The Field Army Defeated: the Battle for the Grebbe Line

CHAPTER EIGHT

THE FIELD ARMY DEFEATED: THE BATTLE FOR THE GREBBE LINE

Introduction

“The forces attacking north of the rivers (mobile troops forward) first con- quer the IJssel Line as soon as possible and immediately advance against the eastern front of Fortress Holland.” Thus read part of the Aufmarschan- weisung for the 18th Army, which invaded the Netherlands on 10 May 1940 under the command of General der Artillerie G.K.F.W. von Küchler. The attack on the Dutch Field Army, entrenched at the Grebbe Line,1 was to be carried out by the Xth Corps. This corps was commanded by General der Artillerie Christian Hansen and consisted of the 227th Infantry Divi- sion, reinforced with, among others, SS regiment ‘Adolf Hitler’, and the 207th Infantry Division, reinforced with SS regiment ‘Der Führer’. The latter regiment was commanded by SS Standartenführer Georg Keppler and, unlike the Wehrmacht units, had no combat experience. The battle in the Netherlands would be this regiment’s baptism of fire. The 526th Infantry Division was also part of the corps, but was held in reserve. As has been mentioned before, the main part of the Dutch Field Army was positioned behind the Grebbe Line. These troops were expressly or- dered to mount a “staunch defence”. To this end, the mobilised units of the Field Army constructed an entirely new defence work after Septem- ber 1939. They placed barbed-wire obstructions, dug trenches, built case- mates and prepared fire plans. Where possible, part of the Gelderse Val- lei had been inundated. The latter had not been successful, however, at the southernmost point of the Grebbe Line, near the Grebbeberg, where a 3.5-kilometre-wide stretch of terrain remained open and very suitable for an attack. This objection to the Grebbe Line had been common knowl- edge for a long time, and in earlier times it had been reason enough to opt

1 The orders from the Commander of the Field Army referred to the “Valley Position”. This chapter will use the more familiar name “Grebbe Line”. 262 chapter eight

Construction of a field fortification in the Gelderse Vallei, mobilisation 1939-1940. for other defence lines. With the intention of improving the situation, in the summer of 1939 the engineers had designed a bombproof pumping station which was to create an artificial inundation area. The project was rejected, however, on the grounds of it “being too expensive”. Six months later, approval was given for the construction of the pumping station, this time using a design by the Directorate-General for Public Works and Wa- ter Management. The harsh winter of 1939-1940 meant that by May 1940, work on the pumping station had still not been completed.2 This lack of vigour in the construction of the Grebbe Line was the result of a lack of unity within the Dutch political and military leader- ship regarding the question as to where the main effort of the national defence north of the major rivers should be mounted. For a long time, therefore, the Grebbe Line was little more than a kind of outpost position

2 V.E. Nierstrasz, De operatiën van het Veldleger en het Oostfront van de Vesting Hol- land. Mei 1940 (The Hague, 1955) 20.