International Relations Between the U.S. and Spain 1945-53 Economics
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International Relations between the U.S. and Spain 1945-53 Economics, Ideology and Compromise Boris Nikolaj Liedtke submitted for the degree of PhD London School of Economics and Political Sciences UMI Number: U091177 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. Dissertation Publishing UMI U091177 Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author. Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. ProQuest LLC 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 1 h£SES F. 3 5 56 . Abstract This is a study of the relations between Spain and the United States from the end of the Second World War to the conclusion of the Madrid Agreements which were signed in September 1953. Through these agreements Spain obtained military and eco nomic aid from the US. At the same time she was integrated into the western defence structure. In return Franco authorized the US to construct and use military bases, some of which were situated near Spanish cities. Furthermore the agreements limited Spain's foreign, economic and monetary policies. The structure of the thesis is determined by the chronological events of the late 1940s and early 1950s. The international background is analysed in the first part of the thesis, running up to July 1951. The second part covers the negotiations between the two countries. By following the chronological events of the negotiations, the thesis tries to assess which of the two parties was willing to compromise in key aspects. Most of the thesis is based on American primary sources throughout the period. Many of the arguments developed contrast directly with those already put forward, notably by Spanish historians. The picture which emerges indicates that Washington, as well as Spain, had great military and strategic interests in signing the Madrid Agreements. This is surprising given the findings by other investigators that Spain was forced almost by circumstances into these agreements. The thesis tries to develop a counter-argument which, hopefully, lays the foundation for a constructive discussion on the issue. (ii) Acknowledgements Over ten years ago I had the opportunity to attend a US military air show at the American Torrejon air-base, near Madrid. For me personally the display of fighter planes was far less stimulating than the change of cultural environment one inevitably experienced upon passing the checkpoint. Here was a place in the middle of Spain, barely an hour away from the capital, which resembled in many aspects the American way of life. Low residential bungalows, large Chevrolets and American football games had replaced Spanish architecture, culture and entertainment. I was intrigued by the coming about of this strange arrangement and decided five years later to investigate the historic and diplomatic background to this. Since then I have accumulated an enormous amount of debt which I owe to those who over the years have helped me in completing this study. It would be almost impossible to name all those friends who have encouraged me to push ahead with the investigation when I had lost a sense of direction. However, I always knew that I could rely on the support from my family which was crucial before and during the work. I would like to thank Dr Spackman and Dr Pettigree who encouraged me to start my PhD in the first place. At the same time good friends like Simon Hankinson, Richard Murray and Marco Rodino were always willing to help out and motivate me whenever I needed it. On the academic side I am grateful to all those professionals which have made it possible for me to obtain the necessary documents. In this respect I am very thankful to Jo Ann Williamson and Kenneth D. Schlessinger from the National Archives in Washington DC and to Colonel Clayton R. Newell, US Army, Chief Historical Services Division, for their help with the declassification of US diplomatic and military documents. I am also grateful to Sir Frank Roberts for finding the time to talk to me about his experiences in the Foreign Office. At the same time I am indebted to three young academics, Dr John Hulsman, Dr Enrique Moradiellos, and Dr Paco Romero (iii) which helped me develop many of the ideas and thoughts expressed in the work, without them I certainly would have learned less. There is, however, one special person who, throughout my work, gave me personal as well as professional advice, my supervisor Professor Paul Preston. He always found the right words to rekindle my enthusiasm and the right academic questions to sent me back to the archives whenever I was lost. I am certain that without his help I would not have been able to complete my work. It is hard to imagine a better supervisor. I sincerely hope that we will be able to continue our professional relationship as well as our friendship. (iv) Table of Contents A- Abstract p.ii B- Acknowledgements p.iii C- Table of Contents p.v D- Introduction p.vi Chapters Chapter 1- 1945/46 Tripartite Statement p.l Chapter 2- The UN Resolution p.25 Chapter 3- 1947 Returning to Spain p.39 Chapter 4- 1948 Year of Change p.64 Chapter 5- 1949/50 The Policy Changes p.90 Chapter 6- Korea and New Concerns p. 120 Chapter 7- NSC72/6 Spain's Realignment p. 13 8 Chapter 8- 1951 Sherman - Franco Talks p. 170 Chapter 9- 1951 The Study Groups p. 188 Chapter 10- 1952 Analysis of the Reports p.219 Chapter 11- 1952 Negotiations p.245 Chapter 12- 1953 Final Bargaining p.283 Chapter 13- 1953 Back to Madrid p.313 Chapter 14- Signing the Agreements p.333 Appendix Bibliography (V) Introduction This is a study o f the relations between Spain and the United States from the end of the Second World War to the conclusion of the Madrid Agreements which were signed in September 1953. The structure of the thesis is determined by the chronological events o f the late 1940s and early 1950s. In the 1940s, almost as soon as the western democracies had solved the fascist challenge to their social and economic structure, an old enemy, Communism, renewed its claim as a plausible alternative to the capitalist economy. The struggle between the two systems, which engulfed almost the entire world, was unique in that the decisive battles rarely involved soldiers. More often they were fought out by diplomats, economists and industrialists all over the globe. The two superpowers continuously tried to extend their respective influence to as many countries as possible. In this context Spain, guarding the entrance to the Mediterranean was o f particular strategic importance. The first part o f the thesis, covering chapters one to seven, sets the international context for the attempt by the US to bring Spain into the western defence structure. Chapter one analyses the coming about o f the tripartite statement: a weak condemnation of Spain as a fascist regime. For both historic and economic reasons, France felt more antipathy towards the Franco regime than either Britain or the US. The Quai d 'Orsay resolved to force the two other western allies into a condemnation o f the Spanish government. However, Britain and the US were unwilling to jeopardise their cordial diplomatic relations with Spain. They succeeded in watering down French demands to such an extent that the ensuing statement had little real impact upon Spain herself. One of the developments that emerged following the statement was the discussion o f the Spanish problem at the UN. The way in which Communist countries tried to exploit the situation at the UN forms the topic of the second. (Vi) chapter. After long talks throughout 1946, the UN passed a resolution which condemned Franco and, amongst other things, recommended the withdrawal of ambassadors from Madrid. The new found willingness on the part of the western democracies to speak out against Franco did not last. In the third and fourth chapter we see how economic, commercial and strategic interests in the US and in Britain encouraged a rapprochement to Spain between 1947 and 1948. Over these two years the US State Department, fearing possibly adverse diplomatic effects o f close ties with Spain, was slowly pressurised by the Department o f Defense and several influential Congressmen into accepting their point o f view. The international developments during 1949 and early 1950 led to a new official US policy towards Spain, based on National Security Council decision NSC72. The fifth chapter looks at the influence which the growing conflict between East and West had on US policy towards Spain. Soon after the National Security Council issued NSC72, the Korean war broke out, adding to the fears o f policy makers in Washington. In the sixth chapter the importance o f this uncertainty is emphasised. Spain was quickly reintegrated into the international community and the UN revoked its own earlier recommendation to withdraw ambassadors from Madrid. Furthermore, the National Security Council initiated a revision o f its policy, stressing the importance o f promptly making use o f Spain's geographic, military and strategic position. As becomes clear in chapter seven, the emerging US policy called for immediate talks with Spain, ignoring the diplomatic, military and moral concerns o f its European allies.