Disarmament Yearbook

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Disarmament Yearbook The United Nations DISARMAMENT YEARBOOK YEARBOOK The United Nations DISARMAMENT United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs United Nations Disarmament Yearbook A rich source of historical knowledge of developments, trends and achievements of multilateral disarmament for more than 40 years. Part I contains an annual compilation of text and statistics of disarmament-related resolutions and The United Nations decisions of the General Assembly. Part II presents the main topics of multilateral consideration during the year and a convenient issues-oriented timeline. Available online at www.un.org/disarmament. DISARMAMENT UNODA Update YEARBOOK An electronic newsletter giving information on the activities of the Office for Disarmament Affairs in all relevant areas of disarmament. Available at www.un.org/disarmament. Occasional Papers A biannual publication with edited presentations made at international meetings, symposiums, seminars or workshops organized by the Office for Disarmament Affairs or its regional centres in Lima, Lomé or Kathmandu. Available at www.un.org/disarmament. Website—www.un.org/disarmament A comprehensive website on all issues in the purview of the Office for Disarmament Affairs in the field of disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control, featuring: • Searchable database of disarmament resolutions and decisions going back to the fifty-second session (1997) of the General Assembly • United Nations Register of Conventional Arms—unique information exchange on international arms transfers Volume 44 (Part II): 2019 • Text and status of treaties and agreements—database • Dedicated working websites for conferences and meetings • Education resources Volume 44 (Part II): 2019 Volume • and more ISBN 978‐92‐1‐139192‐3 asdf 20 06980 Office for Disarmament Affairs New York, 2020 The United Nations DISARMAMENT YEARBOOK Volume 44 (Part II): 2019 Guide to the user The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook, in print and electronic format, is designed to be a concise reference tool for diplomats, researchers, students and the general public on disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control issues under consideration by the international community. Part I of the 2019 Yearbook was published in April this year. It contains all the resolutions and decisions of the seventy-fourth session of the General Assembly. Part II is divided among the main multilateral issues under consideration throughout the year. It includes developments and trends on the issues and a convenient issue-oriented timeline, as well as short summaries found in appendix II, of First Committee and General Assembly actions taken on resolutions and decisions. Because much of the background information is condensed, it is helpful to consult previous editions for expanded historical knowledge. Factual information is provided in the appendices. Websites of United Nations departments and specialized agencies, intergovernmental organizations, research institutes and non-governmental organizations are referenced as hyperlinks in the online version of the Yearbook. Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Hyperlinks to these documents are included in the online version of the Yearbook. Alternatively, they can be accessed, in the official languages of the United Nations, from https://documents.un.org/. Specific disarmament-related documents are also available from the disarmament reference collection at https://www.un.org/disarmament/publications/library/. Electronically available in PDF format at www.un.org/disarmament UNITED NATIONS PUBLICATION E.20.IX.7 ISBN 978‐92‐1‐139192‐3 eISBN 978‐92‐1‐005235‐1 Copyright © United Nations, 2020 All rights reserved Printed at the United Nations, New York Contents Page Foreword ................................................. xi Acknowledgements.......................................... xiii Multilateral disarmament timeline Highlights, 2019 ............................................ xiv Chapter I. Nuclear disarmament and non‑proliferation Developments and trends, 2019 ................................ 3 Issues related to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 5 Third session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons ......................................... 6 Issues related to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty ........ 14 Entry into force and universality ............................. 14 Eleventh Article XIV Conference . 15 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Science and Technology Conference.............................................. 15 International Day against Nuclear Tests ....................... 16 Youth Group............................................. 17 Group of Eminent Persons ................................. 17 Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization....................................... 18 Integrated capacity-building, education and training ............. 18 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons . 19 Bilateral agreements and other issues ........................... 20 Implementation of the Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms .................... 20 Implementation of the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- Range and Shorter-Range Missiles ........................... 22 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) ...................................... 23 Democratic People’s Republic of Korea .......................... 26 Group of Governmental Experts to consider the role of verification in advancing nuclear disarmament .............................. 30 iii International Atomic Energy Agency verification ................... 31 Nuclear verification ....................................... 32 Safeguards conclusions .................................... 32 Safeguards agreements, additional protocols and small quantities protocols ............................................... 33 Verification activities ...................................... 34 Application of safeguards in the Middle East ................... 36 Assurances of nuclear fuel supply . 36 Nuclear security.......................................... 37 Export controls ............................................. 40 Missile Technology Control Regime........................... 40 Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation...... 41 Nuclear Suppliers Group ................................... 42 Fissile materials ............................................ 43 Chapter II. Biological and chemical weapons Developments and trends, 2019 ................................ 49 Chemical weapons .......................................... 50 Twenty-fourth session of the Conference of the States Parties ....... 50 Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons............ 51 National implementation, assistance and protection against chemical weapons, and international cooperation on promoting peaceful uses of chemistry ............................................. 52 Science and technology-related activities ...................... 55 United Nations project on lessons learned from the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons–United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism ................................... 55 Biological weapons.......................................... 56 Meetings of Experts to the Biological Weapons Convention ........ 56 Meeting of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention .... 61 Work of the Implementation Support Unit ...................... 63 Secretary-General’s Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons . 68 Export controls ............................................ 69 Australia Group ......................................... 69 iv Chapter III. Conventional weapons Developments and trends, 2019 ................................ 73 Arms Trade Treaty .......................................... 75 Fifth Conference of States Parties ............................ 76 Small arms and light weapons ................................. 81 Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons .......... 81 Security Council ......................................... 85 Modular Small-arms-control Implementation Compendium ........ 88 Coordinating Action on Small Arms mechanism ................. 89 Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition ........ 90 Ammunition ............................................... 90 General Assembly ........................................ 92 International Ammunition Technical Guidelines and United Nations SaferGuard activities ...................................... 93 Improvised explosive devices .................................. 95 Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons ............................................... 97 United Nations Mine Action Service activities .................. 97 Explosive weapons in populated areas ........................... 98 Vienna Conference and development of a political declaration ...... 101 Relevant discussions under the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons ............................................... 102 Data collection and civilian casualty recording.................. 103 Transparency in conventional arms transfers and military expenditures .. 103 United Nations Register of Conventional Arms .................
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