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:2: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY - EO Directorate of Intelligence 13526.13526; 7 ~"ebruai-yFebruary 1968 3.3(h)(2)3.3(h)(2 EO .’ ‘ _ 13526\13526i INTELLIGENCE MEMORAND·UM INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM ' 3.5(c)3_5(C) j1

l\i The Situation it1 South Vietnam No. 20 i“... - ‘ (As(AS ofOf 1:oo7:00 1tA.M. .M. EST)EST} .. ' i a 5

4 Summary

Despite their first use of tank warfare in South Vietnam, the CoinmuniE;tsCommunists failed illin a nightlong attempt 011on 7 Februai.·yFebruary to sei~~eseine and hold the Lang Vei Special Fo1Forces4 ces Camp. ' ·'

_ The enemy appar,mtlyapparently hoped to move his f\l"'morarmor 011on up Route 9 toward Khc~Khe Sanb.Sanh after taking the camp. 1 'CoordinatedCoordinated ground and mortar assaults warewere also mounted ; at Khe Sanh during the Lang Vei battle. ~

No major new attaclcsattacks were 1~eportedreported elsewhere in South Vietnam overni:ght,overnight, but the situation is still to\.lcbtouch and go in sevaL•aseveral 1 \n·banurban areas--overareas-uover a week a:fte1·after the Communist offensive sto.1•ted.started. In Hue, the enemy is still dug in at strongpoints and thorethere appears to be little prospect of rooting him out soon.

In Saigon, littlolittle activity was reported overnight, but this appears to have resulted largely from thothe in­in- act.tvityactirity of the South Vietnamese forces 111in pushing against the Communists in Cholon.Cholony • This sector .ofof the;.the city may 11.ownow 7 be la1·gelylargely under\.\nder ~1-wmyenemy contl'Ol.Control. E

The enemy position in Dalat also appears stronger than previously repo,rted.reported. Communist units assertedly hold several lceykey sti:·ongpointsstrongpoints and outnumber i'rie11dlyfriendly forces.

Elsewhere, th.orethere are still numerous reports of enemy units concet1tl'atedconcentrated close by some tu•banurban centei~scenters a11dand new attacks could beb<:➔ forthcoming. · ·

IuIn North Vietnam, there are continuing indications of enemy plans to use his air arm in sapportingsupporting the ground offensive in northern South Vietnam. E 3.5(c)3_5(C)

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I Corps i

·1.'1. ‘TheThe No1·thNorth Vietnamese attack on the Lang Vei Sr>ccialSpecial l<"'orcesForces Camp lJetweenbetween KileKhe Sanh and the Laos ‘ borderbordor was repulsed on the morning of the 7th. The ; enemy force, of tmdet.erminedundetermined si.zesize, t used flame-tlwowersflamewthrowers andal'1.d Sovi0t-built:Soviet-built T-34 tanks 111in theii•their attack. .FiveFive ; of the nine enemy tanks were reported knocked out. 3

2. The assault v1a.swas undertalcen.undertaken 111in coordination : with a small-scale attack 011on Hill 861 a.11dand a large­large- 5 scale artillery, rocket, and mortar barrage on the ‘ Khe Sanh base itself. No reports of casualties are i.n.,inz but the Khe Sanh aiairstrip rstl'.'ip is again operatoperational i.onal after aa‘brief brief closure due to numerous craters.

3. Although tanks or a.rmoredarmored vohiclesvehicles were re­re— portedly used by the North Vietnamese injn a recent actionnet ion in Laos, this :lsis the first con:rconfirmed irmed erlenwenemy use of tanks within S,::,t.1thSonth Vietnam. The CommurdstsCommunists

probably believed that the location of Lang VeiVoi in ,o- close proximityproxi.mity ioto Route 9 fl'omfrom Laos would render a - tankta11k attack a.dvantageot\S,advantageous. Enemy use of tanks i11in most other western DMZ areas, however, would hebe more “MU difficult:difficult due to the thick jungle growth and tI'eacherous,treacherous, hilly te1·ra.tn.terrain. ‘

4,4. In Hue, street f'fighting igh ting co11ti1iuescontinues with US Marinesrmesshn;Mari.nes pressing f:orwa.rdforward block by blockblocl<. in t.heirtheir ef­ef- ‘ fot·tfort '!,;o.to drivodrive the rosisti.ngresisting enemy forces out of thothe . ' western half of·of thothe city. South Vietnamese forces ' ‘ still have the enemy holed up·~nup in two areas of the - 1 _citadel.ci.tadel.

II Co1·psCorps‘ u.-

a... 5. The nig·hnight t.; of 6~-76~7 Fohrua1·yFebruary was quiet in the

.—.——--.n major cities in the coastal provinces of central .. South Vietnam. In the highlands to the west, skirmish­skirmishn .inging was reported contiuuingcontinuing in Dalat, where the enemy grip seems stronger than reported earlier. NewNow fight­fight- ing also e1•1.1pt0clerupted near Kon.tumKontum city.

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6,6. In Dalat, thQthe provincial capital of Tuyen DueDuc Province, nnan estimated 1,500 Communist troops 1n·esantlypresently al"eare hol.di.ngholding the rail.roadrailroad stati.on,station, thothe princ-,ipaprincipal l ch\\l.'Ch,church, and t,\anymany ambuahambush sites. These forces are apparently el~montselements of thosothose used by the Communists in tho11~·their'initial initi.al assault 011on Dal.at;Dalat; it is not lu1ownknown if a new o.tt.ackattack has been mounted.mountedr Fi~iendlyFriendly forces in Dal.atDalat aroare reported to total Justjust over 1,000.

7. Just to the nortl1north of Kontum citf,city, US units engaged in heavy contact with a large enemy force, identified as ele1ncr'ltf,elements of the Nol'thNorth Vietnamese 66th Regiment. No details of the battl~,battle, which was still in progress at midday on 7 February, have been re­re- ceived. Other North Vietnamese units, includingincluding.the .the 24th DivisionDivision,1 are reported approaching the city from the south. There have been continuing reports during the past few days that enemy units were close by Kontum city.

8. The nature of North VietnamoseVietnamese weapons and ' eq\lipment,equipment, captured during recent clashes i11in the Dak To a1·eaarea of KonKontum tum Province, iindicate ndica tc that t:hethe enemy uniunits ts i.nin weste1·nwestern KonKontum tum have been newly sup­sup— plied. The weapons were newly manufactured and the latest models. Almost every type of weapon in the North Vietnamese i.nventory,inventory, possibly including 57-mm,5?—mm. and 75-mm.75—mm. fi1:ildfield howitzers, have bee1.1been em.ployedemployed

wv by the onemyenemy in the area near Dak To. The first use fi ofof-the the B-418—41 baaooka-typebazooka-type rocket was noted herAhere on a

.— 6 Febt·1.un·yFebruary attack on the USUs perimeter at Dak To. Saigon and _grIII Coi:~psCorps

9. Downtown Sa'i.gonSaigon was relatively quiet during the night, bL1tbut 16 allied soldiers and 1.20120 Communists were reported killadkilled in a battle near the Tan Son Nln\tNhut AlrbaseAirbase justj\\St to thothe northwest of the city on 6 Febi·uai--y.February. Occasional small arlllsarms fire was heard in the capital last night and government police reported a sharp clash with a group of Viet Cong in Cholon.

f 10. The Directo1~Director of'of the Saigon Municipal Police said yesterdayYesterday that the Communists appear to be tryi.ngtrying to cutout of!off the CholonCholcn district from the rest of Saigon.

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He said that the Viet Cong now have at least one main force battalion in Cholon, barricaded in several strongstrong' positions which government forces have riotnot been ubleable to penetrate.penet1"a te. Two other main forcGforce battalions,ba tt:alic,ns, he says, are currently deployed to the west and south of the capital and.and may also attempt to <-mterenter Cholon.

11. The municipal policepol.ice diroctordirector reportedly was refused a request 011on 6 February that . tanks and recoilless rifles be brought in to the Cholon clearing operation.Operation. National Police Director General Loan is said to have turned down the request because the use of such heavy weapons would destroy portions of the city. .

3.3(h)(2) I

13. Military activity elsewhere iuin the III Corps area centered mainly in HauHan Nghia Province to the west ofof.Saigon .Saigon 011on G6 Feb1·uary,February. A Viet Cong·Cong force over­overe ran a Regional ForcoForce outpost, ki.llingkilling 41 South Viet­Viet— namese and two Aioricans.Americans. In two othGrother engagements in HauMan Nghia, alli0dallied ti·oopstroops lost rrnotheranother 8 killed nndand 28 wounded while reporting 56 Viet Cong k~lled.killed. In Tay Ninh Province the provincial capital was hit by two mortar attacks and a ground probep1·obc 1.astlast night. ThroeThree Popula~Popular Force soldiers were killed and an esti­esti— mated 20-2520—25 civilians worewere killed or wounded. In the other provinces of III Corps Viet Cong actions were limited to harassing fire and light ground probes.probes •

.!Y.£3 Corps

'14.14. South Vietnamese Army and Regional Force units engaged Viet Cong forces in a number of sharp clashes, while o~on clearing operations i.nin and around Can ThoThe city on 5-65~6 February.

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15,15. The Communists appa1·e11tlyapparently have been driven out of the CnnCan ThoThe university buildings in which they hnclhad barricaded themselves.

16. South Vietn.amcseVietnamese at1dand US forces also con..;.cone tim1etinue to make contact with strong enemy forces ,vhilehhile con,uctingconducting sweeps on the outskirts of several other delta provincial capitals.·capitals; The rnassingmassing of large

Viet Cong forces in close proximity to these cities .0.

is an indication that, although the Communists have .M

—¢. suffered heavy casualties in some cases they clearly - have not yet been forced to withdraw to base area~areas to regroup and refit.

"WM I ~thnorth VietnameseVietnanese Air ActivityAotlglty ! 17,17. New developments in the North Vietnamese WW“ air situation on 7 February include l ~~---=--~-~~~_____J 3.3(h)(2)stxzj "probable" enemy high performanceperfo1·111ance aircraft over Laos opposite the southern panhandle of North Vietnam andano l_»__...._-__

.thethe southward 1:iove1:1entmorement of seven AN-2AN-Z tl'ansports.transports. ‘mw 18-.13» TltcThe ~etat ai1•craftaircraft were saidsaid.to t.o be operating south of 17:301?:30 latitude. If the planes are con­con- firmed as North Vietnamese, it would mark someSome highly unusual flight activity for the enemy who usually co11fi.nesconfines his ~:Lrair activity to the region.region above Vinh--someVinh~~some 90 miles to tltethe north. -

19. On 7? Februar1Februarv 3.3(h)(2) ~:--:--~~;:;---~------;;-::-----;;;------:-~~~---;------..------.~~~______Ja minimum of seven AN-2AN—2 transports deploying rom the Hanoi area.area tc,to Vinh,Vinh. Two of the AN-2sAN~23 were be1ieveclbelieved I to have radioed their destination possibly asas.Vinh Vinh I Linh--aLinh——a point alona·along thethatxast coost just to the north of the DMZ~DMZ} During the past week there has been a round of enemy activities suggesting that Vinh air­air- fioldfield might soon be utilized by North Vietnamese aircraft. The stop at Vinh could be used to refuel and/or arm the aircraft for offensive activities in

northern South Vietnam.

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