AFGHANISTAN Briefing Kabul/Brussels, 16 May 2002

THE LOYA JIRGA: ONE SMALL STEP FORWARD?

OVERVIEW rules by the Loya Jirga Commission, a group of 21 Afghans who determined how representatives would be chosen and what they are to do at the meeting. The immensity of the task of rebuilding Two-thirds of those attending the meeting are being Afghanistan into something resembling a indirectly elected in a two-stage process while the coherent state cannot be over-estimated. Nearly remaining third are to be appointed by the Loya three decades of political instability – including Jirga Commission. In stage one of the indirect many years of savage warfare, the wholesale elections, representatives of communities gather on destruction of political and physical infrastructure a given day to select a group of electors. In stage and the inflammation of ethnic divisions – are two, these electors gather in a regional centre layered on top of a nation that was among the between 21 May and 5 June to choose delegates to poorest and weakest governed even in its "golden the Emergency Loya Jirga. That meeting, in Kabul, age" before King Zahir Shah was deposed in will then select the Transitional Administration that 1973. Afghanistan’s transition back to a is to replace the Afghan Interim Authority (AIA). minimum level of political and economic stability Within a further eighteen months, a Constitutional will require many small but crucial steps to keep Loya Jirga must be held to write a new constitution, it on course. and within two years elections must be held for a new government. The hopes of most Afghans and the world at large that the peace process will continue to move The Loya Jirga process, which has been underway forward are singularly focused on the Emergency for several months, is challenged by: 1) a highly Loya Jirga, which meets 10-16 June 2002 and for volatile security environment characterised by which, expectations are unreasonably high. deepening factional tensions and a lack of common Visions of a great leap forward in reconciliation goals; 2) under-resourcing, unfamiliarity and an are misplaced, and the danger of missteps is unclear agenda; and 3) an international community grave. A successful Loya Jirga would represent at that has sometimes been working at cross-purposes best an incremental, albeit important advance in when it needs to apply precise and unified pressure the process of stabilisation. However, an if there is to be a positive outcome. unproductive Loya Jirga could send Afghanistan tumbling back into the internecine conflict of the The key expectation for the Loya Jirga on the part of early 1990s. most Afghans and the international community is that it will correct the ethnic imbalance produced at The Emergency Loya Jirga process, as laid out the Bonn conference that has created an Interim under the Bonn Agreement,1 has a number of Authority dominated by ethnic Tajik members of the phases. The first has involved the drafting of Northern Alliance.2 But a broadly acceptable, balanced outcome is far from certain. In the lead-up to the Loya Jirga, an intense power-struggle is

1 The UN Talks on Afghanistan took place from 27 November 2001 to 5 December 2001 in Bonn and resulted in the Agreement on Provisional Arrangements 2 The Northern Alliance is a grouping of mostly ethnic in Afghanistan Pending the Re-Establishment of Tajik, Uzbek and Hazara factions that fought the long civil Permanent Government Institutions, otherwise known as war against the Taliban. A glossary of political groups and the Bonn Agreement. terms can be found at the end of this briefing paper. The Loya Jirga: One Small Step Forward? ICG Asia Briefing Paper: 16 May 2002 Page 2

occurring at the local, regional, national, and international levels to shape and/or subvert the In particular, the international community, including outcome. Few outcomes seem broadly Coalition forces, should: acceptable. For example, there will be deep Pashtun discontent if Zahir Shah, is excluded, engage in a pre-Loya Jirga dialogue with all and the security ministries (defence and interior) factions to allow adversaries to articulate stay in the hands of the Panshiri faction of the interests, work through mutual suspicions, Shura-i-Nazar.3 Similarly, a strong role for the clarify options, and craft a common vision for an ex-king and a loss of key posts may be acceptable outcome; . unacceptable to the Shura-i-Nazar and important former Northern Alliance constituencies. These initiate an intensive, transparent mediation divergent interests may be on a collision course process, accompanied by the threat of force, to that it will take immense pressure and resolve factional fighting between non-Taliban, compromise to avoid. non-al-Qaeda factions;

Meanwhile, the goal of centralisation of the deploy a security presence to regional centres for government, with emphasis on security functions, the second stage of the Loya Jirga indirect has hardly progressed. With the international election process from 21 May to 5 June; and coalition's war against the Taliban and al-Qaeda still progressing, there is little hope that local and satisfy immediately all requests for logistical regional commanders will soon be downsized. support from the United Nations Assistance Indeed, the exact opposite appears to be Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and the Loya occurring not only among Coalition-supported Jirga Commission and provide an emergency commanders, but all across the country. Inter- budget and transportation resource cushion. factional armed confrontations also appear to be on the rise, with recent fighting reported in the In turn, UNAMA and the Afghan Interim Authority south-east (Gardez), north (Sar-i-Pul), and centre should: (Lal) of the country. increase public outreach programing that not The recent lack of experience among Afghans only explains the Loya Jirga process but also with even remotely representative, let alone addresses well-know concerns head on, and democratic institutions means that the legitimacy encourage independent media outlets to offer of the Loya Jirga will be based much less on the their facilities for balanced, incisive programing fairness of the process than on the fairness of its to help counter locally-controlled propaganda; outcome. The international community is unified in its intention to support the former but has yet the Loya Jirga Commission should publish the to utilise the resources at its disposal to ensure Rules and Regulations for the Loya Jirga the latter. Given the extremely high stakes immediately since failure to do so is causing involved, it is incumbent upon the international suspicion and political gamesmanship based on community to make the extra effort to enable incomplete information and is unnecessarily Afghanistan to take this small, but critical step truncating an already rushed political process; forward. and

explain publicly a realistic timetable for delivery of reconstruction assistance that dampens 3 The Shura-i-Nazar (Supervisory Council) was formed excessive expectations and encourages long- by the late Ahmad Shah Masood and his followers term engagement from donors and recipients. within the predominately Tajik Jamiat-i-Islami party that was nominally headed by former President Burhanuddin Rabbani. Much of their strength was located in the Panshir Valley, Masood’s redoubt. This wing of Jamiat, in which the military and administrative power of the party became concentrated, is now controlled by the “triumvirate” of Defence Minister Muhammad Qassem Fahim, Interior Minister Yunus Qanooni, and Foreign Minister Abdullah Abdullah. The Loya Jirga: One Small Step Forward? ICG Asia Briefing Paper: 16 May 2002 Page 3

I. THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT (or anointed) governors are in an uneasy stand-off with local commanders who control independent forces. In several of these situations, support to Several recent events indicate that the security governors and independent local commanders from situation is not improving and in fact may be Coalition forces in the form of arms, uniforms, deteriorating in advance of the Loya Jirga. The salary, and training is a complicating factor. It is not Afghan Interim Administration has virtually no apparent if, or how, the Coalition is using its authority outside Kabul, and factional tensions influence to reduce these tensions and integrate the throughout the country are increasing based on commanders into a unified command structure. old rivalries and on a desire to control or consolidate more territory in advance of the In the North, long-standing tensions between Rashid political process. Afghan perceptions of the Dostum (Uzbek, Head of Junbish-i-Milli and security situation are also having a deep impact officially Deputy Minister of Defence and on the political process. Commander of the Northern Areas) and Mohammad Usta Atta (Tajik, Jamiat-i-Islami commander, and officially Corps Commander for the North) have A. AN UNSTABLE SITUATION erupted into clashes in Sar-i-Pul and Sholgara, just south of Mazar-i-Sharif. An uneasy peace holds Military power remains very dispersed, with between the Junbish-supported Turkmen governor rivalries posing both short and long-term of Konduz, Amir Latif, the Jamiat Military challenges to stability. AIA authority extends Commander, General Daoud, and the little beyond Kabul, and control of the regions understandably skittish Pashtun communities has reverted virtually to the status-quo ante of scattered throughout the region. Although attempts 1992. The predominantly ethnic Tajik Jamiat-I- have been made to mediate between Dostum and Islami forces control the North-east and compete Atta, there are fears that a full-fledged fight for for power in the North with the mostly ethnic control of Mazar-i-Sharif and the North could ensue. Uzbek militia Junbish-i-Milli and the predominantly Hazara Hezb-i-Wahadat. Ismail A battle to consolidate control over the central Khan, the nominally Jamiat but fiercely Hazarajat region is ongoing, with clashes reported in independent commander based in Herat, is strong Lal, Ghor Province, between the Khalali and Akbari in the West and draws considerable resources factions of Hezb-i-Wahadat. Clashes have also been from his control over trade with Iran. Hezb-i- reported between Abdul Karim Barohi, governor of Wahadat factions control the central region, and Nimroz province and rival commanders in areas by the East and South are fractured among a diverse the Iranian border. Fighting has broken out in array of mostly ethnic Pashtun commanders. recent weeks in Wardak province, especially in Chak, Sayedabad, and Dai Mirdad districts.4 There have been recent clashes in the south-east, north, and centre of the country. In Gardez, There is also concern about possible attacks by al- Paktiya province, a confrontation continues Qaeda members or Taliban remnants. United between Pacha Zadran Khan, who had been Nations, International Security Assistance Force appointed governor by the AIA, and the Gardez (ISAF), Coalition, and Afghan security officials Shura (governing counsel), which rejected his have all stated that they expect such actions against appointment. The AIA attempt to mediate and Loya Jirga, international civilian and military targets appoint a third party has failed. Zadran recently in coming weeks. These are said to be not only rocketed the Gardez central bazaar for several inevitable, but if relatively small scale, largely days, killing a few persons and shutting the unstoppable. Three regions have been highlighted as market down. An additional complication in this particularly dangerous: Jalalabad, Khost, and Farah. confrontation is that Pacha Zadran’s brother, Amanullah Zadran, is the Minister of Tribal On 8 April 2002, the convoy of Defence Minister Affairs and he himself, a participant at Bonn, Mohammad Qassem Fahim was struck by a received early Coalition support against al-

Qaeda. A similarly tense situation exists in several places in the South and East, such as 4 Logar and Qandahar, where centrally-appointed Human Rights Watch Statement, “Rise in Factional Fighting Threatens Fragile Peace”, 7 May 2002. The Loya Jirga: One Small Step Forward? ICG Asia Briefing Paper: 16 May 2002 Page 4

remotely detonated bomb planted on the road- B. AFGHAN PERCEPTIONS side near Jalalabad. At the same time, shab- nama (night letters), a tool of propaganda and Afghans’ understanding of the security environment intimidation used by the Mujahidin during the remains very fragmented. Deep distrust based on the Soviet period, have resurfaced there – offering factional and ethnic fault lines of the last two U.S$50,000 for a dead Westerner and decades colours how virtually every Afghan U.S.$100,000 for a live one. Armed protests by perceives events. The Minister of Defence, Field Shinwari tribesmen against a recent short-lived Marshal Fahim,6 said that he is protecting all the poppy-eradication campaign also underscore the people of Kabul, regardless of language, ethnicity or tentativeness of the security situation in the East. place of origin, and asked, “if we give this responsibility to someone from the tribal areas, will On 30 April 2002, a Loya Jirga Commission they treat us equally”?7 Pashtuns have widely vehicle carrying four Afghan staff was struck by complained that the Loya Jirga Commission has too a small explosion en route to a district election many former communists and too few Pashtuns. A near Khost. The injuries were relatively minor, Hazara commander said that Hazaras could neither and two of the wounded staff members carried on accept a former king who did nothing to help their to oversee the election that day. The explosion is impoverished people in 40 years of rule, nor a ruling believed to have come from a freshly laid cabal of Panshiris who did everything possible to landmine – one that the Loya Jirga Commission destroy Hazara neighbourhoods in Kabul during investigation concluded was remotely denoted fighting in the early 1990s and turned over their and so intended to strike the Loya Jirga vehicle. leader, Mazari, and others, to the Taliban. Although Commission staff have indicated that they fully expect further attacks, few security The drums of discontent are beating particularly provisions have been made for the first phase of loudly throughout the Pashtun belt at the moment. the district election process. Pashtuns are feeling enormously disenfranchised in the current environment. They have lost control of On 2 May 2002, British Coalition forces the country and its capital, they lack unified announced a new sweep through territory leadership, and intra-Pashtun tensions are high. The suspected of harbouring Taliban and al-Qaeda Pashtuns complain that they are labelled as Taliban, holdouts. Forces that are deemed to be “outside” terrorists, and drug lords, and their heartland is the political process, and thus likely to disrupt it, under foreign occupation. Many Pashtuns claim may also be growing. For instance, U.S. special harassment by government soldiers upon entering envoy Zalmay Khalilzad recently equated the role Kabul, and documented reports of attacks against of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar – the hard-line former Pashtun minorities in the North are frequently cited.8 prime minister and leader of the Hezb-i-Islami The factionalised environment is also subject to political group – in the political process with that 5 influence by the better-organised political machines of the Taliban and al-Qaeda. At the same time, of Rabbani and Sayyaf on the one hand and of those who see their political star falling in the Shura-i-Nazar on the other. Internal disputes have lead-up to the Loya Jirga, such as former left the Pashtuns poorly positioned to work the President Rabbani and Rasoul Sayyaf, a key political process. In recent discussions, numerous Mujahidin figure in the 1980s, may resort to Pashtun representatives indicated they believe that disruptive tactics. There are also extensive the factional fighting in places like Gardez, and even reports of al-Qaeda and Taliban forces congregating in the remote south-western provinces of Nimroz and Farah, where there has 6 not yet been extensive Coalition action. Fahim awarded himself the title of Field Marshal at the end of April. This move, supposedly endorsed by Chairman Karzai, was seen as an indication of Fahim’s dangerous ambitions. 7 ICG interview with Minister of Defence Fahim, 24 April 2002. 5 ICG Interview, 21 April 2002. The CIA reportedly tried 8 See Human Rights Watch Report, Paying for the Taliban’s to kill Hekmatyar in May 2002 by firing a missile from Crimes: Abuses of Pashtuns in Northern Afghanistan, 22 an unmanned drone. See Thom Shanker and Carlotta April 2002, and Physicians for Human Rights Report, Gall, “U.S. Attack on Warlord Aims to Help Interim Preliminary Assessment of Alleged Mass Gravesites in the Leader”, The New York Times, 8 May 2002. Area of Mazar-I-Sharif, Afghanistan, 2 May 2002. The Loya Jirga: One Small Step Forward? ICG Asia Briefing Paper: 16 May 2002 Page 5

the continuing Coalition efforts, are all an attempt threw a stone against the Taliban and al-Qaeda”.12 by the Shura-i-Nazar to sabotage the Pashtun From this viewpoint, Pashtun claims to power are areas and their opportunity for political overdrawn because the Pashtuns make up a much participation. The recent arrests in Kabul of some smaller percentage of the population than they say, 300 “coup-plotters” is also cited as a thinly- they supported (and may still support) the Taliban, veiled exercise in intimidation, and there is wide- and they are the historic oppressors of the remaining spread belief that access to the ex-king is being two-thirds of the population of Afghanistan. unduly limited by Kabul security forces.9

This suspicion also extends to the UN and the C. PROTECTION FOR THE LOYA JIRGA international community. For instance, many PROCESS Pashtuns claim that they comprise 60-70 per cent of the population, whereas the UN is currently It is within this unstable, and highly subjective, using population estimates that put them at 38 per environment that critical thought must be given to cent.10 Thus, the Pashtuns insist, they are only the security of the Loya Jirga process itself. getting a fraction of the representation due to them in the government, the Loya Jirga Negotiations are underway to provide some sort of Commission, and in the Loya Jirga itself. The security presence during the second stage of the discontent on all of these fronts has become so Loya Jirga elections when all the district electors deep that the Governor of Qandahar, Gul Agha selected in the initial stage converge upon the nine Shirzai, told one UN official recently that if there regional centres between 21 May and 5 June to were an election in Qandahar tomorrow, the select the representatives to the Loya Jirga. Taliban would win.11 Proponents of a visible security presence argue that this is a necessary show of strength and commitment The Pashtuns, however, are not alone in their on behalf of those supporting the Loya Jirga process. fears or claims to greater power. Afghanistan’s Fears of intimidation in the election are substantial, smaller ethnic groups, once relatively and many feel that even a symbolic force would aid disenfranchised within the Pashtun dominated those trying to be independent. While it may be a state, have evolved a degree of autonomy over dead issue in New York, Washington, and London, the last two decades, reinforced by military the expansion of ISAF continues to be almost strength, that they will not readily yield. This universally supported on the ground in combined sense of historical injustice and Afghanistan.13 Those disappointed at the failure of entitlement has been compounded by recent the international community to agree to this believe events, most strongly among the Hazara and that showing the flag throughout the country is now Uzbeks, who routinely call for a federal system more essential than ever to counteract the perception that would grant them regional autonomy. of disengagement that is creeping into the popular consciousness. The former Northern Alliance groups, and particularly the Shura-i-Nazar, feel that they Several proposals for security at the regional alone held out against the Taliban and al-Qaeda – elections are on the table. First, there is a proposal to whom they believe most Pashtuns supported. deploy one or two British SAS units from regional “We fought against the Taliban and al-Qaeda for centre to regional centre in leap-frog fashion. This seven years, and we liberated Afghanistan from would entail a relatively small force, in any one them. Those who complain about an imbalance in place for only a few days. The second proposal is for the AIA”, noted Defence Minister Fahim, “never some ISAF contingents, without their ISAF hats, to fulfil essentially the same function. The third option is to deploy the first Battalion of the Afghan

9 ICG interviews, Kabul, May 2002. 10 The UN estimates of the main ethnic groups in Afghanistan break down as follows: Pashtun 38 per cent, Tajik 25 per cent, Hazara 20 per cent and Uzbek 12 per 12 ICG interview with Defence Minister Fahim, 24 April cent. 2002. 11 It may be worth noting, however, that there is little 13 The deputy Chair of the AIA, Sema Semar, recently evidence to suggest that support for the Taliban has ever travelled to New York to beseech the Security Council to seriously waned in their former stronghold. reconsider the expansion of ISAF. See below. The Loya Jirga: One Small Step Forward? ICG Asia Briefing Paper: 16 May 2002 Page 6

National Guard, which has begun training with political and economic stability, the delegates took ISAF – possibly with foreign officers in the risky step of creating an Interim Authority with a command. The first two proposals were lifespan of only six months. Before the end of that suggested by Western government and UN period, which began on 22 December 2001, an officials, and blocked by the British government Emergency Loya Jirga, or Grand National Council, and ISAF. The third was promoted by various is to meet and choose a Transitional Authority, that Western government and military officials, but is to “lead Afghanistan until such time as a fully opposed by some in the UN. representative government can be elected through free and fair elections to be held no later than two All these arrangements would be subject to years from the date of the convening of the serious constraints or threats. Foreign or central Emergency Loya Jirga”.14 government contingents would make a desirable target for those hoping to undermine the process, The Afghan Interim Authority consists primarily of especially as they would be directly associated a care-taker administration chaired by Hamid with the legitimacy and integrity of the Loya Karzai, and a Special Independent Commission for Jirga election process. Since the schedule for the the Convening of the Emergency Loya Jirga, headed second stage elections is already established, the by former Supreme Court Justice Mohammed Ismail arrival and departure of troops may be too Qasimyar. The Interim Administration is largely predictable to guarantee force-protection. This tasked with initiating the reconstruction process and would not be an exercise to hold a perimeter recreating institutions of central authority. The securely – on the contrary these elections can and Special Independent Commission, universally should be very public events to which thousands known as the Loya Jirga Commission, is responsible will require relatively free access. There is also a for formulating the rules concerning the number and general fear that rapid deployment/re-deployment selection of representatives to, and the rules of could send the wrong signal – namely one of procedure during the Emergency Loya Jirga. intense insecurity. Finally, concern has been expressed that sending the Afghan National The Emergency Loya Jirga is to choose a “Head of Guard would look like an assertion of power by the State for the Transitional Administration and … those who currently control Kabul – which is approve proposals for the structure and key precisely the problem that many regional players personnel of the Transitional Administration”.15 hope the Loya Jirga will address. After 30 years of political turmoil, it faces tremendous hurdles, both practical and political. The However, given regional tensions and growing Loya Jirga is to be opened by ex-king Mohammad fear of disengagement, a foreign military Zahir, whose ouster in 1973 and subsequent 29 years observer force should be deployed in the second of exile are at the roots of that turmoil. Its stage of the election process to provide an membership is being elected and selected through important confidence boost on the eve of the untested means that will be resolved only days Loya Jirga.. There are clear risks involved, both before the Loya Jirga is scheduled to begin; and its for the process and the forces. On balance, rules, procedures, and precise agenda have yet to be however, a neutral military presence in the determined. current factionalised environment would be a reminder that the international community is watching the process closely. A failure to provide A. ORIGIN AND USE this because of security concerns would be a telling admission the game has already been lost. The Loya Jirga (Grand National Council) is an Afghan tradition with an august but vague history. II. THE POLITICAL CHALLENGE The concept was extrapolated from the model of the tribal jirga or shura, an ad hoc, village-based institution that allows broad representation and, In its preamble, the Bonn Agreement nominally, consensual decision-making. The word acknowledges that signatories are not fully representative of the Afghan people. However, to create a balanced and broadly representative 14 Bonn Agreement, Article I(4). government that could shepherd Afghanistan to 15 Bonn Agreement, Article IV(5). The Loya Jirga: One Small Step Forward? ICG Asia Briefing Paper: 16 May 2002 Page 7

'shura', from the Arabic 'mashwara' (to discuss), replicate a hybrid-model of traditional selection, is best translated from contemporary Dari as popular representation, and central government 'council or committee', while jirga derives from prerogative. Imbedded in this model is an the Turkish for ‘circle’. In some Islamic religious understanding that in order to guarantee broad, thought, the shura is considered the ideal model balanced representation in contemporary for governance, and many Islamic governments Afghanistan, a free-and-fair universal suffrage have used the nomenclature for a variety of election is neither feasible nor desirable. institutions. Thus shura and jirga, concepts as old as Islam itself, carry meanings and associations for most of Afghanistan’s inhabitants. B. THE SELECTION PROCESS

The Loya Jirga is intended to be a national On 1 April 2002, the Loya Jirga Commission manifestation of community decision-making. It released its “Procedures for the Election of the was first employed at the birth of modern Members of the Emergency Loya Jirga”, outlining a Afghanistan, in 1747, when a tribal Loya Jirga in two-track approach wherein approximately two- Qandahar selected Ahmad Shah Durrani to rule thirds of the representatives are to be selected over the lands newly wrested from the Safavid indirectly at the district level, and the remaining empire to the west, and the Moghul empire to the one-third are to be appointed by the Loya Jirga east. Since then the Loya Jirga has been used on Commission in consultation with various average every twenty years to confirm the organisations, civil society groups, nomads, and 18 succession of monarchs, to pass constitutions, refugees. The rationale is to create balance: and to approve government policy, for example regional, including rural/urban, by allowing at least neutrality during World Wars I and II. The one representative for each administrative district composition has generally been a mixture of (uluswali); ethnic, primarily by relying upon representatives appointed by the king and locally geographic concentrations; gender, by reserving 160 selected tribal leaders. appointed seats for women; social-cultural, by providing seats for religious figures, refugees, The last Loya Jirga was held in 1964 to approve a nomads, and traders. new reformist constitution, supported by Zahir Shah, which increased popular sovereignty and The methods for selection and election are civil rights, and reduced the role of the monarch themselves balanced, in form and function, between and the royal family16 in the everyday workings the traditional and the democratic. The local indirect of government. The composition of that Loya elections that will choose 1051 representatives from Jirga was unusual. Of the 452 delegates, 352 up to 390 electoral districts in 32 provinces combine were elected by relatively public and popular consensus-based selection of local leaders with a means. secret ballot.

It is clear from the Bonn Agreement, which embraces the 1964 constitution as its legal framework,17 that the delegates were trying to

18 The seats break down as follows: (The figure in brackets represents those reserved for women) Elected seats: 16 The 1964 Constitution forbade any member of the 1051 by indirect district elections royal family, except the king, from holding high office. Appointed seats: 17 Article II, “Legal framework and judicial system” of Members of the Interim Administration 30 (2) the Bonn Agreement reads: Members of the Loya Jirga Commission 21 (3) 1) The following legal framework shall be applicable Religious Personalities 6 on an interim basis until the adoption of the new Credible Individuals 30 (10) Constitution referred to above: Civil Society Members 51 (12) i) The Constitution of 1964, a/ to the extent that its Professional and Scientific Organisations 39 (6) provisions are not inconsistent with those contained Nomads 25 in this agreement, and b/ with the exception of those Refugees 100 (25) (40 from Pakistan, 30 from Iran and provisions relating to the monarchy and to the 30 from other countries) executive and legislative bodies provided in the IDPs 6 (2) Constitution. Other women from geographically distributed seats 100. The Loya Jirga: One Small Step Forward? ICG Asia Briefing Paper: 16 May 2002 Page 8

The indirect election is a two-stage process. First, process, these requirements are unlikely to prevent representatives of every community within the violators from attending the Loya Jirga. Indeed, electoral districts (which roughly correspond to human rights activists have already expressed the administrative districts) will self-select19 concern that some of the best documented abusers participants in the selection of electors. These are likely to be at the front of the Loya Jirga in community representatives (and the public) will robes, not chains. The Loya Jirga Commission then gather in the district centre on a given day to hopes, nevertheless, that self- and popular selection choose from among themselves twenty to 60 will enforce the criteria to a meaningful degree. electors, the number to be determined in advance by consultations between the District Organising The Loya Jirga Commission has granted authority to Teams of the Loya Jirga Commission and local the regional level to allow second stage elections to leaders. The number chosen will represent an take place immediately following the selection of attempt to ensure that all villages and social electors in certain districts. These are being held in groups are represented. These electors are then approximately 10 per cent of districts. to be chosen by consensus in the public meeting, Unfortunately, the Commission has not identified where the criteria for participation are to be an clear criteria for when this immediate move to stage Afghan citizen by birth, at least eighteen years two is appropriate, so it is being employed old, and capable of exercising full legal rights. somewhat randomly. Holding the second stage election immediately also eliminates the complaint The electors will then go on to the second stage procedure, a clear contravention of the (between 21 May and 5 June) in the regional Commission’s own rules. This uneven approach centre where they will elect by secret ballot from could raise suspicions about the potential for unseen among their own ranks the number of influence. representatives assigned to their district. There are somewhat more stringent criteria for Overall, the consensus-based selection of leaders is a becoming an elector. Candidates must be at least fairly stable and participatory system – albeit one 22 years old, and sign an affidavit to the effect that lists heavily toward hierarchy and away from that they subscribe to the principles and values of equity – that is familiar at the local level. It also the Bonn Agreement, have no links with terrorist tends to internalise politicking by local and regional organisations, and have not been involved with commanders, so that the Loya Jirga Commission is narcotics, human rights abuses, war crimes, unlikely to have to face this thorny issue head-on. looting, smuggling of cultural artefacts, or the The secret ballot vote by locally selected leaders in murder of innocent people.20 the second stage for a few representatives from among themselves appears to be geared primarily Lists of electors are to be disseminated to the towards producing a democratic-like experience for public at least five days before the second phase, participants, though one that is not likely to produce and written complaints about candidates will be any surprise outcomes. reviewed by the Regional Observation Centres established by the Loya Jirga Commission. the The selection process that will determine 400 to 450 complaint process is unlikely to produce reliable seats is also a more progressive variation on a results, however. In the current political traditional theme. Although these representatives environment, accusations are easy, proof will ultimately be appointed by the Loya Jirga difficult, and the lack of due process for decisions Commission, the appointments are intended to could be devastating to the credibility of the confirm decisions taken by the concerned parties Commission. Therefore, despite the effort to themselves. Consultations, and in some cases even introduce some accountability into the election internal elections, will be held among nomads (kochi), refugees in Pakistan, Iran, and Western countries, professional and scientific organisations, and universities. The method for selecting women 19 Local leaders are expected to hold a shura or jirga on a geographic basis is still being worked out. If meeting to choose their nominees prior to the district- this achieves a fair balance, it is not likely to be as wide meeting, thus exerting a strong degree of social controversial as the indirect election process. control on the nomination of electors. 20 However, the list of appointees will be closely Art. 14, Procedures for the Elections of the Members scrutinised for evidence of a political agenda. of the Emergency Loya Jirga. The Loya Jirga: One Small Step Forward? ICG Asia Briefing Paper: 16 May 2002 Page 9

1. Population Uncertainties Afghans were killed and another six million became refugees, and with no reliable update – these figures The Loya Jirga Commission designed a process are dangerously ungrounded. that assigns a minimum of one representative to each electoral district, and additional Because there is no complete and reliable census, representatives per district based on population. the issue at the heart of Afghanistan’s political However, the exact number of electoral districts debate is the relative size of the various ethnic and the size and distribution of the population groups. As noted earlier, the Pashtuns typically remain unknown and controversial. regard themselves as 60 to 70 per cent of the population, whereas the Loya Jirga Commission Due to the administrative meltdown over the last puts them at approximately 38 per cent. While every two decades, no exact record of the number or group overestimates its proportion of the population, boundaries of districts is available. Government this is particularly problematic among Pashtuns, the records indicated from 340-360 districts; the only group who regard themselves as a majority. Loya Jirga Commission has an internally verified list if 363. Through consultations at the Pashtuns have been assailing the Loya Jirga provincial level, the Commission has added an Commission and its selection process on several additional eighteen districts that seem fairly fronts. First, the argument goes, the Commission certain, and another five to ten that are more itself, with only eight Pashtuns among 21 members, problematic. is not representative. Secondly, because the unrepresentative commission chooses the appointed While this has something to do with verifiable seats, too few Pashtuns will be selected. Thirdly, due facts on the ground, i.e. has a district been to the use of incorrect population figures, the functioning as a separate administrative entity for Pashtun districts have too few representatives a sufficient period of time, it provides insight into assigned. Finally, many argue, since the population a much deeper political issue. In 1963, in advance figures are not well known, each district should get of democratic reforms, the administrative map of an equal number of representatives. Instead, they Afghanistan was redrawn. A thorough piece of complain, the Pashtun districts only receive a few gerrymandering, the new map produced compared to districts elsewhere.21 numerous administrative districts in the Pashtun belt that were smaller than elsewhere, and also Whether or not these complaints are justified, they reportedly cut mixed-ethnicity districts to favour reflect the almost universal perception among Pashtuns. If true, this would have the effect of Pashtuns, who are already building up objections to producing a disproportionate number of Pashtun the legitimacy of the Loya Jirga outcome. Indeed, representatives. These divisions are mostly still in broad support and participation in the selection place today. One notable exception is in process across the country does not necessarily Badakhshan, former President Rabbani’s home, presage overall acceptance. Rather political players where the number of districts has gone from may be simply hedging their bets in anticipation of thirteen to an estimated 28. The Pashtuns, the real showdown, which could come before, perhaps having forgotten their own during, or after the Loya Jirga. gerrymandering of 40 years ago, are crying foul.

2. Logistical Shortcomings Inadequate population statistics are central to the problem. Each electoral district gets a number of While agreed long ago on paper, a failure to get seats based on its estimated population – one for minimal logistical support moving is hobbling the every 22,000 people. The population estimates indirect election process. According to the Loya that the Loya Jirga Commission uses extrapolate Jirga Commission, it was promised several months from the incomplete census done between 1976 and 1979 – which was only 60 per cent complete when disbanded following the Soviet invasion. Hafizullah Amin, who became the Communist 21 Ironically, the reason that the Pashtun districts get fewer president, was in charge of the census for a time representatives than the northern districts is because the and is said to have manipulated the results. After former were intentionally drawn to hold less population in 23 years of war in which an estimated 1.5 million 1963.

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ago two-fixed wing aircraft and six helicopters Afghanistan, and locally-controlled partisan stations exclusively to ferry its organising and dominate. There are currently some radio programs, observation teams around the country. In the and an informational film that is being shown in space of two months, the Commission has been villages – but these are unlikely to tackle the most expected to field dozens of teams to each of contentious issues in depth and have yet to get off nearly 390 districts throughout Afghanistan. They the ground in a meaningful way. must identify district volunteers, establish regional offices, be trained and train others, While the damage is done for the first stage, far disseminate information, conduct election more is needed in the next month to make the Loya meetings, disseminate lists of candidates selected Jirga a matter of public awareness and debate, at those meetings, and review complaint instead of merely public speculation. This is petitions. Each task requires significant travel particularly true for the question, highlighted below, within districts, between the districts and regional of how and what it is supposed to decide. People are centres, and between the regional centres and ostensibly being asked to choose their Kabul. In some cases, given the condition of representatives but it is not yet known what roads, the regional centre may be as much as a authority those representatives will have. This is day’s drive from the districts and several days’ hardly how to encourage democratic participation drive from Kabul. International observers are also and accountability to constituents. supposed to be deployed to the field for the first stage of the process, but this likewise has been 4. Keeping out the Commanders hampered by lack of flight support. Given a tight schedule in a delay-prone environment, it may be The essential focus of the political project is to shift impossible to perform these tasks without authority away from “warlords” or commanders and aircraft. into central and local government structures. This redistribution of political and economic power and The necessary logistical support is only arriving influence will take years. However, Commission now, a few weeks from the Loya Jirga itself. members and staff show misplaced confidence that Even if these aircraft become fully operational in Loya Jirga procedures will be effective in the next days, critical time has been lost. The UN marginalising the commanders at least in the mission has blamed the delay on typical selection process. bureaucratic donor malaise, while the donors have suggested that the UN did not plan its This belief rests on two improper assumptions. budgets properly. Regardless, the international First, there is substantial evidence that both regional community must not fail to support an exercise of and local networks are pursuing their political this importance with a minimum of bureaucracy objectives vigorously, including distributing large and a maximum of flexibility. amounts of cash and putting forward representatives in an attempt to capture seats. Given the continuing 3. Public Information Deficit primacy of force and finance in Afghan politics, it is unreasonable to assume that these tools will not be Public information has been another serious effective. deficit in the Loya Jirga process. The public information strategy, and indeed the indirect The second assumption concerns the belief that election strategy as a whole, seems based on an commanders are not already deeply imbedded in overly idealised view of Afghan village life and local political structures. However, most local institutions. The former relies primarily on a commanders are prominent because of their position single district volunteer, who is to spread in the local hierarchy. In other words, they control information by word of mouth, through mosques, military assets precisely because they occupy bazaars, etc., to all eligible residents. It is enough positions of local leadership (due to family history, to expect this lone volunteer to disseminate the wealth, etc.). basic message about where and when the first stage selection of electors will take place, let In this sense the Loya Jirga Commission seems to be alone actually to communicate the unfamiliar focusing too much on process, and not enough on election rules and the purpose and format of the outcomes. A neat selection process, while important Loya Jirga itself. There is only limited radio in for future such exercises, may not produce the The Loya Jirga: One Small Step Forward? ICG Asia Briefing Paper: 16 May 2002 Page 11

desired outcomes at the Loya Jirga, either in The Emergency Loya Jirga will elect a Head terms of representatives or decisions. of the State for the Transitional Compromises between today’s key power- Administration and will approve proposals brokers will be essential. for the structure and key personnel of the Transitional Administration.23

C. WHAT IS TO BE DECIDED The meaning of both “structure” and “key personnel” is open to significant interpretation, and The outcome of the Loya Jirga remains very is the source of considerable politicking and unclear. This is in part because many forces are controversy. There appear to be two camps within trying to shape that outcome. However, it is the Loya Jirga Commission. The first, led by the exacerbated by the fact that the Loya Jirga chairman, Mohammed Ismail Qasimyar, wants to Commission has decided not to establish and define the substance of decisions to be made, as well release the rules until at least 21 May 2002, just as the procedure, in advance – in effect allowing the over two weeks before the delegates arrive in Commission to define questions intended for the Kabul. This delay in providing guidance on the Loya Jirga itself. The second believes that its role is procedure and possibly the substance is to determine only the procedures that the Loya Jirga undermining efforts to produce a smooth and should use to decide both agenda and ultimate transparent process. Not only does it appear to outcome. contravene the Bonn Agreement’s requirement that the rules and procedures be published and 1. Head of State disseminated at least ten weeks before the Loya 22 Jirga convenes, but also, according to The selection of the head of state should be fairly Commission members, the rules are being straightforward. The Loya Jirga will be opened by intentionally delayed. the former king, and this will likely be the first order of business after the selection of a chairperson. One The Commission has worked doggedly to create Commission member has intimated that a petition an open and fair process that will produce a Loya process is likely, possibly requiring some 250 Jirga as representative as can be expected after signatures from the floor. decades of turmoil. Indeed, because of that turmoil, the Loya Jirga’s legitimacy will be One possible problem is the monarchy question. The predicated largely on the outcome rather than on United Nations political advisors are fairly adamant the process. Will a broadly representative process that the question whether to restore the monarchy is produce an outcome that is both broadly not on the table for this Emergency Loya Jirga and representative and acceptable to the key power will have to wait for the Constitutional Loya Jirga in brokers? If not, the Loya Jirga will be eighteen months. Logically, they argue, a discredited, regardless of how well the local Transitional Administration cannot be headed by a elections proceed. Continued delay may monarch. Be that as it may, there appears to be a undermine the political process, and the significant number of persons who support Zahir opportunity for compromise, by preventing Shah’s return to power not only as head of state, but development of a clear understanding of how and as monarch. If so, it will be difficult to suppress where necessary compromises are to be made. debate. After all, this Loya Jirga is the first Failure to establish the parameters of the manifestation of national will after a crippling war. procedures and agenda for the Loya Jirga clearly It would be unseemly for the UN to refuse to let provides further scope for unsettling political people decide what to them may seem a critical gamesmanship issue.

The Bonn Agreement is unclear on exactly what Given repeated rejection of the idea of a return to the Loya Jirga is to decide. It says only that: monarchy by the ex-king himself, it seems unlikely that this issue has a real chance of success in the Loya Jirga. But stopping discussion would leave

22 Bonn Agreement, Art. IV(3) 23 Bonn Agreement, Art. IV(5). The Loya Jirga: One Small Step Forward? ICG Asia Briefing Paper: 16 May 2002 Page 12

those favouring the monarchy suspicious and obviously through the distribution of the top jobs. unsatisfied. It may be best to let the issue arise But does this include only the head of state, prime and die on its own. minister, and chief justice of the supreme court, as some suggest; or also the five key ministries of 2. Structure of Government defence, interior, foreign affairs, finance, and planning, as others claim, or indeed the entire Somewhat more troubling is the completely cabinet? And will these positions be decided singly undefined category of decisions concerning the or through a list? structure of the Transitional Authority. The Bonn Agreement suggests that the Loya Jirga will be The answers to these questions may determine called on to approve proposals for this. However, whether the Transitional Administration will carry in the absence of rules of procedures and the peace process forward, or whether the peace will substantive guidelines, it is not clear who is disintegrate into regional division or even open authorised to produce such proposals. If the warfare. procedure is similar to that described in the 1964 Constitution, it will likely be either the newly 4. Other Matters appointed head of state or perhaps his prime minister. Unfortunately, with only seven days in Are there any other decisions that can, should, or which to complete the entire Loya Jirga, it is will be made by the Loya Jirga? Karzai has been unclear how such proposals should be crafted and reported as saying that extension of the six-month debated. ISAF mandate may depend, in part, on what the Loya Jirga does. Perhaps ISAF expansion may also Some members of the Loya Jirga Commission be raised in order to provide further impetus to the have already drafted proposals on the structure of international community to heed the desires of the government. There are ideas for a provisional Afghan people for security operations beyond parliament to be carved out of the Loya Jirga, Kabul. down to the exact number of seats. This parliament would have the power to enact laws The issue of the AIA appointment process, about and approve budgets. There would also be a which there has been considerable tension, may also Supreme Court with independent justices and arise. A mechanism for selecting provincial, lower courts. municipal, and district-level leaders, including governors, that is acceptable to those from the Others are undoubtedly thinking about the same provinces could help to avoid substantial conflict in issues. Last month Dostum discussed a plan for a the coming two years. “federal” Afghanistan, although details remain vague. He is not alone in advocating a system to ensure greater regional autonomy. It is not clear III. EXPECTATIONS AND POTENTIAL to what extent such proposals – which in the OUTCOMES present context could be destabilising – may be raised at this first Loya Jirga. The process for handling all these issues, however, would appear The Bonn conference made a dramatic, and more democratic and less staged if the Loya Jirga potentially fatal, compromise. In exchange for Commission would publish its rules immediately, granting the Panshiri faction of the Shura-i-Nazar, so that political work could be done publicly and which was then in control of Kabul, the three most transparently. powerful ministerial posts (defence, interior, and foreign affairs) in the AIA, the Panshiris agreed to 3. Key Posts allow the ex-king to return to Afghanistan and to hold a Loya Jirga to choose the next government. Most significant of all is the decision concerning Essentially, the Panshiris were given six months to the key posts in the transitional administration. consolidate their hold on power while agreeing to This is the focus of significant intrigue, as it give it up, should the Loya Jirga so decide. remains unclear which posts will be selected and how. If the point of this Loya Jirga is to balance A half year after Bonn, there is intense disaffection. the inequities of Bonn, it will have to do so most Outside the capital there is open talk of rejecting the The Loya Jirga: One Small Step Forward? ICG Asia Briefing Paper: 16 May 2002 Page 13

outcome if the Loya Jirga does not correct the also any attempt to rig the process will be noticed power imbalance. However, when asked if he and challenged. On the other hand, pressure must be would step-down if the Loya Jirga so decided, the put on the process to ensure a legitimate outcome – defence minister responded that it would be one that will address the imbalances in the AIA irresponsible for him to hand over his post to created at Bonn and keep everyone who counts on “someone who doesn’t know about military the path towards peace. affairs”. The ex-king has returned, and his future role is also the subject of polarised passions. Many within the former Northern Alliance have A. SCENARIOS openly stated that they see no political role for him, while many Pashtun representatives have The following scenarios provide a look at possible said he is the only person who can lead the nation decisions by the Loya Jirga and what political to peace and reconciliation. outcomes those decisions may entail. This exercise is not intended to predict, but rather to warn of the Such statements, which might be normal dangers of possible responses to those outcomes. grandstanding or indications of political leanings Responses could range from increased in a stable situation, should be taken as warnings dissatisfaction with the political process through in Afghanistan. There are still many who see the minimisation of cooperation with the central outcome of this Loya Jirga as their cue whether authority to violent revolt. Due to the high degree of to continue with the peace process or reject it. regional autonomy of political and military Given the shaky security situation, disavowal of leaderships, responses may vary throughout the the Loya Jirga’s outcome at best will mean country. There should be little doubt, however, that refusal to cooperate with the Transitional widespread violence that goes unchecked in one part Authority and undermining of military and police of Afghanistan will signal that political gains are authority. At worst, hostilities could break out – still to be had through the use of force. perhaps only on the periphery at first, but if not controlled they could lead to a far larger Scenario 1: Current Government with Minimal conflagration. It is true, as everyone in Changes Afghanistan including the military commanders insists, that Afghans are tired of fighting. There is likely to be general dissatisfaction among However, active hostilities are already underway, Pashtuns at having lost on both key issues, the King and the war economy has yet to be transformed. and the security ministries. They could very likely It is still a time for soldiers, not just civilians, to find allies among other poorly represented groups make the peace. such as the Hazara and the Uzbeks, both of whom have a recent history of deep enmity with the Shura- No matter how fair the selection process for i-Nazar and have indicated that they will not abide delegates appears, and no matter how finely the the current situation for long. This outcome could rules of procedure for the Loya Jirga are crafted, result in refusal to cooperate with central authorities, the legitimacy of this entire project will be based thus cementing the current de facto control of on the names and positions that emerge at the provinces and regions in the hands of commanders end. There is so little recent experience with and local shuras, and could also result in an attack trustworthy political processes in general that the on Kabul or outlying areas. connection between local selection and the outcome of the Loya Jirga itself will be tenuous Scenario 2: Complete Change of Government with at best in the eyes of most. Given Afghanistan’s King as Head of State and Loss of Key Posts by recent history, there is good reason for the Shura-I-Nazar widespread conviction that power games, both foreign and domestic, will ultimately make or Shura-i-Nazar has indicated that it would not allow break this process. such a decision to be “imposed upon it.” The belief that the king’s missteps are what led to the years of This poses a serious dilemma for the key Afghan political turmoil is compounded by the fact that the and international players. On the one hand, it is king and his supporters have been almost entirely necessary to support a procedurally legitimate absent for much of the last 30 years. The resulting process. Not only is this legally necessary, but resentment is exacerbated by Shura-i-Nazar’s The Loya Jirga: One Small Step Forward? ICG Asia Briefing Paper: 16 May 2002 Page 14

conviction that its tight grip on Kabul is justified since it was the only credible opposition to the Numerous Pashtun representatives have indicated Taliban and al-Qaeda for seven years. Such an that a failure to put the ex-king into office, and/or to outcome could result in outright rejection by lessen the control of the Panshiris will be security ministers, refusal to abide by Loya Jirga unacceptable. However, in the current climate, it is decisions and possibly a shift of heavy armour not inconceivable that former President Rabbani, back into Kabul. As one UN official put it who is campaigning vigorously, or a wildcard head recently, “they might ring the tent with tanks and of state such as Sigtabullah Mojeddi, briefly the ask the Loya Jirga to reconsider”.24 interim president in 1992, could become part of a compromise solution. There has also been Shura-i-Nazar has been able to bring its military discussion of making commander of the army a power into the capital as shown by a recent separate post from minister of defence, which could parade of heavy weapons to mark the anniversary facilitate a compromise over the security sector. of the 1992 Mujahidin take-over.25 Alternatively, if the costs of use of force in this context seem too high, they could withdraw troops to northern B. OUTSIDE LEVERAGE redoubts and become an armed opposition to an extremely unstable central government. They As ever, Afghanistan is subject to extensive foreign likely would be joined in rejection of such a involvement. American military, Western political government by the already independent Ismail influence, the United Nations political and Khan in the West, and possibly also by some humanitarian family, ISAF, and regional powers anti-king Hazara commanders and followers of such as Iran and Pakistan are all heavily involved. Rabbani, Sayyaf, and Hekmatyar. The Western elements have momentarily dwarfed and partially displaced the regional influences, but Scenario 3: King Becomes Head of State with the degree of outside intervention is higher than Current Government Largely Intact ever. This has potentially a more positive aspect . than the interventions of the last 30 years, but it also There are those who claim they will reject any entails great dangers. political role for the king. However, if he is selected as head of state, it may be impossible to In certain ways, the stakes are as high as ever. On 11 limit his role so that it is purely ceremonial as any September 2001, one point was indelibly made in head of state selected by the Loya Jirga is likely the minds of many around the world – insecurity to have some real political powers. Thus, there is abroad means real, life or death insecurity at home. widespread fear that the monarchists, especially If the world fails to make it secure for its own members of the royal family, will use the ex- people, Afghanistan could once again become a king’s position as a Trojan horse to enter threat well beyond its borders. government. A means to control this could result in an acceptable compromise – a relatively weak Given the unstable political and security situation in former-king as head of state who completely and the lead up to the Loya Jirga, what tools of influence repeatedly renounces the concept of monarchy does the international community have at its for Afghanistan, and a hand-over of one of the disposal in Afghanistan and how should they be two security ministries. This obvious compromise applied? would be widely appreciated and go a long way towards quelling the deep dissatisfaction that 1. Military could cause the process to unravel. The B-52 has entered common parlance in Scenario 4: Current Government with Changes of Afghanistan. Air power is seen as the pre-dominant Head of State and/or Security Ministries factor in the rapid collapse of the Taliban and the redrawing of Afghanistan’s political map. Indeed, the threat of the B-52 is regarded as so overwhelming that it may be able to keep warring 24 ICG interview, Kabul, May 2002. factions in check. However, it is unclear whether the 25 The weapons were supposed to have been withdrawn U.S. would respond if its bluff were called, or even from the city after the parade but it is unclear whether all whether there is a bluff to be called in the first place. left or not. The Loya Jirga: One Small Step Forward? ICG Asia Briefing Paper: 16 May 2002 Page 15

In rejecting the expansion of ISAF, Coalition hand. For those they cannot fully control, the threat forces have given a yellow-light to warring of force remains. However such unity is not in factions that may not be ready to give up their evidence. On the day that the ex-king returned to fighting ways out of the goodness of their own Kabul from exile, for example, the minister of hearts. defence, who openly opposed his return, flew to Paris and was treated like a head of state. While the Recent factional fighting reinforces this minister’s message was clear, France’s was not. contention – especially in Gardez where both sides have been supported by the Coalition. The Political unity will also be necessary among the Coalition appears to be pursuing its priority of “permanent five” in the UN Security Council to curb eradicating al-Qaeda even if this entails set backs potentially destabilising interventions from in the stabilisation of Afghanistan. There is fear Afghanistan’s neighbours. Iran, Pakistan and other in Kabul that there is a real contradiction in regional powers must be brought into the group Coalition political and military policy that may working for a peaceful Afghanistan, not excluded be the undoing of long-term stability in from the process. But they have many legitimate Afghanistan. interests in Afghanistan that they will, as always, pursue, so a convincing case must be made not only The near universal call for the expansion of that a peaceful country is in those interests, but also ISAF’s size and mandate has been rejected by the that Western influence is being used for mutually U.S. and the European countries that contributed agreed objectives. forces. Despite repeated insistence by Coalition members that this is a dead issue, Afghan and 3. Economic international advocates have yet to give up the fight. Indeed, Sima Samar, vice-chair of the AIA The international community is promoting and Minister of Women’s Affairs, recently reconstruction assistance as a key contribution to delivered a speech to the UN Security Council Afghanistan’s stability and to the legitimacy of the again calling for ISAF operations beyond the central government. However, while significant capital. promises have been made, too little has reached Afghanistan yet to rely on its impact in the coming It is not unthinkable that Coalition military forces political struggle. Delivery is inevitably slow: due to or ISAF will be drawn, feet-dragging to the last, various bureaucratic requirements (from budget into a domestic political dispute that threatens to approval to tendering and contracting procedures), undo the entire peace process. A sudden logistical difficulties, and the problem of identifying engagement of this sort would likely involve competent in-country labour resources. In short, greater loss of life, and lesser political control, significant reconstruction assistance will not be than a well planned deployment. Such lack of available until long after this Loya Jirga and its planning and coordination of political and political fallout occur. military goals was in evidence in November 2001 when after weeks of promises to the contrary, the The only effective aid at the moment is of the Shura-i-Nazar rolled into Kabul upsetting any emergency humanitarian kind and a few, limited potential power balance. The opportunity to “quick-impact” type projects – neither of which tend correct, not compound, these earlier mistakes to utilise or credit central government participation should be taken. or resources. Indeed, quite the opposite is true. Almost all projects are emblazoned with the logos of 2. Political donors and implementers and thus obviously not intended to inspire either confidence in the Most of those now credibly vying for power in sovereign government or a sense of self-reliance. Afghanistan owe their immediate fortune directly to Coalition actions. Coalition troops and the The depth of the conflict in Afghanistan will not, at partner governments have been intensively least initially, be assuaged by a few development building relationships with these leaders since projects. Certainly the long-term prospects of the September 2001. If they are unified in purpose, economy will figure into Afghanistan’s successful these governments have the political clout to transition, but no amount of money at present will keep most Afghan actors from getting out of ensure that those poised to undo the peace will stand The Loya Jirga: One Small Step Forward? ICG Asia Briefing Paper: 16 May 2002 Page 16

down. The aid community, however, has and the signs that the country could once again come explicitly tied the delivery of assistance to apart at the seams are evident. support for the political process (“conditionality”), threatening to cut off help to A re-balancing of power in Kabul is essential to the certain regions if local or regional players do not Loya Jirga’s success, but anything too dramatic will cooperate. It is not clear either whether the fear likely unhinge the entire peace process. Expectations of an aid-cut-off will change behaviour (six years of an end to rule by commanders will have to wait – of this policy during Taliban rule suggest quite until both the commanders and their benefactors, can the opposite),26 nor even if these threats are be convinced that the way forward is through credible. Human rights violations are a common political compromise and economic rehabilitation. reason to threaten aid-cut-offs – but such threats But compromise now is essential, and the are already becoming incredible. For instance, international community must use its political and will aid be cut off following the reports of human military influence, and in a unified fashion, to push rights abuses against Pashtuns in the North?27 this process forward. Without such significant pressure, no economic peace dividend can be In short, economic pressure through control of realised. reconstruction assistance is not yet an effective sanction for negative political behaviour. The Several things can and must be done immediately to threat of military intervention in intra-Afghan give the Loya Jirga process legitimacy, and to conflicts and intensive political pressure are the prevent the wider peace process from careening out primary tools the international community has at of control. The agenda and procedures for the Loya its disposal at this stage. Afghanistan needs to Jirga must be made clear and must be disseminated pass through the Loya Jirga without a collapse widely and repeatedly throughout the country. back into the factional fighting of the early 1990s Logistical support must be given, unequivocally, to in order to progress to a level of investment in the those responsible for making this process work. A peace process that will be susceptible to subtler dialogue must be established between disgruntled forms of persuasion. Until then, the international factions to forge a common vision of an acceptable, community must be willing to stay in the thick of if not ideal outcome for the Loya Jirga. And swift, the peace process with the Afghans. definitive steps must be taken to nip factional fighting in the bud – lest a few small fires lead to a IV. CONCLUSION conflagration that the world will find itself powerless to stop.

A desperate desire for peace on the part of most Kabul/Brussels, 16 May 2002 Afghans is pushing expectations for the Loya Jirga process beyond what is realistic. Afghanistan’s path towards peace remains troubled and uncertain. An unstable security situation coupled with a hurried, high-stakes political process is a recipe for potential disaster,

26 DAC Network on Conflict Peace and Development Cooperation, The Limits and Scope for the Use of Development Assistance Incentives and Disincentives for Influencing Conflict Situations. Case Study. Afghanistan 1999. 30 April 2002, OECD. 27 See Human Rights Watch Report, Paying for the Taliban’s Crimes: Abuses of Pashtuns in Northern Afghanistan, 22 April 2002, and Physicians for Human Rights Report, Preliminary Assessment of Alleged Mass Gravesites in the Area of Mazar-I-Sharif, Afghanistan. 2 May 2002.

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MAP OF AFGHANISTAN

The Loya Jirga: One Small Step Forward? ICG Asia Briefing Paper: 16 May 2002 Page 18

GLOSSARY OF TERMS

AIA: Afghan Interim Authority Junbish-i-Milli Predominantly ethnic Uzbek militia based in the Bonn Agreement: Formally, the Agreement north of the country and on Provisional Arrange- commanded by General ments in Afghanistan Rashid Dostum Pending the Reestablish- ment of Permanent Hezb-i-Islami: Hardline Islamist Pashtun Government Institutions. Mujahidin group, long Negotiated under the backed by Pakistan and auspices of the United Saudi Arabia, headed by Nations in Bonn from 27 Gulbuddin Hekmatyar November 2001 to December 2001 Hezb-i-Wahadat Predominantly ethnic Hazara militia commanded ISAF: International Security by Mohammad Karim Assistance Force Khalili Ittihad-i-Islami Predominantly ethnic Northern Alliance: Anti-Taliban Coalition of Pashtun militia commanded mostly non-Pashtun forces. by Rasoul Sayyaf, once heavily backed by Saudi Shura-i-Nazar: Predominantly Panshiri Arabia Tajik political group that holds the key posts in the Jamiat-i-Islami Predominantly ethnic Tajik AIA group, officially led by former president Uluswali: Administrative District Burhanuddin Rabbani, with UNAMA: United Nations Assistance forces commanded by the Mission in Afghanistan late Ahmed Shah Masood

The Loya Jirga: One Small Step Forward? ICG Asia Briefing Paper: 16 May 2002 Page 19

ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP

The International Crisis Group (ICG) is a private, ICG’s international headquarters are at Brussels, multinational organisation committed to with advocacy offices in Washington DC, New strengthening the capacity of the international York and Paris and a media liaison office in community to anticipate, understand and act to London. The organisation currently operates prevent and contain conflict. eleven field offices with analysts working in nearly 30 crisis-affected countries and territories and ICG’s approach is grounded in field research. across four continents. Teams of political analysts are located within or close by countries at risk of outbreak, escalation or In Africa, those locations include Burundi, recurrence of violent conflict. Based on Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, information and assessments from the field, ICG Sierra Leone-Liberia-Guinea, Somalia, Sudan and produces regular analytical reports containing Zimbabwe; in Asia, Indonesia, Myanmar, practical recommendations targeted at key Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Pakistan and international decision-takers. Afghanistan; in Europe, Albania, Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia; in the Middle ICG’s reports and briefing papers are distributed East Algeria and the whole region from Egypt to widely by email and printed copy to officials in Iran; and in Latin America, Colombia. foreign ministries and international organisations and made generally available at the same time via ICG raises funds from governments, charitable the organisation's Internet site, www.crisisweb.org. foundations, companies and individual donors. The ICG works closely with governments and those following governments currently provide funding: who influence them, including the media, to Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, highlight its crisis analyses and to generate support Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, for its policy prescriptions. Norway, the Republic of China (Taiwan), Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. The ICG Board – which includes prominent figures from the fields of politics, diplomacy, Foundation and private sector donors include The business and the media – is directly involved in Ansary Foundation, The Atlantic Philanthropies, helping to bring ICG reports and recommendations Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, Carnegie to the attention of senior policy-makers around the Corporation of New York, Charles Stewart Mott world. ICG is chaired by former Finnish President Foundation, Ford Foundation, John D. and Martti Ahtisaari; and its President and Chief Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, John Merck Executive since January 2000 has been former Fund, Open Society Institute, Ploughshares Fund, Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans. Ruben and Elisabeth Rausing Trust, Sasakawa Peace Foundation, and William and Flora Hewlett Foundation.

May 2002

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