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Problems and Prospects of the Negotiated Settlement of Sino-Indian Border Dispute

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Problems and Prospects of the Negotiated Settlement of Sino-Indian Border Dispute PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS OF THE NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT OF SINO-INDIAN BORDER DISPUTE THESIS SUBMITTED FOR THE AWARD OF THE DEGREE OF Boctor of Pi)ilodopI)p IN POLITICAL SCIENCE BY SAHEBA REHMAN UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF PROF. S. NAHEED MURTAZA KHAN DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY ALIGARH (INDIA) 2007 /"•••• 16594 To My (parents NAHEED MURTAZA KHAN Telephones Chairperson 0571-2701720 [Office] Department of Political Science 0571-2500653 [Resi.J Aligarh Muslim University yusuf_Khan [email protected] Aligarh-202002 (Dated: ;^(- II- "7 Certificate I certify that !Ms. SaheSa (Rahman a 6onafide (Research ScdoCar of the (Department of (poCiticaC Science, Jlfigarh has com-pCeted her research titCed "(ProSkms and (Prospects of the ^NegotiatedSettlement of Sino-Indian (Border (Dispute" under my supervision. T^e present thesis has Seen submitted to the (Department of (PoCiticaC Science, JlCigarh MusCim University, JiCigarh in the fuCfiCment of the requirements for the award of the degree of (Doctor of (PhiCbsophy. To the 6est of my ^owCedge, it is her originaC wor^ and the matter presented in the thesis is not submitted in part orfuCCfor any degree of this or any other Vniversity. Supervisor j^ ((ProflS.JN'afiemMutl^a.rM %fian) Jic^owkdgement I Bow in reverence to^dah the aCmigHty ivfiose gracious SCessings gave me the courage, sustenance and devotion to compkte this tasl{, I shafC ever Be indebted to my [earned supervisor <Prof. S. J{aheed Murtaza %jian, Chairperson, (Department of (poCiticaC Science, Ji.M.V. for her ahk guidance, constant help and cooperation throughout the course of preparation of the thesis. I express myprofoundthan^ to my teachers (Prof. M. 94.urtaza Xfian, (Prof. Jirif J{am.eed and (Prof Jlsmer (Baig for their cooperation and encouragement. I shaCC 6e faiCing in my duty if I do not express my deep gratitude to my parents, Brothers, 6rother-in-hiw, sisters, sister-in-hiw and niece without whose unfaiCing support, affection, cooperation and encouragement the worH^ would have not seen the fight of the dawn. I shad aCways Be ad^nowCedging the moraC support and wed wishes extended By my seniors and friends. I sincereCy remain thanhfuC to the support of non-teaching staff of the (Department of (Pofiticaf Science, JIMV. I cannot ignore the appreciaBCe faciCities and heCp expended By the staff memBers of Mautana Jizad LiBrary, Centre for West ^sian Studies and Centre for'Kehru Studies, JI^V. It is oBCigatory to pay my thanl{s to !Mr JABduC Quadir and 9(ew (Boo^(Binder Brothers for typing and Binding the manuscript sl^dfudy. Saheba ^hman Contents Page Preface 1 - IV Chapter- I Historical Background 1-23 Tibetan Episode The Year of Panchsheel - 1954 Nehru's China Visit Map Controversy Chapter-II The Sino-India Border Dispute 24-60 The Flight of the Dalai Lama The Tibetan Revolt Longju Incident Kongka Pass Incident Chou's Visit to India Forward Policy Invasions Unilateral Ceasefire The Colombo Proposals Chapter-Ill The Process of Normalisation 61-86 Atal Bihari Vajpayee's China Visit Chapter-IV Signs of Flexibility-Eight Round of Talks 87-141 The First Round of Border Negotiation The Second Round of Border Negotiation The Third Round of Border Negotiation The Fourth Round of Border Talks The Fifth Round of Border Talks The Sixth Round of Border Talks The Sumdorong Chu Crisis The Seventh Round of Border Talks The Eight Round of Talks Rajiv Gandhi's China Visit Chapter-V Institutional Resolution of Conflict 142 -190 Wu Xueqian's Visit First Meeting of the Joint Working Group Second Meeting of the Joint Working Group Third Meeting of the Joint Working Group Li Peng's Visit Fourth Meeting of the Joint Working Group Fifth Meeting of the Joint Working Group Sixth Meeting of the Joint Working Group Narasimha Rao's China Visit Expert Group Seventh Meeting of the Joint Working Group Eight Meeting of the Joint Working Group Ninth Meeting of the Joint Working Group Jiang Zemin's India Visit Tenth Meeting of the Joint Working Group China's response to the Indian Nuclear Eleventh Meeting of the Joint Working Group Twelfth Meeting of the Joint Working Group K.R. Narayanan's China Visit Thirteenth Meeting of the Joint Working Group Zhu Rongji's India Visit Fourteenth Meeting of the Joint Working Group Fifteenth Meeting of the Joint Working Group Resolution Through Special Representatives Chapter-VI 191-221 Special Representatives to address Border Issue The first round of Special Representatives to address the contentious border dispute. The second round of the round of Special Representatives to address the contentious issues The third round of Special Representatives Negotiation The fourth round of Special Representatives The fifth round of Special Representatives Negotiation Chines Premier Wen Jiabao's Visit to India The sixth round of Special Representatives Negotiations The seventh round of Special Representatives The eight round of Special Representatives talks President Hu Jintao's Visit The ninth round of Special Representatives Negotiations The tenth round of Special Representatives Negotiations The eleventh round of Special Representatives Negotiations Conclusion 222 - 235 Bibliography 236 - 250 Preface India and China the two major Asian countries are inheritors of great civiUzations of Asia. Due to their geographical contiguity, common borders as close neighbours and the requirement of having trade cooperation they are bound to have host of problems. Their relationship is compounded and even shaped by both the internal and external factors of regional and global settings. Geographically speaking they share a long stretch of border with each other and consequently they face a colossal boundary dispute, which require an immediate and strategic solution and resolution. The present study is a comprehensive and in-depth study of the process of negotiated settlement of the boundary dispute. The hypothesis is that sufficient efforts have been made by both the Governments to carry forward the peace process through the method of the negotiated settlement. Sino-Indian relations have experienced profound upheavals and behavioural fluctuations over past five decades ranging from benign warmth in the 1950s through hyper tension in 1960s and 1970s to rapprochement in 1980s and readjustment in 1990s onwards. After establishing formal relations, friendly exchanges between the two nations had taken on a good momentum. In 1954 two Prime Ministers Chao En-Lai and Jawahar Lai Nehru signed joint communique and put forward famous Panchsheel principles. This era was characterized as Hindi-Chini brotherhood era. Nehru played an important role in helping to bring China's presence on to the world stage. By the end of 1959 serious dispute occurred between India and China on border demarcation and shelter to Dalai Lama in India. In October 1962 direct military intervention took place in all the three sectors of the Sino-Indian border i.e. Eastern to Western sectors. This caused a complete infringement between Sino-Indian relations. After some years India and China started to restore their normal relations and revised their friendly ties, shattered by 1962 border dispute. In 1975 China started soft paddling with India. In 1980-1990's the solution to the Sino-India border dispute entered into a positive process of negotiated settlement. The post cold war period witnessed significant developments in the bilateral relations. After the disintegration of Soviet Union both Asian powers realized the urgency of stabilizing the borders and further improve over all bilateral relations in an uncertain world. In this connection Confidence Building Measures (CBMs), Joint Working Groups (JWG), Expert Groups (EG), Special Representatives (SRs) and reciprocal visits of the heads of the states have been playing very important and vital role. Mutual accommodation of each other's vital interests will encourage China to consider the McMahon Line in the eastern sector, which is strategically important to India. If India cannot remain insensitive to the Chinese strength in South Asia and the World, China also cannot afford to remain perpetually hostile towards India. China has been repeatedly saying that it wants to improve relations with India and establish bonds of friendship. In recent past China has resolved many disporatic boundary disputes with Russian states (CIS), ASEAN states and Japan then, why not with India. But there is sheer need of strong determination and accommodative approach of both the countries somehow loss and gains are the essential part of political solutions. India and China would have to forego with some perseverance and patience also. Sino-Indian differences, improved relations and peace process possess a primary prominence in international relations literature. The scenario of two big Asian neighbours got much importance since 1981 when negotiations for peaceful settlement of boundary disputes started to accelerate. After the end of the cold war US hegemony and western world order are the challenges to the oriental world. In this view there exists a fertile ground to study different dimensions of tensions especially territorial dispute and efforts made by them (India-China) to come close in more pragmatic and meaningful way. The present study is intended to explore the major irritants and circumstances, which determine the Sino-Indian relations. The study has HI explored and analysed the relations starting from 1947 till today in chronological order. The study consists of seven chapters. The first chapter is based on historical retrospect of relations between India and China. It also analyses friendly exchange between India and China, which culminated in the form of Panchsheel. The second chapter has investigated out the genesis of major and minor roots of tensions and mistrusts between India and China, which led to 1962 October War. The third chapter outlined the major efforts of restoration of relations between India and China which started in mid seventies. It also has brought about the details of the role of good offices and decision making authorities of both the states in the settlement of border disputes.
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