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A New Review Mechanism for the RCMP’s National Security Activities Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar © Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, represented by the Minister of Public Works and Government Services, 2006 Cat. No: CP32-88/2-2006E ISBN 0-660-19666-2 Available through your local bookseller or through Publishing and Depository Services Public Works and Government Services Canada Ottawa, Ontario KIA OS5 Telephone: (613) 941-5995 Orders only: 1 800 635-7943 Fax: (613) 954-5779 or 1 800 565-7757 Internet: http://publications.gc.ca Printed by: Gilmore Print Group Ce document est également publié en français sous le titre Un nouveau mécanisme d’examen des activités de la GRC en matière de sécurité nationale www.ararcommission.ca A NEW REVIEW MECHANISM FOR THE RCMP’S NATIONAL SECURITY ACTIVITIES Contents I INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 17 1. Introduction 17 2. Organization of the Report 17 3. Overview of my Conclusions and Recommendations 18 II THE HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF CANADA’S NATIONAL SECURITY ACTIVITIES 23 1. Introduction 23 2. Confederation to World War II 25 3. National Security After World War II 26 4. The 1970 October Crisis and Its Aftermath 29 5. The McDonald Commission 32 6. 1984-2001 36 6.1 Overview 36 6.2 Introduction to the RCMP in the CSIS Era 38 6.3 RCMP National Security Activities After the Creation of CSIS 40 6.4 Intelligence-Led Policing 42 6.5 The Internal Organization of the RCMP’s National Security Activities Before 9/11 45 6.6 Interaction with CSIS 46 6.7 The Air India Bombings of 1985 47 III LEGISLATIVE CHANGES FOLLOWING THE TERRORIST ATTACKS OF SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 55 1. Introduction 55 2. New Offences 55 2.1 Anti-terrorism Act 55 2.2 New Definitions: Terrorist Activity and Terrorist Group 56 A NEW REVIEW MECHANISM FOR THE RCMP’S 2 NATIONAL SECURITY ACTIVITIES 2.3 New Terrorism Offences 58 2.4 New Terrorist Financing Offences 59 2.5 Definition of Terrorism Offences 59 2.6 Forfeiture Orders and Terrorist Financing Offences 60 2.7 Consent of Provincial or Federal Attorney General 60 2.8 Other New Offences 61 2.9 Security of Information Act 61 2.10 Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act 63 2.11 United Nations Suppression of Terrorism Regulations 65 3. New Police Powers 66 3.1 Investigative Hearings 66 3.2 Recognizance With Conditions (Preventive Arrest) 68 3.3 Enhanced Electronic Surveillance Provisions 69 3.4 An Act to amend the Foreign Missions and International Organizations Act 69 4. Enhanced Protections for National Security Confidentiality 70 4.1 Canada Evidence Act 70 4.2 Access to Information and Privacy Legislation 72 5. Increased Information Sharing and Integration of National Security Activities 73 5.1 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 73 5.2 Canada-U.S. Smart Border Agreement 75 5.3 New Department: Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada 76 5.4 New National Security Policy 77 5.5 Public Safety Act 77 IV CURRENT NATIONAL SECURITY ACTIVITIES OF THE RCMP 83 1. Introduction 83 2. Organizational Overview 84 2.1 Organization of RCMP National Security Activities 84 2.2 Ministerial Directives 85 2.3 Internal Policies 90 2.4 Internal Accountability Mechanisms 91 2.5 Personnel Involved in the National Security Mandate 94 2.6 Recruiting and Training 94 3. Scope of RCMP’s Current National Security Activities 96 3.1 National Security Intelligence Branch 96 3.2 National Security Operations Branch 98 3.3 Threat Assessment Branch 100 CONTENTS 3 3.4 Criminal Extremism Analysis Section 101 3.5 NSISs, INSETs and IBETs 102 4. Overlap With Other Areas of RCMP 107 5. Information and Intelligence Management, Retention and Sharing 108 5.1 Information Coming Into the RCMP 109 5.2 Information Storage and Maintenance 111 5.3 Information Sharing and Dissemination 112 6. Integration and Interaction with Other Forces and Agencies 116 6.1 Integration 118 6.2 Interaction 119 6.2.1 Other Federal National Security Actors 119 6.2.2 Provincial and Municipal Police Agencies 120 6.2.3 U.S. and Other Foreign Agencies 121 V CANADA’S NATIONAL SECURITY LANDSCAPE 127 1. Introduction 127 2. Canadian Security Intelligence Service 128 2.1 Relevant Legislation 128 2.2 Mandate 129 2.3 Priority Areas 130 2.3.1 Terrorism 131 2.3.2 Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction 132 2.3.3 Espionage and Foreign-Influenced Activities 132 2.3.4 Transnational Criminal Activity 133 2.3.5 Information Security Threats 133 2.3.6 Security Screening and Assessments 134 2.3.6.1 Government Screening 134 2.3.6.2 Sensitive-Site Screening 135 2.3.6.3 Foreign Screening 135 2.3.6.4 Immigration and Citizenship Screening 136 2.3.6.5 Refugee Screening 136 2.4 Assistance to Enforcement 136 2.5 Information Disclosure Practices 138 2.6 Interaction Between CSIS and the RCMP 139 2.7 Operations Abroad 140 3. Integrated Threat Assessment Centre 141 3.1 Relevant Legislation 141 3.2 Mandate 141 4. Communications Security Establishment 143 4.1 Relevant Legislation 143 4.2 Mandate 143 A NEW REVIEW MECHANISM FOR THE RCMP’S 4 NATIONAL SECURITY ACTIVITIES 5. Department of National Defence 147 5.1 Relevant Legislation 147 5.2 Mandate 147 5.3 Domestic National Security Activities 149 6. Canada Border Services Agency 151 6.1 Relevant Legislation 151 6.2 Mandate 152 6.3 Police Powers of CBSA Officers 154 6.4 CBSA Intelligence 155 6.5 Immigration Detention Facilities 157 6.6 National Security Activities 157 6.6.1 Screening of People Entering Canada 157 6.6.2 Lookouts 157 6.6.3 Advance Passenger Information/ Passenger Name Record Information Program 159 6.6.4 National Risk Assessment Centre 160 6.6.5 Cargo Security Mandate 162 6.6.6 Participation in Integrated Teams 163 6.6.6.1 The CBSA and the RCMP 163 6.6.6.2 The CBSA and Other Agencies and Departments 165 6.7 Information Sharing 166 6.7.1 International Partners 168 7. Citizenship and Immigration Canada 169 7.1 Relevant Legislation 169 7.2 Mandate 169 7.3 National Security Activities 170 7.3.1 Pre-removal Risk Assessments 171 7.4 Information-Sharing Role 172 8. Transport Canada 175 8.1 Relevant Legislation 175 8.2 Mandate 175 8.3 Transport Canada Intelligence 176 8.4 Transport Security Initiatives 177 8.4.1 Maritime Security 177 8.4.1.1 Marine Security Operations Centres 177 8.4.1.2 MIMDEX 178 8.4.2 Aviation Security 179 8.4.2.1 Security Screening 179 8.4.2.2 Air Passenger Scrutiny 179 9. Canadian Air Transport Security Authority 181 9.1 Relevant Legislation 181 9.2 Mandate 181 CONTENTS 5 10. Canadian Coast Guard 183 10.1 Relevant Legislation 183 10.2 Mandate 183 10.3 On-Water Operations in Support of National Security 184 11. Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada 185 11.1 Relevant Legislation 185 11.2 Mandate 186 12. Canada Revenue Agency 189 12.1 Relevant Legislation 189 12.2 National Security Mandate 189 12.3 Information Sharing 190 13. Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada 191 13.1 Relevant Legislation 191 13.2 Mandate 191 13.3 National Security Activities 192 13.3.1 DFAIT Intelligence 193 13.3.2 RCMP Foreign Liaison Officers and Secondees to DFAIT 194 14. Privy Council Office 196 14.1 Mandate 196 14.2 National Security Advisor 196 14.3 Security and Intelligence Secretariat 197 14.4 International Assessment Staff 198 15. Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada 199 15.1 Relevant Legislation 199 15.2 Mandate 200 15.3 National Security Activities 201 15.4 Intelligence and Information Sharing 202 16. Other Federal Departments and Agencies Involved in National Security Operations 203 16.1 Health Canada and the Public Health Agency of Canada 204 16.2 Canadian Food Inspection Agency 205 16.3 Environment Canada 205 16.4 Natural Resources Canada 207 16.5 Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission 208 16.6 Department of Justice 209 16.7 Treasury Board Secretariat 210 16.8 Department of Finance 210 16.9 Provincial and Municipal Police Forces 210 16.9.1 Federally-Led Permanent Integrated Teams and Ad Hoc Joint-Force Operations 211 16.9.2 Provincially-Led Integrated Anti-terrorism Teams 213 A NEW REVIEW MECHANISM FOR THE RCMP’S 6 NATIONAL SECURITY ACTIVITIES 16.9.3 Day-to-Day Interaction 214 16.9.3.1 Examples of Interaction with the RCMP 215 16.9.3.2 Examples of Interaction with CSIS 216 VI REVIEW OF NATIONAL SECURITY ACTIVITIES: THE CANADIAN EXPERIENCE 243 1. Introduction 243 2. Law Enforcement Review Bodies 244 2.1 Police Complaints Bodies 244 2.1.1 Commission for Public Complaints Against the RCMP (CPC) 244 2.1.1.1 Marin and McDonald Commission Reports 244 2.1.1.2 Creation of CPC 247 2.1.1.3 Statutory Framework for CPC 248 2.1.2 Military Police Complaints Commission 253 2.1.2.1 Procedural Powers 255 2.1.3 Provincial Police Review Bodies 257 2.1.3.1 Ontario 257 2.1.3.2 Quebec 260 2.1.3.3 British Columbia’s Variation 262 2.2 Judicial Review of Police Actions 263 3. Security Intelligence Review Bodies 265 3.1 Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC) 265 3.1.1 SIRC Mandate and Operations 266 3.1.2 Review 267 3.1.3 Complaints 274 3.1.4 CSIS and RCMP 276 3.1.5 SIRC and Other Review Bodies 278 3.1.6 Obtaining Information 278 3.1.7 Reporting by SIRC 279 3.1.8 Inspector General of CSIS 280 3.2 Office of the Communications Security Establishment Commissioner 281 3.2.1 Review Function 282 3.2.2 Complaints Function 283 3.2.3 Implementation of Recommendations 284 4.
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