. (CALEA). Prior to this role, sued a report recommending organizational and he served as commander of the department’s per- funding changes to enhance efficiency. She holds sonnel division; sector commander (overseeing a bachelor’s degree in political science and jour- patrol and investigative functions); executive offi- nalism from the University of Richmond and a cer; assistant to the chief of police; and crime pre- master’s degree in public policy from the Gerald vention coordinator. Prior to entering police serv- R. Ford School of Public Policy at the University ice, Mr. Narr spent five years as a member of the of Michigan.

About the Authors/Contributors — 91 Jerry Murphy superintendent for the PSNI Urban Region Jerry Murphy is the Director of Homeland Secu- (Belfast and its surrounding suburbs). He is an rity and Development for PERF. In this capacity, honors graduate of the University of Ulster in he manages a variety of research, management public policy and management. His operational and technical assistance projects focusing on law police service covers policing in Belfast, County enforcement and homeland security. He also Antrim and the city of Londonderry. Other serv- oversees the development of new project ideas ice includes command of Tactical Support for for PERF. Rural Region and co-coordination of joint Police/ Previously, Mr. Murphy was Director of the Army operations. Homeland Security and Technology Division at Mr. McFarland’s additional experience in- the National Governors Association, where he volves a period as a police trainer in tactical support provided assistance and resources to governors, skills, Public Order, Search and Security response. their policy advisors and homeland security di- During that time, he researched and jointly devel- rectors. There, he covered issues such as emer- oped the present PSNI Command and Control gency response to terrorism and natural disasters, system for managing public order and other bioterrorism, critical infrastructure protection, major incidents. His service as an investigator, information technology and information analysis and later as a staff officer in the Complaints and and sharing. Discipline Department, provided valuable insight In his 12 years at PERF, Mr. Murphy has and experience into the management of quality held a number of positions, including deputy di- service delivery and the maintenance of profes- rector of research, senior research associate and sional policing ethical standards. He is currently research associate. He has authored and co-au- trained in disaster and civil emergency manage- thored numerous PERF publications. His most ment and in management of chemical, biological, recent publication is Managing a Multijurisdic- radiological and nuclear incidents. tional Case: Identifying the Lessons Learned from the Sniper Investigation. Mr. Murphy also spent 12 years with the Baltimore County Police De- Joshua Ederheimer partment as both director of planning and re- Joshua Ederheimer is director of PERF’s Center search and assistant to the chief. During his for Force & Accountability (CFA) in Washington, tenure at the department, he also served as exec- D.C. He joined PERF in January 2004 as a senior utive director of the Baltimore County Police associate after a successful career with the Metro- Foundation. Mr. Murphy holds a master’s degree politan Police Department (MPD) of the District in policy sciences, has completed extensive work of Columbia. towards his doctorate in policy sciences and is a In May 2005, Mr. Ederheimer was tasked by graduate of the Federal Executive Institute. PERF Executive Director Chuck Wexler with developing and leading the CFA. The CFA’s primary goal is to be the premiere resource on police use- Malcolm McFarland of-force and accountability issues domestically Malcolm McFarland is a serving police officer and internationally. The CFA identifies emerging with the Police Service of Northern Ireland. With trends, seeks out cutting-edge strategies, con- 27 years of service, he is currently the operations ducts research, provides high-quality technical

92 — About the Authors/Contributors assistance to agencies and acts as a central repos- In 2004, Ms. Harris headed the multi- itory for information regarding use-of-force and agency legal team assigned to review and advise police accountability issues. local, state and federal law enforcement agencies While serving as a member of the MPD, Mr. on issues of crowd control and arrest procedures Ederheimer attained the rank of inspector and developed for the Democratic National Conven- was named Director of the Civil Rights and Force tion held in Boston that year. She successfully de- Investigations Division. During his tenure, he fended against a last-minute, federal suit filed by acquired expertise as a commanding officer in advocacy groups challenging the methods by several areas, including internal affairs, use-of- which the Boston Police, Federal Bureau of Inves- force, equal employment opportunity and civil tigation and Secret Service planned to address rights. Mr. Ederheimer reengineered numerous demonstrations and protests. Ms. Harris graduat- processes, and developed and led several opera- ed from Kenyon College and received her law de- tional units that emerged as national models in gree from Northeastern University. She is a mem- such areas as internal and force investigations, ber of the Massachusetts bar, and is admitted to consent decree implementation, police accounta- practice before the First Circuit Court of Appeals. bility, policing in public housing and environ- She serves on the executive boards of the Boston mental crimes investigations. He specializes in Inn of Court and the Federal Bar Association. police leadership, management reform and business process reengineering. He holds a bachelor’s degree in justice from American University and a John Gallagher master’s degree in management from Johns Hop- John Gallagher is an Assistant United States Attor- kins University. ney in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. As a presidentially appointed White House Fellow from 2000 to 2001, Mr. Gallagher served on the person- Mary Jo Harris al staffs of Attorneys General Janet Reno and John Mary Jo Harris is an attorney with the Boston law Ashcroft at the Department of Justice. During this firm Morgan, Brown & Joy LLP, with a practice assignment, he worked on law enforcement issues concentrating on employment and civil rights lit- of national priority, including police integrity, igation and representation of managers in both racial profiling and federal firearms prosecutions. the public and private sectors. Ms. Harris began He also worked with the Civil Rights Division on her legal career as an assistant corporation coun- investigations to determine whether particular po- sel for the City of Boston Law Department, where lice agencies engage in “patterns or practices” of she was a trial attorney practicing in state and unconstitutional misconduct. After leaving Wash- federal court. From 1998 to 2005, she was the ington, D.C., Mr. Gallagher worked as a federal legal advisor to the Boston Police Department. In prosecutor handling civil rights violations in the this capacity, Ms. Harris was involved in all as- District of New Mexico. pects of police management, including working Mr. Gallagher also has served as legal counsel with internal affairs and anti-corruption investi- to Philadelphia Police Commissioner John F. gators reviewing police activity, and advising the Timoney, and as an assistant chief in the Miami police commissioner and command staff on the (FL) Police Department under Chief Timoney. development and implementation of policies, He developed and implemented policies and train- rules and regulations. ing that were instrumental to Chief Timoney’s

About the Authors/Contributors — 93 reform of the police departments of Philadelphia a Harlem precinct at the height of the crack epi- and Miami and to the resulting historic reductions demic and during the worst period of crime in in crime and police misconduct in these cities. American history. He earned his undergraduate Mr. Gallagher began his professional career degree at Long Island University at Southhamp- as a police officer in the New York City Police De- ton and his law degree from New York Law partment, where he was assigned for five years to School.

94 — About the Authors/Contributors About PERF

The Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) is a services and the effectiveness of crime control national organization of progressive law enforce- through the exercise of strong national leader- ment chief executives from city, county and state ship, the public debate of criminal justice issues, agencies who collectively serve more than half of the development of a body of research about the country’s population. Established in 1976 by policing and the provision of vital management ten prominent police chiefs, PERF has evolved services to all police agencies. into one of the leading police think tanks. With In addition to PERF’s cutting-edge police membership from many of the larger police de- and criminal justice research, the organization partments in the country and around the globe, provides a wide variety of management and tech- PERF has pioneered studies in such fields as com- nical assistance programs to police agencies munity and problem-oriented policing, racially throughout the world. The organization also biased policing, multijurisdictional investiga- continues to work toward increased professional- tions, domestic violence, the police response to ism and excellence in the field through its train- people with mental illnesses, homeland security, ing, leadership and publications programs. For management concerns, use-of-force and crime- example, PERF sponsors the Senior Management reduction approaches. Institute for Police (SMIP), conducts executive PERF’s success is built on the active involve- searches for communities seeking police chiefs, ment of its members: police chiefs, superintend- and publishes some of the leading literature in ents, sheriffs and other law enforcement leaders. the law enforcement field that addresses the diffi- The organization also has types of membership cult issues that challenge today’s police leaders. that allow the organization to benefit from the PERF publications are used for training, promo- diverse views of criminal justice researchers, law tion exams and to inform police professionals enforcement of all ranks and others committed about innovative approaches to community to advancing policing services to all communi- problems. The hallmark of the program is trans- ties. As a nonprofit organization, PERF is com- lating the latest research and thinking about a mitted to the application of research in policing topic into police practices that can be tailored to and to promoting innovation that will enhance the unique needs of a jurisdiction. the quality of life in our communities. PERF’s To learn more about PERF visit objective is to improve the delivery of police www.policeforum.org.

About PERF — 95 About the PERF Center on Force and Accountability

Created in April 2005, the PERF Center on Force approaches; statistics, tracking, and analysis; and Accountability is designed to be a significant vehicle pursuits; and violence against law en- resource for PERF members and others in law enforcement officers. As it relates to police account- forcement, and to serve as the principal clearing- ability, CFA competencies include community house for ideas, strategies, and data that will ad- involvement; consent decrees/memoranda of ac- dress problems related to police use-of-force and countability; discipline and conduct review; early accountability. Ultimately, the Center provides intervention systems and processes; equal em- law enforcement executives with information and ployment opportunities; internal investigations; strategies that will help them make more in- law enforcement ethics; misconduct statistics, formed decisions as they serve their communities. tracking, and analysis; policy development; tech- The PERF Center on Force and Account- nology; training; and trends and identification of ability has four primary objectives: promising approaches. The CFA recently released national guide- n Identify emerging trends and seek out effec- lines for conducted energy devices that have been tive new strategies; embraced by law enforcement agencies through- n Conduct groundbreaking research; out the country. Further, the CFA completed two guides on early intervention systems to help n Provide high quality technical assistance to agencies better manage their human resources. law enforcement agencies; The CFA also provided technical assistance to n Create a central resource for information municipalities seeking to assess their use-of-force regarding use-of-force and police accounta- and disciplinary systems within their police de- bility issues. partments. The CFA also examined critical use- of-force issues in a 2005 publication entitled To that end, the CFA is continually develop- Chief Concerns: Exploring the Challenges of Police ing competencies in several specific areas. For Use of Force. A second book on use-of-force is use-of-force, CFA competencies include commu- scheduled for release in 2006. nity outreach and accountability; equipment and To learn more about PERF and the weapons; investigations; police canines; policy Center on Force and Accountability visit development; review boards; tactics; technology; www.policeforum.org. training; trends and identification of promising

96 — About the PERF Center on Force and Accountability About Motorola

Motorola is a Fortune 100 global communica- It also designs, manufactures and sells automo- tions leader that provides seamless mobility tive and industrial electronics systems and telem- products and solutions across broadband, em- atics systems that enable automated roadside as- bedded systems and wireless networks. Seamless sistance, navigation and advanced safety features mobility means you can reach the people, things for automobiles. and information you need in your home, auto, Mobile Devices offers market-changing workplace and all spaces in between. Seamless icons of personal technology—transforming the mobility harnesses the power of technology con- device formerly known as the cell phone into a vergence and enables smarter, faster, cost-effec- universal remote control for life. A leader in tive and flexible communication. Motorola had multi-mode, multi-band communications prod- sales of US $31.3 billion in 2004. ucts and technologies, Mobile Devices designs, Today, Motorola is comprised of four busi- manufactures, sells and services wireless sub- nesses: Connected Home Solutions, Government scriber and server equipment for cellular systems, & Enterprise Mobility Solutions, Mobile Devices portable energy storage products and systems, and Networks. servers and software solutions and related soft- Connected Home Solutions provides a scal- ware and accessory products. able, integrated end-to-end system for the deliv- Networks delivers proven capabilities in cel- ery of broadband services that keeps consumers lular, wireless broadband and wireline access informed, entertained and connected. Its tech- technologies, with recognized leadership in inte- nology enables network operators and retailers to grating core networks through wireless IP, wire- create and execute on new business opportunities less softswitch and IP multimedia subsystems. by providing innovative products and services to The Networks group is advancing seamless mo- the home. bility with innovative technology solutions, as Government and Enterprise Mobility Solu- well as a billion dollar services business with an tions is a leading provider of integrated radio expanded portfolio delivering support, integra- communications and information solutions, with tion, applications and management. more than 65 years of experience in meeting the For more information go to mission-critical requirements of public safety, http://www.motorola.com. government and enterprise customers worldwide.

About Motorola — 97