Fighting the Pre-Eminent Threats with Intelligence-Led Operations

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Fighting the Pre-Eminent Threats with Intelligence-Led Operations Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) Occasional Paper – №16 Fighting the Pre-eminent Threats with Intelligence-led Operations Fred Schreier GENEVA CENTRE FOR THE DEMOCRATIC CONTROL OF ARMED FORCES (DCAF) OCCASIONAL PAPER – №16 Fighting the Pre-eminent Threats with Intelligence-led Operations Fred Schreier Copyright © 2009 by the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces ISBN 978-92-9222-099-0 DCAF Occasional Papers are detailed, theoretical studies on core issues of Security Sector Governance. DCAF Occasional Papers can be downloaded free of charge from the DCAF website at www.dcaf.ch/publications Table of Contents List of Abbreviations and Acronyms .......................................................... 3 Introduction ..................................................................................... 5 1. The Pre-eminent Threats ................................................................ 6 1.1 The Risks and Threats of Transnational Organised Crime .................... 7 1.2 The Risks and Threats of the Proliferation of WMD ......................... 16 1.3 The Risks and Threats of Transnational Terrorism ........................... 25 2. What Is Intelligence? ................................................................... 47 2.1 How Is Intelligence Produced? .................................................. 49 2.2 What Types of Intelligence Services Are There? ............................. 52 2.3 What Are the Problems for, and the Limits of, Intelligence? .............. 54 2.4 Why Is Intelligence Important for Fighting the Pre-Eminent Threats? .... 57 3. The Application of Intelligence and the Contributions of Intelligence-led Operations to Fighting the Pre-eminent Threats ............ 60 3.1 Intelligence-led Policing ......................................................... 60 3.2 Criminal Intelligence Analysis ................................................... 66 3.3 Intelligence-led Counter-trafficking ........................................... 67 3.4 The Contributions of Intelligence-led Operations to the Fight Against the Pre-eminent Threats ............................................... 74 3.5 New Ways of Combating Organised Crime .................................... 88 4. Patterns and Problems of Intelligence Cooperation ............................. 90 4.1 Intelligence and Law Enforcement Cooperation ............................. 90 4.2 Cooperation With and Within the EU .......................................... 92 5. Intelligence-led Operations and Democratic Oversight ........................ 102 5.1 The Need for Tighter Democratic Control, Supervision and Oversight .. 102 5.2 The Problems Accruing to Democratic Control, Oversight and Accountability .................................................................... 104 5.3 Clear Redefinition of Accountability .......................................... 107 5.4 Executive Control and Supervision ............................................ 109 5.5 Reinforcing the Checking Mechanisms Outside the Executive ............ 111 5.6 Improved Complaints Mechanisms ............................................. 112 6. Key Recommendations ................................................................ 113 7. Select Bibliography .................................................................... 117 List of Abbreviations and Acronyms BTWC Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons BW Biological Weapon CBNR Chemical, Biological, Nuclear and Radiological CCTV Closed Circuit Television CIA Central Intelligence Agency CNA Computer Network Attack CNE Computer Network Exploitation COMINT Communications Intelligence CRYPINT Cryptology Intelligence DDoS Distributed Denial-of-Service DNA Deoxyribonucleic acid containing genetic instructions ECHR European Court of Human Rights ECIM European Criminal Intelligence Model ELINT Electronic Intelligence EMP Electro-Magnetic Pulse EU European Union Eurojust European Investigation and Prosecutorial Cooperation Mechanism Europol European Police Office EUSC EU Satellite Centre FATF Financial Action Task Force of the OECD FISINT Foreign Instrumentation Signals Intelligence GCHQ Government Communications Headquarters of the UK GPS Global Positioning System HERF High-Energy Radio Frequency HEU Highly enriched uranium HPM High-Power Microwave HUMINT Human Intelligence IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency ICT Information and Communication Technology IDEW Improvised Directed Energy Weapon IED Improvised Explosive Device ILP Intelligence-led Policing IRA Irish Republican Army IMINT Imagery Intelligence INTDIV Intelligence Division of the EU Military Staff Interpol International Criminal Police Organisation IT Information Technology JHA Justice and Home Affairs MASINT Measurement and Signatures Intelligence NBC Nuclear, Biological and Chemical NCIS National Criminal Intelligence Service of the UK NLW Non-lethal weapons OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development OSCE Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe OSINT Open Source Intelligence PJC Police and Judicial Cooperation Matters R&D Research and Development RDD Radiological Dispersion Device 3 RFID Radio Frequency Identification Device SCADA Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition System SIGINT Signals Intelligence SITCEN Joint Situation Centre of the EU SCCOPOL Section Centrale de Coopération Opérationelle de Police in France SOCA Serious and Organised Crime Agency of the UK TED Transient Electromagnetic Device TELINT Telemetry Intelligence THB Trafficking in Human Beings TOC Transnational Organised Crime TV Television UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle UNDP United Nations Development Program UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime UNSCOM United Nations Special Commission for Inspections in Iraq WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction 4 Fighting the Pre-eminent Threats with Intelligence-led Operations Fred Schreier Introduction This paper discusses the role of intelligence, intelligence services and intelligence- led operations as crucial components of the efforts to counter the new risks, dangers and threats to states and their population. The end of the Cold War and globalisation has not only brought a multiplication of actors, sources of conflict and means to fight. Indeed, globalisation, accelerating techno-logical innovation, growing interdependence and vulnerability of modern states has dramatically enhanced the number and diversity of risks, dangers and threats. The fact that these are increasingly transnational in nature, originate more and more often from non-state actors and appear and mutate ever more quickly, renders the fight against them more difficult. This is particularly true for the unholy trinity of transnational terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and transnational organised crime (TOC) that have become the pre-eminent security challenges confronting the world and the new intelligence priorities. TOC is growing in volume, geographic reach and profitability, and is well positioned for further growth because it does, in many ways, have the most to gain from globalization. Growth and spread of TOC increase the risks of proliferation of WMD and, with it, of catastrophic transnational terrorism as proliferants and terrorists collude ever more symbiotically with TOC groups to move money, men and materials around the globe. The more the international order is threatened by asymmetric warfare of Islamistic terror networks, the more the threat perception will become multifaceted and chaotic if more actors can acquire WMD. These developments not only diminish the predictability of risks and dangers. The more diffuse and unpredictable the situation and the threat perception, the more difficult it will become to clearly distinguish between external and internal, civilian and military threats to a country, and between the strategic, operational or tactical levels of risks and dangers. More than ever before intelligence is the pre-requisite for all measures that aim at the effective prevention, disruption and suppression of these threats. But countering the pre-eminent threats from multiplying non-state actors that operate clandestinely requires more than just intelligence services. These threats can only be effectively counteracted, disrupted, pre-empted and prevented when the operations of all security sector organisations that are mandated to deal with them are intelligence-driven or intelligence-led. This requires a paradigm shift in national security strategy that not only entails a ‘whole of government’ approach and multilateral engagement, but a radical new approach with more intensive 5 collaboration, interaction and information exchange by these organisations with the agencies of the intelligence community. This paper (1) sketches the main threats currently confronting all states. Part (2) elaborates what intelligence is and explains why intelligence is key to counter the expanding array of threats more effectively. Part (3) shows the application of intelligence and the contributions of intelligence-led operations to the fight against the pre-eminent threats. Part (4) explores patterns and problems of intelligence cooperation. In part (5) some of the implications which intelligence-led operations may have for democratic control, supervision, oversight and accountability are indicated. The paper ends with a list of key recommendations 1. The Pre-eminent Threats The threats of yesterday were predominantly
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