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13 Police Q. 387 2010 DATE DOWNLOADED: Mon Sep 27 12:19:26 2021 SOURCE: Content Downloaded from HeinOnline Citations: 13 Police Q. 387 2010 -- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance of HeinOnline's Terms and Conditions of the license agreement available at https://hn3.giga-lib.com/HOL/License -- The search text of this PDF is generated from uncorrected OCR text. -- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope of your license, please use: Copyright Information Police Quarterly 13(4) 387-412 An 20 10 SAGE Publications Reprints and permission: http://www. Com pstat's Effect sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav DOI: 10.1177/1098611110384085 on Crime: The Fort http://pqx.sagepub.com Worth Experience $SAGE Hyunseok jang, PhD', Larry T. Hoover, PhD2 , and Hee-jong joo, PhD2 Abstract Compstat as a policing strategy became popular following the significant crime reduction in New York City during the 1990s. As an innovative management strategy in policing, Compstat attracted considerable attention from scholars and police practitioners. Despite its popularity, little empirical research has scientifically evaluated the effectiveness of the Compstat strategy. In addition, few studies have concentrated on Compstat strategies implemented during the 2000s outside New York City. This study examines the effective- ness of Compstat as implemented by the Fort Worth (Texas) Police Department (FWPD). Using monthly time-series arrest and crime data over a multiyear period, the study examines whether Compstat engendered a significant increase in "broken windows" arrests (minor nuisance offenses) and, using multivariate time-series analysis, the role of the Compstat strategy in explaining changes in violent, property, and total index crimes. Findings indicate that the implementation of Compstat significantly increased some types of broken windows arrests in the FWPD whereas others decreased. Analysis indicates significant decreases in property and total index crime rates after controlling for rival factors, but fails to show a significant change in violent crime rates. If the Fort Worth strategic approach to Compstat had to be described with a single word, it would be focusing. The Queensland study of Compstat also reported using a problem-oriented intervention model-focusing-in lieu of a broken windows approach (Mazerolle, Rombouts, & McBroom, 2007). Property crime was significantly reduced in both settings. Parallel findings from two differently constituted Compstat programs on two different continents provides evidence that the primary component of the Compstat model is focusing, not broken windows enforcement, and the primary impact is on property crime. 'Missouri Western State University, Saint Joseph, MO 2 Sam Houston State University, Huntsville, TX Corresponding Author: Larry T. Hoover, College of Criminal justice, Sam Houston State University, Huntsville, TX 77341 Email: [email protected] 388 Police Quarterly 13(4) Keywords Compstat policing, broken windows enforcement, time-series analysis, Fort Worth Police Department Introduction Following community-oriented or problem-solving strategies, Compstat, an alternative policing management strategy, has drawn significant attention from scholars and police practitioners. The crime decline in New York City following the introduction of Compstat fueled heated debates regarding the influence of this crime-focused strategy on crime rates since the 1990s (Eck & Maguire, 2000; Harcourt, 1998, 2001; Harcourt & Ludwig, 2006; Kelling & Sousa, 2001; Rosenfeld, Fornango, & Baumer, 2005; Willis, Mastrofski, & Weisburd, 2004). Partially due to the well-known success stories in New York City and subsequently several other metropolitan jurisdictions, the Compstat strategy quickly spread throughout the United States and has been characterized by some as the most popular police management and crime control strategy in American history (Weisburd, Mastrofski, McNally, Greenspan, & Willis, 2003). In a nationwide survey conducted in 1999, for example, one third of municipal police departments with more than 100 swom officers reported that they had implemented a "Compstat-like program" (Weisburd et al., 2003, p. 430). As such, the Compstat strategy became one of "the most quickly diffused forms of innovation" (Weisburd et al., 2003, p. 433) and was described as an organizational paradigm shift in policing due to the swiftness of its effect on crime prevention or reduction (Henry, 2002; Walsh, 2001). Despite Compstat's popularity, little empirical research has scientifically evaluated the effectiveness of the Compstat strategy. A number of the reviews of Compstat in New York City have been in the form of "advocacy" books which assume effectiveness (see, for example, Bratton & Knobler, 1998; Henry, 2002; Maple & Mitchell, 1999). A majority of the existing research has been anecdotal and qualitative, thus lacking generalizability. In addition, a few studies that measured the effectiveness of Compstat in New York City found conflicting results concerning the causal relationship between the Compstat strategy and the decline in crime rates (Harcourt, 1998, 2001; Harcourt & Ludwig, 2006; Kelling & Sousa, 2001; Rosenfeld et al., 2005; Willis et al., 2004). It is also important to recognize the potential role of other social structural variables in the reduction of crime rates in New York. Fagan, Zimring, and Kim (1998) reported that nonfirearm homicides began to decline in New York City prior to the implementa- tion of the Compstat strategy. In relation to firearm homicides, however, they found consistent timing between Compstat and the homicide decline, leading them to conclude that the Compstat strategy may have contributed to the lower firearm homicide rate. Karmen (2000) examined the crime drop in New York City and concluded that the Compstat policing strategy may have influenced the reduction of crime. Karmen, how- ever, argued that other factors such as an economic boom, escalated incarceration, change in drug markets, and the change in demographic composition may have played greater Jong et al 389 roles than the police strategy. Rosenfeld et al. (2005) also evaluated the influences of Compstat on the reduction of homicide rates in New York City compared with other large U.S. cities and found no significant differences. They argued that the reduction of homicide rates could be better explained by other social structural variables as most U.S. cities experienced similar reductions in homicide. Due to the inconsistent results of previous research, it has been difficult to develop a conclusion about the effectiveness of the New York City Compstat strategy in reducing crime rates. Further research is necessary to scientifically assess Compstat's impact on crime rates. Considering the widespread adoption of Compstat strategies throughout the nation, it is important to examine the effectiveness of strategies implemented outside of the New York City Police Department (NYPD). The Fort Worth Police Department (FWPD) in Texas implemented a Compstat strategy to address crime and quality of life issues in the early 2000s. While nationwide crime rates began to decline during the 1990s, crime rates reached a plateau in the early 2000s. Therefore, the evaluation of a Compstat strategy implemented during the 2000s provides important information to validate the effective- ness of Compstat in a different time period as well as in a different place. Considering the differences in geographic location, cultural background, organizational subculture, and study period, this study attempted to determine if any significant differences existed in effects as well as strategic approaches between the NYPD's Compstat and the FWPD's "All Staff Meeting" (ASM) version of Compstat. Using monthly time-series data and employing a time-series intervention analysis and a multivariate time-series analysis (regression with autoregressive error modeling), this study examines the relationship between the implementation of Compstat in the FWPD and misdemeanor arrest rates as well as changes in index crime rates. There are two major research questions: (a) Was there a significant increase in the arrest rate for broken windows offenses (i.e., minor nuisance offenses) in the FWPD following the implementation ofthe Compstat strategy? and (b) Was there a significant change in crime rates (i.e., Part I violent, property, and total crime) after Fort Worth implemented the Compstat strategy? Literature Review Compstat Strategy The term Compstat originated from "Compare Stats," a computer file name (Silverman, 1999, p. 98). Similarly, according to Safir (1997), Compstat was short for computer comparison statistics. The term was abbreviated to the eight-character file name limita- tion in DOS programming at the time, "Compstat." Although the term appeared to emphasize a technical aspect of operational strategies, Compstat became the shorthand descriptor of a broad management strategy involving the entire police agency's operation and consisting of several elements (Bratton & Knobler, 1998). NYPD's commissioner, Bratton, and his executive team established four basic principles consisting of (a) accurate and timely intelligence, (b) rapid deployment of personnel and resources, (c) effective 390 Police Quarterly 13(4) tactics, and (d) relentless follow-up and assessment (Bratton & Knobler, 1998; Silverman, 1999; Walsh & Vito, 2004). In conclusion, Hoover (2004a) defined Compstat as "a com- bination of a strategy and a management style" (p. 1) that emphasized
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