UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONERFOR REFUGEES R 7, 72 ENG 557cp.2

, PRELIMINARY REPORT ON CONDITIONS AFFECTING

THE 'REPATRIATION OF AFGHAN REFUGEES

Prepared by:

Richard English, Ph.D

For the Operational Lnit for Repatriation tc Afghanistan l;NHCR, Geneva 20 June D83 1A

Be not so sweet that they swallow you. Be not so bitter that they spityou out.

-- Pushtun proverb

The views presented in this reportare those of the author and should not be construedas representing the official position or policy of the United Nations High Commissioner of Refugees. CONCLLSION 36

REFERENCES 58

ANNEX I/TABLES 59

ANNEX II /POLITICAL PARTIES 7,

ANNEX III CROSS -BORDER AGENCIES & COMMITTEES OF COOPERATION 78

ANNEX IG/DIRECTORY OF NGOS 37

MAPS

1. Major Ethnic Groups of Afghanistan 3

2. Percentage of Refugees in Iran & Pakistan 12 Originating in Each Province of Afghanistan

3. Location of Afghan Refugee Camps in NWFP

4. Location of Afghan Refugee Camps in Baluchistan

5. Approximate Locations of Internally Displaced 14 Populations in Afghanistan

6. Crossing Points for Afghan Refugees 23 Returning to Afghanistan

7 Relief Map of Afghanistan with Planning 34 Regions Indicated

8 Planning Regions 33

Map of individual regions followpp. 33, 39, 42, 49,33 3

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

INTRODUCTION 1. Project Background 5 2. Objectives 3. The Report 4. Acknowledgements

BACKGROUND 1. Population 6 2. Economy and Subsistence 10 3. Consequenses of the War ii - - Agriculture 11 - - Refugees in Pakistan 12 - - Refugees in Iran 13 - - The Internally Displaced 14 - - The Resistance _ .14 4. Prospects for Repatriation. 13

UNHCR .CONCERNS AND ACTIVITIES /AFGHANISTAN ti.... 16 'l. Policy 16 2. Implementation 18. 3. Monitoring 19 4. Planning and Logistics 19 5. Transport 21 6 Mines 24 7. Food 23 8. water 26 9. Shelter 26 10. Health - - Medical Assistance 27 -- Health Conditions 30 - - Health Planning 31 11. Agricultural Assistance 3_

UNHCR CONCERNS AND ACTIVITIES /PAKISTAN 33 REGIONAL PROFILES 35 North North East 33 39 East 42 East Centrai South 43 North west 49 J3 INTRODUCTION

. PROJECT BACKGROUND

2.1 Many months prior to the signing of the Geneva accords, which initiated the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, CNHCR began developing contingency plans for the eventual return of up to four million Afghan refugees settled in Pakistan and Iran. Political constraints, and the very real possibility that the initiation of such activities would spark a premature repatriation, prevented UNHCR from sharing its concerns with others or from seeking the counsel of those individuals and agencies knowledgeable about conditions inside Afghanistan. The signing of the Geneva accords, and the necessity to formalize planning for refugee repatriation, prompted the High Commissioner to create a task force to oversee the planning and implementation of a repatriation programme. Towards that end, the task force, or the Operational Unit for Repatriation to Afghanistan (OURA), assembled a team of consultants to assist in the gathering of information relevant to repatriation planning and to make recommendations accordingly. This report is the outcome of the initial phase of information gathering that was required to refine initial budget, logistic and staffing requirements. The second phase of the information gathering process will refine update and expand upon this report in order that policy and programming can be adjusted to the rapidly changing conditions in Afghanistan.

2. OBJECTIVES

2.2 The primary objectives of the first phase of information gathering project were 1)to set up a computerized data base of country information relevant to the repatriation of Afghan refugees; 2) based upon the results of the first phase, developa preliminary outline for a repatriation programme; and, 3)to identify human and institutional resources that could be calledupon to assist UNHCR and other UN agencies in the implementation of a repatriationprogramme.

2.3 In the early phases of the project, UNHCR and the consultants initiated contact with all agencies based in Peshawar and inQuetta involved in providing assistance to populations inside Afghanistan (hereafter referred to as "Cross- Border .Agencies "). A list of questions soliciting information on conditions within Afghanistan relevant to UNHCR's concerns -- e.g., quality of roads, availability of storage, transport and fuel, level of destruction ofirrigation systems and farm land, security situation andpresence of land mines,- etc. within particular areas -- were distributed to all agencies. Agencies were also requested to provide informationon the nature and extent of their various operations so that a list of existing resources (i.e., medical facilities, agricultural programmes, bases of operation) within each province could beincorporated into a basic repatriation assistance infrastructure. Subsequently, the consultants approached those agencies providing assistanceto refugees in Pakistan and made similar requests forinformation. Eventually, the consultants translated the list ofquestions into Cari and Pushto, the two most common languages ofAfghanistan, and distributed these among a number of Afghanresistance commanders who regularly visit Peshawar.

2.4 Initially, the consultants encounteredenormous reluctance on the part of the cross -border agenciesto provide any information regarding their operations inside Afghanistan. Knowing that UNHCR would be compelled to establish formalcontacts with the Kabul regime concerning any repatriation planning,the agencies feared that the information they provided the consultants wouldeventually fall into the hands of the Kabul regime andthereby jeopardize the security of their activities. Subsequent guarantees from UNHCR thatt.e information provided would remain inPakistan generated a better level of cooperation among the agencies. At this writing, the agencies are preparing more comprehensiveaccounts on the scope of their activities than whatwas eventually provided for the preparation of this report. These accounts represent,to a certain extent, a form of self -evaluation thatthe agencies heretofore had been unable to undertake because of limited resources andpersonnel. However, the agencies have realizedthe importance of information sharing among themselves and have formed a number of committeesin an attempt to coordinate their activites ina more organized fashi,n (see Appendix III for a. descriptionof these committees).

2.5 Two data base systems were setup to store and manage the information that was solicited by theconsultants through the lists of questions, and through-interviewswith knowledgeable individuals. Reports issued by the various cooperative committees ofcross -border and refugee assistance agenciesregarding conditions inside Afghanistan were also edited foruse (see References). A text -based data management system knownas "ask Sam" was customized by the Management Information Systems Servicesunit of UNHCR Headquarters for use in Peshawar to organize the more than two megabytesof text that had been computerized by the end of the project phase I period. Quantatative data regarding the sizeof the refugee population, ethnic and tribal organizationand areas of origin in Afghanistan were, and continue to be, entered intoa Dbase III programme designed by the consultants to manage information gathered on thesesubjects. 3. THE REPORT basic overview of the 2.6 Chapter III of this report provides a population and economy of Afghanistan before1979, and outlines the general understanding of the effects of adecade of armed conflict and political upheaval on Afghansociety. This chapter also examines the social and politicalconsiderations that will effect refugee return. Chapter IV outlines the basic conditionsfor planning and implementing repatriationassistance in Afghanistan from the point of view of policy concernsand sectoral (i.e., food, shelter, storage and health)requirements. Chapter V briefly examines some of the areas inwhich the refugee assistance programme in Pakistan can be reoriented tosupport repatriation planning and devised implementation. Chapter VI examines the six planning regions for organising assistance toAfghanistan. Information on existing agricultural conditions, the level of wardamage, the ethnic and political characteristics of the resistance,and routes of access is presented, as well as information related tothe refugees and displaced populations that originated ineach region. The existing level of NGO and resistance resources --medical, agricultural and administrative -- is also considered. Finally, Section VII reviews the preliminary findings of the consultantteam, reiterates general recommendations and proposes directions forthe information gathering process in the near future. Detailed information regarding administration, origin of refugees, logisticsof repatriation, health conditions and medical resources are containedin the tables of Annex I. A profile of the Afghan resistanceparties and a list of prominent resistance commanders active inAfghanistan is presented in Annex II. Annex III provides a profile of-refugee assistanceand cross -border NGO activities and AnnexIV contains a comprehensive directory of NGOs active in Peshawar and Quetta.

4. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

2.7 This report is a synthesis of ideas and perspectivesfrom sources that are far too numerous tomention. Nevertheless, a number of individuals must be acknowledged for their invaluableassistance in gathering the data on which this report is based, andin educating the reporter regarding the interpretation of the data -- most specifically, the consultants Eva Nordenskjold, Dominique Vergosand Dr. Paul Ickx. Dr. Laurence Lamonier, Naseem Jawad, David Garner, Anders Fange, Jean -Jose Puig and Whitney Azoywillingly shared their hard earned insights concerning the political andeconomic realities of Afghan society. Dr. Azam Gul, Director of the Agricultural Survey of Afghanistan, Engineer Abdul Saboor, In-Charge of Income -Generating Programmes for the International Rescue Committee andHaji Daoud, Director of the Afghan Media Resource Centerprovided technical assistance and general counsel with the samegenerosity that has endeared the Afghan people to all thosewho work with them. Pip Land skillfully edited and computerizedd page after pageof reports and interview notes as well as providing theresults of her own researches into mines and Afghan family life. Finally, the reporter would like to thank the staff of the UNHCR sub-offices in Peshawar and Quetta for the assistance andinformationgenerously provided during the project period. 8

BACKGROUND

3.1 In April of 1978, the pro- Soviet partisan Nur Mohammad Taraki orchestrated the overthrow of the constitutional government of Mohammad Daoud and proclaimed the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. The reforms undertaken by this revolutionary government, especially in the areas of public education and land redistribution, met with widespread dissatisfaction among the traditional Muslim population. Subsequent struggle within the Afghan communist party, which led to a change of leadership, and the growing militancy of the opposition to government reforms prompted theSoviet supporters of the Afghan revolution to take active ,steps to reinforce the beleaguered government. In December 1979, 100,000 Soviet troops invaded Afghanistan and installed Babarak Karmal, founderof the Parcham (banner) wing of the Afghan communist party,as'the country's leader. Since that time, the Soviets have remained inan attempt to assist the government in suppressing armed resistancethroughout the country; a resistance which the participants believeto be jihad, or "holy war ".

1. POPULATION

3.2 The population of Afghanistan is ethnically andlinguistically diverse, combining elements of Indo- European,Turkic and Central Asian Mongol peoples. Islam is the single binding force with the majority professing Sunni Islamas their faith. However, a significant minority, especially the Hazaras ofthe central highlands and the populations living along the Iranianborder, profess Shi'a Islam as their faith. The Persian dialect of Dari is the country's lingua franca although Pushto is spoken exclusivelyin the tribal belt bordering Pakistan.

3.3 The pre -war population is believed to havenumbered between 12 and 15 million, 85% of which derived theirlivelihood from agriculture. More than two million people are thoughtto have been pastoral nomads. In 1979, the total urban populationwas estimated at nearly 15 %, with approximately 6% living inKabul, the capital city. The population growth rate at that timewas 2.3% and life expectancy was among the lowest in Asia: 36.5years for men and 37.8 years for women. The infant mortality rate wasput at a little over 200 per 1000 births.

3.3 The Durrani Pushtuns have dominated thecountry's political life since the late 1700s. The Pushtuns are the largest ethnic group, representing nearly 40% of the country'spopulation (see Table Id /1). They are settled widely along thesouthern perimeter of the central highlands from Herat to beyond thewestern GROUPES ETHNIQUES MAP 1/ MA.JUk ETHNIC (;kUIJJ'S UF AFGHANISTAN U. R. S. Douchanbe CHII-tVE PAK Peshawar TAN ISLAMABAD INDE Pashfouns_Todpks U Nourtstanls_ iRi¡ii ¡ HauarasBoloutche s A AAAAaA A A A r Pas/la'sPannlris e1iiuM Quetta TurkmènesA1rÌÌa<,'. _ E_ larphtzMophois _ .:i 0 200 km Arobes I 9

borders of Pakistan. Large pockets of Pushtun settlement are also found throughout the north as a result of the resettlement and "internal colonization" policies of successive rulers from the late nineteenth century.

rr, iABLE i11/1 -- ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF THE rC?UPOPULATION ,a),,,9 AFGHANISTANMr,HAN N í1.),8 .,. ANO THE REFUGEE POPULATION Di PAKISTAN IN 1481t

Ethnic Groups Language islaaic Afghanistan Refugee! ;f;nan ü tan

Sect LOU. 1''' t .

Pusntun Pashto Sunni i)

1 Tajik Dari Sunni 26 6.0

1 Hazara Mari Shia 10 0.1

1 Uzbek Turkic Sunni 10 O.: 1:.+

i iurkoaan Turkic Sunni 3 1.0 .1

Nuristani Pashai Sunni 1 2.)

1 Salucn 8alucn Sunni i :.6

Others ,,.3 ií..

TOTAL 10'0 100%

t Source: Sìiwinski (1488), Gucree (148*)

3.4 The majority of Pushtuns continue to hold fast totheir ethnic identity and traditions of pukhtunwali, a strict code ofethics governing public behavior, social responsibility, personalhonor and often violent retribution for the violation of this code. For the Pushtun, 'the primary loyalty is to God, then to thefamily and finally, to the Qom or patrilineage, which, for most, canbe traced up through the sub -tribe to one ofthe two "original" Pushtun tribes, the Ghilzai or the Durrani. Leadership among the Pushtun is vested in tribal elders and religious leaders who adjudicatedisputes and exercise authority through tribal councils, called,iirea.

3.5 The Persian -speaking Tajiks constitute the nextlargest ethnic minority. Tajiks are settled throughout the northeastof the country from the Tasqurgan River to the Pamir Mountainsnorth of the Hindu Rush. Turkic- speaking Uzbeks inhabit the northern areasof the country that are contiguous with SovietUzbekistan and the low hi1i that separate the Central Highlands from the BactrianPlain south of the Amu Darya. The Turkoman inhabit this plain and theirsettlements extend westward through the northern reaches of BadghisProvince. The Central Highlands of Hazarajat, which encompass Ghor,Uruzgan, Bamian and parts of Jowzjan,Parwan and Ghazni provinces areinhabited 10

West of Hazarajatand up almost exclusively bythe Mongol Hazaras. semi- nomadic Persian to the border of Iranlive a population of the barren southlands speaking Shi'as known asthe Aimaq. Throughout Brahui tribesmen. of the country livesemi -nomadic Baluch and of these Like the Pushtuns,leadership among the majority 3.6 However, peoples derives fromin part from religiousauthority. prominent secular authority isconcentrated more in the hands of than in the egalitarian lineages of landholding families, or khan, from their Qom of thePushtun. Powerful khans derive their support sharecropping tenantsmuch like a feudal landholder. primordial ties of kinship combinedwith 3.7 The strength of the religious leaders has the absolute authorityof local tribal and governments of repeatedly undermined attemptsby successive Afghanistan to centralizeauthority. Reformist rulers in particular from these groups, as have repeatedly metwith formidable opposition traditions most reforms have beenperceived as violations of tribal and attempts to erode thelocal power structure. As a result, only Afghanistan's rulers have foundit difficult to introduce not especially social, but economic andtechnological reforms as well, that into the Pushtun dominated areas. Once source astutely observes the Mujahidin is the conflict between theSoviet- supported regime and between in many ways acontinuatibn'of the traditional struggle reformist and anti- reformistforces. This conflict follows the same and schisms between central andlocal power, and between secular religious authority that havedivided Afghanistan for centuries (EEC, 1987)

2. ECONOMY AND SUBSISTENCE information about Afghanistanbefore and 3.8 Accurate and objective during the war is difficult toobtain. Successive governments have buttress repeatedly manipulated socialand economic indicators to of their claims of politicallegitimacy, to justify the direction their internal policy and toreinforce their appeals forforeign population derived its aid. Approximately 85% of the pre -war livelihood from farming or herding. Estimates derived from western arable development sources indicate thatonly half of the country's prior to land (23% of the entire landsurface) was under cultivation Much of this cultivation wasconcentrated in the northern 1979 Helmand River plains, the upper and lowerKabul river valleys and the cultivation was of cereals,wheat valley. Ninety percent of this rice. The being the staple food cropfollowed by barley, maize and Average yields of these two major cash crops werecotton and fruit. principal crops were among thelowest in the world according to one source,

...due to natural soil deficiencies,salinity, high evapo- transpirationin summer, cold winters restricting agriculture to nine months in the year,sharp diurnal temperature changes, water scarcity,and overexploitation of small holdings by poor farmerswho cannot afford natural or artificial fertilizers. There has also been severe wind and water erosion (King, 1988). 11

3.9 Despite these obstacles, and periodic famines, by thelatter half of the 1970s, the country was considered virtually self- sufficient in food production and theeconomy was beginning to show signs of growth with improving exports offresh and dried fruit, cotton, and natural gas (largely to the Soviet Union).

3.10 Nearly two- thirds of the country is rangelandand supported an estimated 24 million sheep, including 4 millionKarakul sheep in the north. These provided the raw materials for smallscale carpet weaving and textile industries, especiallyin the northern and western parts of the country, as wellas meat, and indispensable element of the .afghan diet.

3.11 The most enduring pattern of subsistenceis that of families cultivating irrigated (abi) river bottomland with cereals and driving their flocks into the hills eachday for pasture. At higher elevations, or in oasis areas, rain- fed /snow -fed cultivation (lalmi) replaces irrigated farming. In the semi -desert areas of thesouth and west, extensive networks ofunderground channels (karez)are maintained for cultivation. Irrigation is vital to the population's subsistence. At least 80% of the country's total wheatcrop is cultivated on irrigated lands.

3. CONSEQUENCES OF THE WAR

3.12 Ten years of war have hada devastating effect on the society and economy of Afghanistan. The systematic destruction of the agriculture by Soviet /Afghan forces,especially in those areas thought to be supporting the resistancehas undermined the capacity of the country to feed itself. Four million people have fled the country to settle as refugees in Pakistanand Iran. Another 1.5 to two million people have abandoned theirvillages for moresecure areas within the country, either in the citiesor in rural areas removed from the main concentrationsof conflict. Another one million Afghans are estimated to have lost their livesas a result of the war. Table III /2 demonstrates thedramatic social dislocation of the Afghan population resulting from a decade of politicalupheaval.

-- AGRICULTURE - -

3.13 .according the the AgriculturalSurvey of Afghanistan conducted under the auspices of the Swedish Committee for Afghanistan,the country's agricultural productionhas been reduced byone -third of the pre -war levels owing to the large scale abandonment offields and the deterioration of irrigationworks. The principal reasons for this decline, according to the Survey, are:1) the reduction of farm manpower, both family and hired labordue to flight, disability and /or death; 2) a 40% reduction in the numbers ofdraught animals due to disease, mines or deliberate slaughter bygovernment forces; 3)a decline in the genetic potential of the wheat seed; and 4)a decline in the use of fertilizer among most farmers. In addition, there has been a general declinein the livestock that Afghan farmers have traditionally fallen back on during times ofpoor TaBLE 111/2

CONPPIEON OF THE POFULATIONDISTIEUTION OF AFr31-4M11 F.79;1';13-7--

Distribution of theAfghan Population 1978

Rural( 85Z>-..

-Urbon(153:)

11. 'Distribution ofthe Afghan Population 1987

Urban C24)- ..141MOOOORO

.- MMMMM pluood(11g)--

-7011111 111111 Met u g ees(337;)-1

SGurce: SLIWIMEKI (19E18) agricultural production. Numbers of common sheep, Karakul sheep and goats have dropped anywhere from between 55 and 70% according to the Agricultural Survey's estimates. The survey also notes that despite the fact that certain areas of the country have suffered more severe destruction than others tnamely, Kandahar, Logar, Paktya, Parwan and Herat provinces), the effects of the war have been remarkably consistent across all regions of the country. The Survey report interprets this consistency to indicate the systematic manner in which the destruction of Afghan agriculture was planned and executed. More specific effects of the war- related damage will be discussed in the regional profiles of Chapter VI.

-- REFUGEES IN PAKISTAN --

3.14 The exodus of Afghans began shortly after the Saur Revolution of 1978. By October 1979, and the overthrow of the government of Mohammad Taraki, there were nearly 200,000 Afghans seeking asylum in Pakistan. By mid -January 1980, following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the installation of Babarak Karmal, the number of refugees had increased to 500,000. Within almost a year, the number had swollen to nearly two million as the government attempted to swiftly put down the resistance throughout the country. By June of 1983, the number of Afghan refugees settled in Pakistan had reached three million people.

3.15 The majority of the refugees originate from areas thatare exposed to the main activities of the war, along major road networks and near strategic resources where resistance activity is concentrated. The causes of flight have been numerous, but most often they are the result of reprisals fromone side against those supporting the other. These reprisals extend from the bombardment and shelling of villages to the indiscriminate sewing of anti- personnel mines. Conscription of villagers by the Afghanarmy is another factor, as ::are the internecine conflictsamong rival religious and ethnic factions exacerbated by wartimeconditions and the proliferation of arms. The report of Commission Internationale d'Enquete Humanitaire report on the conditions of theinternally displaced in Afghanistan sums up dramatically theconditions faced by much of the rural population of the country:

... when,in the course of months of war, a community findsits harvests destroyed, its livestock decimated, thebazaars ali around closed or lacking the most essentialgoods, and the money has run out, even if their houses are still standing, little alternative remains for the membersof the community but to escape to areas with which they are familiar, andwhere they are sure of finding something to feed their children(LIEN, 1985:15).

3.16 The majority of the refugees in Pakistan havebeen settled by the government in more than 300 "refugee villages"located in the provinces of NWFP, Baluchistan and Punjab. The remainder have settled spontaneously in the country's majorurban centers, Islamabad, Lahore and Karachi. MAP 2 /PERCENTAGE OF REFUGEES IN IRAN & PAKISTAN ORIGINATING IN EACH PROVINCE \ , 1 lSonguj 2.0 s / Bidakhsh>tn 1 Balkh( 0.3 i }''-L....iTakh0a ` ' ,1 0.7 Fir ib NA Í. .m,npici f -1 ,1owz¡\\ . 0.4 t Bghli'.i Her6t A .../-. Bagas d h,-,...... /%.1 1.1 J ..,.. r , `.S.0.2 yv 2.7 J Bamlan NA r Vatrdk JPl4nNAs f Q'(.k. Kib 1 8 ` 10.5 zKonarh 5. 5 0 , Ghawt / I. 1 , y 0.2 i hS Nrtnrh/t .. .``<:: -= _ ' ( , 41 ( yvçer . 1 Crúzgin \. Ghazni y;- ,-..P,kci; 9.2. . , Farah j ....4 ; 1.3 .+ - 5.3 t"9" t 'y ` 4 / Paktlká" '. '... Zibol i., 7.0 / Y {! i.±. ''. ]r w i' : .. ,7 ,,¡¡.: Al ..:... .1 . v..' 9.5 1.3 / ` r .r .t j , r 200,000 or more Nimrúz 3.1 / / He4mand' Glid3 1 e h#' 50,000 - 200,000 '. ' L. 1 less than 50,000 MAP 3/ `;U.S.SR. / ,-^.-- ^ BaroghilPoss \.. "" LOCATION OF AFGHANREFUGEE `,/ J VILLAGESINNORTHWEST FRONTIER / PROVINCE ' (BADAK:TSHAL\j SCALE IN MILES CHITRAL o 20 40 60 e0 100 NORTHERN AREA GILGIT AGENCY

INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY \ Chitral A. ^_ . ..- '1\ PROVINCIAL BOUNDARY K DIVISIONAL BOUNDARY U N FATA AREA BOUNDARY L11L'J1J111111J1 DIR S WAT A 1 J AGENCY BOUNDARY R Dir Dassu DISTRICT BOUNDARY KOFIISTAN DISTRICT H.O. i I ...... J REFUGEE VILLAGE i Saidu /MANSEHRA i:! ! I ` 1-t114:... i Marlsehra a A1tiKAND' i; i :; i ; (NANGRAHARI / cc ' ,.MARDAN

IABBO` jTABAD ) AFGHANISTAN '. M ar a n .. . .ÿdi ! z . 4i l!1 t LOGART .--_ ir . J 41 I H í; r , 0ö ' d.%. ,... r i!ijWIII?. 4Kohatr á :OHAT . PAKTYA I . M J it. 3a n u \ PUNJAB

BANNU .*- JNIIANWALI

DERA ISMAIL J 1 KHANS j

D.I.KHANKHI N.,-/ (

BALUCHISTAN NAP !t/ LOCATION OF AFGHAN REFUGEE VILLAGES IN BALUCI1ISTAN I Z ML f -- ' . f i i :chi z trrakld [w o - r N I MROZ 1 [EMPAUMA aku arra dttf.h c:=1 ul 1 1-.u:lirl.z;h Khan '`l [4511'At1_DAL1IClíI aTtLri. 1 ATor, :og1t_.ni Tan r t:illa I1,ji Aiiz d eZar l;rez r2G z 3 Dash Goran Irranas filll;Ga1 Katwai et", :a.l Al'G1 tANI :ìT,.lt :i_, . Lej y Karcz 16.2 Mohd I:hel 1 Ghazgai t:inar.: Speciar New PJriri Chaga i 4 412 (,a YI tlohdt:otid 1:he I:hel 1 3 2 : / Zaro a o-bs. t. an tiohdLatlfalbad l:hel 5 Mtilgagaït I 11 Amri lft) .4 hah SurY,llabSurl:hab 12 -F;algr,ga, 3 ;alga {.1 It'.i:t oka:.irdi r Jungle i trfin ItadiraNew Sur :habairat 1(.2 16<2 ` t;algag^ir;algayl:i 5 4 kfto tif1/4 t Posti 3 GiPosti l lachlh 12 ModelShireenaub "1Shire :ar 2 n-.,ub ChowkiKarezNadi 16.2 1&21L2 f..,_ f....:.,.. r .,. Pishuk ZorAntiNew Chah n Shireenaubz ha d t SINO te, PiPir r AlizaiAlizaiAbad 16.2 16.26- l í INT(Rtll.1 IoNr, I_ 1Wo NDAO'I 41:::4dery MMaLOCATIONDISTRICPRnviNatAt-,.... RaADS T t',OalrlOARi tiQc 0 c.i Fit . 13

3.17 By far, the majority of the Afghan refugees are ethnic Pathans who share the strong cultural ties of Pushtun language and custom with the predominant populations of NWFP west of the Indus and much of northern Baluchistan. Many among these populations trace their ancestry to Afghanistan. Moreover, 62% of the total estimated AR population originated in the 10 provinces (including Logar) of Afghanistan that border Pakistan. Common adherence to Sunni Islam further reinforces the ethnic bond between the two populations. These continuities of custom, territory and religion no doubt underlie the tolerance with which the populations of the two provinces have received the enormous influx of refugees. Turkic and Persian -speaking muslims from the northern and western regions of Afghanistan make up sizeable minorities of the refugee population where they have settled in concentration.

3.18 The refugee population is an overwhelmingly dependent one: 24% are men, 48% are children under the age of 15; and, 28% are women who, owing to the custom of female seclusion (purdah), are largely prohibited from participating in the labor force. According to a survey of the social and economic conditions of Afghan refugees in Pakistan conducted by the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development in mid -1986, only 15% of the refugee population sampled were men of the prime working age 18 -49 years. Seven out of every ten households sampled in the UNRISD survey were dependent on agriculture as their primary source of livelihood in Afghanistan. In Pakistan, however, Afghans are prevented from owning and cultivating land. Moreover, fewer than 85% of refugee males sampled by the survey possess any'employment skills. Thrs poverty of skills combined with a low rate of literacy (approximately 14% for men of working age), prevents the large majority of able -bodied Afghan men from holding anything but low paying casual employment to supplement their family incomes. As a result, the majority of the refugee population is dependent on regular relief assistance provided by the Government of Pakistan and other donor governments.

-- REFUGEES IN IRAN--

3.19 According to official estimates, more than two million Afghans are living as refugees in Iran. However, it is estimated that, prior to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, at least 600,000 Afghans were resident in the country and largely assimilated into the agricultural and construction labor force. Nevertheless, it has been estimated that, between 1978 and 1985, refugees from the provinces of Nimroz, Farah, Ghor, Herat and Badghis were fleeing to Iran at the rate of 100,000 per year

3.20 Nearly half of the entire refugee population is settled in the eastern provinces of Khorassan and Sistan- Baluchistan. One- quarter million, believed to be urban refugees from Herat, are settled in the provincial capital of Khorassan, Meshed. Other areas of refugee settlement are the provinces of Teheran, Isfahan, Kerman and Sheraz. Aside from the Baluch, who have settled in the predominately Baluch regions of southeastern Iran, the majority of the refugee population professes Shi'a Islam and speaks Persian (the Farsiwan 14

and the urban Qizalbash) or the Dari dialect (the Hazaras and the Aimaq). These commonalities of faith and language, as well as the manpower requirements of the Iranian economy have facilitated the settlement of- Afghans throughout the country.

-- INTERNALLY DISPLACED --

3.21 The internally, displaced population of Afghanistan represent a significant but poorly understood dimension of the social dislocation brought on by a decade of war. Knowledgeable observers estimate that upwards from 1.5 million people have abandoned their homes for more secure locations within the country. Two patterns of flight have been discernible: from the countryside to the cities; and, from the countryside to the more remote interior.

3.22 Table II1 /2 indicates that the urban population of the country has swollen in the past decade. In 1978, one Afghan in eight resided in a city. In 1987, that figure had grown-'to one in three. Since 1980 and the first Soviet /Afghan offensive against the Panjshir Valley. that drove thousands of Tajiks into Kabul city, large numbers of rural Afghans have sought relief from bombardment and dwindling food supplies in the most war- affected areas by migrating to the cities. Kabul has experienced the most marked influx, with some sources estimating that the pre -war population of the city has more than tripled in the last decade. Other cities, especially Mazar- i- Sharif in the north, and Jalalabad, Ghazni and Gardez in the east have witnessed more modest but nevertheless dramatic influxes as well. However, the major.cities in the south and west, Kandahar, Helmand and Herat, have suffered heavy damage during the war. The populations of, these cities have abandoned the regions altogether for the security of refugee settlements in Pakistan'and Iran, or they have migrated into the central highlands of Hazarajat.

3.23 The other pattern of displacement is within the country itself. For many non -Pushtun Afghans, particularly the Uzbek and Tajik of the north as well as the Hazaras, asylum in Pakistan does not constitute a secure and suitable alternative to abandoning one's home. Many prefer to remain in some proximity to their fields and to seek the security of neighboring mountainous regions,as is largely the case in the north central parts of the country (see Map 5). Data gathered by the Agricultural Survey of Afghanistan indicatesa drop of 30% in the number of owner -occupied farms in Afghanistan since 1978 and a corresponding increase of 24% in the number of farms cultivated by tenants. By interpretation, one pattern emerges from f this data; that of farmers abandoning theirown fields and moving to areas where they can obtain tenancies.

-- THE RESISTANCE --

3.24 The Mujahidin resistance emerged asa spontaneous movement against the modernizing reforms of the Daoudera and the more radical Socialist reforms of the Taraki regime. Resistance parties were formed basically along tribal, ethnic and religious lines. Initially, the parties based in Pakistanwere channels for the de 15

distribution of relief assistance to refugees,but withthe proliferation of representation, the Governmentof Pakistan took steps to limit the influence of all butseven parties. Even after UNHCR had begun to take a major role inproviding assistance to Afghan refugees, membership ina political party was a prerequisite for a refugee to receive a ration cardfrom the Government of Pakistan. For this reason, the resistanceparties have considerable, if only instrumental, influenceamong the refugee population.

3.25 The influence if the parties islimited inside Afghanistan. Mujahideen commanders, by and large,declare allegiance to those political leaders who can provide them with a reliable supplyof arms and ammunition. Recruitment of mujahidin fightersis undertaken through the tribal and ethnic network to which the commandersbelong and not through the activities of party representativesin the camps. A profile of the resistance parties can be found in AnnexII

4. PROSPECTS FOR REPATRIATION

3.26 For the large majority of refugees, organized repatriationis not a prerequisite to their return to Xfghanistan. The planning of such activities may even act as a "push" factor, causingsome refugees to return prematurely. The refugees are in thebest position to determine when conditions are right forrepatriation. The movement of resistance fighters back and forthacross the border provides reasonably current information on localconditions throughout the areas of refugee origin. Tribal authority remains best check to spontaneous the return. Patterns of return willprobably follow the patterns of flight with families followingthe decisions of their seniors and communities following thedecisions of their elders. Sufficient private transport exists in Pakistanto enable even large numbers of refugees access to the border and beyond. As an example, each summer, at least 200,000 people migratefrom refugee settlements in Mianwali, Dera Ismail Khan and Bannudistricts of SWFP to the highlands of Waziristan and Zhob withina maximum of six weeks without any government assistance whatsoever. Refugees will undoubtedly have to pay inflated rates for transportwhen the momentum of repatriation increases. These market conditions will have a considerable alone effect on the timing ofa refugee family's return.

3.27 At this writing,no mass and rapid return of refugees imminent. appears The continuation ofresistance fighting and the of the central weakness government are the most importantconstraints to spontaneous repatriation,. However, the large majorityof the population will be constrained by the agriculturalsystem as well. Rehabilitation of fields and irrigation works destroyedby bombs and shelling or lying long fallow will require monthsof preparation before crops can be sewn. For most of thecountry, it is now too late to undertake this work in time for planting. If internal security improves and a stable government is in placeby the new year, large numbers of refugees can be expected to returnto their homes in late winter (February /March) to beginpreparations for spring planting. 16

UNHCR CONCERNS AND ACTIVITIES /AFGHANISTAN

4.1 Experts differ over the actual extent of war damageto the agricultural system of Afghanistan and the types ofassistance that will be required for its rehabilitation. Nevertheless, two facts are certain: the existing level of the country's food productionand food imports will not be sufficient to absorb a return of fourmillion refugees; and, two to three years will be required forfarmers to bring their agricultural lands back to the level ofpre -war _production.

4.2 In exercising its traditional mandate ofprotecting refugees, UNHCR must be both judicious in developing itsprogramme of assistance for returning refugees inside Afghanistan. At the same time, it must remain committed to the maintenance ofcurrent levels of assistance to refugees settled in Pakistan. At all costs, CNHCR must adjust its assistance to local needs and conditionsin such a way that refugees are not encouraged to return to theirhomes before some form of reconstruction has been undertaken. UNHCR and NGO staff who work with Afghans in thecamps know that the refugees are very much aware of the conditions in their homevillages, and the time, effort. and equipment that will be requiredto bring their fields back into productivity. Although there is no consensus of opinion, it appears likely that most of the refugee families havingan agricultural background (i.e., from 60- 70% of the refugee population settled in Pakistan) will send able-bodied members back to their villages to beginor continue reconstruction activities and cultivation until local conditionsare perceived secure enough for all dependents to return as well. This strategy is likely to be followed especially by refugees who originatedin provinces close to the Pakistan border.

4.3 The following sections outline the basicconditions for planning and implementing repatriationassistance in Afghanistan. These are followed in Chapter VI bya number of recommendations for reorienting the Pakistan programme towardrepatriation.

1. POLICY

4,4 The two most cruciaj factors for UNHCRand otter açencies in developing a programme of assistancein Afghanistan are local security and the coordination ofreconstruction with repatriation activities. A priority for establishing localsecurity is the de- mining of access roads and theirperimeters in order to allow sal? and timely passage of relief goods andstaff, as well as the genera.» population, to regional capitals and theiroutlying satellite 'o'..ns from which the bulk of the assistance.acjvities is likely to be 17

organized. UNHCR, WFP and /or their intermediaries will have to establish formal contacts with the representatives of local and regional governments in Afghanistan in order to secure protection for staff and to facilitate the movement of goods. Any reliance on the national army to underwrite security for expatriates, even providing for a significant change in the national government, would be misplaced. The army has been plagued by low morale and desertion since before the Soviet invasion, and the departure of officers of middle and senior rank will likely follow Soviet withdrawal. Cooperative local commanders will be able to provide adequate and reliable security within, and somewhat beyond, their spheres of influence. Nevertheless, to whatever extent the Soviets withdraw from the country and a stable government is established inKabul, conditions of civil war and tribal vendettamay persist in many parts of the country for years to come. For this reason,' good lines of communication must be established between in- country field offices, regional headquarters and bases of operation maintained inPakistan (and Iran) to facilitate the evacuation of staff if and when necessary.

4.5 The coordination of reconstruction with repatriationactivities requires that: 1) relief assistance be designed tosupport the population while it undertakes reconstruction; 2) returningrefugees alone cannot be targeted fbr relief assistance; and, 3)methods for the delivery of relief assistance must discouragedependency on its regular distribution. Relief assistance must be timed with the initiation of simple and streamlined development assistancepackages. In addition to providing basic food, shelter and healthcare assistance, UNHCR and WFP must consider the supply of basic agricultural inputs such as seeds, saplings, insecticides,hand tools and basic veterinary extension services. All segments of the Afghan population -- the refugees, the internally displacedand those who remained behind --will requiresome form of this assistance. To ignore the totality of the needs of the population,or to target any one particular group within the population for assistance,would likely exacerbate local tensions and createenormous security problems for the implementing agencies. Finally, the distribution of relief assistance should be organizedaccording to development -based models such as the "food for work" / "food forcredit" schemes pioneered by WFP, or labor intensive publicworks rehabilitation projects such as those initiated by UNHCRand the World Bank for Afghan refugees in Pakistan. Many observers and technicalexperts advise that the best assistance to theAfghan population would be the cash to enable them to buy the goodsthey require to rehabilitate their farmlands and rebuild their homes. The UNHCR /World Bank projects have demonstrated that the infusionof cash can be the most direct and positive way of contributingto the welfare of individual households while stimulating the expansion ofthe the local economy. Overall, programme design should minimizelocal reliance on the regular distribution of relief goods that wouldhave the effect of retarding local commercial and agriculturaldevelopment.`. ,8 1

2. IMPLEMENTATION population of providing assistanceto the entire 4.6 The task of The financially and logisticallydaunting. Afghanistan is require a degree offlexibility repatriation ofrefugees alone will that is unfamiliar,if not in planningand implementation those donors and multilateralagencies such as unacceptable, to many the current It is clear, however,that an alternative to of the UNO. have to be developedif central governmentof the country will the population. At adequate assistanceis to be delivered to regime is thought tocontrol twenty -five percent present, the Kabul to major towns and the country. This control extends only or less of strategic industries and garrisons protectinglines of communication, The governmentministries have neither the natural resources. deliver the amount of personnel nor theadministrative capacity to assistance required. For this reason, relief and reconstruction from Pakistan (and assistance programmeswill have to be implemented regional governments that Iran) under the auspicesof the local and Nevertheless, UNHCR will eventually control the Afghancountryside. mandate to implementassistance programmes be compelled by its and the through the Kabul government. To the extent the refugees -controlled internally displaced arelikely to return to government security is assured,UNHCR must develop an areas if local government to implementing capacity underthe auspices of the Kabul assist these returnees. particularly the northeast andthe In a number of regions, 4.7 effective systems of west, Mujahidincommanders have established built upon traditionallocal power structures. civil administration of members of the Under these systems,councils or shura., made up: leadership maintain justice regional military,religious and secular education and socialwelfare' programmes and administer health, exist throughout their areas ofjurisdiction. More localized shuras where tribal rivalries throughout the east andsouth of the country prevent the coordinationof regional activities. such NGOs, especially thosethat have been providing 4.8 food and commanders and shuras withlimited amounts of medical, effective links agricultural assistance, arelikely to be the most between UNHCR, WFP and thelocal governments ofAfghanistan. professional However, most of the cross-border agencies lack the to implement regularassistance skills or administrative resources refugees programmes over awide area. Many of the NGOs working among administrative abilities in Pakistan, on theother hand, possess the and Afghan staff toundertake plus the experienced expatriate working assistance programmes ofconsiderable size. The two groups agencies have together under the coordinationof UNHCR and other UN the potential of undertakingwidespread multi -level assistance working with refugees havealready programmes. A number of NGOs identified territories and sectorswhere they wish to be active once the repatriation programming getsunderway. Still, the enormity of NGOs with relevant job at hand will requirethe recruitment of larger, population's needs. experience to assure evenbasic coverage of the NGOs can provide Here too, the cross -boderand refugee assistance valuable links between theseagencies and the Afghanleadership. 19

3. MONITORING

4.9 The logic of this implementation assumes that UNHCR and WFP will be operational at the level of assistance delivery but not at the level of assistance distribution. Given the finite nature of UNHCR's mandate for repatriation of Afghan refugees -- to assist returnees until they are able to support themselves -- it may be counter- productive.for UNHCR to establish scores of field offices and hire large numbers of people to staff them, only to abandon the programme after only a few years when continued assistance is no longer required. NGOs on the other hand may have more enduring interests in the welfare of the Afghan people and could effectively capitalize on initial UNHCR support to establish a more long term presence in the country.

4.10 Nevertheless, UNHCR field staff will obviously be required to monitor the effectiveness of the NGOs as implementing partners, as well as the effectiveness and appropriateness of the assistance being provided.

4.11 In all cases, there will be a great shortage of capable and experienced staff, especially Afghans, to implement assistance programmes. Money may be better spent in supporting NGOs to develop the Afghan staff that they already possess.

4. PLANNING AND LOGISTICS

4.12 Defining Planning Regions --Six regions have been identified for repatriation planning in order to allow for the design of differential packages of assistanje. These regions correspond to those identified by the Agricultural Survey of Afghanistan conducted by the Swedish Committee in 1987 -1988. The principal features distinguishing each region are thus related to factors of agricultural production such as climate, topography, cropping, yields and patterns of production. Nevertheless, there is considerable continuity between the agricultural features of each region and the culture and social organization of the populations that inhabit them.

4.13 It is possible, then, to generalize about the regions in order to determine the kinds of assistance required by their inhabitants -- the specific shelter requirements, the types of agricultural inputs appropriate for the region, the political institutions through which to channel assistance and the likely constraints to the implementation of programmes. The specific considerations for each region are examined in Chapter VII.

4.14 Bases of Operation -- This report has emphasized that repatriation must be organized from within Afghanistan in order to support immediate reconstruction efforts. Such an operation will require an infrastructure of in- country storage facilities and a network of communications to coordinate the delivery and distribution of assistance within each region. The infrastructure must be adequately linked with larger storage facilities in Pakistan where 20

relief and assistance supplies can be stockpiled and fed 'into the regional systems as :necessary.

4.15 Atotal;;of '29,; entral stores and 126 satellite bases of operation ..haveibeezt &identi:fied for' planning'purposes.fi_ These are listed by región4ih AnüexÁTable -6 A central store has been earmarked for each'próvincial capital of'the;coúntry,,,whle bases of, operation have been located on the basis of three ç.zteria: 1) accessibility -°byroad "ánd- heavy vehicles; 2)-occupyinga central location within (a known concentration of 'pre- war"population, and, 3)41, likely;transit point for returning populatióñs en route. The number of bases of operation per region -and per province can be expanded or contracted as actual needs are determined:='

1 4.16 Each base of operation -- essentially -a sto'ehouse with offices and accommodations -- would be established under UNHCR /WFP auspices and operated by,an implementing :partner in cooperation' with local or regional authorities. These authorities would provide sec rity for implementing staff and supplies- ;as well-às for the movement of goods and personnel to and from provincial capitals. Implementing staff will have to defer to,.the judgement'of local..; authorities regarding these determinations.',At they same time; :implementing staff will be responsible, either directly or'through lodai intermediaries, for assessing. the, adequacy.aßd appropriateness;of assistance for the needs of the target,populatïon:

4.17 The.plarning calls for eaçh bases of. operation.,to be established with a basic health facility.sothat activities of implementing agencies and their field staff -are' concentrated in as few a "number :of locations aspossible: edical:"and':: agricultural extensionwservices.can be- organized:on.a, day,tó day..basis from each center. The'reason for-'this is to facilitate coordination between implementing partners and' local "authorities as;`well'as'`to enhance the

security of the field,"staff. , ,All basic.theàlth facilities must be linked with a hospital, preferably- located°at each provincial capital, that can provide specialized care:for referral patients and provide supervision for medical field staff An absolute minimum requirement for each of these hospitals will be surgical and physical rehabilitation facilities capable of-dealing 'with large numbers of people likely to be wounded by mines.

4.18 By identifying these bases of operation, thi'sireport is not recommending that UNHCR /WFP attempt to `support identicalprogrammes of assistance in each.,and every -one. The listing of. bases. in Annex Table 3 represents a blue print -for an infrastructure required to deliver assistance to all parts of Afghanistan

The creation of an infrastructure of bases of operation does not necessarily require a large scale programme of construction to be launched from Pakistan. In many. areas,, rudimentary:storage facilities'have been -- maintained by the resistance::...Government buildings-may also be 'rehabilitated for'-use.`Construction materials such as those, used for the building of insettlement`'stores in the refugee camps -of Pakistan can be transported without +great difficulty. into Afghanistan and °erected quickly However,-no- programme of 21

construction and rehabilitation can be undertaken until implementing partners charged with the coordination of assistance in particular regions determine the actual local conditions and requirements. Such assessments have to be initiated as quickly as possible so that the materials and manpower can be mobilized. As noted above, NGOs currently working in Afghanistan have experienced staff capable of undertaking such assessment.

4.20 Phases of Implementation --Clearly, the evolving political conditions of the Afghan countryside and the development of internal security will be the biggest factors in determining therate of implementing relief assistance. Three phases of implementation have tentatively been identified according to the likely pattern ofSoviet withdrawal and the opening of regions to reasonablysecure movement of relief goods and personnel (see Table V/1 below). The logic of the phases implementation within each region is describedin Chapter V.

TABLE Y/1 -- LIKELY PHASES OF REFUGEE REPATRIATION ANO PROGRAMME IMPLEMENTATION

Region Phase I Total AR Phase II Total AR Phase III Total aR Population& Population Population

(0 1000) (1 1000) (1 1000)

North Balkh Far* . 3orzjan

Sanangan 35

North East iadakhshan Bagnlan Takhar 33 Kunduz 180

East Kunar

Lagnian

Hangrahar

Paktya 1195

East Central Ghazni

toga r Baiyan tabul Yardak 652 Kapisa NA Parran 122

South Reiland

Kandahar

H11roI

Paktika

Iabul 1055 Uruzgan 51

r 1 North rest Faran

Ghor

Herat +3S Badghis 43 j

Total 15 3331 6 121 3 337 1

t Total of registered refugee faiilies living in Pakistan originating in the provinces listed. 5. TRANSPORT

4.21 According to existing information, there appears to be sufficient transport in both Pakistan and Afghanistan to provide for the movement of refugees and the supplies that will be required to support them. The World Food Programme in Peshawar estimates that thereare over 25,000 trucks of at least eight ton capacity registered in NWFP alone. This number is exclusive of the nearly 5000 .afghan vehicles operating with Temporary Route Permits _ throughout the country. In Afghanistan, In 1977, 11,000 trucks of at least eight ton capacity and more than 6000 buses were in operation.

4.22 The large majority- of those refugees returning to Afghanis tan will use any of the border crossing points listed in Table :V:1. The majority of these will likely use the main motorable routes thrcugh Chaman (from Quetta) and Torkham (from Peshawar) as well as the less well travelled routes through Badini, Gul hatch, Angurada, Lakka Tigga, Kharlachi and Teri Nangal, all of which link up with the north -south highway of eastern Afghanistan.

4.23 Although the primary roads have suffered considerable damage from the war, especially the destruction of bridges by the Mujahidin, they are still viable transport and supply routes. The average speed capable on these roads is 25 kms. per hour, which has the effect of doubling pre -war travel times. Secondary roads to sattelite towns have been mined extensively, especially those used by theresistance as supply and transport routes. The Mujahidin themselves rely on alternate routes that link up with sattelite towns andmajor bazaars. Conceivably, refugees travelling long distances will be able to reach established intermediate stopoverpoints where essential supplies are available for purchase. TABLE IV /1 -- PRINCIPAL POINTS OF CROSSING /PAKISTAN TO AFGHANISTAN

Crossing Point I Location 1 Districts of Refugee Settlesent Accessible Ì Estisated 4R Population

i to Crossing Point I of Districts lfasiliesl+ 1 l i i i NWFP 1 L

Arandu Ì Chitral Chitral, Dir 22,300

Nawa Bajaur Balaur 29,'00

Torkhas Peshawar Peshawar 15 II, Kohat (excl. Hanau), Swat 177 000 Mardan. Malakand, Abbottaoad, Manshera I Mohssand I I 72.500 Teri Mangal, Lakka- Parachinar Kurras, Kohat (incl. Hangul Tigga, Kharlachi

1

Saidgi/ Sulam Khan Mirasshah North Waziristan, Bannu 3o,900

Sul Katch/Angurada S. Waziristan Dera Ishsail Khan, South Waziristan 21,900

PUNJAB

L . . i Saidgi/9hulas Khan Mirasshah Mianwali

31,300 1

1

; 9ALUCHISTAN I

l i i Badini, Gasar-u-din Zhob ! 'hob, Loralai 20,358 Karez

I

M , Chaman Chasan 6ulistan, Pishin, Quetta, Chasan 79,370

Shasuzi, Chotu, Chagai ( Chagai 29,584 Yushtagan Shar, I

i Barachah

i

+ Registered refugees only nul©oundery necerlly repreenlel.On eulhwdelrre. le CROSSING POINTS USSR `1ushanbe CHINA 231 TorkhamNawaArandu Mary Hairalan Fcyzabao akhan Valley 654 SaidgiKharlachi/Teri Mangal /Gulam Lakka Khan Tig Kushka Anckhvoy 'O Sheberghan e -Shanl Mazar' Konfluz Aa9hlan Kafalgan Al NORTHWESTFRONTIER 78 BadiniGuiAngurada Katch owraqhoudr M:lunana P 1, P P H I P N0 Elaqram Chankar U S earlko.vf 1110 9 QamarChaman -u -Din Karez G I l O R Ch.u)lal:uan t3:1nu:1n Kabulk _ J.Italahad S.uowbl , ' l Shpwar ., Islamabad 121413 KushtaganChotuShamuzi Char SlruuLnd Ghazni J 1 A6 Khr 0.40 I 5 // 1 1 INDIA 15 Baramchah F.uar1 í Arytr.uu1.11) /r PAKISTAN6-, ; . r .. ... RAN \ O.uul.rh:u Sp n ßutd:tk i 7 MAP /j Afghanistan International boundary .t2 1a 10 Surfaced road l National capital ahedan 12 11 .4p GasfleldRefugeeAirfield areas 15 L3ALUC PISTAN 13 o I 50 I 50 100 1 ISO 1001_, 200 Kilornlre. 150 700 Mlles 24

6. MINES

4.24 The prolific and indiscriminate use of mines by Soviet/Afghan forces has been one of the most brutal aspects of the ten years'of war in Afghanistan. Thousands of people have been killed and maimed by an insidious variety of explosive devices. Mines are also responsible to a large degree for the decimation of the country's livestock. The threat of mines is probably the singlemost important factor affecting the return of refugees to their homes. Clearing mines, even for well equipped experts, is an arduous and lengthy task. The unchartered presence of mines is likely to be the most significant threat to the personal safety of Afghans for a generation to come.

4.25 The resistance forces and others reporting on the situation within Afghanistan use the term "mine" to describe more than just landmines. Landmines as such are usually of two distinct types: anti -tank mines and anti -personnel mines. The former are typically explosives encased in plastic shell. The latter are made of plastic, rubber and explosive. Both types explode when pressure is exerted on them, such as the weight of a vehicle or the tread of a man's foot. Metal detectors are ineffective for locating these mines.

4.26 These two types of mines are usually found around garrisons, security check posts, along side of major roads, along tracks used by the resistance and around villages that have been captured and then vacated by the Soviet /Afghan forces. The routes into Afghanistan from Iran and Pakistan are thought to be particularly effected. These mines are generally sewn in fields; usually, an anti -tank mine is surrounded by a cluster of anti -personnel mines. The anti -tank mines may have anti -lift devices (booby traps) fitted underneath. A rope with a hook may be used to pull out the anti -tank mine so it can be defused. But if it is believed an anti -lift device is in position, it is necessary to dig a small trench alongside the mine and carefully dig away the earth underneath the anti -tank mine to reach the booby trap. Resistance fighters report doing this even under fire when they have been attacking garrisons. In general, the Mujahidin and local populations are knowledgeable about the location of minefields, and have learned how to systematically clear a path through them.

4.27 Mujahidin also refer to the "Improvised Explosive Devices" (IED) used by Soviet /Afghan forces as "mines ". IEDs range from the sophisticated explosive and shrapnel devices such as those is fitted with a sonic sensors and placed along paths used by the resistance units, to plastic kitchen utensils filled with explosives. Reports of aircraft dropping plastic butterflies, balls, and even thin metal strips which lay in the bushes and explode on touch arenumerous. Such IEDs may litter the fields and are difficult to detect. Mujahidin units do use metal detectors to try and locate mines, but obviously these are useless if no metal has been used in the manufacture of the mines. These IEDs constitute a special problem for children but there is some evidence to indicate that these mines deteriorate and are no longer active over a period of months. 95

4.28 The third type of "mine" referred to by resistance fighters are the booby traps placed in the villages when Soviet /Afghan forces vacate them. These may be fitted to doors, hidden among clothes, placed behind children's toys etc. They are intended to discourage people from returning to their villages where they would continue to provide cover and assistance to the resistance units.

4.9The resistance forces have shown themselves to be extremely capable of locating and defusing mines with the most primitive technology. They represent the most capable resource for dealing with the problem of mines during repatriation and reconstruction efforts. Implementing partners will need to explore the possibility of recruiting, training and equipping teams of former resistance fighters for the detection and defusing of mines.

7. FOOD

4.30 According to knowledgeable observers, there appears to be sufficient food available from domestic production and legal and illegal imports to sustain the current population of Afghanistan. However, there is no accurate information regarding actual levels of production and imports. Reports from medical personnel and other observers indicate that malnutrition is not a serious problem in the country but that the population of many areas has barely enough food to live on. Clearly, the current level of food supply cannot support a major influx of returning refugees. Nor can the rehabilitation of abandoned agricultural lands be completed in sufficient time to boost domestic production to required levels. The provision of food assistance will thus be a major component of the repatriation programme.

4.31 Based on the levels of assistance to refugees in Pakistan, a minimum of 180 kgs of wheat per capita is needed to sustain the population in cereals alone. With the potential for the return of four million refugee, approximately 720,000 metric tons of wheat will be required annually for distribution inside Afghanistan. All signs indicate that only a small percentage of the refugee population will return to Afghanistan within the next few months. Larger numbers are expected to wait until late winter 1989 when, it is believed, adequate security will exist to enable farmers to begin the rehabilitation of their lands. Nevertheless, even the rapid return of 10% of the refugee population will require considerable amounts of wheat stock and an effective distribution network to he in place if food shortages are to be averted.

4.32 Other kinds and levels of related food assistance such as cooking oil and cooking fuel will have to be determined in coordination with WFP. However, implementing agencies must avoid creating local dependencies on the free and regular distribution of assistance. Alternatives such as "food for work" programmes or "food for credit" programmes -- whereby recipients are advanced food supplies and obligated to reimburse the donor with a percentage of the amount after the first harvest -- will have to be integrated into the relief and reconstruction activities of the implementing' agencies. 96

will enable people 4.33 Public works programmes that provide wages of to purchase supplementaryfood items until they are capable producing for themselves. This purchasing power will encourage the development of local production aswell as the importation of basic necessities.

8. WATER

4.34 Potable water exists in adequatesupply throughout the settled rural areas of Afghanistan. While wells have sustained damage in some areas, cleaningand repairs can be accomplished with local manpower and resources. The quality of potable water should not be of immediate concern. Public health interventions in the areas of sanitation and safe water can follow initial reconstructionefforts. Water supply in heavily damaged urban areas maypresent public health problems but technical assistance in this field will have tobe provided by other UN organizations.

4.35 Distribution centres will require their own water supply to accommodate staff as well as refugees and displaced peoples in transit. Local laborers can be hired to dig wells or develop a water supply along those used +locally. Well travelled transit points may require mobile tankers to maintain suitable quantities of water.

9. SHELTER

4.36 Shelter requirements for the returning population will be extensive. Observers have estimated that more than half of all Afghanistan's villages have been destroyed. The rehabilitation of agricultural land will coincide with the reconstruction of housing. UNHCR can provide for the immediate need by stockpiling temporary shelter in Pakistan for delivery to distributions centres in Afghanistan as required. Tarpaulins, rather than tents, will be adequate for temporary shelter because returnees will undertake housing construction as quickly as possible. It is not likely that families will return to their villages until the weather is suitable for such construction.

4.37 Of greater concern is the need for alternatives to the wooden beam roof construction methods employed by the majority of Afghans. Knowledgable sources estimate that Afghanistan's wood stock is being depleted at a rate 10 times greater than its ability to regenerate. The enormous demand for building materials, combined with wood fuel requirements, will have rapid and ecologically disastrous consequences for the country.

4.38 Metal components such as the pipe and corrugated sheeting proposed for the construction of bases of operation may prove the most viable alternative roof construction methods in the short term. Materials can be imported from Pakistan and made available through the distributions centres at subsidized cost and /or credit. At a later stage, the development of local pre -cast reinforced concrete beam and slab production can be encouraged for the supply of more durable construction materials. 27

4.39 A number of the NGOs working with refugees in Pakistan are experienced in construction with these components. Those willing to implement programmes in Afghanistan should be encouraged to combine the construction of bases of operation with the training of local populations in the use of alternative building materials. Other agencies, such as Architectes sans Frontiere and to some extent VITA, can provide technical assistance in developing cheaper and more efficient methods of construction to implementing agencies.

10. HEALTH

4.40 By all accounts, health care in Afghanistan was rudimentary before the war and has only deteriorated over the past decade. Lack of consistent and reliable information about the existinglevel of health coverage -- the number and capacity of operating health facilities, the number and level of training of healthpractitioners, the availability of medicines-- makes it impossible to accurately assess the health conditions of the population. However,it is possible to construct a profile of the health situationfrom the reports of organizations that provide medical assistance to the population from across the border. Although the level of this assistance has been extremèly limited, the coverage has been geographically widespread enough to providea reasonable sample of all regions of Afghanistan.

-- MEDICAL ASSISTANCE --

4.41 Some of the most enduring activities of thecross -border agencies have been the provision of medicalassistance to facilities within Afghanistan. These activities have generally taken theform of 1) staffing facilities with expatriatemedical professionals; 2) training Afghan medical practitioners; and,3) supplying medicine to both the facilities and the trainees. Over the last two years, the Alliance, through its own health committee (AHC),and with fundinç from USAID and technical assistance fromManagement Sciences for Health, has initiated a medical training andsupply programme for Afghan Basic Health Workers. AHC members are Jamiat, Harakat Inqilab, NIFA and ANLF.

4.42 It is impossible to accurately determinethe level of health resources in the country because of the considerable

problems related . to all types of cross -border assistance,not the least of which are lack of continuous communication and the risks of monitoring. In. addition, the poor coordination ofcross border activities among participating agencies results inconsiderable overlap of funding and supply to medical personnel in Afghanistan.

Medical Resources

4.43 Medical facilities tend to be situatedto serve populations, that have remained in their villages. These are often located remote areas of a province to which access is difficult. accord,, g to the best available sources,cross -border agencies, including 28

are responsible for 291 "clinics" throughoutAfghanistan (see Annex Table 4 for a complete listing). For planning purposes, a "clinic" has been defined as a health facility whose staff has a total combined training of at least 30 months (e.g., four staff with nine months training each). In actuality; the term "clinic" is used as a measure of human and medical resources to indicate acertain "critical mass" of health care potential. Among all these clinics, there are known to be only 43 qualified MDs working, including expatriate doctors. In addition, there are 570 AHC Basic Health Workers placed throughout the country who,if properly supervised, are able to provide effective medical extension services. Based on estimates of the pre -war population, however, the number of clinics in existence is adequate to serve only 34% of the population (one clinic per 15,000 people). An additional 577 clinics would be required to meet the basic health needs of the entire Afghan population. The distribution of clinics is extremely uneven with a number of provinces having more than are actually required for the size of the original population. Little information exists regarding the actual capacity of these clinics to provide more than simple curative services or referrals to regional facilities. Indeed, little information exists on the condition of hospitals and other health facilities operated by the Afghan government.

4.44 Expatriate Staffing (see Annex III /5 for Agency profiles)

AVICEN sends personnel into border provinces where they supervise AVICEN trainees who conduct small vaccination campaigns in preparation for more disjant missions.

CAP ANAMUR (Deutsche Notartze) has one hospital in Bamyan, staffed by expatriates.

MDM has a well- equipped and well- staffed surgical hospital in Wardak. It serves as a referral hospital for several clinics staffed by Afghan health workers in the same area.

MSF- France has one hospital in Ghazni staffed with expatriate doctors. Two facilities in Badakhshan have been left in the care of locally trained Afghan health workers until they can be re- staffed by expatriates during the summer. Successful vaccination campaigns are being conducted by expatriate staff in Ghazni and Paktya.

MSF- Netherlands and MSF -Belgium operate a hospital staffed with an expatriate team in Parwan. This is the only expatriate group working with a Shi'a population.

The Norwegian Committee places expatriate doctors in Ghazni on an intermittent basis. Expatriates also supervise vaccination programmes carried out by Afghan trainees.

4.45 All of these agencies have difficulty finding medically qualified people able to adapt to the difficulties of working in 29

Afghanistan. Each agency has had its operation disrupted at some time due to "cultural" misunderstandings between expatriate medical staff and the populations they serve. Nevertheless, many regions of Afghanistan have an explicit need for foreign medical assistance, mainly because Afghan doctors refuse to work under the harsh conditions of the Afghan countryside.

4.46 Medical Training

AVICEN runs training courses for.vacc'inators and then supplies them with vaccines and cold chain equipment to take into Afghanistan. To date, 30 vaccinators have been trained. AVICEN provides introductory lectures on immunization in training courses offered by other agencies.

Freedom Medicine operates a six month medical training course that has turned out more than 200 trainees. Each trainee is regularly supplied with medicines.

Health Unlimited, in cooperation with the Islamic Aid Health Center, operates a 9 -month training course for 20 students in Quetta. No information on the number of graduates is available.

IMC runs an eight month training course with 40 students per session. To date, it has graduated about 100 students.

MCI operates three and six month training courses plus special technical training in X -Ray and laboratory work.

MTA conducts an eighteen month training course for 13-20 students per session. Two sessions have graduated, and a third graduates. in September 1988.

Alliance Health Committee conducts a three month training course for 240 Basic Health Workers. Upon graduation, each BHW is supplied with drugs and other medical equipment according to the estimated length of stay in their assigned posts. AHC has also begun a vaccinator course with the assistance of AVICEN.

4.47 The personnel trained by these programmes are in mostcases supervised, paid, supplied and resupplied with medicines by theirown agencies. Often, the Swedish Committee and the Alliance Health Committee will provide back up assistance to the agencies. Many of the trainees are absorbed by the regional health systems setup by Jamiat commanders in the north and the west of the country. These systems operate with a core of qualified medical staff (trained doctors and nurses) who test the trainees supplied to them and assign them to particular facilities within the system. These systems are described in greater detail in Chapter VI.

4.48 Medical Supplies -- The Swedish Committee regularly supplies drugs and medical equipment to a large number of Afghans inside the country. The level of qualification varies widely among the recipients but there are a number of trained MDs being assisted. J'0

An .Afghan doctor on the SCA staff in Peshawar screensapplicants and provides each with a kit of supplies suitable to their level of knowledge. The German Committee for Afghanistan supplies medicine and equipment on a similar basis to a number of health facilities in east and east -central Afghanistan. Mercy Corps International likewise supplies medicines and equipment to health facilities in the southern provinces of Afghanistan.

4.49 Although informal coordination between those committees working inside Afghanistan has always existed, formal coordination between all the committees has proven to be very difficult. The Committee of Medical Coordination (CMC) has been meeting for more than two years in an attempt to standardize training curriculum, drug lists and coordinate assistance to trainees. However, the CMC does not represent or attempt to include all cross -border medical agencies in its membership. Furthermore, the prevalent tendency for most of the CMC member agencies to work through the resistance parties prevents them from developing closer ties with the regional health systems of the Mujahidin commanders. Nor are most CMC members able to monitor their health facilities and personnel directly. They rely instead on reports from the field, which are not easily verifiable. During the summer of 1988, CMC plans to launch a monitoring mission to verify the status of all member health programmes.

-- HEALTH CONDITIONS --

4.50 A number of CMC- member agencies have attempted to standardize the examination records maintained by their health personnel in order to accurately assess the health requirements of the population in Afghanistan (see Annex Table 4C for a survey of pathology). This information combined with reports from medical and non -medical people from different regions of the country provide the following health profile.

4.51 The pathology reported is typical of all impoverished Third World countries. Gastro - intestinal disorders, respiratory ailments, skin infections, eye disorders and muscular complaints make up a full 64% of the cases recorded. Malaria has become a major problem in many areas of the country. The situation can be compared with what existed before the implementation of a government Malaria Control Program before the war. The lowlands of the former Qataghan province (Kunduz, Baghlan, Takhar) and the eastern provinces can be considered hyper -endemic. The Hari Rud Valley, Badakhshan valleys, Kunduz mountains, Helmand valley and Registan should be meso- endemic. All regions between the altitudes of 1500 -2000 meters are at least hypo -endemic. Normally, malaria is not typical above 2000 meters. However, the atypical movement of people between the different regions of Afghanistan, and between Afghanistan and the neighboring countries, accounts for a more than normal number of imported cases even at these altitudes.

4,52 Several reports of what seem to be cases of cerebral malaria give way to the assumption that an earlier pattern of malaria has '1a

redeveloped. Early infestation in late spring an early summer with Vivax gives way, certainly in the hyper- endemic regions to Falciparum. In addition to the normally existing breeding places for the vectors, one has to take into consideration the disruption and destruction of irrigation canals, which, in certain regions, also acted as drainage canals.

4.52 Tuberculosis was and is a major problem for all regions and all ethnic groups. Refugees currently under treatment in Pakistan are almost certainly liable to become reinfected during any lapse in their schedule of medication. Leprosy still seems confined to Hazarajat. Anthrax has been reported, mainly by expatriates,in the northern provinces. Intestinal parasites are abundant. Respiratory and skin infections and their complications makeupone -third or more of the pathology.

4.54 Childhood diseases (EPI- target diseases) account for thedeath of 20 - 60% percent of children under five, varying with regionand source of information. Localized epidemics have been reported regularly. Almost every year reports of "cholera" epidemics in the dry season are received from various provinces. From Zabul, Logar and Wardak, unsubstantiated rumors of limited outbreaks of "smallpox" have been received.

4.51 The nutritional status of the populationas a whole is not alarming, but borderline. In most rural regions where people remained beyond 1981, lack of food became the major cause for later becoming refugees. The near -draught conditions between 1984 and 1986, combined with systematic destruction ofscarce crops by the Soviet and government forces, have triggered an exodus froma number of regions, particularly the rain -fed regions of the north. Internally displaced populations in the northern and central provincesare the most prone to the possible danger of malnutrition because of the limitations of the local agricultural system to support them.

4.56 A major problem exists for the victims of land mines. often limbs must be amputated by people with little surgical experience. Prostheses are difficult to come by and often impossible to fit. The health administration of Herat reports more than 2000 suchcases.

-- HEALTH PLANNING --

4.57 At the level of present planning, at least 75 health facilities will be required to meet the needs of refugees and internally displaced populations returning to the 15 Phase I provinces. Qualified health staff, such as those being trained by the cross -border agencies and AHC will be sufficient to operate these facilities inasmuch as their interventions are likely to be simple. However, given the likelihood of a the high,and continued incidence of mine- related injuries, each province will requirea central hospital with surgical capacity as wellas prosthetic fitting and physical therapy components. MDs staffing district -level hospitals can be utilized to supervise a number of health facilities, each with its own compliment of Basic Health Workers. The above information on 32

health conditions and existing resourceswithin the country can be used in developing an overall planfor health coverage.

11. AGRICULTURAL ASSISTANCE

4.58 This report has repeatedly emphasized that relief assistance must be coordinated with reconstruction. UNHCR's capacity to contribute to agricultural rehabilitation and development is limited, but efforts must be made to assist local populations with their basic requirements. The information presented in Chapter VIIis intended to provide general guidance for such assistance.

4.59 After mine clearing, the rehabilitation of irrigation systems is the priority for restoring agricultural productivity. While much of the traditional irrigation network has been destroyed by mines and shelling, neglect and lack of maintenance has also contributed its deterioration. Programmes such as those implemented under UNHCR in Baluchistan for the repair and cleaning of karezes should be a priority for agencies implementing programmes in Afghanistan.

4.60 The severe depletion in numbers of-traction animals will seriously effect the rate of agricultural rehabilitation. Experts agree that the regeneration of stock to original levelswill take up to eight years and that the import of stock is not likely to be successful on the scale required. UNHCR can support veterinary extension services in order to help maintain existing animals as well as possible. NGOs that have been involved in cross -border assistance have had success with projects that purchase tractors and other forms of motorized traction for use on a cooperative basis by local shuras. The availability of seed for distribution or sale does not pose a problem according to the Peshawar -based NGO,Volunteers in Technical Assistance (VITA). According to VITA estimates, 5000 tons of new wheat seed would be optimal for upgrading existing seed stock and sufficient quantities of suitable seed are available in Pakistan. More sophisticated programmes, especially those involving the distribution of seeds, fertilizer and pesticides, will require expert technical assistance, such as that which can be provided by the staff of the Agricultural Survey of Afghanistan and VITA in Peshawar.

4.61 The key to implementing these projects, as with the distribution of relief assistance, is the coordination of planning and implementation of activities with local authorities. These are the groups that are most knowledgeable about the needs of the population and the most adequate means for meeting those needs. The ability of the commercial sector to provide for these needs cannot be underestimated. Prior to and during the war, there has been considerable movement of commodities such as livestock, machinery, tools and fuel from Pakistan to Afghanistan. 3'

UNHCR CONCERNS AND ACTIVITIES /PAKISTAN

5.1 The maintenance of current levels ofassistance to Afghan refugees settled in Pakistan is essentialto guarantee a deliberate pace of repatriation. The maintenance of assistancewill permit able- bodied men to leave their familiesin the security of the Pakistan camps while they undertakeinitial rehabilitation of their agricultural lands inside Afghanistan. Any significant cut in the basic assistance package-- wheat, edible oil, kerosene and health care -- could be interpreted as a winding down of assistance. This interpretation could, in turn, trigger a rapid and large scalereturn of refugees before an infrastructure of relief assistancehas been established in Afghanistan. All available information indicatesthat the country cannot produce enoughfood, nor does it have the resources to supply the free market with enough food, to feeda significant increase in thepopulation.

5.2 Refugees must be kept informedabout developments in repatriation policy. Misinformation about UNHCRor Government of x. Pakistan intentions towards the refugees could itself triggera premature departure of many refugees. Recent experience suggests that regular contacts with the Afghan political leaders''isan effective way of assuring that UNHCR policy is not misconstruedat the camp level.

5.3 A number of_.components of thoseprogrammes serving Afghan refugees in Pakistan should be restructuredor enhanced in such a way as to develop skills that will beapproprite during and beyond period of reconstruction. the Efforts to train communityhealth workers should be redoubled. Likewise, increased training-- or more specifically, apprenticeshiptraining -- as wellas continued assistance to skilled refugees should be encouraged. Towards these ends, UNHCR should stimulate the development ofcooperative programmes between NGOs workinginside Afghanistan and with refugees whereby those working the former could advise-the latteron the types of skills required to carry out some of thecross- border projects, e.g., agricultural assistance. In turn, the refugeeassistance agencies would recruit apprentices for trainingand place them in cross- border projects, pay their salaries and, thus,enable the cross -border agencies to expandtheir projects inside.

±a_ 5.4 At the same time, UNHCR must launchpilot assistance projects inside Afghanistanthrough those NGOs working expressed a willingness in Pakistan that have to extend themselvesacross the border. in this way will UNHCR Only and the agencies concernedgain the necessary experience to undertakemore extensive repatriation Small scale construction programmes. and /or maintenanceprojects, foe example, can be started up in the provinces bordering Pakistan providedthat the NGOs and their Afghan staff can obtain guarantees of security from local authorities in the areas where they plan to work. in those areas where fighting has subsided, small labor intensive irrigation or road repair projects can be tested utilizing local manpower. Pilot projects not only can provide valuable experience about the potential for developing large scale repatriation assistance projects but can provide immediate information on local and regional conditions, which can then be used to refine repatriation planning.

5.5 An important role for UNHCR field staff in Pakistan will be monitoring of refugee movements in order to anticipate refugeereturn on a significant scale. Field staff must be given the initiativeto develop more and better quality contacts with Afghans in thecamps to keep abreast of developments towards spontaneous repatriation. NGO staff working in the camps are valuable sources of informationand should be cultivated. UNHCR should also consider recruiting Afghan staff to work with field officers in order to facilitate "deep monitoring ",i.e., contact with ordinary Afghans who, unklikemany of the refugee leaders at the camp level, haveno self- interest in misrepresenting camp conditions to a UN officer. Monitoring staff should also be posted at major crossing pointsto determine when, and to extent refugees are their return.

5.6 UNHCR must develop a contingency plan for the organized repatriation of vulnerable groups-- widows, orphans, the disabled and the destitute -- who may not be ableto return to Afghanistan without assistance. .Such a programme would .haveto be coordinated through the Government of Pakistan tosecure adequate and reliable transport. Similarly, coordination on the Afghanistan side willbe required to facilitate transfer of these peopleacross the border and transport to a destination. Facilities for the care of these individuals may have to be established in central locationsuntil they can be "placed" in their villages of origin. The programme should not be implemented before it is apparent that largenumbers of refugees are returning spontaneously. Otherwise, groups of refugees may delay their departure in hopes of qualifying for this special assistance. MAP 7/ RELIEF MAP OF AFGHANISTAN WITH PLANNING REGIONS INDICATED RELIEF 1 o Douchanbe CHINE o Mechhed wait Wits 4922m Sal1d Koh Peshawar Kh.1yM'r PISS o-- ISLAMABAD llamun-e Saban o Quetta 500moins - 1000 de 500 m m 30002000 - 4000- 3000 m m 0 i = 200 km 1000 - 2000 m plus de 4000 m iI\ i :- ) \.\_.-",..1 I -,i ..'. :':,

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REGIONAL PROFILES

NORTH

6.1 Provinces and % of the Refugee Population-- Faryab (na), Balkh (0.3), Samangan (0.4), Jowzjan (0.2),Total (0.9)

6.2 Background -- The northern region, particularlySamangan and Balkh provinces,is perhaps the most strategicarea of Afghanistan from the Soviet point of view and, thus, isamong those areas most affected by the war. The principal supply route linkingKabul with the border town of Hairatan, and the railheadof Termez in Soviet Uzbekistan, bisects Samangan province. The cities of Mazar- i- Sharif and Shibargan are Soviet /Afghan strongholdsvital for the protection of the region's naturalgas fields and the pipelines that supply both Kabul and the Soviet Union. Resistance activities in the region have been limited because the flat landscape ofthe far north provides little protection for 'guerrilla warfare. Nevertheless, observers have noted a pattern of systematic destructionand depopulation of villages south of the Soviet border withinthe last few years by Soviet /Afghan forces. The large influx of refugees from theregion into Pakistan in 1985 -86 is thoughtto be the result of such strategy. However, up until this time, the majority ofthose people displaced from the region have remainedin Afghanistan, migrating either to the city of Mazaror settling in the highlands of northeast Bamyan and the northern perimeter ofHazarajat. Aside from the desire to remain as closeas possible to their agricultural and pasture lands, the long and difficult travelrequired to circumvent Kabul in order to reach the securityof Pakistan has, until recently, discouraged many inhabitants from joiningthe refugee population.

6.3 The majority of the refugees fromthis region are settled in the Mianwali camps of Punjab. Because of the difficulties of living in the Punjab for these largelyTurkoman and Uzbek refugees-- the extreme heat, the dissimilarity of thehost population, the lack of employment -- many observers have predicted that these will beamong the first refugees to returnto Afghanistan. However, given Soviet interests in the North and the logicof Soviet withdrawal, it isnot likely that conditions will beconducive to repatriation forsome time. Nevertheless, the most likelyroute of return for those settled in the Punjab is throughMiramshah /Ghulam Khan where they link up with heavy transportat Gardez to take them north through Pul -i -Alan, Kabul and topoints northeast via the main highway. 36

6.4 Ethnic and Political Overview -- The Turkic- speaking Uzbeks and Turkoman populations dominate the northern region. The Turkoman are settled widely across the semi -desertic Bactrian plain, which extends southward from Soviet Turkestan and the Amu Darya for nearly 100 kilometers. Uzbeks occupy the fertile lands between the Bactrain Plain and the Central Highlands of Hazarajat. Hazaras dominate the southern reaches of Jowzjan, Balkh and Samangan controllingmuch of the private transportation through the region. Large numbers of Tajiks inhabit Samangan and Pushtuns live in pocketsthroughout the region.

6.5 Jamiat -i- Islami is the most influential resistanceparty in the region (see Annex II for a profile of the major resistanceparties). In Balkh, Khalil Khan, formerly a deputy of the widelyrespected Tajik commander, Zabiullah Khan, is believedto have the strong support of Jasmiat leader Burhanudin Rabbani and theability to create a strong regional administration modelledon those of the other prominant Jamiat commanders AhmadshahMasoud and Ismail Khan. Partisans of both Hezb -i- Islami partiesare found in Balkh and Jowzjan as are those of Gailani and the Uzbekcommander Azad Baig. Harakat /Mohammadi has a following in parts ofSamangan, the southern mountains of Balkh and in Faryab. In Faryab, especially the capital, Andkhoi, Najat-i-Milli/Mdjadeddi is influential. By and large, the Shiite parties are strongly representedamong the Hazaras in the south of all four provinces. The Soviet /Afghan forces control allof Mazar -i- Sharif and its environs as wellas much of the northern plains to the Soviet border.

6.6 Recently, the Kabul government carvedout a new province named Saripul from -the southern districts of Balkhand Jowzjan, an area largely inhabited by the Hazaras. Descendents of the central Asian Mongol invaders of Afghanistan, theHazaras have long suffered the discrimination of the country's Pushtun rulers. Knowledgeable observers believe that thismove to create an exclusively Hazara province is an attempt by the Kabulgovernment to capitalize on the animosity between Hazaras and Pushtuns in orderto win over the Hazaras to the government. This administrative move is also interpreted to indicate Soviet intentionsof maintaining considerable influence in the region forsome time to come.

6.7 Agriculture -- Good rain fall and fertilesoils combine to make the North the second most importantagricultural area of the country. The predominance of medium sizedfarms and large tenant holdings combined with a relatively lowdensity of population allowed the region to produce agricultural surpluses before the war. The topography is mountainous in the southbecoming flatter in the north and east towards the Amu Darya River.In order of importancecrops are wheat, barley, cotton, flax andsesame, maize and some rice. The area is particularly noted. for its sheep herding(17% Of national flock of common sheep and 86% ofthe national Karakul flock). Carpet weaving is important cottage industryespecially among the Turkoman. The area has 24% of the total irrigatedland and 24% of the total dryland farming area of the country.Ginning and textile manufacture are.regional industries. The country's onlynitrogen fertilizer factory is located at Balkh. 37

Committee reported that the 6.8 Farmers surveyed by the Swedish main war damage was caused bythe bombing of villages, shooting of livestock and destruction of irrigationsystems. Shortage of manpower, draughtanimals, fertilizer (in some areas), and the increase of crop diseases werealso listed as problems.

6.9 kfghanaid has undertaken some agricultural assistanceprojects in Balkh Province.

6.10 Wheat Storage Facilities: Mazar -i- Sharif (Balkh) one silo -30,000 tons. Fertilizer storage facilities: Mazar -i- Sharif - approximately 5,000 tons.

6.11 Bases of Operation -- Because of the distance of the provinces from Pakistan and the likelihood of a protracted Sovietwithdrawal from the region, the establishment of bases of operation and health facilities, and the implementation of assistance programmes will probably not be possible until Phase III of the repatriation operation. Considering the existing "push" factors related to living conditions in the Punjab, refugees may return to areas that have provided asylum to internally displaced populations from the same region. The internally displaced may indeed follow the same patterns of preliminary repatriation as those of refugees originating in provinces close to the Pakistan border, i.e., sending able- bodied men to rebuild houses and rehabilitate agricultural land. -

Region Province Store ana Bases of Operation ' i Ref4ees

Hospital (Uluswaii & Icwn) ; Per Prcyiace

,North Phase ill Balkh yazar-i-Sharif Balkh, Daulatabaa, 3hcl,ara .: Char Bola

Faryab Aaiaana Anakhoi, 3auiataoac, :aisar NA

Sowzjan Shibarghan Sang Charak, !ari-Pul, ;Rqcha

Saaangan Aibak/Saaangan Dara-i-Suf, Owl' ? iasnçurgan, :3

Bu-i-Dawaa; Dcab Rui

.

IT 4 ..

6.12 Medical Coverage -- As the table below reveals, health coverage is at a very low level in this region with only 25% estimated requirements being met by non -government sources. There are only four non -government MDs accounted for in the the entire region. MSF /France operates two health facilities in Badakhshan periodically staffing them with expa,:.riate teams. The following table gives a very crude indication of the level of health coverage throughout the region. Additional details can be found in Annex Table 4. :3 8

iRee,'Ion ¡Province No. of clinics IN1.0. 01' clinics No. of clinics ;NO implemented by ¡Implemented ty per 15,a0 pop. Allianos Alliance Health ¡CtIC ht members ,stili require: Committee baseo on re-ar ;.mealtn crez pop. estimates

7,4 :3'410

,Faryab 31

23

; amangan 14

t. 4 3'?

NORTHEAST

6.13 Provinces and % of the Refugee Population-- Baghlan (2.7;, Takhar (0.1), Kunduz (2.0), Badakhshan (0.7), Total (5.5)

6.1.1 Background -- The Northeast is another extremely strategicarea for the Soviets. The two main routes of supply to Kabul from the Soviet Union -- the route from Termez through Balkh and Samangan provinces, and the route from Dushanbe through Kunduz-- join at Pul -i- Khumri, the provincial capital of Baghlan. The Northeast has also developed into one of the most effectiveareas of the resistance of the war despite repeated and concentrated Soviet/Afghanoffensives against the population. The effectiveness of the resistance is in large part due to the efforts of the Jamiat commander .Àhmadshah Masoud who is based in the Panjshir Valley. The Panjshir forms the southern border of Baghlan and Takhar provinces and its control is strategic to the defense of the northern highway.

6.15 For close to a decade, Masoud has built up an effective military and civil administration under the Shura of the North. This shura, a form of supervisory council made up of commanders, religious leaders and elders from throughout the region, meets regularly with its local representatives to evaluate the needs of the population and to determine appropriate types of assistance. The shura provides assistance to the families of war dead and woundedas well as internally displaced people who have migratedto Kabul city. In addition, the shura administers an extensive medical andeducation system throughout the region.

6.16 As in the northern region, the large percentage of the population directly effected by the war has remained inthe country, migrating to the mountains north of the Panjshiror to the environs of Kabul. The nearly 30,000 refugee Tajik families registered in NWFP are settled in the camps of Peshawar Districtor in those districts close to the border (e.g., Chitral, Kurram,North Waziristan, Hangu).

6.17 The most likely route of return for the majority ofthe refugees will be through Jalalabad via Torkham, turningnorth of Sarobi to skirt Kabul city, thenon to Mahmud Raqi and points north along the main highway or northeast throughthe Panjshir Valley.

6.18 Ethnic and Political Overview-- Tajiks are the predominant ethnic group of the Northeast Region withpockets of Pushtuns and Uzbeks settled in the north of the region,Pamiris in the east and Hazaras in the highlands of the west. The influence of Professor Rabbani's Jamiat -i- Islami is widespread throughoutBadakhshan, Takhar and large parts of Kunduz and eastern Baghlan. Hezb -i- Islami /Gulbadin is influential in thePushtun areas of Badakhshan (especially Kishm and Jurm), northernTakhar province, Kunduz and the west of Baghlan. Harakat /Mohammadi has a following in pockets of Kunduz and northern Takhar and the Uzbekcommander Azad

40

Baig who is loosely affiliated with Pir Gailani /(Mahaz -i- Milli) has a following among the Uzbeks of Takhar. The Ismaeli populations inhabiting eastern Badakhshan and the Hazara areas of western Baghlan have aligned themselves with the Kabul government.

6.19 Agriculture -- Wide fertile plains dominate the north towards the Amu Darya, but the south and east has a predominantly mountainous topography (Badakhshan has more peaks over 7,000 metres than any other province) where agriculture is carried out in narrow valleys or in high altitude pockets of flat land. There is plentiful rainfall and extensive traditional irrigation systems. Before the war this was the most important agricultural zone in the country, with a highly productive system of irrigated agriculture (17% of the national total) that allowed for double cropping in. most areas. Dryland agriculture (30%.-of national total) was also significant. In order of importance, major crops were irrigated wheat, dryland wheat, rice, cotton, barley, maize, and sugar -beet. In addition, the Northeast accounted for one -fifth of the country's fruit production. Sheep herding was also important and provided the raw material for carpet weaving cottage industry. Heavy industry was mainly cotton ginning, sugar -beet processing and soap manufacture from cotton seed oil.

6.20 As in the North, farmers surveyed by the Swedish Committee reported major damage due to bombing of villages, the shooting of livestock and damage to irrigation systems. The shortage of manpower, seeds, fertilizers, and pesticides were also cited as problems. Some rehabilitation work has been carried out through agricultural committees supported by the Shura of the North in Baghlan, Kunduz, Takhar and parts of Badakhshan.

6.20 Agricultural projects have been undertaken in the region by Afghanaid (Kunduz, Takhar); Afrane (Baghlan, Badakhshan);Guilde du Raid( Baghlan); Norwegian Committee (Badakhshan).

6.21 Wheat storage facilities: Pul- i- Khumri( Baghlan), one silo -30,000 tons capacity. Badakhshan, two hangers (oneat Kishim) - 2,000 tons each Dast -i -Archi (Takhar), one hanger - 2,000 tons ; Talogan, Takhar, one hanger - 2,000 tons. Fertilizer storage facilities: Pul -i- Khumri - approximately 5,000tons; Kunduz - 5,000 tons; Dasht -i -Archi - 2,000 tons; Talogan (Takhar)- 2,000 tons; Faizabad (Badakhshan) - 1,000 tons; Kalat (Badakhshan)- 1,00C tons.

6.22 Bases of Operation -- Access to much of thearea, especially Baghlan and Kunduz, will dependon the political stability of Kabul, and, of course, the level of accessibilityto the provinces of the eastern region. However, many of the cross -border agencieshave extensive projects among both the local and the internallydisplaced populations of the region. These projects could be sustained and expanded on a limited basisas required. 4

Region Province Store s ; Bases cf Operation , #

Hospital ¡ {Ulusrall i ?ton) ;er

Í North East Phase II 3adaKnsnan Faizataa lure, Oarraz é yesay, 'csrRasnel, aeshia, Yaknan (?)

Taanar ialoQan + rhraja Ghar, Rustag, Iskaaisn,

rangi Quia, Farknar, Cast-i-Arc1i, anost-o-Farang

Phase III Bagnian tagnian Puì-i-Khusri, Ooshi, hanrin, :14 andaraD

Kunduz Kunduz Hazrat luau Tanin, Knan ,Dad,

Oaia -i-ill

10TAt 19 ' r ...

6.23 Medical Coverage -- The Northeast possesses an effective health system operating in conjunction with the Shura of the North. In 1985, Dr. Sahar was appointed Regional Responsible for Healthby the Shura and he visited Peshawar to contact allcross -border medical agencies ánd arrange for the training of sixty students. He also made arrangements with the Alliance Health Committee, theSwedish Committee and the Norwegian Committee to obtain medical suppliesfor existing health facilities. Dr. Sahar now supervises 18 clinics, two hospitals and a training facility in the four provinces ofthe Northeast. An important aspect of this health system is that it operates within the larger administrative structure of the Shura, which, for example, is able to mobilize roadconstruction to link clinics with hospitals.

Region Province INo, ofclinics No.of clinics ;No. cf clinics ;Mc.of

iaplehented ty Dy Iter 1S,)í;0 pop. ; I : :roca -ei. :.

Alliance Health :7C temcers ;still 'eoUlr iccao :. :ae :i::.

Ccnti:tee r oased on ;re -Mar ì'r,ealtr Yorkers '

;tot. estiiates 1

FORTH Badakhsnan o ' o j 27 lEASTc 3agnlan

Kunduz 3 1 32

1axnar 7 C

;7TAl 4 :4 42

EAST

Population -- Paktya (7.0), 6.23 Provinces and % of the Refugee Nangrahar (10.5), Laghman(5.9), Kunar (5.9), Total(29.3)

of the eastern region account 6.24 Background -- The four provinces all regions for the largest percentageof the refugee population of Pakistan, and the of Afghanistan. The proximity of the region to ethnic ties that link thepopulations on both sides of theborder, made asylum in Pakistan a moreviable option for the inhabitants of the region than for many of thosein the interior. Jalalabad, however, is one of the few citiesnot devastated, by the Soviet/Afghan forces and its population has swollenwith internally displaced people from throughout the East andEast Central regions. Similarly, Gardez, the provincial capital ofPaktya Province has become a refuge for large numbers of the internallydisplaced. heaviest fighting of the war 6.25 The East has seen some of the because a number of major supply routesfor the resistance cross from Pakistan to Paktya. The Mujahidin stronghold at Khosthas continually been a target for fierceSoviet/Afghan air and artillery attacks that have frequently spilled acrossthe border into Pakistan.

6.26 Much of the refugee population fromKunar and Laghman is settled in the camps of Chitral,Dir and Bajaur districts of NWFP. These refugees are likely to return to theirhomes through any of the many mountain passesconnecting the two rfegions, or by roadthrough Arandu (Chitral) and Nawa (Bajaur) --both of which lead to Asadabad, the provincial capital of Kunar -- orvia Torkham and Jalalabad to Mehtarlam, the provincial capital of Laghman

6.27 Refugees from Nangrahar are concentratedin Peshawar, Kurram and Kohat camps and will likely returnvia Torkham and Jalalabad. Refugees from Paktya are largely settled inKohat and North Waziristan. Motorable roads from Karlachi and Lakatigga inKurram, and Gulam Khan and Saidgi in NorthWaziristan, lead to Gardez.

6.28 Political and Ethnic Overview -- Pushtunsdominate much of the region, especially south and east ofJalalabad. The Khoghiani, Shinwari and ,Mohmmand tribes are prominentin Nangrahar Province as are the Zadran,Nangal, Tori and Khosti tibes in Paktya. The Safi tribe predominates in the lowlands ofLaghman and Kunar but the highlands and isolated valleys of theseprovinces -- collectively known as Nuristan -- are inhabited by non-Pushtun groups such as the Nuristanis and the pastoral Gujars.

6.29 Unlike the Jamiat in the North andNortheast, no one resistance party dominates the East. This may reflect both the independenceand the devisiveness of the regions Pushtuntribal culture. Hezb-i-Islami/Khalis is influential south ofJalalabad (Khalis was born in Nangrahar) and it shares itsinfluence with Gailani's Mahaz party in Paktya. The Khalis commander of Gardez andKhost (Paktya), Chitral

h..,.n. chNy .lt ('\` 1 :21,61:1 0.11.1-A.

I / \ vc..du. I \l.dáhtM. I Italia ...,tT.kh.A L Firyib) \ Ym..aM ,..i L l.wvy.. lB.hün9 / i i\ '\ r fe \ Bidghis .'. ..Ñnul+' .1 Bimwn 1 / \ r..l'^tGkd-""-, HN11 i- Ghowr/ !y i V.r4k vKb. i I. / ..-`. l. i 1 l ... ( Onizgin .. Ch.zni 1 Farah i ,¡-.,,.Ie' // / (j"--s...... i N . / Psktiki _._.J L"hal!.t / / t. ------N / /H.Im.nd I Odnd.hir Nimrriz I

I I 43

Jallaludin Hagani, has extensive influence not only throughoutPaktya Province but in neighboring Ghazni and Wardakas well. Hezb -i- Islami/ Gulbudin has support in Nangrahar and parts ofLaghman and southern Kunar. Both Gailani and Mojaddedi also have partisansin southern Kunar but the inhabitants of Nuristan largelysupport a regional ethnic movement led by Maulavi Afzal knownas Daulat- i- Ingilab (Revolutionary Government). Recent reports indicate that the Kabul government is seeking the support of thismovement by proposing to create an autonomous province for the Nuristanis. The reformist (Wahabi) party of Prof. Sayyaf, Itihad-i- Islami, has limited influence in parts of Paktya, Nangrahar andKunar.

6.30 Agriculture -- The eastern provincesare a densely populated mountainous region with small farms andintensively irrigated agriculture that allows for doublecropping of wheat, maize, rice, corn, sugar cane, vegetables and cotton. Farmers use mixed organic and chemical fertilizer when possible but there is littlemechanized cultivation. The area is relativelywarm with generally mild winters and hot summers. The major livestock isgoats and cattle. The eastern provinces are the main forestedzone of the country accounting for 52% of the Afghanistan'sforest cover;

6.31 Farmers surveyed by the Swedish Committeereported the main war damage to the region was the bombingof villages, shooting of livestock and destruction ofirrigation systems. The lack of manpower (due to out migration), fertilizers,seeds and 'agro- chemicals have all affectedagricultural production.

6.32 Agricultural projects have beenundertaken in the region by Afghanaid (Kunar); Bureau International Afghanistan (Kunar,Laghman); and, The Norwegian Committee(Kunar).

6.33 Wheat storage facilities: Bal Murghab (Laghman),one hanger -2,000 tons storage. Fertilizer storage facilities:Laghman - 4,000 tons; and Jalalabad (Nangrahar)- 14,000.

6.34 Bases of Operation-- Because of their proximity to the Pakistan border, the provinces of the eastern region shouldbe the most accessible and logistically the simplest to supply. It is likely that interventions can be undertaken very earlyon, perhaps even on a pilot basis to explore thepotential constraints to repatriation assistance. The number of bases ofoperation and health facilities for Nangrahar andPaktya may have to be increased considering the large numbersof people thatare expected to return. Such planning can only take place when more accurateinformation concerning the districts ofrefugee origin become available ;

.:re sas ?5 :1 ;,ef,:e?: :4:,:5

D°.cn, i ;5aeaoae (nas (Lndr, Ilalaesn, .Sta :1s; ; ?nase ;

laÿntan 'et:ar .al .ir:a ;a-, .ìisnan;

Nai1i'3r,ar ,.ia:aDac .n.'tar. ',10;:a7:. .Jrk" ,..

':. '..-

'e53ra , ïosn;a

i aM;lj Garle: lrGS;, ;ai, +a;+el Aar31, :wan, CnalKani

;iCíAl ;0

6.35 Medical coverage -- Of the four eastern provinces, Kunar and Paktya have reasonably good health coverage while Nangrahar, because of the size of the population, will require considerable expansion of its health resources. There are 10 MDs accounted for in the region's non -governmental health system and a large percentage of the Basic Health Workers trained by the Alliance Health Committee.

ein Province imo. of clinics iro.of Clini:s ;mo. of c:ini:=. limolementea Dy limclementea cr ;,er :S,J0e ;,00. .:iance !Alliance aeaitn jC'C ulcers iStiii reluire: 715.: !Committee lCasea Jn -e3:. +C'?-s estimates Í !

:Mz'T aunar

llÿnman

Manÿranar

3

.S 45

EAST CENTRAL

Provinces and % of the RefugeePopulation -- Kabul (1.8), 6.36 Kapisa (na), Bamyan (na), Parwan(1.4), Logar (7.5), Wardak (0.2), Ghazni (9.5), Total (20.4)

Inner East Region is divided 6.37 Background -- The East Central or Soviet by the principal north -southroute linking Kabul with the Union and all points to thesouth and west of the country. These wide highways are heavily guarded bySoviet /Afghan garrisons and perimeters have been cleared ofvegetation and habitation on either side to eliminate protective coverfor resistance attacks on Soviet north of Kabul in Kapisa convoys. The Panjshir Valley lies to the Province.

6.38 The pattern of social dislocationwithin the region corresponds roughly to its ethnic makeup. The Tajiks and non -Pushtuns in Parwan and Kapisa provinces have migrated toKabul or to the mountains of southern Parwan, eastern Bamian andWardak. Substantial numbers of Pushtuns have sought refpge in Pakistan. Those from Kabul, Parwan and Logar are settled in Abbottabad,Kohat, Mardan, Peshawar and, more recently, Mianwalidistricts. Those from Wardak have settled in Kurram and those from Ghazni in SouthWaziristan and D.I. Khan. The city of Ghazni has also experienceddramatic expansion with the settlement of the internally displaced

6.39 As with the North East Region, the primary routesof refugee return to the East Central will be through and Jalalabad to Kabul; via Miramshah and Kurram to Gardez and the northernfeeder route to Pul -i -Alam, the provincial capital of Logar, andpoints north and west.

6.40 Ethnic and Political Overview -- Pushtuns dominate the entire region south of Kabul, especially the provinces of Logar(Kharoti and Niazi tribes), Wardak (Wardaki and Ahmadzai) and Ghazni(Andar, Nasir and Taraki). The mountainous region north of the capital, particularly the Panjshir and Parwan valleys, is inhabitedlargely by Tajiks. Hazaras make up much of the population of Bamyan aswell as western Wardak and Ghazni, areas that are considered partsof Hazarajat.

6.41 As elsewhere in the country, political influencelargely follows ethnic and tribal loyalties. Although the government controls Bamyan city and environs, the Shiite parties,particularly Mohseni's Harakat- i- Islami, has strong support, as does the pro- Khomeini Sasman- i -Nasrthroughout the north of the region. Gailani's Mahaz party is influential in southernGhazni and much of Wardak, where the commander Amin Wardak has built up anextensive local administration with the help of a number of cross-border agencies. Mahaz and Hezb- i- Islami/ Khalis, and, to some extent, Jamiat, have influence in Logar although much of theprovince has been depopulated by the war. Jamiat has strong support in the . . , .;trim1\ _ It ¡ .,%<'''- . . , r Jl4-SIi . U a k... ' 4 .. _ - t _ ..4.11;e" '. r /+ ii :wr . ., k ' r . c ` `\ - ,' No ` r , W / : .r 'r! 4- 1,4'3 :1re.ili: ,. , .0;,ÿ,.y :A ,?a'' .r i, il"!r ' :- l`. ; -. 14 1% b V ¡,- lz . '' , . ., . Wi,-, P frI.N .. :. _ * v ,. l' r+.= i,.4 .-~ ,-e Ir .- _,- '

.. -, 'v' 4r"r ` 4.14,4,....1 tk ', w . t T y r .d V i"i , . - , I-r r7r A .,. -

.- 46

Panjshir, through the influence of Ahmadshah Masoud, Parwan and Kabul city. The Hezb- i- Islami /Khalis commander, Abdul Haq dominates the resistance in and around the capital but Kabul and its environs are clearly under the control of the government.

6.42 Agriculture -- Much of the region is cool and mountainous with a short growing season. River bottom land is irrigated and cultivated with wheat (single crop). The uplands are cultivated with dry field wheat, maize and potatoes. The area is important its fruit production (21% of the national total) with grapes, apples, and pears being the most common varieties. Land holdings are small and there is limited mechanized cultivation. With 11% of the national sheep flock, textile production is important to the regional economy.

6.43 Again, farmers surveyed by the Swedish Committee listed the main war damage as the bombing of villages, shooting of livestock and the destruction of irrigation systems. Lack of manpower, pesticides, seeds and draught animals were also common complaints. Horticulture in Parwan has been particularly damaged by the war, as has the the farmland along the highway from Kabul to Qalat (Zabul) and major towns throughout the region.

6.44 Agricultural projects have been undertaken in the region by Afghanaid (Kapisa, Logar); Afrane (Ghazni); Austrian Relief Committee (Logar); Guilde du Raid (Bamyan, Wardak); Norwegian Committee (Ghazni).

6.45 Wheat storage: Kabul has four silos with a capacity of 30,000 tons each (total 120,000). In Kabul, nearly 169,000 tons of Soviet -supplied flour is distributed on a monthly basis to city bakers through 12 outlets. Fertilizer storage facilities: Kabul - 11,000 tons; Ghazni - 1,000 tons; Parwan - 5,000 tons; Bagrami (Kabul) - 2,000 tons.

6.46 Bases of Operation -- The southern sector of the region has reasonably good access from Pakistan and a repatriation programme can be established in this area early on. As with much of the north, access to the other of the region's provinces will depend on the political and security situation in and around Kabul. 47

kkegion Province Store & Bases cf Operation t;.e ugees

Hospital (Uluswali & Town) j Per Provinces

:East Central Phase I Ghazni Ghazni Moqur, Jaghatu, Jagnori, Oarabagn ;t:

Logar Pul-i-Alas honaoaad Agha, Azro, Charkh :BI

Wardak Maidan Shahr Chak, Markaz-i-Eensud i Gardandiwaì,

Behsud

Phase II Kapisa Mahaood Ragi Konistan, Nijrao, Pahjsnir 1Potina r.A

8aiyan Basyan Kahiard h

Phase III Kabul Kabul Pagnaan, Deh Sabz, Sarobi, Cnarasyab, 1 0 arabagh, Mir Bacha Kot

1

Í I Parwan Charikar Ghorband SZ

Surkhi Parsa

TOTAL ' 1 22 I ''t

6.47 Medical Coverage -- There are reasonably adequate health resources in a number of the East Central provinces, especially Ghazni, Logar and Wardak, where the resistance has been effective at protecting health facilities and staff. Fourteen MDs are accounted for in the non -governmental health system as well as nearly half of all Basic Health Workers trained by the Alliance Health - Committee The region has the largest and most continuous presence of expatriate health workers of any region in the country. Medecins du Monde operates a surgical hospital in Wardak with expatriate staff. Parwan and Kapisa are incorporated into the health system of the Shura of the North. CAP ANAMUR (Germany), operates a hospital in Bamyan; MSF Holland & Belgium jointly sponsor a medical team working with Hazaras in Parwan; MSF /France operates a hospital in Ghazni; and, the Norwegian Committee places expatriate doctors in Ghazni periodically. -13

1No. of clinics ;Mo. of Region Province No. of clinics No. of Clinics Alliance reaì:n implemented by implemented by per 15,000 pop. Comai: :ee 3asi: Alliance healtnICnC members (still required eaitn ,cr.ers Coaaittee ¡based on pre -rar }pop. estioates

EAZT Banyan 3 s CENTRAL

Ghazni 3 !

Kabul

Kapisa 10

:o Logar <

Parwan 5

wardak 25

TOTAL 11 40 SOUTH

6.48 Provinces and % of the Refugee Population-- Helmand (4.1), Kandahar (12.3), Nimroz (3.1), Paktika (7.0),Uruzgan (1.3), Zabul (1.3), Total (25.6)

6.49 Background -- Like the northern region, the Southhas suffered some of the most severe effects of the war. Reports from Kandahar city claim that two -thirds of the city and allthe villages within a 20 mile radius of the city limits havebeen razed. The extensive fruit orchards lining the Kandahar- Herat Highway have been clear cut by Soviet/Afghan troops to eliminate cover for Mujahidir .3ttac s on supply convoys. This action has largely eliminated Kandahar's commercial agricultural economy. The extensive irrigation works of the Helmand Valley have deteriorated severelydue to...ar damage and lack of maintenance.

6.50 There are both extensive refugee and internallydisplaced populations related to this region. Kandahar province alone is thought to be the origin of the largest percentageof the refugee population, much of which is settled in and aroundQuetta and the Chaman, Pishin and Gulistan districts of Baluchistan. The populations of Kandahar city are widely settled in thesmall towns of Panmjwai District, south of the city and in Shorawak Districtalong the Baluchistan border. Others from Kandahar, like those originating in the populated zones of Helmand and Zabul, fledto the mountains southern Hazarajat.

6.51 The Kandahar - Herat Highway, with its link roadto Quetta-via Chaman, will be the most likely route of refugeereturn. Those returning to Zabul, Uruzgun and provinces of origin further northare likely to travel via Badini and Qamar -u -Din Karez in Zhob District along motorable roads that eventually connect with the North -South Highway. Those destined for Paktika may travel through Zhob into South Waziristan and cross the border at Gul Katch, near 'ana.

6.52 Ethnic and Political Overview -- The Pushtuns dominate much of the south along a wide belt that extends from all of Pakzika and Zabul (Sulaiman Khel, Kakar and Hotaki tribes) westacross northern Kandahar, Helmand and Nimroz (Àchakzai, Barakzai, .Alizai and `:urzai tribes respectively). Hazaras inhabit the mountainous regions north of this belt and dominate the population of Uruzgun. Semi -nomadic Baluch and Brahui tribes occupy the oasis zones of southern Kandahar, He .nand and Nimroz but by and large these areas a sparsely inhabited.

6.53 Kandahar is the centre for the ylagam- i- Mushtarq or .;oi-:t which is made up of tribal elders, mullahs and resistance commanders largely from the Mohalajat, Panjwai and Arghandab districts te province. Jamiat, Mahaz and Hezb -i- Islami /Khalis are represented i.. this region as well, especially the respected commander of southeastern Hazarajat, including Ghazni, Sayad Jagian (!1aha:). -T- .1- Is._I . / r, ' , t)(-:=- 2:___. ¡ .. I,- Dashl-i Jaharlriurtt ..l. _J `_r t1. `,Nr ` -á - -o _- - - C., 1 ¿y) I . : _ I -it(;.1uJzrrreh.. . _-- _ 4 ,.-_ -LT . , _...... _ - . lerntral Stures \ _ - linter ut Uperatr..n While the Magam -i- Mushtarq hasa reputation for effective military and political administration, it is unclearto what extent it implements social and medical programmes beyondthe capacity of its participant commanders who maintain contacts withcross -border agencies in Peshawar and Quetta. Similarly, there exists in Zabula Shura -i -Jihad (Council of the Holy War) thatcomprises 16 commanders -- two from each party active in the region plus two representatives of the nomadic populations. These councils constitute embryonic governments in their own right, modest attemptsto overcome tribal and political differences in orderto plot regional strategy. If these groups are able to hold together afterthe fighting ends, they could be effective as intermediaries forthe implementation of assistance programmes in the region.

6.54 Uruzgan Province, in the heart of Hazarajat,is one of those areas least affected by the war. Although the capital is controlled by the government, commanders aligned withmany of the resistance parties have successfully repelled Soviet/Afghan incursions elsewhere in the province Few people have been displaced from thearea and, as a result, it is one of the few areas producingagricultural surpluses for export. Harakat -i- Isami /Mohseni is influentialin much of this part of Hazarajat but there have beenreports of clashes between Harakat and the pro- Khomeini partisansof Sepa-i-Pasdaran, Nasr and Hezbullah. Similar internecine strifeamong the Hazaras, as well as between pro- Iranian and Pushtun groups areknown to have taken place in the Baghran area of northern Helmand,and area that has developed into a prime poppy cultivationzone. Nimroz is thought to be largely controlled by the government but politicalgroups of Maoist sympathies (Showle Jawid) are also activein the province. Harakat /Mohseni and Hezb -i- Islami havesupport in the northeast of the province and independent Baluchcommanders, thought to have the backing of the Iranian government,are active in the central areas.

6.55 Agriculture -- The region is largely desertinterspersed with oasis agriculture where there is doublecropping of wheat, corn and some rice. In addition to the well developed modernirrigation systems of the Helmand Valley, (where there isparticularly good agricultural land), thereare also traditional irrigation systems based on springs and karezes throughoutthe region. In all, the region represents 22% of the national irrigatedfarmland, and ll% of the rainfed farmland. Kandahar was an important fruit production area with a healthy dried fruit and fruit canning industry. Winter grazing for sheep in the region supporteda ginning industry in Helmand. Land holdings were larger than average andmechanized cultivation was common. The districts of Khakreez, Shah Walikotand Neshki Nakhud, where there is quite goodagricultural land, have been badly damaged during thewar. Likewise in the lower Helmand Valley, Arghestan and eastern Nimroz which have alsoexperience significant outmigration. The same applies to thearea around Zaranj. Tirinkot in Uruzgun has suffereda high rate of destruction but otherwise Uruzgun, much of Nimroz and Paktika havenot been severely affected by the war.

6.56 Farmers surveyed by the Swedish Committeeindicated that clearance of mines and other explosivesfrom fields, roads and karezes will be important in Kandahar and Helmand particularly. Other outstanding requirements will be the rehabilitation of the irrigation systems and orchards, pesticides and the provision of seeds. There will be a demand for tractors and other forms of motorized traction in areas such as Zabul which is reported to have suffered a particularly severe shortage of draught animals.

6.57 Agricultural projects have been undertaken in the region Afrane (Kandahar); Guilde du Raid (Kandahar) and Austrian Relief Committee (Kandahar).

6.58 Wheat storage facilities: Kandahar, one silo -30,000 tons Fertilizer storage facilities: Kandahar - 5,000 tons; Lashkargah (Helmand) - 6,000 tons; Girishk (Helmand) - 6,000 tons.

6.59 Bases of Operation -- Assuming an early Soviet withdrawal, large parts of the south, especially provinces bordering 'Baluchistan, are likely to be accessible early in the repatriation timetable with little seasonal obstruction to the commencement of reconstruction efforts. With its good network of roads linking the major towns, good supply and communication links can be maintained over long distances throughout the region. Uruzgan has not been seriously effected by the war but the prevalence of poppy cultivation there may create security risks for expatriate personnel.

4

1 Province Store & ?ases of Cpèration P:.,: ier Hospital Jlaswali 3..+n ....

Phase I 9elland 6irisnk lusa Sa1a, lau:ac, 3ara2 :ar ?

Uarweshan, lac-i-Ali, Saghran,

Deh 3hu, Sarcan fala ? Sangi,,

Kandahar Kandahar Spin 8oldak, 9rgnandab, Dand, Panjwai, arghastan, laruf,

laiwand, 3hcra4ak, :hawaiiCGt

Vi1roi Iaranj Chakhansur, Laslja'wiri, Char-aurjaS,

Khashrud

?aktika 3haran Gcaai, Urgun, (ata4at ? _argun :har

+iazakh wa, Áor Malay

'cabul Qal3t Ar;nancaC, :hahjoi, Gai ':h3!'a",

$hinkaz, TaraaR-o-Ga:,:ak

Phase II Urulgun iirinkot Chora, K.has Jru: an, 6ajran,

Deh :(unsi

:4 6.60 Medical Coverage -- With the exception of Kandahar province, the availability of medical resources in the region is limited. Only four MDs are accounted for in the non -governmental health system. Mercy Corps International and Dr. Hagani of Islamic Aid Health Centre fund and supply a number of stationary and mobile health facilities throughout the south. Health Unlimited (U.K.) formerly staffed a clinic in Uruzgan with expatriate personnel.

Province I Region IMC. cf clinics Mo. of Clinics Ho.if cls ;YC. . imeletented by inolezented dy 'cer 1:,)CO ;cc. ;Al::a-:e .-.-

Alliance Heal:,, CMC letters is:ill r=;uirec :az: -- .-.: Cc9ti:tee tase: :n :re-ea- .za-' - es:.Za:es

:NTH Helland

Kandahar 12

Mixrot

Paktilea 3

Urulgan

iaoul

TOTAL 4 29 NORTHWEST

6.61 Provinces and % of the Refugee Population -- Herat (5.0), Ghor (1.1), Badghis (1.1), Farah (5.3), Total (12.5)

6.62 Background -- Despite the fact that the logistics for the resistance in the North West is coordinated to a large extent from Peshawar, very little is known about conditions in the four provinces. This is due to extremely poor communications with the region and the presence of a relatively small number of refugees :rom the region settled in Pakistan. The historic city of Herat lies at the intersection of the main highways linking the region withthe Soviet Union and Iran. Control of the city by the resistance would effect the supply and communications to the entire southwestern sector of the country as far as Kandahar. For this reason, the Soviet /Afghan forces have eliminated all habitation along the perimeter of the highways to discourage Mujahidin attackson supply convoys. Reports from Herat, which is thought to have hada population of nearly three -quarters of a million people beforethe war, indicate that the city itself and the surrounding villages have largely been destroyed. Other smaller cities in the region, including Farah Markaz, Farah Rud, Bala Boluk and thearea surrounding the Soviet air base at Shin Dand in Farah Province, and Qala- i -Nau, the provincial capital of Badghisare all thought to have sustained extensive damage as have the villages along the perimeter of the highway linking Herat with Islam Qilaon the Iran border.

6.63 The large percentage of the region's refugee population is thought to be settled in the adjacent Iranian provinces of Khorassan, especially in the city of Meshed, and the province of Sistan Baluchistan. It is difficult to determine to what extent these refugees have been displaced by the war or to what extent they constitute some of the large numbers of Afghans who had settledin the region before the war as so- called "economicrefugees ".

6.64 The internally displaced populations of the region,especially of Herat Province, are thought to be considerable. They are largely settled in the mountainous regions of western Hazarajat(Ghor and eastern Farah) that have suffered little of the effectsof the war.

6.65 Ethnic and Political Overview-- The population of the North west has a far more heterogeneous mix of ethnicgroups than the southern or eastern regions. Pushtuns and Tajiks cultivate the watersheds of the region's major riversystems -- the Farah Rud and Rud -i -Guz in Farah Province; the Har -i -Rud and Khushkin Herat. The semi -nomadic Aimaq,a Dari speaking Shi'a people, occupy tracts of wasteland along the Iranian border, north of Herat andthe uplands of much of Ghor and Badghis. A population of Persian speaking Shi'a known as Farsiwan are scattered throughout the districtsthat surround Herat city. ,+roI r-. ! n .1 -!-_ 1i ,P ci 1',.yef1- )ys1'(7 aw - 1 1,0,4/ / ^ p.0, _ál 4071.- Iw1oU f ..... :; 1.., ...__; re i . ,,,,, r, \ I D 7 ,/ ;: ,r,: es,i \ ( w,1 +.1, ` , r...y 1 i.,.Ì Z ...... \ i ,. ...,,, i dS3M [LIMON 14OI732.1 ôPotty G uolmsado jo sasep O 84.1OjS ienua0 /fill: uefucysNi-l-ttise4 -0 . __.___ - wr_ __ _ e -vp .,í. % . /.___ _._ Yv Q .,.., tv.v1t-11^ ry0,/ -. ; 1 r - C"O' +__.. \\ __ ,- ... f pGJIJ 1 ' 9 Pu /1 / /^-_' i' ç`M,__. IORUOIbS !/¡J` _"opt.1y µ.w+00 IDIH. 7"'"' o M, / :I"O \ ' I. ...w,l -}.;;j .,1ÿ \ ,,.,,,t?v,^í .. 3\\'` O '' .._.. `\ \ -- -:J :. -el %1J ~`.'°'.j\¡ Q 4 ..414,4 S gojV._W. ;NV, l'`v ..T. -73.4 °.. _...: y,o...,p Üjla«`'(1(/;^ /1 3ti

6.66 Jamiat Islami has the strongest support in the region. The Jamiat commander Ismail Khan, one of the most influential commanders of the resistance, has organized an effective military and civil administration that extends from Herat city to Shin Dand in northern Farah and westward into central Ghor. The few NGOs working in the Herat region deal almost exclusively with Ishmail Khan's administration. Harakat -i- Islami /Mohammedi has considerable influence among the Pushtuns of Badghis, Farah and Ghor. Hezb -i- Islami /Gulbudin also has partisans in Ghor, especially around the provincial capital Chagcharan.

6.67 Agriculture -- The region is relatively undeveloped with limited irrigated cultivation of wheat, maizecotton, rice and fruit. There is extensive rain -fed cultivation of wheat in Badghis, Ghor and eastern Farah. Forests, mainly of natural pistacchio, account for 12% of the national timber stock. Ginning and silk production are local industries. Herding is important to the livelihood of the region's population which holds 22%of the national flock of common sheep and 25% of the national flockof Karakul sheep. As in the South, farmers surveyed by the SwedishCommittee reported that the region has sufferedsevere war- related damage due to bombing of villages, shooting livestock and destructionof irrigation systems.

6.68 Agricultural projects have been undertaken in theregion Afrane (Herat)

6.69 Wheat storage facilities: Herat,one silo - 30,000 tons; Shin Dand (Farah), one hanger- 2,000 tons; Qalai Naw (Badghis)- 2,000 tons. Fertilizer storage facilities: Farah- 1,000 tons; Shin Dand - 1,000 tons; Herat, two units,one of 6,000 tons and the other of 2,500 tons.

6.70 Bases of Operation -- To date, there is littleevidence that the government of Iran willcooperate in any repatriation efforts organized by UNHCR. However, there may developan Iranian interest in providing assistance to Shiite Hazarasin the central highlands of eastern Ghor, Uruzgan and Bamian. In such a case,it may be possible to develop supply links to the North west viaIran. Otherwise, all assistance will.have to be supplied fromQuetta via Chaman and the Kandahar - Herat Highway. The road network in the formerlypopulated areas is good and should present few difficulties forregular supply and communication. 'rrf:nce itre 3 lases of 0Cera :... t:e=y...osc

,ospitai lusea.i S Tcyr (

V i nor:n 'rest Phase r3rin Farai Sala Firer .. , :r :s'a,

:a:3-.-an, G.;:.a; , .rar..

:aÍtra

ihor ; ."agnCnaran 'G:;A, :h:r-. 'i013ri,

;eri: ier3: r .argr. . 'Zen,

...rar '. .ai.

:ern :al. . .-

:hase :1 C3C:nis :a:3: ¡iu

4

6.71 Medical Coverage -- Herat possesses a medical system similar to that existing in the Northeast. Dr. Mahmud Shah (Darweish) is responsible for health under Ismail Khan's administrationin Herat. Dr. Shah supervises 80 people in one hospital and 11working clinics plus a mobile unit staffed witha surgeon In addition to regularly placing students in Peshawar -based trainingprograms, he has also started a three month trainingprogramme in the central hospital of Herat. Because of the flat topography of thearea, there is little security for health personnel. Of an original six MDs working inthe system, two were buried alive when their undergroundhospital was bombed. Another changed the site of his clinic 17times last year to avoid attacks by government forces. The AHC has only 13 Basic Health Workers in the entire region.

I ¡Region ;Province re.cf clinics ,ro. c' .1iri:s oc. c' c..ri:. Y:. ;` iaplesented oy iispi esenteo :y iter ! , :: :c:. 11.3-:e -ea:. lalliance Heaita jCrIC le9cers ¡stil. -e.J:re: :]l:.:ee :ai..

Capsittee ' :aseo }n 'e-4a- e3.. .:..e.-: ;:C. es:.late.

!awls

¡Herat Jó

CONCLUSION

,.l This report has attempted toprovide a broad and detailed account of theconditions that will affect the repatriation of Afghan refugees and the ability ofUNHCR to provide them with assistance. The report argues thatthe present conditions of the country -- poor levels of security and deterioratedagricultural production -- will discourage any spontaneous returnof refugee families to Afghanistan in the near future. For this reason, it is crucial that current levels of assistance to refugees settled in Pakistanand Iran be maintained. The reliability of such assistance and the assurance of continued asylum will enable the majority of the refugeepopulation, -- especially the morethan 60% originating from provinces bordering Pakistan -- to undertake deliberate steps for their ownrepatriation, such as the rehabilitation of agricultural lands, fromthe security of their present settlements.

7.2 Nevertheless, UNHCR must be prepared for the worst possible situation of a large scale, spontaneous return to Afghanistan that would tax the country's existing food supply well beyond its capacity. This report outlines a basic infrastructure for providing relief assistance and recommends institutional arrangements for delivering that assistance. These recommendations emphasize the role of experienced NGOs and the importance of local governments throughout the country to the successful implementation of relief assistance. Phase II of UNHCR's information gathering project will continue with its efforts to compile more detailed information onthe conditions inside the country. Additional efforts will be made to refine the data regarding the areas of refugee origin in order to better target relief and reconstruction assistance. An important aspect of these efforts will be the continuedcoordination and information sharing with those NGOs that are, or intend to be, active in assisting the population of Afghanistan

7.3 Barring the absolute necessity for emergency relief, repatriation assistance should be aimed it supporting reconstruction activities inside Afghanistan. Projects designed to stimulate local agricultural and commercial development will be an essential component of this assistance. UNHCR has the responsibility of assuring that the loss of life during the repatriation of Afghan refugees is kept to a minimum. However, the implications of this mandate extend to the entire population of a country that has suffered more than a decade of political upheaval and war. UNHCR has the responsibility of assuring that assistance efforts direct the population towards self- sufficiency as adequately as possible. REFERENCES

Carp, Craig (1987) Afghanistan: Eight Years of Soviet Occupation. Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Washington, D.C.

Carter, Lynn and Whitney Azoy (1988) "Agriculture and Rural Reconstruction in Afghanistan." Paper prepared for the Cooperatiove Committee of Private Voluntary Organizations, Peshawar.

Christensen, H. and W. Scott (1987) Survey of Social and Economic Conditions of Afghan Refugees in Pakistan. Geneva: UNRISD.

English, Richard (1988) "Report on the Social Assessment, World Bank /UNHCR Income Generating Project For Refugee Areas (Phase I)." Pakistan, The World Bank.

Etienne, G.(1982) "Afghanistan, de eclaircie a latragedie," in G. Etienne, Developoment rural en Asie. Paris, P.U.F. College de Tier Monde.

(1987) "Les Refugies Afghans." Les Nouvelles d'Afganistan (Nos. 35-36).

King, R.B. (1976) "Afghanistan Conspectus." Surry, England, Overseas Development Administration (revised by ODA in 1988).

Sliwinski, Marek (1988) "Evaluation des Consequences Humaines, Sociales et Ecologiques de la Guerre en Afghanistan." Bureau International Afghanistan and Medecins Sans Frontieres, Paris.

Swedish Committe for Afghanistan (1988) "Report of the Agricultural Survey of Afghanistan." Peshawar. ff

ANNEX I-- TABLES bit

ANNEX TABLE 1-- POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE UNITS OF AFGHANISTAN

Province Capital' Units No. Uluswalis Alaqadaris (District) (Tehsils)

1. Badakhshan Faizabad Jurm, Darwaz Ragh, Shahbazarg, Eshkashem Baharak, Khwahan Keshim, Wakhan Keranomonjan Faizabad Zebak, Sheghnan

2. Badghis Qalai Nau Murghab, Ghormach, Kush Kohna Qadis, Jawand Qalai Nau

3. Baghlan Baghlan Pul-i-Khumri Dahna-i-Ghori Doshi, Nahrin, Talawa Barfak Andarab Khinjan, Barka Khost-o-Farang Baghlan

4. Balkh Mazar -i- Sharif Nahr -i -Shahi Dehdadi Balkh, Daulatabad Char Kant Sholgara Keshende Shor Topa Char Bolak Chemtal Mazar -i- Sharif

5. Bamyan Bamyan Kahmard, Bamyan, Shibar Yakawlan$, Saighan Panjab, haras

6. Farah Farah Bala Baluk Khaki $afid Anar Dara Fars Qala -i -kan Gulistan, Farah Parchaman Shindand, Bakwa

7. Faryab Maimana Andkhoi Khan Charagh Pushtun Kot Qurghan Pul Charagh Qaragul Darzab Kohistan Shirin Tagab Almar Daulatabad Qaisar Maimana 8. Ghazni Ghazni Moqur Zena Khan wawa, Dehyak Anderl Khwaja Cmri Nahur Gilan Jaghatu Ab -band Jaghori Goru Qarabagh Sultan Khel Malistan Jani Khel Ghazni Delah, Oma Yousaf Khel Warmarray 9. Ghor Chaghcharan Sharak Saghar Tolok Ghor -i- Taywara Peshaband Lal -i -Sar Jangal Chagcharan

10. Helmand Lashkar Gah. Nahr -i -Seraj Rog Musa Qala Sarban Qala Nauzad Kajakai Garam Sar Washir Nad -i -Ali Nava Barakzai Baghran Deh Shu Lashkargah Province Capital AdmiDistrative ynits No. Uluswalis Alaqadaris (District) (Tehsils)

11. Herat Herat Anjil Chist -i- Sharif Pushtun Zarghun Obeh, Herat Gazrah Karukh Golran Kushk Ghoryan Zenda Jan Kehan Adraskan 12. Jawzjan Shibarghan Sang Charak Balkhab Sar-i-pul Kohistanat Aqcha Mardyan Mengajek Faizabad Qargin Khanazah Shibarghan Khumyab 13. Kabul Kabul Char Dehi Charasyab Paghman Khak-i-Jabar Deh Sabz Kalkan Bahgrám Islatif Sarobi, Kabul Koh Daman Qarabagh Shakardara 14. Kandahar Kandahar Spin Boldak Daman Shiga Ghorak Dand, Kandahar, Nish Arghastan Reg Maruf Khakre Arghandab Panjwai Maiwand Shorawak Shahwalikot 13. Kapisa Mahmood Rugi Kohistan Durnama Koh Band Nejrab Chargarya Panjsher Dara- i- Hazara Taqab Alasay Mahmood Raqi 16. Kunar Asadabad Khas Kunar Chapa Dara Sarkani Tarang -o -Badal Bar Kunar Kamdesh Narai Chauki Dangam Pech, Asmar Mazar- o- Surgai Asalabad

17. Kunduz Kunduz Chardarra Ali Abad Hazrat Imam Sb. Khan Abad Qala -i -Zal Kunduz 18. Laghman Mehtar Lam Alinagar Aziz Khan Kaz Alishang Qarghae Nooristan Mehtar Lam 19. Logar Pul -i -Alum Kulangar, Charkh Mohammad Agha Khosh Azro Pul- i -Alam Barak -i -Barak Province Capital Administrative Units Uluswalis Alagadaris (District) (Tehsils)

20. Nangrahar Jalalabad Shinwar Pachir Wagam (Hakumat Kalan) Sherzad Khugiani Khwajazai-o- Kama Goshta Surkhrod Behsud Koz Kunar Dara Noor Nazran Batikot Rodat Chaprahar Deh Bala Lalpura Mohmand Dara Achin, Hesarak Jalalabad

21. Nimroz Zaranj Kangg Zaranj Khashrud Chakiansur Lashjawin Char-Burjak

22. Uruzgun Tirinkot Chora, Khas,Uruzgan Ajarestan Gizab Dehrud Kaj ran Shahrestan Dehkundi Tirinkot 23. Paktika Sharan Sharan Zerok Gomal Aroni Urqun Neka, Sar Rowza Katawaz Bermal Wazakhwa(Vézaha) Gyan Wor Mamay Matta Khan 24 Paktya Gardez Khost Hassan Khel Hukumat-i-Kalan)Mandozai Daniwe Patan Jani Khel Sabari Sayed Karam Gurbaz Zormat Bak, Shamal Musa Khel Laj Mangal Tani Shawak Zadran Tarizai Chamkani Nadir Shar Kot Sperah Darra Darang Jaji Maidan Qalandar Gardez (Hakumat-i-Kalan) 25. Parwan Charikar Ghorband Shinwar Bagram Koh-i-Safi Jablus Siraj Salang Surkh-i-Parsa Sheikh Ali Charikar

26. Samangan Aibak/Samangan Dara -i -Suf Guldar Khulm Hazrat Sultan Ru -i -Dawab (Doab lui) Samangan 27. Takhar Talogan Khwaja Ghar Yangi Rustacl Chal Iskamish Darqad Chah-ab Warsaj Yangi Qala Kalfgan Farkhar Talogan Dast-i-Archi Khost-o-Farang

28. Wardak Maidan Shahr Sayed Abad Narkh Chak Jalrez Markaz-i-Behsud Jaghatu Behsud Daymirdad Maidan Shahr 29. Zabul Qalat Arghandab Mizan Shahjoi Ataghar Dai Chapan Shamalzai Taraak -o- Jaldak Shinkai Salat 63

i c ORIGIN i CV TABLE Arrv !AN 9.9FU3E3_PROVINCES

{

= s

I F''GVince IPre-war Fo:ulatlontli ! Area of.Asylua T:tal is .. Total as .. 1

I . I f111 r.-.i^=z: . ,:viii:e P.iiliati0nl

all figures i10041 I Pakistant2l i tran(3) I Total I

1 1 1 1

I NWFP 1 Baluchistan! Punjab í 1

1 ! I i ! I

i

i .. . I 493 2 466 .,.._. __r.

jargTir,ir 53v, I 4i, ! 3i" 10... 53,4

' ,;"a:ri 1 747 264 I 96 I ! 390 ! 9.4' 40.9

a}:'ia 498 314 1 16 I 14 1 ! 349 I 9.13 ..+ 7.4!. I : 1 I 2E84 I 262 21 293 1 ..'a..`

245 I I { 2 I I ! î.r^; I ;Faetika ! 266 263 I03.0

'Lachman 311 I 223' I 1 I I 224 I 5.39 21.2

4u ,;. 250 I 223 I 1 I I 223 i 5,.27 71."

!Farah 235 200 i 200 i 5.26 ; 35.1

199 ! 142 ;Herat - 767 1 5.1:`, 25.l':

I I ! Helmand ; 519 20 155 4.^a _...

1 I i !Micro: 1 104 100 117 3..2 76.i

494 I I ! i i iP.ghlan i 52 4' 1114 2.'4 21.0 CL,C

I i 1 i i !Kúnúli': i JJN 30 41 76 2.00 :3.5

I 1 i:altul 1 1.319 56 13 I I 69 I 1.22 5.2.,

Paran 411' I 48 5 ! I 53 I 1.3, 1 12.9

! I IUru:dan 444 ;40; 51 1 1.34 I1.+

; I:abul 17+ 1 1 49 ! 1.2 27.3

I Iüñor I 338 1 (401 43 I 1.13 12.7

, I i ¡4adgis ! 234 (40/ 43 1.!.3 18.3 498 !:ada}:sñan I 210 I 29 0.74 J.v

i c. I ''.alargan 1 273 4 1 I !. 1 .. C'1 5.4

1! Balkh 569 I 2 . .

;aarlak 2E8 ! 9 1 0.24 ...

! I 589 ? I .12 ! ...

!Takhar I 520 I 5 I n.!' ,,

1 !9aSV3n 269 1 NA I I

IFar,ab i 583 I 11A I

1 1Kaeisa 346 1 I 4A I

i ' I i !

I ;Total' I 12.956 2162 157 I 114i1 ! 2201

S:our:es: t1I Census of Afghanistan 119741 .21 UNHCR 'Sub- Offices Peshawar (21991 Guetta 11/89) and Lanore ,!2!371 /based on GOP fi:ures:,of registered refugee=_ only. Unregisterec refugees in Pakistan esti.;ated at 340. ,.n 2stioates orori :ed by VITA, Peshawar & aia:ellanecus regional sources.

47:'ta: copulation for Afghanistan does not ncltlde 1\CIraC_ esti9ated at 1.5 -2

!: f:ÿliree In ( 1 represent projections froa aggregated e3ti]a'e"_ 3 above. öA

ANNEX TABLE 3 -- GENERAL TIMINGS OF AGRICULTURAL ACTIVITIES IN AFGHANISTAN

HOT ZONE MEDIUM ZONE COLD ZONE

1 Sowing Harvest Sowing Harvest Sowing 'Harvest

wheat Oct 15 May 10 Oct 1 May 30 March 1 Aug 15 Nov 31 June 31 Nov 15 July 15 March 15 Sept

Cc n Aug 1 Nov 30 Aug 15 Nov 15 Aug 15 Dec 10 Aug 30 Nov 30

General 1.Nov -- March 1.0ct -- Feb Green Vegetables 2.March - August 2.March 15 - August March -- August

Grapes Preparation Nov -Feb Jan -March Feb -March

Ì June -Oct July -Sept July -Sept;

Sugar Beets June -July Oct -Nov July Nov July Nov

Onions Jan -Feb .April March May -June August Nov August Nov March July

Potatoes' March_ Aug March Aug ' Sept Jan Sept Jan Sept -Aug Nov !

Fruits Preparation Oct -Feb Nov -Jan Nov -Jan May -Oct June -Oct June -Oct

Source: Mercy Corps International Quetta (May 1988) 66- r1ï!Ì'ICRI HC LC4 '- r1CUll rL N.0 JJUi? .ir1f rírfril _! al'1=

! I iRegicn Province iNo. of clinics*No. of clinics* ;No. of ciinics yo. cf iiapieaenteo by inp:enenteá by per 15,000 pop. :::.:;n:2 Alliance Reaitn CyC aeaoers ;still required I.:;;;;::ee :as::; ;Committee ioased an pre-war Ireai:n +crKers ipop. estiaates

¡ I iNCRT!i ¡òaikh 3.)

i I IFarya0

i

i ÍJ0w1)an is

! I iSaaangan .4

i

TOTAL 4 I 25 35

i I I Region Province N. of clinics No. of clinics 'No. of clinics iyo. of ;implemented by implemented Dy per i5,4t) pop iAiiiance Alliance health CMC aeaDers Istili requireo iCoaiittee :as:: Committee paseo on pre-war Ir+eaitn aorrers ;pop. estiaates

NORTH cadakhsnan o D 27 . EAST

äagnian 1 0 26

KunouZ 2 3 Jl 4.v

iaknar 25 .,

TOTAL s , b b

1

Region ¡Province ¡no. of clinics ¡No. of Clinics Íh0. of ciini:s No. of iiaoleaentea oy liapleaentea oy ( tper 15,000 pap. Alliance heil :, -c ¡Alliance health ¡ChC sewers I Istiil required I Cc;i :lee .as'_: ; ICoaaittee Iusea on pre-sar heaì.n none!

Í 1 ¡KC. estiaates

,

IEAST (Kunar 10

liagnaan a B 10 1

Ihangranar :c

,P?K:ya 4

IOTA!.

1 Province Ivo. of clinics 'so. of Clinics I'ro.:f clinics so. :f

'iapieaentea Of 1iapiesentea :y ÍCer 1:,000 ocç. ¡+i:ilnCe

'Alliance deaitn 11;10 ;ewers ¡still requires Ilaa:.:ee :is:. ICcasittee ¡cased on cre-rar;rieai:n sours ;pcp.est:aates

Baayan

Ghain:

1aa "1i 1 t:

. 1sd

Logar

Parran 1

¡arm( 21 it

TOTAL 11 ¡ 10 o 7

h. ;ityion Province xo. of ¡RC. 3f :liatcs f I ilabletented by itibiesentec Dy er 1ianceAealto CC seners tillreluireo 'Couittee ibasec :n :re-isr ;-ealto

IP00 ov'sve.

L. :4

:4

C

11- flf io 14o. :f ;-

;:acielentel :y ;12:111entel :y ;er -ea.:. .4:11ance :4.eaitn :IC leacers 3%4: °!:91 k:ia:ttee :isec :1 :re-se* -f!.:- :*

,DCD.

To :- -

Itces oct::ce ;:rent :cent!: les.:7. 'I.' ic

.Clioic Is :efineo is st :east tic :vs:* iito it least :rstoing cetieen toe'. 68

ANNEX TABLE 8A -- OVERVIEW OF NON -GOVERNMENTAL HEALTH PERSONNEL AND FACILITIES IN AFGHANISTAN

Province M.D. MTA IMC AHC ARC Expa- in and and Nurse Basic triate

CAC MCI F.M. Led Health Teaa Clinics ClinicTrainees Clinic Worker

BADAKHSHAN 0 2 5 0 3 2

BADGHIS 1 2 9 2 3 0

BAGHLAN 1 1 12 1 17 0

BALKH 1 3 13 0 33 0

BAMYAN 0 1 8 0 15 1

FARAN 0 0 6 2 2 0

FARIAB 1 2 9 2 30 0

GHAZNI 5 8 14 3 23 2

GHOR 0 3 3 4 1 0

HELMANO 1 3 4 1 5 0

HERAT :4 3 14 4 7 0

JAWZJAN 1 3 20 1 21 0

KABUL 1 3 35 1 61 0

KAPISA 1 5 11 1 6 0

KUNAR 2 1 19 1 43 0

KUNDUZ 1 0 2 2 20 0

LAGHMAN 1 0 5 0 10 0 LOBAR 2 8 22 4 54 0

NANGRAHAR 4 1 23 1 37 0

NIMROZ 0 1 0 0 0 0

PAKTIA 3 7 40 4 45 0

PAKTIKA 0 0 0 0 4 0

PARWAN 0 0 24 1 18 1

OANOAHAR 2 5 14 2 13 0

SAMANGAN 1 0 4 1 7 0

TAKHAR 3 1 24 1 21 0

URUZGAN 0 5 1 1 2 0

WARDAK 6 6 39 1 56 1

ZABUL 1 2 5 0 7 1 222 Total 222

43 76 385 41 569 3 69

ANNEX TABLE 88--LOCATION OF ALLIANCE HEALTH COMMITTEE BASIC HEALTH WORKERS

: Faryab ** Province : Badakhshan ** Province Center 4 Almar 4 Darwaz 2 1 Keshem 2 Center 1 ** Subtotal** Dawlat Abad 3 8 Gurziwan 2 Lawlash L

Ñ* Province : 8adghis pashtoon koot ì3 Ghurmach 1 QudOghak 1 Qadis 2 8hirin Tagab 4 ** Subtotal** **`Subtotal ** 3 30

: ** Province : Baghlan ** Province Ghazni Andarab 7 Ajirestan 2 Center 1 Andal 1 Doshi 1 Andarab 1 Khost-e-Fereng Center 4 Nahrin 4 Jaghatoo 1 Pul Khumri 1 Jaghury 1 Warichi 1 Malistan 4 ** Subtotal ** MOqur 1 ` 17 ~ Nawar 2 Qarabagh 5 Zana Khan 1 ** Province : Balkh Center ** Subtotal** Charbolak Z3 Chimtal Dawlat Abad ** Province : Ghorat Mazar Sharif 4 Center 1 Nahr-e-Shahi 6 ** Subtotal** Sholgara 7 1 ** Subtotal ** 33 ** Province : Helmand Baghran 2 Kajaki 1 ** Province : Bamiyan Center 6 Nawaz 1 Kamard 5 Sangin 1 Saighan 2 ** Subtotal *'* Sheber 1 5 Waras 1

** Province : Herat ** Subtotal ** - 15 Center 1 Gulran 1 ** Province : Farah Guzara Center 1 Robat`Sangi Purchaman 1 Zindajan ** Subtotal ** ** Subtotal** 2 7 TO

** Province : Jawzjan Khas Kunar 4 Aqcha 4 Ninglam 1 Center 3 Peech Darz Ab 1 Sarkani 4 Iztrab 1 ** Subtotal *v Kohistan 2 47 Qarqin 2 Sangcharak 3 : ** Province , unouz Sari Pul 5 Ali -lbad l 4* Subtotal *e -ircni 21 [enter _

Ct1*r Dara I

*4( Province : Kabul Imam San/o -1 ? 1 khan Abaa 4 Bagrami 7 Nahr Jadeed l [cnter 3 w4 Subtotal /-..akari 1 -:[' Charasiab 12 Chardehi 4 t* Province : Lagnman Deh Sabz 15 Alishing 1 Kabul 1 Center 1 Mir Bachakoæt 4 Qarghay B Mosai 1 ** Subtotal ** Paghman A 10 Qarabagh 1 Sarobi 3 ** Province : Lagar Shakar Dara 4 Azr ** Subtotal ** :a Baraki Barak 3 1 Baraki Rajan 1 Center 6 ** Province : Kandahar Hesarak 1 Arghandab 7 Khoshee Center L 1 kulangar 5 Dand 1 Mohd Agha Panjwai 2 Pul Alam 4 Shah Khel 1 Tangiwagn/an l Speenboldak 1 ** Subtotal v* ** Subtotal *t f4 117

^1 Province : mangarn,:i'' ** Province : Kapisa Achin 1 Kohistan 5 Center l Tagab 1 Dara-e-Noor 1 ** Subtotal ** Bhani Khel 6 Hesarak _

Kagan 1 ** Province : Kunar Kama 4 Asmar 12 Khiwa Center l _, Khogiani .1 Chawki 10 eusnra 1 Dara-e-Peech 7 wangarhar 71

Rodât k:: h o 1 m Shilman ** Subtotal ** Shinvar Sorkhroad Wir K a y a ** Province : Takhar *:K Subtotal *M Center Chah Ab 4 EshE: amish 1 :;c K Province : F'aktia k::haw) a Ghar 1 Rostay LK.nter C Warsaj 1 Dand F'atan 1 Mangi Qala Gara Gai ** Subtotal ** Gu1buz 1 21 Jaji G Khost 6 ** Province : Uruzgan Musa Khel . Deh Sabz Pathan 1 <:ij ran i Said Karam 11 :K* Subtotal ** Saroj ee "1, Tani

Tchon Kari 1 ** Province : Wardak Wazai 4 Baghis 1 ** Subtotal ** Behsood 45 Cen ter 4 Chack 7 ** Province : Paktik:a Ibrahimkhel i 'r.': h a i r F: o o t Jaghatoo 10 Saroj ee 1 Maidan 1_ Urgon 1 Nerkh Maidan 1 ** Subtòtal ** Said Abad 17 4 Wardak 1 ** Subtotal ** ** Province : Parwan 56 Bagram 1 Center ** Province : Zabul Deh Sabz i Arghandab Chorband Cen ter Jabul Seraj 1 Shaher Asfahan 1 Kohistan 1 :3hincal F'anjshir 5 k* Subtotal ** Parwan i Surkh Parsa 1 *** Total *k* Tagab 1 360 * Subtotal ** 1t3 ** Province : Samangan Center

Dara- e -Soof 1

Hazrat Sultan 1 i2

ANNEX TABLE 8C -- PATHOLOGY IN VARIOUS HEALTH STATIONS

Pathology Ghazni Badakhshan Badakhshan Hazarajat Balkh Compiled e: encountered elevation elevation elevation elevation elevation data. 2000 a. 2000 m. 1500 a. 2500 m. 750 a.

tt CARDIOVASCULAR

HYPERTENSION 0.5 1.4 0.9 1.4 2.3 1.3

OTHERS 0.9 0.6 0.2 1.1 1.2 0.6

ti DEFICIENCY DISORDERS

ANEMIA 1.8 2.2 0.9 0.6 1.2 1.6 DESHYRAT 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.8 GOITER 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.8 0.3 1.0 MALNUTRITION 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.7

It EAR MEDIAL OTITIS 2.0 3.2 2.2 1.8 4.6 3.0 OTHERS 0.4 1.4 1.4 0.8 1.4 1.1

It EPI-TARGET DISEASES

DIPHTERIA 04 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 MEASLES 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.9 PERTUSSIS 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.5 TBC 0.3 2.2 1.6 3.4 3.4 0.0

tt EYE

CONJUNCTIVITIS /TRACHOMA 4.2 6.0 10.9 5.9 6.4 3.7. OTHER 2.8 3.5 2.0 1.4 1.8 0.i

tt GASTRO-INTESTINAL

DIARRHEA 1.9 2.4 2.8 3.2 2.6 6.5 GASTRITIS /ULCER 9.9 5.6 5.9 7.7 8.6 6.6 PARASITES 19.0 10.0 15.4 11.3 11.6 8.0 VAGUE COMPLAINTS 2.5 3.5 3.5 2.2 1.3 3.3

it GENERAL SYMPTOMS

MALAISE 8.5 0.0 0.0 2.1 10.4 1.1

it GENITO- URINARY

HIGH URINARY TRACT INFECTION 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.5 0.7 INFERTILITY 0.5 1.0 0.4 0.9 0.9 0.0 LOW URINARY TRACT INFECTION 1.1 1.2 0.0 3,1 1.9 1.7 MALE GENITAL DISORDERS 0.1 0.2 0.0 0,1 0.5 0.7 URINARY STONES 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1

it GYNECO-OBSTETRICS

DELIVERY /DYSTOCIA 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.1

GYNECO INFECTION 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.1 0,1. 0.2 it INFECTIOUS DISEASES

HEPATITIS 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 LEPRA 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 MALARIA 0.1 5.4 8.3 0.2 1.2 0.4 TYPHOIED 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 *Data compiled from reports of INC health traineesfrom locations throughout Afghanistan. 73

PATHOLOGY IN AFGHANISTAN IN VARIOUS HEALTH STATIONS

Pathology Ghazni Badakhshan Badakhshan Hazarajat Balkh Compiled encountered elevation elevation elevation elevation elevation data. 2000 a. 2000 0. 1500 e. 2500 I. 750 a.

it MOUTH

DENTAL PROBLEM 1.1 1.7 2.0 1.4 3.7 0.2

tt MUSCULO- SKELETAL

ARHTRALGIA 19.1 12.0 11.8 16.1 2.2 7.9 INFECTIOUS 0.1 0.5 0.4 0.3 2.1 0.0 R.A. 1.5 0.6 0.3 ).5 1.4 1.9

STRAIN /SPRAIN 0.0 6.7 0.0 1.2 0.0 1.2

tt NEURO-PSYCHIATRIC

DEPRESSION /ANXIETY 0.3 0.5 0.5 1.0 0.7 0.9 EPILEPSY 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.0 MENINGITIS 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.7 OTHERS(INCL. HEADACHE) 4.0 3.3 4.9 2.6 3.6 0.6

it RESPIRATORY /HIGH

COMMON COLD /COUGH 7.0 5.3 2.5 4.5 3.2 8.3

tt RESPIRATORY /LOW .

BRONCHITIS /PNEUMONIA /ASTHMA 4.8 6.9 7.7 14.4 9.1 13.8

it SKIN

ALLERGY /ATOPIC /UNSPECIFIED 1.4 3.3 2.5 1.9 2.5 1.9 ECTO-PARASITES 0.0 0.6 0.4 1.2 1.2 0.9

INFECTIOUS 3.5 2.7 3.0 3.5 3.1 3.0 tt TRAUMA

BURNS . 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.7 0.0 NOT WAR RELATED 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.7 0.0 WAR RELATED 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.1 2.6 0.1 ANNEX II ANNEX II /1 -- POLITICALPARTIES

The Alliance of AfghanMujahidin

The Islamic Unity ofAfghan Mujahidin was formed in Peshawarin 1985 by theseven Afghan resistance parties Government of Pakistan. recognized by the Knowledgeable observers Alliance was formed under believe that the pressure from Islamabad, with of the United States, the support in order to establisha unified front resistance groups that among the could eventually evolveinto a government of Afghanistan in exile. The Alliance is madeup of Sunni parties only and does notrepresent the Shi'a groups, namely, theconsiderable minority of Hazaras. However much political the formation of the pressure came to bearon Alliance, it continuesto serve as the channel for arms and principal ammunition to commandersinside. years, much of the United In recent States governmenthumanitarian assistance earmarked specificallyfor Afghanistan has Alliance with the been channeled throughthe express purpose of buildingAlliance institutions.

Harakat- e- Ingalab -i- Islami (Mhd. NabiMohammadi) Mohammadi, a Pushtun -- born in LogarProvince in 1925,was a prominently anti- Communistreligious teacher in the 1960s. Afghanistan during He was a member ofthe Afghan Parliament fled to Pakistan after from 1970 -74 and the 1978 SaurRebellion. and earlier alliance He was a leader of between Hezb -i- Islami/Gulbuddin and Jamiat -i- Islami butformed his Islamic that alliance dissolved. Revolutionary Movementwhen Mohammadi's partyis characterizedas moderate and traditionalin its philosophy with a largefollowing, especially among minorreligious leaders. from Jamiat with It is the onlyparty aside a sizeable followingamong the Uzbek. effectiveness of its The commanders is not highlyregarded. An offshoot of this party isthe Harakat -i- Islami group led by NasrullahMansoor. Hezb- i- Islami(MaulaviYunis Khalis) born in Nangrahar -- Khalis is a Pushtun Province in the 1920s. He was educated in religious schools in Afghanistan and Pakistanand eventually in Kabul asan author and teacher of settled Islamic studies(maulavi). During the 1960s, hebecame politically Daoud and was eventually prominent as anopponent of forced into exilein Pakistan after Daoud coup of 1973which overthrew the the monarchy ofZahir Shah. subsequently helpedto form the Hezb -i- He Islami (IslamicParty) and took up arms againstthe communist regime that succeededDaoud. In 1979, he split withparty leadership and party is characterized formed hisown faction. The as espousing moderately tenets. Its adherents fundamental Islamic are largely Pushtuns andthe internal )rganization of theparty is characteristically loyalty is founded tribal, i.e.,party upon thetraditionalcustomary and religious %6

authority of its senior members. Among Khalis's adherents are some of the most effective commanders of the resistance including Abdul Hag of Kabul and Jallaluddin Hagani of Paktya.

Hezb -i-Islami (Gulbuddin Hekmatyar) -- Gulbuddin isa Pushtun born in Kunduz province in 1947. While a student of Engineering at Kabul University in the mid- 1970s, he became a prominent figure in the Islamic movement. He fled to Pakistan in 1974 and, with the assistance of the Bhutto government, founded the Hezb -i- Islamiparty in order to undertake armed resistance against the Daoud regime. Despite changes in government, Gulbuddin has continued to receivethe strong support of Pakistan. The party is characterized as advocating extreme fundamentalist Islamic views. Ironically, the party draws its strength of organization from the same Stalinist modelas does the two controlling Afghan Communist parties, Khalqand Parcham. His adherents are largely young intellectuals dedicated toan Islamic revolution who have often remonstratedmore traditional religious leaders for their lack of resolve. As a result, Gulbudin's support is weak among the traditional tribal and religious leaders. Despite Gulbudin's prominence in the West as the most efficientand organized of the resistance party leaders, his commandersare not renowned for their skills in battle. Moreover, a number of commanders aligned with Gulbudin are known to have waged campaignsagainst commanders of other resistance parties, especially inareas controlled by Jamiat. They are also believed to have periodically attacked supplycaravans destined for other commanders.

Itihad- i- Islami (Prof. Abd ul- Rassul Sayyaf)-- Sayyaf, a Ghilzai Púshtun, was born in Paghman in the 1940s. He received religious training at Kabul University and at Al -AzharUniversity, Cairo. While a professor of Theology at KabulUniversity, he became active in the Islamic movement which led to his imprisonmentfor six years following the coup of 1973 that overthrew the monarchy. In 1980, Sayyaf was elected as chairman of the Islamic Alliancefor the Liberation of Afghanistan (Ittihad -Islami). The party espouses the reformist philosophy of the Saudi Wahabi movement and,as a result, receives much of its funding from Saudi Arabia and othergovernments of the Gulf. Itihad -i- Islami has followers amongmany ethnic groups. However, Wahabism is not popular with the religious and secular elite of the Pushtuns and this fact limits theinfluence of the party.

Jebh -i -Nejat -Milli Afghanistan (Sebghatullah Mojadeddi)-- Mojadeddi is a Pushtun born ofone of the most respected religious families in Afghanistan. Trained in theology in Kabul and Cairo, he taught theology at Kabul University during the 1960s. He was imprisoned by Zahir Shah for anti -communist activitiesand later fled to Denmark where he taught Islamic studies. Mojadeddi's party, the Afghanistan National Liberation Front (ANLF),is characterized as moderate and traditional in its philosophy. The party's chief support lies among the Pushtuns but both its politicalinfluence and the ability of its commandersare considered poor. it

Jamiat-i-Islamì (Burhanudddin Rabbani)-- Rabbani, a Tajik, was born in Badakshan in 1942 to a lineage of renownedSufi teachers belonging to the Naqehbandi sect. After receiving a doctorate in Islamic Law from Al -Azhar University, Cairo,he returned to Kabul to become dean of the Faculty of Islamic Lawat Kabul University. He joined the Jamiat party, known for itsmoderately fundamentalist Islamic philosophy, in 1968 andwas made its leader in 1972. Jamiat is thought to have the most effectivepolitical and military leadership of all the parties. It has widespread influenceamong Pushtuns as well as the Tajiks, Uzbeks and Turkoman. Among Rabbani's adherents are the most effectivecommanders of the resistance including Ahmadshah Masoud of thePanjshir, Khalil Khan, the successor of Zabiullah Khan in Mazar, andIsmail Khan of Herat.

Mahaz -i -Nijat Milli (Pir SayyidAhmad Gailani)-- Gailani is a hereditary religious leader of theQaderya Sufi sect. He graduated from the Faculty of Theology of Kabul University in theearly 1930s and was for many years religious advisor to King ZahirShah. Gailani's party, the National Islamic Front for Afghanistan(NIFA) is characterized as moderate and enjoys a respectable followingamong those Pushtuns loyal to theformer King. The party's internal organization as well as the effectiveness of its commanders,however, is not highly regarded.

The Shi'a Parties Excludedfrom the Alliance:

Harakat -i- Islami (Ayatollah Mohseni) -- Mohseni was born-in Kandahar in the 1940s to a family of ethnic Qizalbash. He is the founder of an important Shi'a religious school in Ghazni and enjoysa large following among the urban Shi'a populations ofsouthern and western Afghanistan as wellas the Hazaras. Mohseni is thought to have good ties with many of the moderate Ayatollahs ofIran. The organization of his party is well regarded and his commandershave been extremely effective in keeping the Soviet /Governmentforces from penetrating Hazarajat fromany front.

Shura- i- Ittifaq (AyatollahBehechti) -- A traditionalist Islamic party with an equally large followingamong the Hazaras but with a much less effectivecadre of commanders.

Sepah -i- Pasdaran (RevolutionaryGuards), Sasman -i -Nasr (Organization of Victory) &Hizbulla (Party of God)-- Three radically fundamental groups that have no identifiableleader. Each party has ties to Iran and at least one, the Pasdaran,receives arms and funding from Iran. The limited following of bothparties is exclusively among the Hazaras and the activity of theircommanders is thought to be directed againstthe other Shi'a parties.

The Communist Parties

The Afghan Communist Party is divided into two hostilefactions reflecting both personal rivalriesand enduring ethnic tensions. Those of the Khalq (The Masses)are largely Pushtun and are hardline nationalist in their relations with the Soviet Union. Parcham (The Banner) is made up mostly of urban Tajiks and ismore moderate in its ideology than Khalq. 77A

ARNE' TAKE 7 -- MAPLE AFGHAM iiSISTANCE LEADERS AND rails AaiAS ùi INFLùERCE

!Region !hovince !Cossander !Part7 Area !itbaieilnbe

1 ! ! ! !

1CaTREAST !Xauiawi Azbad Gui !RIO !Parchiri !P/Safi

1 1 Chief of Glen for BGL/TER/ED7. . . '

I

! ! !

SUN !Basir Ehaied !JI !Faizabad !%rktat

!Arian Par !jl !leshs 1.t.lt

!Sayed Najisuddin !JI !Eardaz;Koran !Sayed

! ! ! !

BGL !Abdul Hai iagjoa !JI !Writ. '

!Abdai Ghayour(Xasar Ghayour) !us !Bagálan '

., ;:l. !Gazi isialuddin !ji !Esiasesi .14:3,

!Sayed Kayal ' ! .,.....,...

!Asir Rasai !EIG !Baghlah

! ! !

101 !Xailai Ehailaddin !EPA '.

!Xallai Saud !ji Mani:ad

Nazi iailisatuliah !.II !Khanabad

I !Abdul Each. Gaiish !RIG .

! ! ! .

TER !Eng. 3asiir - !HIG !TEKIEGL !TajlOrib

!Xauialli Eassein (his repiacetent) !JI !Roscar !Tajik

!Ahladshah Xassoad !:i !BDIOTKR/EGL !Tajik !Palawan Eafit !EFA !Talcian 1:bek

!Sayed Wad keen !jI !Talogan !l'ajii

!Azad iaig !NIFA !Taihar !Uzbek

!Xasur Rama !EIG !hint, qiia !Uzbek

1

! ! !

NORTE HI !Khaiii Clan !:i Nazar South !Tajik

!Xaulawi Alai !JI !Shalgaaa !Tajli

. !Ina Khan !RIG '.

!Zabet Toufan !EIG .' '

!XL.Osian !HIT !

!Mir Alta NI !Naresnai 1

1

! ! !

FRY !Xaalavi Bahader !HIT ! !Sayed

, !Eng. lassil !am . 1:hei

!Abdel Raise Sarawi !RRET !Planar 1:tek

!Abdul Rah' Railani !Hail !Pasataniot '

!Gasi Chula' !ji !Sherquani

! ! ! ! !

1 jt: !Xaulawi tarif !II !Sangsharak

1 !Si'/J1 !Saripai

1

!Sardar !jI/SYF !

!Aster Palawan

. .

SX11 !Xaailwi Ajab Gal !HIG !Knout .

!Xhd. lahrin !jI !Sasangan South njiiirit.:el

. .

! !RIX !Daresouf .

1

' ! !fills !:.eg:in !?rc7inCe !CJaaanoer lTantia !Area !Etnn-=eiT..ce

I 1 ! i

!EAST !ENE !Raj', Xitra Xohassad !El/ !Barikot !:1Sar:arSa:

! !Anwar Alin !NiFA !Barikot !!iuris:aa:

! !.Xd. Zarin !NJI l3aadesn !

! !Dr. Sadig !Ji !KhanEanar

! ! !HIE !Asnar

I 1 1

!

!'sNN ! !6iG ! !

I I I I

!'IGR !Eng. Xahaad ! H:3 lSurkhcd !:lsn:an

I !Tor Pavia !JI !Zan !E,'Bnc?:aca:

!Eau AIR !Eva !2, Scir:ac

!Eng. Ghaffar !HIG !Bend !?nshtua

!Abdul gadir !ill lJpinabora !?, iaaai:ei

1 1 1

! P3Y !Jalainddin Bagani !HIE !EnostiGaraet !.:(ia6ran

! ! !

!:AST CäNTAL lBNY !Bas Xd. Khan !NIFA 1

.1 to !Anaad Easir !Ji lFuru:an

!?aghnan !Adel !HIM !Jar Ges1a

! lXagsoodt !HIM !Shekhali

lHtarajat!Anwari !HIM !. Sangiekn !Din Xd. Khan !HIM lDariscaf

!Sahli Ehan ' !ez-snura lGaraac !Ear ar a

!Sarwar Ehan ;Shan- i -Sahij !eI-snura ! !lazara e ;

!Akbar than !NIFA ( i !Paajao !Eatara

!Ehana boria l Nawur !Earora

!Nateki !Dariscuf

! !

l6Ga

!Dr. Faetalian ! Baral(1 Barak

!

!3E1, !Abdul Rai !Kabul

!Ghn111 Anwar lJnaY3ara

!Xd. Anwar lJekcaiak

!Malian âtaatailan !?aglaaa

!Md. Anwari '?agàsan

1 !3"rS .} PRN!Farid

!Pina Solang

!Aaayatuliah Shafaq !Bagras

!Ahaadshah Nasoud lPanjsair

!

!'iît !Asia Wardak ldera:a .11C9aii

! 4 !Xaulawi Naii Mohasaad lTutgan

! GEE!Rare Daca natal sou:û

1 !Rare Abdallah !B. Jardei

!Xauiawi Farknaddin laarrls

!Asir Badal Ehan !aracagh

!Sayed Jagian

!Xaulawi Abdei ianis Fedahi lgarabagn !?;.Ande:

! 770

'.'xegion !?rovince !Colmar !Tutin !Ares litàniertrioe , , ! ! ,

! !SOUTH !ELK lAfitaiiah Etas !SY? : !?:étrattt: !War Abàaliah dita !Sole ! !?.it .-:11.e:ier; !Alit. filial: Sassi, Atbaa:ada !ELT !Nasa;tia;Su;it !

' 'Sitn ... din !Sae ! '.?;Ait:a: '.:.ri ! !A,ir Naihe, Sanai ;' i !iii !Sund !?: Eutcta: ! ! !Asir [Mil all! !Ell !Saotad : ! !lassi, Kd. l'adad !:1 lSaotad :ta;iÌ ! lAbdal lahnu lar, :3a;ùu, 9asrisuil:?;'siruti, ! !ing. Naiad ! !Giri Iugti ! ! lKaaitsi Atta Md. !Eldt lSaa;iniGirisu !?; ;satt:ai !Esji Abàai Basar !97' !Liu lam ! l3aiooi Cut lSFA !Saricaa ;aia ! ! !!lcàanaad Ali !SY1 lGarnsir l3ti:ca ° , , . ! !iGl !Mallah 9aqibaliah !II lArgnucao !Nallak Iagab !Eid !

! !Dr. Abdallah :dIC !Bnridad ! ! !Aair daji lsaaáallay !SIG ! !How. Alisa ! !Abdal lasik !ill lAtlatu ! ! !Anir Tout Abaái daiisajiballak Ibr.!3TF !?sajsai !'ri9ar:ai ! !Asir Saled Fuladdi, 111FA Puai !P/Sadcui ! !Eiji Abàaì GatiE !11F1 !

! ! ! !sal nid. Akkudtada (also u /arti) !ST? !Baia :A11t Abnu lanklC LbÌttl '.,i lGanaernC

! 'Eaji Fakir dku !Sidi :dhtsa

, ! ! !

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!Farooq list !SIC

'Gin Kama! lSIïA

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!A,ir Sei Fan !III !Cult. Sanity: Cilia; Etta !fill : !Asir Sa1e,i !SPA ! lAninaiiah lSYF linasn

lSiaiaq (also active ta lugs) !3l; !SLtras:in !Kaaiast Abdul Sa,ad !STE Tsui

,

I 1

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! 1 ! A Gllmu . 77D

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,

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1

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aril'

..

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!Xtuityl Ami itqL !H:.] !Altratrt

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.

! ,.. !iat !instil flan .ii !Eertt

.' !iusstin aorUtudi !EA !Sett ' ,,i ' !Aziniith Af:sii !iert:

! ! ! ! !i !Alt Xtuitwi Autieu

1

. !Aedui :aim Fula; !HET !Seguar

' tulari Anal :anir !iiiT !71:4srt

.' !Xtulawt Acdui lattr !Hi: !Sttrig

!Xliltd Chai ,;etit !CC! !:lssa:aa !ihrtail itig !CT !dirvatrta

!Xtuilyi iittq !HIT !Taill

!Xaultili Xd. Atil 'III !Scitar

!Aatr Xtuitwi Lapit

%aimlamAihantadt !;1 !Ttivart !Xaaitri Xd.:ssa

!Nun ihu !:: !Ehartd 71,;11.

!Abdul tral !$T? !:hircart:

!Atdai Catar hicill !...ii !'.:hirctIrtt

Itiaiaddia !?.::, ....atr..4trtt

Eli HEY : Eartit: !(:.11

SY? :

Najlt-i-Xiiii/X0J110111 EiX

:hurt : :hart Itiftq :EPA : Sepa-i-Ptswt: ANNEX III -- AGENCY COMMITTEES ACTIVE IN PESHAWAR

r. JOINT COUNCIL:

A Joint Council was set up in March 1988 to create a platform for information sharing and policy discussion between non -governmental agencies, donors and UN agencies. At present the councilis comprised of:

Two representatives of VAG (Voluntary Agencies Group) Two representatives of CMC (Committee of Medical Coordination) Two representatives of the Cooperative Committee (Cross -border, non -medical).

Single representatives for other bodies as listed below, with some attending as observers only

List of Representatives

Agency Representing

Afg "anaid Chairman International Rescue Committee Voluntary Agencies Group Austrian Relief Committee Voluntary Agencies Group Afrane Cooperative Committee Volunteers in Technical Assistance Cooperative Committee Committee of Medical Coordination Committee of Medical Coordination Medecins sans Frontieres Committee of Medical Coordination UNHCR World Food Programme Swedish Committee for Afghanistan Management Sciences for Health Coordination Humanitaire Europeene Pour L'Afghanistan (CHEA) Volunteers in Technical Assistance Pakistan Red Crescent /League of Red Cross International Committee of Red Cross USAID 79

II. VOLUNTARY AGENCY GROUP (VAG)

Afghanaid Austrian Relief Committee (ARC) Danish Committee for Aid to AfghanRefugees (DACAAR) Int,- national Rescue Committee (IRC) Salvation Army Save the Children (SCF /USA) Save the Children (SCF /UK) SERVE Shelter Now International SOS /PG Belgium

In 19811 ten Peshawar basedagencies working with Afghan refugeesfamed themselves into a working Committee named the Voluntary AgencyGroup. These are internationally based with headquarter officesoverseas. All are non -governmental and all implement refugeeassistance programmes fc, UNHCR.

These agencies can offer usefulexperience in the present situation: Collectively, they may have working with them one of the largestpools of trained Afghans in the world and, inturn, the organizations themselves now have considerable experience workingwith Afghans. They have varying degrees of experience working alongside UN agencies and have metthe various reporting and accountingrequirements. They can often respond' quickly to crisis humanitarian issues. They have a wide variet, of funding sources and their headquarter offices in differentparts of the world provide support to themand car, help to disseminate information.

Tha following are excerpts from a statement of purpose preparedby the VAG in May 1988:

All the agencies of the Voluntary Agency group are interestedin exploring ways in which they can be of assistance to the Afghansupon their return to Afghanistan. Wesee this as a natural continuation of existing refugee work. As with the work for refugeesin Pakistan we think there should be little distinctionbetween the type of aid (ie., relief, reconstruction, development); nor should distinctions be made foraid recipients (ie., repatriated refugees, internally displaced -persons, need, local populations). All the agencies feel stronglythat assistance programmes need to be maintained for Afghan refugeesin Pakistan as long as the refugees remain here.

We foresee agencies working in a variety of ways in Afghanistan. Some may work in geographic areas handlinga number of different relief sectors; others may chose to work exclusively in a singlesector to a specific geographic area or in that sector over a widegeographic area. If agencies enter into agreements with UN bodiesor governments, the voluntary agencies thinkthat such agreements shouldbe kept as flexible as possible. This is esoecially, trueat the beginning of the repatriation process as there are many unknownsbefore us. Since there will orobabl not to a strong central power in Afghanistan, the UN systemsnouli be prepared to assist the voluntary agencies in solving tasksana issues normally handled bya central government. 80

We are also aware that there are a number of other agencies and groups who are working with the Afghans. No qualified, well meaning organization should be excluded from providing assistance. The Voluntary Agency Group believes that it is'extremely important to continue and even broaden the consultation and coordination process among the agencies, whether or not they are affiliated with the VAG, or any other organization.

The help and assistance of everyone is needed to overcome the many problems and humanitarian concerns faced at this moment by the Afghans. The Voluntary Agency Group urges that comprehensive and thorough consultation be continued and expanded as rapidly as possible. 81

III. COOPERATIVE COMMITTEE

Afghanaid Afghanistan Agricultural Survey Austrian Relief Committee (ARC) Bureau International Afghanistan (SIA) German Afghanistan' Foundation Norwegian Committee for Afghanistan Swedish Committee for Afghanistan Volunteers in Technical Assistance (VITA)

The Cooperative Committee represents 12 agencies that implement cross -border 'Cash for Food' and agricultural rehabilitation projects.. The projects are implemented in areas controlled by the Afghanresistance in all 29 provinces of Afghanistan and are channelled througha range of different contacts: Commanders Local traditional councils, 'Shuras' The Seven Party Alliance of Mujahideen

Some ofthe organizations have their own expatriate field workers while others have Afghan field workers trained''to superviseand lead the programmes. Over the years these agencies have gained considerable experience in the areas of building relationships with Afghans, transportation of goods into Afghanistan and the impleméntationof projects within Afghanistan. With a mixture of tight security and organizational flexibility the$' have carried out such activitiesas: Immediate relief to war victims such as 'Cash for Food' and reconstruction assistance to prevent people from becomingrefugees Reconstruction of irrigation systems Providing the local farmers with seeds and fertiliser,including project experiments with improved sleds. Providing local people with tools and equipmentsuch as oxen and tractors for ploughing. Training of agricultural and veterinary extensionworkers.

These agencies expect their programmes will continue as before, and increase within the limitations ofmoney and that the war is actually continuing. Strengthening the structures ofcoordination between the voluntary agencies who work cross -borderor intend to do so,is also one of their major concerns. a2

IV. AGENCIES ACTIVE IN PARTICULAR SECTORS INSIDE AFGANISTAN

MEDICAL

See list of CMC and seperate breakdown.

AGRICULTURE

Afghanaid Afrane Austrian Relief Committee Afghanistan Agricultural Survey B.I.A. Norwegian Committee Swedish Committee V.I.T.A.

IRRIGATION

Afghanaid Afrane Austrian Relief Committee Afghanistan Agricultural Survey B...A. Norwegian Committee Swedish Committee V.I.T.A.

CASH GRANTS /FOOD DISTRIBUTION

Afghanaid Afrane Guilde du Raid Norwegian Committee Swedish Committee

ENGINEERING

Swedish Committee V.I.T.A. (Afghanaid) (Afrane)

VETINARY

B.I.A. Duch Committee German Afghanistan Foundation V. COMMITTEE OF MEDICAL COORDINATION

Afghanistan Vaccination and ImmunizationCentre (AVICEN) Freedom Medicine German Afghanistan Committee International Medical Corps Medecins sans Frontieres Medical Refresher Courses for Afghans Medical Training for Afghans Mercy Corps International Norwegian Committee for Afghanistan Swedish Committee for Afghanistan.

All the members have set themselves the aim to provide or improvemedical care for the Afghan people in areas of Afghanistan,not controlled by the central government. The CMC membersare listed below (in alphabetical order), with short descriptions oftheir projects.

AFGHANISTAN VACCINATION AND IMMUNIZATIONCENTRE( AVICEN).- FRANCE

AVICEN's aim isto carry out vaccinationprogrammes inside Afghanistan. AVICEN trains Afghans as vaccinators in a training centre inPeshawar/ Pakistan and supplies them with vaccines and practical trainingin border areas of Afghanistan under the supervisionof French physicians.

FREEDOM MEDICINE (FM)- USA

Freedom Medicine trains Afghans.as 'Village Health Workers' ina training centre with attached clinic and surgicalhospital for Afghan refugees, located in Thal, Kohat District, Pakistan.Trainers are Afghan and American physicians andnurses. After completing theirsix -month training course the trainees return to their home villages in Afghanistanto provide medical care to the local people. They are continuouslysupplied with medicine and equipment from Pakistan in cooperation withthe Swedish Committee for Afghanistan. FM also operates a clinic ?orAfghan refugees in ';hitral, Pakistan.

GERMAN AFGHANISTAN COMMITTEE (GAC)- WEST GERMANY

The German Afghanistan Committeeoperates several clinics inside Afghanistan, staffed with Afghan physicians and paramedics. The clinics are regularly supplied from Peshawar, Pakistan by GAC. Additionally 5AC sends German physicians to these clinics in summer toassist and further train the Afghan medical staff. GAC also operatesa small training centre with attached clinic for Afghan refugees in Sadda,Kurram Agency. Pakistan where basic refresher courses for theparamedical staff offered. are 84

INTERNATIONAL MEDICAL CORPS (IMC) - USA

International Medical Corps offers nine -month medical training courses for Afghans with advanced surgical training. The training centre, located in Nasir Bagh, Peshawar, Pakistan, includes an outpatient clinic and a hospital for Afghan refugees. After completion of their training IMC's trainees return to their home villages in teams of three or four to set up a health centre. They are continuously supplied from Pakistan by IMC in cooperation with other agencies.

MEDECINS DU MONDE (MDM) - FRANCE

Medecins du Monde operates a surgical hospital in the Afghan province of Wardak permanently staffed with Afghan and French medical personnel. In this hospital and two attached clinics MDM staff train Afghans as healtn workers in a nine -month training course. MDM also carries out vaccination programmes regularly in the area of this hospital and in the province of Kunar.

MEDECINS SANS'FRONTIERES (MSF) - FRANCE

Medecins sans Frontieres was the first foreign NGO to come to Afghanistan after the. Soviet invasion to offer medical care in areas not controlled by the central government. Already in 1980 MSF sent the first mission of French doctors into Afghanistan who built up a hospital. Meanwhile MSF has established several such hospitals permanently staffed with French and Afghan personnel. MSF trains Afghans in these hospitals to enable them to operate these hospitals on their own at a later point. An advanced medical training programme for Afghans, located iñ Pakistan,is presently under consideration. In cooperation with United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, MSF is also involved in médical care for Afghan refugees in Pakistan.

MEDICAL REFRESHER COURSES FOR AFGHANS (MRCA) - FRANCE

MRCA offers refresher courses, mainly in surgery and dental care. for Afghan medical staff who are willing to work inside Afghanistan, but :chose education in one way or the other has been insufficient. MRCA operates a hospital in Peshawar, Pakistan where European medical staff are training the Afghans.

MEDICAL TRAINING FOR AFGHANS (MTA) - FRANCE

MTA is a joint project of the Belgian NGO Solidarite Afghanistan and the French NGO Aide Medicale Internationale (AMI). MTA offers sixteen -month advanced medical training courses for the Afghan health workers in a training centre with attached hospital in Peshawar, Pakistan. The Afghans are trained by French doctors provided by AMI. After completion of training the trainees return to Afghanistan to set up a clinic. They are continuously supplied from Pakistan by MTA in cooperation with Swedish Committee for Afghanistan. MERCY CORPS INTERNATIONAL(MCI) - USA supports several hospitals and clinics in the Mercy Corps International southern and western provincesof Afghanistan with salaries, medical At the same time MCI offers supplies and equipment fromQuetta, Pakistan. six -month training courses in atraining center in Quetta, Pakistan, for Afghan medical staff whowill work in these clinics. MCI also holds three -month extendedfirst-aid courses for Afghans in Quetta.

NORWEGIAN COMMITTEE FOR AFGHANISTAN(NCA) - NORWAY

The Norwegian Committeefor Afghanistan operates a hospital with several Afghan sub clinics in the provinceof Ghazni in Afghanistan, staffed with and Scandinavian medicalpersonnel. In the areas of this hospital NCA The hospital has carried out severalvaccination programmes successfully. and the sub -clinics areregularly supplied with medical equipment from for Afghans in a hospital to be Pakistan. A medical training programme set up in a rural area inPakistan is under planning.

SWEDISH COMMITTEE FOR AFGHANISTAN(SCA) - SWEDEN

The Swedish Committee forAfghanistan was one of the first NGOs to come to Pakistan after the Soviet invasionof Afghanistan to give medical aid to working the Afghan people. Since 1982 SCA provides Afghan medical staff inside Afghanistan with salaries,medicines and equipment. SCA also makes many of its servicesavailable to other agencies, e.g. by supplying trainees from Freedom Medicine, IMC andMTA with salaries and equipment after completion of their trahiing courses. LA;

VI. EUROPEAN COORDINATION COMMITTEE FOR AID TO AFGHANISTAN (ECCA), COORDINATION HUMANITAIRE EUROPEENNE POUR L'AFGHANISTAN (CHEA)

Afghanaid, London, England Afghanistan Hjelpen, Oslo, Norway Afghanistan Support Committee, London, England Afrane, Paris, France A.I.M.E., Strasbourg, France Aide Medicale Internationale, Paris, France Amis de L'Afghanistan, Paris, France Association Luxembourgeoise, Luxembourg Association Suisse des Amis de L'Afghanistan, Lausanne, Switzerland Lectif Provence Afghanistan, Marseille, france Guilde Europeene du Raid, Paris, France Health Action Humanitarian, London, England Komitee Afghanistan Vrij, Amsterdam, Netherlands Medecins du Monde, Paris, France Medecins sans Frontieres, Paris, France Swedish Committee for Afghanistan, Stockholm, Sweden Solidarite Afghanistan, Liege, Belgium SOS /PG, Brussels, Belgium Afghanistan Relief Committee, New York, USA. 88

ANNEX IV -- GOVERNMENTAL AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES BASED IN PESHAWAR

JUNE 1988

(* indicates UNHCR implementing partner)

NAME OF ORGANIZATION ADDRESS TELEPHONE

AFGHAN AID (UK)* 5B Gul Mohar Road 42030 Chief Officer University Town Mr. Peter Rees, Peshawar, Field Director Pakistan World Hqtrs: 18 Charing Cross Rd. London WC2N OHR Tel. 01- 379 -7218 Ms. Jackie Wray, Program Director

AFGHAN CULTURAL ASSISTANCE House 117, Shaheen Town 43281 FOUNDATION* (just down alley, behind Chief Officer Gemstone Corp. Jamrud Rd) Robert -Darr, Director University Town Peshawar, Pakistan World Htrs: 2150 Shattuk Ave, Suite 900 Berkeley, CA 94704 (415)453 -5011

AFGHANISTAN EDUCATION COMMITTEE 15 -A Gul Mohar Lane 41247% Chief Officers University Town 42952 Sven Johnsson, Director Peshawar, Pakistan Prof. B. Safi, Director Curriculum University P.0 Box 876

AFGHAN EYE HOSPITAL 11 Gul Mohar Road 41093 Chief Officer: University Town Dr. Herbert Friesen Peshawar, Pakistan

AFGHAN FEMALE SURGICAL HOSPITAL Jamrud Road 41682 Chief officers Peshawar, Pakistan Dr. Murad Ali Shah, Director Dr. Saida Barakzai, Head of Female Staff

AFGHANS' HEALTH & SOCIAL Near Police Station .ASSISTANCE ORGANIZATION Old Bara Road, Chief Officer University Town Dr. M. Nasin Ludin Peshawar, Pakistan Project Director P.O. Box 753, U.P.O.

AFGHAN LEPROSY SERVICE 3C -II Circular Road Chief Officers: University Town Medical Officer: Dr. Shah Wall Peshawar, Pakistan Advisors: Dr. Ruth Pfau Dr. Nakamura. 89

AFGHAN MEDICAL AID Spin Jumat 43283 Chief Officer 5B Park Road Dr. Ahmed Sher Zamani University Town Director Peshawar, Pakistan P.O. Box 869

AFGHANISTAN NOTHILFE Bldg. 17E, Jehangirabad 42591 WEST GERMANY Jamrud Road Dr. Qayyum Peshawar, Pakistan GPO Box 679

AFGHANS' OBSTETRICS & 64 - Circular Road 40721 GYNECOLOGICAL HOSPITAL Peshawar, Pakistan ChìE: Officer: Dr. M. Hussain Momand, Director

AFGHAN REFUGEES HUMANITARIAN 53/82 Park Ave. Rd. 41023 ISLAMIC UNITY University Town Chief Officer: Peshawar, Pakistan Dr. Amanullah Rassoul, P.O. Box 455 President

World Hqtrs.: 201, Route de Chavanne 1007, Lausanne Switzerland

AFGHAN RELIEF (UK) Nasir Bagh Road 42223 Chief Officer: Peshawar, Pakistan Saira Shah, Representative

World Hqtrs: P.O. Box 457 London NW2 4BR

AFGHN SURGICAL HOSPITAL Nishtarabad 61945 Chief Officers: Peshawar City Mr. Firdaus Khan, Administrator Peshawar, Pakistan AFGHAN WELFARE CENTER c/o Khyber Teaching 41181/8 Chief Officer: Hospital Dr. Rahim Pashtoonyar Peshawar, Pakistan

AFGHANISTAN VACCINATION AND 46C Sahibzada Abdul Qayum 42493 IMMUNIZATION CENTER Road, University Town (AVICEN) Peshawar, Chief Officer: Pakistan Philippe Truze 90

AFRANE 2 Park Lane 42320 Chief Officer: University Town Philippe Hamel Peshawar, Pakistan Jacky Mathonnat on the Board of Directors, home office)

world Hqtrs: 6 Rue Christine P.O. Box 254 75524 Paris, Francè

ASIA FOUNDATION *21 Jamaluddin Afghani c/o 43333 Chief Officer: Road Carla Grisman University Town Peshawar, Pakistan

ASSOC. ARCHITECTES SANS FRONTIERE Canal Road ;23iá Chief Officer: Louis L'Hopital University Town Patrick Peshawar

President: Pierre Allard World Hqtrs. 15 rue Massena 06000 Nice, France

AUSTRIAN RELIEF COMMITTEE* 80D Park Road 42584 Chief Officers: University Town 42592 Nassim Jawad, Geert Kellerman Peshawar, Pakistan Chairmen G.P.O. Box 489

World Hqtrs: Salztorgasse 71b A -1010 Vienna, Austria

BUREAU INTERNATIONAL Afzalabad Road, near 43270 d'AFGHANISTAN Old Bara Road, near Chief Officer: Police Station Alain de Beures T461 Bernard Delpuech University Town Peshawar, Pakistan World Hqtrs: 24, Rue Chaligny (Dr. Akhtar House) 75012 Paris Tel. 16(1) 43.07.15.67

CARITAS 3A Park Ave. 40925 Chief Officer: University Town Rev. Gregory P. Rice: Peshawar, Pakistan Director Mr. George Murad Deputy Director

World Hqtrs: CARITAS Pakistan Headquarters c/o Catholic Church Connaught Road Rawalpindi, Pakistan 9'

CATHOLIC RELIEF SERVICES* House 31 -B, St. 34 824342 Chief Officer: F7 /1 Mr. Bruce Jamison, Director Islamabad, Pakistan P.O. Box 1657

CHURCH WORLD SERVICE House 5, St. 74 824680 Chief Officer: G6/4 Ashe Mengistu, Director Islamabad, Pakistan

CHRISTIAN HOSPITALS REFUGEE Lohar.. Banda code: EXTENSION PROJECT Banda Lai Khan 059 -219 Chief Officer Mansehra, tel: Mr. Guy E. Ailing, Administrator NWFP, Pakistan 718

World Hqtrs: Church World Service House 11, Street 51 Shalimar 7/4, Islamabad, Pakistan. Tel: 824680

COORDINATION of MEDICAL COMMITTEES 4 -B Railway Road 42300 Chief Officer: University Town Ms Lynn Carter, Administrative DirectorPeshawar, Pakistan Dr. Kate Cita, Medical Director

DANISH COMMITTEE FOR AID TO 10 Gul Mohar Lane 40731 , AFGHAN REFUGEES (DACAAR)* University Town Chief Officer: Peshawar, Pakistan Niels Christian- Andersen, P.O. Box 855 Representative

World Hqtrs: Pederstraade 3 1453 Copenhagen, Denmark

FREE AFGHANISTAN SWITZERLAND House #1 42223 Chief Officers: Nasir Bagh Road Beat Roman Kraettli, Peshawar, Pakistan Saira Shah ' P.O. Box 924 42916

FREEDOM MEDICINE 4 -A Railway Road 42505 Chief Officers: University Town telex: Mr. Robert Brenner, Peshawar, Pakistan 52458 Ms Gay le Clerk Brenner FRMED Directors

World Hdqtrs: 941 River Street' Suite No.201 Honolulu, Hawaii 94813 USA Tel: (808) 521 -2251 92

GERMAN AFGHANISTAN COMMITTEE 23C Park Ave. Rd. 42446 Chief Officer: University Town 42588 Dr. Reinhard Eroes Peshawar, Pakistan Director

World Hqtrs: Bonner Afghanistan Cont. Mackenheises Allee D -5300 Bonn, West Germany Mr. Hundesagen

GERMAN AFGHANISTAN FOUNDATION 55 -B Jamaluddin 43257 Chief Officer: Afghani Road Dr. Karl Viktor Freigang University Town Professor M. Fazel

World Hqtrs: Rosseger 13.4130 Moers 1 West Germany tel. 0284.1142.726

GERMAN AGENCY FOR TECHNICAL* c/o TTC- Peshawar 60638 TRAINING PROGRAMME (GTZ) Gul Bahar 1 telex: Project Manager: PO Box 656 5269 Gottfried Marienfeld Peshawar GPO. PCOPE -Pk

GTZ: DOMESTIC ENERGY SAVING PROJECT* 431 Old Bara Rd 42511 Chief Officer: University Town Cornie Nuizenger Peshawar, Pakistan

GUILDE EUROPEENNE DU RAID 2 Park Lane 42320 Chief Officer: University Town M. Patrick Trizay, Peshawar, Pakistan Representative

World Hqtrs: 11 Rue de Vaugirard 75006 Paris, France Tel. 43.26.97.52

HELP -HILFE ZUR SELBSTHILFE 34 -E Syed Jamaluddin 41530 Chief Officer: Afghani Road Dr. Lorenz L. Goser University. Town Representative Peshawar, Pakistan P.O. Box 912

HELP THE AFGHANS FOUNDATION House 2 Hospital Road 73854 Chief Officer: Peshawar Cantt. Dr. Antony Van der Bunt, Peshawar, Pakistan Telex: Representative 52369

World Hqtrs: Binckhorstlaan 309 P COPE PK 2516 BC The Hague, Netherlands 93

HUMAN CONCERN INTERNATIONAL 40 C Sahibzada Abdul 42524 Chief Officer: Qayum Road Mr. M.B. Fadil, Manager University Town Peshawar, Pakistan P.O. Box 880 World Hqtrs.: P.O. Box 3984 Station C Ottawa, Ontario Canada K1Y 4P2 tel. (613)234 -4585

INTER AID COMMITTEE Dabghari Gardens 76195 Chief Officer: Mission Hospital Ashe Mengistu, Director Peshawar, Pakistan Mr. Harrison Massey Bangalow No. 9 P.O. Box 488

INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE 15 -B Old Jamrud Road 41673/ RED CROSS (ICRC) University Town 41371/ Chief Officer: Peshawar, Pakistan 40815 Mr. Andre Collomb G.P.O. Box 418 telex: Head of Delegation 52428 World Hqtrs.: Geneva, Switzerland ICRC P PIS

INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION OFFICE 32 -A Jamrud Road University Town Peshawar

INTERNATIONAL MEDICAL CORPS 32B Chinar Road 41156 Chief Officer: University Town Jeffrey C. Paulsen, Peshawar, Pakistan Director of Operations G.P.O. Box 562 Nasir Bagh Training Ctr. 41755 Nasir Bagh Road World Hqtrs.: Suite 2008 10880 Wilshire Blvd. Los Angeles, CA 90024 tel. (213)474 -3927

INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE* 41F Sahibzada Abdul 41274 Chief Officer: Qayum Road 43242 Mr. Tom Yates, Director University Town 41845 Mr. Steve Segal, Deputy Director Peshawar, Pakistan Ms. Margaret Segal Director Development Center for Afghan Education ] 42421 40189 World Hqtrs: 386 Park Avenue South New York. NY 10016 ISLAMIC RELIEF AGENCY* 17 Chinar Road 42245 Chief Officer: University Town Dr.Abdul Rehman Ahmed, Peshawar, Pakistan Director P.O. Box 887 Dr. Sumar, Assistant Director University Town Peshawar World Hqtrs: Dr. Abdullah Seleiman Khartoum W372 Post Box Sudan

ITALIAN COOPERATION FOR 3 -C Gul Mohar Lane 41496 DEVELOPMENT University Town 42520 Chief Officer: Peshawar, Pakistan Dr. Paolo Piva, Team Leader P.O. Box 813

World Hqtrs.: Dipartmento Perla Cooperazione Allo Sviluppo via Salvatore Coularini 25, 00194 Rome, Italy

KUWAIT RED CRESCENT 71 E Abdara Road 42521 Chief Officer: University Town T1x52359 Dr. Abdul Hai Suliman, Director P.O. Box 782 HILAL PK

World Hqtrs: Kuwait Red Crescent P.O. Box 1359 Kuwait KRC Hospital 41508

MEDICAL REPRESHER COURSES for Kalimabad near Flexo 62477 AFGHANS (MRCA) Dispensary Chief Officer: GT Road Ms. Arielle Calmejune, Director Peshawar, Pakistan P.O. Box 862, U.T.

47 C -2 Sahibzada Abdul Qayyum Road, U.T. Peshawar, Pakistan

MEDICAL TRAINING FOR AFGHANS (MTA) 14 -A Park Road 41492 Chief Officer: University Town Mr. Christian Gravet Peshawar, Pakistan Project Manager G.P.O. Box 326 Peshawar Cantt. 42419 World Hqtrs.: 110 Rue des Vennes 4020 Liege, Belgium

MEDECINS du MONDE 2 Park Lane 42320 Chief Officer: University Town telex: Representative: Peshawar, Pakistan 52490 Dr. Christian Courtade WHOUS PK

World Hqtrs: 67 Ave. de la Republique 75011 Paris, France

tel. 1 43 57 70 70 telex: 216213 F MEDMOND J C

MEDECINS SANS FRONTIERES 2 Park Lane 42320 Chief Officer:Dr. R. Saleon- Terras University Town Dr. Juliette Fournot Peshawar, Pakistan Programme Director Bernard Chomiellier, Administrator Dominique Martine, Medical Coordinator

World Hqtrs.: 68,Blvd St- Marcel 75005 Paris France

tel. 1 47 07 29 29 telex: 201.720 F Minitel 3615

MSF HOLLAND 5/A -1 Park Road General Coordinator: University Town Bertrand Ganne Peshawar, Pakistan.

World Hqtrs: Reguliersbreestraat 12 1017 CN Amsterdam tel. 020 -25 1272 telex: 10773 MSF NL

MERCY FUND* Old Bara Rd. Afzalabad 42405 Chief Officer: University Town Telex Ms. Anne Hurd, Director Peshawar, Pakistan 52484 HNS Ph

MUSLIM AID FOR AFGHAN REFUGEES 75 -A Abdara Road 43203 Chief Officer: University Town Dr. Mohammad Salim Director Peshawar, Pakistan P.O. 914 U.T. World Hqtrs: P.O. Box 3 London, England N78L1 tel. 01- 6094426

NORWEGIAN COMMITTEE FOR AFGHANISTAN 15 -A Gul Mohar Lane 41247 Chief Officer: University Town Elisabeth Eide, Co- Director Peshawar, Pakistan Terje Skaufjord, Co- Director P.O. Box 876 U.Town 42517 96

NAME OF ORGANIZATION ADDRESS TELEPHONE

NORWEGIAN REFUGEE COUNCIL/ 51 C Park Avenue 42304 NORWEGIAN CHURCH AID University Town Chief Officer Peshawar, Pakistan Mr. Kjell Helge Gottfredsen Director World Hqtrs. Norwegian Refugee Council Prof. Dahls gt. 1 Oslo 3 Norway tel. 47- 2/603970 telex: 72343 NORFUN

Norwegian Church Aid P.O. Box 5868 Hegdehaugen Oslo 3 Norway tel. 47- 2/493970 telex: 19493 CHELP N

OCKENDEN VENTURE* 32 D2 Old Jamrud Road 40410 Chief Officer: Mr. Lobsang Yeshi University Town World Hqtrs: England Peshawar, Pakistan

ORTHOPEDICS OVERSEAS (no local office) - Chief Officer: volunteer doctors work in Afghan Dr. Kermit Veggeberg, Director Surgical Hospital or Kuwait Red Crescent Hospital World Hqtrs: Suite SO4, S380 Long Point Houston, TX 77055 (713) 461 -4170)

ORTHOPEDIC WORKSHOP Lady Reading Hospital 60231 Les Johnstone, Representative Peshawar, Pakistan ext. 351 Susi Harmon, Representative World Hqtrs. Sandy Gall Afghanistan Appeal Upstairs Downstairs Project 182 Hammersmith Road London, UK W6

PAK- GERMAN BAS -ED 7 Gul Mohar Road 40989 Chief Officer University Town William Schuldt, Project Director P.O.Box 744 Peshawar, Pakistan World Hqtrs. GTZ Postesach 5180 6236 Eschborn 1 West Germany PAKISTAN RED CRESCENT* Dabgari Gardens 65336 Chief Officer Peshawar, Pakistan Col (Retd) Mazhar Ali Shah Secretary & Chief Executive World Hqtrs. Islamabad, Pakistan

PSYCHIATRY CENTER FOR AFGHANS Jamal Road, St. 5 42987 Chief Officer Shaheen Town Dr. M. Azam Dadfar, Director Peshawar, Pakistan P.O. Box 641', GOP Peshawar, Pakistan

SALVATION ARMY* 14- Old Jamrud Road 42230 Chief Officer University Town Jan Willem Kanis Peshawar, Paistan Field Program Coord. P.O.Box 922 world Hqtrs. 101 Queen Victoria Station London EC4D 4EP England

SAUDI RED CRESCENT 2 Gul Mohar Road 42207/ Chief Officer University Town 41488 Mr. Wael H. Jelaiden, President Peshawar, Pakistan P.O.Box 347 World Hqtrs. Saudi Red Crescent Riyadh, Saudi Aral-a

SAVE THE CHILDREN (UK)* 30 -D Jamaluddin 41918/ Chief Officer Afghani Road 41170 Mr. Johan Bertens University Town Peshawar, Pakistan

Mr. Andrew Ruck, 810304 Field Director 820387 H.No.5 Street 60 F 7/4 Islamabad World Hqtrs. 17 Grove Lane Camberwell London SE5 PRD England

SAVE THE CHILDREN (USA)* 68 Nazim -ud -Din Rd. 854690 Chief Officer F8/4 telex. William Soules, Director Islamabad, Pakistan 54074 P.O.Box 1952

World Hqtrs. 54 Wilton Road Westport, CT P.O. Box 950

SERVE* 5 Mulberry Road 41706 Chief Officer University Town Mr. Gordon Magney, Director Peshawar, Pakistan Mr. Steve Craig, Deputy Director P.O. Box 477 SHELTER NOW INTERNATIONAL* 32 C/1 Circular Road 41130 Chief Officer University Town Mr. G. deBeurs, Peshawar, Pakistan Mr. Thor Armstrong ,Co- Directors G.P.O. Box 354

World Hqtrs. 19 A Wilkensen Rd Singapore 1543 Japan

SOS /PG BELGIUM SOLIDARITE* 2 Rehman Baba Rd. 40839 AFGHANISTAN University Town 42319 Chief Officer Peshawar, Pakistan Mr. Fernand Lohisse, Director P.O. Box 799

World Hqtrs. SOS /PG Rue A. Bois, 361 1150 Brussels Belgium

Solidarite Afghanistan Belgique Rue des Vennes, 110 4020 Liege Belgium

SWEDISH COMMITTEE FOR 41 -A Circular Rd 41247/ AFGHANISTAN 42218 AFGHANISTAN EDUCATION 15-A Gulmohar'Lane 41247/ COMMITTEE 42952 SWEDISH COMMITTEE AGRICULTURAL 5A Park Road 40827 SURVEY OF AFGHANISTAN University Town telex Chief Officer 52365 Mr. Anders Fange, Director

World Hdqtrs: Svenska AfghanistankoLmitten Essingeringen 90 S -11264 Stockholm Sweden

UNION AID FOR AFGHAN REFUGEES* 27A S.J. Afghani Rd 41578/ Chief Officer University Town 41579 Dr. Turyalay Nassery, Director Peshawar, Pakistan P.O. Box 428

World Hqtrs. '.Kaiserplatz 3 5300 Born West Germany

UNION OF AFGHAN MUJAHID Jehangirabad 42591 DOCTORS Jamrud Road, Near Khyber Chief Officer telephone exchange Dr. M. Qayum Yar, President Bungalow 17E Peshawar, Pakistan P.O. Box 679

UNITED MEDICAL CENTER OF AFGHAN Hospital -Canal Road 42818 OF AFGHAN MUJAHIDIN DOCTORS Academy Town Chief Officer: Danishabad Hermann Mallinckhodt, President Peshawar 99

GOVERNMENTAL & NON -GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES BASED IN QUETTA

NAME OF ORGANIZATION ADDRESS TELEPHONE

INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE Khan -e -Kalat House 5119 OF THE RED CROSS (ICRC) Sheikh Manda 5129 P.O.Box 76 Chief Officer Mr. °Patrick Stedman, Heaed of Sub -Delegation

Programme Activities Location

- 60 bed surgical hospitalfor Afghan war -wounded. Quetta

- 2 First Aid postswith Pakistan Red Crescent Society and Chaman transport patients from there to Quetta. Badini

- Provide one month first aid coursefor young men returning to Afghanistan and 2 days Red Cross Courses for Afghan Mujahideen.

-Refer patients to their hospitals in Peshawar for artificial limbs. Send to Pakistan Red Crescent Society rehabilitation centre for paraplegia in Hayatabad, Peshawar.

- Provide protection for prisoners of war.

INTERNATIONAL LABOUR 56 -A Chaman Housing 75001 ORGANIZATION (ILO)* P.O.Box 349, Quetta Chief Officer Mr. Michael Mulcahy, Chief Technical Advisor

Programme Activities Location

- Vocational Training Programme for ARs in the following Okar Girdi Jungle trades.

- Plumbing, construction, woodwork, domestic electrical Chagai Latifabad installation, farm mechanics /auto mechanics, radio repair Loralai

- AR Construction Team Project Construction and maintenance All RVs in of BHUs, schools, dispensaries, etc. Baluchistan

ISLAMIC AID HEALTH CENTRE PO Box 293 Quetta Chief Officer: Tel. 79780 Dr. Hagani 100

GERMAN AGENCY FOR TECHNICAL Sirki Road 77085 COOPERATION (GTZ)* P.O. Bo.352 Quetta Chief Officer Mr. Walter Lièdmeier, Acting Project. Manager

Programme Activities Location

- Vocational Training Programme for Afghan Refugees in TTC Quetta following trades: - Auto Mechanics - Carpentry - Plumbing

- Technical Training for local Pakistanis TTC Quetta

- Self Help Project for Rural Development and Community Baluchistan Services Programme.

MERCY CORPS INTERNATIONAL Arbab Garam Khan Rd Chief Officers: Quetta Mr. Jerry Dines, Director Engr. Ayubi, Medical Coordinator

Programme Activities

- Supports several hospitals and clinics in southern and westernprovince of Afghanistan with salaries, medical supplies and equipment.

- Six -month training courses at a training center inQuetta.

- Three -month extended first -aidcoursesfor Afghansin Quetta.

OPERATION HANDICAP INTERNATIONAL* 82 Street E 79237 Office (OHI) Block IV 70002 Workshop New Quetta Chief Officer Mr. Claude Magnier, Coordinator

Programme Activities Location

- Orthopaedic and Physiotherapy Services for Afghan Refugees Quetta, Baluchistan

- Training, Pakistani and Afghan hospital workers in Quetta Physiotherapy.

INTERCHURCH AID Mission Compound 72 2461 Chief Officer: Mission Hospital Mr. Fred Innis Quetta Coordinator

Programme Activities Location

- Provision of relief supply with emphasis of new arrivals. Quetta - Primary education 101

NAME OF ORGANIZATION ADDRESS TELEPHONE

CHRISTIAN HOSPITAL REFUGEE Mission Compound 73825 EXTENSION PROJECT* Mission Hospital, P.O.Box 348 Quetta Chief Officer Mr. Fred Innis, Coordinator Ms. Elsie Stephan, Medical Coordinator

Programme Activities Location

- Run 2 Basic Health Units Mohd Khel No.5

- Run one clinic in Quetta New Quetta

- Run the Christian Hospital in Quettafor both refugees Quetta and locals.

- Run a mobile dispensary for newarrivals and unregistered Quetta refugees. Pishin and Gulistan District

PAKISTAN RED CRESCENT SOCIETY Silachi House 73822 Chief Officer: Silachi Street Mr. S. Tajamal Hussain Sariab Road, Secretary Quetta

Programme Activities Location

- Staff 2 first aid pósts for AfghanMujahideen Chaman Badini (Zhob District)

- Distribute relief goods.

ANSARI HOSPITAL FOR REFUGEES Ansri Hospital 76774 Chief Officer: Sariab Road Dr. Saeed Abdul Rehman Opposite Zehri House Quetta

Programme Activitieg Location

- 50 bed hospital providing medical treatmentfor war wounded Quetta Afghans and seriously ill Afghan refugees 102

ADDRESS TELEPHONE NAME OF ORGANIZATION 292/294 Block 5 70671 SAUDI RED CRESCENT Satellite Town Chief Officer: Quetta Mr. Hameed IbrahimAl- Baptain Director Location Programme Activities Panjpai, Surkhan, - 5 BasicHealth Units Pir Alizai, Muslimbagh

refugees, providingmedical, - 30 -bedhospital for Afghan Saranan surgical, gynaecologicaland eye care. Quetta - SurgicalHospital

74478 CONTRE Al- Gilani Road ACTION INTERNATIONAL P.O.Box 319, Quetta LE FAIM (AICF)* Chief Officér Mr. Phill_ipe Mailfait,Chief of Mission Location Programme Activities Surkhab, Pir Health Care Programmemedical services to women - Primary Alizai and children,including:

- Dispensaryin each camp. Vaccination for womenand children. Sanitation Training of outreachworkers. Technical assistance toGovt. run BHUs

- Laboratoryin Pishin Civil Hospital Surkhab, Pir Alizai to Skilled Afghanrefugees - Assistance Mohd Kheil, Muslimbagh and Loralai

Surkhab & Loralai Tree Planting Project - (Nursery) Pir Alizai, Surkhab

Mohd Khel, Fuel Saving Project for ARs. - Domestic Muslimbagh and Loralai 103

ADDRESS TELEPHONE NAME OF ORGANIZATION 70 D/B5 70037 MEDECINS SANS FRONTIERES* Satellite Town (NSF) France P.O. Box 432 Quetta Chief Officer More Antoine Leveau,Medical Coordinator Patrick Vercammen,Administrator Location Programme Activities 10 camps in Ghagai - Trainingof medical district officers and BHU staff - Sanitationprogramme - TrainingCommunity Health Workers - MCH programme

Satellite Town 78447 (Education) EXPERIMENT IN INTERNATIONAL* C/o UNHCR 78928 (IG) LIVING (EIL) P.O.Box 30 Chief Officer Mr. Jan Karpowicz,Project Director Abdul Quduz Matin(Education) Location Programme Activities All districts of Training - MaterialsDevelopment /Teacher Baluchistan Afghan Refugees -Agricultural Support to

37 -C Block 5 76384 CATHOLIC RELIEF SERVICES* Satellite Town Quetta Chief Officer Dr. Riaz, ProjectCoordinator (Medical) (IG) Ms. ElizabethNeuenschwander, Project Manager Location Programme Activities Muslimbagh - HealthCare Programme forARs Rehydration Therapy Training Loralai - HealthEducation and Oral & Loralai -Sanitation Programme

Community Health Workersand Traditional Birth - Training Loralai Attendant

Generation Project for AR women Gulistan - Income Mohd Khel