Perspective EXPERT INSIGHTS ON A TIMELY POLICY ISSUE

BEN CONNABLE, JAMES DOBBINS, HOWARD J. SHATZ, RAPHAEL S. COHEN, BECCA WASSER WEIGHING U.S. TROOP WITHDRAWAL FROM IRAQ STRATEGIC RISKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

May 2020 C O R P O R A T I O N Contents

Executive Summary ...... 1 Weighing U.S. Troop Withdrawal from Iraq ...... 2 Key Analytic Drivers ...... 2 Past and Current U.S. Strategy on Iraq ...... 3 Assessing Prospective Harms to U.S. Strategic Interests in Iraq ...... 3 Impact on the Counter–Islamic State Campaign ...... 8 Impact on the Efforts to Counter Iranian Malign Influence ...... 11 Impacts on Competition with Russia and China ...... 13 Impacts on U.S. Economic Interests and Iraqi Economic Stability ...... 15 Impacts on U.S. Regional Force Posture and Access ...... 17 Comparative Analysis: Impacts Across the Four Withdrawal Options....19 Overall Recommendation: Commit to a Small Enduring Advisory Presence ...... 20 Specific Recommendations ...... 22 Expect Some Modest, Temporary Reversals ...... 24 Notes ...... 25 References ...... 30

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No Withdrawal Limited Withdrawal Full Withdrawal Disengagement (early 2020 force levels (combat assistance (combat assistance + (all military forces + Strategic Interest sustained) forces only) advisory teams) financing + materiel)

Countering the Islamic State Very Low High Very High Very High

Countering Iran Very Low Moderate High Very High

Competing with China and Russia Very Low Low Moderate Moderate

Economic prosperity and stability Very Low Very Low Moderate High

Regional military force posture Very Low Very Low Moderate Moderate

1 Weighing U.S. Troop Withdrawal to keep energy markets stable and trade routes secure, and from Iraq to counter Iranian malign influence.3 These requirements reinforce the consistent language in U.S. strategic docu- In this Perspective, we assess the possible strategic risks ments regarding Iraq and the broader Middle East since at associated with a withdrawal of U.S. military forces from least 2005.4 Iraq and, building from this assessment, recommend a set of policies and actions to help the United States meet its strategic objectives in the Middle East. Our analysis and Key Analytic Drivers recommendations are intended to help both policymakers Because the 2018 NDS does not resolve the debate over and the public to consider both sides of this important Iraq policy even within the defense establishment, fur- issue. ther analysis is warranted. Withdrawal might result from Strong opinions have been offered for and against a range of different circumstances and policy decisions.5 withdrawal by policymakers, policy analysts, military lead- While the impetus of withdrawal has serious practical ers, veterans, and members of the general public.1 Present implications for the United States, Iraq, and for U.S. mili- arguments generally align with those made during the tary forces, we focus our analysis on three major strategic peak 2006–2007 Iraq counterinsurgency period and during drivers: the period leading up to the 2011 withdrawal.2 The 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) adds a new element, as 1. U.S. strategic objectives in Iraq derived from official it asserts that the United States will shift its military focus documents and statements from countering terrorism toward great-power competition 2. withdrawal options, ranging from no withdrawal to with, primarily, China and Russia. full military disengagement Some military professionals and policymakers have 3. likely harm to U.S. strategic interests for each with- read the NDS as an almost binary directive: Refocusing on drawal option. China and Russia requires a substantial withdrawal from Our assessment and recommendations are built from a the Middle East. However, the NDS also directs the U.S. review of public, official U.S. statements on strategy toward Department of Defense to help maintain favorable regional Iraq, and what we derived from those statements to be the balances in the Middle East, to deter regional adversary most common and most emphasized U.S. strategic interests aggression, to defeat and deny safe haven to terrorists, to in Iraq. prevent hostile powers from dominating the Middle East,

The 2018 NDS does not resolve the debate over Iraq policy.

2 Past and Current U.S. Strategy on experts—and quite a few Iraqis—to have been a mistake, Iraq reversing improvements in the Iraqi security forces and opening the way for the Islamic State.7 One of the most oft-stated concerns about the continuing U.S. military presence in Iraq is the perceived lack of a clear regional or country-specific strategy to guide mili- Assessing Prospective Harms to tary purpose and action.6 We agree that strategic clarity on U.S. Strategic Interests in Iraq Iraq is much needed, and we find that the stated official objectives are not sufficiently linked to consistent policies Given the variability between stated strategic objectives or justifications for U.S. military operations. Since the and the practical policies on Iraq, and given the shifting 2003 U.S.-led coalition invasion of Iraq, some Iraq policies global environment, we distilled a set of five U.S. national appear to have been directly at odds with contemporaneous security interests from recent and current policy docu- strategic statements. ments to help drive our analysis. Table 2 describes the But while policy and strategy are often not well five categories of declared U.S. national security interests aligned, there are many readily available official docu- relevant to Iraq. ments describing U.S. strategic interests in Iraq. Given a few necessary changes to reflect emerging conditions, these Withdrawal Options documents are generally consistent in tone and content from at least 2005 and into 2020. Since 2003, the U.S. There are clearly stated U.S. interests in Iraq and practi- strategy toward Iraq has been focused on establishing and cal interests in maintaining a military presence in Iraq. sustaining a stable and democratic state. Table 1 provides Questions remain regarding the level of presence needed a comparative set of quotes from strategic documents and and the degree to which the costs and risks of U.S. mil- official websites beginning with the 2005 U.S. National itary presence might counterbalance perceived benefits. Strategy for Victory in Iraq and ending with the U.S. Answering these questions requires a practical look at Department of State (DoS) official policy on Iraq in early different options for military presence and investment in 2020. Iraq. Treating military presence in Iraq as a binary all-in While there has been effectively no change in declared or all-out policy challenge obscures the difficult choices U.S. strategic objectives in Iraq since 2005, there has been that will almost certainly have to be made in the middle a wide fluctuation in force levels. In 2007, at the height of ground. the Sunni insurrection, there were more than 150,000 U.S. Table 3 lists and describes four options for withdrawal troops in Iraq. From 2011 to 2014 there were none. In early from Iraq, including a no withdrawal scenario. Any of the 2020, there are approximately 5,000 or 6,000 U.S. troops in withdrawal options could be dictated by the Iraqi govern- Iraq. The 2011 withdrawal is considered by many Western ment under cited agreements or selected as a shift in course by U.S. policymakers.8 Or, the Iraqi government could, in

3 TABLE 1 Published U.S. Strategic Objectives in Iraq, 2005–2020

Ways and Source Year Selected Quote Summarizing Strategic Objectives in Iraq Means

National Strategy 2005 We will help the Iraqi people build a new Iraq with a constitutional, representative Military for Victory in Iraq government that respects civil rights and has security forces sufficient to maintain domestic order advising, and keep Iraq from becoming a safe haven for terrorists advisors

Bush National 2006 And in Iraq, we will continue to support the Iraqi people and their historic march from tyranny to Military Security Strategy effective democracy. We will work with the freely elected, democratic government of Iraq—our new advising, (NSS) partner in the War on Terror—to consolidate and expand freedom, and to build security and lasting advisors stability.

Obama NSS 2010 Our goal is an Iraq that is sovereign, stable, and self-reliant. To achieve that goal, we are continuing Military to promote an Iraqi Government that is just, representative, and accountable and that denies advising, support and safe haven to terrorists. The United States will pursue no claim on Iraqi territory or advisorsa resources, and we will keep our commitments to Iraq’s democratically elected government.

2014: Nineteen Iraqi Army brigades and thousands of Federal Police break and flee in front of the Islamic State offensive.

Obama NSS 2015 We will continue to support Iraq as it seeks to free itself from sectarian conflict and the scourge of Military extremists. . . . This requires professional and accountable Iraqi Security Forces that can overcome advising, sectarian divides and protect all Iraqi citizens. It also requires international support, which is why advisors we are leading an unprecedented international coalition to work with the Iraqi government and strengthen its military to regain sovereignty.

Trump NSS 2017 We will strengthen our long-term strategic partnership with Iraq as an independent state. . . . We will Military retain the necessary American military presence in the region to protect the United States and our advising, allies from terrorist attacks and preserve a favorable regional balance of power. advisors

Trump NDS 2018 We will develop enduring coalitions to consolidate gains we have made in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Military and elsewhere, to support the lasting defeat of terrorists as we sever their sources of strength and advising, counterbalance Iran. advisors

Department of State 2019 Iraq is now a key partner for the United States in the region as well as a voice of moderation and Military democracy in the Middle East. . . . U.S. security assistance supports the development of a modern, advising, accountable, fiscally sustainable, and professional Iraqi military capable of defending Iraq and its advisors borders.

SOURCES: U.S. National Security Council, National Strategy for Victory in Iraq, Washington, D.C.: The White House, 2005; George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, Washington, D.C.: The White House, March 2006; Barack Obama, National Security Strategy, Washington, D.C.: The White House, May 27, 2010; Barack Obama, National Security Strategy, Washington, D.C.: The White House, February 2015; Donald J. Trump, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, Washington, D.C.: The White House, December 2017; Mattis, 2018; DoS, “U.S. Relations with Iraq,” bilateral relations fact sheet, November 13, 2019. a The 2010 NSS stated that military advisors would support ISF development through the scheduled withdrawal period, but not clearly after that period. The Obama adminis- tration planned for DoS to lead Iraqi security forces (ISF) development after the military withdrawal, but the program for Title 22 advising under the Chief of Mission did not go as planned. Lack of access and insufficient funds to the DoS program led to its very limited progress. See Brennan et al., 2013, for more on this effort.

4 TABLE 2 Categories of U.S. National Security Interest in Iraq

U.S. National Security Interest Description and Sources

Countering the Islamic State The United States continues to pursue the defeat of the “Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).” This requires ongoing counterterrorism pressure and support actions, including partner support to regional forces battling the Islamic State and economic and other support to the governments battling against the Islamic State.

Sources: 2017 NSS; 2018 NDS; DoS, “Joint Statement by the Political Directors of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS,” Office of the Spokesperson, January 29, 2020; 2020 Operation Inherent Resolve website, undated.

Countering Iran The United States seeks to counter Iran’s destabilizing activities in the Middle East, block Iran’s financing of terror, and address Iranian weapons proliferation activities. In Iraq, the United States seeks to ensure Iraq’s sovereignty and self- reliance.

Sources: 2017 NSS; 2018 NDS; DoS, “U.S. Relations with Iraq,” bilateral relations fact sheet, November 13, 2019.

Competing with China and Long-term strategic competitions with China and Russia are the principal Russia priorities for the U.S. Department of Defense. China and Russia pose “new threats” to Middle East security and stability that must be countered.

Sources: 2018 NDS; Assistant Secretary of State David Schenker, “China and Russia: The New Threats to the Middle East Security and Stability,” October 8, 2019.

Economic prosperity and The United States will “support the reforms underway that begin to address stability core inequities that jihadist terrorists exploit . . . [and] play a role in catalyzing positive developments by engaging economically, supporting reformers, and championing benefits of open markets and societies.” The United States will maintain “vigorous and broad” economic engagement and help Iraq become a “self-reliant” country.

Sources: 2017 NSS, p. 49; 2018 NDS; DoS, November 13, 2019.

Regional military force posture The United States rebalances forces to compete with China and Russia while maintaining sufficient forces and access around the world to ensure regional stability and to prevent an imbalance of force that might lead to military crises.

Sources: Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter, 2017 Defense Posture Statement: Taking the Long View, Investing for the Future, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 2016; 2018 NDS.

5 TABLE 3 Prospective Withdrawal Options for Iraq

Level of Withdrawal Description

No Withdrawal Early 2020 force levels are generally sustained. If the Islamic State is further suppressed, the U.S. military can execute a gradual, conditions-driven transition from a mixed direct combat assistance and training advisory role to a training-focused advisory mission.

Limited Withdrawal Tactical ground and air advise and assist units providing direct combat assistance to Iraqi military forces engaged in combat against the Islamic State are withdrawn from Iraq or reduced and redeployed to bases within Iraq to conduct on-base-only training missions. U.S. logistics operations and limited, noncombat air operations could continue.

Full Withdrawal Both tactical ground and air forces and advisors providing training support to the Iraqi military on major bases are fully withdrawn from Iraq, ending military-to-military engagement beyond routine Chief of Mission activities. All U.S. military shared basing spaces in Iraq— including within the Kurdish Regional Government—are relinquished to the Iraqi government.

Disengagement In addition to withdrawing combat assistance and advisory units and relinquishing borrowed physical space on Iraqi military bases, the United States ends its financial and material support to the ISF and Iraqi ministries. the future, establish such restrictive conditions that U.S. battle against residual Islamic State elements. This would military presence would become untenable. This would include the retraction of direct combat intelligence assis- effectively force a withdrawal while limiting damage to tance, ground-to-ground fire support, medical support, U.S.-Iraq relations. As of early 2020, there is no enduring logistics assistance, and some air support. The United status of forces agreement between Iraq and the United States would retain military presence on Iraqi bases for States. training activities. No Withdrawal sustains the approximate force level in Full Withdrawal removes all these direct assistance place in early 2020. These forces would continue both the elements, as well as U.S. military advisors helping to train combat assistance and the training advisory roles they cur- and equip the ISF in bases across Iraq. This would effec- rently fulfill. Periodic reassessment of the counter–Islamic tively end the military advisory program in Iraq, although State fight would allow for a prospective, gradual transition civilian and coalition advisors might be used to fill in some of combat assistance forces to training-focused advisory of the ensuing gaps. Chief of Mission activities, including missions. military financing and sales, would continue, although Limited Withdrawal removes or internally reassigns major support programs would necessarily be slowed in Iraq those U.S. military teams providing direct assis- because of lack of military-to-military engagement. tance to the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) in the ongoing

6 Disengagement ends all U.S. financial and military Rubric for Assessing Harm to U.S. Strategic support to the ISF. This would entail cutting off all for- Interests in Iraq eign military funding, including the multibillion-dollar Counter-ISIS Train and Equip Fund (CTEF).9 It would also We drew from existing RAND assessment methods, as include cutting off military support and financial sup- well as U.S. Intelligence Community guidelines on the port to Iraqi ministries responsible for national security, language of estimative probability, to develop a rubric for including the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of the probable harm to U.S. strategic interests in Iraq for each 10 Interior. Nonmilitary financial support to Iraq, including of the four options. We assessed harm to both the stabil- broader economic loans, might or might not continue. ity and security of Iraq—a stated strategic interest of the Our comparative assessment of the five U.S. national United States—and to broader U.S. interests as identified in 11 security interests with the four withdrawal options focuses strategic documents. For example, full military with- on the near term, through the end of 2020. It is possible drawal from Iraq would cause some harm to U.S. efforts to that conditions might change significantly in Iraq by the compete with Russia in Iraq, and it would also cause some end of 2020. However, even improved security conditions harm to U.S. efforts to compete with Russia worldwide as would have only limited impact on the very long-term a result of the competitive loss of influence in Iraq and the interests of the United States in Iraq, or on the prospective Middle East. benefits of sustaining a small military advisory footprint in Table 4 explains the levels for strategic harm assess- Iraq indefinitely. ment. In general, the likelihood of results correlated with the likely impact of those results. In other words, an option that might present a very low chance of damaging U.S. strategic interests would also be likely to have very low neg- ative impact if enacted. Therefore, assessment probabilities

TABLE 4 Strategic Harm Assessment Rubric: Explanation of Rating Levels

Rating Level Prospective Harm to U.S. Interests

Very low risk of harm Little to no chance that U.S. interests will be harmed. If harm occurs, it will be minimal.

Low risk of harm Little chance that U.S. interests will be harmed. If harm occurs, it will be manageable.

Moderate risk of harm About even chance that U.S. interests will be harmed. If harm occurs, it will be damaging.

High risk of harm Harm to U.S. interests will probably occur. If harm occurs, it will cause serious damage.

Very high risk of harm Harm to U.S. interests is very likely to occur. If harm occurs, it will cause severe damage.

7 and impact are combined in a single assessment rating. almost certainly give it space to reform or evolve into a All assessments reflect the informed subject-matter expert new organization with similar objectives. Those objectives judgment of the authors of this report, backed by the cited currently include—and almost certainly would continue reference material. to include—the denial of access for the United States to Assessments are provided in each of the analytic sec- all areas under Islamic State control, the murder of U.S. tions below. All assessments are aggregated for comparison citizens, the destruction of U.S-allied governments, and the in the section titled “Comparative Analysis: Impacts Across disruption of Western states through terrorism and propa- the Four Withdrawal Options.”12 ganda. Given events from 2014 through early 2020, this is not a threat to be taken lightly. The primary purpose of the U.S. military forces in Impact on the Counter–Islamic Iraq is to support Iraqi and Syrian partners in their ongo- State Campaign ing operations against the Islamic State in both Iraq and Syria.19 U.S. forces are positioned across several bases in Since 2014, policymakers have been primarily focused Iraq, from which they help train the ISF, provide direct on the counter–Islamic State campaign in Iraq and in combat support to Iraqi units engaged against the Islamic Syria. As of early 2020, the Islamic State no longer holds State, help to direct material support to the Iraqi Army physical territory in either country.13 Cells of Islamic State and counterterror units, gather and provide intelligence on fighters continue to operate within Iraq’s urban and rural Islamic State fighters and leaders, and provide cross-border communities, organizing and conducting more limited support to ongoing operations against the Islamic State in attacks than they were capable of in early 2019.14 As an Syria. organization, the Islamic State still directs and inspires Withdrawal of American troops from Iraq would have international terror attacks.15 Islamic State leaders, and significant impact on the counter–Islamic State fight in many of its fighters, are Iraqi, and the group retains an both Iraq and in Syria. In Syria, the loss of support bases, Iraqi orientation.16 The killing of the previous Islamic State surface-to-surface firing positions, intelligence collection leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, temporarily decapitated the activities, and logistics support in Iraq will require more group’s leadership but did not end its functional or ideolog- of a standoff approach to counterterrorism activities.20 In ical existence.17 the full withdrawal scenario, U.S. support activities in Iraq Current Islamic State leadership want the United would no longer be able to assist remaining U.S. ground States to withdraw from the Middle East, but the group’s forces or partner forces in Syria. Intelligence collection primary objectives are the destruction of U.S. regional and supporting ground fires would cease to exist. There partner governments and the creation of a Middle East would be some inevitable degradation in the efficacy of caliphate.18 Although the success of the Islamic State is, counter–Islamic State operations in Syria. Given the lack in early 2020, highly unlikely, purposefully abandoning of alternative nearby support areas to forces positioned the counter–Islamic State fight in Iraq and Syria would

8 in northeastern Syria, the U.S. military mission in Syria would probably become untenable. The primary purpose of Specifically in Iraq, the limited withdrawal scenario would place greater burden on the ISF to continue to the U.S. military forces pursue and suppress remaining Islamic State forces. We found no publicly available, empirical estimate of the in Iraq is to support Iraqi ISF’s ability to accomplish this mission in the absence of U.S. direct combat assistance. However, there are many and Syrian partners in acknowledgments that dependencies similar to those developed between U.S. and Iraqi forces in the early 2000s their ongoing operations have reemerged during Operation Inherent Resolve.21 Implementing a gradual limited withdrawal would help against the Islamic State. reduce the likelihood of catastrophic setbacks. But some loss of capability against the Islamic State would be ground forces, the degradation of capacity in Syria, and inevitable. the contraction of all U.S. activities in Iraq to the embassy In the full withdrawal scenario—which would compound in Baghdad, this loss of visibility and access probably also include a reduction in European support would effectively hand the counter–Islamic State fight to personnel—Iraq would take responsibility for all of its mili- Iraq and Iran. tary operations, from training to logistics to planning to Would a nearly full transition of the counter–Islamic fires and joint integration. Again, there are no clear, empir- State fight in Iraq and Syria matter at this point? It might ical assessments of Iraq’s capabilities in these areas, but it not matter if the Islamic State was an isolated organiza- can be safely assumed that Iraqi forces would suffer from tion focused only on disrupting these two states. It also possibly significant near-term degradation in capability. might not matter if the United States did not have broader Unless it was carried out over a number of years, the equities in the stability and success of Iraq as a nation disengagement scenario would sharply reduce the efficacy state (more on that below). Given that the Islamic State of Iraqi forces that have become heavily dependent on U.S. is a global terrorist organization as well as a local insur- financial and material support. Disengagement would fur- gency, the inability to directly suppress, degrade, and deter ther reduce U.S. and coalition efforts to address the refugee it—or to do the same with a new force that might manifest crises in Iraq and Syria. Tens of thousands of refugees from thus-far-unresolved Sunni Arab disenfranchisement in Islamic State–held areas are ripe for future recruitment, Iraq and Syria—would significantly increase the likelihood and the Iraqi government is not prepared to address this that the ongoing counter–Islamic State fight would fail. vexing and costly challenge without significant Western assistance.22 Coupled with the complete withdrawal of

9 Conclusion: All Levels of Withdrawal Harm the Counter–Islamic State Fight The full withdrawal The no withdrawal scenario would allow the United States and its coalition allies to provide ongoing combat and disengagement assistance support to the ISF while continuing to prepare options would have Iraqis for eventual control of the counter–Islamic State fight. Periodic assessment of conditions might allow for a potentially catastrophic gradual, conditions-driven transition away from combat assistance missions toward greater focus on training and consequences for the educating the ISF. However, risks in maintaining pres- ent force levels remain. At some point, conditions might ongoing counter–Islamic require a limited, and perhaps temporary, increase in troop levels. A constant forward presence would reduce the likeli- State campaign. hood of setbacks and also mitigate their impact. The lim- ited withdrawal option would provide continuing capacity Even if great care were to be taken on the ground, the full to support operations in Syria and to assist Iraqi forces, withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq or the disengagement though some degradation in Iraqi forces would be inevita- scenario would probably remove the legal justification for ble. The full withdrawal and disengagement options would the U.S. intervention against the Islamic State in Syria. have potentially catastrophic consequences for the ongoing Justifications for the use of force in Syria are complex, but counter–Islamic State campaign in both Iraq and Syria. they generally center on the need to protect Iraq.23 Full To avoid a near-term collapse, full withdrawal of U.S. withdrawal and disengagement should be associated with military forces from Iraq would have to be conducted with the purposeful abandonment of the counter–Islamic State exceptional care over a long period of time to allow the ISF fight in Iraq and in Syria. Table 5 depicts the assessment for time to adjust and wean itself away from extensive logis- probable harm to the counter-Islamic State fight across the tics, intelligence, fires, medical, and other dependencies. four withdrawal options.

TABLE 5 Assessing Probable Harms: Countering the Islamic State

No Withdrawal Limited Withdrawal Full Withdrawal Disengagement (early 2020 force levels (combat assistance (combat assistance + (all military forces + Strategic Interest sustained) forces only) advisory teams) financing + materiel)

Countering the Islamic State Very Low High Very High Very High

10 Impact on the Efforts to Counter Iranian Malign Influence Iraq is a focal point for Iranian malign influence constitutes the second—though U.S.-Iranian adversarial perhaps not now the second-most important—U.S. national security interest in Iraq. Beginning with the competition. Iranian hostage crisis in the immediate aftermath of the Iranian Revolution in 1979, Iran and the United States have continually exchanged both overt and clandestine kinetic, a strategy of influence and dominance in Iraq. Although economic, and informational attacks. Iran used its proxies the true nature of Iranian strategy in Iraq is hidden from to attack the U.S. Embassy and the Marine Corps barracks the public domain, it is clear that Iranian leaders seek to in Beirut, Lebanon, in 1983, and killed and maimed at maximize their influence over Iraq’s parliament, prime least hundreds of U.S. military personnel in Iraq during minister, and cabinet; to reap economic benefits from Iraq’s the 2003–2011 counterinsurgency.24 Iranian leaders have oil revenue and domestic economy; to exercise influence repeatedly called for the destruction of the United States. over the Iraqi energy sector; and to dominate Iraq’s secu- As of early January 2020, Iran has an active nuclear rity sector through the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF, program that might lead to the development of a nuclear militias granted authorities or established in 2014 to com- weapon. Iran directly supports terrorist groups that are bat the Islamic State), thereby challenging the monopoly indisputably tied to attacks on Americans around the over the legitimate use of force that rightly belongs to the 27 Middle East. Iran is hostile to American allied states, sovereign nation of Iraq. Iran has continuously lever- including Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the aged this power and influence in Iraq to undermine U.S. United Arab Emirates.25 The United States labeled the interests there, and Iran frequently supports attacks on U.S. Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, Iran’s premier mil- military and civilian personnel. itary intervention force, a terrorist organization in 2019.26 Gaining predominant influence in Iraq would greatly The most recent tensions between Iran and the United enhance Iran’s ability to project power in the region, con- States are emblematic of long-standing, low-level hostilities solidating its position in Syria and Lebanon and increasing that periodically bring the two countries to the brink of the threat to Iraq’s other neighbors and Israel. It could also war. potentially reverse the current (albeit tenuous and uneven) Iraq is a focal point for U.S.-Iranian adversarial com- trend toward Iraqi national unity, as the Sunni and Kurdish petition. After the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, Iranian minority areas rejected the rule of an Iranian-dominated proxy group leaders, Iranian-influenced politicians, and Shi’a Arab regime in Baghdad. Other regional states might Iranian leaders such as the late Qassim Suleimani pursued

11 pile on to a fragmented Iraq, resulting in a multisided con- flict on the Syrian model. Even a partial withdrawal Since 2003, the United States has sought to minimize or at least counterbalance Iranian influence in Iraq. U.S. of U.S. military forces from military presence in Iraq enables the United States to do so, mainly by providing an alternative source of security Iraq conveys some benefit assistance, providing economic support and policy advice, and mobilizing other sources of support from the region to Iran. and beyond. combat forces leaves a gap that can be filled by the Islamic Conclusion: All Levels of Withdrawal Harm Revolutionary Guard or by PMF proxies, strengthening Efforts to Counter Iran in Iraq and Beyond the hand of Iran in Iraq’s security sector and undermin- ing Iraqi sovereignty. Full withdrawal would further open Given overt Iranian malign intentions and continuing opportunities for Iranian advisors and agents to insinuate anti-American actions, even a partial withdrawal of U.S. themselves into ISF training bases and recruiting com- military forces from Iraq conveys some benefit to Iran. mands. Disengagement by the United States would leave No withdrawal would signal to Iran that the United States Iraq to pursue more robust financial and material support and its coalition allies would be consistent and reli- arrangements; these would inevitably include Iran. Table 6 able partners to the Iraqi government, and that Iranian depicts the assessment for probable harm to countering pressure would not achieve the desired result of a U.S. Iran across the four withdrawal options. drawdown. Removing direct combat assistance to ISF

TABLE 6 Assessing Probable Harms: Countering Iran

No Withdrawal Limited Withdrawal Full Withdrawal Disengagement (early 2020 force levels (combat assistance (combat assistance + (all military forces + Strategic Interest sustained) forces only) advisory teams) financing + materiel)

Countering Iran Very Low Moderate High Very High

12 Impacts on Competition with Russia and China The Middle East is a focal The 2018 NDS prioritizes great-power competition over point for great-power counterterrorism activities. One of the arguments for with- drawal from Iraq is the need to realign U.S. military forces competition. toward adversarial competition with China and Russia. This argument incorrectly suggests that competition with 32 both of these great powers occurs only in Asia and Europe. in Iraq. Russia and Iraq have a long-standing diplomatic Both states compete actively in Africa and the Middle East. relationship, going back to Iraq’s relationship with the 33 Increasingly, China views the Middle East as an Soviet Union. Currently, Russia seeks to strengthen its essential part of its One Belt One Road economic expan- relations with Iraq to support its broader regional objec- sion program. One Belt One Road is China’s bid for tives: to be recognized as a major power in the Middle East, global advantage, both for its own economic interests and to strengthen its own economy, and to maintain regional in competition with other great powers. Russia is also stability in order to prevent a further rise in Islamic 34 expanding its interests across the Middle East and compet- extremism. Russia has enacted a transactional strategy ing directly with the United States for political influence, across the region to achieve these objectives. This strategy access to markets, and control of the open battlefield in is resource- and-opportunity-dependent. It seeks to max- Syria. Increasingly, the Middle East is a focal point for imize short-term economic, political, and security gains great-power competition between the United States, Russia, while reducing the advantages of strategic competitors 35 and China across diplomatic, informational, military, and for influence, such as the United States. For Russia, Iraq economic fields of interest. Iraq is one of several important represents an opportunity to erode U.S. influence and to 36 nodes in this competition. complicate U.S. policy in the Middle East. China has signed on to help rebuild some of Iraq’s Russia specifically seeks to strengthen its influence war-damaged infrastructure.28 As of 2018, China was Iraq’s over the Iraqi military through arms sales and bolster second-largest trading partner, and China’s trade volume Russia’s economy through energy deals. Arms sales and with Iraq significantly exceeded that of the United States.29 trade have been linchpins in Russia’s Iraq strategy. Between Iraq exported 22.4 billion U.S. dollars of crude oil to China 2015 and 2019, Iraq ordered 48 Pantsyr-S1 mobile air in 2018.30 According to the Chinese Ambassador to Iraq, defense systems, 19 Mi-28N combat helicopters, 24 Mi-35 China-Iraq trade across all sectors exceeded 30 billion U.S. combat helicopters, 10 TOS-1 multiple rocket launchers, dollars in 2018.31 four Su-25 ground attack aircraft, 300 BMP-3 armored Russia is competing with both the United States and personnel carriers, and 73 T-90S main battle tanks from 37 China for the finite economic and military sales markets Russia. Trade between Iraq and Russia may exceed 1.5 bil- lion U.S. dollars per year.38 Russia’s energy diplomacy in

13 Iraq has given it presence, as Russian companies such as in the region or to take sides in its many disputes. However, Gazprom Neft and Lukoil operate in Iraq and, within Iraq, economic benefit that China accrues in Iraq will help to with the Kurdistan Regional Government.39 bolster its pursuit of advantage against the United States Russia will undoubtedly seek to take advantage of a elsewhere around the world. potential U.S. withdrawal. Whenever possible, Russian Russia, in contrast, might seek to fill at least part of leaders offer Russian military and economic power as an the security void left by an American departure. Russian alternative to American military and economic power. In leaders would certainly offer increased arms sales and the case of a U.S. military withdrawal, Russia is likely to perhaps military advisors to the ISF. They might increase amplify its diplomatic and economic engagement with both their direct combat assistance to the counter–Islamic State Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government leaders fight. Arguably, this might be better than leaving the field in Erbil. entirely to Iran, but it would also consolidate and expand Russia’s influence throughout the region. If used in Iraq, Russian tactics on display previously Conclusion: Harm from Withdrawal Can Be in Chechnya and today in Syria would almost certainly Moderated, But China and Russia Will Gain exacerbate minority disenfranchisement. This would per- Of the four options, no withdrawal would provide the petuate the likelihood of extremist resurgence and further United States with the most physical presence and influ- destabilize Iraq and the Middle East. Given its transac- ence in Iraq. Both physical presence and influence with tional approach to its international relationships, Russia senior Iraqi military and political leaders are essential to might then depart, leaving behind the fruits of its routinely gaining advantage in adversarial competition.40 Increments poorly managed and ill-intended labors. Handing Iraq’s of withdrawal across the other three options will necessar- security and development needs off to Russia is not a real- ily reduce both presence and influence, thereby reducing istic policy option for the United States, and it would not be prospective advantage against China and Russia in Iraq. palatable for most Iraqis. Table 7 depicts the assessment of Chinese interests in Iraq are essentially commercial the harm to U.S. competition with China and Iraq across and not otherwise greatly incompatible with those of the the four withdrawal options. United States, as China does not seek to play a security role

TABLE 7 Assessing Probable Harms: Competition with China and Russia

No Withdrawal Limited Withdrawal Full Withdrawal Disengagement (early 2020 force levels (combat assistance (combat assistance + (all military forces + Strategic Interest sustained) forces only) advisory teams) financing + materiel)

Competing with China and Russia Very Low Low Moderate Moderate

14 Impacts on U.S. Economic Interests and Iraqi Economic Stability Economic decline would The United States has several overlapping economic-related diminish the capacity of national security interests in Iraq. First, because it seeks to help Iraq develop into a stable and effective partner, the Iraqi state to suppress the United States benefits from a strong and stable Iraqi economy. Second, U.S. interest in global economic growth terrorist movements and benefits from stable global oil production. Iraq is the fourth-largest oil producer in the world, and stable Iraqi oil limit radicalization. production benefits American economic interests. Third, the United States benefits from weapon sales to, and trade Withdrawal of military financial and material assis- with, Iraq. Assuming a close relationship between the two tance would place the Iraqi government in crisis. Iraqi states, the more Iraq can afford to spend, and the more leaders would have to choose to either continue to fund the robust its trade, the more the United States stands to gain. nation’s armed forces at the current level of performance, Fourth, the United States benefits from the absence of which would mean going immediately deeper into debt, or the political instability that would almost certainly ensue considerably reduce military capabilities.45 If a cut in U.S. from a collapsing Iraqi economy. If the Iraqi economy and other international funding accompanied a military collapses, the millions of Iraqi youth who already have withdrawal, as seems likely, a security crisis would almost few reliable job prospects will face an even bleaker future. certainly ensue. Economic drivers do not dictate participation in terrorism, A U.S. troop withdrawal could have a different, more but the lack of economic opportunity is one important fac- devastating sanctions-related effect on Iraq: the prospective tor in the decision to participate in terrorism.41 Conversely, end of Iran-related sanctions waivers. Iraq has received economic decline would diminish the capacity of the Iraqi waivers five times to allow it to continue purchasing elec- state to suppress terrorist movements and limit radicaliza- tricity and natural gas from Iran, despite the maximum tion of disaffected populations. pressure campaign of the United States against Iran. These Presently, the Iraqi economy is in trouble. Oil makes purchases supply about one-third of Iraq’s electricity. The up approximately 90 percent of Iraq’s overall revenue, so current waiver was to expire February 13, 2020.46 budgets can and do rise and crash with the fluctuating Electricity shortages have sparked widespread, violent world market.42 Iraq continues to struggle with corruption, protests in Iraq.47 Without a troop presence, the United both as a legacy from the Saddam Hussein period and from States may feel little incentive to allow Iraq to continue new systems of corruption established since 2003.43 It is buying energy from Iran. Iraq would then have a dilemma: exceptionally difficult for private entities to do business in It could continue such purchases and avoid electricity Iraq, undercutting investment and, therefore, growth.44

15 shortages—but risk getting sanctioned by the United States already adversely affected program planning, management, and potentially suffering severe economic harm—or it and oversight.53 To the extent that U.S. aid programs rely could end electricity purchases, suffering economic harm on a U.S. military presence, either indirectly for stability and perhaps exacerbating unrest. or directly for protection and movement, and to the extent If the waiver were to be lifted, one of the most import- that global efforts rely on the U.S. troop presence, a with- ant institutions that could be affected is the Trade Bank drawal would put these programs at risk. of Iraq, were it to conduct transactions with sanctioned Iranian entities.48 This could cause great difficulties for Conclusion: Little Economic Harm in Iraq. Not only does the Trade Bank account for 30 per- cent of Iraq’s banking assets, but it is “Iraq’s primary bank Limited Troop Withdrawal, Considerable for financing imports and its transactions are largely Economic Harm from Disengagement government-related.”49 There should be little to no economic harm to U.S. stra- There are other ways the United States could exercise tegic interests from the no withdrawal and limited with- its sanctions powers or regulatory oversight if it were no drawal options. A full withdrawal would be accompanied longer interested in a stable environment for its troops. by decreases in external aid and vulnerability to U.S.-Iran The United States could increase its compliance enforce- related sanctions at a time when Iraqi security forces ment regarding the distribution of dollars by the Central would be saddled with greater challenges and related Bank of Iraq to make sure that dollars were blocked from costs. Disengagement would directly undermine the Iraqi sanctioned entities. Stepped-up enforcement could lead government and force it to choose between maintaining a to dollar shortages in Iraq, which has a highly dollar- robust security force or damaging its own economy, while ized economy.50 Such shortages would also make it more simultaneously increasing Iraq’s dependence on China, difficult for Iraq to purchase imports. Even worse for Iraq, Russia, and Iran. Disengagement would provide tangible Iraq’s oil revenues go into an account at the Federal Reserve economic benefit and opportunity to U.S. adversaries, and Bank of New York. These amount to billions of dollars at it would cause serious harm to Iraq’s economy and stabil- any one time. Were Iraq to lose the sanctions waiver, the ity. However, while the impact to Iraq’s stability is high— United States could freeze these accounts, although doing therefore, presenting a serious threat to the U.S. strategic so would involve a multistep process.51 interest in maintaining a stable and productive Iraqi A U.S. troop withdrawal would likely affect levels of state—the overall economic impacts on the U.S. economy both U.S. aid and global aid to Iraq. Iraq’s reconstruction could be moderated by increased oil production from other needs are immense, and foreign aid is seen as an important states and from the limited trade relationship the United input into helping it recover from the war with the Islamic States has with Iraq. Table 8 depicts the assessment of prob- State.52 An 80 percent reduction in the staff of the U.S. able economic harm across the four withdrawal options. Agency for International Development mission in Iraq has

16 TABLE 8 Assessment Probable Harms: Economic Impact

No Withdrawal Limited Withdrawal Full Withdrawal Disengagement (early 2020 force levels (combat assistance (combat assistance + (all military forces + Strategic Interest sustained) forces only) advisory teams) financing + materiel)

Economic prosperity and stability Very Low Very Low Moderate High

Impacts on U.S. Regional Force A withdrawal of all U.S. ground forces would also make Posture and Access defending and reinforcing the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad more difficult. A concerted attack by Iranian-backed mili- Finally, the United States has a stated interest in maintain- tias against the embassy would be particularly difficult to ing a capable military posture in the Middle East to deter repel, should regular Iraqi forces choose not to intervene. adversaries, support allies, sustain freedom of movement On the benefit side of the ledger, the limited with- for both military and economic purposes, counter terror- drawal, full withdrawal, and disengagement scenarios ism, and, if necessary, fight wars. The security ramifica- would free up some resources that could be dedicated tions of an Iraq withdrawal, therefore, may not be felt only elsewhere. The approximately 5,000 to 6,000 troops in inside Iraq proper. Iraq include some low-density, high-demand units (e.g., A second U.S. military withdrawal from Iraq in less special operations forces) that could be quickly redeployed than a decade could have rippling effects for American or returned to permanent bases to reduce stress on the power projection across the region if that withdrawal pre- broader force.54 vented the United States from supplying its other bases and Presumably, the funding previously dedicated to Iraq assisting other forces in the region. Moreover, depending could in the disengagement strategy be repurposed to other on what lessons both American allies and the American allies and partners in other parts of the world. The rela- public took away from the Iraq withdrawal, it might shape tive size of this benefit depends on how many forces were both allies’ willingness to host American bases on their withdrawn and the resources to be redirected. Therefore, territory and the American public support for forward disengagement provides more benefit than limited with- posture more broadly. drawal, mostly because of the security force assistance As we alluded to in the section on countering the funding the United States gives Iraq. Even on the high end, Islamic State, the primary impact of U.S. withdrawal from however, the total resources repurposed are still relatively Iraq on regional posture would be in Syria. Given Turkey’s modest compared with the overall size of the U.S. military. opposition to American support to its Kurdish partners The benefits accrued would likewise be relatively modest. in Syria, access to bases in Iraq are essential to support any substantial American ground operations in Syria.

17 Perceptions of a U.S. withdrawal from Iraq, whether fair or unfair, would likely contribute to the growing impression that the United States does not stand by its allies.

Other than in Syria, a U.S. military withdrawal from allies. This might affect the crucial network of allegiances Iraq would probably not have much impact on American and bases that the United States depends upon around the military presence in the broader Middle East. Even if Iraq world.55 denied the United States military overflight of its territory, the United States could still maintain unimpeded access to Conclusion: Withdrawal Would Severely its other allies and partners in the region, including Israel, Egypt, and Jordan. And presuming that the United States Harm U.S. Posture in Syria and Would could maintain overflight of Saudi Arabia, the United Undermine U.S. Regional and Global States could still resupply American bases in the Persian Credibility Gulf. Sea lanes of communication probably would be Ultimately, the impact of a limited or full withdrawal of unaffected. American forces on regional force posture is limited given The larger, more negative impacts of a full with- the small size of the American presence in Iraq currently. drawal would be felt only in the longer term. A full with- Disengagement would not significantly add to the mod- drawal from Iraq would contribute to the already tenuous erate harm caused by full withdrawal. Table 9 depicts the assumptions about the value of American partnership and assessment of probable harms to U.S. regional force posture allegiance. Perceptions of a U.S. withdrawal from Iraq, and access across the four withdrawal options. whether fair or unfair, would likely contribute to the grow- ing impression that the United States does not stand by its

TABLE.9 Assessing Probable Harms: Regional Force Posture

No Withdrawal Limited Withdrawal Full Withdrawal Disengagement (early 2020 force levels (combat assistance (combat assistance + (all military forces + Strategic Interest sustained) forces only) advisory teams) financing + materiel)

Regional military force posture Very Low Very Low Moderate Moderate

18 Comparative Analysis: Impacts A full withdrawal of U.S. combat assistance forces and Across the Four Withdrawal training advisors would place both the counter–Islamic Options State fight and the efforts to counter Iran at serious risk. Counter–Islamic State operations would be placed at some Viewed together, these five assessments of potential risk of full failure unless the withdrawal were conducted impacts of withdrawal on U.S. strategic interests are with exceptional care, allowing Iraqi forces ample time and revealing. They show that sustaining current force levels space to adjust. Threats to American global influence and or conducting a thoughtful and gradual withdrawal or economic interests would rise. Full disengagement from internal repurposing of combat assistance forces—those support to the ISF would have a high likelihood of crip- U.S. military forces directly engaged in assisting the ISF pling the counter–Islamic State fight and severely under- and the Kurdish-led forces in Syria in the counter–Islamic cutting efforts to counter Iranian malign influence in Iraq State fight—would have relatively limited impact on U.S. and the broader Middle East. It would open doors for both strategic objectives. The greatest risks in limited with- Russia and China and create rippling economic disruption. drawal would be to the counter–Islamic State fight and to Disengagement would bring the U.S.-led counter– the effort to counter Iran. Islamic State fight across the Syria-Iraq arc to a halt. Iran Even a minor drawdown of forces while the Islamic would have a free hand in Iraq, assuming that the Iraqi State was active, and while Iran was pressing its advan- people did not turn against Iranian influence. If the United tage, would signal to Iraq, Iran, the Islamic State, China, States ended Iraq’s sanctions waivers, it would seriously Russia, and other states and nonstate actors that the United harm Iraq’s economy and force it into the hands of Iran. States was retracting from its oft-repeated commitments. It If the United States did not end Iraq’s sanctions waivers in would reduce the effectiveness of Iraqi forces still strug- this scenario, it would be tacitly endorsing Iranian malign gling to suppress the Islamic State. On the other hand, a influence in Iraq. All of these prospective harms are listed minor drawdown might also signal a deference to Iraqi in Table 10. sovereignty, thereby reducing current tensions between Comparatively, the no withdrawal and limited with- the United States and Iraq that have resulted from alleged drawal options pose far less risk to U.S. strategic interests Israeli strikes in Iraq against Kata’ib al-Hezbollah forces, than full withdrawal or disengagement. Disengagement U.S. strikes against Kata’ib al-Hezbollah, and the U.S. would be immediately counterproductive to U.S. strategic strike that killed Qassim Suleimani and others in January interests in Iraq, the Middle East, and, according to the 2020. NSS and NDS, the world.

19 TABLE 10 Assessing Probable Harms to U.S. Interests Associated with Military Withdrawal from Iraq

No Withdrawal Limited Withdrawal Full Withdrawal Disengagement (early 2020 force levels (combat assistance (combat assistance + (all military forces + Strategic Interest sustained) forces only) advisory teams) financing + materiel)

Countering the Islamic State Very Low High Very High Very High

Countering Iran Very Low Moderate High Very High

Competing with China and Russia Very Low Low Moderate Moderate

Economic prosperity and stability Very Low Very Low Moderate High

Regional military force posture Very Low Very Low Moderate Moderate

Overall Recommendation: Commit stabilize and strengthen Iraq. The nature of the advisory to a Small Enduring Advisory mission should shift over time—see below—but it should Presence not be terminated. Justification for this overall recommendation (to set Published strategic objectives on Iraq from 2005 through a modest but enduring military commitment in Iraq) 2020 are consistent with one another and also with the is explained in greater detail in An Enduring American broader U.S. strategic interests in the Middle East and Commitment in Iraq (Connable, 2020; www.rand.org/t/ around the world. Supporting a stable and friendly Iraq is PE353). In that report, and above, we cite some arguments in the continuing long-term interest of the United States. for what would amount to a full withdrawal or disengage- This does not require continuing the combat assistance ment from Iraq. Although some of these arguments are mission in Iraq over the long run, but it does require main- well articulated, none provide a thorough explanation of taining a small force of military advisors to help train and what would be withdrawn, and how withdrawal would be develop Iraqi military capabilities so that Iraq can defend safely implemented, and how withdrawal would explic- itself. Long-term presence also sustains U.S. influence in itly affect other U.S. interests in the near term and over Iraq, which, in turn, can help to blunt Iranian, Russian, time. In our reading, none of these arguments successfully and other malign influence. Synergistic impact can be address the concern that another withdrawal from Iraq achieved by sustaining a modest but consistent military might precede another collapse, followed by yet another advisory presence and continuing to provide some form hasty and costly intervention. of military financial and material aid to the ISF. Coalition Committing to an enduring low-cost, low-risk military advisors will continue to play a critical role in helping to investment is wiser than betting on an approach that has

20 already failed once. It is also wiser than investing in the presence. But it begins with a near-term and visible reduc- faint hope that every American president in the future will tion in current troop levels. If this withdrawal is carefully remain committed to disengagement from the Middle East, packaged with appropriate messaging and diplomatic and that current and future U.S. leaders will not come to engagement, it might reduce current tensions with the Iraqi regret yet another vaguely articulated strategic mistake in government and deflate Iranian efforts to shift the focus of Iraq. protesters toward the United States. If reductions were lim- ited to a few hundred troops, the prospective impact on ISF combat capabilities against the Islamic State could be mit- Choose Carefully Between No Withdrawal igated. Coalition partner forces might help to fill some of and Limited Withdrawal the gaps left by departing U.S. military forces. However, the We recommend a careful selection between no with- intended message of limited withdrawal would also signal drawal and limited withdrawal. Either approach would some amount of weakness to Iran and other adversaries. help achieve the recommended policy of enduring, Even a modest near-term withdrawal conducted solely for small-footprint advisory commitment. The choice between the purposes of messaging would inevitably undercut the these two options boils down to a simple risk and benefit ongoing counter–Islamic State campaign to some extent. calculation. No withdrawal sends a strong signal to Iran, In either scenario, committing to enduring investment to Iranian-backed militia leaders, to all Iraqis, and to will also require continued strong diplomatic engagement the world that the United States will not be intimidated with the government of Iraq with the goal of reaching a into retracting from a clearly and oft-articulated military mutually acceptable and beneficial accommodation that commitment to an allied state. Maintaining current force will serve both nations’ interests. Ideally, the United States levels in the near term will also prevent a reduction in and its allies would pay greater heed to Iraqi sovereignty combat capability against the Islamic State and maximize and end unilateral military actions that might unravel an U.S. influence with the ISF. However, this approach also agreement for enduring military presence. The need for risks reinforcing arguments made by Iranian leaders and enhanced diplomatic action is emphasized in An Enduring some Iraqis that U.S. military presence is an affront to Iraqi American Commitment in Iraq.56 sovereignty. Arguably, it risks shifting some of the focus of The following recommendations are derived from the ongoing antigovernment, anti-Iran protests toward the U.S. present analysis, as well as from the subject-matter exper- military. tise of the authors and from the authors’ existing, pub- Limited withdrawal represents an inverse approach lished, cited analyses on this subject. within the overall policy of enduring, small-footprint commitment. Ultimately it still retains a small advisory

21 Specific Recommendations Iraq’s socioeconomic crisis. In turn, Iran would gain much greater influence and Iraq would be further destabilized, The following specific recommendations support either with potential negative consequences for U.S. partners in a no withdrawal or limited withdrawal approach to U.S. the region. Neither outcome meets stated U.S. strategic military presence in Iraq. objectives as outlined in Table 1.

Maintain Consistent Strategic Objectives Negotiate an Enduring Agreement to and Continue to Support Iraq’s Democracy Sustain Security Forces Assistance President Trump’s stated strategic objectives for Iraq in Missions both the 2017 NSS and the 2018 NDS are clear and con- The quickly evolving crisis in early 2020 centering on sistent. The United States should continue to pursue a strat- Iranian proxy force attacks and the killing of Qassim egy focused on helping Iraq to become a stable and friendly Suleimani revealed the weaknesses in current agreements. nation. The 2019 DoS bilateral relations fact sheet empha- As negotiated in 2008 by the Bush administration, the sizes efforts to “bolster Iraq’s democratic institutions” as Strategic Framework Agreement, relating to a wide variety central to the U.S. assistance mission to Iraq.57 Clearly, of policy spheres, from security to culture and the environ- Iraqi democracy will be challenged by internal division, ment, and the Security Agreement, relating to the status corruption, and Iranian meddling for many years, and of U.S. military forces and now expired, were compromise probably for decades. However, Iraq does have a basically documents intended to help transition U.S.-Iraq relations functioning democratic government with long-term poten- toward something more enduring and stable. These now tial. Maintaining a U.S. military presence in Iraq will not 12-year-old documents served and have now outlived their solve Iraq’s problems, but it can help reduce the likelihood purposes. The 2014 counter–Islamic State forces agreement of state collapse and provide some stability to help encour- is insufficient to support a long-term military advisory age growth over time. Such growth would benefit the mission. A formal status of forces agreement might not be United States if the United States government assumes and in the offing, and it might or might not be desirable. But if maintains the role of a steady and reliable partner to Iraq. the U.S. and Iraqi governments wish to build and sustain an enduring partnered relationship, a new, more stable, and Maintain Iran Sanctions Waivers for Iraq more formal agreement must be negotiated. Whichever approach is taken toward U.S. military pres- There is no need for the United States to build or ence in Iraq, the United States should not end sanctions maintain U.S.-leased or -owned bases in Iraq. Advising waivers. Forcing Iraq to choose between Iran and partial can continue on Iraqi bases, as long as the ISF are capa- economic ruin, on the one hand, and the inability to pro- ble of helping to protect small U.S. advisory teams from vide services to its population, on the other, would deepen harm; some capacity for immediate self-protection must

22 There is no need for the United States to build or maintain U.S.-leased or -owned bases in Iraq. be maintained. Formal accommodations and access for Iraqi Army and Federal Police service of over 200,000 some form of U.S. logistics and quick reaction capability— soldiers and police would be far more capable of defending perhaps based at existing facilities in Kuwait—to support Iraq against a resurgence of the Islamic State, and against both advisors and diplomatic facilities should be made. an unwanted military intervention, than the comparatively tiny 10,000-man CTS alone. Both forces are needed to work together to ensure the future stability of Iraq. Gradually Move to a Noncombat Recommendations for this approach, and for the focus Assistance, Partner-Focused Mission in on the Iraqi Army—while retaining support to CTS—are Iraq described in An Enduring American Commitment in Iraq.58 Rapid change to the current mission or any kind of rapid military withdrawal from Iraq would be dangerous for Final Disposition: Routine Military Advisory both the United States and Iraq. The current force of sev- Activities as Part of Routine Country Operations eral thousand advisors should be sustained, with combat What would this enduring, small-footprint advisory force assistance advisors gradually shifting to a safer and more look like? A team of U.S. advisors working with coalition sustainable training support role. If a modest reduction in allies from Iraqi-owned bases, supported by quick-reaction forces is needed to achieve an optimally sized security force and logistics forces in a neighboring state, could effec- assistance mission, we also recommend a carefully consid- tively continue to advise the ISF, help professionalize the ered and gradual transition and withdrawal of those forces. Iraqi officer and noncommissioned officer corps, deliver Drawdown should be strictly conditions-driven: Exposing military material support, ensure freedom of movement for the ISF to unnecessary risk in the near term in turn risks U.S. diplomats, counterbalance Iranian influence, support having to redeploy U.S. forces to Iraq, or perhaps ceding limited operations in eastern Syria, and avoid the kind of influence to Iran. economic destabilization or loss of access associated with Over the long run, advisors should continue to more-drastic options. advise and assist Iraq’s Counter-Terrorism Service (CTS) but should shift focus of effort to building a moderately effective Iraqi Army that would be less prone to the kind of collapse that occurred in 2014. A moderately competent

23 operations, counterterrorism operations, and (what should Security force assistance be) gradually improving Iraqi government service delivery capabilities. does not progress on a neat and linear upward Increase Collaboration with Coalition Allies in Iraq trend line. As of early 2020, there are indications that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) will assume a greater 61 Gradually Adjust Military Advice and role for security assistance activities in Iraq. This pres- Training to Help Iraq Focus on Enduring ents an opportunity to either reinforce success with a no withdrawal policy or mitigate consequences with a limited Stability withdrawal policy. No matter which of the four options With coalition support, Iraq’s security services executed are selected, the United States should seek to accelerate its a highly successful campaign against the Islamic State. collaboration with NATO and non-NATO coalition allies Their tactical acumen has improved over time. However, in Iraq and sustain (and perhaps increase) funding to coali- this campaign has done little to convince many Iraqis that tion advisory activities. they are safe from their own government.59 The Iraqi Army remains popular with Iraqis across the ethnosectarian spectrum, but neither the Army nor the other security Expect Some Modest, Temporary services have dedicated much effort to civil-military activ- Reversals ities.60 Tactical success against the Islamic State should not Policymakers and the American public should expect some be equated with stabilization, or with long-term stability. security setbacks in the future. Security force assistance Formalization of the Shi’a Arab–dominated, does not progress on a neat and linear upward trend line. Iranian-backed PMF and its enduring presence in areas Additional troops might have to be temporarily added to where it is not welcomed—such as the 99 percent Sunni the advisory mission from time to time. However, a consis- Arab Anbar Province—undermine the government’s tent military presence in Iraq will significantly mitigate the image and its perceived monopoly on the use of force. In impact of any setbacks and significantly reduce the like- addition to helping to build up the capabilities of the Iraqi lihood that an emerging crisis like the one in 2014 might Army to help secure Iraq and offset the unhelpful role of generate another regional and worldwide crisis. the PMF, U.S. military advisors should, over time, assist the Army and other security forces in developing better civil-military capabilities in support of counterinsurgency

24 Notes September 2007; Hal Brands, “Why America Can’t Quit the Middle East,” Hoover Institution, March 21, 2019; David Pollock, “Eight Rea- 1 Andrew J. Bacevich, America’s War for the Greater Middle East: A sons Why the United States and Iraq Still Need Each Other,” Washing- Military History, New York: Penguin Random House, 2016; Mohammed ton Institute for Near East Policy, January 9, 2020. Ayoob, “It’s Time for America to Disengage from the Middle East,” The 2 National Interest, June 30, 2016; Jeffrey D. Sachs, “US Military Should Nir Rosen, “If America Left Iraq,” The Atlantic, December 2005; Ted Get Out of the Middle East,” Boston Globe, April 3, 2017; Toby C. Jones, Galen Carpenter, “Withdrawal from Iraq Now Will Be Less Painful “Don’t Stop at Iraq: Why the U.S. Should Withdraw from the Entire Than Years from Now,” CATO Institute, November 26, 2006; Joel Ray- Persian Gulf,” The Atlantic, December 22, 2011; Emma Ashford, “Unbal- burn, “The Last Exit from Iraq,” Foreign Affairs, March/April 2006; Bill anced: Rethinking America’s Commitment to the Middle East,” Stra- Danvers and Michael E. O’Hanlon, “Plan a Moderate Iraq Exit Strategy,” tegic Studies Quarterly, Spring 2018; John Dale Glover, “Trump Brookings Institution, November 22, 2005; Christopher Hitchens, “The Should Consider Withdrawing from Iraq as Well as Syria,” Fox News, Perils of Withdrawal: We’re Sticking with Afghanistan. Why Would We December 26, 2018; Stephen Farrell, “Should U.S. Forces Withdraw Ditch Iraq?” Slate, November 29, 2005; James Dobbins, “Iraq: Winning From Iraq?” New York Times, September 8, 2008; Andrew Tilghman, the Unwinnable War,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 1, January–Feb- “Poll: 70% of Troops Say No to Boots on the Ground in Iraq,” USA ruary 2005, pp. 16–25; Lawrence J. Korb and Brian Katulis, Strategic Today, September 28, 2014; John Glaser, Withdrawing from Military Redeployment, Washington, D.C.: Center for American Progress, Bases: Why a Forward-Deployed Military Posture Is Unnecessary, September 29, 2005; Ben Connable, “A War That Abhors a Vacuum,” Outdated, and Dangerous, Washington, D.C.: CATO Institute, July 18, New York Times, December 18, 2006; Kenneth M. Pollack, “Five Myths 2017; Bruce Riedel and Samuel Berger, “America Must Pull Out of Iraq About the Iraq Troop Withdrawal,” Brookings Institution, August 22, to Contain Civil War,” Brookings Institution, July 23, 2007; Brendan 2010; Thomas Bowditch, Policy Options and the U.S. Withdrawal from O’Leary, How to Get Out of Iraq with Integrity, Philadelphia, Pa.: Univer- Iraq, Arlington, Va.: Center for Naval Analyses, August 2009; Fred sity of Pennsylvania Press, 2009; Ruy Teixeira, “Cure the Economy? Pull Kaplan, “Leaving Iraq: What Will Happen When U.S. Combat Troops Out of Iraq,” Center for American Progress, February 15, 2008; Mara Withdraw?” Slate, June 26, 2009; Max Boot, “Obama’s Tragic Iraq Karlin and Tamara Cofman Wittes, “America’s Middle East Purgatory: Withdrawal,” Wall Street Journal, October 31, 2011; U.S. Withdrawal The Case for Doing Less,” Foreign Affairs, January/February 2019; Raises Questions of a Vacuum in Iraq,” Voice of America, October Jeffrey D. Sachs, “US Military Should Get Out of the Middle East,” Bos- 20, 2011; Richard R. Brennan, Jr., Charles P. Ries, Larry Hanauer, Ben ton Globe, April 2, 2017; Doug Bandow, “It’s Time for American Troops Connable, Terrence K. Kelly, Michael J. McNerney, Stephanie Young, to Leave Iraq,” Forbes, May 16, 2011; Loren Thompson, “War Without Jason Campbell, and K. Scott McMahon, Ending the War in Iraq and End: Why Iraq Can Never Be a Stable Democracy,” Forbes, June 20, Disestablishment of United States Forces—Iraq, Santa Monica, Calif.: 2014; Micah Zenko, US Military Policy in the Middle East: An Appraisal, RAND Corporation, RR-232-USFI, 2013; and others. London: Chatham House, October 2018; Linda Robinson, “Winning the 3 James N. Mattis, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy Peace in Iraq: Don’t Give Up on Baghdad’s Fragile Democracy,” Foreign of the United States of America: Sharpening the American Military’s Affairs, September/October 2019; Ben Connable, Natasha Lander, and Competitive Edge, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 2018. Kimberly Jackson, Beating the Islamic State: Selecting a New Strategy for Iraq and Syria, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-1562- 4 U.S. National Security Council, National Strategy for Victory in OSD, 2017; Alexandra Stark, “Don’t Abandon Iraq (Again),” The Iraq, Washington, D.C.: The White House, 2005; Ashton B. Carter and National Interest, August 2, 2018; Michael E. O’Hanlon, “The Case John F. Kerry, “Section 1222 Report: Strategy for the Middle East and for Staying in Iraq,” Brookings Institution, September 13, 2011; “Why to Counter Violent Extremism,” undated but written and posted in May U.S. Troops Should Stay Even Though Iraq’s Parliament Voted Them 2016; George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United Out,” National Public Radio, January 7, 2020; “US Defense Secretary States of America, Washington, D.C.: The White House, March 2006; Mattis: US Will Stay in Iraq a While,” Fox6, February 20, 2017; Meghan Barack Obama, National Security Strategy, Washington, D.C.: The O’Sullivan, “Why U.S. Troops Should Stay in Iraq,” Washington Post, White House, May 27, 2010; Barack Obama, National Security Strategy, September 9, 2011; Carlos Pascual and Ken Pollack, Salvaging the Pos- Washington, D.C.: The White House, February 2015; Donald Trump, sible: Policy Options in Iraq, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution,

25 National Security Strategy of the United States of America, Washing- Calif.: RAND Corporation, R-3045-ORNL, September 1983; Ben Con- ton, D.C.: The White House, December 2017; and others. nable, Embracing the Fog of War: Assessment and Metrics in Coun- terinsurgency, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, MG-1086, 5 Strategic Framework Agreement for a Relationship of Friendship and 2012; David C. Gompert, Terrence Kelly, and Jessica Watkins, Security Cooperation Between the United States of America and the Republic of in Iraq: A Framework for Analyzing Emerging Threats as U.S. Forces Iraq, November 17, 2008. Leave, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, MG-911-OSD, 2010; 6 See the cited arguments for withdrawal from Iraq and the greater and others. Middle East, above. 11 An action that might cause considerable harm to U.S. interests in Iraq 7 For example: Peter Beinart, “Obama’s Disastrous Iraq Policy: An might have less, or negligible, harm to U.S. global interests. The inverse Autopsy,” The Atlantic, June 23, 2014; Reihan Salam, “We Never Should condition might also be true. Have Left Iraq,” Slate, June 12, 2014; Rick Brennan, “Withdrawal 12 The authors of this report and many other colleagues at RAND have Symptoms: The Bungling of the Iraq Exit,” Foreign Affairs, November/ written extensively about the prospective impacts of withdrawal from December 2014; Priyanka Boghani, “Jack Keane: Leaving Iraq Was an Iraq, as well as the actual impacts in the wake of the 2011 withdrawal. ‘Absolute Strategic Failure,’” Frontline, July 29, 2014; “McCain Clashes In 2009, RAND produced the congressionally mandated assessment of with Panetta Over U.S. Troop Withdrawal from Iraq,” CNN, Novem- Iraq withdrawal options and impacts, Withdrawing from Iraq: Alter- ber 15, 2011; Tim Arango, “U.S. Marks End to 9-Year War, Leaving an native Schedules, Associated Risks, and Mitigating Strategies (Perry Uncertain Iraq,” New York Times, December 15, 2011; Rebecca Kaplan, et al., 2009). In 2013, RAND published Ending the U.S. War in Iraq: CBS News “Leon Panetta Criticizes Obama for Iraq Withdrawal,” , Octo- The Final Transition, Operational Maneuver, and Disestablishment of ber 2, 2014. United States Forces—Iraq (Brennan et al., 2013). This report assessed 8 The White House, “Fact Sheet: The Strategic Framework Agreement the withdrawal that occurred in late 2011 and analyzed its near-term and the Security Agreement with Iraq,” December 4, 2008. impacts on U.S. strategic interests in Iraq and in the broader Middle East. See References for additional RAND reports on the issue of post- 9 Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Counter-Islamic State of Iraq and 2003 withdrawal from Iraq. Syria (ISIS) Train and Equip Fund (CTEF): Justification for FY 2020 Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO),” in Department of Defense 13 “Trump Hails Fall of Islamic State ‘Caliphate’ in Syria,” BBC, March Budget Fiscal Year (FY) 2020, Washington, D.C., March 2019. 23, 2019. 10 U.S. Director of National Intelligence, Analytic Standards, Intelli- 14 Carter Malkasian, The Islamic State and the Persistent Threat of gence Community Directive 203, McLean, Va.: Office of the Director Extremism in Iraq, Center for Strategic and International Studies, of National Intelligence, January 2, 2015; Henry H. Willis, Mary Tighe, November 30, 2018; Katherine Bauer, Matthew Levitt, and Aaron Y. Andrew Lauland, Liisa Ecola, Shoshana R. Shelton, Meagan L. Smith, Zelin, After Baghdadi: How the Islamic State Rebounds, Washington John G. Rivers, Kristin J. Leuschner, Terry Marsh, and Daniel M. Institute for Near East Policy, October 28, 2019; Raja Abdulrahim and Gerstein, Homeland Security National Risk Characterization, Santa Isabel Coles, “Islamic State Returns to Guerrilla Warfare in Iraq and Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-2140-DHS, 2018; Angela Syria,” Wall Street Journal, January 2, 2018; and others. O’Mahoney, Ilana Blum, Gabriela Armenta, Nicholas Burger, Joshua 15 For example, “IS ‘Caliphate’ Defeated but Jihadist Group Remains Mendelsohn, Michael J. McNerney, Steven W. Popper, Jefferson P. a Threat,” BBC, March 23, 2019; Michael Knights, “The Islamic State Marquis, and Thomas S. Szayna, Assessing, Monitoring, and Evalu- Inside Iraq: Losing Power or Preserving Strength?” CTC Sentinel, ating Army Security Cooperation: A Framework for Implementation, December 2018, pp. 1–10. Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-2165-A, 2018; Lauren A. Fleishman-Mayer, Mark V. Arena, and Michael E. McMahon, A Risk 16 For a detailed analysis of the Islamic State’s history, with additional Assessment Methodology and Excel Tool for Acquisition Programs, citation, see Connable et al., 2017. Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-262-OSD, 2013; Kenneth 17 Peter Baker, Eric Schmitt, and Helene Cooper, “ISIS Leader al-Bagh- A. Soloman, William E. Kastenberg, and Pamela F. Nelson, Dealing with dadi Is Dead, Trump Says,” New York Times, October 27, 2019; Rukmini Uncertainty Arising out of Probabilistic Risk Assessment, Santa Monica,

26 Callimachi and Eric Schmitt, “ISIS Names New Leader and Confirms 26 DoS, “Designation of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps,” fact al-Baghdadi’s Death,” New York Times, October 31, 2019; Jenna Jordan, sheet, Office of the Spokesperson, April 8, 2019. “The Death of Baghdadi Isn’t the End of ISIS,” Washington Post, 27 Joseph Felter and Brian Fishman, Iranian Strategy in Iraq: Politics November 5, 2019; and others. and “Other Means,” West Point, N.Y.: Combating Terrorism Center, 18 See Graeme Wood, “What ISIS Really Wants,” The Atlantic, March October 13, 2008; Tim Arango, “Iran Dominates in Iraq After U.S. 2015; and others. ‘Handed the Country Over,’” New York Times, July 15, 2017; Beston Husen Arif, “Iran’s Struggle for Dominance in a Post-ISIS Iraq,” Asian 19 Operation Inherent Resolve website, undated. Affairs, Vol. 50, No. 3, 2019, pp. 344–363; Frederick W. Kagan, Ahmad 20 Todd South, “3rd Cavalry Regiment Soldiers Are Firing Intense K. Majidyar, Danielle Pletka, and Marisa Cochrane Sullivan, Iranian Artillery Missions into Syria with Iraqi, French Allies,” Army Times, Influence in the Levant, Egypt, Iraq, and Afghanistan, American Enter- December 11, 2018; Lead Inspector General for Overseas Contingency prise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War, May 2012. Operations, Operation Inherent Resolve and Other Overseas Contin- 28 “China to Contribute to the Rebuilding of Iraq,” Kurdistan24, gency Operations, report to Congress, undated. April 16, 2019; “Iraqi Officials, Experts Optimistic About PM’s Upcom- 21 For example, Susannah George, “Iraqi Victories Remain Fragile as US ing Visit to China: Report,” Xinhua, September 9, 2019. Reduces Troops,” Military Times, February 18, 2018; Todd South, “Why 29 2018 data from the Observatory of Economic Complexity website a Self-Reliant Iraqi Military May Take ‘Years, if Not Decades’ and Could (A. J. G. Simoes and C. A. Hidalgo, “The Economic Complexity Obser- Require a ‘Generation’ to Reform,” Military Times, November 5, 2018; vatory: An Analytical Tool for Understanding the Dynamics of Eco- Ismael Alsodani and Michael Knights, Strengthening Iraqi Security nomic Development,” workshops at the Twenty-Fifth AAAI Conference Forces, Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, on Artificial Intelligence, 2011). December 27, 2017. 30 2018 data from World Top Exports, undated. 22 For example, Colin P. Clarke, “The Terrorist Threat Posed by Neglect and Indifference,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, September 19, 31 “China-Iraq Trade Exceeds 30 Bln USD in 2018 Amid Increasing 2019. Cooperation: Chinese Ambassador,” Xinhua, May 6, 2019. 23 For example, Tess Bridgeman, “When Does the Legal Basis for U.S. 32 Nicu Popescu and Stanislav Secrieru, eds., Russia’s Return to the Forces in Syria Expire?” Just Security, March 14, 2018. Middle East: Building Sandcastles? Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, Challiot Paper No. 146, July 2018; Martin Russell, 24 As of June 2019, DoS labels both of these groups terrorist organiza- Russia in the Middle East: From Sidelines to Centre Stage, Brussels: tions (U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Counterterrorism, “Foreign European Parliamentary Research Service, November 2018; Stockholm Terrorist Organizations,” webpage, undated). Also see U.S. Department International Peace Research institute, SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, of Defense, Report of the DoD Commission on Beirut International 2018; Andrew Jacobs and Jane Perlez, “U.S. Wary of Its New Neighbor Airport Terrorist Act, Washington, D.C., October 23, 1983; Joseph H. in Djibouti: A Chinese Naval Base,” New York Times, February 25, 2017; Felter and Brian Fishman, Iranian Strategy in Iraq: Politics and “Other Aisha Han and Rachel Rossie, What Are the Implications of Expanded Means,” West Point, N.Y.: Combating Terrorism Center, U.S. Military Chinese Investment in the MENA Region? Atlantic Council, August 10, Academy, October 13, 2008; “U.S. Accuses Hezbollah of Aiding Iran in 2018; Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military and Security Devel- Iraq,” New York Times, July 2, 2007; and Michael Knights, Iran’s Ongo- opments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2019, Washington, ing Proxy War in Iraq, Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute for Near D.C., May 2019; Russian foreign trade data from 4th Quarter, 2018; 2018 East Policy, Policywatch 1492, March 16, 2009. data from the Observatory of Economic Complexity website (Simoes 25 The current Iranian regime has more complex relationships with the and Hidalgo, 2011); World Trade Organization, “World Trade Statistical Kuwaiti, Omani, and Qatari governments. See, for example, Giorgio Review 2018,” webpage, 2018; 2017 data from World Bank, “World Inte- Cafiero, Iran and the Gulf States 40 Years After the 1979 Revolution, grated Trade Solution,” website, undated; World’s Top Exports, website, Washington, D.C.: Middle East Institute, February 8, 2019. undated.

27 33 Francis Fukuyama, The Soviet Union and Iraq Since 1968, Santa and Sul Donggyu, “Common Drivers of Transnational Terrorism: Prin- Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, N-1524-AF, 1980. cipal Component Analysis,” Economic Inquiry, Vol. 51, No. 1, January 2013, pp. 707–721; Kartika Bhatia and Hafez Ghanem, How Do Edu- 34 Becca Wasser, The Limits of Russian Strategy in the Middle East, cation and Unemployment Affect Support for Violent Extremism? Evi- Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, PE-340-RC, 2019, p. 3–4. dence from Eight Arab Countries, working paper, Brookings Institution, 35 James Sladden, Becca Wasser, Ben Connable, and Sarah Grand-Clem- March 2017; Akinola Olojo, Nigeria’s Troubled North: Interrogating the ent, Russian Strategy in the Middle East, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Drivers of Public Support for Boko Haram, The Hague, Netherlands: Corporation, PE-236-RC, 2017, p. 2. International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, October 2013. 36 For more on the general Russian approach to disrupting U.S. policy, 42 International Monetary Fund, 2019 Article IV Consultation and see Ben Connable, Stephanie Young, Stephanie Pezard, Andrew Radin, Proposal for Post-Program Monitoring – Press Release; Staff Report; Raphael S. Cohen, Katya Migacheva, and James Sladden, Russia’s and Statement by the Executive Director for Iraq, IMF Country Report Hostile Measures: Combating Russian Gray Zone Aggression Against No. 19/248, Washington, D.C., July 2019. NATO in the Contact, Blunt, and Surge Layers of Competition, Santa 43 Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index 2018, Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-2539-A, 2020. website, 2018. 37 Pantsyr is an advanced air defense system capable of countering 44 World Bank, Doing Business 2020: Comparing Business Regulations many advanced U.S. military capabilities. The Mi-28N and Mi-35 in 190 Economies, Washington, D.C., 2020. are direct competitors with the American AH-1 Cobra and AH-64 attack helicopter series. TOS-1 competes with the American M-270 45 The bulk of such assistance is delivered through the Counter-Islamic Multiple-Launch Rocket System, and it is capable of firing advanced State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) Train and Equip Fund (CTEF). The fiscal munitions that present a capable threat to advanced ground combat year (FY) 2019 enacted value of CTEF was $850 million for Iraq and an forces. Su-25 aircraft are equivalent to the American A-10 Thunder- additional $250 million for border security for partner nations fighting bolt II ground attack aircraft, and the BMP-3 is an advanced armored ISIS. The FY 2020 request was $745 million for Iraq. Office of the Secre- personnel carrier that generally competes with the M-2 and M-3 series tary of Defense, 2019. Bradley infantry fighting vehicle. 46 Ben Van Heuvelen and Ben Lando, “U.S. Sanctions Threats Cast 38 This assumes some growth from late 2018 data. See “Iraq-Russia Shadow on Iraqi Economy,” Iraq Oil Report, January 9, 2020. Trade Reaches $1.4 Billion Per Year: Envoy,” Kurdistan24, September 29, 47 Mustafa Salim and Liz Sly, “Widespread Unrest Erupts in Southern 2018. Iraq Amid Acute Shortages of Water, Electricity,” Washington Post, 39 Maxim A. Sukhov, “Between Baghdad and Erbil: Russia’s Balancing July 14, 2018. Act in Iraq,” Middle East Centre blog, London School of Economics, 48 Edward Wong, “Trump Pushes Iraq to Stop Buying Energy from May 3, 2018; Dmitry Zhdannikov, “The Great Russian Oil Game in Iraqi Iran,” New York Times, February 11, 2019. Kurdistan,” Reuters, April 19, 2018. 49 Fitch Ratings, “Trade Bank of Iraq,” December 16, 2019. 40 For more on the relationship between physical presence and influ- ence, see Congressional Research Service, Should the United States 50 This point was raised by Ahmed Tabaqchali, chief investment officer Significantly Increase Its Foreign Military Commitments? Washington, of Asia Frontier Capital, in Ben Van Heuvelen and Ben Lando, “U.S. D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980; Amy Ebitz, “The Use of Sanctions Threats Cast Shadow on Iraqi Economy,” Iraq Oil Report, Military Diplomacy in Great Power Competition: Lessons Learned from January 9, 2020. the Marshall Plan,” Brookings Institution, February 12, 2019. 51 Van Heuvelen and Lando, 2020. 41 For example, Brian Michael Jenkins, Building an Army of Believers: 52 Jihadist Radicalization and Recruitment, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Shelly Culbertson and Linda Robinson, Making Victory Count After Corporation, CT-278-1, April 2007; Gaibulloev Husrav, Sandler Todd, Defeating ISIS: Stabilization Challenges in Mosul and Beyond, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-2076-RC, 2017.

28 53 Lead Inspector General, Operation Inherent Resolve: Lead Inspector 58 Connable, 2020. General Report to the United States Congress, July 1, 2019–October 59 See Connable et al., 2017, for more on Iraqi disenfranchisement and 25, 2019, U.S. Department of Defense, Washington, D.C., November 15, the counter-Islamic State campaign. 2019. 60 See Connable, 2019, for more information on the popularity of the 54 Rashaan Ayesh, “Where U.S. Troops and Military Assets Are Deployed Iraqi Army and the offset approach to the PMF. in the Middle East” Axios, September 21, 2019. 61 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Allies Agree to Enhance NATO 55 Stacie L. Pettyjohn, U.S. Global Defense Posture, 1783–2011, Santa Mission Iraq, Discuss Russian Missiles and Mission in Afghanistan,” Monica, Calif: RAND Corporation, MG-1244-AF, 2012. February 13, 2020. 56 Connable, 2020. 57 U.S. Department of State, November 13, 2019.

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31 Jacobs, Andrew, and Jane Perlez, “U.S. Wary of Its New Neighbor in “McCain Clashes with Panetta Over U.S. Troop Withdrawal from Iraq,” Djibouti: A Chinese Naval Base,” New York Times, February 25, 2017. CNN, November 15, 2011. Jenkins, Brian Michael, Building an Army of Believers: Jihadist North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Allies Agree to Enhance NATO Radicalization and Recruitment, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Mission Iraq, Discuss Russian Missiles and Mission in Afghanistan,” Corporation, CT-278-1, April 2007. As of March 16, 2020: February 13, 2020. https://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/CT278-1.html O’Mahoney, Angela, Ilana Blum, Gabriela Armenta, Nicholas Jones, Toby C., “Don’t Stop at Iraq: Why the U.S. Should Withdraw from Burger, Joshua Mendelsohn, Michael J. McNerney, Steven W. Popper, the Entire Persian Gulf,” The Atlantic, December 22, 2011. Jefferson P. Marquis, and Thomas S. Szayna, Assessing, Monitoring, and Evaluating Army Security Cooperation: A Framework for Jordan, Jenna, “The Death of Baghdadi Isn’t the End of ISIS,” Implementation, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-2165-A, Washington Post, November 5, 2019. 2018. As of March 16, 2020: Kagan, Frederick W., Ahmad K. Majidyar, Danielle Pletka, and Marisa https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2165.html Cochrane Sullivan, Iranian Influence in the Levant, Egypt, Iraq, and Obama, Barack, National Security Strategy, Washington, D.C.: The Afghanistan, American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the White House, May 27, 2010. Study of War, May 2012. ———, National Security Strategy, Washington, D.C.: The White House, Kaplan, Fred, “Leaving Iraq: What Will Happen When U.S. Combat February 2015. Troops Withdraw?” Slate, June 26, 2009. Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Counter-Islamic State of Iraq and Kaplan, Rebecca, “Leon Panetta Criticizes Obama for Iraq Withdrawal,” Syria (ISIS) Train and Equip Fund (CTEF): Justification for FY 2020 CBS News, October 2, 2014. Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO),” in Department of Defense Karlin, Mara, and Tamara Cofman Wittes, “America’s Middle East Budget Fiscal Year (FY) 2020, Washington, D.C., March 2019. Purgatory: The Case for Doing Less,” Foreign Affairs, January/February Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military and Security Developments 2019. Involving the People’s Republic of China 2019, Washington, D.C., May Knights, Michael, “The Islamic State Inside Iraq: Losing Power or 2019. Preserving Strength?” CTC Sentinel, December 2018, pp. 1–10. O’Hanlon, Michael E., “The Case for Staying in Iraq,” Brookings ———, Iran’s Ongoing Proxy War in Iraq, Washington, D.C.: Washington Institution, September 13, 2011. Institute for Near East Policy, Policywatch 1492, March 16, 2009. O’Leary, Brendan, How to Get Out of Iraq with Integrity, Philadelphia, Korb Lawrence J., and Brian Katulis, Strategic Redeployment, Pa.: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009. Washington, D.C.: Center for American Progress, September 29, 2005. Olojo, Akinola, Nigeria’s Troubled North: Interrogating the Drivers of Lead Inspector General, Operation Inherent Resolve: Lead Inspector Public Support for Boko Haram, The Hague, Netherlands: International General Report to the United States Congress, July 1, 2019–October 25, Centre for Counter-Terrorism, October 2013. 2019, U.S. Department of Defense, Washington, D.C., November 15, Operation Inherent Resolve website, undated. As of January 14, 2020: 2019. https://www.inherentresolve.mil Lead Inspector General for Overseas Contingency Operations, O’Sullivan, Meghan, “Why U.S. Troops Should Stay in Operation Inherent Resolve and Other Overseas Contingency Operations, Iraq,” Washington Post, September 9, 2011. report to Congress, undated. Pascual, Carlos, and Ken Pollack, Salvaging the Possible: Policy Options Malkasian, Carter, The Islamic State and the Persistent Threat of in Iraq, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, September 2007. Extremism in Iraq, Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, November 30, 2018. Mattis, James N., Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 2018.

32 Perry, Walter L., Stuart Johnson, Keith Crane, David C. Gompert, Simoes, A. J. G., and C. A. Hidalgo, “The Economic Complexity John Gordon IV, Robert E. Hunter, Dalia Dassa Kaye, Terrence Kelly, Observatory: An Analytical Tool for Understanding the Dynamics Eric Peltz, and Howard J. Shatz, Withdrawing from Iraq: Alternative of Economic Development,” workshops at the Twenty-Fifth AAAI Schedules, Associated Risks, and Mitigating Strategies, Santa Monica, Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2011. As of March 16, 2020: Calif.: RAND Corporation, MG-882-OSD, 2009. As of March 16, 2020: https://oec.world/en/ https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG882.html Sladden, James, Becca Wasser, Ben Connable, and Sarah Grand- Pettyjohn, Stacie L., U.S. Global Defense Posture, 1783–2011, Santa Clement, Russian Strategy in the Middle East, Santa Monica, Calif.: Monica, Calif: RAND Corporation, MG-1244-AF, 2012. As of March 16, RAND Corporation, PE-236-RC, 2017. As of January 8, 2020: 2020: https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE236.html https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG1244.html Soloman, Kenneth A., William E. Kastenberg, and Pamela F. Nelson, Pollack, Kenneth M., “Five Myths About the Iraq Troop Withdrawal,” Dealing with Uncertainty Arising out of Probabilistic Risk Assessment, Brookings Institution, August 22, 2010. Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, R-3045-ORNL, September 1983. As of March 16, 2020: Pollock, David, “Eight Reasons Why the United States and Iraq Still https://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/R3045.html Need Each Other,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, January 9, 2020. South, Todd, “3rd Cavalry Regiment Soldiers Are Firing Intense Artillery Missions into Syria with Iraqi, French Allies,” Army Times, Popescu, Nicu, and Stanislav Secrieru, eds., Russia’s Return to the December 11, 2018 Middle East: Building Sandcastles? Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, Challiot Paper No. 146, July 2018. ———, “Why a Self-Reliant Iraqi Military May Take ‘Years, If Not Decades’ and Could Require a ‘Generation’ to Reform,” Military Times, Rayburn, Joel, “The Last Exit from Iraq,” Foreign Affairs, March/April November 5, 2018. 2006. Stark, Alexandra, “Don’t Abandon Iraq (Again),” The National Interest, Riedel, Bruce, and Samuel Berger, “America Must Pull Out of Iraq to August 2, 2018. Contain Civil War,” Brookings Institution, July 23, 2007. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Arms Robinson, Linda, “Winning the Peace in Iraq: Don’t Give Up on Transfers Database, 2018. Baghdad’s Fragile Democracy,” Foreign Affairs, September/October 2019. Strategic Framework Agreement for a Relationship of Friendship and Cooperation Between the United States of America and the Republic of Rosen, Nir, “If America Left Iraq,” The Atlantic, December 2005. Iraq, November 17, 2008. As of January 15, 2020: Russell, Martin, Russia in the Middle East: From Sidelines to Centre https://photos.state.gov/libraries/iraq/216651/US-IRAQ/us-iraq-sfa-en. Stage, Brussels: European Parliamentary Research Service, November pdf 2018. Sukhov, Maxim A., “Between Baghdad and Erbil: Russia’s Balancing Act Sachs, Jeffrey D., “US Military Should Get Out of the Middle in Iraq,” Middle East Centre blog, London School of Economics, May 3, East,” Boston Globe, April 3, 2017. 2018. Salam, Reihan, “We Never Should Have Left Iraq,” Slate, June 12, 2014. Teixeira, Ruy, “Cure the Economy? Pull Out of Iraq,” Center for American Progress, February 15, 2008. Salim, Mustafa, and Liz Sly, “Widespread Unrest Erupts in Southern Iraq amid Acute Shortages of Water, Electricity,” Washington Post, July Thompson, Loren, “War Without End: Why Iraq Can Never Be a Stable 14, 2018. Democracy,” Forbes, June 20, 2014. Schenker, David, Assistant Secretary of State, “China and Russia: The Tilghman, Andrew, “Poll: 70% of Troops Say No to Boots on the Ground New Threats to the Middle East Security and Stability,” October 8, 2019. in Iraq,” USA Today, September 28, 2014. Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index 2018, website, 2018. As of March 16, 2020: https://www.transparency.org/cpi2018

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34 About the Authors Ben Connable is a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation, a member of the faculty at the Pardee RAND Graduate School, and a retired Marine Corps intelligence and Middle East Foreign Area officer. He focuses on warfighting, European regional, Middle East regional, and national strategy issues in support of U.S. Department of Defense sponsors. Connable received his Ph.D. in war studies from King’s College London War Studies Department.

Ambassador James Dobbins is a senior fellow and distinguished chair in Diplomacy and Security at the RAND Corporation. He has held a variety of State Department and White House posts and served on numerous crisis management and diplomatic troubleshooting assignments as special envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Kosovo, Bosnia, Haiti, and Somalia for the admin- istrations of Barack Obama, George W. Bush, and Bill Clinton.

Howard J. Shatz is a senior economist at the RAND Corporation who specializes in international economics and economics and national security. His research has included civil service reform, development policies, labor markets, and statistical systems in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, and from 2007 to 2008 he served as a senior economist at the U.S. President’s Council of Economic Advisers, where his policy areas were foreign investment, the Iraqi economy, and U.S. exports. Shatz received his Ph.D. in public policy from Harvard University.

Raphael S. Cohen is a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation and associate director of the Strategy and Doctrine Program in RAND Project AIR FORCE. He works on a broad range of defense and foreign policy issues, including defense strategy and force planning, Middle East and European security and civil-military relations. Cohen received his Ph.D. in government from Georgetown University.

Becca Wasser is a senior policy analyst at the RAND Corporation, where her primary research areas include wargaming, international security, and U.S. defense and foreign policy in the Middle East. She holds an M.S. in foreign service from the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University.

35 About This Perspective The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest.

This research was sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and conducted within the International Security and Defense Policy Center of the RAND National Defense Research Institute (NDRI), a federally funded research and development center (FFRDC) sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense intelligence enterprise.

For more information on the RAND International Security and Defense Policy Center, see www.rand.org/nsrd/isdp or contact the director (contact information is provided on the webpage).

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