The Swedish Security Service

2020 We need additional efforts and an increased will to keep Sweden safe. This cannot wait, the threats are real and they exist here and now. More people need to do more and think one step ahead.

KLAS FRIBERG, HEAD OF THE SWEDISH SECURITY SERVICE

Sidan 2 We need additional efforts and an increased will to keep Sweden safe. This cannot wait, the threats are real and they exist here and now. More people need to do more and think one step ahead.

KLAS FRIBERG, HEAD OF THE SWEDISH SECURITY SERVICE Klas Friberg: The most important Anna Sjöberg: incidents are the Sweden is, in ones that never many ways, an happen. attractive target. 06 16

Kennet Alexandersson: Åsa Ahl: Ahn-Za Hagström: Sweden has seen Effective Attacks in other parts intensified activities protective security of the world affect the and attacks by measures provide extremist environments other countries. the foundation. in Sweden. 20 30 36

Fredrik Hallström and Susanna Trehörning: Charlotte Society as a whole has a von Essen: responsibility to stop the We must be able growth of extremist to counter the environments. future threat. 40 46 Contents

4 The Swedish Security Service 2020 34 Terrorism and extremism in a new age 6 Klas Friberg: The most important incidents 36 Blurred boundaries in extremist environments are the ones that never happen 40 Acting now prevents future attacks 10 Threats and vulnerabilities affecting 43 Mission: Aliens cases Sweden’s national security 12 The Swedish Security Service in brief 44 Sweden must be better equipped to secure the future of our democracy 14 Swedish interests are 46 Charlotte von Essen: threatened by hostile states We must be able to counter the future threat 16 Extensive attacks on democracy 49 The archive – a part of Swedish history 20 A state-sanctioned murder attempt 24 Serious threats to Sweden’s security 26 New centre to strengthen Sweden’s cyber security 28 5G 30 Protecting the most critical assets 33 Operational area: Dignitary protection

THE SWEDISH SECURITY SERVICE 2020 5 Klas Friberg: The most important incidents are the ones that never happen

The security threat to Sweden has increased, and the Security Service asses- ses that it will continue to do so over the coming years. The rapid digitalisa- tion process, global political polarisation and the ongoing pandemic are some of the factors that have not only led to more intensified activities from hostile states, but also furthered the growth of extremist environments.

hen asked to sum up 2020 and provide a measures currently in place – something the Security report on the security situation in 2021, Service has long argued for. Klas Friberg, Head of the Swedish “We need additional efforts and an increased will to Security Service, states that Sweden’s keep Sweden safe. Our hope in providing this situation security is increasingly at risk. report is that more stakeholders will take action against the W“We face security threats posed by hostile states and security threats. That more people will understand that violent extremists alike, and it is clear that those who wish to harm Sweden and our democracy have increased their capability. At the same time, our society has grown more «Our hope in providing this situation vulnerable. The ongoing pandemic also affects many factors report is that more stakeholders of importance to Sweden’s security.” Klas Friberg stresses that Sweden could be better will take action against the security prepared to counter the threats – both the ones posed by threats.» hostile states and the ones posed by violent extremists. “More efforts are required across society. This cannot wait, the threats are real and they exist here and now.” what is considered an opportunity today may very well pose After three years as Head of the Security Service, Klas a security threat tomorrow. That more people will think Friberg is of the opinion that while decision-makers, one step ahead.” government agencies and businesses have to some extent As an example, Klas Friberg lists foreign investments, come to view security in a new light, this is not enough to acquisitions or business collaborations in Sweden. The reduce the gap between the threat and the protective results today are new jobs and new money for the owners. ➔

6 THE SWEDISH SECURITY SERVICE 2020 Klas Friberg Head of the Swedish Security Service since 1 March 2018. Klas Friberg is a lawyer and chief of police. He has been Head of the Västra Götaland Police Patrol Department and Head of the Västra Götaland Criminal Investigation Department. After a few years as Head of the National Bureau of Investigation, he assumed the post as Chief Commissioner of Västra Götaland County Police, and later held the post as Head of Police Region Väst.

THE SWEDISH SECURITY SERVICE 2020 7 Tomorrow, the result may be that skills and “The Security Service, too, needs cutting-edge innovations that are important to Sweden no technology to counter the threats.” longer remain in the country. Or that the situation is exploited to influence Swedish decision-making. Sweden’s security policy position has deteriora- Or that the capability of hostile states to gather ted, and the Security Service assesses that the information of importance to Swedish security intelligence threat will remain high over the next increases. five years. “We have to be able to connect the puzzle The ongoing pandemic is assessed to have pieces. The threat posed by hostile state is played a part in worsening existing vulnerabilities long-term. These states use all resources available and creating new ones. As a result of the pande- to them. They have time and money, huge staff mic, the Security Service has had to focus on new resources and vast technical capabilities. Their sectors that may be of interest to hostile states, actions are based on security and foreign policy such as healthcare and biomedicine. objectives, as well as domestic interests.” You said that there has been a change in how Hostile states do not always have the intent to security is viewed. What did you mean by this? harm Sweden – their primary purpose may be to “First and foremost, I was thinking of the Govern- benefit themselves, and the threats may be both ment’s proposition on Sweden’s total defence, direct and indirect. which was adopted by the Riksdag (Swedish In a similar way, the threat posed by violent Parliament) in December, but also recently extremism is both short-term and long-term. The introduced and upcoming legislation in the area political polarisation that of protective security.” has taken place in many In the proposition on parts of the world over the total defence, the Govern- past few years provides a «The attacks affect our ment states that protective breeding ground for security is vital to Sweden’s violent extremism, and fundamental rights and freedoms, capability to handle antago- rapid technological our political independence and nistic threats and to reduce developments give rise to vulnerabilities on all levels online communities, our territorial sovereignty.» of society. Protective security connecting violent is referred to as the basis for extremists to individuals at total defence as a whole. the fringes of extremist “In its proposition, the environments. The result is an increased risk of Government also states that Sweden needs to terrorist attacks, and, in the long run, an further increase its capability to defend itself in increased threat to our democracy. the cyber arena. The Government highlights the “The development in many countries over the seriousness of these types of attacks by stating past few years, for example the January 2021 that a cyber-attack, in some cases, can be conside- storming of the United States Capitol, has shown red akin to a military attack. In this context, you us that democracy is under threat. We must never need to keep in mind that cyber-attacks targeting take it for granted.” various parts of our society are constantly The Service’s efforts to counter the changed ongoing. And that the protective security efforts threat have intensified over the past few years. are progressing too slowly.” With the current situation, the efforts to prevent and counter threats to Sweden’s security, and to The digitalisation process and technological our citizens’ rights and freedoms, will intensify developments, which are in themselves positive further. things, have helped strengthen the cyber espio- “The Security Service’s mission is to secure the nage capabilities of hostile states, and this method future of our democracy, and this includes has grown more important. Every day, attempts handling the changed threat. We also need to are made to obtain information of importance to make others understand what is required for a Sweden’s national security, to unlawfully influ- secure Sweden and to contribute to it. Sweden’s ence Swedish decision-making, or to carry out security is a joint concern.” other security-threatening activities. As part of its efforts to ensure a secure The Security Service assesses that this develop- Sweden, the Security Service is continuing to ment will continue. develop its own IT and technology capabilities. Strengthening the Service’s technological compe- How serious is the situation? tency will make it better equipped to fulfil its “The attacks are extensive enough to threaten remit. Swedish jobs, welfare and competitiveness – our

8 THE SWEDISH SECURITY SERVICE 2020 economic prosperity. They also affect our funda- against regime critics having sought refuge in mental rights and freedoms, our political indepen- Sweden, as well as cases of state-supported terrorism. dence and our territorial sovereignty. The cyber- One possible future development is that attacks, combined with insufficient protective hostile states will increasingly use individuals in security efforts, risk revealing Sweden’s total violent extremist environments to increase defence capability as it grows. In short – the polarisation, carry out subversive activities or situation is serious.” commit terrorist attacks. “In this context, I am very grateful for the In December 2020, the Government decided to Security Service’s well-functioning cooperation establish a cyber security centre, with the with our partners, both nationally and internatio- Security Service as one of the responsible nally. We cooperate with the Military Intelligence agencies. How will this increase our resilience? and Security Service (MUST), the National Defence “It is positive that the Government has made a Radio Establishment (FRA) and the other Nordic decision on a national centre for cyber Read more security services on a daily basis. We also security. While we already have well-functi- about how the Security maintain close contact with security and oning collaboration in the cyber area, our Service wants to counter intelligence services around the world.” joint capability will increase according to the increased security Well-functioning collaboration with a formula where one and one equals threat in the interview with other public agencies, in Sweden as well three. But a cyber centre alone cannot Charlotte von Essen, as abroad, is vital for success in counte- handle the challenges present within the Deputy Head of the ring violent extremism. The increased cyber security area.” Security Service, polarisation in society contributes to the on page 46. growth of extremist environments, while Over the next few years, entities involved in support activities carried out in Sweden and security-sensitive activities, as well as other other countries increase their scope for action. essential services, are expected to connect to the The ongoing pandemic is also used in violent planned 5G network. This will increase the extremist propaganda, linking it to an ideological number of possible attack targets, and give rise to discourse. The Security Service assesses that new vulnerabilities. This was taken into account subversive activities will continue, and that the by the Government and the Riksdag when they risk of terrorist attacks will remain elevated over established that the future 5G network will part of the coming years. Swedish critical infrastructure. “Long-term efforts to curb the growth of “This concerns Sweden’s future security. extremist environments are necessary to be able Society will be dependent on 5G, and we need to to handle the threats to our democracy. The ensure that hostile states cannot use the 5G Security Service’s work has resulted in the closure network to gather sensitive information or for of schools run by individuals who contribute to influencing, control or sabotage purposes.” radicalisation, and in individuals who pose a security threat no longer being able to remain in What will happen if Sweden cannot guarantee Sweden.” a secure 5G rollout? “The 5G network rollout is important to Sweden Together with other agencies, primarily the Police and necessary for social progress. At the same Authority, the Security Service has also engaged in time, entities engaged in security-sensitive efforts to decrease the scope for action for activities as well as other essential services will be individuals in the extremist environments. These using the 5G network. This gives hostile states efforts have included identification of individuals huge opportunities to covertly gather information who pose a security threat, and reducing the cash that may harm Sweden. It also means that one flow to violent extremism – from foreign finan- single cyber-attack may have far-reaching conse- cing as well as public funding received by quences, for example on critical infrastructure anti-democratic and violent organisations. and our national economy.” “The Security Service’s remit is to counter Over the past year, the Security Service has threats to Sweden’s security and our citizens’ handled several cases clearly showing the intent rights and freedoms. This is what we work toward and capability of hostile states to coordinate their every day. For us, the most important incidents activities. Cases have involved everything from are the ones that never happen. More stakehol- cyber-attacks and suspected espionage to attempts ders in society need to be of this mind-set. to procure critical products related to weapons of Keeping Sweden secure requires resources, mass destruction. But there have also been cases perseverance and a long-term approach. Sweden where the Security Service, in close collaboration must not be a sanctuary for terrorists or for those with the Prosecution Authority, has investigated engaging in security-threatening activities on how hostile states have threatened and used violence behalf of hostile states.” ●

THE SWEDISH SECURITY SERVICE 2020 9 Threats and vulnerabilities affecting Sweden’s national security Hostile states and violent extremists alike pose security threats to Sweden. Our democratic values are challenged by the broadened threat posed by hostile states, while there are still flaws in the protection of our most critical assets. The attack threat remains elevated and is affected by events around the world. The Security Service assesses that the security threats are increasing.

10 THE SWEDISH SECURITY SERVICE 2020 A broadened and more complex threat Elevated attack threat The threat to Sweden has broadened and grown more The attack threat posed by the violent right-wing Threats and complex in nature. The traditional intelligence threat extremist movement and the violent Islamist movement remains, while there has also been an increase in remains elevated. The threat is affected by events around security-threatening activities. The attacks and activities the world. The terrorist threat is transnational, with the target our constitutional rights and freedoms, economic internet acting as a platform for both radicalisation and vulnerabilities affecting prosperity, political decision-making and territorial calls to carry out terrorist attacks. The boundaries sovereignty. Sweden is an attractive country to hostile between violent and non-violent right-wing extremism states. are becoming less and less clear. Sweden’s national security All resources are used Increased scope for action Hostile states use and combine all available resources to The increasing polarisation in society contributes to the reach their goals, basing their security-threatening growth of extremist environments. Coupled with money Hostile states and violent extremists alike pose security threats to Sweden. activities on their own strategic objectives. The attacks received through public funding, this increases the scope Our democratic values are challenged by the broadened threat posed by hostile are constant and affect Sweden’s democracy. Attacks on for action for violent extremists, which in turn could regime critics in Sweden and abroad indicate that hostile further increase the attack threat. New communication states, while there are still flaws in the protection of our most critical assets. states are taking greater risks. platforms also give violent extremists better opportuni- The attack threat remains elevated and is affected by events around the world. ties to covertly carry out security-threatening activities. The Security Service assesses that the security threats are increasing. Digitalisation and cyber attacks The digitalisation process, which is expected to accelerate Subversive activities continue further with the 5G network rollout, will increase vulnera- Subversive activities, which seek to prevent citizens from bilities. Hostile states have a high capability in the cyber exercising their fundamental rights and freedoms, are area, which will grow more important for intelligence used by all three violent extremist movements. Members gathering as well as for malicious attacks. A malicious of the extremist movements commit crimes such as cyber-attack by a hostile state could have very serious threats and violence, and harass and discredit politicians, consequences for Sweden’s security. government officials and public servants, mostly in order to influence decisions. Insufficient protective security Insufficient protective security is of particular concern, as this, in combination with the high capability of hostile states, leads to severe vulnerabilities. This may lead to sabotage of security-sensitive operations, or the disclosure of security-classified information.

THE SWEDISH SECURITY SERVICE 2020 11

The Swedish Security Service in brief

The Swedish Security Service is both a security service and a police service, with a nationwide remit. A security service is tasked with increasing the level of national security by detecting and preventing security threats to their country and its critical assets, and by reducing vulnerabilities associated with these assets.

Protecting Sweden

Governance The Security Service operates under the Transparency The Swedish Security Service is supervised by: Government, and the Head of the Security Service has • The bodies supervising the national administration, such the ultimate responsibility for its operation. It is governed as the Parliamentary Ombudsman and the Office of the by instructions and appropriation directions, in which its Chancellor of Justice. goals and remit are set forth. The appropriation directions, • The Commission on Security and Integrity Protection renewed every year, are classified. The Service is to monitor (SIN). SIN inspects how the Service handles personal world developments so as to be able to rapidly adjust its ope- data and also acts at the request of private individuals to rational activities in response to new situations. The Security check any use of intrusive measures. Service is also governed by various statutes, such as the • The Service’s oversight council, tasked with ensuring Police Act. What distinguishes the Security Service from public transparency. The members of this council, other government agencies is that most of the documents representing all the Riksdag parties, are appointed by the covering its governance, planning and reporting are classi- Government. They closely monitor the Service’s fied, on the grounds of national security. operational activities and may provide advice and suggestions to the Head of the Security Service. Registers Under the Act concerning the Swedish Security Service’s Processing of Personal Data, the Security Service Threats To ensure the functioning and maintenance of may process personal data when this is necessary to pre- Sweden’s democracy and sovereignty, the Head of State, vent, avert or detect offences against national security. The the Riksdag and the Government, as well as information on Service may also process personal data when people apply Sweden’s national defence and key buildings, are to be regar- for security-classified positions. This procedure includes ded as critical assets. checks against the Criminal Records Registry. The Service is not allowed to register personal data based solely on what is known about a person’s racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious beliefs, health or sexual orientation. Intent Threat Capability Secrecy The Service strives to be as open as possible about its work and conclusions. However, the Service’s first consideration is always its operations and national security. The Service’s Intrusive working methods cannot be disclosed and sources must always A threat arises when an individual, an organisation or measures: be protected. In ongoing criminal investigations, the Service, just a hostile state has both the intent and the capability to For example telephone like the Police Authority, must leave it to the person heading the commit a criminal act, e.g. a terrorist attack or espionage. interception or investigation to decide on the extent of investigation secrecy, the Intent and capability may change over time, and the Security camera purpose of which is to prevent investigations from being jeopardi- Service modifies its assessments and adjusts its measures surveillance. sed or hampered. in response to the current situation.

Intelligence work The Security Service’s intelligence work is carried out National collection of information is carried out through both nationally and internationally. Intelligence work surveillance, human sources, interrogations, contacts with consists of: other public agencies and organisations, etc. In an international context, intelligence enabling the Service to meet its remit is often gathered by its liaison officers posted Direction abroad. Once the information has been processed, investigated Collection and analysed, and conclusions have been drawn, these are further processed by the Service. A criminal investigation may be launched and conducted by the Service or by a prosecutor. Processing Information may also be shared with the Government, other public agencies or organisations to allow them to take appropri- Analysis ate measures within their areas of responsibility. Initiating legal proceedings, declaring a foreign diplomat persona non grata in Sweden, or improving protection in some respect are all Dissemination of information examples of such measures.

12 THE SWEDISH SECURITY SERVICE 2020

Areas of operation

Protective security Counter-intelligence Counter-terrorism Counter-subversion Dignitary protection Raising the level of security Preventing and detecting Preventing and detec- Countering harassment, Protecting the central across society through espionage and other unlaw- ting terrorism targeting threats, violence, coer- government and foreign analyses, records checks, ful intelligence activities Sweden, Swedish inte- cion or corruption aimed diplomatic represen- inspections of and recom- targeting Sweden and rests abroad and foreign at harming Sweden’s tatives, and ensuring mendations to public agen- Swedish interests abroad, interests in Sweden, acts democratic system of security at state visits cies, municipalities, regions foreign interests in Sweden, of terrorism in other government. and similar events. and companies operating in and refugees. countries, international ter- sectors critical to national rorist networks in Sweden security. as well as the support and financing of terrorism.

Additional remits Counter-proliferation Aliens cases The Service’s work also includes counter-proliferation, which The Swedish Security Service’s remit includes preventing involves preventing the proliferation, procurement and produc- individuals who pose or may come to pose a security threat tion of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). The Service’s from staying or settling in Sweden. The Service’s role in primary task in this area is to prevent the transfer of expertise, relation to aliens legislation and as a referral body for the products, substances or micro-organisms from or via Sweden Swedish Migration Agency is a key element of this work. to actors seeking to procure or develop WMDs. This work is carried out in close cooperation with other public agencies.

The Security Service nationwide The Service has a nationwide remit and operates from its head office in Solna and from six regional offices. These offices act on behalf of the head office to collect information and engage in threat-reducing measures, often in cooperation with other public agencies, including the Swedish Police Authority. They also 1 provide protective security information and advice, and take part in the protection of the central government. The regional offices thus support and contribute to the Service’s operational activities from their regional perspectives. Nord in Umeå: 1 The counties of Jämtland, Norrbotten, Västerbotten and Västernorrland. Bergslagen in Örebro: 2 The counties of Dalarna, Värmland and Örebro. Mitt in Uppsala: 3 The counties of Gävleborg, Uppsala and Västmanland. Väst in Gothenburg: 2 3 4 The counties of Halland and Västra Götaland. Head office: Solna, Stockholm Öst in Linköping: The Security Service’s head office 5 The counties of Jönköping, Södermanland and is responsible for the counties of Östergötland. 4 Stockholm and Gotland. Syd in Malmö: 5 6 The counties of Blekinge, Kalmar, Kronoberg and Skåne. 6

THE SWEDISH SECURITY SERVICE 2020 13 Sidan 20

14 THE SWEDISH SECURITY SERVICE 2020 Swedish interests are threatened by hostile states Sweden is an attractive country to hostile states. The attacks are constant. They target commercial interests, research and development, military activities, political decision-making and human rights and freedoms. At the same time, protective security efforts are insufficient.

THE SWEDISH SECURITY SERVICE 2020 15 Anna Sjöberg, Head of Operations

Extensive attacks on democracy Cyber-attacks, espionage and attempts to murder dissidents. The attacks and activities from hostile states target everything from our constitutional rights and freedoms to our economic prosperity, political decision-making and territorial sovereignty. Sweden is, in many ways, an attractive target.

16 THE SWEDISH SECURITY SERVICE 2020 the threat to Sweden has changed. Tradi- more areas than previously, and that there are tional attacks continue to occur, such as more and more connections between different the stealing of information from areas. For example, economic pressure is used to high-tech industry and research, obtain political goals. These activities may cause attempts to influence political decisions harm to Sweden’s economic prosperity and to our Tand mapping of critical facilities. But over the human rights and freedoms, as well as our ability past few years, the activities have broadened. The to defend ourselves, which is the basis of our countries that wish to harm Sweden use all democratic society. At the same time, not all resources available to them, in a structured and activities by hostile states aim to harm Sweden – systematic manner, acting on their own or via the primary purpose might be to benefit their proxies. own country. “Sweden’s strategic geograp- The Service knows that hical location, our strong foreign direct investments in protection of democratic rights «The understanding has Sweden, to a very high extent, and freedoms, a competitive correspond to other countries’ high-tech sector and groups of increased, but there are not various plans and policies for people who have sought refuge technological, civilian and here to get away from the enough measures in place military development. In Sweden, regime in their country of origin to protect what must be there is free and close collabora- are all reasons why hostile states tion between the sectors of carry out security-threatening protected.» education, research and business, activities in and against which is difficult to copy. The Sweden”, says Anna Sjöberg, purpose may be to exploit Head of Operations at the Security Service. technology, development and know-how and to The understanding of protective security has gain access to well-educated and skilled person- increased, but there are not enough measures in nel. Direct investments make it possible to be part place to protect what must be protected – and of various networks and development platforms sometimes, such measures are altogether absent. in sectors prioritised by hostile states. “The high capability of hostile states, combi- As a direct result, jobs, know-how and ned with the insufficient protective security innovations risk disappearing from Sweden when efforts of possible targets, leads to vulnerabilities entities within world-leading research are mapped in maintaining a secure Sweden. When protective and drained of information. security measures are incommensurate, this may “Swedish technology, products, know-how and lead to sabotage of security-sensitive operations or information are highly valuable to hostile states, the disclosure of security-classified information”, to enable them to realise their industrial plans, says Anna Sjöberg. production and military development. Lawful as The Service has also noted that the security-­ well as unlawful methods are used.” threatening activities of foreign countries target Anna Sjöberg also stresses that Sweden is ➔

THE SWEDISH SECURITY SERVICE 2020 17 engaged in many positive collaborations with other Cyber espionage has become an ever more countries. important tool for stealing information or enga- “This concerns, for instance, trade agreements ging in security-threatening activities, for example and other collaborations that are vital to Sweden’s through constant attempts to breach firewalls in development.” order to gain access to IT servers and steal informa- tion. Several countries engage in various types of For instance, a backdoor may be installed in a espionage and security-threatening activities network and then used for unrestricted and targeting Sweden. The most substantial threat to undetected entry and exit for a long time. Sweden is posed by Russia, China and Iran. The Swedish world-leading research and innovation regimes in these countries aim to create stability is one target for such attacks. The aim is to steal for their own regimes and to strengthen their know-how and take over companies in order to countries’ status as economic, political and military unlawfully build competence and capability. The superpowers. These states are acting more offensi- Security Service estimates the monetary value of vely than previously to unlawfully collected informa- support their own interests tion and know-how to amount and to force others to act «The monetary value to billions of Swedish kronor according to their will. These every year. countries typically spend vast of unlawfully collected “There are likely numerous amounts of money and unrecorded cases. As protec- human resources over the information and know-how is tive security efforts are often course of many years, estimated to amount to billions not as prioritised as they sometimes decades, to should be, the ability to achieve their security policy of Swedish kronor every year.» withstand an attack or to objectives. To reach their detect a breach of the systems goals, they use resources is often lacking.” throughout their entire society, and are able to The Security Service knows of numerous coordinate these well. groups that engage in cyber-espionage against Russia, China and Iran collect information and Sweden on the behalf of foreign intelligence know-how from Swedish universities and institutes services. for higher education and research. They also Meanwhile, decision-makers and politicians are engage in attempts to recruit personnel and to pressured to change or halt decisions, and journa- influence Swedish researchers. lists are pressured in order to influence their media The Russian and Chinese activities targeting reports. Smear campaigns are carried out to Swedish research and development are primarily present a picture of Sweden as a country in chaos, aimed at technological and military research, and in contrast to the well-functioning country in at dual-use products. These activities are largely question. Individual citizens are also targets of linked to the development goals of these countries. harassment and pressure, and their lives are “The Security Service has made various efforts monitored. Sweden’s democracy and territorial to raise knowledge and awareness of the security­- sovereignty are being challenged. threatening activities targeting Sweden. We have talked to heads of protective security and staff at The Security Service constantly works to counter universities and institutes for higher education and prevent espionage and security-threatening and research. We are also engaged in knowledge- activities. This includes constant gathering of boosting efforts aimed at trade and industry”, says information in order to analyse it, assess it and Anna Sjöberg. take action, sometimes quickly. Other times, the

18 THE SWEDISH SECURITY SERVICE 2020 Cyber espionage has become an ever more important tool for stealing information or engaging in security-threatening activities.

Service must engage in systematic, long-term and persistent work for several years before acting. The Service also engages in security-enhancing The threat posed by hostile states efforts by reducing vulnerabilities related to The broadened threat posed by hostile states has evolved in recent critical assets and services. This involves contac- years, and increased over the past five years. Today, there are more ting entities that may be of interest to foreign countries carrying out intelligence activities targeting Sweden, and they intelligence services and informing them of the are targeting more areas. Instead of a traditional intelligence threat, intelligence threat, cyber security and methods where individual countries were either interested in espionage used to recruit agents. targeting refugees, industrial espionage, influencing politicians or Well-functioning protective security measures military espionage, hostile states now target several areas at the same are vital to protect Sweden. Insufficient protective time. The threat actors cause harm to Sweden’s economic prosperity security is, therefore, an area of particular and to our fundamental rights and freedoms, as well as our ability to concern. Protective security should constitute a defend ourselves, which is the basis of our democratic society. There are also more and more connections between different areas, such as threshold to prevent attacks. engaging in economic pressure to reach political goals. “Security must be more highly prioritised. Consider security early on and keep it in mind for The Security Service assesses that the intelligence threat will all sorts of development. For protective security to remain high in the coming years. It will mainly focus on commercial have an impact on entities handling critical assets targets, military targets, technology, research and development, and services, it must permeate all areas of and individuals who have sought refuge in Sweden. Hostile states will operation, and these issues must be handled by also continue to attempt to influence Swedish political stances, as the top management, as they are the ones who well as to broadcast an image of Sweden as a country on the brink can set aside the time and resources needed. This of collapse in their own countries. The intent and capability to use makes it possible to identify the most critical violence against dissidents who have sought refuge in Sweden will also remain. assets and services and how to protect them”, says Anna Sjöberg. ●

THE SWEDISH SECURITY SERVICE 2020 19 The investigation soon showed that a foreign regime may be behind the attack in Gävle. The victim stated that he is a political video blogger, and that his blog might be the motive for the crime.

20 THE SWEDISH SECURITY SERVICE 2020 A state-sanctioned murder attempt

Over the past five years, Sweden has seen intensified and broadened activities and attacks by other countries. In early 2020, a Chechen citizen was the victim of a murder attempt in an apartment in Gävle.

mergency services received the call at lunchtime showed that the case was not as simple as that. There were on Wednesday, 26 February 2020: a suspected knife indications that the regime of another country may be attack in an apartment in central Gävle. The first behind the crime. The criminal investigation was therefore police patrol to arrive at the scene was met by an transferred to the Security Service and a prosecutor at the injured man sitting on the floor in the hallway National Security Unit of the Prosecution Authority. Ewith a bleeding gash on his forehead. In the bedroom, they found another bleeding man, dressed in outerwear. At the The Security Service’s mission is to prevent and counter, foot of the bed was a blood-splattered hammer. but also investigate, crimes against Sweden’s national The man in the hallway had just survived a murder security, such as espionage and unlawful intelligence attempt in his own apartment. He had been woken up by a activities. The Service also investigates other crimes, such heavy blow from a hammer to his head, and, though dizzy, as murder or attempted murder where a foreign regime is had managed to overpower and incapacitate his attacker, suspected of being responsible. The attempted murder in who had just attempted to commit Gävle is one example of this. a state-sanctioned murder. “Although the attempted «The perceived threat murder itself took place in Every day, all year round, Sweden is Sweden, it was preceded by subjected to attacks, espionage and to the stability of a extensive planning and reconnais- security-threatening activities. totalitarian regime knows sance in Sweden as well as abroad, These activities and attacks target carried out by a foreign regime. Sweden as a country, but also no boundaries.» For example, a car was purchased individuals or groups that other in another country and driven to countries try to counter. Sweden, flight tickets and visas “One reason that authoritarian regimes monitor, were paid for, and the perpetrator was promised a reward threaten, or even go as far as attempting to assassinate of € 60,000 for completing his task”, says Jörgen, who individuals who are exercising their democratic rights in works as an investigator at the Security Service. Sweden is a need for regime stability. The perceived threat Interrogations and interviews with the suspect, the to the stability of a totalitarian regime knows no bounda- victim and a woman with whom the victim had entered ries”, says Kennet Alexandersson, senior analyst at the into a relationship revealed that the planning of the Security Service. murder had begun several months earlier in the Chechen Both injured men were taken to hospital. An initial Republic, a constituent republic of Russia. The perpetrator’s interview was held with the victim. He was worried about task had been set and planned in meetings in the Chechen his family, who lives in another country. He stated that “if capital Grozny and in Moscow. they got to me, they may have got to my family”. The man The Security Service knows that several countries are explained that he is a political blogger living under threat. involved in security-threatening activities targeting A prosecutor in Gävle launched a criminal investigation Sweden. The most substantial threat is posed by authorita- into attempted murder, but the investigation quickly rian regimes that can devote significant resources to ➔

THE SWEDISH SECURITY SERVICE 2020 21 request for mutual legal assistance. Unfortunately, our request was ignored. Instead, we had to use other methods and collaborations to proceed with our investigation”, says Jörgen.

When authoritarian regimes commit crimes such as espionage, this is done covertly. Various clandestine methods are used to provide a misleading or false picture of what is really going on. Some examples are the use of false names or cover positions. Similar methods are used when authoritarian regimes sanction murders. The investigation took a new turn when it became clear that the woman with whom the victim had entered into a relationship was involved in the murder plans. The woman has a background in the Chechen Republic, but has lived abroad for some time and has no links to the regime. A person close to the woman, with links to the Chechen regime, used threats to coerce her to contact and monitor the victim. She was then instructed over the phone to open the door for the perpetrator on the morning of the crime.

The perpetrator originates from another country and has no links to the Chechen regime. He was coerced and threatened by individuals in Sweden and in Russia to assassinate a Chechen individual. The perpetrator received instructions over the phone to enter the apartment. In its judgement, the Gävle District Court wrote that “it appears obvious that an affluent power is behind the crime”. The District Court Authoritarian stated that the attempted murder was very costly, regimes can mobilise with expenses for transport, hotel stays and significant pocket money for the perpetrator, who was resources to offered a total of € 60,000 in payment. Further- achieve their more, the District Court stated that a large goals. number of individuals were involved, that several achieve their set security policy goals, and have trips by plane and train occurred, that a car was the ability to mobilise capabilities throughout purchased abroad and transported to Sweden, and their entire society. that a reconnaissance trip to Gävle took place. “Authoritarian regimes spend vast amounts of money and time, in some cases decades, to reach The District Court sentenced the perpetrators to their security policy goals. They have thousands of ten and eight years’ imprisonment respectively, employees and are able to mobilise all areas of as well as expulsion, on the counts of attempted their societies, from public institutions to private murder and aiding and abetting attempted enterprises, to reach these goals”, says Kennet murder. The judgement of the District Court has Alexandersson. been appealed and will be tried by the Court of While the interviews and interrogations Appeal in the spring of 2021. helped make the details of the attempted murder The victim remains active as a video blogger. clearer, extensive investigate efforts, analyses of The regime in the Chechen Republic has seized materials, evaluation of evidence and other not officially commented on the events in Gävle. investigative measures remained to be carried out. Russia has yet to reply to Sweden’s request for The fact that the individuals involved originate mutual legal assistance. The Security Service’s from Russia complicated the investigation. work to counter and investigate security- “In order to obtain access to information and threatening or criminal activities by authorita- check facts in Russia, the prosecutor submitted a rian regimes continues. ●

22 THE SWEDISH SECURITY SERVICE 2020 Kennet Alexandersson, senior analyst, counter-intelligence

THE SWEDISH SECURITY SERVICE 2020 23 Serious threats to Sweden’s security Hostile states are engaged in activities that threaten Sweden’s national security. The Security Service has noted a broadened and deepened threat that affects Sweden in more ways than before. The security-threatening activities carried out by hostile states are based on these states’ own strategic goals and aim to strengthen them. The most substantial threat to Sweden is posed by Russia, China and Iran.

Russia traditional media, Russia seeks to influence decision-making, Russia has the intent and capability to undermine our opinions or behaviour among decision-makers or specifically country’s security and capacity to act. This is manifested targeted groups in Sweden. through continuous security-threatening activities targeting Russia also engages in industrial espionage targeting Swedish society. Swedish industry, research and development. Through In recent years, the West has seen numerous displays of methods such as cyber espionage, Russia collects information how far Russia is willing to go to reach its goals. The annexa- on e.g. Swedish infrastructure and technology, for immediate tion of Crimea, deportation of Western diplomats, the or future use. attempted murder of a former intelligence officer in 2018 Russia also carries out intelligence activities against and the attempted murder of a leading Russian opposition individuals in Sweden with Russian backgrounds, for politician in August of 2020 are just some examples. Russia example through the use of serious threats. The targeted has also carried out influence operations targeting the individuals are either considered a threat to the Russian general elections in several countries. regime, or may have access to information of interest. As part of the Baltic Sea region, Sweden is important to Russia for military, economic and security-political reasons. China The aim of Russia’s activities targeting Sweden is to keep The Chinese Communist Party permeates the Chinese Sweden militarily non-aligned and out of NATO. government and society as a whole. China’s expressed Russia continuously uses a number of lawful and unlawful ambition is to increase its global influence and advance to a methods while staying below the threshold of armed conflict. position as a global superpower; militarily, economically and The aim is to weaken the political, economic and military politically. As the Chinese economy grows, so does the cooperation between Sweden and other countries. According Chinese state’s need for intelligence in order to support to the Defence Commission, it cannot be ruled out that Russia these interests. might use military measures against Sweden. China has both the intent and the capability to weaken State-owned Russian media portrays Sweden as a country and limit Sweden’s capacity to act in cases where Sweden’s in chaos and decay. One of the aims of this is to strengthen actions are considered a threat to Chinese interests. Although the Russian regime’s status amongst its own population. The geographically far from China, Sweden rests firmly within political survival of the Russian regime is highly prioritised the Chinese sphere of interest when it comes to achieving by the Russian leadership. China’s long-term military, economic and political goals. Through the use of intelligence officers operating under China’s economic plans are clearly tied to its security diplomatic cover, Russia recruits agents to spy on Sweden. policy objectives. One in three Russian diplomats in Sweden are intelligence China actively seeks information on technology and officers operating under diplomatic cover. Russia also know-how available and developed in Sweden. Industrial engages in influence operations through so-called proxies: espionage and the acquisition of Swedish energy and tech other groups that carry out activities on behalf of the regime. companies are two methods used by China to ensure the By spreading fake news and disinformation in social and success of its five-year plans. This is exemplified by the legal

24 THE SWEDISH SECURITY SERVICE 2020 The broadened threat from hostile states affects Sweden’s security:

States Actors Targets Activities Ambitions and goals: Examples of actors that Examples of Swedish Examples of security- • Security and foreign may carry out security- interests and targets: threatening activities: threatening activities: • Swedish politics policy goals • Espionage: recruiting • Security and intelligence • Economic growth • Swedish defence human sources, services • Military capability • Civil society cyber-attacks, signals • Military forces development • Media intelligence • Proxies (criminals, militias, • Regime stability • Trade and industry • Influence operations and legitimacy etc.) • Research and • Strategic deterrence • Diplomats and other development • Establishing platforms: representatives company acquisitions, • Religious and political financing, collabora- associations tions, property • Companies and financial purchases institutes • Persecuting regime • Media, think tanks critics: identification, • Universities and harassment, attacks researchers and violence

obligation for Chinese-owned companies to share techno- China exerts pressure is by using or threatening to use logy and know-how with China’s civilian and military various economic tools as a lever, should other countries intelligence services. A fusion is taking place between engage in activities disapproved of by the Chinese govern- civilian and military activities, meaning that civil techno- ment. logy is incorporated into military materiel development, in Much like Russian intelligence officers, Chinese intelli- order to further China’s military capabilities. gence officers also operate under diplomatic cover in China is heavily invested in growing as a space nation, Sweden. The Chinese intelligence services also use journalis- and is developing its space capabilities for both civilian and tic cover positions. military purposes. The Chinese state has been known to exploit Chinese Iran citizens active at Swedish universities and institutes for Iran is mainly involved in industrial espionage and intelli- higher education and research to obtain technology and gence activities targeting refugees. know-how in order to increase its military capabilities. Iran’s intelligence activities targeting refugees are mainly In addition to engaging in industrial espionage and geared towards minority groups considered by the Iranian strategic acquisitions, China also has an interest in other regime to pose a threat. The Iranian regime uses its intelli- Swedish sectors. One example is Sweden’s actions on issues gence services to carry out security-threatening activities in that the Chinese regime considers internal matters, such as Sweden. This involves monitoring regime critics and targets official Swedish support for Swedish citizens imprisoned in in Sweden linked to opposition groups considered by Iran as China. Chinese intelligence services and other government being or potentially being destabilising or potentially destabi- agencies strive to monitor Sweden’s actions, and to spread a lising to the regime. message that supports the Chinese state’s stance, using both The primary goal of the Iranian regime is to secure its covert and overt influence operations. own survival by countering internal and external threats China’s intelligence activities also involve espionage wherever identified, including in Sweden. Exiled opposition against dissidents and the Tibetan and Uyghur communities groups are considered an internal threat located outside the in Sweden. These activities are seen by China as part of its country’s borders. Such groups and individuals exist in efforts to protect its territorial integrity from perceived Sweden. threats and to protect the Communist Party. In this regard, There are several international examples of how the the Chinese state engages in intelligence activities and actions of the Iranian leadership have endangered people’s influence operations against Sweden to secure the survival lives and well-being. Planning and preparation for such of the regime. actions have taken place in Sweden. The intelligence threat posed by China has become Iran is also engaged in industrial espionage, mainly broader and deeper in scope, and nowadays also includes targeting Swedish high-tech industry and Swedish products cyber espionage, strategic acquisitions, and pressure or that could be used in Iran’s nuclear weapons programme. threats exerted against Swedish political decision-makers, Iran spends vast amounts of resources on this, and some of researchers, public figures and others. One way in which these resources are used in Sweden. ●

THE SWEDISH SECURITY SERVICE 2020 25 New centre to strengthen Sweden’s cyber security

Cyber-attacks targeting Sweden are not only a reality, they are also extensive. In December 2020, the Government decided that a National Centre for Cyber Security was to be established as a step towards strengthening Sweden’s ability and resilience in this area. This centre will play an important role in Sweden’s efforts to reduce the gap between threats and security in the cyber area.

26 THE SWEDISH SECURITY SERVICE 2020 he purpose of the National Centre for Cyber Security is to pool resources to strengthen Sweden’s ability to prevent, detect and respond to antagonistic cyber-attacks targeting Sweden. National Centre for TThe Security Service, the Armed Forces, the National Defence Radio Establishment (FRA) and Cyber Security the Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB) have been The National Defence Radio The Defence tasked with setting up the centre. They will work Establishment Materiel in close cooperation with the Defence Materiel The Armed Forces Administration Administration (FMV), the Police Authority and The Civil Contingencies Agency The Security Service the Post and Telecom Authority (PTS). While the above-mentioned agencies already cooperate extensively in the cyber area, the Cyber Security Centre will allow for more seamless and The Police integrated collaboration between the agencies Authority involved, thereby increasing Sweden’s capability The Post in the cyber area. and Telecom Authority Preparations for the Centre, by the Security Service and the other six agencies involved, were already underway months before the formal decision and budget allocation. These efforts will intensify in 2021. The co-location of staff and capabilities, as well as the recruitment of a head and other key functions, are in a the information and cyber security area, in planning stage. parallel to the Centre’s activities. The support provided by the Centre will Cyber-attacks by state actors targeting Swedish increase as the allocation of resources proceeds. interests are constant and grow ever more The Centre and its synergies will develop gradu- advanced. Attacks with purely criminal motives ally in the period 2021–2023, when it will be are also constant, targeting public agencies, evaluated by the Government. A decision will then businesses and individuals alike. The Security be made on the Centre’s focus and operation Service assesses that the direct and indirect costs post-2023. incurred by cyber-attacks amount to billions of Once fully established, the Centre will be a Swedish kronor. contributing factor to enhancing the protection against antagonistic threats and reducing digital Cyber espionage is also used to steal information vulnerabilities. One central aspect will be coordi- of importance to Sweden’s national security, in nated efforts with joint analyses and situation attempts to unlawfully influence Swedish reports on threats, vulnerabilities, risks and decision-making, or to carry out other security- protective capabilities. The Centre will also be able threatening activities. These actions affect to advise the Government Offices on strategic Sweden’s sovereignty and, in the long run, our issues related to cyber security. democracy. As the Government stated in its total A well-developed centre for cyber security will defence proposition, the consequences of a also provide opportunities for enhanced collabora- cyber-attack by a hostile state on critical assets tion with trade and industry. On the whole, the and IT systems may be at par with the consequen- Security Service assesses that the Centre will be a ces of a conventional military attack. powerful tool in Sweden’s continued efforts to Today, there is a gap between threats and develop the foundation of a modern total defence. security in the cyber area, and it keeps growing. The agencies that make up the Centre will The National Centre for Cyber Security will play a retain their respective areas of responsibility in very important part in reducing this gap. ●

THE SWEDISH SECURITY SERVICE 2020 27 5G will play an important role in the digitalisation of society. At the same time, the information being shared becomes more vulnerable to attacks or 5Gmanipulation when more and more units and systems are interconnected.

he technological developments delivered The Government has stated that Sweden must by 5G will enable mobile networks with be prepared for the challenges brought on by the considerably higher speeds, lower costs, 5G network rollout. Ahead of the allocation of the higher capacity and significantly more radio frequencies for the future 5G network, an connected units than previously. amendment was made to the Electronic Communi- TAlthough this will have many advantages for cations Act, stipulating that a license must not be society as a whole, vulnerabilities will increase. granted if the radio use can be assumed to cause Vulnerabilities in the 5G network may be exploi- harm to Sweden’s security. In connection with this ted to manipulate or attack systems and wireless amendment, the Government stressed that it is digital infrastructure. Critical information systems only the Security Service and the Armed Forces may be subjected to hacker attacks, total defence that have the overall picture as concerns the efforts and industrial operations may be targets of security situation and threats to Sweden. The most sabotage or espionage, and other attacks on important parts of the digital infrastructure need networks or information systems may take place. to be secure enough to protect critical services and When many critical services become depen- assets. The new provisions therefore stipulate that dent on 5G, IT incidents may have extensive the Post and Telecom Authority (PTS), which is the consequences for society as a whole and for the government agency responsible for granting integrity of individual citizens. This may be the licenses, must consult with the Security Service case if such incidents occur in financial systems, and the Armed Forces prior to granting licenses. traffic command centres, administrative and The invitation to participate in the auctioning medical systems within the health care sector, of radio frequencies in the 5G network expired in digital control systems for electricity and water the spring of 2020. In connection with this, the supply, and electronic communications. As such, Security Service and the Armed Forces issued a attacks on wireless digital infrastructure can affect joint policy document, stipulating the security Sweden’s security. aspects to be considered in regards to the appli-

28 THE SWEDISH SECURITY SERVICE 2020 «The actors involved in the 5G network rollout will be able to influence the functionality and security of the network over time to a greater extent than previously.»

cant operators. This included that the network and the work has involved several of the must be designed not only so as to withstand Service’s areas of operation. The actors involved attacks, but also to prevent unlawful control, in the 5G network rollout will be able to manipulation and collection of information. influence the functionality and security of the A risk assessment of operators, suppliers and network over time to a greater extent than subcontractors must also be carried out. previously. From a security perspective, it has The Security Service’s assessment is based on therefore been necessary to consider not only information that the Service has access to in its how the network is constructed, but also which capacity as a security and intelligence service, actors are involved. ●

THE SWEDISH SECURITY SERVICE 2020 29 Åsa Ahl works with protective security.

30 THE SWEDISH SECURITY SERVICE 2020 Protecting the most critical assets

Sweden is one of the most digitalised and globalised countries in the world. While in itself positive, this has also led to a more vulnerable society. Swedish companies and public agencies are constantly subjected to various attacks. More entities are now required to report security-threatening incidents to the Security Service.

he Riksdag has decided on the overar- to urgent vulnerabilities as a result of not spen- ching goals for Sweden’s total defence for ding enough time and resources on the basic the years 2021–2025, stating that analysis of whether their operations are security­- well-functioning protective security sensitive, and if so, which parts”, says Åsa Ahl, efforts provide the who works with protective Tbasis for the entire total defence. security at the Security Service. Protecting the most critical «The companies and public assets and services, which are of The Security Service has importance to how Sweden agencies we meet with want to published guidelines to help functions as a country, is thus get it right, and also have a companies and public agencies more important than ever. One with their protective security vital part of this work is that better understanding of efforts. These contain concrete public agencies and companies protective security than they tips and advice for all aspects of make an analysis of whether adequate protective security. The and how their operations have a previously did.» primary advice concerns the bearing on Sweden’s security, protective security analysis. One and how these should be vital question that public protected. A non-existent or incomplete protective agencies as well as companies need to address is security analysis is the most common vulnerabi- what the consequences would be for Sweden if all lity in terms of protective security in Sweden. or some of their operations were attacked. “The companies and public agencies we meet “This involves putting on your protective with want to get it right, and they have a better security glasses and thoroughly considering all understanding of protective security than they aspects of your operations, and how an attack on previously did. However, they often have to attend certain of these could affect Sweden as a country. ➔

THE SWEDISH SECURITY SERVICE 2020 31 Comprehensive protective security Information security

Personnel Physical security security

All aspects of protective security need to co-exist and overlap in order to provide comprehensive protection.

These efforts need to be given time, involve all areas security efforts. There have also been a number of operation, and be prioritised by management.” of security- threatening incidents. The Security Service carries out inspections One of the sectors to which the Security Service of companies that are engaged in security- has provided protective security advice over the sensitive operations, for example ones related past years is universities and institutes for higher to Sweden’s energy supply, food and water, education and research. Free research and the financial systems, protection and security or exchange that exists between institutes across research and development. the world is vital for viable research. At the An inspection may be initiated by the Security same time, the Security Service has noted that Service or as a result of a report on security- intelligence activities targeting universities and threatening incidents. Even though more and institutes for higher education and research have more companies and public agencies actually do intensified, and that protective security efforts submit reports, there are still many unrecorded need to be taken more seriously. cases, and reports from more entities are needed. From an international aspect, Russia, China “The fact that more companies and public and Iran pose an intelligence threat to research agencies are submitting reports is important, not and development. Attempts to recruitment and only because it allows them to take appropriate influence researchers in Sweden are some of the The guidelines contain measures to protect their critical assets, but also methods used. concrete tips and to be able to see the incident from a broader The research and development sector has also advice for all aspects perspective. Have there been similar incidents of adequate protective been largely unaware of what its critical assets security. Available at elsewhere? How does this affect Sweden’s security are, and has given low priority to protective sakerhetspolisen.se on the whole?” says Åsa Ahl. ●

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34 THE SWEDISH SECURITY SERVICE 2020 Terrorism and extremism in a new age Terrorism and other ideologically motivated crimes pose a threat to democracy. The Security Service works around the clock, 365 days a year, to detect and prevent these crimes – to ensure that what must not happen does not happen.

THE SWEDISH SECURITY SERVICE 2020 35 Blurred boundaries in extremist environments The number of attacks carried out in the West increased once again in 2020, breaking the previous trend. Attacks in other parts of the world affect the extremist environments in Sweden. All three extremist environments consider themselves part of an international context, supporting ideas and ideologies rather than any particular organisations.

Ahn-Za Hagström, senior analyst, counter-terrorism and counter-subversion

36 THE SWEDISH SECURITY SERVICE 2020 ince 2017, there has been a decrease in radicalisation and recruitment. These support the number of terrorist attacks carried activities help the extremist environments grow and out in the West. This trend was broken increase the room for action for their members, in 2020. The overall terrorist threat to which in turn affects the attack threat. Sweden remains elevated, which means Sthat a terrorist attack could take place in Sweden. Like the threat they pose, the various extremist Currently, the Security Service assesses that the environments are also complex and consist of attack threat posed by the violent right-wing individuals, groups, networks and organisations. extremist environment is equal to that posed by The Security Service assesses that lone actors on the violent Islamist extremist movement. The the fringes of the extremist environments are the main attack threat is assessed to be posed by lone most likely to carry out attacks or other violent actors, who, in addition to ideological convictions, crimes. One tendency seen in all three environ­ may have personal reasons to act. An attack could ments is that they consider themselves part of an likely be carried out using relatively simple international context, supporting ideas and means. ideologies rather than any However, the threat to the particular organisations. democratic system is not solely «Terrorist attacks and The digitalisation process made up of attack threats. The has made the extremist Security Service makes other violent crimes can also environments global and more continuous assessments of the accessible. New digital various trends that may affect be considered a way platforms offer vast possibili- the threat to national security. of communicating.» ties for communicating and The threat is complex, and connecting with like-minded aspects to be considered are individuals. There have been target choice, type of threat, and possible timing. All many cases where lone actors in Sweden have three of the violent extremist environments received support in the form of instructions, tips and monitored by the Security Service – violent right- inspiration from individuals all around the world, wing extremism, violent left-wing extremism and even though their attacks were carried out locally violent Islamist extremism – engage in subversive and single-handedly. activities. They pose a threat to our democracy and Nowadays, the call to action is often to “do what prevent individuals from exercising their democratic you can with what you have,” which is a more rights and freedoms. Crimes that are carried out simple modus operandi than previously seen, but systematically and repeatedly so as to change the also one that is more difficult for security services to social order are serious and of interest to the detect and monitor. Security Service. Examples of such crimes are the “Previously, the perpetrators perhaps had to use of systematic violence or threats and harassment acquire weapons or explosives and get in contact aimed at politicians, journalists and government with each other. For these reasons, such plans were officials. easier to detect. Now, the instructions are to use “The aim of these crimes is to decrease public what you have, which could be anything from a trust in our society and our politicians,” says Ahn-Za kitchen knife to a car that you drive into a crowd of Hagström, senior analyst at the Security Service. people. It’s also easier to find instructions online, for There are individuals in all three extremist example on how to manufacture explosives.” environments who pose a long-term threat to The Security Service is not interested in whether Sweden through their involvement in various an opinion in itself is extreme or radical. The right support activities, such as financing of terrorism, to have an opinion is the heart of democracy. What ➔

THE SWEDISH SECURITY SERVICE 2020 37 Step by step, a lone-actor terrorist is born. Feelings of loneliness and isolation may lead to individuals being drawn to extremist circles, and they can easily find inspiration online.

38 THE SWEDISH SECURITY SERVICE 2020 «People get involved in extremist environments for different reasons, and do not always fully agree with the violent ideology initially.»

the Security Service is interested in, in its mission to of attack is not as common as attacks aimed at protect democracy, is whether a person is extreme symbolic targets. An attack on a mosque, church, or radicalised to a point where they consider crime synagogue, association premises or similar may have to be a necessary method to change the social order an extensive deterring effect and lead to individuals – that the person has the intent and capability to not daring to practice their faith, openly showing commit crimes based on their ideology. their sexual orientation or getting involved in certain “People get involved in extremist environments political issues. for different reasons, and do not always fully agree “Terrorist attacks and other violent crimes can with the violent ideology initially. They might lack a also be considered a way of communicating. By sense of community, purpose or belonging, and find attacking different targets, messages are sent to some ideas that draw them in, and only later come different groups. This may involve spreading fear to embrace the violent ideology.” amongst an ethnic group or inspiring and encoura- There are individuals who are not clearly part of ging like-minded individuals to also carry out attacks, an extremist environment, but in various ways to do what they can with the tools at their disposal.” sympathise with or share the worldview of such an environment, who are affected and shaped by online The Security Service assesses that violent right- messages that normalise and advocate violence. wing extremists in Sweden and across Europe have “For some time we have seen that the bounda- a growing interest in eco-fascism and environmen- ries between violent right-wing extremism and tal and animal rights issues. The climate crisis is non-violent right-wing extremism are becoming blamed on increased immigration, the overpopula- blurred. The discourse within non-violent right-wing tion of the earth and the lack of action by politici- extremist circles is growing more similar to what we ans concerning these issues. The ideology is based see in the violent circles. Jokes and memes with calls on nationalism, anti-Semitism and accelerationism, for and glorification of attacks appear more and which is the belief that society needs to collapse at more often.” a more rapid pace through more radical methods. The Security Service also sees a trend where Proponents of accelerationism are of the opinion different driving forces are consolidated into that terrorist attacks are necessary to speed up the personal ideologies. Individuals in or at the fringes collapse of society so that a new world order can be of extremist environments may be influenced by established. radical nationalism, racism and xenophobia, Crises in society are also exploited by extremist antisemitism, alienation, segregation, misogyny or environments to increase polarisation and the lack of contempt for politicians. They may also be triggered faith in society or parts thereof. The ongoing pande- into action by issues relating to animal rights, the mic is no exception; all three extremist environments climate, LGBTIQ+ rights, gender equality and equal monitored by the Security Service use it for propa- opportunities. ganda purposes by drawing parallels to their ideolo- The targets of ideologically motivated crimes gies and blaming the consequences of the pandemic vary depending on what the individuals or groups on the state, authorities or other parts of society. This behind them wish to achieve. In some cases, their is assessed to continue also when the spread of the goal is to cause as much physical harm as possible, disease decreases. Analysing and monitoring the with the aim of harming and killing as many people extremist environments’ activities linked to the as they can. Targets of such attacks may be markets, pandemic is complex work that will continue for concerts, shopping centres or tourist areas. This type quite some time. ●

THE SWEDISH SECURITY SERVICE 2020 39 Acting now prevents future attacks The growth of violent extremist environments is a serious threat, fuelled by polarisation and alienation, according to Fredrik Hallström and Susanna Trehörning, Head and Deputy Head of the Security Service’s Counter-Terrorism and Counter-Subversion Unit

he polarisation in society contributes to of hundreds of millions of Swedish kronor”, the growth of these environments and Fredrik Hallström continues. increases their ability to commit acts of In its operational activities, the Security violence. Service has noted that there are individuals linked Focusing on attack threats is not to violent extremism who are active in organisa- Tenough to counter the threat posed by the tions that receive public funding. Due to the lack extremist environments. A wider approach must of transparency in the system, it is difficult to be used to counter radicalisation, recruitment and estimate how much public funding organisations financing, which all add to the threat to Swedish linked to violent extremist environments have democracy. Society as a whole has a responsibility received, but it amounts to hundreds of millions to stop the growth of extremist environments. of Swedish kronor. Schools, municipalities and other public agencies “We can see that public funds are handed out play an important part in this. The Government to organisations that appear legitimate on the now has a strategy to prevent terrorism and surface, but where individuals who have returned violent extremism, and society as a whole needs to from conflict areas engage in activities that apply this strategy more and make better use of support violent extremism. Money may be sent the tools already in place. abroad to support terrorist organisations, used to “If someone is left out, you have to get invite radical lecturers or for other undemocratic involved. Several stakeholders in society have a activities. The state and municipalities should not responsibility to step in when there are children be funding organisations that do not live up to who are not attending school, who lack a sense of democratic terms and conditions”, says Fredrik community and who risk being drawn into an Hallström. extremist environment. The good forces in society, In order to find out whether these organisa- especially male role models, need to step up and tions do live up to democratic terms and condi- offer something other than violent extremism”, tions, a deeper analysis is needed. The Security says Susanna Trehörning. Service therefore advocates the setting up of a “Efforts must also be made to counter the knowledge centre to support public agencies with more business-like aspects of the violent extremist knowledge in the form of assessments of organisa- movements, where radicalisation, recruitment tions, actors, extremism and anti-democratic and financing may now be carried out via compa- circles that receive public funding in the form of nies, foundations and associations with a turnover government or municipal subsidies.

40 THE SWEDISH SECURITY SERVICE 2020 Historically, this has been a problem in all three of being influenced by individuals who promote or Fredrik Hallström extremist environments monitored by our Service, sympathise with violent Islamism. and Susanna Trehörning, but the problem is currently mainly found in the “These schools promote an anti-democratic Head and Deputy violent Islamist environment. perspective, and there is a risk that they become a Head of the Security platform for radicalisation”, says Fredrik Hall- Service’s Counter- Together with other agencies, the Security Service ström. Terrorism and contributed to the closure of five schools in 2020. Counter-Subversion Unit. A number of schools that were under the influ- In 2020, a handful of individuals returned from ence of key individuals within the violent Islamist former conflict areas in Syria and Iraq. The environment have been identified. Most of these returnees do not form a homogeneous group. The are assessed to have had a long-term goal to majority of those who have returned are assessed segregate, recruit and radicalise children and to remain radicalised and affected by their young people. These closures have prevented tens experiences in the conflict areas, whereas others of millions of Swedish kronor being paid to these are not. As such, each individual’s intent and schools and their owners. The closures have also capability must always be assessed, upon their led to children and young people being at less risk return as well as at a later stage. It is important to ➔

THE SWEDISH SECURITY SERVICE 2020 41 focus not only on those who have returned, but to areas to corroborate that an individual has keep in mind that the environment that they left actually committed a crime. Under current still remains and constitutes a breeding ground for legislation, there is no general ban on travelling extremism. These environments have continued abroad to engage in combat training or weapons to grow and have increased the risk of radicalisa- handling training. This is a problem as it increases tion. This also calls for action from several public the extremist environments’ capability to carry agencies. out terrorist attacks in Sweden. Just as there are “The Security Service is no longer the only individuals in the violent Islamist environment agency to handle returnees. The Police Authority, who have travelled abroad to participate in the Migration Agency and Social Services are combat or training, there are similar tendencies involved in different ways than previously”, says within the violent right-wing extremist environ- Susanna Trehörning. ment. Several agencies already have a structure of “There are countries that are of interest to collaboration in place as concerns returnees from Swedish right-wing extremists”, says Fredrik conflict areas. These include the Centre for Preven- Hallström. ting Violent Extremism (CVE), the Migration Agency, the Police Authority, the National Agency The Security Service notes that individuals who for Education, the National Board of Health and are part of violent extremist environments exploit Welfare, the Swedish Association of Local Authori- gaps in Swedish legislation in other areas, and ties and Regions (SKR), the Security Service and often commit crimes other than ideologically the Prosecution Authority. Municipalities that may motivates ones. Examples include organised crime be involved in receiving returnees have made and systematic abuse of the welfare system. preparations for this, and if there are children “All of the crimes they commit – theft, involved, Social Services are contacted. handling stolen goods, fraud, benefit fraud and “Different agencies have different tools, and as so on – provide scope for action for influential such, it is important that more of them are individuals, networks and groups within the involved. The CVE has played a key role, and has violent extremist environments. For this reason, done a good job of coordinating the work and we have intensified our collaboration with the collaborating with the municipalities concerned”, Police Authority, and we are working more says Fredrik Hallström. closely together than ever before”, says Fredrik In addition to the fact that the legislation Hallström. concerning terrorist travel applies only to a small “The Security Service wants it to be difficult to number of individuals who have travelled to be based in Sweden if you support terrorist conflict areas after 1 April 2016, it is difficult to activities. This is what we aim for in our opera- secure enough evidence from unstable conflict tions. The more we disrupt the extremist environ- ments and limit their economic flows, the harder it is for these individuals to engage in support activities”, says Susanna Trehörning. The Security Service spends a lot of resources Travellers to conflict areas or combat on identifying and assessing individuals who pose training camps – and those who return a security threat to Sweden. Some 200 of them have been issued an expulsion order, but it has Since 2012, some 300 individuals have travelled from Sweden only been possible to enforce a third of these. This to conflict areas in order to join a terrorist organisation, engage in means that some of the individuals assessed by combat training or join a combat unit. Most of them have travelled the Security Service to pose a security threat to conflict areas in the Middle East. Approximately half of them have remain in Sweden and are able to engage in since returned to Sweden. The Security Service makes individual security-threatening activities. assessments of all returnees from conflict areas or combat training “This is a big problem. We can’t just ignore camps, based on their intent and capability to commit crimes. people who pose a security threat because their The assessments are based on monitoring of each individual in expulsion cannot be enforced”, says Susanna the context of the threat they may pose. Returnees may have gained experiences that have increased their capability or strengthened their Trehörning. conviction to carry out attacks. They may also have increased their “The fact that we have to continue to spend contact networks or obtained a certain status among other violent time and resources on assessing these individuals extremists, who in turn may carry out ideologically motivated crimes, and using threat-reducing measures against them influence others or otherwise support terrorism. affects the Security Service’s efficiency. As long as they remain in the country, they can engage in harmful activities”, says Fredrik Hallström. ●

42 THE SWEDISH SECURITY SERVICE 2020 MISSION Aliens cases The Security Service assesses whether an individual poses a threat.

Mission: to prevent individuals who are Our work is governed by three acts: Established collaboration with the Swedish not Swedish citizens – and who are assessed The Swedish Citizenship Act, the Act Migration Agency: The Security Service is to pose a threat to Sweden’s security concerning Special Controls in Respect involved in the process surrounding cases – from staying or settling in Sweden. of Aliens (LSU) and the Aliens Act. related to residency and citizenship.

The Security Service is a referral The Security Service requests an expulsion When an expulsion order body for the Migration Agency under the Act concerning Special Controls cannot be enforced • The Migration Agency refers a case to in Respect of Aliens In cases where the individual faces risks the Security Service for comments. • The Security Service requests to the such as persecution, torture or extra-judi- • The Security Service assesses whether Migration Agency to have an individual who cial punishment in their country of origin, the individual in question might pose a is assessed to pose a security threat the expulsion order must not be enforced. security threat and sends a written expelled. In connection with this request, When an expulsion order cannot be assessment to the Migration Agency. The the Security Service may detain the enforced, the individual in question may be Security Service may recommend that the individual. obligated to report to a police station at set individual’s application be rejected for • The Migration Agency examines the times, often several days a week. security reasons. request and decides whether the individual The measures taken against individuals who cannot be expelled are commensurate • The final decision is made by the should remain in detention or not. The with the threat they are assessed to pose, Migration Agency. If the Migration Agency Security Service and the individual and are designed to make it more difficult decides to reject an application, the concerned are given the opportunity to for them to engage in security-threatening applicant may lodge an appeal with the submit comments during this process. activities. Even if an individual cannot be Migration Court. In cases where the • Detention orders may be appealed to the expelled at a certain point in time, the Security Service has recommended a Migration Court of Appeal. Detention expulsion may be enforced at a later stage, rejection, the Service becomes a party in orders are continuously re-examined by should conditions change. the appeal proceedings. the Migration Agency. Expulsion orders may be appealed to the Government. Prior to the Government’s decision, the Migration Court of Appeal must hold a hearing and give its opinion, for example as to whether it is possible to expel an individual to a certain country.

THE SWEDISH SECURITY SERVICE 2020 43 Sidan 82

44 THE SWEDISH SECURITY SERVICE 2020 Sweden must be better equipped to secure the future of our democracy Those who wish to harm Sweden and our democracy have increased their capability. Sweden is not sufficiently equipped to face the threats posed by hostile states or violent extremist environments. A collective national effort is needed.

THE SWEDISH SECURITY SERVICE 2020 45 Charlotte von Essen: We must be able to counter the future threat Sweden’s future security depends on how we handle the changing threat. In order to counter the security-threatening activities carried out by both hostile states and violent extremists, we need new legislation and wider prioritisation of Sweden’s security.

he Security Service has said it many times, coordination and planning in order to be able to but it is vital for our future that Sweden’s handle the threats posed by hostile states and security is more highly prioritised. It is violent extremists, as well as the vulnerabilities. not enough that we know – we also have For these reasons, we welcome the ongoing efforts to act. Steps must be taken across society to produce a new national security strategy.” Tand through collective national efforts on every level of the civil service”, says Charlotte von Essen, The understanding of the threat posed by hostile Deputy Head of the Swedish Security Service. states has increased, says Charlotte von Essen, The changing threat is a constant factor in the referring to public debate as well as the Security Security Service’s work. The Service assesses that Service’s talks with decision-makers and other the security threats posed by hostile states as well government agencies. as violent extremists will increase over the coming “This understanding helps our work progress, years, aided by the rapid digitalisation process and and gives us better opportunities to counter the technological developments. At the same time, security-threatening activities hostile states are there are flaws not only in the protective security engaged in here and now. At the same time, a lot efforts, but also in the cooperation needed to face remains to be done.” the threats. “There needs to be a joint focus and agreement What do you consider to be the biggest challenge? on what must be done in Sweden. We have to “Making more people act proactively. More people create opportunities to enhance our capabilities, need to understand that the various elements of ➔

46 THE SWEDISH SECURITY SERVICE 2020 Charlotte von Essen Deputy Head of the Security Service since 15 May 2017. Charlotte von Essen has a background as an assessor at the Stockholm Administrative Court of Appeal. She has been a legal advisor, Deputy Director-General and Director-General for Legal Affairs at the Ministry of Justice. Upon her appointment as Deputy Head of the Security Service, she was Head of the Uppsala Administrative Court.

THE SWEDISH SECURITY SERVICE 2020 47 «More people need to understand that the various elements of the broadened threat are connected, and take the necessary measures to protect Sweden, both in the short and long run.»

the broadened threat are connected, to see the and counter threats to Sweden’s security and our whole picture – and take the necessary measures citizens’ rights and freedoms”, says Charlotte von to protect Sweden, both in the short and long run. Essen. One positive example is the new 5G legislation, The increasing online activity puts new which ensures that Sweden can take advantage of demands on the ability to handle the information vital technological developments without compro- flow. mising security. This approach will be important “The amount of information is vast and in the future if we want to reach a point where we ever-increasing. Our mission is to identify the can reduce the gap between threats and security. threats and threat-actors in that information – in One important mission for the Security Service is other words, to find the needle in an ever-growing to contribute to these efforts by sharing our haystack. If we are to succeed, we need to be able knowledge.” to process information in a new, more efficient way. One example is to use automated processing In the past few years, there have been several to a larger extent.” positive changes to protective security legislation. But it is not only in the area of protective security Wouldn’t this entail that the Security Service that the Security Service sees the need for would gain access to significant amounts of legislation tailored to technological and societal information? developments. One area that needs to be reviewed “Many people assume that the Security Service has concerns law enforcement agencies’ possibilities access to considerably more information than we to access information from messaging services in actually do. New methods of communication apps and social media. In practically every case appear constantly and are used by those want to handled by the Security Service, the communica- harm Sweden and our democracy – criminals, tion between the individuals involved takes place terrorists, and hostile states. The Security Service’s through messaging services and apps, but the mission is to secure the future of our democracy, possibilities of finding out who has been in and to make sure that what must not happen does contact with whom and when are limited. not happen. To ensure this, we need to be able to “While hostile states and violent extremists process information in a way that allows us access conduct security-threatening activities online to to the right information. A modern security an ever-increasing extent, the Security Service service must be able to find the unknown threat does not have all the tools necessary to prevent before it is realised.”●

48 THE SWEDISH SECURITY SERVICE 2020 The archive – a part of Swedish history The modern day history of the Swedish Security Service stretches over a hundred years. In connection with World War I, the First Bureau of the General Staff, or the Police Bureau as it was called, was established. ­While the Service’s tasks, organisation and working methods have all changed over time, its main remit – to protect our democracy and prevent­ crimes against our national security – remains.

omething else that remains is the Security obscure events throughout history, as well as Service’s archive, in which much of the type-written reports, statements and minutes tell a material that has been received or used by story of all the work that has been put in by so Swedish security services over the past 100 many people over the years, all with the aim of years is still kept. At some point, most of protecting Sweden. Each object and every document Sthe material is either sent to the National Archives or constitute a small part of the Security Service’s, and destroyed, but some is kept in the archive. The Sweden’s, history. Security Service does not have its own museum. The A security service is unique among government archive functions as somewhat of a historical exposé agencies, as much of its activities are subject to of all the threats to Sweden’s security that have been secrecy. Secrecy for the sake of secrecy is never the handled over the past century. goal, but a prerequisite for an agency such as the Walking through the archive is like walking Security Service being able to carry out its work. through Swedish contemporary history. Archived The actors targeted by the Security Service must not material from spy cases dating back to Sweden in know how its work is carried out. the inter- and post-war periods is gathered in neat, As a result, much of the Security Service’s often aged and fragile folders. Compilations listing archive is subject to secrecy. Even objects from long “convicted spies and traitors” from the 1940s are ago may be important puzzle pieces to someone kept next to spy maps from Stockholm in the 1950s, wishing to gather information on the Service’s microphone, camera and surveillance equipment methods. However, the passage of time makes it from the 1960s, and much, much more. possible to lift the veil of secrecy on some of the Yellowing newspaper clippings from famous and objects used throughout history. ●

Matchbox camera The ability to covertly gather relevant informa- tion is important to a security service. As such, surveillance officers are one of the most valuable resources for the Service’s operational work. For obvious reasons, the equipment they use is subject to strict secrecy. This camera, disguised as a matchbox, was a real piece of cutting-edge tech- nology in its day. Many surveillance subjects were unknowingly caught on film using this camera. ➔

THE SWEDISH SECURITY SERVICE 2020 49

Letter opener The Security Service’s predecessor during World War II was called the General Security Service (1938– 1946). One important task carried out by one of the Service’s departments, the Central Bureau, was postal control. Some 300 members of staff were employed to open letters and other mail and go through their con- tents. During World War II, as many as 200,000 letters per week were opened. Steam was used to dissolve the glue and open the letters. Regular tea kettles were often used, but there were also specially made letter openers. One such letter opener is pictured here. It is accompa- nied in the archive by a nine-page document titled “Memo on technical working methods for postal control”, dated 12 June 1941. This document contains instructions such as “when steam exits the pipe, move the envelope back and forth with its back facing the pipe at a distance of 4–5 centimetres, allowing, as efficiently as possible, the steam to hit the glue stripe at the upper tab.”

Letter box Exchange of information between individuals is vital to successful intel- ligence work. Today, this type of communication takes place mainly through encrypted digital channels. However, during the Cold War, the passing on of important information was much more analogue. This log functioned as a “letter box”, where the person leaving the information could place it in the hollowed-out space to be collected by its intended recipient at a later point. No one knows exactly when the log ended up with the Security Service, but it has been kept as a reminder that our adversaries are innovative – and that many things are not what they first appear to be.

Production: Swedish Security Service Graphic design: Springtime-Intellecta Illustrations: Fredrik Tjernström Photo: Svartpunkt/Magnus Glans Printed by: Stibo Graphic A/S Horsens Danmark

ISBN: 978-91-86661-20-5

50

Production: Swedish Security Service Graphic design: Springtime-Intellecta Illustrations: Fredrik Tjernström Photo: Svartpunkt/Magnus Glans Printed by: Stibo Graphic A/S Horsens Danmark

ISBN: 978-91-86661-20-5 How to order: The publication can be downloaded from www.sakerhetspolisen.se and ordered via [email protected]

The Swedish Security Service is responsible for ensuring that what must not happen does not happen. Therefore, our work is preventive. We avert threats to Sweden’s security and to our citizens’ rights and freedoms. Because our mission is to secure the future of our democracy. This we carry out resolutely and with a long term perspective. We protect the central government and Sweden’s secrets. We counter espionage, extremism and terrorism. For us, the most important incidents are the ones that never happen.

Box 123 12, 102 28 Stockholm, Sweden +46 10 568 70 00 | [email protected] sakerhetspolisen.se