Lawrence S. Wittner. The Struggle against the Bomb, vol. 2: Resisting the Bomb: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement, 1954-1970. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997. vii + 641 pp
Lawrence S. Wittner. The Struggle against the Bomb, vol. 3: Toward Nuclear Abolition: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement, 1971 to the Present. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003. vii + 657 pp , , .
Lawrence S. Wittner. The Struggle against the Bomb, vol. 1: One World or None: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement through 1953. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993. vii + 456 pp. $29.95, paper, ISBN 978-0-8047-2528-6.
Lawrence S. Wittner. The Struggle against the Bomb, vol. 2: Resisting the Bomb: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement, 1954-1970. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997. vii + 641 pp. $34.95, paper, ISBN 978-0-8047-3169-0.
Lawrence S. Wittner. Toward Nuclear Abolition: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement, 1971 to the Present. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003. 657 S. $80.00, cloth, ISBN 978-0-8047-4861-2.
H-Net Reviews
Reviewed by Randall Forsberg
Published on H-Peace (May, 2004)
Larry Wittner's trilogy on the history and im‐ changes in many aspects of Soviet policy, includ‐ pact of the antinuclear movement surpasses the ing a reduction in military spending, the with‐ goal he set for himself. In the preface to volume 1, drawal of forces from Afghanistan, and deep cuts One World or None, Wittner comments that de‐ in nuclear weapons. As a result of the conver‐ spite some previous research, "most of the story is gence of these two sets of developments, there is a located in a vast, uncharted wilderness," and, he major political and historical controversy, still says, as a result of this and other impediments, alive today, about what caused the end of the U.S.- "this study cannot be defnitive. Rather it is meant Soviet nuclear arms race and the subsequent deep to serve as a trailblazing work, beginning the cuts in their nuclear arsenals. process of uncovering the history of the world‐ In the concluding paragraph of chapter 16 wide struggle against the bomb and of its efects ("Breakthrough for Nuclear Disarmament, on public policy" (pp. xi-xii). 1985-88"), Wittner sums up his case that the prime The trilogy is extraordinarily useful as a trail‐ mover in this development was the massive blazer for two reasons. First, its scope is truly worldwide antinuclear movement: comprehensive. It covers the entire period of "Yet the bulk of the credit for the new course-- thought and action about nuclear weapons, from or, as Gorbachev liked to call it, the "new think‐ 1945 to the present, and it covers activism and ing"--lay with the nuclear disarmament campaign government policy in all parts of the world--not and the tidal wave of antinuclear sentiment that it just in the United States, the Soviet Union/Russia, generated. So powerful was the antinuclear pres‐ and Western Europe, but also in Japan and in oth‐ sure that it began transforming Reagan's ap‐ er regions. Second, equally important or perhaps proach to nuclear weapons even before the ad‐ more so, the trilogy works hard to unearth and vent of Gorbachev, thus setting the stage for their delineate the impact of activist eforts on govern‐ later agreements. Once Gorbachev appeared on ment policies (and, where relevant, the impact of the scene, it became irresistible. Reagan--still un‐ government policies on activist eforts). In the easy with the nuclear disarmament movement area of nuclear armaments, most histories to date but swept forward by the antinuclear Zeitgeist-- have focused either on popular culture or on gov‐ broke loose from his old moorings. By contrast, ernment policy. They have not attempted to look Gorbachev was enamored with the movement, in a careful, detailed, well-documented manner at and--like his closest advisors--repeatedly adopted the interaction between the two. its ideas and proposals." (p. 403) Wittner's efort to assess the impact of public The diametrically opposing view, still widely protest on government policy is particularly im‐ believed and frequently articulated by conserva‐ portant for the period of the Reagan presidency, tive commentators, is that the prime mover in 1981-89, the centerpiece of volume 3, Toward Nu‐ ending the arms race was the U.S. military clear Abolition. During this period the scale and buildup under Reagan in the early 1980s, which intensity of activist-government confrontation forced the Soviets to stop competing with the reached a peak, both in the United States and in United States militarily because they could no Europe. At the same time, in the USSR Mikhail longer aford to do so. Gorbachev's capitulation Gorbachev came to power and made radical proved, they argue, that "Peace through Strength,"
2 H-Net Reviews the approach advocated by Reagan's right-wing whether it was true that he held this view, and if supporters and administration ofcials, was cor‐ so, why. He responded that it was true that he did rect. not favor any treaties with the USSR, even if com‐ Wittner shows in convincing and fascinating pletely one-sided, because the Soviet dictatorship detail that the Reagan administration's support was so terrible and untrustworthy that it was bet‐ for the "zero option" on intermediate nuclear ter not to have any agreements with them at all.) forces--ultimately accepted by Gorbachev as the Wittner also cites direct statements opposing basis for the INF Treaty--was a concession to the more or less all forms of arms control by a num‐ demands and the political clout of the activists, as ber of conservative Republican leaders both at the was the administration's 1982 announcement of a outset of the Reagan administration and again at willingness to hold negotiations on reductions in the close, when the INF Treaty was signed. The strategic intercontinental arms (START). In chap‐ implication of this is that the INF Treaty and the ter 13 ("Public Policy Wavers, 1981-85") and chap‐ START Treaty, concluded under Reagan's succes‐ ter 14 ("U.S. Policy: The Hard Line Softens, sor George H. W. Bush, would never have been 1981-85"), Wittner paints a gripping picture of the signed by the United States had it not been for the disputes regarding these arms control initiatives popular antinuclear protest movement. Other among conservatives in government in the United concessions to public opinion, wrenched out of States and Western Europe. Supplementing pub‐ the Reagan administration bit by bit during the lished memoirs and unclassifed government pa‐ 1980s, included a proposal for limits on under‐ pers with interviews of Reagan's senior security ground nuclear tests, a revision of the START pro‐ ofcials--Kenneth Adelman, Richard Allen, James posal to include more cuts on the U.S. side, and a Baker, Frank Carlucci, Edwin Meese III, Robert public reversal of the ofcial view of whether a McFarlane, Richard Perle, Caspar Weinberger-- nuclear war could be fought and won. Wittner confrms a startling point suspected by Regarding Gorbachev, Wittner cites personal many but not previously documented: the ofcial interviews, memoirs, and speeches in which Gor‐ U.S. positions on START and INF, while intended to bachev describes the times and ways in which his placate the public and members of Congress and approach to nuclear policy was infuenced by European parliaments, were at the same time de‐ American and European popular antinuclear liberately designed to be so one-sided as to be un‐ movements and by pro-arms-control Western sci‐ acceptable to the USSR. In both cases, the initial entists and policy experts. Two speeches made in positions were developed by the most hawkish 1983 show that Gorbachev was by then commit‐ members of the administration, Perle and Wein‐ ted to nuclear arms control and disarmament due berger, who opposed all arms control agreements. to his own beliefs about the danger of a nuclear Other ofcials, such as Secretary of State Al Haig, holocaust. Wittner overlooks an important aspect opposed the U.S. policy initiatives on the grounds of Gorbachev's "new thinking," however. Gor‐ that they were patently "not negotiable." This is bachev's primary goal as leader of the USSR was important because it shows the degree to which to change the Soviet economy. For some years eco‐ the Reagan team opposed arms control and disar‐ nomic growth had been slowing and by the mament treaties, even those that, from a narrow mid-1980s, when Gorbachev took ofce, the GDP military viewpoint, were extraordinarily favor‐ had started to decline. This dire situation gave able to the United States. (In a chance meeting Gorbachev license to undertake radical measures with another ultra-conservative Reagan ofcial, to turn the economy around. His view of how to Richard Pipes, the National Security Council spe‐ do so was to create a form of socialism with a "hu‐ cialist on the USSR, in the mid-1980s, I asked man face," with open communication instead of
3 H-Net Reviews repression, in which reform (perestroika) and the proving the economy and with improving rela‐ free exchange of ideas and information (glasnost) tions with the West as a supplementary means to would lead to innovation and increased produc‐ that end. tivity, while "new thinking" in foreign afairs Regarding the conservative view that the So‐ would lead to positive relations with the West viet's inability to match Reagan's military buildup that, in turn, would generate Western investment forced the Russians to end the arms race, it must and permit the import of Western technology.[1] be admitted that the buildup was so huge that the One component of his plan for economic reform Russians could never have matched it. Between was to make deep cuts in military spending, a step 1981 and 1985 Reagan increased the U.S. military which Gorbachev was persuaded by Western budget to a fgure that was 50 percent above the peace-oriented analyses would in itself generate norm, in constant dollars. There was no precedent economic growth. (Unfortunately, in the absence for such an increase in peacetime; the only com‐ of a planned conversion program, it had the oppo‐ parable increases were those that occurred dur‐ site efect.) Alexei Arbatov, a former member of ing the Korean and Vietnam wars. Not surprising‐ the Duma's Defense Committee and a long-time ly, the U.S. military had a hard time fnding ways arms control advocate and negotiator, reviewed to employ a sudden growth of this magnitude, and post-Gorbachev eforts to reconstruct the true lev‐ in some cases they were driven to absurd ex‐ el of military spending, as distinct from the pub‐ tremes. For example, they refurbished two World licly reported military budget. Though inconclu‐ War II-era battleships at enormous cost, and then sive, studies suggested that the fgure could have re-retired the ships just two years later because been anywhere from 25 to 40 percent of the GDP they had no real military value. over several decades; and that it was this terrible The Soviets could not have matched the Rea‐ distortion of economic infrastructure and priori‐ gan buildup economically, but that is something ties that had led, ultimately, to the decline in GDP they would not have tried to do in any case. The that Gorbachev was trying to reverse. This, of overall composition and cost structure of the U.S. course, does not support the view that Reagan's and Soviet militaries were so diferent--their de‐ military buildup drove the USSR into abandoning ployments, numbers, and roles so lacking in mir‐ the nuclear arms race and the Cold War: it sug‐ ror-image qualities--that Soviet military comman‐ gests a much longer-term domestic economic ders would not have wanted to model their mili‐ problem that afected the military policies of Gor‐ tary growth on that of the United States. The one bachev and his cohorts. area where the USSR did specifcally try to match In this context it is important to note a few the United States was in the number of "surviv‐ key facts regarding military resources. First, nu‐ able" strategic nuclear weapons that it could de‐ clear weapons have always taken only a small liver to the other side of the world in thirty min‐ part of military budgets, on the order of 20 per‐ utes. The U.S. deployment of "MIRVed" multiple cent or so in the 1950s and 1960s and declining to‐ warhead missiles starting in the early 1970s even‐ ward 10 percent or less in the 1970s and 1980s. So tually gave the United States an advantage of eliminating certain components of the nuclear ar‐ about 5:1 in that area. A Soviet efort to match senals would not have had a signifcant economic that specifc buildup began in the late 1970s and impact: that would have required deep cuts in was largely completed by the time Reagan's conventional military forces and weapon produc‐ buildup was in full swing. tion, which Gorbachev also made. This means that In sum, the evidence suggests that the Reagan Gorbachev's nuclear initiatives could have been buildup had no impact on Gorbachev's policies made even if he were not preoccupied with im‐
4 H-Net Reviews leading to the end of the arms race, and that West‐ extraordinary, in my view, is his fne judgment re‐ ern protest movements and arms control advo‐ garding the relative importance of particular indi‐ cates did have a signifcant impact. In addition, viduals, organizations, and actions--knowing however, it would be reasonable to conclude that which to give many pages and which to compress Gorbachev's concerns about the Soviet economy to one or two sentences. Similarly, his judgment played an important role in his thinking about se‐ regarding the signifcance of particular conficts, curity matters and nuclear weapons. At the least, choices, events, and turning points in the life of concerns about the impact of excessive military the protest movement is very fne. Time and again spending on the economy would have confrmed in reading sketches of people, organizations, and or reinforced the "dovish" pro-disarmament posi‐ events that I knew well from my own participa‐ tions Gorbachev might have been inclined to sup‐ tion as an activist leader, I felt that the presenta‐ port in any case. At most, concerns about revital‐ tion was fair, not giving too much or too little izing the domestic economy and the political sys‐ credit, blame, or attention, but an appropriate tem may have been an important motive behind amount, given the implications of the situation for his foreign policy "new thinking." This is an issue the larger picture of how activists infuence poli‐ that Wittner does not address. In fact, the words cy. One case in point concerns the roles and inter‐ glasnost and perestroika do not appear anywhere actions of members of the Physicians for Social in volume 3 (except in references to passages to Responsibility and the International Physicians Gorbachev's book entitled Perestroika). "New for the Prevention of Nuclear War, and in particu‐ thinking" on security matters is presented more lar Helen Caldicott and Bernard Lown. This is an fully than I have seen in any other source, but important but turbulent story that Wittner tells completely in isolation from the domestic ele‐ deftly, indicating the problems briefy but giving ments of Gorbachev's drive to reform the USSR. far more attention, appropriately in my view, to The Reagan period is only one of the many the extraordinary growth and positive contribu‐ policy junctures over the last seven decades tions on all sides. where Wittner looks carefully at both published When reviewing a trail-blazing study of large‐ works and unpublished documents to illuminate ly uncharted territory, especially a book with this the impact of public protest on policymakers. In scope, it is unreasonable to discern no omissions. every case, there are new insights and informa‐ However, from my own experience as an activist- tion, flling in the kaleidoscope of interaction be‐ scholar, I fnd only two gaps in Wittner's trilogy. tween public policy and individual action. First, he gives little attention to what is generally Another special strength of the trilogy is the called the "arms control community," or the schol‐ consistently balanced overview of the organiza‐ arly practitioners of studies of peace and security tions that played a central role in the public that focus on arms control and disarmament. This protest movement, the key individuals in those or‐ is a relatively small group of specialists and ex‐ ganizations, their most important public actions, perts whose political positions and roles typically and some of their internal history, growth, strife, lie somewhere in between those of activists, on and decline. This requires a detailed knowledge of the one hand, and policymakers, on the other. the activities of hundreds--perhaps thousands--of Since this is my own professional reference individual activists, and more than one hundred group, the omission was glaring. Of course, Wit‐ activist organizations, operating independently in tner does not set himself the task of covering the all parts of the world over a period of decades. triangular relationships among policymakers, What makes this aspect of Wittner's work truly arms control experts, and activists--nor, for that matter, does he attempt to explore the role of the
5 H-Net Reviews mass news media, or the role of citizen education. Scientists), which tried to stop the nuclear arms The largest and most difcult of these sectors to race at the outset. Because of his outspoken sup‐ cover comprehensively is the activist segment, port for nuclear disarmament after the war, Mor‐ and we should be thankful for Wittner's ground‐ rison was blackballed as a communist. With the breaking work there. Just as in the case of Gor‐ support of physicist Hans Bethe at Cornell, howev‐ bachev's domestic concerns, I would argue that an er, Morrison obtained a job there, became a explanatory efort that omits key factors altogeth‐ tenured physics professor and, eventually, moved er cannot provide a satisfyingly complete expla‐ to the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) nation. Since the arms control community has where he became a distinguished "Institute Pro‐ had an enormous impact on activist eforts as fessor," free to spend his time as he wished. While well as government policies, neither can be fully his paid work was in astrophysics and cosmology, understood in the absence of this larger discus‐ Morrison has publicly supported nuclear arms sion. control and disarmament eforts in many ways For instance, in the late 1960s, at the initiative throughout the period from 1950 to the present, of Alva Myrdal, Swedish ambassador to the Gene‐ serving repeatedly as president or chairman of va disarmament talks and author of The Game of the Federation of American Scientists, giving lec‐ Disarmament: How the United States and Russia tures about nuclear weapons, writing books and Run the Arms Race (1976), the Swedish govern‐ articles on the topic, supporting other public in‐ ment created an independent research center, the terest organizations, and encouraging physicists Stockholm International Peace Research Institute and other scientists to become involved in sci‐ (SIPRI), with Swedish government funding but an ence-related public policy issues. In his trilogy, international staf and governing board. The main Wittner mentions only a handful of scientists and purpose of SIPRI was to contribute to worldwide academics by name; yet, like Morrison, many, eforts for nuclear disarmament by providing a many more social and natural scientists have con‐ source of impartial information on the U.S.-Soviet tributed to educating and supporting antinuclear nuclear arms race, independent of the alarmist, activists and protests over the past half century. worst-case analyses that might be put forward by Yet another example is provided by profes‐ the governments concerned. Among the original sional arms control analysts who served in gov‐ staf members at SIPRI in 1968 were Mary Kaldor ernment positions for a certain period, but for and myself. Around 1980-81, Kaldor was instru‐ most of their lives earned a living in other ways, mental in creating the European Nuclear Disar‐ most often by teaching at Harvard, MIT, Stanford, mament initiative (END), while, at about the same and other U.S. universities. Some prominent time, I was helping to launch the U.S. Nuclear members of this group in Cambridge who were Freeze campaign. Without the support and spe‐ active more or less throughout the period covered cialized education that work at SIPRI provided by the trilogy are George Rathjens, Jack Ruina, each of us, neither might have gone on to help Paul Doty, George Kistiakowsky, and Charles shape and lead the popular antinuclear protest Zraket. Jack Ruina and Charles Zraket, members movements in the United States and Europe. of the electrical engineering department at MIT in Another quite diferent case involves Philip the 1950s, worked on the computers and radars Morrison, a young physicist in the Manhattan for the frst U.S. continental air defense system. Project at Los Alamos and then, after World War Zraket took the research of campus and formed II, one of the founding members of the Federation the MITRE corporation (MIT research and engi‐ of Atomic Scientists (later Federation of American neering); Ruina remained at MIT. George Kisti‐ akowsky, a senior chemist at Los Alamos, super‐
6 H-Net Reviews vised Ph.D. work in chemistry at Harvard in the dowments, government grants, and tuition pay‐ 1950s by Rathjens and Doty, introducing both to ments. Proft-making businesses sell products to the world of nuclear weapons and arms control the public. Government agencies are supported policy. Later, Doty headed a Harvard center spe‐ by taxes. Most nonproft organizations receive cializing in security and arms control studies charitable contributions from individuals and (Center for Science and International Afairs), foundations. while Rathjens and Ruina taught nuclear policy Like other nonproft groups, activist organiza‐ and arms control at MIT. As teachers, these scien‐ tions rely on a combination of membership dues, tists trained a generation of arms control experts foundation grants, and individual donations; but who went on to government, activism, teaching, like poets, painters, and dancers, they are notori‐ journalism, and other professions. As experts, ously plagued by underfunding to the point of they participated in Pugwash meetings and other starvation. If an activist group is trying to alert conferences with physicists and chemists from the public or the government to a little-recognized the USSR, where issues relating to antiballistic problem, then it is likely to be underfunded. Once missile defense and strategic nuclear arms control the problem is widely recognized, funding to were broached and debated prior to being fnal‐ study it will be forthcoming--but by then it is no ized by diplomats in the ofcial negotiations. longer as sorely needed. Frank von Hippel, a Moreover, these scientists shared with others, physicist arms control expert and activist leader, such as MIT's Jerome Wiesner and Harvard's once remarked to me that in our feld "a founda‐ Thomas Schelling, credit for the ground-breaking tion grant is like a life preserver thrown to a Fall 1960 issue of the quarterly journal Daedalus drowning man just as he reaches the shore." What (published by the American Academy of Arts and Wittner may assume needs no mention, and what Sciences), which was dedicated to and actually history of the kind he has written may not re‐ launched the concept of "arms control" agree‐ quire, but what I believe is too central to go un‐ ments. Specifcally they supported the view that stated is the tremendous degree of self-sacrifce "partial" arms limitation agreements could lower that infuses the work and lifestyle of most disar‐ the risk of nuclear war and permit gradual mament activists. Policymakers, think tank schol‐ progress toward nuclear disarmament following ars, and professional experts on security matters the failure of the proposals for general and com‐ tend to be well paid and respected; though vital to plete disarmament and international control of the political process, grassroots activists are not. nuclear weapons that had been debated in the UN Note between 1946 and 1960. In these and other ways, arms control experts who published their studies [1]. See for example, Edward A. Corcoran, openly, used mainly or exclusively non-classifed "Perestroika and the Soviet Military: Implications material, and were not supported by government for U.S. Policy," Cato Policy Analysis 133 (May 29, grants or contracts played a key role in shaping 1990). See also Celeste A. Wallander, "Lost and and leading public protest movements; but the Found: Gorbachev's 'New Thinking,'" Washington history of that interaction is yet to come. Quarterly 25 (Winter 2002): pp. 117-129. Wallan‐ der points out that in Gorbachev's three-pronged A second, small but signifcant, "sin of omis‐ initiative, perestroika (restructuring) was meant sion" from Wittner's trilogy merits mention. This to "eliminate inefciencies and break up sclerotic concerns the means of support for activists. Al‐ administrative structures"; glasnost (openness) most by defnition, an activist organization is one was meant to "erode the infuence of the state and that has no formal institutional source of support. Communist Party interests that were powerful ob‐ Colleges and universities are supported by en‐
7 H-Net Reviews stacles to economic reform"; and new thinking in foreign and military policy--stressing the common security posed to all nations by the threat of a nu‐ clear disaster--was "conceived and deployed in a secondary role to support the urgent need for do‐ mestic political and economic reform."
If there is additional discussion of this review, you may access it through the network, at https://networks.h-net.org/h-peace
Citation: Randall Forsberg. Review of Lawrence S. Wittner. The Struggle against the Bomb, vol. 2: Resisting the Bomb: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement, 1954-1970. ; Lawrence S. Wittner. The Struggle against the Bomb, vol. 3: Toward Nuclear Abolition: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement, 1971 to the Present. ; Wittner, Lawrence S. The Struggle against the Bomb, vol. 1: One World or None: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement through 1953. ; Wittner, Lawrence S. The Struggle against the Bomb, vol. 2: Resisting the Bomb: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement, 1954-1970. ; Wittner, Lawrence S. Toward Nuclear Abolition: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement, 1971 to the Present. H-Peace, H-Net Reviews. May, 2004.
URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=9328
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States License.
8