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Hybrid Threats a Strategic Communications Perspective ISBN - 978-9934-564-33-8

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Hybrid Threats a Strategic Communications Perspective ISBN - 978-9934-564-33-8 IMAGES – SHUTTERSTOCK – IMAGES Hybrid Threats A Strategic Communications Perspective ISBN - 978-9934-564-33-8 DISCLAIMER: This document is a research product of the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence (NATO StratCom COE). It is produced for NATO, NATO member countries, NATO partners, related private and public institutions and related individuals. It does not represent the opinions or policies of NATO or NATO StratCom COE. The NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence (NATO StratCom COE) is a NATO accredited multi-national organisation that conducts research, publishes studies, and provides strategic communications training for government and military personnel. The NATO StratCom COE was initially founded by Latvia, Estonia, Germany, Italy, Lithuania, Poland, and the United Kingdom in 2014. Since then Canada, Finland, the Netherlands and Sweden have joined the Centre. Denmark, France and Slovakia are set to join in 2019. © All rights reserved by the NATO StratCom COE. Material may not be copied, reproduced, distributed or publicly displayed without permission of the originator. Hybrid Threats A Strategic Communications Perspective Acknowledgements Project Director Ben Heap Project Assistants Sophia Krauel, Jente Althuis Research Assistants Alexandra Clifton, Tara Flores, Leonie Haiden, Pia Hansen, Torsten Hertig Contributing Authors Dr Sean Aday, Dr Māris Andžāns, Dr Una Bērziņa-Čerenkova, Dr Francesca Granelli, John-Paul Gravelines, Dr Mils Hills, Miranda Holmstrom, Adam Klus, Irene Martinez-Sanchez, Mariita Mattiisen, Dr Holger Molder, Dr Yeganeh Morakabati, Dr James Pamment, Dr Aurel Sari, Dr Vladimir Sazonov, Dr Gregory Simons, Dr Jonathan Terra Global Influence, Hersh Consulting, Latvian Institute of International Affairs (LIIA), Norwegian Defense Research Establishment (FFI) With thanks to Henrik Aagardh-Twetman, Devin Ackles, Iona Allan, Vårin Alme, Ruta Apeikyte, Uku Arold, Professor Christina Archetti, Matt Armstrong, Sebastian Bay, Andreas Beger, Gita Bērziņa, Beata Bialy, Dr Neville Bolt, Mira Boneva, Erik Brattberg, Henry Collis, Dr Patrick Cullen, Linda Curika, Thomas Frear, Lucy Froggatt, Melissa Hersh, Brady Hills, Ivars Indans, Jakub Janda, Dr Ivo Juurvee, Alise Krauja, Dr Torbjørn Kveberg, Elina Lange-Ionatamisvili, Dr Andrew Mumford, Piret Pernik, Dr Vladimir Rauta, Dr Sophie Roberts, Connor Seefeldt, Dr Antti Sillanpaa, Bernd Sölter, Zane Štāla, Jan Stejskal, Sanda Svetoka, Dr Claire Yorke, Deniss Žukovs King’s Centre for Strategic Communications, The European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats, European Union External Action Service Layout by Inga Ropsa Media enquiries to Linda Curika: [email protected] 4 Hybrid Threats About this report Aim This report is the product of a research project undertaken by the NATO Strategic Commu- nications Centre of Excellence (NATO StratCom COE), at the request of the governments of Lithuania and Estonia. The project was designed to deepen our understanding of the wide range of measures which come under the umbrella of ‘hybrid threats’. Such measures aim to influence the political decision-making of a targeted nation in a way which hurts their na- tional security interests, predominantly conducted in the ‘grey zone’ between peace, crisis and war. Scope The project broadens the framing of current debates on hybrid threats beyond the most common empirical reference points, which tend to relate to the Russian Federation. A standardised framework is used to analyse case studies which are assessed to offer examples of hybrid threats. Analysis has been conducted from the perspective of ‘Strategic Communications’, which is articulated for this report not simply as a suite of capabilities disseminating messages to explain actions or intentions in support of strategy but as a basic function of statecraft. Strategic Communications is therefore considered both as an overarching philosophy to be inculcated into organisational culture and as a cross-government process, central to integrating the instruments of national power. The research focuses on the national level, where the primary responsibility lies for understanding, identifying and responding to hybrid threats. In this main volume, summaries of 30 cases are provided, of which a representative selection of 10 cases are analysed in detail in a separate annex. In order to limit the scope of the project, this phase of research focuses solely on state actors. Purpose The case studies are not intended to be definitive accounts of a particular scenario or provide templated solutions to similar situations, nor does the inclusion of any particular state actor necessarily conclude malicious intent. The report encourages the reader to take a ‘360-de- gree view’ of an issue area, deepening their knowledge of factors and considerations relevant to threat assessment. This report is designed to help the reader develop two complementary viewpoints. First, being agile and adaptive enough to deal with emerging security challenges where the identity and intent of adversaries may be unclear or deliberatively deceptive. Threats may also be consti- tuted by the synergy of many different, apparently unconnected measures. Second, the Strategic Communications mindset. This is the notion that everything communicates. The key to an effective strategy is therefore to understand actors and audi- ences, then integrate policies, actions and words across government in a coherent way to build national resilience and leverage strategic influence. 5 Hybrid Threats CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 7 Executive Summary 8 A STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS APPROACH TO HYBRID THREATS 17 About hybrid threats 18 The Strategic Communications mindset 21 Strategic Communications at the national level 22 Research approach 24 KEY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 26 10 key recommendations 27 Analysis of thematic areas 37 CASE STUDY SUMMARIES 47 1. RUSSIAN SNAP EXERCISES IN THE HIGH NORTH 48 2. CONFUCIUS INSTITUTES 50 3. 2007 CYBER ATTACKS ON ESTONIA 52 4. US TRANSIT CENTER AT MANAS 54 5. THE SPREAD OF SALAFISM IN EGYPT 56 6. DISINFORMATION IN SWEDEN 58 7. HAMAS’ USE OF HUMAN SHIELDS IN GAZA 60 8. THE 2010 SENKAKU CRISIS 62 9. HUMANITARIAN AID IN THE RUSSO-GEORGIAN CONFLICT 64 10. CHINESE PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN TAIWAN 66 11. DETENTION OF ESTON KOHVER 68 12. FINNISH AIRSPACE VIOLATIONS 70 13. SOUTH STREAM PIPELINE 72 14. RUSSIAN LANGUAGE REFERENDUM IN LATVIA 74 15. INSTITUTE OF DEMOCRACY AND COOPERATION 76 16. ZAMBIAN ELECTIONS 2006 78 17. SERBIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH 80 18. COMMUNIST PARTY OF BOHEMIA AND MORAVIA 82 19. BRONZE NIGHT RIOTS 84 20. RUSSKIY MIR FOUNDATION IN THE BALTICS 86 21. CRIMINAL NETWORKS IN THE DONBAS 88 22. CIVIL DISORDER IN BAHRAIN 2011 90 23. PAKISTANI INVOLVEMENT IN YEMEN 92 24. OPERATION PARAKRAM 94 25. SNAP EXERCISES AND CRIMEA 96 26. ELECTRONIC WARFARE DURING ZAPAD 2017 98 27. RUSSIAN ESPIONAGE IN SWEDEN 100 28. RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM IN THE NETHERLANDS 102 29. CYBER ATTACKS ON ROK & US 104 30. CASAS DEL ALBA IN PERU 106 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 7 Hybrid Threats Executive Summary This report is the result of a two-year study conducted by the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Ex- cellence. It is designed to help national authorities understand, prepare for, identify and respond to hybrid threats. The research focuses on state actors and uses a standardised framework to analyse 30 case studies taken from a range of geopolitical scenarios. It does so from the perspective of Strategic Communications, which is articulated not simply as a means of supporting national strategy through coordinated messaging but as a mechanism for integrating all actions taken by a government, central to both the development and implementation of strategy. About hybrid threats The final communique from the 2018 NATO summit in Brussels stated that NATO nations had “come under in- creasing challenge from both state and non-state actors who use hybrid activities that aim to create ambiguity and blur the lines between peace, crisis, and conflict.”1 The term ‘hybrid’ has been used to describe a wide ar- ray of measures, means and techniques including, but not limited to: disinformation; cyber attacks; facilitated migration; espionage; manipulation of international law; threats of force (by both irregular armed groups and conventional forces); political subversion; sabotage; terrorism; economic pressure and energy dependency. NATO defines hybrid threats as a ‘type of threat that combines conventional, irregular and asymmetric activities in time and space’.2 This provides the essence of something produced by the synergy of different measures but used alone it is too broad. Most current definitions of hybrid threats lean heavily on Russian actions in Ukraine and Crimea, but this risks neglecting one of the key aspects of hybrid threats, that of adaptability. While discussions surrounding the essential nature of ‘hybridity’ are likely to continue, the underlying phe- nomena the term encapsulates remain very real.3 This report therefore focuses on the characteristics of hybrid threats. These are actions which: Are coordinated and synchronised across a wide range of means. Deliberately target democratic states’ and institutions’ systemic vulnerabilities. Use a wide range of means. Exploit the threshold of detection and attribution as well as the border between war and peace. Aim to influence different forms of decision-making at the local (regional), state, or institutional level. Favour and/or gain the agent’s strategic goals while undermining and/or hurting
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