Party Proliferation and Political Contestation in Africa Senegal in Comparative Perspective

Home , Bokk Gis Gis, Popular Front (Senegal)

CONTEMPORARY AFRICAN POLITICAL ECONOMY

Catherine Lena Kelly Contemporary African Political Economy

Series Editor Eunice N. Sahle University of North Carolina Chapel Hill Chapel Hill, NC, USA Series Editor Eunice N. Sahle is Associate Professor with a joint appointment in the Department of African, African American and Diaspora Studies and the Curriculum in Global Studies at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, USA. Advisory Board: Bertha O. Koda, University of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania; Brij Maharaj, University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa; Thandika Mkandawire, London School of Economics and Political Science, UK; Cassandra Veney, United States International University-Africa, Kenya; John Pickles, the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, USA; and Wisdom J. Tettey, University of British Columbia, Canada. Contemporary African Political Economy (CAPE) publishes social science research that examines the intersection of political, social, and economic processes in contemporary Africa. The series is distinguished especially by its focus on the spatial, gendered, and cultural dimensions of these processes, as well as its emphasis on promoting empirically situated research. As consultancy- driven work has emerged in the last two decades as the dominant model of knowledge production about African politics and economy, CAPE offers an alternate intellectual space for scholarship that challenges theoretical and empirical orthodoxies and locates political and economic processes within their structural, historical, global, and local contexts. As an interdisciplinary series, CAPE broadens the field of traditional political economy by welcoming contributions from the fields of Anthropology, Development Studies, Geography, Health, Law, Political Science, Sociology and Women’s and Gender Studies. The Series Editor and Advisory Board particularly invite submissions focusing on the following thematic areas: urban processes; democracy and citizenship; agrarian structures, food security, and global commodity chains; health, education, and development; environment and climate change; social movements; immigration and African diaspora formations; natural resources, extractive industries, and global economy; media and socio-political processes; development and globalization; and conflict, displacement, and refugees.

More information about this series at http://www.palgrave.com/gp/series/14915 Catherine Lena Kelly Party Proliferation and Political Contestation in Africa

Senegal in Comparative Perspective Catherine Lena Kelly American Bar Association Rule of Law Initiative Washington, DC, USA

Contemporary African Political Economy ISBN 978-3-030-19616-5 ISBN 978-3-030-19617-2 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-19617-2

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This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland To my families in Dakar and Lawrence, with special thanks to Baaba Diallo and my mother Mary Byrd Kelly. Foreword

What are the roles and functions of political parties in the complex democracies of Africa? For those immersed in the political practices of Western democracies, the temptation may be to apply Western models and assumptions to answer the question. Granted, to a limited degree this approach would be correct: in Africa as elsewhere the political party serves as the basic building block of civic engagement and political activity. So, too, the active presence of several parties is one of the identifying characteristics of a functioning democracy (so much so that the term “multi-party democracy” is, when examined, somewhat a redundancy). But to assume that political party behavior in Africa models that of parties in the West would be a profound mistake. As Catherine Kelly demonstrates in Party Proliferation and Political Contestation in Africa: Senegal in Comparative Perspective, the reality is much more complex. Dr. Kelly’s successful effort to unpack that complexity begins by tracing the phenomenon of political party proliferation in Senegal. After independence in 1960, Senegal was a single-party authoritarian state ruled by the Socialist Party. In the mid-1970s, the president permitted the first “party of contribution” to the ruling Socialist Party (1974) and allowed for the establishment of three ideologically distinct parties (1976). When unlimited party formation became legal in 1981, 14 parties registered to com- pete in the newfound political space. Today, party formation has accelerated and there are nearly 300 registered parties in Senegal. As these elevated numbers suggest, the research challenge confronting the effort to understand Senegalese party dynamics was inherently daunt- ing. The challenge was nonetheless met: Party Proliferation is the deeply

vii viii FOREWORD and meticulously researched product of 18 months of intensive fieldwork in Senegal and almost 175 interviews of political elites (party leaders, ministers, Members of Parliament, human rights activists, journalists, trade union members, and local elected officials) along with various forms of archival research and data-gathering. Among those interviewed were 46 individuals who had registered new political parties in Senegal from 1998 to 2003, critical primary sources who were difficult to identify and locate. The important core findings ofParty Proliferation are key to an understanding of Senegalese politics and help illuminate party politics elsewhere in Africa. Dr. Kelly writes that “while the logics of party creation are mul- tiple and various opposition parties in Senegal are created to contest elections, many other party leaders run organizations that function primarily to obtain patronage that does not depend on regularized vote-seeking.” And, she further notes: “Political parties formed primarily for negotiating patronage rarely become the consistent opposition organizations that are purported to bolster democracy and accountability.” These findings have clear implications for the rule of law. The extreme proliferation of political parties weakens the party system. As is the case in Senegal, the proliferation of patronage-seeking political parties has contributed in many cases to the prolongation of the rule of all-too-powerful presidents by reducing and diffusing the ability of the political party system to mount an effective opposition to such rule. This imbalance and unchecked power has led to numerous setbacks in the rule of law and, at times, the promotion of human rights. Party Proliferation is a well-written and interesting book that advances the understanding of the role of political parties beyond those that have successfully placed candidates in elected office. While focused on Senegal, the book has direct relevance to political and rule of law development in many other countries. With this publication, Dr. Kelly has performed a public service and notched a significant achievement.

American Bar Association Alberto Mora Chicago, IL, USA Carr Center for Human Rights Policy Harvard Kennedy School Cambridge, MA, USA Acknowledgments

This book would not have been possible without the support of several organizations and many people from Lawrence, Kansas, to the Cité Cap Verdienne in Dakar. Parts of the book began as my doctoral dissertation project in the Harvard University Department of Government, where I had the pleasure to learn from many friends, advisors, and colleagues. I was so lucky to have Steve Levitsky as my dissertation committee chair and intellectual mentor during my years on campus and in the field. Steve saw potential and merit in the project from its early stages, challenged me to think about it cleverly and creatively, and made my time at Harvard the most rigorous and worthwhile learning experience that it could be. I truly could not have done it without him! Nahomi Ichino, Jorge Dominguez, and Leonardo Villalón offered very valuable insights and critiques as members of my dissertation committee, as well as some formative opportunities to conduct research and contribute to workshops in West Africa. Many colleagues deserve thanks for enriching conversations and advice along the way: Leonardo Arriola, Kojo Asante, Zachary Barter, Mindie Bernard, Jaimie Bleck, Jeff Borns, Colin Brown, Edouard Bustin, Carlos Costa, El Hadji Samba Amadou Diallo, Claire Duguid, Katie Levine Einstein, Gerald Early, Dan Eizenga, Alex Fattal, Sheena Chestnut Greitens, Shelby Grossman, Omar Guèye, Andy Harris, Mai Hassan, Martha Johnson, Shashank Joshi, Eddy Lazzarin, Adrienne LeBas, Jamie Loxton, Jordan Long, Timothy Meyer, Lisa Muller, Fallou Ngom, George Ofosu, Chika Ogawa, Jeffrey Paller, Matthew Page, Tim Parsons, Amanda Pinkston, Rachel Riedl, Viri Rios, Andy Sobel, Alex Thurston, Rebecca Vernon, Jason Warner, Martha Wilfahrt, Susanna Wing, and Fadzilah

ix x ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Yahaya. Two very special people, Itai Sened and the late Victor LeVine, got me started on political science and African studies in the first place. I also appreciate the collegiality extended to me by academics and practitioners in Dakar and Saint Louis, especially Mamadou Ciss, El Hadji Omar Diop, Ismaïla Madior Fall, Babaly Sall, El Hadj Mbodj, Issa Sall, and Abdoulaye Thiam. I am grateful for financial support from Harvard University’s Weatherhead Center for International Affairs and the US Department of Education’s Title VI Foreign Language and Area Studies Fellowship, which together facilitated 15 months of field research in Senegal. Thanks are also due to the Harvard Committee on General Scholarships, which facilitated a subsequent research year at Sciences-Po in Paris, France; to Professor Robert Mattes, who recruited me onto the Senegal research team for the African Legislatures Project during my fieldwork; and to the American Political Science Association Africa Workshop on religion and politics, which provided a venue to explore portions of the arguments in this book with American and African mentors and peers in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, in summer 2013. A research grant from the West Africa Research Association in summer 2015 provided the much-needed oppor- tunity to return to Senegal for three additional months to collect data on the Senegalese Democratic Party and political developments under Macky Sall. Led by Professor Ousmane Sène, the Center was an enriching institu- tion of affiliation both during this fellowship and on earlier legs of the research. Wolof language training from the Baobab Center, the Dakar Language Center, and the Harvard University African Languages Program, from my beloved instructors Lamine Diallo, Mbouillé Diallo, Assane Diallo, and Ismaila Massaly, were instrumental in improving the quality of my work and making my time in Senegal enjoyable. The Diallos, along with Ibrahima Fall and Mbouillé, became my second family while I lived and worked in Dakar over the years. Baaba’s tremendous generosity to wel- come me into the family home every day, including for many a plate of thiebu jen “Penda Mbaye,” showed me what Senegalese teranga really is. Profound logistical and substantive pointers from Oumar and Fall, sisterly guidance from Tabara, and years of Wolof training from Lamine were transformative, too. I am also grateful for my friendships with others in the community, including the Ndieguène family, Abdou Karim, and my many friendly and generous neighbors (among them, Abdoulaye, Mor, Ousmane, Paa Sy, René, and the Wades), and the mechanics near the ACKNOWLEDGMENTS xi

National Assembly who became cherished unforeseen friends and Wolof conversation partners. My family and friends from the United States have also contributed in immeasurable ways to my pursuit of a research career and the book writing process. My parents, Mary Byrd Kelly and Van Kelly, have provided too many kinds of inspiration and support to enumerate here. My sister, Laura, gave encouragement and insights that were indispensable at a few critical moments. And what would I have done without many delightful friends along the way, especially those who knew me long before we’d have ever guessed I’d write this. In the pages that follow, portions of Chaps. 1 and 5 draw from my article, “Senegal: What Will Turnover Bring?” which appeared in the July 2012 issue of the Journal of Democracy. Parts of Chap. 4, as well as small elements of Chaps. 1, 2, and 3, were originally published in “Party Proliferation and Trajectories of Opposition: Comparative Evidence from Senegal” in the January 2018 issue of Comparative Politics and are reprinted with the journal’s permission. Last but certainly not least, I am extremely thankful to the Senegalese politicians, civil society leaders, journalists, and academics who were will- ing to be interviewed and consulted for the project. The translations of French-language quotes into English are my own. All remaining errors in the manuscript are my own. Furthermore, the statements and analysis expressed are solely mine in my individual capacity, not those of any institutions with which I am affili- ated. They have not been approved by the House of Delegates or the Board of Governors of the American Bar Association and do not represent the position or policy of the American Bar Association. Praise for Party Proliferation and Political Contestation in Africa

“Having twice experienced a turnover in power following the defeat of incumbents in presidential elections, Senegal has been widely hailed as a model of democracy in Africa. Yet the country continues to intrigue and puzzle analysts for its unexpected political dynamics. Prime among these are the striking proliferation of parties that do not conform to expected logics of party politics, and the failure to institutionalize the party system. In the consequent debate on the nature of Senegalese democracy, Kelly offers an explanation for this phenomenon within the theoretical framework of ‘competitive authoritarianism.’ Building on a wealth of data gathered from interviews over a year and a half of fieldwork, she offers a fine- grained and nuanced empirical examination of the logic of party creation and the dynamics of party trajectories over a quarter century of democratic experimenta- tion. This book will be of high interest not only for those attempting to make sense of the intriguing Senegalese case, but more broadly for those interested in the surprising patterns of party politics in African democratization.” —Leonardo A. Villalón, Professor and Dean, University of Florida, USA

“An analytical treasure trove, this book takes our understanding of Senegal’s idio- syncratic democracy to a whole new level. In it, Kelly skillfully explains the intrica- cies and inner workings of Senegal’s ever-evolving democratic system, sharing her expert knowledge with us, the readers. A must-read for political scientists and Africanists alike, this book shows us why Senegal stands out as an especially useful and salient case study of political party formation and proliferation.” —Matthew T. Page, Associate Fellow, Africa Programme, Chatham House, UK

“This important book tells us why and how party proliferation occurs, as politicians create new parties, rather than remaining loyal or collaborating with existing options. Kelly makes the case that this is costly for democracy and accountability. When parties function primarily as vehicles for negotiating patronage rather than long-term electoral mobilization, there are adverse consequences for oppositional strategies, candidate selection, and elite defection. A critical book for scholarship and policy on political parties, democracy, and governance in the region.” —Rachel Beatty Riedl, Director of Program on African Studies and Associate Professor of Political Science, Northwestern University, USA

xiii xiv PRAISE FOR PARTY PROLIFERATION AND POLITICAL CONTESTATION IN AFRICA

“In this deeply researched and highly accessible book, Kelly takes up a vital question in the study of contemporary Africa – why are there so many political parties? In the course of her masterful examination of Senegal, a prominent African democracy, Kelly challenges conventional assumptions about how political parties work and what they want. By showing the patterns underlying Senegal’s hundreds of parties and its long history of defections and realignments, she sheds crucial light on broader issues related to how democratic experiments unfold. This excellent study will have wide relevance for researchers, students, and policymakers working on Africa – as well as for anyone interested in understanding emerging democracies around the world.” —Alexander Thurston, Visiting Assistant Professor of Political Science and Comparative Religion, Miami University of Ohio, USA Contents

1 Introduction: Party Proliferation and Its Consequences in Senegal and Beyond 1

2 Theories of Party-Building: Africa, Competitive Authoritarianism, and Democracy 29

3 Party Formation and Proliferation on Senegal’s Uneven Playing Field 59

4 Negotiators or Adversaries? Tracing the Sources of Party Trajectories 97

5 Defeating Presidents from Within: Regime Insiders and Turnover in Senegal 137

6 Party Loyalty and Defection from the Ruling Party Under Proliferation 173

7 Conclusion and Notes on Comparative and Policy Perspectives on Party Proliferation in Africa 211

Index 231

xv Abbreviations

AFP Alliance of Forces for Progress / Alliance des Forces du Progrès AJ/PADS And-Jëf/African Party for Democracy and Socialism / And-Jëf/Parti Africain pour la Démocratie et Socialisme AND National Alliance for Democracy / Alliance Nationale pour la Démocratie ANOCI National Agency for the Organization of the Islamic Conference / Agence Nationale de l’Organisation de la Conférence Islamique APL/Dog bumu gacce Patriotic Action for Liberation / Action Patriotique pour la Libération APR Alliance for the Republic / Alliance pour la République ASECNA Agency for Aerial Navigation Safety in Africa and Madagascar / Agence pour la Sécurité de la Navigation Aérienne en Afrique et à Madagascar BBY United in Hope / Bennoo Bokk Yakaar BCEAO Central Bank of the West African States / Banque Centrale des Etats de l’Afrique de l’Ouest BCG Centrist Bloc Lions / Bloc Centristes Gaïndé BDS Senegalese Democratic Bloc / Bloc Démocratique Sénégalais BGG Common Vision / Bokk Gis Gis BP Political Bureau / Bureau Politique BPS Senegalese Popular Bloc / Bloc Populaire Sénégalais

xvii xviii ABBREVIATIONS

Cap 21 Coalition Around the President for the 21st Century / Coalition autour du président pour la 21ème siècle CD Directing Committee / Comité Directeur CD-BGG Democratic Convergence/Common Vision / Convergence Démocratique-Bokk Gis Gis CDP/Garab gi Convention of Democrats and Patriots/The Remedy / Convention des Démocrates et Patriotes CDS Social and Democratic Convention / Convention Démocratique et Sociale CEJECAS Circle of Young Socialist Professionals / Cercle des Jeunes Cadres Socialistes CNCAS National Agricultural Credit Accounts of Senegal / Caisse Nationale de Crédit Agricole du Sénégal CRAES Council for Economic and Social Affairs / Conseil de la République pour les Affaires Economiques et Sociales CREI Court of the Repression of Illicit Enrichment / Cour de la Répression d’Enrichissement Illicite CSM Senegalese Council of Magistrates / Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature DC Citizens’ Democracy / Démocratie Citoyenne DIC Division of Criminal Investigation / Division des Investigations Criminelles ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States ENA National Administration School / Ecole Nationale d’Administration ENP Effective Number of Parties FAL Front for Change / Front pour l’Alternance FDP Front for Democracy and Progress / Front pour la Démocratie et le Progrès FP Popular Front / Front Populaire FSD/BJ Democratic and Social Front / Front Démocratique et Sociale/Benno Jubel FSR/Laabal Social Front for Restoration / Front Social pour la Restauration/Laabal GC Generation of the Concrete / Génération du Concret GP The Great Party / Le Grand Parti HCCT High Council of Local Authorities / Haut Conseil de Collectivités Territoriales JPA Youth for Turnover / Jeunesse pour l’Alternance LD/MPT Democratic League-Movement for the Workers’ Party / Ligue Démocratique/ Mouvement pour le Parti du Travail ABBREVIATIONS xix

LDR Republican Liberal Democrats / Libéraux Démocrates Républicains/Yessal M23 June 23 Movement / Mouvement du 23 juin MCR Movement for Citizenship and the Republic / Mouvement pour la Citoyenneté et la République MDS/NJ Movement for Democracy and Socialism / Mouvement pour la Démocratie et le Socialisme/Naxx Jarinu MLPS Liberal Movement for the Senegalese People / Mouvement Libéral du Peuple Sénégalais MMD Movement for Multiparty Democracy MNSM Movement of Servants of the Masses / Mouvement National de Serviteurs des Masses MPD/Liggey Movement for Democracy and Work / Mouvement pour la Démocratie/Liggeey MPS People’s Movement for Socialism / Mouvement Populaire Socialiste MRDS Movement for Social and Democratic Reform / Mouvement pour la Réforme Démocratique et Sociale MRS Senegalese Republican Movement / Mouvement Républicain Sénégalais MSU Movement for Socialism and Unity / Mouvement pour le Socialisme et l’Unité OIF International Organization of Francophonie / Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie PAI African Independence Party / Parti Africain de l’Indépendance Parena African Renaissance Party / Parti de la Rénaissance Africaine PCA Chairman of the Board / Président du Conseil d’Administration PCRs Presidents of rural communities / Présidents des Communuautés Rurales PDS Senegalese Democratic Party / Parti Démocratique Sénégalais PDS/R Senegalese Democratic Party/Renewal / Parti Démocratique Sénégalais/Rénovation PEP Party for Hope and Progress / Parti de l’Espoir et du Progrès PETROSEN Senegalese Petroleum Company / Société des Pétroles du Sénégal PF Patriotic Front PH Humanist Party / Parti Humaniste xx ABBREVIATIONS

PIT Party of Independence and Workers / Parti de l’Indépendance et du Travail PLP Party of People’s Liberation / Parti pour la Libération du Peuple PLS Senegalese Liberal Party / Parti Libéral Sénégalais PPC Party for Progress and Citizenship / Parti pour le Progrès et la Citoyenneté PPS Senegalese Popular Party / Parti Populaire Sénégalais PR Reform Party / Parti de la Réforme PRC Party of Renaissance and Citizenship / Parti de la Renaissance et de la Citoyenneté PS Socialist Party / Parti Socialiste PSD/Jant bi Social Democratic Party / Parti Social Démocrate/ Jant bi PSP Senegalese Party of Progress / Parti Sénégalais du Progrès RADDHO African Assembly of Human Rights / Rencontre Africaine pour la Défense des Droits de l’Homme RDS Assembly of Senegalese Democrats / Rassemblement Démocratique Sénégalais RES-Les Verts Senegalese Ecological Assembly- The Greens / Rassemblement Ecologique du Sénégal-Les Verts RND National Democratic Assembly / Rassemblement Nationale Démocratique RPM Rally for Mali / Rassemblement pour le Mali RPS/Jammi Rewmi Senegalese Patriotic Assembly / Union Patriotique Sénégalais/Jammi Rewmi RTA/S Assembly of African Workers – Senegal / Rassemblement des Travailleurs Africains – Sénégal RUP Assembly for Unity and Peace / Rassemblement pour l’Unité et la Paix SDE Senegalese Water Company / Sénégalaise des Eaux SOMICOA Maritime Industrial Society of the West Coast of Africa / Société Maritime et Industrielle de la Côte Occidentale de l’Afrique SUTELEC Single Union of Electrical Workers / Syndicat Unique des Travailleurs de l’Electricité UDF/Mboolo mi Union for Democracy and Federalism / Union pour la Démocratie et le Fédéralisme/Mboolo mi UDFPP Democratic Union of Progressive and Patriotic Forces / Union Démocratique des Forces Progressistes Patriotiques Abbreviations xxi

UFPE Union of Emerging Patriotic Forces / Union des Forces Patriotiques Emergentes UJT Union of Young Laborers / Union des Jeunesses Travaillistes UNDP National Union for Democracy and Progress UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization UNP National Union for the People/Success / Union Nationale pour le Peuple/Tekki UPC United People’s Congress UPR Union for the Republic / Union pour la République UPS Senegalese Progressive Union / Union Progressiste Sénégalais URD Union for Democratic Renewal / Union pour le Rénouveau Démocratique URD/FAL Union for Democratic Renewal/Front for Turnover / Union pour le Rénouveau Démocratique /Front de l’Alternance YAW Path of the People / Yoonu Askan wi List of Figures

Fig. 1.1 Patterns of party proliferation by country 2 Fig. 4.1 Factors shaping party trajectories over time 102 Fig. 5.1 Economic conditions at successful and failed alternations 152 Fig. 6.1 Party label changes over time 187

xxiii List of Tables

Table 3.1 Parties running on their label in national races, by degree of contestation 65 Table 3.2 Presidential co-optation of new parties, 1998–2003 74 Table 4.1 Frequencies of party trajectories by endowment combinations 114 Table 4.2 Frequencies of trajectories of parties with vote-mobilizing potential 117 Table 4.3 List of parties by levels of each endowment 118 Table 4.4 Case studies 119 Table 5.1 Insiders and outsiders with over 5% of the vote, 1993–2012 142 Table 5.2 Features of incumbent re-election and turnover in Senegal 154 Table 6.1 Trajectories of former PDS ministers in mid-2015 184

xxv CHAPTER 1

Introduction: Party Proliferation and Its Consequences in Senegal and Beyond

Political parties are critical for making democracy work. When parties aggregate and represent citizens’ broad-based interests, while also groom- ing capable and appropriate candidates for elected office, they empower citizens to make clear political choices and hold public officials accountable for the governance that they provide. Although multiparty politics is essential for citizens to express preferences about who governs them, too many political parties can dilute the power of the opposition, render vote choices opaque, and erode popular confidence in parties as vehicles of interest articulation and accountability. It is for these reasons that the recent proliferation of registered political parties—both in Senegal and elsewhere in Africa—is important for scholars, policymakers, and practitioners to understand. This book examines the origins and consequences of the proliferation of political parties, a trend that took hold in sub-Saharan Africa after many countries transitioned to multiparty politics in the 1990s. When the Berlin Wall fell, the political and economic support of Western and Soviet powers declined across the continent, leaving many African leaders more vulnera- ble to domestic popular pressures for regime change. In protests from

The statements and analysis expressed are solely those of the author and have not been approved by the House of Delegates or the Board of Governors of the American Bar Association and do not represent the position or policy of the American Bar Association.

Benin and Mali to Zambia and Gabon, citizens expressed the demand for more freedoms, liberties, and opportunities than they had enjoyed under the military, personalist, and single-party authoritarian regimes that had predominated after independence in the 1960s. In 1989, all but five African regimes were authoritarian, but by 1995, 38 countries had reformed their constitutions to allow for multiparty politics and competitive elections (Bratton and Van de Walle 1997: 7). Since the start of these “democratic experiments,” the number of registered political parties has multiplied— and in some cases, drastically accelerated—in a diverse set of countries with different legacies of conflict, sources of wealth, histories of military and civilian rule, and salience of identity-based political cleavages. By 2010, after 20 or more years of multiparty competition, Cameroon had over 250 parties, Madagascar and Senegal over 150, Burkina Faso, Benin, and Mali over 100, and Mozambique, Malawi, and Kenya approximately 50. By mid-2018, these numbers had climbed even higher, especially in the fran- cophone African cases (Fig. 1.1).1

Fig. 1.1 Patterns of party proliferation by country 1 INTRODUCTION: PARTY PROLIFERATION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES… 3

Party proliferation has persisted long after the founding presidential and legislative elections of each country’s multiparty transition. It is around these transitional elections that democracy and governance experts would expect to see a temporary spike in party formation in response to newfound political opportunities. They would also expect party leaders with unsuccessful electoral performance in the founding elections to learn from their mistakes. In other words, although proliferation is expected during transitions to multipartism, the parties performing poorly are then expected to disappear or fuse with other, more successful parties in subsequent rounds of political contestation. Senegal is a least-likely crucial case of party proliferation because its transition from post-independence authoritarianism to multiparty politics occurred earlier than in most other African countries.2 While most of these countries were authoritarian regimes from independence in the 1960s to the end of the Cold War, Senegal held its first post-independence multiparty presidential elections in 1978, over a decade earlier than its counterparts that transitioned in the early 1990s. Until 1974, President Leopold Sédar Senghor oversaw a de facto single-party authoritarian regime and headed the ruling Socialist Party (PS). However, in that year, Abdoulaye Wade—an aspiring politician who was then a lawyer and university pr ofessor—convinced Senghor to allow him to create the Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS). Subsequently, in 1976, Senghor oversaw the establishment of three ideologically differen- tiated parties: the PS, which was declared the country’s social democratic party; the PDS, labeled as Senegal’s liberal democratic party; and the African Independence Party (PAI), designated as Marxist. His successor, Abdou Diouf, initiated legislative changes to allow for an unlimited number of parties in 1981. Based on current theories of party behavior after multiparty transitions, Senegal’s longer experience with multiparty politics makes it the place where one might least expect party proliferation to persist and most expect the party system to have consolidated. Yet, by mid-2011, Senegal had 174 registered political parties, a number that had tripled between 2000 and 2010 alone; by mid-2018, there were nearly 300. In Senegal and many other African countries, conventionally cited factors like ideological preferences, formal electoral rules, and social cleavages are not highly correlated with the number of registered parties. Consequently, they cannot fully account for the dynamics of party proliferation (LeBas 2011; Manning 2005; Van de Walle and Butler 1999). Why, then, do so many politicians continue to found parties in Senegal, and why do others choose not to create them? What are the implications of proliferation for party trajectories, presidential turnover, and party loyalty, which each shapes the nature and quality of political contestation? 4 C. L. KELLY

More specifically, why do so many politicians create parties in Senegal? What are the determinants of a consistent opposition party trajectory, as opposed to one of collaboration with incumbents? What explains why ex- regime insiders, rather than regime outsiders, induced presidential turnovers in 2000 and 2012? And how do politicians conceptualize and evaluate their choices to defect or remain loyal to particular parties? This book seeks to answer these core questions in the chapters that follow. These questions are important not only because of their implications for democratization and governance but also because of Senegalese and other African citizens’ interest in answering them. Generally, political science research in the West neglects issues focused on a country’s total number of registered parties. It focuses almost exclusively on the study of parties that run candidates for office or control parliamentary seats. Yet when analysts restrict their view to such parties in countries like Senegal, they ignore other types of parties that provide further insight into the social and political dynamics that shape governance and contestation; this creates an incomplete, if not misleading picture of how patronage distri- bution, political bargaining, and engagement with the state actually work. Quite contrastingly, the proliferation of registered parties has not escaped the attention of African academics, statespeople, and journalists. They observe with worry and disillusionment that proliferation is accompanied by chronic party switching, social fragmentation, fragile opposition parties and coalitions, and low public trust in political parties and their leaders. As early as 2001, legislators from African countries in the International Organization of Francophonie (Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie, OIF) expressed concern about the consequences of party proliferation for political development, given the parochial nature of many parties that are formed (Abdrahman 2001). Burkinabè analysts have con- cluded that “the efflorescence of political parties gives voters and citizens the impression that [party] leaders are motivated by lowly material interests, which reduces the collective credibility of the opposition” (CGD- IGD 2009: 17). Cameroonian experts lament the “mushrooming of non-viable political parties” and the “proliferation of ghost parties” that subvert democratization and dilute the “real opposition” (Tandé 2009: 127; Nyamnjoh 2005: 121–122). Some Malian observers note the corre- lation between proliferation and the prevalence of ephemeral, oversized political coalitions united only by the desire for government posts (Camara 2012: 49), while others claim that the “uncontrolled” creation of parties with low mobilizing capacity reduces the popular legitimacy of political parties as a whole (Sidibé 2015). 1 INTRODUCTION: PARTY PROLIFERATION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES… 5

Similarly, within Senegal, the historian Sémou Pathé Guèye (2003) contends that the proliferation of “parties that have nothing but a name” contributes to the “degradation of pluralist democracy in the eyes of people who don’t feel [parties to be] useful in their everyday life” (181–182). Moustapha Niasse, the current President of Senegal’s National Assembly, remarks that “the Senegalese have created the concept of the ‘telephone booth party,’ a party composed of the wife, the husband, the two children, the cook, and the chauffeur.”3 These are not the “real political parties” needed for coalitions to have “stability, permanence, and political clout” (Sud Quotidien 2015). The political scientist, El Hadji Omar Diop (2011), documents such patterns and their erosion of the “Senegalese democratic myth.” There is also vibrant press coverage of proliferation, with some pieces defending each citizen’s legal prerogative to form a party, but others accusing the parties that result from proliferation of pursuing opportunis- tic self-promotion or of blurring the political landscape and obscuring the ease with which citizens can assess their voting and policymaking choices. Taking these apprehensions seriously, the book examines party proliferation, party trajectories, presidential turnovers, and patterns of party loyalty and defection in contemporary Senegal, which has long been con- sidered a bastion of peaceful, multiparty electoral competition in sub- Saharan Africa. The book first seeks to describe the proliferation of registered parties and understand its sources. Building on these insights, it then analyzes three notable developments in Senegalese politics in the context of party proliferation: the paucity of parties that consistently oppose any given incumbent; the tendency for ex-regime insiders instead of regime outsiders to function as the president’s foremost electoral com- petitors; and the linkage between party creation and elite defection from existing parties. The results are relevant for scholars, policymakers, and practitioners who are engaged with democracy, rule of law, and governance issues, particularly those that demand a deep understanding of the meanings of party formation, the functions that parties actually serve, and the implications of those realities for the nature of opposition and political contestation. In short, the research concludes that many Senegalese parties are formed for negotiating access to the state rather than for contesting and winning elections. Because a significant subset of parties is formed primarily for negotiating patronage, parties rarely become the consistent, long-term opposition organizations purported to bolster democracy and accountability. These realities contrast to some extent with canonical accounts of political parties, which depict them as teams of ambitious 6 C. L. KELLY

politicians who pool resources and coordinate competition for elected office and who remain outside of government to critique it if they do not win (Aldrich 1995; Downs 1957; Duverger 1963). In research on consolidated democracies, parties are critical components of good governance because they aggregate and represent citizens’ broad-based interests and thereby empower citizens to hold public officials accountable (Key1964 ; Lipset 2000; Schattschneider 1942). However, parties are often created for different, non-electoral reasons in competitive authoritarian regimes and thus do not always oppose incumbents in the ways that classic theories predict. As in Senegal, most places with party proliferation began experiencing it under competitive authoritarian regimes, in which presidents and politicians made decisions about party-building that reflected neither fully democratic nor fully authoritarian constraints on their political behavior. This regime type emerged after the Cold War ended, when “the disappearance of competing Western security interests…brought a sharp increase in external democratizing pressure” and made African leaders more vulner- able to popular protests for political reform (Levitsky and Way 2010b: 236).4 On the uneven playing field, a hallmark of competitive authoritarianism, presidents enjoy a degree of incumbency advantage that surpasses what is typical in democracies. With systematic and deep advantages rela- tive to the opposition in “access to state institutions, resources, and the media,” presidents can weaken their political competition by depriving opponents of state resources, controlling the media to hinder opposition coverage and access, and overseeing the politicized application of the law (Levitsky and Way 2010a, b: 9–12). This not only empowers the president to create incentives for proliferation if he so chooses; it also renders sur- vival in the opposition so financially difficult that many politicians are constrained—or even motivated—to form parties that are primarily patronage-oriented rather than primarily election-oriented. Party creation thereby becomes no longer just a tool for the few, lucky politicians with the capacity to attract the financial and human capital necessary to win elections; it also serves as an outlet for less prosperous politicians who lack these resources to lobby for access to the state. The purposes of political parties in turn shape various aspects of political contestation, including party trajectories into the ruling coalition or the opposition, presidential turnover, and politicians’ decisions about party loyalty. When parties are formed for negotiating access to the state rather than for winning elections, they rarely become the consistent,