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Questioning the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution Questioning the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution The Plan As the 1964 presidential elections approached, President Johnson (Democrat) saw the need for a congressional resolution that would endorse the growing US involvement in Vietnam. Such a resolution would strengthen the president’s credibility, and would make him look tough on Communism at a time when his challenger Republican Barry Goldwater was criticizing LBJ for being soft. Accordingly, LBJ decided to wait for North Vietnamese provocation before sending his request to Congress. However, it is VERY significant that both the request was written prior to any provoking incident, as well as plans to attack North Vietnam. The Incident According to LBJ According to the public announcements of President Lyndon Johnson and Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, twice in two days the North Vietnamese had attacked U.S. warships “on routine patrol in international waters,” and engaged in a “deliberate” pattern of “naked aggression”; evidence of both attacks was “unequivocal,” and these had been unprovoked.” According to Johnson and McNamara, the United States would respond in order to deter future attacks but was planning no wider war. The Request This lesson invites students to travel back to August 1964 and to imagine that they were members of Congress when the Johnson administration proposed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. It asks them to practice critical thinking. Divide into groups and imagine that you are members of Congress when this resolution was introduced in 1964. Your assignment is to come up with at least 5 critical questions that you would have wanted fully answered before you voted on the resolution. You needn’t have opinions on the resolution, simply questions. (Note: Think of the resolution as an upside-down essay, with each “whereas” intended as a piece of evidence supporting the thesis, i.e., the resolution.) 1. ____________________________________________________________________________________ ____________________________________________________________________________________ ____________________________________________________________________________________ 2. ____________________________________________________________________________________ ____________________________________________________________________________________ ____________________________________________________________________________________ 3. ____________________________________________________________________________________ ____________________________________________________________________________________ ____________________________________________________________________________________ 4. ____________________________________________________________________________________ ____________________________________________________________________________________ ____________________________________________________________________________________ 5. ____________________________________________________________________________________ ____________________________________________________________________________________ ____________________________________________________________________________________ Gulf of Tonkin Resolution (1964) Eighty-Eighth Congress of the United States of America Joint Resolution To promote the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia. Whereas naval units of the Communist regime in Vietnam… have deliberately and repeatedly attacked United States naval vessels lawfully present in international waters, and have thereby created a serious threat to international peace; and Whereas these attacks are part of deliberate and systematic campaign of aggression that the Communist regime in North Vietnam has been waging against its neighbors and the nations joined with them in the collective defense of their freedom; and Whereas the United States is assisting the peoples of southeast Asia to protect their freedom and has no territorial, military, or political ambitions in that area, but desires only that these people should be left in peace to work out their destinies in their own way: Now, therefore be it Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Congress approves and supports the determination of the President, as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression. Section 2. The United … is, therefore, prepared, as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist … Southeast Asia … in defense of its freedom. Section 3. This resolution shall expire when the President shall determine that the peace and security of the area is reasonably assured by international conditions … except that it may be terminated earlier by concurrent resolution of the Congress. The Incident During the summer of 1964 the United States directed two ongoing naval operations in the Gulf of Tonkin, north of the 17th parallel off the coast of Vietnam. One operation involved South Vietnamese commandos, trained by the US CIA, who would launch hit-and- run strikes on North Vietnamese coastal sites using very fast patrol boats. The other operation would send US warships to within 8 miles of the North Vietnamese coast in order to trigger the operation of North Vietnamese radar. The ships would then take measurements of the radar’s locations and frequencies. The US destroyer Maddox was engaged in such a mission off the North Vietnamese coast on August 1. The day before, several South Vietnamese patrol boats had raided North Vietnamese coastal positions in the same area. On the morning of August 2, several North Vietnamese patrol boats attacked the Maddox. Several torpedoes missed their target, but machine gun fire hit the US warship. There were no casualties. The Maddox had begun firing as soon as the patrol boats approached, sinking one patrol boat and damaging two other others. Planes from nearby US aircraft carrier Ticonderoga assisted by strafing the enemy boats. When LBJ received word of the incident, he sent a stern warning to North Vietnamese leaders in Hanoi. To underscore American determination, the Maddox, joined by a second destroyer, the C. Turner Joy, were ordered back into the same area the next day. Several South Vietnamese patrol boats also staged another hit-and-run mission in the same area. During that evening, radar and sonar readings taken by the crews of the destroyers seemed to indicate that both US destroyers were under attack. No enemy boats were actually seen and no hostile gunfire was heard. Nevertheless, both destroyers fired for several hours at the unseen attackers. Heavy rain that evening in the Tonkin Gulf contributed to the confusion. When Johnson learned of the situation, he decided to order retaliation, and to quickly ask Congress for a resolution of support. A few days after Congress immediately passed the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, analysis of the incident all but proved that the destroyers were not under attack. Johnson himself remarked to an aide, “Hell, those dumb stupid sailors were just shooting at flying fish.” ____________________________________________________________________________________________________________ Conclusion Each of LBJ’s claims when requesting the Tonkin Gulf Resolution wound up proving false. And yet, the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution passed Congress without a single dissent in the House of Representatives, and only two “no” votes in the Senate. It gave the president carte blanche to “take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression.” As they say, the rest is history. There are many choice-points in the history of the Vietnam War, and August 1964 is a crucial one. Imagine how this history might have played out had more Congress people been as curious and critical as they were in questioning the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. You should ask yourself: Why did virtually the entire Congress go along with Johnson? Why didn’t more of the American people question or protest the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution? One of the essential aims of the school curriculum should be to nurture skepticism—to prompt students to question and demand evidence. GTS: 1. Some have argued that the North Vietnamese were to blame for the incident, while others have maintained the US was at fault. Discuss the case that both sides might make? 2. Why do you think that LBJ went to Congress and the American people immediately, rather than waiting for a full investigation of the second “attack?” 3. Sometime later, LBJ remarked to aides that this resolution was “like grandma’s night-shirt – it covered everything.” What did he mean by this? .
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