Copyright by

Patrick Dean Bunch 2012

The Thesis Committee for Patrick Dean Bunch Certifies that this is the approved version of the following thesis:

DELIBERATE UNCERTAINTY:

The South Asian Crisis of 1971, the Nixon White House, and the U.S.

State Department.

APPROVED BY SUPERVISING COMMITTEE:

Supervisor: GAIL MINAULT

JEREMI SURI

DELIBERATE UNCERTAINTY:

The South Asian Crisis of 1971, the Nixon White House, and the U.S.

State Department.

by

Patrick Dean Bunch, B.A.

Thesis Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of The University of Texas at Austin in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements

for the Degree of

Masters of Arts

The University of Texas at Austin August 2012

Abstract

DELIBERATE UNCERTAINTY:

The South Asian Crisis of 1971, the Nixon White House, and the U.S. State

Department.

Patrick Dean Bunch, M.A. The University of Texas at Austin, 2012

Supervisor: Gail Minault

This thesis focuses on the events surrounding the South Asia Crisis of 1971, beginning in when the Pakistani government launched its military crack-down in East Pakistan in the spring and extending to the conclusion of the Indo-Pak War by the year’s end. It examines how

President Nixon’s administration and the US State Department viewed the events in South Asia, what they saw as being the appropriate response, and the differences in what they thought the US should do in response to what was happening on the other side of the globe. The analysis will reveal that the President and his primary foreign policy advisor, Dr. Kissinger, deliberately misled and misinformed the US State Department and its Ambassadors abroad in Pakistan and

India in an effort to keep secret from them and the American public, the President’s desire to support Pakistan and to blame India as the source of the conflict. The resulting confusion and

iv misunderstanding by the diplomatic community raised tensions in the region, lengthened the conflict, and weakened America’s credibility in the sub-continent.

v

Table of Contents

Chapter 1 Introduction………………………………………………………… 1

Chapter 2 Background………………………………………………………….4

Chapter 3 President Nixon vs. the State Department…………………………..9

Chapter 4 The "Dissident Cables"……………………………………………..18

Chapter 5 Nixon's Tilt toward Pakistan………………………………………..25

Chapter 6 Blame India………………………………………………………….34

Chapter 7 USS Enterprise and Task Force 74…………………………………40

Chapter 8 Analysis…………………………………………………………….53

Appendix A: Chronology of Events……………………………………………..61

Appendix B: Historical Figures…………………………………………………..62

Bibliography……………………………………………………………………...63

Chapter 1 Introduction

This thesis focuses on the events surrounding the South Asia Crisis of 1971, beginning in when the Pakistani government launched its military crack-down in East Pakistan in March of

1971 and extending to the conclusion of the Indo-Pak War by the year’s end. Specifically, examining how President Nixon’s administration and the members of the US State Department viewed the events in South Asia, what they saw as being the appropriate response to those events, and how they differed in what they thought the US should do in response to what was happening on the other side of the globe. My analysis will reveal that the President and his primary foreign policy advisor, Dr. Kissinger, deliberately misled and misinformed the US State

Department and its Ambassadors abroad in Pakistan and India. All in an effort to keep secret from the public President Nixon’s preference for supporting Pakistan, who was assisting the

President’s efforts to re-establish relations with China, and his desire to blame India, with whom the President had a long history of animosity, as the source of the conflict. The resulting confusion and misunderstanding by the diplomatic community raised tensions in the region, lengthened the conflict, and weakened America’s credibility in the sub-continent.

Foreign Policy making is one of the primary responsibilities of the Chief Executive officer of the United States government, the President. The American President as both the Head of State and Chief Executive is charged by the Constitution as the primary diplomat for US foreign relations with other nations. But the modern Presidency is assisted in conducting foreign affairs by the professional diplomatic corps serving with the US State Department. These

Ambassadors, Consul-Generals, and Foreign Service Officers assist and carryout numerous diplomatic and administrative functions for the US government, it’s citizens abroad, and foreign nationals seeking to study, work, and visit the United States.

1

How each President has conducted his administration’s foreign affairs has varied based on personal preference, natural inclinations, and political accommodations. One of the most controversial Presidents in recent history was Richard M. Nixon. Although best-known for abdicating the Presidency following the Watergate investigation in 1973, President Nixon’s term in office was actually very successful in terms of foreign policy advancements. Those included the ending of American involvement in the war in Vietnam, the opening of diplomatic relations with Communist China, and the beginning of strategic arms talks with the Soviet Union. Most of these successes were conducted primarily by the President and his closest advisor, Dr. Henry

Kissinger. The State Department’s diplomatic corps generally played only a minor role during these negotiations. President Nixon, having served as Vice President under President

Eisenhower, had a long and established distrust of the State Department’s professional corps of academic and intellectual experts. Preferring direct talks and personal contact over the traditional diplomatic negotiation techniques, the President ignored the established Foreign Service officer corps. The resulting conduct of foreign policy during his administration left the State Department largely out of the loop.

The resulting lack of communication and direction presented difficulties and confusion for both the American diplomats serving abroad and within the foreign nations where they were serving. One of the most glaring examples of this was during the first Nixon administration dealing with the South Asian Crisis of 1971. Also known as the Bangladesh Liberation War, the

Bengali-dominated eastern province of Pakistan broke away from the control of the central

Pakistan government with the assistance of India. Faced with the threat to the stability of one of

America’s primary allies in South Asia, President Nixon worked hard to ensure that the official

US policy was to support Pakistan. Unfortunately, the world press was largely sympathetic

2 toward the Bengalis’ efforts to gain their independence. The result was an American administration that publicly supported the non-democratic Pakistani government, as it sought to crush their own Bengali citizens.

The wealth of transcripts and official State Department cables reveal a Foreign Service that was deliberately kept in the dark concerning the administration’s policy during the crisis, and a White House determined to ‘Tilt’ America’s support toward Pakistan regardless of the cost in public or international credibility.

3

Chapter 2 Background to the South Asian Crisis

If the story of the birth of Bangladesh has to start somewhere, then it should be the year

1947, when India was formally granted independence from London and partitioned into the nations of India and Pakistan. Unfortunately for Pakistan, its territory consisted of two widely separated eastern and western sections, split by over a thousand miles of India between them.

The people of these two halves had very little in common aside from sharing the Muslim faith.

Both wings of the country were made up of distinct cultures and spoke distinct and separate languages. The founder of Pakistan, the ‘Great Leader’ Mohammad Ali Jinnah sought to use one single language for the state as a means to link the divided halves of his new nation together.

But let me make it very clear to you that the language of Pak is going to be Urdu and no

other language. Anyone who tries to mislead you is really the enemy of Pak. Without one

state language, no nation can remain tied up solidly together and function.1

He was not successful, and the imposition of a foreign language on the Bengali-speaking

Eastern Pakistanis was not well received. Within four years the first clashes between West and

East would result in the first deaths between these countrymen, as the Bengalis protested against the perceived cultural domination by the western Punjabi-lead government in West Pakistan.

Over the next two decades, tension continued to grow between the two halves of the nation, formally called East Pakistan with its capital in Dhaka, and West Pakistan which built a new national capital in Islamabad. Eventually, political tensions enabled a military junta led by

General Ayub Khan to overthrow the weak civilian leadership and establish Martial Law.

General Yahya Khan, the second soldier to hold the title and post of Chief Marital Law

1 Husain, Syed S. What was once East Pakistan. (Karachi, Pakistan: Oxford University Press,2010), 78. 4

Administrator, was not warmly welcomed by his eastern countrymen and failed to manage the growing political split between the two halves of the nation.

Troubles for the nation peaked following the disaster of the Bhola Cyclone which slammed into East Pakistan in November of 1970. Estimated casualties ranged from three hundred thousand to half a million, with many more suffering from Islamabad’s ineffective and desultory relief efforts. President Yayha, after viewing the area devastated by the storm by helicopter, reportedly said, “It doesn’t look that bad.”2 His touching comment did not go over well with his Bengali countrymen.

Eventually, social and political stagnation forced General Yahya to re-introduce civilian elections in December of 1970, in a bid to reunite the divided parts of his nation and to retain a semblance of power and boost economic recovery. The results took Islamabad by surprise as the

East Pakistan’s Awami League, lead by the long suffering Bengali politician Sheikh Mujibur

Rahman, won a majority in the national election, and the right to form a Bengali-majority government for the first time in Pakistan’s history, with Sheikh Mujibur as the Prime Minister.

The opposition party led by the Western dominated Pakistan People’s Party of Zulfiqur Ali

Bhutto refused to accept such a political solution. Bhutto suggested that it would be better for the two halves of the nation to go their own ways, “Idhar hum, udhar tum,” me here, you there.3

Following the election, efforts by General Yahya and the two political leaders to reach an agreement stretched throughout the first three months of 1971, but to no avail. Finally, on 25

March 1971, President Yahya gave up on the hopes of compromise.4 He ordered his Martial Law

2 Husain, 16 3 Niazi, The Betrayal of East Pakistan, (Karachi, Pakistan: Oxford University Press, 1998), xxiv. 4 Jackson, Robert V, South Asian Crisis: India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, ( New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975), 147. 5 enforcer in East Pakistan, General Tikka ‘The Butcher’ Khan to “sort them out”. The military crack-down against the recalcitrant Bengalis, code-named Operation Searchlight, began with

General Tikka’s orders to his troops, “I want the land and not the people.”5 It would be known by the Bengalis as the Bangladesh Liberation War, and by the White House as the South Asian

Crisis.

The following day, 26 March 1971, is recorded as Independence Day for the nation of

Bangladesh, the former East Pakistan. For the following ten months, Bengali refugees flooded into the neighboring states of India, and quickly overwhelmed the ability of the Indian government to deal with a mounting humanitarian crisis. Up to ten million former East

Pakistanis would seek sanctuary in the refugee camps in India against a deliberate and calculated campaign of terror by the Pakistan Army against its own citizens.

Relations between West Pakistan and India rapidly deteriorated as both sides sought international assistance to support their claims. For Pakistan it was stopping the escape of

Bengali miscreants out of East Pakistan and their return as Indian-sponsored terrorists. While

India begged for help in stopping the flood of refugees from East Pakistan crossing the border, means of paying for their care and feeding, and eventually returning them to East Pakistan.

President Yahya soon came to see his nation’s continuing troubles as being born in the

Cabinet of the Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. His personal machismo turned the growing crisis into a personal contest between himself and the Indian Prime Minister, a woman. Meeting

5 Niazi, 46 6 with a visiting Chinese delegation, President Yahya was quoted as saying, “If that woman thinks she can cow me down, I refuse to take it. If she wants a war, I’ll fight her.”6

However, buoyed by her own recent victory in the Indian general elections, Prime

Minister Gandhi was determined to find a solution to the troubles spreading out from East

Pakistan. No solution could be sought, however, that allowed the government in Islamabad to continue to abuse its own citizens, many with ties to fellow Bengalis in the eastern states of

India.7

The United States under the first term administration of President Nixon quickly found itself embroiled in the events on the subcontinent. As part of the President’s new policy efforts to restore relations with Communist China, Islamabad and General Yahya played a critical role in fostering the early contacts between Washington and Beijing. Unfortunately, the secret nature of those negotiations required that they be kept from the public media and restrained the administration’s willingness to publicly chastise Pakistan for its conduct in East Pakistan.8 As a result, the US found itself wrapped up in a close relationship with both China and Pakistan, in direct opposition to India and its newest ally the Soviet Union.

A storm of controversy erupted in Washington following the signing of the Indo-Soviet

Friendship Agreement in August of 1971. Officially, the treaty was not the formal establishment of a defensive pact. It simply mandated “mutual consultations” in the event either nation was attacked.9 Advisors to the administration saw the agreement as primarily a means to neutralize

6 Blechman, Barry M. and Stephen S. Kaplan, Force without War, (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1978), 207. 7 Jackson, 149 8 Archer K. Blood, The Cruel Birth of Bangladesh: Memoirs of an American Diplomat, (Dhaka, Bangladesh: University Press, 2002), 256 9 J.F.R. Jacob, Surrender at Dacca, (New Delhi: Manohar Publishers, 1997), 97 7 the threat of China to India, not as a means of bringing the super-powers into the South Asian crisis.10

Open conflict between India and Pakistan officially began with the Pakistani airstrikes against Indian airfields on the western borders on the 3rd of December, 1971. General Yahya had finally decided that the best means of defending his Eastern region from Indian-supported

Bengali guerillas was to provoke India into open war in the West, a war that he hoped the US and the UN could force into cease-fire before Pakistan would be completely dismembered.11

India however, had not been idle in its own preparations for war; as a result the Indian

Army in turn launched a rapid and successful invasion of East Pakistan the next day. The Joint

Indian-Bengali forces rapidly made its way to Dhaka, the capital of East Pakistan, and forced the capitulation of the Pakistani army by the 16th of December 1971. Both India and Pakistan quickly agreed upon a cease-fire on both the Eastern and Western fronts. The war ended with the emergence of the new nation of Bangladesh and the fall of General Yahya’s military rule in the ensuing fallout from the loss of the East.

10 Palit, D.K., The Lightning Campaign: The Indo-Pakistan War 1971, (New Delhi: Thompson Press, 1972), 66. 11 Blood, 334 8

Chapter 3 President Nixon vs. the State Department

Since the Kennedy administration, each President has provided to all US Ambassadors a letter detailing their responsibilities in conducting the foreign affairs of the nation in their country of assignment.12 President Nixon dispatched his letter to all American ambassadors world-wide shortly after taking office. It began; “Your mission as Ambassador to ______is of the utmost significance to our country and to me personally.”13 With this simple sentence,

President Nixon made it known that the foreign policy of the United States was to be his personal prerogative. He continued, “I attach the greatest importance to my Constitutional responsibilities for the conduct of our relations with other countries. As the personal representative of the President of the United States, you share these responsibilities in the country to which you are accredited.” 14 President Nixon made it clear that America’s

Ambassadors were speaking for the President of the USA. And that their duties gave them a degree of responsibility in formulating the foreign policy of the US, but a subordinate role to that of the President.

President Nixon did make allowance, however, for differences of opinion between the official position of the US government and the opinions of his ambassadors. “The Secretary of

State and I have made it clear that we welcome the opportunity to consider alternatives policies and courses of actions before making final decisions . . . we encourage your putting them forward.”15 This simple phrase would return to cause Nixon and Kissinger great frustration

12 Harry W. Koop and Charles A. Gillespie, Career Diplomacy-Life and Work in the U.S. Foreign Service (Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2008), 112. 13 U.S. Department of State, Historical Document, Foreign Relations of the United States, “Letter from President Nixon to All United States Ambassadors Abroad”, Volume II, 310, http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v02/d310. 14 Ibid. 15 Ibid. 9 during the South Asian crisis as the Ambassadors and Foreign Service Officers did just what he had asked them to do, made their own opinions known.

Having served for so many years as the Vice President under Eisenhower, Nixon had already established his own opinions about the State Department by the time he assumed the

Oval office. Nixon carried a grudge with the way he felt the Foreign Service had “disdained him as Vice President.”16 He had little to no confidence in the ability of the professional diplomatic corps to carry out America’s interests abroad and did not trust them. In his own words, Nixon intended “to ruin the foreign service.”17 This did not bode well for ensuring an effective

American foreign policy during the first years of the Nixon administration.

As fate would have it, it was during his first administration that Nixon had his greatest foreign policy triumph, with the establishment of formal relations with the People’s Republic of

China. It was a measure of his lack of trust in the State Department that neither he nor Kissinger made the Foreign Service aware of the secret negotiations between Washington and Beijing until after the fact. Secretary of State Rogers only learned of the progress of these talks shortly before the rest of the world did at President Nixon’s California residence on 15 July 1971.18 The decision to keep these talks out of the spot light had repercussions for the US diplomats stationed in South Asia as they dealt with the unfolding crisis around them.

Early in the Nixon administration, Secretary of State Rogers followed through on the

President’s stated welcoming of “alternative policies and courses of action,” by establishing a

‘dissent’ channel in the official State Department communication system. This would allow

Ambassadors and other diplomats the opportunity to air their divergent views with the entire

16 Koop, 10. 17 Koop, 10. 18 Kalyani Shankar, Nixon, Indira, and India: Politics and Beyond, (Delhi: Macmillan Publishers, 2010), 106. 10

Foreign Service corps.19 Intended to enable a greater degree of discussion within the State

Department, it also kept the disagreements with official US policy ‘in-house’ and away from the open media.

During 1971, in the months following the crack-down within East Pakistan, the US

Consul General in Dhaka, Archer Blood, could no longer contain his frustration with the

“Inexplicable refusal of the White House to express any criticism of the Pakistan Army’s reign of terror.”20 Unknown to Archer Blood was the major role that Pakistan’s President Yahya was playing in facilitating President Nixon’s efforts to open ties with Communist China.

Consequently, the White House responses to the events in East Pakistan were muted. As the

Bengali massacres continued, Consul-General Blood eventually availed himself of the ‘dissent’ channel and issued a series of communiqués highly critical of what he saw as the administration’s lack of sympathy for the Bengali population while Washington continued to support the Pakistan Army. Blood’s cables were quickly leaked to the press and the ensuing firestorm won Blood no friends in the White House and eventually resulted in his removal from the US Consul-General in Dhaka and his exile to State Department headquarters in Washington,

D.C. for the remainder of the 1970’s21.

Both President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger were unhappy with Blood and other Foreign

Service Officers who continued their critical appraisals against the official lack of condemnation by the US government on Pakistan’s efforts to subdue their rebellious eastern province. Within the State Department, Undersecretary Sisco, a strong supporter of the President’s policy, admitted the Department’s difficulty in dealing with these contrary diplomats to Dr. Kissinger,

19 Blood, 243. 20 Blood, 256 21 Blood, 258 11 saying “My people seem to be leaving the reservation.” Kissinger quickly noted that the administration had no intention of changing its policy toward Pakistan and that the Department should get its rebellious Foreign Service officers “in line.”22

The State Department is like many government organizations, when things are going smoothly no one notices them, and when events explode into crisis they are the first to get the blame. One result of this is a Foreign Service corps that has a defensive mentality that all too often claims that any and all criticism is unfair.23 And like all large, long-term organizations, the

State Department has been accused of having a self-perpetuating mindset that the very nature of diplomacy requires US diplomats to place themselves above mere government policies. Former

Secretary of State Dean Acheson once observed “the attitude is that the President and Secretaries may come and go but the Department goes on forever, has lead many President to distrust and dislike the Department of State.”24

During the early months of his administration, President Nixon received an analysis of the personnel and officers in the State Department detailing the weaknesses of America’s diplomatic corps. Authored by a former State Department official and friend to the president,

Turner Shelton, it was highly critical of the current Foreign Service corps’ loyalty to the Nixon

White House, the Department’s elitist tendencies, and its failure to pursue bold foreign policy initiatives. Dr. Kissinger summed up for the President Mr. Shelton’s main points with a laundry list of the Department’s failings:

22 Blood, 248 23 Kori N. Schake, State of Disrepair: Fixing the Culture and Practices of the State Department, (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 2012), 15. 24 Schake, 44 12

….It is impossible to convert or to re-educate members of the Foreign Service who retain

strong emotional ties to former Presidents or former Administrations.

….There is a professional elitism in the Foreign Service which tends to delude its

members into believing that they have a charter to dominate the conduct of foreign

affairs. This is further complicated when they also harbor allegiance to previous

Presidents.

….There is a general lack of responsiveness in the Department of State in implementing

directives and instructions from the White House and a deficiency in personal loyalty to

you.

….The State Department system rewards conformity and discourages those who have the

courage to break new ground, thus resulting in a general void of originality and

forcefulness.

….The Foreign Service is inbred, opposes the infusion of new blood and tends to

dominate key posts to permeate its power.25

The result of this analysis of the State Department was no surprise to either President

Nixon or Dr. Kissinger. Both of them held a low opinion of the professional diplomatic community. And at no time during the South Asian Crisis were the members of the State

Department entrusted with the details affecting the Administration’s policy decisions, nor were they given the freedom to contribute to foreign policy debate. For President Nixon, loyalty trumped all other considerations when deciding on who could be trusted to be the voice of

25 U.S. Department of State, Historical Document, Foreign Relations of the United States, Volume II, http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v02/d317, 317. 13

American policy. The most influential member of the White House for foreign policy was without a doubt Dr. Kissinger, in his role as National Security Advisor. Dr. Kissinger held similar views to the President’s as to the competence of the State Department to carry out the nation’s foreign policy and their inability to ensure that the interests of the United States, and subsequently those of its allies, were looked after during the events of 1971.

Kissinger: “The State Department position, as I understand it, is to do nothing…Every

time we ask State “what do you do now,” they have a telegram to Yahya asking him to do

something. The choice is between adopting a generally threatening posture and indicating

State’s policy is noninvolvement- don’t get arms in, don’t move anything.”

Nixon:” Non-involved? Meaning?”

Kissinger: “Rape of Pakistan.”26

Becoming an Ambassador from the United States to a foreign country is not a difficult task. There are no prerequisites, no prior employment requirements, and no specific training needed. Former Foreign Service officer Henry Koop described in his book Career Diplomacy,

“Unlike (other professions), amateurs are allowed to participate (in diplomacy). There are no sanctions for being diplomatic without a license. Anyone formally designated by a sending state and accredited by a receiving state is a certified diplomat, with rights and obligations under international law. In the US, there are only two credentials for service in a high diplomatic position: nomination by the president, and confirmation by the Senate.”27

26 U.S. Department of State, Historical Document, Foreign Relations of the United States, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971, http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v11/comp1, 168. 27 Koop, 51 14

The vast majority of the Ambassadorships, Consul-General openings, and numerous

Foreign Service officer positions are filled with career personnel. Historically, only about one- third of the Ambassadorial positions have been filled by presidential political appointees. The majority of personnel working for the State Department are professional diplomats with significant experience in overseas posting. However, the professional diplomatic corps has a predilection for granting themselves the duty of ensuring that American foreign affairs are not unduly affected by transient politics; the very politics that the administration view as the Foreign

Services necessary accountability to the elected government ruling in the White House.28 For this reason, the political appointment of ambassadors by a President ensures that these officials have a commitment to the White House’s foreign policy program, and is a check against those career

Foreign Service officers who might block or impede the President’s foreign agenda.29

The US foreign policy process has rarely enabled the professional diplomatic corps to have any degree of influence over policy. Traditionally, the Foreign Service has been limited to advising Presidents and officials about the national interest of different foreign nations, their motivations and limitations of the people in power. But Foreign Service Officers have critical skills and abilities that must not be over looked. They include the ability to predict foreign reactions, to see the possibilities of negotiations, and perhaps most importantly to communicate between the American government and foreign powers without misunderstandings.30 It is this vital skill of the professional diplomat to be one who is able to exchange, understand, and communicate in a disorderly and largely unregulated field of human interaction. But this same ability has not been readily sought by American Presidents when making foreign policy

28 Schake, 94 29 Schake, 37 30 Kopp, 63 15 decisions. Even Dr. Kissinger, who would eventually serve as Secretary of State, agreed that the

Foreign Service “has little influence through any formal role; its ability to shape policy depends on an intangible bond between the Secretary of State and the President.”31 It is a relationship that can either be a help or a hindrance for the administration’s conduct of foreign affairs. In the

Nixon White House, the president retained for himself the right to oversee the direction and scope of America’s foreign affairs; and he had little faith in the ability of the diplomats in the

State Department to assist him.

In spite of their professionalism, the State Department is filled with human beings just as vulnerable and opinionated as the rest of humanity. They do not always agree with their Chief

Executive, and when their honest opinions differ from the current policy line, they are expected to provide their best judgment to their superiors as to what should be America’s policy. 32 Mr

Kopp writes that a professional member of the State Department, “should be enough of a diplomat to figure out how to tell his boss what he thinks without committing sabotage, and how to be loyal without pandering.”33

During the events of the South Asia crisis, the ‘dissident’ channel provided by the State

Department proved to be a headache for the White House. Dr. Kissinger in writing his memoirs admitted that the Nixon White house’s failure to publicly condemn the Pakistan Army’s military repression in East Pakistan was creating a dilemma for the administration, which was determined to protect their recently opened lines of communication with China.34 As a result, despite the administration’s protest that it was doing everything it could to encourage a political solution to the crisis, its very own diplomatic corps continued to argue for a more public condemnation

31 Kopp, 90 32 Kopp, 92 33 Kopp, 93 34 B.Z Khasru, Myths and Facts: Bangladesh Liberation War, (New Delhi: Rupa Publications, 2010), 92 16 against the outrages they were witnessing in East Pakistan. Thus despite efforts to present a unified message, both the President and Dr. Kissinger remained frustrated with what they saw as an unruly State Department;

Dr. Kissinger to Secretary of State Rogers, “I think there’s a shade of difference between

State’s and the President’s view. He would like to tilt towards Pakistan and not India and

your people go the other way.”

Rogers: “I don’t see that. I don’t think its right. Does he think that?...I don’t think it

serves the President well. I don’t think we should say the President wants us to kick

India.”35

Privately, Kissinger and Nixon were more candid about their unhappiness with officers in the State Department who continued to press for support for India following their invasion of

East Pakistan. Dr. Kissinger described the diplomatic corps as “morally corrupt, but it's also intellectually so totally corrupt.”36 For the President, his biggest disagreement rested in what he saw as the State Department’s Pro-India stance, the belief that India’s invasion of East Pakistan was justified by a democratic government over a military dictatorship. Which for President

Nixon was an open declaration of disloyalty, “By God, we just don't do it that way. I mean, it doesn't make, an evil deed is not made good by the form of government that executes the deed,

Henry.”37

35 U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, Vol XI, South Asia Crisis, 156. 36 U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, Vol XI, South Asia Crisis, 171. 37 U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, Vol XI, South Asia Crisis, 171. 17

Chapter 4 The “Dissident Cables”

“On no other issue- except perhaps Cambodia- was the split between the White House and the Department so profound as on the Indo-Pakistan crisis.”- Dr. Kissinger38

Following the beginning of the Pakistan Army’s crack-down on the recalcitrant Bengalis of East Pakistan, Consul-General Archer Blood began to send a series of cables detailing the atrocities being committed by the Pakistan Army on its own citizens. The subject heading of the first cable was labeled “Selective Genocide.”

28 March: “Here in Dhaka we are mute and horrified witnesses to a reign of terror by the

Pak military…. Full horror of Pak military atrocities will come to light sooner or later. I,

therefore, question continued advisability of present USG posture of pretending to

believe GOP false assertions…”

29 March: “As details of horror stories of varying reliability filter in it appears army

seeking (A) terrorize population in general and thereby crush will to resist (although

resistance in Dacca ended several days ago), and (B) eliminate all elements of society

that pose potential threat to consolidation and maintenance of martial law authority.”

Archer Blood continued to send daily reports describing the events occurring in East

Pakistan. Frustrated by a lack of response from the State Department in Washington or the

Embassy in Islamabad concerning his reporting on the Pakistan Army’s campaign against the civilian population, on the 6th of April 1971, Blood sent the first of his dissident cables out from

Dhaka:

38 A.M.A. Muhith, American Response to Bangladesh Liberation War, (Dhaka, Bangladesh: University Press, 1996), 238. 18

Aware of the (Department’s) proposals on “openness” in the Foreign Service, and with

the conviction that U.S. policy related to recent developments in East Pakistan serves

neither our moral interests broadly defined nor our national interests narrowly defined,

numerous officers of AmConGen Dacca, USAID Dacca and USIS Dacca consider it their

duty to register strong dissent with fundamental aspects of this policy.

Our government has failed to denounce the suppression of democracy. Our government

has failed to denounce atrocities. Our government has failed to take forceful measures to

protect its citizens while at the same time bending over backwards to placate the West

Pak dominated government and to lessen likely and deservedly negative international

public relations impact against them. Our government has evidenced what many will

consider moral bankruptcy.

We, as professional public servants express our dissent with current policy and fervently

hope that our true and lasting interests here can be defined and our policies redirected in

order to salvage our nation's position as a moral leader of the free world……39

The response from the State Department and the Embassy in Islamabad was not supportive of Blood’s opinions. Ambassador Farland issued orders to the other American consulate in Pakistan to destroy all copies of the Blood cable40, while Secretary of State Rogers was quick to express his displeasure to Dr. Kissinger over the phone:

Rogers: I wanted to talk about that goddamn message from our people in Dacca. Did you

see it?

39 U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, Vol XI, South Asia Crisis, 91. 40 Blood, 246 19

Kissinger: No.

Rogers: It's miserable. They bitched about our policy and have given it lots of distribution

so it will probably leak. It's inexcusable.

Rogers: It's a terrible telegram. Couldn't be worse—says we failed to defend American

lives and are morally bankrupt.

Kissinger: Blood did that?

Rogers: Quite a few of them signed it. You know we are doing everything we can about

it. Trying to get the telegrams back as many as we can. We are going to get a message

back to them.”41

Unfortunately for Secretary Rogers, the media did get hold of Blood’s message and published it. Public questions and Congressional inquiries quickly followed. The senior leadership of the State Department responded to Blood’s cable, reminding him about the

‘internal’ nature of the events in East Pakistan and the importance of ensuring that State

Department messages remain confidential;

We have been restrained in our public utterances for several reasons…. We view

situation in East Pakistan as primarily an internal matter of the Pakistan Government and

most other governments have same view...

We welcome expression of strongly held views as well as recommendations on policy.

We are sure, however, that you wish these be forwarded privately and directly to

41 U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, Vol XI, South Asia Crisis, 20. 20

principal officers, while at the same time not receiving such wide-spread dissemination as

to increase likelihood of leak to press.42

Archer Blood was not alone in his condemnation of the official US government policy toward the ‘internal’ Pakistan conflict occurring in East Pakistan. America’s Ambassador to

India Kenneth Keating in Delhi added his own comments through his official cables as well;

I believe the United States, whether we like it or not, bears very heavy responsibility for

the continuing deterioration of the situation.43

Greatly concerned at United States vulnerability to damaging allegations of association

with reign of military terror. I believe USG: (A) should promptly, publicly and

prominently deplore thus brutality, (B) should privately lay it on the line with

GOP…..This is time when principles make best politics.44

Not every member of the diplomatic corps disagreed with the official White House position. In Pakistan, US Ambassador Joseph Farland expressed to Washington his support for the President’s ‘tilt’ toward Pakistan as the best a means of ensuring the US influence in the region;

I find it extremely difficult to advocate a course of action which would markedly

diminish U.S. influence in Pakistan at such crucial time in Middle East and Indian Ocean

area affairs.

42 U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, Vol E-7, Documents on South Asia, India and Pakistan: Crisis and War, March-December 1971, http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve07/ch2, 129. 43 U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, Vol XI, South Asia Crisis, 70. 44 Blood, 215 21

I am fully cognizant of the fact that much of world press has hammered hard at U.S.

policy as enunciated by McCloskey, State Department spokesman, i.e., crisis in East

Pakistan is internal affair, but U.S. has expressed concern humanitarian grounds and use

of U.S.-supplied arms.

You must be aware there is strong advocacy in the State Department seeking to pull rug

from under GOP and support the idea of an early Bangla Desh. Further, Embassy has had

full-scale revolt on general issue by virtually all officers in Consulate General, Dacca,

coupled with forfeiture of leadership for American community there. Dacca's reporting

has been tendentious to an extreme.45

In spite of the efforts by his superiors to dampen his outrage, Archer Blood continued to cable his disagreement with the official policy from the Consulate General in Dhaka;

In a country wherein our primary interests defined as humanitarian rather than strategic,

moral principles indeed are relevant to issue. We also disagree with view that current

situation should be viewed simply as ‘constituted’ government using force against

citizens accused of flouting its authority.46

Ambassador Farland continued to express the necessity for professional reporting from his subordinate colleagues and reiterated the necessity for the official US government position on the crisis;

Since we are not only human beings but also government servants, however, righteous

indignation is not of itself an adequate basis for our reaction to the events now occurring

45 U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, Vol XI, South Asia Crisis, 34. 46 U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, Vol E-7, Documents on South Asia, India and Pakistan: Crisis and War, March-December 1971, 130. 22

in East Pakistan. The constituted government is using force against citizens accused of

flouting its authority. The struggle (is) Pakistani and Pakistani.

In this embassy’s view, deplorable as current events in East Pakistan may be, it is

undesirable that they be raised to level of contentious international political issue. We

believe firmly that we should “keep our options open” so as to be able to promote our

interest as events continue to unfold.47

The internal disagreement between the Consul-General in Dhaka and the US Embassy in

Islamabad continued throughout the crisis. Due to efforts by President Nixon, through

Ambassador Farland, the government of President Yahya was able to withstand international pressure to end the military crack-down in the east. A few weeks after the Blood Cables were sent out Ambassador Farland dispatched his deputy, Sid Sober, to examine the facts on the ground in Dhaka. Archer Blood hoped the accuracy of his reports would be confirmed and his displeasure with Washington’s policy vindicated. He was quickly disappointed, “At first I welcomed his visit, but I quickly became depressed when I realized that Sid, a friend of twenty- four years, doubted the balance and accuracy of our reporting.”48

The US policy was obviously focused on helping Pakistan out of disaster of its own making while lessening the advantages enjoyed by India and the Bengali resistance. It quickly became apparent to Blood that the embassy in Islamabad had fallen for the steady stream of propaganda that the Government of Pakistan had been issuing in the weeks since the crack- down. The Ambassador in Islamabad, however, had resigned himself to the “sad registration-

47 U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, Vol XI, South Asia Crisis, 128. 48 Blood, 286. 23 their formerly respected colleagues in East Pakistan had clearly gone off the deep end.”49 At a meeting of all the senior US diplomatic officers in Pakistan during the mid-summer, CG Blood attempted once again to present a clear and realistic assessment of what he believed would be the eventual success of the Bengali population against their Western occupiers. This was a view that was not supported by the military advisor to Ambassador Farland, the famous US Air Force pilot

General Chuck Yeager. General Yeager was quick to point out the futility of American support for the Bengali Rebels; “Do the Bengalis have any aircraft? Any tanks? Then how can they stand up to the well-equipped, disciplined Pakistan Army?”50

49 Blood, 288. 50 Blood, 288. 24

Chapter 5 Nixon’s ‘Tilt’ toward Pakistan

No administration undertakes a change in policy without having a firm grasp of what it

wishes to achieve and what its limitations in carrying out those policy changes are. For

President Nixon, who made no secret of his intent to have a leading role in creating

America’s foreign policy, that change would be altering the foundation which had been the

bedrock of US foreign relations during the previous decade. Since the end of the Second

World War, the US had committed itself to defending the nations of the non-communist

world from the aggressive forces of the Soviet Bloc. From Greece in the Mediterranean to

Vietnam in the Far East, American arms and soldiers had been sent to assist its allies in the

common cause against the “Red Scare” of world communism. President Nixon had been one

of the strongest supporters of America’s active and aggressive foreign policy to defeat the

Soviet Union and its comrades wherever they sought to gain a foothold in the Free World.

But after a decade of America’s commitment to the conflict in Southeast Asia, President

Nixon had decided that a change had to be made,

In these conditions, the United States should not be the fireman running from one

conflagration to the other, but can address itself to the longer-term problems of a peaceful

international structure and leave to local responsibilities the immediate task of

construction.51

In simplest terms, the US decided that while it was willing to honor its treaty

commitments, it would expect its allies to see to their own defense first and to only call upon

51 U.S. Department of State, Historical Document, Foreign Relations of the United States, Foundations of Foreign Policy, 1969–1972, http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v01/comp1, Vol I, 58. 25

America if it was absolutely necessary. This was eventually to be called the ‘Nixon

Doctrine’.

It states the following: One, of course, we will maintain any commitments that the United

States has. Two, that in the case of a threat by a nuclear country against a non-nuclear

country, we feel that we have a special obligation since we are the only major nuclear

country in the free world. Three, with respect to other threats, or with respect to other

programs, the initial and principal responsibility has to be borne first by the country

concerned and secondly by the region concerned.52

The President’s intent was to enable his White House to make significant changes to the

US policy toward the Soviet Union, Communist China, and the on-going war in Vietnam.

With the Soviet Union it was to be Nuclear Arms Control and détente. With China, Nixon

and his main policy advisor Dr. Kissinger, it would be the chance for a new opening in

dialogue and the re-establishment of formal relations with the most populous communist

nation in globe. Vietnam would of course be the first nation to feel the effects of Nixon’s

change to policy, the ‘Vietnamization’ of the war.

Events on the sub-continent would soon prove to be the nadir of the Nixon doctrine, as the US found itself in a dilemma between supporting an ally but without the ability to provide them the weapons that would enable them to do so themselves. Eventually, the White House under Dr. Kissinger’s advice, sought to separate the humanitarian aspects of the crisis from the political. Dr. Kissinger repeatedly worked to portray the US position as “attempt (at) two efforts simultaneously; one to ease human suffering…and secondly, we have attempted to bring about a

52 Ibid, 69. 26 political resolution to the conflict which generated the refugees in the first place.”53 The crisis in

South Asia would prove to be unmanageable from the Oval office and would require the White

House to go to extremes to ensure America’s policies were in favor of supporting the government of Yahya in Islamabad.

A key component of the White House’s strategy for dealing with the crisis was to separate the humanitarian aspects of the policy from the political. In effect, to show that the administration was working to alleviate the human suffering of the Bengali refugees in India, without the administration having to put public pressure on the Pakistanis to end their military crackdown.54

Unlike the majority of the Foreign Service officers, Ambassador Farland in Islamabad supported the President’s preference for private channel communications. As he saw it, it was the use of private and often direct face-to-face communication that had been the most successful in persuading President Yahya to adhere to US demands. “The central element of our strategy in

Pakistan, has been the maintenance of sufficient leverage with the G.O.P. to encourage actions on its part designed to lessen the danger of an Indo-Pak war….These have been the major purposes of the generally sympathetic, non-reprehending attitude we have maintained toward

Pakistan.”55

However, the public bias of the Pro-Pakistan policy continued to stymie its effectiveness, forced by the American and world media’s constant repetition of the alleged atrocities being committed by the Pakistan Army in East Pakistan. President Nixon refused to bow to public and

53 Jacob, 226. 54 A.M.A. Muhith, American Response to Bangladesh Liberation War, (Dhaka, Bangladesh: University Press, 1996), 238. 55 U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, Vol E-7, 145. 27

Congressional pressure to publicly admonish Yahya’s regime. In private talks with the Indian

Foreign Minister Singh, the President stressed that private consultations were the most effective means to bring the crisis to an end, “One way the public pressure, another way the private, shall we say persuasion. I have always believed in the latter myself as the most effective way, particularly when I know the individuals fairly well…We will then proceed on that basis. I don't think anything, however, certainly at this point, would be served by any indication of the United

States putting public pressure on Pakistan. That I know would be wrong if we want to accomplish our goal.”56

For President Nixon, the public media was not the place for conducting a nation’s foreign affairs. The private friendship that he had developed with Pakistan’s Yahya would not be simply tossed away by public recrimination concerning the events in East Pakistan. “We are not going to engage in public pressure on the Government of West Pakistan. That would be counter- productive. These are matters that we will discuss only in private channels.”57

This ‘Tilt’ as it would be known, was a deliberate effort by Nixon and his supporters, especially Dr. Kissinger, to provide the diplomatic, political, and material support that would give Pakistan a fighting chance a) to retain its controlling position in East Pakistan, and b) to survive a direct conflict with India. Within the inner circle of the administration, known as the

White House Situation Advisory Group (WSAG), the ‘Tilt’ was actively pursued as America’s primary basis for dealing with the events in South Asia. Comprised of various members of the executive branch, including Defense, CIA, State, etc., the job of the WSAG was not to formulate

56 U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, Vol E-7, 138 57 Muhith, 202. 28 policy, but to find “justification for the pro-Pakistan policy the President had already endorsed.”58

In a study memorandum prepared for the White House, the WSAG reviewed America’s interests and limitations in the secession of East Pakistan from the West,

Our consistent position has been that US interests are better served by a unified Pak than by

its separation into two independent states. Finally, we have recognized that we have no

realistic alternative but to support Pak unity if we were to maintain satisfactory relation with

the government in Islamabad.59

The White House Advisors realized however, that the US had limited ability to influence events. Due to Pakistan’s aggression against neighboring India, previous administrations had restricted arms sales and refused direct military support. The State Department had studied the details of America’s commitments under the SEATO (Southeast Asian Treaty Organization), and determined that the US was only required to come to Pakistan’s defense in the event of an attack by a communist nation, i.e. the Soviet Union. Therefore, the President was advised to limit himself in public pronouncements of support for the Yahya government.60

We also recognize that as a practical matter our ability to influence the course of these events

is very limited…Unless and until separation is certain, any shift in our position, would be

against our continuing interest in seeing Pakistan remain unified. Any softening on our

part… would contribute to the process of disintegration.61

58 Anderson, 220. 59 U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, Vol E-7, 123 60 Anderson, 254. 61 U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, Vol E-7, 123. 29

It is interesting to note that in the early stage of the crisis, the report did recommend that if events escalated, that the long-term interest for the US would best be served by adopting a firm stance against Islamabad. This advice was ignored in the months which followed.62

President Nixon realized that he had no choice but to keep America’s support for

President Yahya under wraps and away from the media. Speaking with Pakistan’s Foreign

Secretary Khan at the White House, President Nixon admitted, “We will do everything we can to try to help you in your cause. That's where we stand here. How, what we can do—what we can do, of course, is limited by the circumstances. I'd like to give you more encouragement than this, but I'd like to be totally honest.”63

Dr. Kissinger’s support for his President was unwavering and he encouraged the WSAG to implement the ‘Tilt’ policy, reminding its membership “We are not trying to be even- handed.”64 However, both Kissinger and President Nixon continued to be frustrated by what they perceived as the State Department’s continued insistence that the US maintain a balanced policy between the strategic and humanitarian concerns. This was despite the efforts of the State

Department’s diplomatic corps to forge a peaceful settlement that would equitably bring the conflict to a close. It was a balance that President Nixon had no interest in pursuing, “Whoever is doing the background at State is invoking the President’s wrath. Please try and follow the

President’s wishes.”65

Dr. Kissinger’s frustration with the other members of the WSAG continued to grow in the later months as the crisis erupted into open conflict between India and Pakistan; “I am getting

62 Ibid, 123. 63 U.S. Department of State, Historical Document, Foreign Relations of the United States, Vol XI, 154. 64 Anderson, 228. 65 Ibid, 257. 30 hell every half-hour from the president that we are not being tough enough on India. He has just called me again. He does not believe we are carrying out his wishes. He wants to tilt in favor of

Pakistan. He feels everything we do comes out otherwise.”66

Eventually, even the staunchest supporter of the administration’s Pakistan ‘Tilt’,

Ambassador Farland in Islamabad, began to suggest that changes be made in the dialogue between Washington and Islamabad, “Our belief that events in East Pakistan are an internal affair of Pakistan and should remain so... [State] Department has consistently taken the position that USG should not become involved in Pak situation...... This mission has, on the whole, agreed with this position….. Nonetheless, I believe that, in the present circumstances, we should be somewhat more willing than we have been heretofore to express our thoughts with controlled candor to the main parties concerned.”67

Realizing that his administration would not be able to actively support Pakistan in its efforts to retain its control over East Pakistan, President Nixon decided that steps should be taken to provide America’s ally and Nixon‘s personal friend with unofficial and technically illegal arms transfers. Specifically, President Nixon authorized the transfer of American fighter planes, currently leased to Jordon, to Pakistan. The President instructed that the transfer of these aircraft be done “very quietly.”68 Unfortunately, the State Department was not supportive of the

President’s decision.

Nixon: “Let's get assurances to the Jordanians. Let's send a message to the Chinese. Let's

send a message to the Russians. And I would tell the people in the State Department not a

goddamn thing they don't need to know. Right, John?

66 Muhith, 203. 67 U.S. Department of State, Historical Document, Foreign Relations of the United States, Vol XI, 21. 68 Anderson, 252 31

Attorney General Mitchell: Well, you've got to give them the party line on that or all a

sudden the Secretary of State will say that's illegal.

Nixon : Is it really so much against our law? [planes from Jordon to Pak]

Kissinger : What's against our law is not what they do, but our giving them permission.

Nixon : Henry, we give the permission privately.

Kissinger : That's right.

Nixon : Hell, we've done worse.”69

As President Nixon’s Advisor for National Security, Dr. Kissinger worked tirelessly to find alternatives for the President to support Pakistan. One avenue that was looked into was an agreement made with Pakistan during the Kennedy administration. Dr. Kissinger debated the merits of the ‘Kennedy Treaty’ with Secretary of State Rogers,

Kissinger: “He showed the aide memoire of Kennedy's — in case of aggression by India

against Pakistan the U. S. would come to the assistance of Pakistan.

Rogers: It doesn't say military. I don't think there is any problem. The Aide Memoire of

Kennedy's does not commit the U. S. to go to war in the event that Pakistan is attacked by

India and we should not say that… You can't say Aide Memoire commits U.S. to go to

war. You can't circumvent the Constitution…

Kissinger: I am not trying to circumvent the Constitution. I am trying to maintain a

minimum of credibility which is almost impossible in the light of this niggling.

69 U.S. Department of State, Historical Document, Foreign Relations of the United States, Vol XI, 165. 32

Rogers: Oh, come on. There is no niggling or haggling. I have only said we have no

treaty commitment to go to war in the event there is an attack on Pakistan. But, we have

no legal obligation. If we suggested we had it would be a catastrophe. None of our

treaties provide that we have a commitment to take military action.”70

70 U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, Vol E-7, 195. 33

Chapter 6 Blame India

President Nixon’s previous experience both as the nation’s Vice President under

Eisenhower and as a private citizen afterwards colored his views about other nations, their people, and their leaders. President Nixon disliked no other nation as strongly as India and its

Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi. Nixon considered her to be a “cold-blooded practitioner of power politics.” Likewise, the Prime Minister was as unimpressed with the President as he was with her.71 Consequentially, once the crisis began, neither leader was ever able to have a rational dialogue with the other.

In the Fall of 1971, Prime Minister Gandhi carried out a tour to the major capitals of the

Western world, seeking to secure support for India’s struggle to care for the ten million Bengali refugees flooding across her borders. In a press statement Prime Minister Gandhi issued following her visit to the US seeking refugee aid, she was direct in her view that India would not give into American pressure to end the crisis without first ensuring a favorable outcome for India and its Bengali allies, “The times have passed when any nation sitting three or four thousand miles away could give orders to Indians on the basis of their color superiority to do as they wished.” Nixon’s private reply to Dr. Kissinger was equally direct, “She doesn’t mind the color of our aid dollars.”72 It was not a congenial relationship. President Nixon’s frustration continued over what he saw as Gandhi’s deliberate provocation of the media against his White House’s

‘Tilt’.73

71 Kalyani Shankar, Nixon, Indira, and India: Politics and Beyond, (Delhi: Macmillan Publishers, 2010), 8. 72 Ibid, 20 73 U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, Vol E-7, 162. 34

Following the Pakistan air-strikes on the 3rd of December, India unleashed her own well prepared campaign against Pakistan. While simply conducting a holding action along the border with West Pakistan, the Indian and Bengali force quickly stormed into East Pakistan and rapidly advanced toward the capital of Dhaka. In a letter addressed to President Nixon, the Prime

Minister was blunt in her reason for responding with an invasion of her own making, “I should stress to Your Excellency that the people and the government of India are determined that this wanton and unprovoked aggression should be decisively and finally repelled once and for all.”74

Dr. Kissinger was quick to back-up the President’s policy of supporting Pakistan against the obvious Indian aggression. Failure by the US to denounce India’s invasion would result in a situation of “international anarchy, and where the period of peace, which is the greatest desire for the President to establish, will be jeopardized, not at first for Americans, but for peoples all over the world.”75

President Nixon was unmoved by India’s assertion that they were simply making an effort to put an end to the trouble spilling across over into their country. Supported by CIA finding’s that were supposedly provided by an agent working directly in the Indian Cabinet,

Nixon was determined not to allow Pakistan to fall to the Indian Army. “Then during the week of

6 Dec, we received convincing evidence that India was seriously contemplating the seizure of

Pak-held portions of Kashmir and the destruction of Pak military forces in the west. We could not ignore this evidence….We had to take action to prevent a wider war.”76

The evidence that President Nixon spoke of was from the Indian cabinet itself, through a

CIA agent directly reporting the private deliberations of Prime Minister Gandhi’s senior staff.

74 Khasru, 326. 75 Jacob, 227. 76 U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, Vol E-7, 104. 35

The CIA report detailed Gandhi’s desire to ‘settle’ the situation in East Pakistan as soon as power could be transferred to the Awami League, and prepare the Indian Armed Force for an offensive against West Pakistan. However, the CIA agent did note that the Indian Cabinet did intend that the major fighting would be over by the end of December.77 This reveals a lack of interest on India’s part in the complete subjugation of West Pakistan. This was soon backed up by the American Military Attaché in Nepal, who as a result of discussion with Indian officials, found himself the recipient of the ‘Indian Grand Strategy’,

The Indian aim was to keep fighting in the east until the Bangladesh government was

installed, and to fight to prevent West Pakistan’s push into Kashmir. With victory in the

east, India would then pull back to the previous borders, provided West Pakistan did the

same. 78

Finally, the Indian Ambassador Jha was directly asked by the State Department about

India’s aims. His reply was that “Indian did not want war and did not start it. India clearly did not and does not covet any part of Pakistan’s territory.”79

Regardless of the reports coming from overseas or from the Indians themselves; President

Nixon and Dr. Kissinger were determined to lay the blame for the outbreak of war on Prime

Minister Gandhi’s government. Unfortunately, once again the department responsible for conducting the foreign affairs of the US was refusing to play along with the President’s desires.

The diplomats at State saw the primary US interest as ending the conflict and preventing it from expanding beyond the confines of the subcontinent.

77 Anderson, 232. 78 Anderson, 233. 79 U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, Vol E-7, 181. 36

Kissinger: “The President does want to act. Wants to take a line to condemn the Indians.

Secretary of State Rogers: It's not a matter of condemning or blaming. It's trying to stop

it. If we blame India a general war will break out…We are short-sighted if we think our

general approach is castigating India. It's to bring a ceasefire.

Kissinger: And withdrawal.

Rogers: If we say let's condemn India, what does that do? We are trying to bring about

ceasefire.

Kissinger: That's what we want to do but in order to get that we have to make clear who

started action.”80

President Nixon had no interest in the State Department’s point of view, and ordered that the Foreign Service be excluded from further discussion,

Nixon : In what you discuss at your meeting, I just strongly urge—don't let, keep as much

of it under the hat as you can….. And I would tell the people in the State Department not

a goddamn thing they don't need to know.81

Ambassador Keating in Delhi, apparently unaware that he was not conducting the affairs of the US in India as the President wished, continued to offer his best and professional opinion about the statements made by the American administration. In a December cable concerning the

White House press releases about the US position on the Indo-Pak war, Ambassador Keating worried over a refusal by Washington to acknowledge the facts on the ground, “I do not believe

80 U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, Vol XI, 158. 81 U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, Vol XI, 165. 37 those elements of the (White House) story either add to our position, or perhaps more importantly, to our credibility.”82

In Islamabad, Ambassador Farland had no personal conflict, as he was a strong supporter of the President. Ambassador Farland also agreed that the Foreign Service was filled by pro-

Indian supporters who were refusing to abide by the US ‘Tilt’ towards Pakistan.

Nixon: Well, I think we just continue on our line. We, as you know, we're having a hell

of a time keeping the State Department bureaucracies hitched on this thing. They're

basically pro-Indian. When I say “they,” not all. But a lot of them.

Farland: Well, my Consul General over in Dacca—

Nixon: He's no good.

Farland: blew the whistle on the whole thing.

Nixon: He's bad, isn't he?

Farland: Well he's gone. He's here in the Department now.83

Ambassador Farland’s troubles with the US Consulate in Dhaka did not end with Archer

Blood’s replacement. Herbert Spivack was considered to be an organization man, loyal to his career in the Foreign Service and nearing retirement, a man not expected to make waves.84

Chosen to replace Blood, Spivack found himself repeatedly at the center of the turmoil in East

Pakistan. CG Spivack found himself on the wrong side of US policy in early December with his cable to Secretary of State Rogers, inelegantly titled “Villainy by Night.” The text outlined the

82 US State Dept Cable Delhi #18950, 8 Dec 1971. 83 U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, Vol E-7, 141. 84 Anderson, 241 38 mounting evidence of an on-going effort by the Pakistan Air Force to deliberately bomb Dhaka’s slums and orphanages, and lay the blame on the advancing Indians.

Ambassador Farland was unimpressed and made only a token inquiry with the Pakistan

Foreign Ministry. The matter for the US Embassy in Islamabad was considered closed by the

America’s Defense Representative General Yeager, who deduced that the bombs could only have been dropped by Indian aircraft, an observation he was able to make from over a thousand miles away. CG Spivak’s observations were considered irrelevant.85

85 Anderson, 245. 39

Chapter 7 USS ENTERPRISE & TASK FORCE 74

President Nixon was determined to see a shift in the way the US dealt with the other powers that shared the globe with America. A critical element of that policy would be accepting that not every conflict would require a US presence to solve it. But at the same time, the US would not abdicate its responsibility to shape international relations as a means toward the peaceful settlement of disputes. However, it must be noted that for President Nixon, the international arena where these events played out, was a precarious place for a balance of the world’s powers. Formerly, only the United States and the Soviet Union held significant positions, but with Nixon’s efforts, Communist China was brought in as an alternative power.

Still a balance was maintained, but one that offered greater flexibility between the Great powers and more opportunities for finding common answers to disputed conflicts.

The South Asia crisis put this new strategy to the test. Each side in the conflict was linked with one of the Superpowers in a series of treaties and alliances that progressively drew these political behemoths towards the edge of war. The oldest relationship was that of America and

Pakistan, nations that had a twenty year history of military alliances in CENTO and SEATO, military arms and equipment transfers, and training programs. Pakistan was lucky enough to find a second ally in Communist China. Both nations had found themselves at war with India in the early sixties, and had grown their relationship through military exchanges and economic development. For India things might have looked bleak were it not for the interest that the Soviet

Union showed in developing a relationship with the largest democracy in the world. The resulting ‘Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation’ presented a strategic counter- weight to the political pressure that the United States could apply on Delhi in any conflict with

Islamabad.

40

In the South Asian crisis, the ‘Nixon Doctrine’ was put to the test as Washington struggled to use this new global balance to shape an outcome to its liking. Responding to his critics, President Nixon replied, “We have no influence—we have no responsibility for either.

(Ending the crisis) is not our job. The Russians have an interest in India. The Chinese have a hell of an interest in Pakistan. We only have an interest in peace. We're not anti-Indian; we're not anti-Pakistan. We are anti-aggression, as a means of solving an internal, a very difficult internal problem.” 86

Dr. Kissinger provided a more prescient view of the possible ramifications of the conflict, which he viewed as the template for future provocations and adventure by the Soviets and their allies in more strategically vital areas of the globe.

The thing that concerns the President and me is this; here we have Indian-Soviet

collusion, raping a friend of ours. Secondly, we have a situation where one of the motives

that the Chinese may have had in leaning towards us a little bit is the fear that something

like this might happen to them…. Thirdly, if the Soviets get away with this in the

Subcontinent, we have seen the dress rehearsal for a Middle Eastern war.87

President Nixon made a direct appeal to the Soviets to use their influence to bring hostilities to a quick end. Washington sought to use Moscow to save Islamabad from the threat posed by Delhi.

86 U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, Vol E-7, 163. 87 U.S. Department of State, Historical Document, Foreign Relations of the United States, Vol E-7, 159. 41

The key to the settlement, however, is in the hands of the Soviet Union. They can restrain the

Indians. If the Soviet Union does not restrain the Indians, the United States will not be able to

exert any influence with Yahya to negotiate a political settlement with the Awami League.88

The White House decided to show America’s interest in the region by the deployment of a naval battle group to the Bay of Bengal, between India and East Pakistan. The deployment of the American Task Force into the Bay of Bengal sought to preserve America’s credibility and honor with our allies. As well as to protect the new-born relationship that Nixon sought to develop with the Chinese. This was a relationship that both the President and Dr. Kissinger believed the Soviets were driven to tear apart, and they believed that India would be the wedge to do just that. By defeating one of the oldest of China’s allies, Pakistan, and rendering impotent

China’s newest, America, the USSR would diminish China’s entrance on to the world stage.89

This was a decision with results that could not easily be predicted, not even by Dr.

Kissinger, “We're going through this agony to prevent the West Pakistan army from being destroyed. Secondly, to maintain our Chinese arm. Thirdly, to prevent a complete collapse of the world's psychological balance of power, which will be produced if a combination of the Soviet

Union and the Soviet armed client state can tackle a not so insignificant country without anybody doing anything?90

In spite of the months long efforts by the White House to affect the events playing out on the sub-continent, none was to have more of an effect than the deployment of a US Naval Task

Force headed by the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS Enterprise into the Bay of Bengal.91

88 Ibid, 169. 89 U.S. Department of State, Historical Document, Foreign Relations of the United States, Vol E-7, 156. 90 U.S. Department of State, Historical Document, Foreign Relations of the United States, Vol XI, 168. 91 Blechman, 188. 42

Ordered to away from its war-time station off North Vietnam on the 12th of December, Task

Force 74 moved through the narrow Straits of Malacca on the evening of the 13th, arrived in the

Bay of Bengal by the 15th of the month, and was expected to arrive on the coast of East Pakistan by the 16th of December, an date which unfortunately was twenty-four hours after the surrender of Pakistan’s Eastern Command in Dhaka to the Joint Indian-Bengali Forces. 92

The White House’s intent for the movement of the American Navy into the Indian Ocean was to pressure the Indian government into NOT attacking West Pakistan, to keep them from destroying what remained of the Pakistan Army or dismantling Islamabad’s control over the contested territories of Kashmir.93 No effort was made to keep the movement of the Task Force a secret. On the contrary, the Enterprise and her consorts sailed in broad daylight through some of the most heavily traveled shipping lanes in the world. The news of their arrival was quick to reach Delhi, Moscow, and Islamabad. 94

In the White House, the US Navy was to be the ‘neon-sign’ announcing America’s commitment to Western Pakistan, and specifically President Yahya.

Kissinger: “Well the trouble is we have to convince the Indians now. We've got to scare

them off an attack on West Pakistan as much as we possibly can. …We've got to warn

the Russians about some kind of attack on West Pakistan.”

Kissinger: We'll take an aircraft carrier from Vietnam into the Bay of Bengal for the

evacuation of American civilians that are in the area.

Nixon : The aircraft carrier is easy.

92 Khasru, 357. 93 U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, Vol XI, 168. 94 Khasru, 390. 43

Kissinger : We should get a note to the Chinese.

Nixon : Right.

Kissinger : We should move the carrier to the Bay of Bengal.

Nixon : I agree with that. Go ahead.

Kissinger : And you could tell the Chinese what you're doing and tell them of the

advantage for them to move some troops to the frontier.”95

For Gandhi’s cabinet, the looming arrival of the American Task Force caused more confusion that concern. The reported purpose of the Task Force, ensuring the safety of the remaining American citizen’s in East Pakistan, made little sense to the government in Delhi as the majority of those evacuees had already left Dhaka aboard chartered airliners on the 12th of

December.96 The Indians presumed that the US forces had an interest in drawing off the Indian forces pressing on the Eastern Pakistan Army, diverting the Indian carrier Vikrant from its attacks on the East Pakistan ports, and breaking the blockade of Pakistan shipping in the Bay of

Bengal.97 No direct connection was made to the conflict occurring on the border with West

Pakistan.

The Indian Ambassador soon called upon the US State Department to express his government’s concern over reports that the Enterprise, “equipped with all kinds of devices and gadgets,” was moving to evacuate the remaining Americans in Dhaka. Specifically, India sought assurance that there would be no evacuation by force or without asking India first.

95 U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, Vol XI, 165. 96 Jacobs, 134. 97 Anderson, 263. 44

The furor continues over US intentions in sending a naval task force, including the

aircraft carrier Enterprise in to the Bay of Bengal. Wire services report that Indian

Ambassador Jha told a press conference yesterday following a meeting with Assistant

Secretary Sisco that he was unable to obtain a categorical denial of reports that the US

vessels were to establish a beachhead to evacuate Pak soldiers and civilians from EP.98

The Ambassador never received either the assurances or denials he sought for the American administration.99 But then President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger had no interest in alleviating the

Indian’s concerns.

Kissinger: And I—I'd like to call State to call (the Indian Ambassador) in. He says he has

unmistakable proof that we are planning a landing on the Bay of Bengal. Well, that's

okay with me.

Nixon: Yeah, that scares them.

Kissinger: That carrier move is good. That—

Nixon: Why, hell yes. That never bothers me. I mean it's a, the point about the carrier

move, we just say fine, we had a majority. And we've got to be there for the purpose of

their moving there. Look, these people are savages.100

The Enterprise and its escorts were considered by most Indians to be more of a belated and symbolic show of support for America’s doomed ally in East Pakistan. The aircraft carrier was too far from the western front, over a thousand miles actually, to have any influence in the fighting between India and Western Pakistan. The decision to deploy the American warships into

98 SITREP #44, US State Department Operations Center, 15 Dec 1971 99 State Department Cable from Undersecretary Irwin to Ambassador Keating, 14 Dec 1971. 100 U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, Vol XI, 189. 45 the Bay of Bengal so late in the conflict in East Pakistan made little sense to the Indian commanders there.101 Perhaps the Indian’s greatest comfort came from their fellow co-signers of the Indo-Soviet Treaty. The Soviet Ambassador to India reportedly assured Prime Minister

Gandhi that the US efforts to ‘bully’ India were not a precursor to America’s direct military involvement in the Indo-Pak conflict. What’s more, he assured them that Soviet naval forces were close behind the American’s and would prevent them from interfering with Indian forces in the Bay.102 Washington however, was convinced that just the presence of American warships would start a clear chain of events to bring Delhi, under pressure from the Soviet, to the negotiating table.

Kissinger : The Indians will scream we're threatening them.

Nixon : Why are we doing it anyway? Aren't we going in for the purpose of strength?

Well, what do we want them [unclear] for?

Kissinger : Well I—hell, I'd move the carriers so that we can tell the Chinese tomorrow to

move their forces to the frontier, and then if the Russians intervene—

Nixon : Well, all right. Now, will the Chinese intervene if we don't move the carriers?

We may just move the helicopters in.

Kissinger : It'd be better to have the carrier. But we'd have to do a lot of things, and “we'd

have to do them toughly.”103

In the end, the Prime Minister Gandhi chose to ignore the American navy presence in the

Bay of Bengal and focused on ending the conflict on her terms as quickly as possible. Following

101 S.N. Kohli, We Dared: Maritime Operations in the 1971 Indo-Pak War, (Delhi: Lancer International, 1989), 22. 102 Jacobs, 256. 103 U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, Vol XI 168. 46 the surrender of the Pakistan army in Dhaka on December 15, India issued orders for a unilateral cease-fire for its forces in the west the next day. 104 President Yahya, bowing to the inevitable, issued his own cease-fire as well.

The unfulfilled hope of the “American cavalry riding to the rescue” of the beleaguered

Pakistanis resulted in days of delay before General Niazi requested a cease-fire. No actual US planes, ships, or soldiers were involved with the war in East Pakistan, but the possibility of

American forces adding their fire-power to those of the Pakistan Army had significant effect on the war that did occur.

General Niazi, the Martial law Administrator and commander of the Pakistan Army in the east, had repeatedly asked for assurances that the promised foreign support was actually enroute.

From Islamabad, the messages promised, “yellow from the north and white from the south.” 105

Weakly veiled indications of help from China and America but without specifically mentioning just what that help might entail. In order to better prepare for the arrival of Pakistan’s allies,

General Niazi’s staff attempted to gain more specific details. The answer from Army

Headquarters in Islamabad was ‘soon’. The frustrated Army staff in Dhaka inquired of their higher headquarters “how soon is their soon?”106

Initially orders from Army Headquarters in Islamabad exhorted the Eastern Command to refuse any cease-fire agreement.107 It was on that same day evacuation flights from Dhaka were cancelled by General Niazi’s headquarters, supposedly because of the damage sustained by the airport run-way during Indian air attacks. Although the foreign diplomatic community in Dhaka

104 Blechman, 193. 105 Siddiq Salik, Witness to Surrender, (Karachi, Pakistan: Oxford University Press, 1977), 199. 106 Siddiq Salik, Witness to Surrender, (Karachi, Pakistan: Oxford University Press, 1977), 200. 107 Blechman, 205. 47 assumed that the Pakistan Army wanted civilians in the city for the American Task Force to

‘evacuate’, along with themselves.108

The command in East Pakistan continued to draw-out their defenses in order to keep open the seaports on the Bay of Bengal, just in case American forces actually showed up. Rumors of

Chinese paratroopers landing north of the capital spread just as rapidly. 109 Eventually, General

Niazi went to the diplomatic representatives of both China and the US in Dhaka to inquire about the truth of their nations support for his struggling forces. Neither of the diplomatic heads had any information on any promises of support, and expressed ignorance of any moves by their respective governments.110

American Consul-General Spivack can be excused for being unable to reassure the

General about US support. The White House had deliberately kept its Foreign Service ignorant of the USS Enterprise movement into the area. President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger debated the merits of the issue without any input from the State Department or even the President’s primary military advisor, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Nevertheless, both of them debated the merits and limitations of America’s involvement in the crisis.

Kissinger: From the Chinese angle I'd like to move the carrier. From the public opinion

angle, what the press and television would do to us if an American carrier showed up

there I—

Nixon : What, why—can't the carrier be there for the purpose of evacuation?

108 Anderson, 241. 109 A.A.K. Niazi, The Betrayal of East Pakistan, (Karachi, Pakistan: Oxford University Press, 1998), 180. 110 Siddiq Salik, Witness to Surrender, (Karachi, Pakistan: Oxford University Press, 1977), 200. 48

Kissinger : Yeah, but against whom are we going to use the planes? Against whom are

we going to use the planes? Are we going to shoot our way in?111

In the end, the White House decided that the promise of American support was critical to ensuring their nation’s commitment to an ally, while at the same time providing a lever against increasing Soviet aid on India’s behalf.

Nixon : What are we going to ask the Russians to do?

Kissinger : Ceasefire, negotiation, and subsequent withdrawal… Demanding assurances.

I would keep open the possibility that we'll pour in arms into Pakistan. I don't understand

the psychology by which the Russians can pour arms into India but we cannot give arms

to Pakistan. I don't understand the theory of non-involvement. I don't see where we will

be as a country.112

Without exception, the post-crisis analysis by the White House confirmed for itself that due credit for the survival of West Pakistan was solely due to the threat presented by the USS

Enterprise and its attending warships. Dr. Kissinger was certain that the India’s ‘reluctant’ acceptance of a cease-fire with West Pakistan was due to Soviet pressure from the US Navy arrival and unwillingness by Moscow to risk détente with Washington.113

Kissinger: “The Indians have just declared a unilateral ceasefire in the West. We have

made it.

Nixon: What's it mean?

111 U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, Vol XI, 168. 112 U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, Vol XI, 168. 113 Muhith, 246. 49

Nixon: It's the Russians working for us. We have to get the story out.

Kissinger: Congratulations, Mr. President. You saved W. Pakistan.”114

The White House was certain that India was determined to dismember West Pakistan and eliminate Islamabad’s ability to threaten India again in the future. General Haig, senior advisor to

Dr. Kissinger, was quoted as saying “We believe and we have very strong confirmation that those steps were effective in convincing the Soviet Union to influence the Indians to accept a ceasefire rather than to proceed with attacks against West Pakistan- in other words, to stop short of what had been their goal against Pakistan.”115

Within the American government, the White House’s intent was not understood by most anyone outside the President’s inner circle of advisors. The State Department was focused on ending the open conflict between India and Pakistan. Congress was often critical of the administration’s support for Pakistan verses the humanitarian crisis of the Bengali refugees.

Even the US Navy itself had a different purpose for undertaking an excursion into the India

Ocean. The Admirals were more interested in demonstrating the US Navy’s ability to operate in the Indian Ocean to counter the growing Soviet presence in that part of the world. The opportunity to intervene in the actual conflict between India and Pakistan, in either the east or the west, was given little serious attention by the admirals.116

The government of President Yahya was certain that the only hope for victory in the East lay with the arrival of military forces from either China or the US. While the Chinese noticeably made no specific commitment or troop movements, the American deployment of the Enterprise

114 U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, Vol XI, 191. 115 Khasu, 275. 116 Blechman, 195. 50 into the India Ocean was exactly what Yahya was hoping for. Not surprisingly, rumors of the

Task Force’s arrival strengthened his resolve and encouraged him to continue the fighting in East

Pakistan even after he had given General Niazi permission to surrender.117

The government of India was similarly perplexed about the proper response to the arrival of the US Task Force. Gandhi’s cabinet was confused by the reported purpose of sending such powerful warships to evacuate the few dozen civilians reported to be remaining in Dhaka, and the tardiness of the vessel’s arrival until after a cease-fire in East Pakistan had already been announced. No one in the Delhi government could see any connection between the presence of the American Navy in the eastern Indian Ocean, and the continuing conflict along the western

Indian-Pakistan border.118

The biggest effect of the announcement of the deployment of the Enterprise to the Bay of

Bengal was the prompt diplomatic and military co-operation between India and the Soviet

Union. The Soviet Defense minister arrived in Delhi for consultation, while his Indian counter- part followed up with a trip to Moscow.119 Additionally, the Prime Minister was assured by

Soviet Ambassador Pegov that the US Navy would not be allowed to intervene unmolested.120

Perhaps the biggest effect of America’s “atomic gun-boat diplomacy” was the post-crisis decision by the Indian government to pursue a nuclear program of their own. Supporters of later

Indian governments argued to the Prime Minister that if Delhi had its own equivalent nuclear capability, then Washington would never had so brazenly entered the conflict on the side of

117 Anderson, 225. 118 Blechman, 192. 119 Blechman, 178. 120 Blechman, 201. 51

Pakistan.121 Not surprisingly, their efforts were mirrored by Islamabad who undertook a nuclear- weapons program of their own shortly afterwards.

The governments of the sub-continent were not the only ones uncertain about America’s intentions in the Indian Ocean. Before the Task Force reached the Bay of Bengal, questions had continued to arise and were becoming an issue for US diplomats as well. The US embassy in

Delhi found itself unable to provide answers to the Indian Foreign Ministry because it was not being kept abreast of the policy decisions being made in Washington. Ambassador Keating eventually had to cable the Secretary of State directly for answers.

Up until last few days I have felt able to defend U.S. policy on the basis of our over-

riding concern to bring a halt to hostilities. I am now troubled by fact a number of my

diplomatic colleagues view deployment of carrier task force as military escalation by

U.S…In order to place me in a position to defend this development I would welcome

fullest possible rationale to respond to foregoing arguments advanced by my colleagues

here.122

Ambassador Keating never received an answer from Secretary Rogers. But that was the intent of the White House’s policy all along. Dr. Kissinger described the role for the US naval force was to create “precisely the margin of uncertainty needed to force a decision by New Delhi and Moscow.”123

121 Muhith, 250. 122 U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, Vol E-7, 188. 123 Muhith, 246. 52

Chapter 8 Analysis

History has documented President Nixon’s obsession with secrecy against those he perceived as his political opponents, and this trait has entered the American political lexicon as

“Nixonian”: a term used to signify extreme secretiveness or corruption. The President sought strength by isolating himself from those who were not part of his inner circle of advisors. Thus, his preference for developing his administration’s Foreign Policy in isolation, away from the distractions and leaks that resulted from bringing “outsiders” into the policy processes.

In dealing with diplomats and foreign heads of state, President Nixon preferred direct and private talks over the open dialogue of public diplomacy. Kissinger’s trip to Communist

China in July of 1971 was a perfect example of this. It allowed the White House to make opening moves toward Beijing without the harsh glare and criticism that a public trip would have entailed. The opportunity for private diplomacy continued to be President Nixon’s primary means of dealing with the crisis on the sub-continent as well. Whether dealing with Pakistan’s

President Yahya, the Indian Prime Minister, or the Soviet Union, the White House routinely used direct and private consultation to communicate its desires and intentions.

President Nixon routinely saw the media and journalists as his administration’s primary enemies. He felt that there was little to gain from allowing the public to have knowledge of the fragile diplomacy that the White House was seeking to carry out. The media’s scrutiny would upset the efforts of the White House to support Pakistan while laying blame for the crisis on

Prime Minister Gandhi’s India. For the White House, the formation of Foreign Policy was a prerogative exclusively for the President. The State Department was not a part of that processes.

The President and the State Department had significant differences of opinion about what

America’s policy should be and how it should be carried out. The result of these differences was

53 a break-down in communications between the White House and State, which reinforced the distrust that President Nixon harbored for the professional diplomatic corps.

During the Nixon administration, foreign affairs were to be the shining example of progress and success; accolades that the President could use to provide legitimacy for his administration and ammunition to use against his domestic “enemies.” The State Department’s diplomats and Foreign Service officers were not part of that success. Not being part of the

President’s inner circle of confidants, the diplomats of State were not policy advisors but only implementers of the President’s agenda. If the State Department was allowed into the process of developing a foreign policy, it would bring non-White House people into the President’s decision making inner-circle. This was a danger to his desire to maintain firm control over policy making and risked the possibility that the administration’s enemies in the media would gain a view of and openly criticize Nixon’s decisions. Public diplomacy exposed the White House to media scrutiny, a scrutiny that President Nixon viewed as a personal attack, and any public disagreement with his administration was seen as disloyal.

The White House vs. the State Department

Within the US government, the South Asian crisis spawned two sides that struggled to form the official government response to the events occurring in Dhaka, Islamabad, and Delhi.

President Nixon, his advisors, and their support for Pakistan and its President Yahya rested on one side. The White House was opposed by many of the professional diplomats of the State

Department and their support for the East Bengalis.

For President Nixon, Pakistan was the key American ally on the sub-continent. Any policies which threatened this relationship were an anathema to him. During the crisis, Pakistan

54 was seen as the sole route through which US influence could be applied to bring about an acceptable solution. But it limited the response that Washington could apply, as any public denunciation of the government in Islamabad would risk losing the influence the US could bring to bear. In the White House, this necessitated a separation between the public statements and private assurances made to Pakistan. The contradiction involved publicly denouncing the human suffering of the Bengali refugees and offering aid to alleviate it, while privately talking with

Islamabad about getting their own political house in order.

Prior to the Indian intervention in East Pakistan in December of 1971, Washington’s official position was that the military crack-down by the Pakistan Army in the East was the response by the government to internal disorder. The involvement by international organizations or foreign nations was not required or supported. Once India invaded however, the official statements from Washington changed. They stressed the importance of making an international effort to bring the conflict to a rapid close and perhaps most importantly, the need to label Delhi as the instigator in this conflict.

Unfortunately for the White House, the primary diplomatic forum through which the US interacted with the nations during the crisis was through the State Department. This was an organization that held a different view on America’s purpose and policies for the area, largely due to the fact that the White House failed to tell them otherwise. The support of an established and legitimate democratic government was seen as a priority by the Foreign Service corps, thus

India was seen as being more ‘in the right’ than the militarily dominated Pakistan.

The international reputation of the US was the primary currency that diplomats used to further their aims and policies. Recognizing that this was at risk of being squandered by the

55

White House’s refusal to publically denounce the widely reported atrocities of the regime in

Islamabad against their Bengali citizens in the east, the diplomatic corps were constantly insisting that it was in our own best interest to denounce Pakistan’s actions. The US State

Department focused its influence on bringing about a cease-fire, without regard to which side actually began the fighting.

The Circle of Deliberate Miscommunication

The deliberate efforts by President Nixon to create and carry out foreign policy without the involvement of his own State Department resulted in confusion, dissention, and distrust with- in the American government during the South Asian Crisis. A vicious circle of animosity, denial, and recriminations went back and forth between the White House and the Diplomatic corps. It derailed attempts by President Nixon to ensure that America’s ally, Pakistan, was not dismembered by the actions of the Soviet’s so-called lackey, India. Regardless of how the events played out within East Pakistan itself, President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger were determined to support President Yahya and ensure that America’s presence on the sub-continent would not be hindered by the encroachment of the Soviet Union.

Nixon’s unwillingness to allow anyone outside his closest advisors to participate and his preference for direct personal dialogue severely constrained the chances of success of America’s policy choices. The use of back-channel communications and back-room talks separated the foreign policy making process from the professional diplomats at the State Department and in the embassies abroad who carried it out. These Foreign Service officers tried to follow the official policies and pronouncements that they were being told. But lacking official instruction about the

President’s line of thinking, Ambassador Keating and Consuls-General Blood and Spivack were

56 obviously frustrated and handicapped by a disconnect between what they saw everyday outside their official residences and the cable traffic that they were receiving from Washington.

Eventually, these diplomats felt forced to express their frustration and discontent with the void between what they felt America’s public voice was and what it should be. Their decision to utilize the dissent channel was an effort to try to change the administration’s policy and to mitigate the publicity damage that resulted from the President’s Tilt toward Pakistan.

Unfortunately for the White House, the cables from Dhaka and Delhi were leaked to the media.

The resulting spot-light thrown on to the internal conflict between Washington and its officers abroad, not surprisingly, were not positive. President Nixon was not pleased by the journalists’ descriptions concerning the dissent cables coming out of Dhaka and Delhi. While he directly blamed the media for its efforts to discredit and destroy him personally, President Nixon saw these cables as further proof of the disloyalty of the professional diplomatic corps toward the

White House. These leaked messages simply gave the President more incentive to keep the State

Department and its officers in the dark concerning his on-going efforts to support President

Yahya.

As America’s closest ally in the region, Pakistan’s President Yahya had a direct link to the White House through Ambassador Farland, but he was just as prone to failing to grasp

Nixon’s intentions. Yahya was well aware of America’s requirement for a separation between public versus private messages of support. And while Ambassador Farland was direct in his push to get the Pakistanis to end the troubles in East Pakistan as quickly as possible, once the Indians crossed into eastern Begal, America’s efforts shifted to ensuring that the remaining parts of West

Pakistan survived. The deployment of Task Force 74 and the USS Enterprise, however, gave

President Yahya new hope that the conflict in the East could be ended favorably in Islamabad’s

57 favor. The threat of America’s nuclear aircraft carrier and its accompanying Marines would, theoretically, allow the Pakistan Army enough breathing space either to delay the Indians long enough for the UN to establish a cease-fire, or at the very least enable the evacuation of the West

Pakistanis out of Bengal. The possibility that the Americans would not actively come to

Islamabad’s defense seems not to have occurred to President Yahya. Eventually, once the East fell to the Indians and Prime Minister Gandhi’s offer of a cease-fire was made, President Yahya finally realized that the American cavalry would not be riding over the hill to save the Pakistan

Army. His decision to delay General Niazi’s authorization to seek a cease-fire in Dhaka did little to alter the final outcome of the Indian invasion, and only added to the final butcher’s bill once the Indian Army entered East Pakistan’s capital.

The other side involved in the South Asian crisis also suffered from President Nixon’s penchant for kept secrets. Prime Minister Gandhi and her cabinet initially were confused as to the purpose behind the US Navy’s movement into the Bay of Bengal. The Americans’ claim that

Task Force 74 was dispatched to evacuate the few dozen remaining US citizens in the country made little sense to the cabinet in Delhi. Once the Pakistan Army in the East had surrendered, the

USS Enterprise and the threat of America’s intervention in Bengal was no longer a serious consideration in the Prime Minister’s decision to offer a cease-fire. Gandhi decided that the best way of dealing with America’s navy was to ignore them while admonishing President Nixon for his blatant use of “atomic gunboat diplomacy”. The link that Dr. Kissinger and President Nixon made between the presence of the American Task Force and ensuring the integrity of Western

Pakistan was never made by Delhi. The public purpose for the Task Force, (the evacuation of civilians from East Pakistan), varied from the private message to India (do not dismember West

Pakistan) that the White House wanted to convey. The efforts that Dr. Kissinger and President

58

Nixon made to bring the Soviets and China into the South Asian Crisis as a means to control and restrain the Indians, were completely obscured from the Indian government’s foreign policy decisions. America was simply seen as being the biggest bully in the Bay of Bengal, but one who had little means of influencing an end to the crisis. Eventually, it was India alone that decided to end the conflict. Pakistan had no option but to accept the peace that was offered to it.

Conclusion

The internal disconnect and lack of open dialogue within the Nixon administration was not the only source of miscommunication and misunderstanding. The White House’s preference for informal and back-channel communication had repercussions in the international forum as well. Multiple heads of state, Ambassadors, and diplomats were befuddled and confused by what they heard coming from the official State Department announcements, and what the US administration was actually doing.

For the White House, the South Asian Crisis was never seen as being simply an old argument between former members of the British Raj. It was all part of the ongoing struggle in the Cold War between the Soviet Union with its comrades, and the US with its allies. The efforts of the White House to redraw the Balance of Power between Washington and Moscow through the opening of a new dialogue with Beijing, was threatened by the flare up in East Pakistan.

Washington pressed Moscow to use its influence with India to keep them from over-running

Pakistan. The Soviets reassured the Indians that the American Task Force was no real threat to

Delhi and that America’s posturing was more for reassuring Pakistan’s weakened government.

Despite the failures of the Consuls-General Blood and Spivack to change the official

American response to the atrocities committed by the Pakistan army in the name of “internal

59 unrest”, their efforts were not in vain. Archer Blood was eventually recognized by the State

Department for his efforts to bring to Washington’s attention the failings of the nation’s foreign policy. In 2005, the Archer K. Blood American Center Library was officially dedicated in

Dhaka., Bangladesh to his memory. Although the American naval flotilla played no direct part in the conflict, its presence had a significant effect on the nations involved in the events on the sub- continent. Even today, the Bengali community continues to recall the events of 1971 through the lens of their struggle for liberation. It was a struggle in which the US was on the opposite side, a decision which continues to reverberate decades later among the Bengalis , even as the USS

Enterprise finds itself due to be retired from active service.

(Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s) visit to Calcutta and Dhaka coincides with the final

voyage of US naval ship Enterprise: this aircraft carrier represents the lowest point in

America’s engagement of Bengali nationalism…..But it will remain one of those ironies

of history that this naval ship which was the cause of so much bad blood in relations

between Bengalis and America should be finally sailing into the sunset just as the very

office-bearers in Washington once responsible for the nadir in those relations are seeking

a new beginning with the twin halves of Bengal. - The Telegraph, Calcutta, India, 6 May

2012

60

Appendix A: CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

14 Aug 1947 Partition of the British Raj into India and Pakistan.

21 Feb 1952 “Language Martyrs Day”, Bengali martyrs killed protesting West Pakistan linguistic and cultural dominance.

14 Oct 1955 Pakistan formally organized into West and East sub-divisions.

12 Nov 1970 Cyclone “Bhola” strikes East Pakistan.

7 Dec 1970 General election awards majority of seats in Pakistan parliament to East Pakistan’s Awami league under Sheikh Mujibur Rehman.

28 Feb 1971 President Yahya delays the opening of the NationalAssembly over refusal of Western and Eastern parties to reach agreement on power-sharing.

4 Mar 1971 Awami League activist stage protests in East Pakistan, rioting ensues.

25 Mar 1971 President Yahya announces OPERATION SEARCHLIGHT, the military crack- down in East Pakistan.

26 Mar 1971 Independent Bangladesh is announced.

3 Dec 1971 In response to Indian support for Bengali rebels, West Pakistan conducts OPERATION CHENGIZ KHAN, airstrikes on Indian airfields.

4 Dec 1971 India declares war and invades East Pakistan.

9 Dec 1971 President Yahya authorizes Governor of East Pakistan to surrender.

12 Dec 1971 General Niazi receives message from Pakistan Army Headquarters in Islamabad

“Yellows from the North and Whites from the South’.

13 Dec 1971 President Yahya orders General Niazi to surrender, Gov Malik resigns.

15 Dec 1971 General Niazi requests a cease-fire.

16 Dec 1971 East Pakistan Command surrenders to Joint Indian-Bengali forces.

20 Dec 1971 President Yahya forces to resign, Bhutto assumes Presidency of West Pakistan

61

Appendix B: Historical Figures

United States Nixon, Richard M.- President of the United States Kissinger, Henry A.- Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Rogers, William P.- Secretary of State Irwin, John N., II- Undersecretary of State Sisco, Joseph J.- Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and East Asian Affairs Blood, Archer K.-Consul General in Dhaka until June 1971 Spivack, Herbert- US Consul General, Dhaka, replacement for CG Blood (Jun-Sep) Kenneth Keating B.- US Ambassador to India Farland, Joseph S.- US Ambassador to Pakistan Pakistan Yahya Khan, A.M., Gen- Chief Martial Law Administrator and President of Pakistan Sultan Khan, M.-Foreign Secretary of Pakistan Bhutto, Zulfiqar Ali- Chairman of the Pakistan People’s Party Rahman, Sheikh Mujibur- President of Awami League (East Pakistan) Khan, Tikka, LtGen- Commander for Eastern Command of the Pakistan Army (Mar-Apl 1971), and Martial Law Administrator and Governor of East Pakistan (Feb-Sep 1971) Malik, A.M.- Governor of East Pakistan (Sep-Dec 1971) Niazi, A.A.K., LtGen- Commander for Eastern Command of the Pakistan Army (Apl-Dec 1971) Farman, Rao, MajGen- Military Advisor to the Governor of East Pakistan Indian Gandhi, Indira- Prime Minister of India Singh, S. Swaran- Minister of External Affairs Kaul, T.N.- Foreign Secretary of Indian Ministry of External Affairs Jha, Lakshmi K.- Indian Ambassador to the US

62

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