THE MIG-23 ATTACK CALUEQUE AND SOUTH AFRICA SURRENDERS.

27th June 1988 wil make history in the war of Angola. The Cuban forces were approaching the border, when in 7th June 1988 Fidel Castro warns the Cuban Command, that according to intelligence sources, the SAAF planed a surprise attack, and order the MiG-23 to be ready to start counter attacks inside Namibia and near the border , specially the airports of the SAAF in Ruacana, Oshkati and Ondangwa and the hydro electrical complex of Calueque-Ruacana. This would be an warning to South Africa if it does not accept negotiations, the Cubans will enter in Namibia.

After the clashes in the border, from 27th June 1988, the Cubans prepare a strong response. According to the plan, at 13.00, 11 Mig-23ML attack with 16 tons of bombs and destroy the military post at the border in Calueque, one of the concentration points of the SADF. The complex was also the main source of electricity and water to great part of Namibia, and was a key for the strategy of South Africa.

The attack takes place with to squadrons from the MiG-23 regiment at Lubango, at command of Lutenent Cololel Manuel Arias and the Mayor Mauricio Lopez. Each plane takes 4 demolition bombs FAB-500 of 500 Kg each. Near the moment of take off to of the planes of Captain Gustavo Clavijo are deemed as not ready yet, and Colonel Lamas (chief of the DAAFAR) decide to include in its place a couple of the planes in Cahama. Other two planes are kept in Cahama as air cover in case of an attack of the SAAF with R-24R and R-60M missiles. At 12:30, the MiG-23 start their engines. The planes take off in couples, and then go to the South, at no more than 20-30 m above the ground an at more than 1000 Km/h, evading the South African radar, they cross the border and then turn 100 degrees towards northeast, to surprise the South Africans from an unexpected approximation. The pilots attain total surprise. Then gain altitude and then dive in a 30 degree angle. The first squadron of mayor Mauricio Lopez, together with Torres, Godoy and Guzman, fall over Calueque exactly at 13:00. The second squadron of Lutenent Colonel Manuel Arias and Captain Orlando Carbó, Mayor Jorge Rodriguez Marquetti and Lutenent Carlos Palacios follow. The target is completely covered in smoke and flames. From the transformers of the electrical complex great sparks fly, and the main source of water for the South African army in Namibia is destroyed. The chief of the FAR in Africa, Colonel Pedro Lopez observes the attack from his own plane.

The South Africans suffered such psychological shock, that the SADF abandoned the complex immediately. When the first Cuban ground T-62 columns occupied Calueque a week later, they saw the impressive effectiveness of the bombing. Everywhere there were signs of destructions and the precipitous flee of the South Africans. Several Casspir armored vehicles were overturned and calcinated bodies of South Africans were everywhere. Uniforms hung from trees.

Although the SADF, as usual to them, admitted officially only 13 dead, the Cubans assessed that at least 50 South Africans died in the attack and several hundreds were wounded. Even when the South Africans themselves, admitted later in Afrikaans that "the MiG-23 pierced our hearts", they however take revenge on paper, inventing the story that they took down a plane with a Ystervark gun of 20 mm, in reality, the Cuban planes returned from the mission intact.

The same day of the attack at Calueque, the South Africans called an American mediator, Chester Crocker, to start a contact with Havana. In the peace negotiations, the Cubans demand the South Africans to go out of Angola by August 1988, and form Namibia in 1989.

The humiliating defeat of the SADF in Angola, was one of the factors that provoqued in South Africa a profound political crisis, that ended with the democratization of the country. The victorious Cuban troops, finish their mission in Angola in 1991.Victory of democracy, human rights and justice.

And then there was Fidel Castro:

His one major concern was that the South Africans would mess up his gesture by giving battle. He cabled Ochoa on June 7: "News of a possible South African surprise air attack…should not be underestimated…be ready to counterattack with as many aircraft as possible to completely destroy the Ruacana water reservoirs and transformers…plans should also be prepared to hit Oshakati and nearby airbases…the Cahama group and everything that is available will have to be used for this…do not wait for orders to carry out the attack if there is a strong enemy attack against our troops."

These instructions were apparently given without prior consultation with the Angolan Government, which had reached a tacit understanding with Pretoria that the Ruacana complex was not to be touched. Castro merely sent a telex to President Eduardo dos Santos informing him that he had ordered his generals "to place all forces on a state of maximum alert, to take all security measures and to have our aircraft ready to take off and repel the attack." If he was less than candid with Dos Santos, Castro was equally determined that all other parties should be aware of his plans. "We notified the Soviets… we were warning everyone of the danger of the possibility that we might have to launch a strong attack in northern Namibia."

The South African air attack did not materialise. Instead, on July 26, South African long-range artillery bombarded Cuban units near Chipa. Castro decided that the shelling was not sufficient to merit a strike on Ruacana. He cabled Ochoa: "The first step must be a strong air attack against the camp, military installations and South African personnel in Calueque and its environs…if the enemy’s artillery can be located, strike it harshly."

Eleven South Africans died in the attack, the dam was hit and Pretoria "raised a big fuss." But the South Africans also "restrained themselves militarily" – just as Castro hoped they would. He cabled again: "We have given them our initial response. Now it is up to them to decide what to do and if they should continue the escalation." Five weeks later all parties accepted the New York principles.

This was the climax of the war. From Calueque on the negotiators took charge. There were hiccups to be sure. Castro informed Ochoa as late as October 10 that an "impasse" had been reached and that there might have to be another demonstration. But this, it seems, was designed less to frighten the South Africans than to sober up the Angolans, who were waiting for the outcome of the US presidential election before they finally committed to the tripartite agreement. The Ruacana and Calueque dams would once again be the targets, but – as Castro told his commanders: "I do not think the South Africans want to resume the hostilities."

This is not the story of a South African defeat. It is the story of an Angolan defeat and how, with considerable nerve and panache, the Cubans extricated themselves from it.

When I visited the Museum of the Revolution in Havana last Match, it struck me as odd that the exhibit commemorating the "glorious victory" at Cuito Cuanavale should have been secreted away from public view in a side corridor. Now there seems to be an explanation. Fidel Castro had yet to decide who should be credited. The general to whose genius the glory might logically have belonged was shot at dawn last Thursday. Division General Arnaldo Ochoa Sanchez, commander of the Cuban Expeditionary Force in Angola between November 1987 and January this year – the man, in other words, sent in to clean up the mess after Unita and the SADF had thrashed the MPLA and its Soviet advisers at Mavinga – was executed on charges, principally, of attempting to smuggle cocaine to the US in cahoots with Columbia’s notorious Medellin cartel.

Or so at least the Cuban people and the world have been asked to believe. The transcripts of those sections of Ochoa’s "trial" that were broadcast on Cuban television, and other evidence, suggest that the truth is rather different. The general may, tangentially, have been involved in the drug trade, but that was not the reason for his arrest and liquidation. Ochoa, according to those who knew him (including diplomats involved in the Angola/Namibia settlement process), was a man of striking countenance and much intelligence and charisma.

He knew his mission was to preside over Cuba’s last hurrah in Angola and that the "heroic" defence of Cuito was, therefore, a vainglorious fraud, designed to cover a retreat that had already been decided. The 15 000 new troops who followed Ochoa came to save Cuban face, not the MPLA. Defence Minister Raul Castro, Fidel’s brother, quoted the general as saying: "I have been sent to a lost war so that I will be blamed for the defeat." That was, indeed, his view. The end for the SADF was signaled on June 27, 1988.

A squadron of MIGs bombed the Ruacana and Calueque installations, cutting the water and power supply to northern Namibia and SADFs military bases and killing 11 young South African conscripts. A Mig-23 executed a neat victory roll over Ruacana on the Namibian side of the border. The war was effectively over. The Cubans could have marched into Namibia but exercised restraint, with all parties, including the USA and Soviet Union, looking for compromise and a way forward in negotiations that had previously been going nowhere. Fidel was not looking for a bloody encounter which would have cost many lives on both sides. Apartheids leaders could afford casualties even less than the Cubans, considering the popular mass struggle and growing armed actions within Namibia and South Africa itself and the serious problems Pretoria was encountering with recalcitrant white conscription.

Chester Crocker. America’s chief negotiator was to confide: .Reading the Cubans is yet another art form. They are prepared for both war and peace. We witness considerable tactical finesse and genuinely creative moves at the table.

The central negotiation issue was UN Security Council Resolution 435, concerning South Africa’s withdrawal from Namibia, and that country’s independence. Linked to this was the departure of Cuban troops from Angola. A final settlement was signed between the parties in New York in December 1988. It is history that the last SADF soldier left Angola at the end of August 1988, and that Namibia became independent in March 1990, even before the Cuban exodus from Angola. Apartheid Foreign Minister, Pik Botha, had tried to modify Resolution 435, asserting that the SADF would withdraw from Angola only, if Russia and its proxies did the same.. They made no mention of even considering a withdrawal As can be seen, detail differ and even the “hero” was executed, but the attack at Calueque even has a further Cape Town connection.

In Joostenbergvlakte, one of the Northern Suburbs of Cape Town, lives a person who’s name could have replaced that of Corporal E.P. Koorts in the South African Roll of Honour. This gentleman, who owns a Logistical Firm, was selected for Border Duty, but at the last moment he was ordered to stay in South Africa after being re-assigned. His friend, Corporal E.P. Koorts, was sent in his place and unfortunately was killed in the Calueque incident. www.latrinchera.org