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Secret White Housepapers Bare Indian 'Tonkin Gulf' Secret White Housepapers tv 0 c 7 E A csr 7 1— bare Indian 'Tonkin Gulf' WASHINGTON — The secret White From Katmandu in the Himalayas, House papers reveal some ominous similari- meanwhile, came word that both the Soviet ties between the Bay. of Bengal and the Gulf and Indian military attaches had asked Col. of Tonkin. Melvin Hoist, the American attache, what he The Gulf of Tonkin incident on Aug. 4, knew about Chinese troop movements and 1964, led to our deep involvement in the U.S. fleet movements. Vietnam war. The American public was told "USSR Attache Loginov," said the se- that • North Vietnamese torpedo boats had cret dispatch, "called upon PRC military attache Chao Kuang Chih in Katmandu ad- vising Chao that PRC should not get too Jack Anderson serious about intervention, because USSR staged an unprovoked attack up^n .a U.S. would react, had many missiles, etc." destroyer, although later evidence indicated Hoist 'concluded, the dispatch added, that that the attack was actually provoked. "both the USSR and India embassies have a The risk of a similar naval incident in growing concern that PRC might intervene." the Bay of Bengal caused grave apprehen- Simultaneously, the Central 'Intelligence sions inside the State Department as a U.S. Agency rushed out a top secret report that task force steamed toward a Soviet task "the Chinese have been passing weather force at the height of the Indian-Pakistani data for locations in Tibet and along the fighting. Sino-Indian border since 8 December. The On Dec. 7, a tap secret warning was continued passing of weather data for these flashed to Washington that "three Soviet na- locations is considered unusual and may in- val ships, •a seagoing minesweeper and a dicate some form of alert posture." tanker have begun to move northeastward into the Bay of Bengal. The units entered Soviet threat the Indian Ocean from the Malacca Strait on And from New Delhi, the CIA reported: 3 December and were located approximately "According to a reliable clandestine source, 500 nautical miles east of Ceylon on 7 De- Prime Minister Gandhi told a leader of her cember." Congress Party that she had some indica- i.rgent huddles in the White House led to tions that the Chinese intend to intervene a decision on December 10 to assemble in along India's northern border . Mrs. Gan- Malacca Strait a U.S. task force, spearhead- dhi said that the' Chinese action might be in ed joy the aircraft carrier Enterprise, the the Ladakh area." Naw's most powerful ship. The primary Russia's ambassador to India, Nikolai purlose was to make a "show of force" and M. Pegov, however, promised on December to diiert Indian planes and ships from Paid- 13 that the Soviets "would open a diversion- sten. ary action" against the Chinese and "will J the task force moved into position, not allow the Seventh Fleet to intervene." Admral John McCain, our Pacific corn- Here are the highlights of this ominous maver, inquired on December 11 about Soviet pledge, which the CIA claimed to "the feasibility of . aerial surveillance of have picked up from a "reliable source!' Sovii task group located approximately 180 "Pegov stated that Pakistan is trying to NM Nautical miles) southwest of Ceylon." draw both the United States and China into the present conflict. The Soviet Union, how- Air surveillance ever, does not believe that either country Pithorization was flashed back the same will intervene. day in the event Task Force 74 is directed to trnsmit the Strait of Malacca. • At that Peace on earth timepppropriate . screening-surveillance "According to Pegov, the movement of flight are authorized." the U.S. Seventh Fleet is an effort by the the Am e r i c an warships moved U.S. to bully India, to discourage it from thrah the strait and headed into the Bay striking against West Pakistan, and at the of Ingal, even more ominous 'reports same time to boost the morale of the Paid- • reae?.d Washington from the Defense Intel- stani forces. Pegov noted that a Soviet fleet ' ligeie Agency. is now in the Indian Ocean and that the tecent indicators have been received Soviet Union will not allow the Seventh Fleet whic suggest the PRC (Peoples Republic of to intervene. Chin) may be planning actions regarding "If China should decide to intervene in the ndo-Pakistan conflict," a top secret Ladakh, said Pegov, the Soviet Union would meage reported tersely. "According to a open a diversionary action in Sinkiang. Pe- relitle clandestine source, (Pakistan's) gov also commented that after Dacca is lib- Predent Yahya Khan claimed . today erated and the Bangladesh government is thathe Chinese Ambassador in Islamabad installed, both the U.S. and China will be hacassured him that within 72 hours the unable to act and will change their current Chese Army will move towards the border. attitude toward the crisis." `President Yahya's claim cannot be con- This is how the big powers danced pre- fined. However, recent Peking propaganda cariously on the edge of the brink just be- stgments have become more critical of In- fore Christmas as people sang about peace dis involvement in East Pakistan." on earth and good will toward men. .
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