Party Proliferation and Political Contestation in Africa Senegal in Comparative Perspective

CONTEMPORARY AFRICAN POLITICAL ECONOMY

Catherine Lena Kelly Contemporary African Political Economy

Series Editor Eunice N. Sahle University of North Carolina Chapel Hill Chapel Hill, NC, USA Series Editor Eunice N. Sahle is Associate Professor with a joint appointment in the Department of African, African American and Diaspora Studies and the Curriculum in Global Studies at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, USA. Advisory Board: Bertha O. Koda, University of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania; Brij Maharaj, University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa; Thandika Mkandawire, London School of Economics and Political Science, UK; Cassandra Veney, United States International University-Africa, Kenya; John Pickles, the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, USA; and Wisdom J. Tettey, University of British Columbia, Canada. Contemporary African Political Economy (CAPE) publishes social science research that examines the intersection of political, social, and economic processes in contemporary Africa. The series is distinguished especially by its focus on the spatial, gendered, and cultural dimensions of these processes, as well as its emphasis on promoting empirically situated research. As consultancy- driven work has emerged in the last two decades as the dominant model of knowledge production about African politics and economy, CAPE offers an alternate intellectual space for scholarship that challenges theoretical and empirical orthodoxies and locates political and economic processes within their structural, historical, global, and local contexts. As an interdisciplinary series, CAPE broadens the field of traditional political economy by welcoming contributions from the fields of Anthropology, Development Studies, Geography, Health, Law, Political Science, Sociology and Women’s and Gender Studies. The Series Editor and Advisory Board particularly invite submissions focusing on the following thematic areas: urban processes; democracy and citizenship; agrarian structures, food security, and global commodity chains; health, education, and development; environment and climate change; social movements; immigration and African diaspora formations; natural resources, extractive industries, and global economy; media and socio-political processes; development and globalization; and conflict, displacement, and refugees.

More information about this series at http://www.palgrave.com/gp/series/14915 Catherine Lena Kelly Party Proliferation and Political Contestation in Africa

Senegal in Comparative Perspective Catherine Lena Kelly American Bar Association Rule of Law Initiative Washington, DC, USA

Contemporary African Political Economy ISBN 978-3-030-19616-5 ISBN 978-3-030-19617-2 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-19617-2

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This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland To my families in Dakar and Lawrence, with special thanks to Baaba Diallo and my mother Mary Byrd Kelly. Foreword

What are the roles and functions of political parties in the complex democracies of Africa? For those immersed in the political practices of Western democracies, the temptation may be to apply Western models and assumptions to answer the question. Granted, to a limited degree this approach would be correct: in Africa as elsewhere the political party serves as the basic building block of civic engagement and political activity. So, too, the active presence of several parties is one of the identifying characteristics of a functioning democracy (so much so that the term “multi-party democracy” is, when examined, somewhat a redundancy). But to assume that political party behavior in Africa models that of parties in the West would be a profound mistake. As Catherine Kelly demonstrates in Party Proliferation and Political Contestation in Africa: Senegal in Comparative Perspective, the reality is much more complex. Dr. Kelly’s successful effort to unpack that complexity begins by tracing the phenomenon of political party proliferation in Senegal. After independence in 1960, Senegal was a single-party authoritarian state ruled by the Socialist Party. In the mid-1970s, the president permitted the first “party of contribution” to the ruling Socialist Party (1974) and allowed for the establishment of three ideologically distinct parties (1976). When unlimited party formation became legal in 1981, 14 parties registered to compete in the newfound political space. Today, party formation has accelerated and there are nearly 300 registered parties in Senegal. As these elevated numbers suggest, the research challenge confronting the effort to understand Senegalese party dynamics was inherently daunt- ing. The challenge was nonetheless met: Party Proliferation is the deeply

vii viii FOREWORD and meticulously researched product of 18 months of intensive fieldwork in Senegal and almost 175 interviews of political elites (party leaders, ministers, Members of Parliament, human rights activists, journalists, trade union members, and local elected officials) along with various forms of archival research and data-gathering. Among those interviewed were 46 individuals who had registered new political parties in Senegal from 1998 to 2003, critical primary sources who were difficult to identify and locate. The important core findings ofParty Proliferation are key to an understanding of Senegalese politics and help illuminate party politics elsewhere in Africa. Dr. Kelly writes that “while the logics of party creation are multiple and various opposition parties in Senegal are created to contest elections, many other party leaders run organizations that function primarily to obtain patronage that does not depend on regularized vote-seeking.” And, she further notes: “Political parties formed primarily for negotiating patronage rarely become the consistent opposition organizations that are purported to bolster democracy and accountability.” These findings have clear implications for the rule of law. The extreme proliferation of political parties weakens the party system. As is the case in Senegal, the proliferation of patronage-seeking political parties has contributed in many cases to the prolongation of the rule of all-too-powerful presidents by reducing and diffusing the ability of the political party system to mount an effective opposition to such rule. This imbalance and unchecked power has led to numerous setbacks in the rule of law and, at times, the promotion of human rights. Party Proliferation is a well-written and interesting book that advances the understanding of the role of political parties beyond those that have successfully placed candidates in elected office. While focused on Senegal, the book has direct relevance to political and rule of law development in many other countries. With this publication, Dr. Kelly has performed a public service and notched a significant achievement.

American Bar Association Alberto Mora Chicago, IL, USA Carr Center for Human Rights Policy Harvard Kennedy School Cambridge, MA, USA Acknowledgments

This book would not have been possible without the support of several organizations and many people from Lawrence, Kansas, to the Cité Cap Verdienne in Dakar. Parts of the book began as my doctoral dissertation project in the Harvard University Department of Government, where I had the pleasure to learn from many friends, advisors, and colleagues. I was so lucky to have Steve Levitsky as my dissertation committee chair and intellectual mentor during my years on campus and in the field. Steve saw potential and merit in the project from its early stages, challenged me to think about it cleverly and creatively, and made my time at Harvard the most rigorous and worthwhile learning experience that it could be. I truly could not have done it without him! Nahomi Ichino, Jorge Dominguez, and Leonardo Villalón offered very valuable insights and critiques as members of my dissertation committee, as well as some formative opportunities to conduct research and contribute to workshops in West Africa. Many colleagues deserve thanks for enriching conversations and advice along the way: Leonardo Arriola, Kojo Asante, Zachary Barter, Mindie Bernard, Jaimie Bleck, Jeff Borns, Colin Brown, Edouard Bustin, Carlos Costa, El Hadji Samba Amadou Diallo, Claire Duguid, Katie Levine Einstein, Gerald Early, Dan Eizenga, Alex Fattal, Sheena Chestnut Greitens, Shelby Grossman, Omar Guèye, Andy Harris, Mai Hassan, Martha Johnson, Shashank Joshi, Eddy Lazzarin, Adrienne LeBas, Jamie Loxton, Jordan Long, Timothy Meyer, Lisa Muller, Fallou Ngom, George Ofosu, Chika Ogawa, Jeffrey Paller, Matthew Page, Tim Parsons, Amanda Pinkston, Rachel Riedl, Viri Rios, Andy Sobel, Alex Thurston, Rebecca Vernon, Jason Warner, Martha Wilfahrt, Susanna Wing, and Fadzilah

ix x ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Yahaya. Two very special people, Itai Sened and the late Victor LeVine, got me started on political science and African studies in the first place. I also appreciate the collegiality extended to me by academics and practitioners in Dakar and Saint Louis, especially Mamadou Ciss, El Hadji Omar Diop, Ismaïla Madior Fall, Babaly Sall, El Hadj Mbodj, Issa Sall, and Abdoulaye Thiam. I am grateful for financial support from Harvard University’s Weatherhead Center for International Affairs and the US Department of Education’s Title VI Foreign Language and Area Studies Fellowship, which together facilitated 15 months of field research in Senegal. Thanks are also due to the Harvard Committee on General Scholarships, which facilitated a subsequent research year at Sciences-Po in Paris, France; to Professor Robert Mattes, who recruited me onto the Senegal research team for the African Legislatures Project during my fieldwork; and to the American Political Science Association Africa Workshop on religion and politics, which provided a venue to explore portions of the arguments in this book with American and African mentors and peers in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, in summer 2013. A research grant from the West Africa Research Association in summer 2015 provided the much-needed opportunity to return to Senegal for three additional months to collect data on the Senegalese Democratic Party and political developments under Macky Sall. Led by Professor Ousmane Sène, the Center was an enriching institution of affiliation both during this fellowship and on earlier legs of the research. Wolof language training from the Baobab Center, the Dakar Language Center, and the Harvard University African Languages Program, from my beloved instructors Lamine Diallo, Mbouillé Diallo, Assane Diallo, and Ismaila Massaly, were instrumental in improving the quality of my work and making my time in Senegal enjoyable. The Diallos, along with Ibrahima Fall and Mbouillé, became my second family while I lived and worked in Dakar over the years. Baaba’s tremendous generosity to wel- come me into the family home every day, including for many a plate of thiebu jen “Penda Mbaye,” showed me what Senegalese teranga really is. Profound logistical and substantive pointers from Oumar and Fall, sisterly guidance from Tabara, and years of Wolof training from Lamine were transformative, too. I am also grateful for my friendships with others in the community, including the Ndieguène family, Abdou Karim, and my many friendly and generous neighbors (among them, Abdoulaye, Mor, Ousmane, Paa Sy, René, and the Wades), and the mechanics near the ACKNOWLEDGMENTS xi

National Assembly who became cherished unforeseen friends and Wolof conversation partners. My family and friends from the United States have also contributed in immeasurable ways to my pursuit of a research career and the book writing process. My parents, Mary Byrd Kelly and Van Kelly, have provided too many kinds of inspiration and support to enumerate here. My sister, Laura, gave encouragement and insights that were indispensable at a few critical moments. And what would I have done without many delightful friends along the way, especially those who knew me long before we’d have ever guessed I’d write this. In the pages that follow, portions of Chaps. 1 and 5 draw from my article, “Senegal: What Will Turnover Bring?” which appeared in the July 2012 issue of the Journal of Democracy. Parts of Chap. 4, as well as small elements of Chaps. 1, 2, and 3, were originally published in “Party Proliferation and Trajectories of Opposition: Comparative Evidence from Senegal” in the January 2018 issue of Comparative Politics and are reprinted with the journal’s permission. Last but certainly not least, I am extremely thankful to the Senegalese politicians, civil society leaders, journalists, and academics who were willing to be interviewed and consulted for the project. The translations of French-language quotes into English are my own. All remaining errors in the manuscript are my own. Furthermore, the statements and analysis expressed are solely mine in my individual capacity, not those of any institutions with which I am affili- ated. They have not been approved by the House of Delegates or the Board of Governors of the American Bar Association and do not represent the position or policy of the American Bar Association. Praise for Party Proliferation and Political Contestation in Africa

“Having twice experienced a turnover in power following the defeat of incumbents in presidential elections, Senegal has been widely hailed as a model of democracy in Africa. Yet the country continues to intrigue and puzzle analysts for its unexpected political dynamics. Prime among these are the striking proliferation of parties that do not conform to expected logics of party politics, and the failure to institutionalize the party system. In the consequent debate on the nature of Senegalese democracy, Kelly offers an explanation for this phenomenon within the theoretical framework of ‘competitive authoritarianism.’ Building on a wealth of data gathered from interviews over a year and a half of fieldwork, she offers a fine- grained and nuanced empirical examination of the logic of party creation and the dynamics of party trajectories over a quarter century of democratic experimenta- tion. This book will be of high interest not only for those attempting to make sense of the intriguing Senegalese case, but more broadly for those interested in the surprising patterns of party politics in African democratization.” —Leonardo A. Villalón, Professor and Dean, University of Florida, USA

“An analytical treasure trove, this book takes our understanding of Senegal’s idio- syncratic democracy to a whole new level. In it, Kelly skillfully explains the intrica- cies and inner workings of Senegal’s ever-evolving democratic system, sharing her expert knowledge with us, the readers. A must-read for political scientists and Africanists alike, this book shows us why Senegal stands out as an especially useful and salient case study of political party formation and proliferation.” —Matthew T. Page, Associate Fellow, Africa Programme, Chatham House, UK

“This important book tells us why and how party proliferation occurs, as politicians create new parties, rather than remaining loyal or collaborating with existing options. Kelly makes the case that this is costly for democracy and accountability. When parties function primarily as vehicles for negotiating patronage rather than long-term electoral mobilization, there are adverse consequences for oppositional strategies, candidate selection, and elite defection. A critical book for scholarship and policy on political parties, democracy, and governance in the region.” —Rachel Beatty Riedl, Director of Program on African Studies and Associate Professor of Political Science, Northwestern University, USA

xiii xiv PRAISE FOR PARTY PROLIFERATION AND POLITICAL CONTESTATION IN AFRICA

“In this deeply researched and highly accessible book, Kelly takes up a vital question in the study of contemporary Africa – why are there so many political parties? In the course of her masterful examination of Senegal, a prominent African democracy, Kelly challenges conventional assumptions about how political parties work and what they want. By showing the patterns underlying Senegal’s hundreds of parties and its long history of defections and realignments, she sheds crucial light on broader issues related to how democratic experiments unfold. This excellent study will have wide relevance for researchers, students, and policymakers working on Africa – as well as for anyone interested in understanding emerging democracies around the world.” —Alexander Thurston, Visiting Assistant Professor of Political Science and Comparative Religion, Miami University of Ohio, USA Contents

1 Introduction: Party Proliferation and Its Consequences in Senegal and Beyond 1

2 Theories of Party-Building: Africa, Competitive Authoritarianism, and Democracy 29

3 Party Formation and Proliferation on Senegal’s Uneven Playing Field 59

4 Negotiators or Adversaries? Tracing the Sources of Party Trajectories 97

5 Defeating Presidents from Within: Regime Insiders and Turnover in Senegal 137

6 Party Loyalty and Defection from the Ruling Party Under Proliferation 173

7 Conclusion and Notes on Comparative and Policy Perspectives on Party Proliferation in Africa 211

Index 231

xv Abbreviations

AFP Alliance of Forces for Progress / Alliance des Forces du Progrès AJ/PADS And-Jëf/African Party for Democracy and Socialism / And-Jëf/Parti Africain pour la Démocratie et Socialisme AND National Alliance for Democracy / Alliance Nationale pour la Démocratie ANOCI National Agency for the Organization of the Islamic Conference / Agence Nationale de l’Organisation de la Conférence Islamique APL/Dog bumu gacce Patriotic Action for Liberation / Action Patriotique pour la Libération APR Alliance for the Republic / Alliance pour la République ASECNA Agency for Aerial Navigation Safety in Africa and Madagascar / Agence pour la Sécurité de la Navigation Aérienne en Afrique et à Madagascar BBY United in Hope / Bennoo Bokk Yakaar BCEAO Central Bank of the West African States / Banque Centrale des Etats de l’Afrique de l’Ouest BCG Centrist Bloc Lions / Bloc Centristes Gaïndé BDS Senegalese Democratic Bloc / Bloc Démocratique Sénégalais BGG Common Vision / Bokk Gis Gis BP Political Bureau / Bureau Politique BPS Senegalese Popular Bloc / Bloc Populaire Sénégalais

xvii xviii ABBREVIATIONS

Cap 21 Coalition Around the President for the 21st Century / Coalition autour du président pour la 21ème siècle CD Directing Committee / Comité Directeur CD-BGG Democratic Convergence/Common Vision / Convergence Démocratique-Bokk Gis Gis CDP/Garab gi Convention of Democrats and Patriots/The Remedy / Convention des Démocrates et Patriotes CDS Social and Democratic Convention / Convention Démocratique et Sociale CEJECAS Circle of Young Socialist Professionals / Cercle des Jeunes Cadres Socialistes CNCAS National Agricultural Credit Accounts of Senegal / Caisse Nationale de Crédit Agricole du Sénégal CRAES Council for Economic and Social Affairs / Conseil de la République pour les Affaires Economiques et Sociales CREI Court of the Repression of Illicit Enrichment / Cour de la Répression d’Enrichissement Illicite CSM Senegalese Council of Magistrates / Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature DC Citizens’ Democracy / Démocratie Citoyenne DIC Division of Criminal Investigation / Division des Investigations Criminelles ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States ENA National Administration School / Ecole Nationale d’Administration ENP Effective Number of Parties FAL Front for Change / Front pour l’Alternance FDP Front for Democracy and Progress / Front pour la Démocratie et le Progrès FP Popular Front / Front Populaire FSD/BJ Democratic and Social Front / Front Démocratique et Sociale/Benno Jubel FSR/Laabal Social Front for Restoration / Front Social pour la Restauration/Laabal GC Generation of the Concrete / Génération du Concret GP The Great Party / Le Grand Parti HCCT High Council of Local Authorities / Haut Conseil de Collectivités Territoriales JPA Youth for Turnover / Jeunesse pour l’Alternance LD/MPT Democratic League-Movement for the Workers’ Party / Ligue Démocratique/ Mouvement pour le Parti du Travail ABBREVIATIONS xix

LDR Republican Liberal Democrats / Libéraux Démocrates Républicains/Yessal M23 June 23 Movement / Mouvement du 23 juin MCR Movement for Citizenship and the Republic / Mouvement pour la Citoyenneté et la République MDS/NJ Movement for Democracy and Socialism / Mouvement pour la Démocratie et le Socialisme/Naxx Jarinu MLPS Liberal Movement for the Senegalese People / Mouvement Libéral du Peuple Sénégalais MMD Movement for Multiparty Democracy MNSM Movement of Servants of the Masses / Mouvement National de Serviteurs des Masses MPD/Liggey Movement for Democracy and Work / Mouvement pour la Démocratie/Liggeey MPS People’s Movement for Socialism / Mouvement Populaire Socialiste MRDS Movement for Social and Democratic Reform / Mouvement pour la Réforme Démocratique et Sociale MRS Senegalese Republican Movement / Mouvement Républicain Sénégalais MSU Movement for Socialism and Unity / Mouvement pour le Socialisme et l’Unité OIF International Organization of Francophonie / Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie PAI African Independence Party / Parti Africain de l’Indépendance Parena African Renaissance Party / Parti de la Rénaissance Africaine PCA Chairman of the Board / Président du Conseil d’Administration PCRs Presidents of rural communities / Présidents des Communuautés Rurales PDS Senegalese Democratic Party / Parti Démocratique Sénégalais PDS/R Senegalese Democratic Party/Renewal / Parti Démocratique Sénégalais/Rénovation PEP Party for Hope and Progress / Parti de l’Espoir et du Progrès PETROSEN Senegalese Petroleum Company / Société des Pétroles du Sénégal PF Patriotic Front PH Humanist Party / Parti Humaniste xx ABBREVIATIONS

PIT Party of Independence and Workers / Parti de l’Indépendance et du Travail PLP Party of People’s Liberation / Parti pour la Libération du Peuple PLS Senegalese Liberal Party / Parti Libéral Sénégalais PPC Party for Progress and Citizenship / Parti pour le Progrès et la Citoyenneté PPS Senegalese Popular Party / Parti Populaire Sénégalais PR Reform Party / Parti de la Réforme PRC Party of Renaissance and Citizenship / Parti de la Renaissance et de la Citoyenneté PS Socialist Party / Parti Socialiste PSD/Jant bi Social Democratic Party / Parti Social Démocrate/ Jant bi PSP Senegalese Party of Progress / Parti Sénégalais du Progrès RADDHO African Assembly of Human Rights / Rencontre Africaine pour la Défense des Droits de l’Homme RDS Assembly of Senegalese Democrats / Rassemblement Démocratique Sénégalais RES-Les Verts Senegalese Ecological Assembly- The Greens / Rassemblement Ecologique du Sénégal-Les Verts RND National Democratic Assembly / Rassemblement Nationale Démocratique RPM Rally for Mali / Rassemblement pour le Mali RPS/Jammi Rewmi Senegalese Patriotic Assembly / Union Patriotique Sénégalais/Jammi Rewmi RTA/S Assembly of African Workers – Senegal / Rassemblement des Travailleurs Africains – Sénégal RUP Assembly for Unity and Peace / Rassemblement pour l’Unité et la Paix SDE Senegalese Water Company / Sénégalaise des Eaux SOMICOA Maritime Industrial Society of the West Coast of Africa / Société Maritime et Industrielle de la Côte Occidentale de l’Afrique SUTELEC Single Union of Electrical Workers / Syndicat Unique des Travailleurs de l’Electricité UDF/Mboolo mi Union for Democracy and Federalism / Union pour la Démocratie et le Fédéralisme/Mboolo mi UDFPP Democratic Union of Progressive and Patriotic Forces / Union Démocratique des Forces Progressistes Patriotiques Abbreviations xxi

UFPE Union of Emerging Patriotic Forces / Union des Forces Patriotiques Emergentes UJT Union of Young Laborers / Union des Jeunesses Travaillistes UNDP National Union for Democracy and Progress UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization UNP National Union for the People/Success / Union Nationale pour le Peuple/Tekki UPC United People’s Congress UPR Union for the Republic / Union pour la République UPS Senegalese Progressive Union / Union Progressiste Sénégalais URD Union for Democratic Renewal / Union pour le Rénouveau Démocratique URD/FAL Union for Democratic Renewal/Front for Turnover / Union pour le Rénouveau Démocratique /Front de l’Alternance YAW Path of the People / Yoonu Askan wi List of Figures

Fig. 1.1 Patterns of party proliferation by country 2 Fig. 4.1 Factors shaping party trajectories over time 102 Fig. 5.1 Economic conditions at successful and failed alternations 152 Fig. 6.1 Party label changes over time 187

xxiii List of Tables

Table 3.1 Parties running on their label in national races, by degree of contestation 65 Table 3.2 Presidential co-optation of new parties, 1998–2003 74 Table 4.1 Frequencies of party trajectories by endowment combinations 114 Table 4.2 Frequencies of trajectories of parties with vote-mobilizing potential 117 Table 4.3 List of parties by levels of each endowment 118 Table 4.4 Case studies 119 Table 5.1 Insiders and outsiders with over 5% of the vote, 1993–2012 142 Table 5.2 Features of incumbent re-election and turnover in Senegal 154 Table 6.1 Trajectories of former PDS ministers in mid-2015 184

xxv CHAPTER 1

Introduction: Party Proliferation and Its Consequences in Senegal and Beyond

Political parties are critical for making democracy work. When parties aggregate and represent citizens’ broad-based interests, while also groom- ing capable and appropriate candidates for elected office, they empower citizens to make clear political choices and hold public officials accountable for the governance that they provide. Although multiparty politics is essential for citizens to express preferences about who governs them, too many political parties can dilute the power of the opposition, render vote choices opaque, and erode popular confidence in parties as vehicles of interest articulation and accountability. It is for these reasons that the recent proliferation of registered political parties—both in Senegal and elsewhere in Africa—is important for scholars, policymakers, and practitioners to understand. This book examines the origins and consequences of the proliferation of political parties, a trend that took hold in sub-Saharan Africa after many countries transitioned to multiparty politics in the 1990s. When the Berlin Wall fell, the political and economic support of Western and Soviet powers declined across the continent, leaving many African leaders more vulnerable to domestic popular pressures for regime change. In protests from

The statements and analysis expressed are solely those of the author and have not been approved by the House of Delegates or the Board of Governors of the American Bar Association and do not represent the position or policy of the American Bar Association.

Benin and Mali to Zambia and Gabon, citizens expressed the demand for more freedoms, liberties, and opportunities than they had enjoyed under the military, personalist, and single-party authoritarian regimes that had predominated after independence in the 1960s. In 1989, all but five African regimes were authoritarian, but by 1995, 38 countries had reformed their constitutions to allow for multiparty politics and competitive elections (Bratton and Van de Walle 1997: 7). Since the start of these “democratic experiments,” the number of registered political parties has multiplied— and in some cases, drastically accelerated—in a diverse set of countries with different legacies of conflict, sources of wealth, histories of military and civilian rule, and salience of identity-based political cleavages. By 2010, after 20 or more years of multiparty competition, Cameroon had over 250 parties, Madagascar and Senegal over 150, Burkina Faso, Benin, and Mali over 100, and Mozambique, Malawi, and Kenya approximately 50. By mid-2018, these numbers had climbed even higher, especially in the francophone African cases (Fig. 1.1).1

Fig. 1.1 Patterns of party proliferation by country 1 INTRODUCTION: PARTY PROLIFERATION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES… 3

Party proliferation has persisted long after the founding presidential and legislative elections of each country’s multiparty transition. It is around these transitional elections that democracy and governance experts would expect to see a temporary spike in party formation in response to newfound political opportunities. They would also expect party leaders with unsuccessful electoral performance in the founding elections to learn from their mistakes. In other words, although proliferation is expected during transitions to multipartism, the parties performing poorly are then expected to disappear or fuse with other, more successful parties in subsequent rounds of political contestation. Senegal is a least-likely crucial case of party proliferation because its transition from post-independence authoritarianism to multiparty politics occurred earlier than in most other African countries.2 While most of these countries were authoritarian regimes from independence in the 1960s to the end of the Cold War, Senegal held its first post-independence multiparty presidential elections in 1978, over a decade earlier than its counterparts that transitioned in the early 1990s. Until 1974, President Leopold Sédar Senghor oversaw a de facto single-party authoritarian regime and headed the ruling Socialist Party (PS). However, in that year, Abdoulaye Wade—an aspiring politician who was then a lawyer and university pr ofessor—convinced Senghor to allow him to create the Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS). Subsequently, in 1976, Senghor oversaw the establishment of three ideologically differentiated parties: the PS, which was declared the country’s social democratic party; the PDS, labeled as Senegal’s liberal democratic party; and the African Independence Party (PAI), designated as Marxist. His successor, Abdou Diouf, initiated legislative changes to allow for an unlimited number of parties in 1981. Based on current theories of party behavior after multiparty transitions, Senegal’s longer experience with multiparty politics makes it the place where one might least expect party proliferation to persist and most expect the party system to have consolidated. Yet, by mid-2011, Senegal had 174 registered political parties, a number that had tripled between 2000 and 2010 alone; by mid-2018, there were nearly 300. In Senegal and many other African countries, conventionally cited factors like ideological preferences, formal electoral rules, and social cleavages are not highly correlated with the number of registered parties. Consequently, they cannot fully account for the dynamics of party proliferation (LeBas 2011; Manning 2005; Van de Walle and Butler 1999). Why, then, do so many politicians continue to found parties in Senegal, and why do others choose not to create them? What are the implications of proliferation for party trajectories, presidential turnover, and party loyalty, which each shapes the nature and quality of political contestation? 4 C. L. KELLY

More specifically, why do so many politicians create parties in Senegal? What are the determinants of a consistent opposition party trajectory, as opposed to one of collaboration with incumbents? What explains why ex- regime insiders, rather than regime outsiders, induced presidential turnovers in 2000 and 2012? And how do politicians conceptualize and evaluate their choices to defect or remain loyal to particular parties? This book seeks to answer these core questions in the chapters that follow. These questions are important not only because of their implications for democratization and governance but also because of Senegalese and other African citizens’ interest in answering them. Generally, political science research in the West neglects issues focused on a country’s total number of registered parties. It focuses almost exclusively on the study of parties that run candidates for office or control parliamentary seats. Yet when analysts restrict their view to such parties in countries like Senegal, they ignore other types of parties that provide further insight into the social and political dynamics that shape governance and contestation; this creates an incomplete, if not misleading picture of how patronage distribution, political bargaining, and engagement with the state actually work. Quite contrastingly, the proliferation of registered parties has not escaped the attention of African academics, statespeople, and journalists. They observe with worry and disillusionment that proliferation is accompanied by chronic party switching, social fragmentation, fragile opposition parties and coalitions, and low public trust in political parties and their leaders. As early as 2001, legislators from African countries in the International Organization of Francophonie (Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie, OIF) expressed concern about the consequences of party proliferation for political development, given the parochial nature of many parties that are formed (Abdrahman 2001). Burkinabè analysts have concluded that “the efflorescence of political parties gives voters and citizens the impression that [party] leaders are motivated by lowly material interests, which reduces the collective credibility of the opposition” (CGD- IGD 2009: 17). Cameroonian experts lament the “mushrooming of non-viable political parties” and the “proliferation of ghost parties” that subvert democratization and dilute the “real opposition” (Tandé 2009: 127; Nyamnjoh 2005: 121–122). Some Malian observers note the correlation between proliferation and the prevalence of ephemeral, oversized political coalitions united only by the desire for government posts (Camara 2012: 49), while others claim that the “uncontrolled” creation of parties with low mobilizing capacity reduces the popular legitimacy of political parties as a whole (Sidibé 2015). 1 INTRODUCTION: PARTY PROLIFERATION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES… 5

Similarly, within Senegal, the historian Sémou Pathé Guèye (2003) contends that the proliferation of “parties that have nothing but a name” contributes to the “degradation of pluralist democracy in the eyes of people who don’t feel [parties to be] useful in their everyday life” (181–182). Moustapha Niasse, the current President of Senegal’s National Assembly, remarks that “the Senegalese have created the concept of the ‘telephone booth party,’ a party composed of the wife, the husband, the two children, the cook, and the chauffeur.”3 These are not the “real political parties” needed for coalitions to have “stability, permanence, and political clout” (Sud Quotidien 2015). The political scientist, El Hadji Omar Diop (2011), documents such patterns and their erosion of the “Senegalese democratic myth.” There is also vibrant press coverage of proliferation, with some pieces defending each citizen’s legal prerogative to form a party, but others accusing the parties that result from proliferation of pursuing opportunis- tic self-promotion or of blurring the political landscape and obscuring the ease with which citizens can assess their voting and policymaking choices. Taking these apprehensions seriously, the book examines party proliferation, party trajectories, presidential turnovers, and patterns of party loyalty and defection in contemporary Senegal, which has long been considered a bastion of peaceful, multiparty electoral competition in sub- Saharan Africa. The book first seeks to describe the proliferation of registered parties and understand its sources. Building on these insights, it then analyzes three notable developments in Senegalese politics in the context of party proliferation: the paucity of parties that consistently oppose any given incumbent; the tendency for ex-regime insiders instead of regime outsiders to function as the president’s foremost electoral competitors; and the linkage between party creation and elite defection from existing parties. The results are relevant for scholars, policymakers, and practitioners who are engaged with democracy, rule of law, and governance issues, particularly those that demand a deep understanding of the meanings of party formation, the functions that parties actually serve, and the implications of those realities for the nature of opposition and political contestation. In short, the research concludes that many Senegalese parties are formed for negotiating access to the state rather than for contesting and winning elections. Because a significant subset of parties is formed primarily for negotiating patronage, parties rarely become the consistent, long-term opposition organizations purported to bolster democracy and accountability. These realities contrast to some extent with canonical accounts of political parties, which depict them as teams of ambitious 6 C. L. KELLY

politicians who pool resources and coordinate competition for elected office and who remain outside of government to critique it if they do not win (Aldrich 1995; Downs 1957; Duverger 1963). In research on consolidated democracies, parties are critical components of good governance because they aggregate and represent citizens’ broad-based interests and thereby empower citizens to hold public officials accountable (Key1964 ; Lipset 2000; Schattschneider 1942). However, parties are often created for different, non-electoral reasons in competitive authoritarian regimes and thus do not always oppose incumbents in the ways that classic theories predict. As in Senegal, most places with party proliferation began experiencing it under competitive authoritarian regimes, in which presidents and politicians made decisions about party-building that reflected neither fully democratic nor fully authoritarian constraints on their political behavior. This regime type emerged after the Cold War ended, when “the disappearance of competing Western security interests…brought a sharp increase in external democratizing pressure” and made African leaders more vulnerable to popular protests for political reform (Levitsky and Way 2010b: 236).4 On the uneven playing field, a hallmark of competitive authoritarianism, presidents enjoy a degree of incumbency advantage that surpasses what is typical in democracies. With systematic and deep advantages relative to the opposition in “access to state institutions, resources, and the media,” presidents can weaken their political competition by depriving opponents of state resources, controlling the media to hinder opposition coverage and access, and overseeing the politicized application of the law (Levitsky and Way 2010a, b: 9–12). This not only empowers the president to create incentives for proliferation if he so chooses; it also renders survival in the opposition so financially difficult that many politicians are constrained—or even motivated—to form parties that are primarily patronage-oriented rather than primarily election-oriented. Party creation thereby becomes no longer just a tool for the few, lucky politicians with the capacity to attract the financial and human capital necessary to win elections; it also serves as an outlet for less prosperous politicians who lack these resources to lobby for access to the state. The purposes of political parties in turn shape various aspects of political contestation, including party trajectories into the ruling coalition or the opposition, presidential turnover, and politicians’ decisions about party loyalty. When parties are formed for negotiating access to the state rather than for winning elections, they rarely become the consistent, 1 INTRODUCTION: PARTY PROLIFERATION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES… 7 long- term opposition parties that bolster democracy. Party leaders are reliant on personal resources for party-building on the uneven playing field; few have the resources to become serious enough competitors with the president to judge it worthwhile to bear the costs of regularly running against him in the hope of someday defeating him. Given the paucity of opposition parties that consistently remain outside of government under any given president, ex-regime insiders—defined as politicians who have accessed state resources through ministerial appointments—have amplified advantages as opposition candidates for the presidency, especially if they have used their prior access to the state to build the clout and capital needed to compete seriously on the uneven playing field. The ease with which certain ex-insiders have formed their own organizations and won elected posts reinforces temptations for elites to defect from existing parties and break out on their own. The remainder of the introduction presents the book’s contributions to knowledge about party-building and democratization in greater depth (Sect. 1.1), situates Senegal as a case of competitive authoritarian party- building (Sect. 1.2), and provides an overview of the study’s methodology (Sect. 1.3) and research design (Sect. 1.4).

1.1 What the Book Argues Focused on the end of the Abdou Diouf presidency (1992–2000) and the Abdoulaye Wade presidency (2000–2012), the book argues that the proliferation of primarily patronage-oriented parties and the paucity of consistent opposition parties are patterns that Diouf and Wade used the uneven playing field to sustain, if not amplify, during competitive authoritarian rule. Under Macky Sall, party proliferation and inconsistent opposition have endured, first under several years of democratizing reforms and now during a period of relative retrenchment.5 The book’s analysis covers politicians and parties from all three presidencies, but concentrates on the Wade era, when competitive authoritarianism was arguably at its height. Beyond its usefulness for understanding political dynamics within Senegal, the influence of competitive authoritarianism on party-building is worth analyzing due to the sheer number of African countries that have fallen into that regime category since the start of post-Cold War “democratic experiments.” Of the 47 countries in Bratton & Van de Walle’s study, 37 were not full-fledged democracies by the end of 2012.6 Eighteen African countries were in Freedom House’s “partly free” category, which 8 C. L. KELLY signals the presence of many aspects of the uneven playing field that characterizes competitive authoritarian rule. In addition, 14 of the 35 countries that were deemed by Levitsky & Way as competitive authoritarian by 1995 were African. By analyzing specific aspects of the Senegalese party system during a prolonged period of competitive authoritarianism, the forthcoming chapters are designed to propose explanations for party formation, defection, trajectories, and turnover in and of themselves, as well as to explore how competitive authoritarianism has contributed to or reified those patterns. Each set of conclusions should thus be considered as hypothesis- generating, helping to further theorize prominent patterns in contemporary Senegalese party politics that experts have also observed but not yet explained in several other African countries.

Party Creation Can Serve Non-electoral Purposes The book first documents the prominence of parties with leaders who are neither election-oriented nor promoters of policies that advance particular ideologies or special interests. Although Senegal has various parties that contest elections and attempt to forge stable constituencies among voters, party creation is more consistently an expedient way to access state resources than a means of regular electoral contestation. Parties are often the expression of the ambition of a single politician, whose organization consists of the politician’s family, friends, and neighbors who are socially and materially invested in his success. The founder and his followers tend to seek advancement through the politician’s ability to negotiate access to the state, whether through a plum job, material benefits from the ruling entourage, or greater proximity to the ruling party’s network of cadres able to solve personal problems. As previously mentioned, the proliferation of such parties contrasts with the fundamentally election-oriented organizations depicted in the classic literature on party development. Downs (1957) holds that parties originate out of ambitious politicians’ need to pool their resources and form teams to facilitate winning elected office; politicians create parties in order to better organize election campaigns, develop linkages to constituents to increase the likelihood of re-election, and aggregate preferences to propose legislation in a timely manner (Aldrich 1995). Senegal, in contrast, has a significant subset of parties that are not formed by leaders primarily for regular electoral competition. Perhaps the most telling evidence 1 INTRODUCTION: PARTY PROLIFERATION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES… 9 of the primacy of patronage negotiation over vote-maximization is that by about six months before the 2012 presidential elections, only 43 of the 174 registered parties had ever run on their own labels for seats in the National Assembly or for the presidency. In other words, three-quarters of Senegal’s parties were not behaving according to Downs’ model. Even for realists expecting to observe some divergence between parties’ actual and stylized functions of parties, this disparity is large.7 Through these arguments, the book lends further credence to the claim that party behavior in non-democracies is not always vote-maximizing (Levitsky and Way 2010b; Mainwaring 2003; Riedl and Lupu 2013; Van de Walle 2007). However, the research herein also considers the fates of all types of registered parties, which makes the book distinctive from many other studies in political science and economics. The latter tend to be based on measures of the effective number of parties (ENP) competing in elections or holding seats in parliament, which are weighted by the amount of the vote that each party garnered in an election or by the percentage of seats won in parliament (Laasko and Taagepera 1979).8 These measures are useful for understanding the relative electoral strength among the parties that compete on their own labels in elections or gain legislative representation. However, ENP has its drawbacks too. It masks qualitative variation in the range of party types (Bogaards 2004: 186) and provides a limited summary of Senegal’s fluid party system, where parties can become major players quickly and disappear from the electoral arena just as fast (Resnick 2013). ENP is useful for studying politics in its electoral form, but understanding political contestation in Senegal requires analyzing much more than just the electoral outcomes of party activity. Because many Senegalese parties are active in politics even if they do not contest or win elections, their persistence suggests that they represent ambition for other political, economic, and social advantages; similarly, a variety of parties that have participated only once in elections—and some that did not perform very well in them—have leaders who have been appointed to the government. The interest and willingness of Senegalese presidents to entertain these party leaders’ claims on the state indicate that electoral success is just one of several factors shaping patronage negotiation and political ascension. ENP is problematic in this setting because it ignores the legal and political presence of parties that choose not to run in elections, even if they influence governance and political contestation in other ways.9 Focusing instead on the total number of legally recognized parties allows 10 C. L. KELLY us to examine the full range of partisan actors: those that become major electoral players and those that do not. If we abandon the premise that parties are election-oriented, and if we inductively study whether creating a party advances a founder’s political goals both within and outside of the electoral sphere, then we get a more complete and accurate picture of how patronage distribution, political bargaining, and politicians’ engagement with the state work.

Party Trajectories Often Entail Collaboration, Not Opposition The logics of party formation and proliferation affect longer-term party trajectories. Opposition parties are generally characterized as vehicles for voicing alternatives to the ideas and policies that incumbents propose, serving as counterweights to the ruling party and fostering accountability and government responsiveness to citizens (Grzymala-Busse 2007; Lipset 2000; Stepan 2007). Opposition parties are expected to rival those in government and “present a viable alternative to the political status quo,” even if the opposition more generally does not always coalesce (Arriola 2012: 5; LeBas 2011). But in Senegal, few of the political parties formed since the start of proliferation engaged in trajectories of consistent opposition throughout the Wade presidency. Instead, many parties have collaborated with the president even when their support to the ruling coalition was not necessary to form a government or constitute a legislative majority.10 The book demonstrates that party founders’ capacities and decisions to pursue consistent opposition are shaped by the degree and type of resources they possess to overcome structural disadvantages on the uneven playing field. Party leaders rarely possess the endowments that together foster the pursuit of consistent opposition trajectories—namely, prior experience as either high-level state administrators or national-level civil society figures, and access to international sources of private financing. With experience as state administrators or national civil society figures, party leaders can market themselves as capable replacements to incumbents. With access to international private financing, they can compete for office using the clientelist strategies that citizens expect of serious candidates. For the few party leaders with both endowments, the prize of the presidency is so large, and their potential to win it is serious enough, that consistent opposition is an attractive long-term pursuit. Overall, these insights complement findings that private sector resources of party leaders, as well as party ideology and institutionalization, shape the opposition’s 1 INTRODUCTION: PARTY PROLIFERATION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES… 11 coordination against incumbents in specific elections and the electoral coalition choices of parties in single contests (Arriola 2012; Bogaards 2014; Wahman 2014). However, the literature has thus far overlooked the role that international private financing specifically can play in shaping consistent opposition, particularly in combination with a party leader’s state or civil society experience.

Ex-regime Insiders Induce Turnover The previous findings raise an additional question: if consistent opposition parties are rare and the uneven playing field handicaps them, then why did Senegal have presidential turnovers in 2000 and 2012? Africanist scholarship has already identified economic crisis, opposition coalescence, patronage scarcity in the ruling party, and presidential death or resignation as structural factors that increase prospects for turnover in all kinds of regimes with multiparty competition (Cheeseman 2010; Reuter and Gandhi 2010; Van de Walle 2006). However, there are few systematic accounts of who the agents of turnover are and how their behavior fosters it. To begin filling these gaps in the case of Senegal, the book shows that politicians who have accessed state resources through ministerial appointments, known as “ex-regime insiders,” were the most serious electoral challengers in Senegal’s 1993, 2000, 2007, and 2012 presidential elections. Politicians who are insiders before emerging as opponents have opportunities to access state resources—including salaries, media exposure, control over low-level state employment, and opportunities to network with well-resourced elites—that can help them attain the financial capital and political credibility needed to outperform outsider presidential candidates.11 Although insider advantage does not ensure turnover, those who make the most of it have plausible chances of defeating incumbents. These dynamics correspond to a paradoxical political reality: former government collaborators, rather than the committed outsiders conventionally defined as the opposition, are often the ones who defeat incumbent presidents. This was the case when Macky Sall, an ex-PDS elite, defeated Abdoulaye Wade in 2012; it was also the case when Abdoulaye Wade, a participant in the enlarged presidential majority governments in the 1990s, defeated Abdou Diouf in 2000. However, to fully differentiate the turnovers of 2000 and 2012 from incumbent re-elections of 1993 and 2007, we must also consider two relatively contingent factors: prolonged uncertainty about succession within the ruling party (which 12 C. L. KELLY increases former insiders’ chances of attracting the support of former colleagues), and the leading ex-insider’s resistance to the president’s attempts to co-opt him right before the campaign (which helps ex-insiders brand themselves as genuine alternatives to the incumbent).

Party Defection Fuels Further Party Creation The rise and fall of the PDS as the ruling party provides further insight into the dynamics of party loyalty, party defection, and party creation in Senegal. The PDS began in 1974 as a “party of contribution” to the ruling PS. It made history in the 2000 presidential elections when its leader, Abdoulaye Wade, defeated Abdou Diouf and ended 40 years of PS rule. Now, the PDS is one of Senegal’s most popular opposition parties. Yet despite the PDS’s considerable historical legacy and nationwide implantation, it has constantly grappled with the challenges of preventing defection. Structurally, Senegal lacks the ideologically polarized party system, high legal and bureaucratic costs of party creation, and strongly enforced internal party rules that foster party loyalty. Most Senegalese parties also lack the inclusive candidate selection procedures that rein in incentives for defection (Doorenspleet and Nijzink 2013; LeBas 2011; Mac Giollabhuí 2011). Personal, cultural, and contextual factors also shape how PDS elites understand and evaluate their “exit, voice, and loyalty” options (Hirschman 1970). Over time, PDS elites have weighed various push and pull factors in determining whether to remain loyal to the PDS, form a new party, join an existing party, or leave party politics altogether. Ideational and affective factors played significant roles in all periods. In addition, low levels of internal democracy in the PDS and Wade’s selective application of party rules became salient sources of grievance that fostered various forms of defection, especially after 2000, when PDS leaders prioritized running the state over maintaining the party. During Wade’s presidency, the party continually delayed internal elections, the Directing Committee became too unwieldy to shape the party’s direction, and Wade increasingly favored his son and his son’s supporters in the party and the government. Under these conditions, the value of exit increased relative to the potential gains of using voice within the party to express discontent about its inner workings. PDS politicians increasingly came to use party creation both as a means of permanent exit from the PDS as well as a tool for attempting to use voice unconventionally, outside of the PDS, to negotiate a return to the party on better terms. 1 INTRODUCTION: PARTY PROLIFERATION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES… 13

1.2 Why Senegal Is a Critical Case of Party-Building Senegal under Diouf (1981–2000) and Wade (2000–2012) is a critical case of party-building under competitive authoritarianism. As subsequent chapters illustrate in more detail, party proliferation became a noticeable pattern in Senegal around 1998, at the end of the Diouf presidency, and accelerated throughout the Wade presidency. Despite Senegal’s reputation as one of Africa’s oldest electoral democracies, it was arguably a competitive authoritarian regime during this period according to the procedural minimum criteria for democracy. Minimalist definitions classify countries as democratic if they have multiparty elections; electoral definitions are less permissive, requiring multiparty elections that are regularized, free, and fair. The procedural minimum definition of democracy requires both free and fair elections and the respect of civil liberties and fundamental freedoms (Dahl 1971).12 Although not explicitly part of this definition of democracy, the absence of an uneven playing field is also constitutive of the procedural minimum conditions obtaining (Levitsky and Way 2010b). Competitive authoritarian regimes may exhibit some but not all of the procedural minimum qualities of democracy due to an uneven playing field, which gives the ruling party systemic and deep advantages in its “access to state institutions, resources, and the media” and makes opposition more structurally difficult than in democracies (Levitsky and Way2010a : 58). Senegal has been a minimalist democracy since it held competitive, multiparty elections from 1978 onward and several prominent scholars applying a variety of stricter standards have labeled Senegal under Diouf and Wade a “full-fledged electoral democracy” (Gellar2005 : 156) and a “clientelist democracy” (Beck 2008). This book argues that Senegal only partially met procedural minimum standards of democracy in the 1990s and 2000s, and was instead best characterized as competitive authoritarian at the time. In that period, the degree of election transparency fluctuated, civil liberties were not consistently respected, and an uneven playing field significantly constrained the opposition. There was modest progression toward democracy based on these standards under Diouf, whereas Wade’s presidency brought about multiple, serious regressions of sufficient degree and gravity to question the evenness of the playing field. Although democracy is undoubtedly best conceived as a “process rather than an event” (Villalón 1994), Senegal between 1992 and 2012 was arguably in a more competitive authoritarian stage of that process. 14 C. L. KELLY

Under Diouf, even as Senegal made some significant reforms in terms of free and fair elections starting with a democratic electoral code in 1992, certain competitive authoritarian practices persisted. Consensually elabo- rated by government and opposition leaders, the 1992 electoral code established a secret ballot, expanded voting rights to the diaspora and 18-to-21-year-olds, required the use of ballot boxes and indelible ink for the vote, allowed party representatives to be present at the polls, guaranteed equal media access to all candidates, and established a national ballot- counting commission, among other reforms (Kanté 1994). However, the elections that followed were freer, but not always fair. The 1993 presidential election was a “small step forward,” but not a “definitive transition from quasi-democracy to democracy” (Villalón 1994: 192). Moreover, the “the political playing field was not entirely level in that the PS retained control over the state apparatus that legislated, administered, and adjudi- cated the electoral process” (Beck 2008: 64). Difficulties in preventing electoral fraud persisted into the late 1990s as the ruling PS stalled negotiations with the opposition for a more independent electoral commission (Fall 2011). Under Wade, electoral integrity improved, but the president used the uneven playing field to shape elections to his advantage. Senegal’s major opposition parties accused the ruling party of fraud after Wade’s re- election in 2007; rigorous statistical tests also suggest that it was likely (Beber and Scacco 2012). The opposition ended up boycotting the 2007 National Assembly elections after Wade manipulated the electoral calendar twice and there had been no independent audit of the electoral register after its reconstruction for biometric voter registration.13 In the domain of civil liberties, including freedom of speech, assembly, and association, violations of procedural minimum standards occurred under Diouf and even more significantly under Wade. Under Diouf, several major opponents were arrested and jailed when they protested about political issues. For instance, after the 1993 National Assembly elections, Moustapha Sy, the young leader of the Moustarchidine religious movement, was detained on vague charges of posing threats to public order; and in 1994, “public meetings and rallies were regularly forbidden as the government sought to curtail the activities of both the opposition and the Moustarchidine movement” (Villalón and Kane 1998: 144, 150). Under Wade, the government violated the civil liberties of journalists and opposition politicians on several occasions. Perhaps the most extreme case was the near-deadly attack in 2003 on opposition party leader, Talla Sylla, 1 INTRODUCTION: PARTY PROLIFERATION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES… 15 by thugs allegedly employed by the PDS. After Sylla went to France for medical treatment and returned to Senegal, the PDS used its legislative supermajority to pass the Ezzan Law, providing amnesty for all political crimes committed between 1983 and 2004 (Kelly 2012). More typical violations of civil liberties included President Wade’s use of the Division of Criminal Investigation (DIC) as a “political force” to intimidate opposition politicians (Mbow 2008: 163),14 the ongoing harassment of journalists,15 and the administration’s violent suppression of pre-electoral protests in 2007, 2011, and 2012. Freedom of the press was intermittently threatened as well. As of 1993, the electoral code guaranteed equality of access to the state media during election campaigns. However, the state did not establish an independent regulatory authority until 1998 (Fall 2011: 175). Opposition access to media improved as the number of private media outlets grew, but it remained skewed in favor of the ruling party both before and after alternance (Diop 2013; Gellar 2005). As the private media further expanded under Wade, the government censored controversial political writing, intermittently shut down private newspapers and radio stations, and harassed journalists (Havard 2004; Loum 2013). In general, Wade’s administration targeted “troublemaking politicians, public figures, and journalists” with “a range of legal measures such as temporary closure of newspapers, suing for libel or for threatening the security of the state (according to Article 80 of the Penal Code) and police investigations” (Dahou and Foucher 2009: 28).16 Finally, Senegalese politics took place on an uneven playing field during both presidencies. Access to state resources was so skewed in favor of the ruling party that many opposition parties had trouble surviving without collaborating with the president. Each president enjoyed discretionary powers to create and destroy government institutions that he could pack with sympathizers, thereby multiplying his allies’ advantages and further weakening the opposition. For instance, in the late 1990s, Diouf used the ruling party’s supermajority in the National Assembly to create the Senate, a body that is two-thirds appointed, to distribute more patronage to PS supporters and increase party cohesion. Wade also used packable institutions filled largely through executive appointment to meet patronage needs. To these ends, he created the Council for the Republic for Economic and Social Affairs (Conseil de la République pour les Affaires Economiques et Sociales, CRAES) in 2004, revived the Senate in 2007, and converted the CRAES into the Economic and Social Council in 2008. 16 C. L. KELLY

The judiciary also depended on the executive branch in ways that skewed the playing field. Regarding election disputes, “in nearly every instance in which the opposition went to court before 2000…to contest alleged election irregularities, the courts invariably rejected these claims.” Under Wade, the judiciary “remained subordinated to the president who nominated all judges and to the Minister of Justice…who was responsible for taking the lead in prosecuting criminal cases” (Gellar 2005: 159). Wade controlled the salary, perks, and appointments of all five appointments to the Constitutional Council, which was legally permitted to pro- nounce on the constitutionality of Wade’s controversial decision to run for a third term in 2012 and decided in his favor. More generally, as well, Wade skewed the playing field by using state resources to recruit, reward, and retain a vast set of collaborators. In comparative perspective, Senegal under Diouf and Wade exhibited fewer autocratic attributes and more democratic attributes than many other cases of competitive authoritarianism in Africa, like Cameroon, Gabon, or Kenya. Given these relative differences, Senegal under Diouf and Wade was thus one of Africa’s competitive authoritarian regimes that was most likely to exhibit patterns of party-building that are common in democracies. Theoretically, it is a least-likely crucial case of party proliferation and a most-likely crucial case of consistent opposition, yet in reality, it exhibits a great deal of party creation—as well a paucity of parties that pursued consistent opposition trajectories—in the period under study.

A Least-Likely Crucial Case of Proliferation Senegal’s sequence of political development and the timing of its transition to multipartism make the country a least-likely case of proliferation. In early modern Europe and North America, the confluence of economic development with political liberalization, as well as the sequencing of this liberalization (with the advent of multiparty competition preceding the extension of universal suffrage), yielded institutionalized and consolidated party systems (Shefter 1977). Industrialization did not accompany these political changes in Senegal and other African countries. However, unlike most of its African counterparts, Senegal did follow the Western sequencing of liberalization, with a period of multiparty competition among an exclusive elite under French colonial rule prior to the extension of mass suffrage. In 1848, the French colonial administration extended citizenship to all long-term residents of Senegal’s Four Communes, the urban com- 1 INTRODUCTION: PARTY PROLIFERATION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES… 17 munities of Dakar, Saint-Louis, Rufisque, and Gorée. While residents of other parts of French West Africa remained colonial subjects who were disenfranchised, Africans from the Four Communes gained the right to vote in multiparty elections for the French National Assembly.17 Senegal thus had significant experience with competitive elections among a small urban elite when, nearly a century later, the French colonizers extended mass suffrage in 1946 and reinforced it thereafter. Furthermore, as mentioned previously, Senegal shifted to multiparty politics in 1978, about a decade earlier than many other African countries that did so in the early 1990s. Senegal has since developed a party system that is quite fluid, but still more institutionalized than that in counterparts like Benin, Mali, and Zambia (Kuenzi and Lambright 2001; Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Riedl 2014). Given Senegal’s extra decade of multiparty competition, it is one of the places where we would least expect parties to remain so numerous if proliferation is supposed to spike but then fall after founding elections.18 Senegal is thus also a place where we would expect most politicians to have incentives to build their careers within the set of parties that already have the social and financial capital to compete regularly in elections. Analyzing proliferation in Senegal, a least-likely case, will help to identify some of the sources and mechanisms of party formation that are likely to be the strongest and apply across other African countries in which proliferation is theoretically less surprising.

A Most-Likely Crucial Case of Consistent Opposition Senegal is also a most-likely crucial case of consistent opposition based on its institutions: many consistent opposition parties were expected under Diouf and Wade because until 2012, the president’s party had always controlled a parliamentary majority on its own and did not need other parties to form a government. Under these conditions, opposition parties are expected to resist co-optation or collaboration with the ruling party and to serve repeat- edly as counterweights to incumbents by monitoring, critiquing, and challenging them. Yet in practice, while there are dozens of parties that run on their own label against any given president at least once, fewer parties persist in this across multiple consecutive elections or an entire presidency. By identifying factors that explain various party trajectories in a place where consistent opposition is less common than expected, the research generates an explanation that works even in the case where divergence between theoretical expectations and reality is potentially the hardest to explain. 18 C. L. KELLY

1.3 Methodology The research employs interdisciplinary approaches. Several theories and methodologies used in the study come from comparative politics (the author’s core discipline), but they are combined with other ideas and techniques from political economy, anthropology, and history. This framework is used, in turn, to answer theoretically relevant questions that are also of practical concern in Senegal. Many conclusions drawn in the book are based on data collected during 18 months of fieldwork in Senegal between 2010 and 2015, including during the 2012 presidential and National Assembly elections. Through the fieldwork, the author consulted a rich set of primary and secondary sources to gather information about party leaders’ backgrounds, political experiences, and resources, as well as parties’ purposes, behavior, and relationship to government and opposition. The interdisciplinary and field-intensive approach serves three principal purposes. The first is to produce an ethnographic account of why so many politicians create their own parties and what purposes they and other politicians see these organizations serving. The second is to use descriptive analysis and comparative case studies to explain party formation, party trajectories, presidential turnover, and elite choices about party loyalty and defection. The third is to use the subnational study of politicians and parties in Senegal to generate hypotheses about party-building that are worth testing elsewhere in Africa. Often, the advancement of these goals hinged upon gathering qualitative data through semi-structured interviews that the author conducted in French and Wolof with approximately 175 Senegalese politicians, government officials, journalists, and activists. It also required processing archival materials from government institutions, parties, and politicians’ personal papers. Three of the most notable elements of the field-based materials include comprehensive information on all parties that formed within a particular time frame (1998–2003); an original dataset on those parties that captures their behavior over all five national elections spanning the Wade presidency; and detailed information from party and government documents about the party membership patterns of former ruling party (PDS) elites with ministerial experience.

1.4 Plan of the Book The book has six additional chapters. Chapter 2 situates the project and its claims in political science theories of party formation, party-building, and democratization. The chapter illustrates that party proliferation initially 1 INTRODUCTION: PARTY PROLIFERATION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES… 19 took hold during a phase of Senegalese politics that was competitive authoritarian. It explains how competitive authoritarian regime dynamics can enhance our current understanding of the purposes and behavior of Senegalese parties, particularly on the uneven playing field maintained by Presidents Diouf and Wade. Finally, it describes how the book’s arguments about Senegal improve or refine extant theories, findings, and assumptions about party politics, which tend to focus on either democracies or fully authoritarian regimes. Chapter 3 describes patterns of party formation in Senegal and addresses the sources of party formation and proliferation. It presents an in-depth account of the logics of party creation among a chronological subset of politicians who contributed to Senegal’s initial acceleration in party formation. The research features information acquired through primary source, semi- structured interviews that the author conducted in French and in Wolof with all 46 people whose parties were registered between 1998 and 2003, the six years surrounding Senegal’s first presidential turnover in 2000.19 Several vignettes of party creation illustrate the rarity of parties that regularly compete in national elections on Senegal’s uneven playing field. The vignettes also trace the logics of pre- and post-alternance party formation. They are bolstered by analysis of the types and frequencies of new parties’ electoral activity and performance, as well as by their leaders’ backgrounds and declared motivations. Interviews with additional party founders, politicians, intellectuals, human rights advocates, trade unionists, and journalists— with material from research in government, party, and personal archives, local newspaper coverage, and political biographies—expand and verify the information provided by founders in the sample. Chapter 4 explores how and to what extent party leaders’ levels of state or civil society experience and international private financing correspond to the tendencies of their organizations to engage in consistent opposition, tactical alliances, or full-fledged co-optation. The research is based on information from an original dataset that captures party behavior over all five national elections spanning the Wade presidency, including the coalition choices and electoral behavior of all 46 parties created between 1998 and 2003, the number of years of state or civil society experience that the leader of each party had prior to creating the organization, and the level of international private financing that primary and secondary sources estimate that each leader possesses. Eighteen months of fieldwork in Senegal yielded information from interviews, local newspaper coverage, party statistics on the retention of key elites, political biographies, and official rosters solicited from party and coalition administrators. Descriptive 20 C. L. KELLY statistical analysis of all 46 sampled parties attests to the correlation between party leader endowments of experience and financing on the one hand, and long-term party trajectories on the other. Comparative case studies of parties that exhibit a wide range of levels of experience and financing reveal the ways in which party leaders’ different combinations of endowments shape their response to the built-in incentives to collaborate with the president on the uneven playing field. Ultimately, the analysis demonstrates how party leaders’ resource endowments, political networks, and initial patterns of electoral participation interact to shape the longer- term series of strategic decisions they make across elections. Chapter 5 identifies both structural and contingent factors that explain Senegal’s two presidential turnovers in 2000 and 2012; each occurred despite the paucity of consistent opposition parties in the contemporary party system and was achieved by an ex-regime insider. The chapter first compares the political biographies and electoral performance of several insider and outsider presidential candidates in order to articulate why insiders can often compete more seriously with the incumbent and create real potential for turnover. Relying on local newspaper coverage of the campaigns, official reports about each election’s conduct, and secondary research including ample Senegalese sources, it then characterizes how structural and contingent factors related to insiders’ candidacy and behavior played out before Senegal’s last four presidential elections. The conditions in place before turnover (2000 and 2012) differed from those observed before races resulting in incumbent re-election (1993 and 2007). The analysis of insiders’ emergence and their subsequent oppositional behavior augments our understanding of electoral competition in the context of patronage-based ruling parties like the PS and the PDS. The chapter also documents how proliferation and inconsistent opposition continue under President Sall, who initiated democratic reforms but is now arguably in the process of overseeing democratic retrenchment, if not a competitive authoritarian resurgence in Senegal. This pattern persists despite reforms that reduced the scope of the uneven playing field, especially in the first years of Sall’s presidency. In this way, legacies of the recent competitive authoritarian past still shape party politics. Chapter 6 applies the concepts of exit, voice, and loyalty developed by the economist, Albert Hirschman, to contextualize defections from the PDS before and after Wade’s defeat in 2012. To shed further light on how Senegalese politicians evaluate and enact the concepts of party loyalty and party switching, the chapter first traces the evolution of underlying incen- 1 INTRODUCTION: PARTY PROLIFERATION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES… 21 tives for exit, voice, and loyalty during the party’s foundational phase in opposition (1974–2000), its presidential phase (2000–2012), and its return to opposition (2012–present). It subsequently examines party membership patterns among all current and former PDS elites with ministerial experience, quantifying trends in loyalty and defection among some of the party’s most privileged members. The relevant dataset is based on information from PDS members who are critical to the party’s institutional memory, official documentation of ministerial appointments, and archival documents. The chapter closes with case studies of the loyalty and defection choices of former ministers, legislators, mayors, regional and local party leaders, and people who belonged to party institutions like the National Secretariat and the Directing Committee. Each case study seeks to account for the ways that various individual, personal factors interacted with the enforcement of party rules and procedures to influence people’s decisions about party loyalty and defection. The work marshals information from archives, local newspapers, books by local analysts, and over 20 semi-structured interviews that the author conducted with current and former PDS elites in mid-2015. Chapter 7 provides concluding insights on the relationship between parties and democratization in Senegal, reviewing the conclusions drawn in preceding chapters. The conclusion places these insights from Senegal into comparative perspective, discussing where beyond Senegal it would be productive to explore the book’s hypotheses about party formation, opposition trajectories, ruling party loyalty, and presidential turnover. It also summarizes the policy implications of the research, describing how the book’s findings have the potential to enhance the approaches taken by domestic policymakers, foreign diplomats, and international development practitioners concerned with democracy, rule of law, and governance issues in countries like Senegal. Tying together various parts of the research, the conclusion then explains why party proliferation in Senegal has neither definitively fostered nor structurally impeded democratization as of the time of writing, December 2018.

Notes 1. The party registration statistics for these countries were available via government websites, newspapers, or secondary publications devoted to the issue. See AfriMAP 2009; Africa Confidential 2014; Benin Ministry of Interior 2007; CMD 2012; CGD-IGD 2009; Diatta 2018; Diop 2006, 2011; 22 C. L. KELLY

Investir en zone franc n.d.; MATCL 2011; Madagascar Ministry of Interior 2014; Diop 2011 and additional tracking of party registration statistics from the Ministry of Interior; Svasand 2014; Tandé 2009; UNDP 2003. 2. For more on least-likely and most-likely crucial cases, see Gerring 2007 (89). 3. Interview with Moustapha Niasse, 7/21/15, Dakar. 4. Presidents, who had extensive and relatively unchecked control over state resources, could often temper the transition, moving their country toward but not to democracy. 5. Chapters 5 and 7 provide additional analysis of democracy under President Sall. 6. There are multiple viable datasets for measuring democracy, including Polity IV, V-Dem, the Freedom House Freedom in the World index. Freedom House 2013 (with 2012 as year of review) data was used to generate the cursory glance provided here. Ten African countries of the 47 that Bratton & Van de Walle studied were “free.” 7. For instance, Gazibo (2006) expects some degree of divergence, but asserts that analyzing the “…dynamics of alliances, fusion, and often the process of scission that leads to the proliferation of parties and coalitions” is critical for a deeper understanding of party politics in Africa (19). 8. In Senegal, the acceleration in the number of legally registered parties has not been accompanied by a constant upward trend in the effective number of parties. After the adoption of a democratic electoral code in 1992, ENP fluctuated but stayed within the range of 2 and 3 for six elections, and only surpassed the 1–3 zone indicative of a dominant party system in the 2012 presidential race. This provides further evidence that the total number and effective number of parties do not capture the same features of party politics. 9. Measures of electoral volatility are also useful for studying how new entrants and established players in the electoral sphere influence the nature of the party system. However, these measures also focus on the organizations that are already in the electoral arena and are therefore subject to critiques similar to those of ENP. 10. Chapters 2 and 4 cover the president’s strategic interaction with party leaders in greater detail. In a nutshell, presidents seek to fragment and destabilize the opposition in order to ensure their re-election, but presidents in competitive authoritarian regimes are constrained in the amount of repression they can use and often also use positive inducements to incentivize opponents to collaborate. Ideally, the president would permanently co-opt the leaders of the parties that are most electorally threatening, but she is not always successful because those parties often have some resource endowments that help them resist co-optation. Presidents thus tend to 1 INTRODUCTION: PARTY PROLIFERATION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES… 23

target party leaders with a variety of goals, resource endowments, and vote-mobilizing capabilities who react differently to the president’s attempts at co-optation and generate variation in party trajectories. 11. Lucan Way (2005) originally identified these mechanisms in the post- communist context; the book uses them as guiding hypotheses for Senegal. 12. Dahl (1971) provides eight criteria that essentially boil down to free and fair multiparty competition, the protection of civil liberties, and mechanisms for democratic accountability. 13. Wade formally postponed them for flood-related reasons and administrative concerns, but was suspected of postponing for his own political gain. 14. For example, Wade used the DIC to interrogate opposition party leaders like Amath Dansokho and Jean-Paul Dias. In 2005, police also arrested Idrissa Seck’s deputy, Yankhoba Diattara, for organizing anti-Wade rallies during the President’s visit to Thiès, Seck’s hometown and stronghold. 15. In 2006 and 2007 alone, “the DIC beat two journalists who had published speculations about the president’s ‘nighttime whereabouts’; police arrested one journalist who wrote about Senegal’s high cost of living and another who wrote about Wade buying a limousine; and the state shut down a newspaper that published stories about the involvement of Karim Wade, the president’s son, in corruption scandals.” (Kelly 2012: 124). 16. The government also banned Abdou Latif Coulibaly’s Wade, un opposant au pouvoir: L’alternance piégée? (Dakar: Editions Sentinelles, 2003), which detailed the Wade regime’s abuses. 17. Five percent of the population had these citizenship rights before World War II. Although competitive elections were confined to the Four Communes in the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth century, plural associational life spread to the hinterlands before the advent of mass suffrage (Gellar 2005: 40). 18. At the very least, we would expect the number of parties to plateau if leaders of electorally unsuccessful parties do not deregister them but instead abandon them to join more successful parties in subsequent elections. However, this does not appear to be the case. For instance, of the 46 chronological parties sought, 43 remained politically active in 2011–12. 19. For several politicians who were either deceased or difficult to meet, the author interviewed a close colleague or family member in the party. Several founders were not trackable, but local newspaper reporting provided partial information about them and their parties. No founders were entirely unidentifiable; all were active in Ministry of Interior meetings about the electoral code as late as 2004–2006 or were known by Senegalese journalists or politicians. 24 C. L. KELLY

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Theories of Party-Building: Africa, Competitive Authoritarianism, and Democracy

The book’s arguments about party formation and behavior in Senegal expand upon insights from two literatures, one on competitive authoritarianism and another on party-building and party functions in developing countries. The central argument is that many Senegalese parties are primarily concerned not with competing in elections, as most research on party-building assumes, but instead with patronage negotiation, which does not necessarily entail vote-seeking. It often involves contesting elections erratically at best while negotiating non-elected posts and material or financial benefits from the president. When parties are formed for negotiating access to the state rather than for winning elections, they rarely become the consistent, long-term opposition parties thought to fortify democracy and generate accountability. The uneven playing field, a hallmark of competitive authoritarianism, contributes to our understanding of why politicians would form parties that are not election-oriented but nevertheless find them worthwhile vehicles for political advancement. It also helps us account for proliferation, which theories of party-building in democracies and dominant-party autocracies do not predict. In turn, the nature of party formation in Senegal’s competitive authoritarian regime

© The Author(s) 2020 29 C. L. Kelly, Party Proliferation and Political Contestation in Africa, Contemporary African Political Economy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-19617-2_2 30 C. L. KELLY sheds further light on why the country has experienced two turnovers, despite considerable incentives for party defection and the rarity of parties that pursue consistent opposition trajectories. The rest of the chapter situates the book’s arguments about party for mation (Sect. 2.1), party trajectories (Sect. 2.2), presidential turnover (Sect. 2.3), and party loyalty and defection (Sect. 2.4) within the social science and African studies literature, highlighting how each subsequent chapter builds upon and responds to existing theories about party-building in Africa.

2.1 Party Formation and Proliferation Theories of party-building in democracies and autocracies do not predict proliferation. Nor do they account for one prominent kind of party we observe in Senegal, parties with leaders who are neither election-oriented nor policy-oriented promoters of particular ideologies or special interests. Chapter 3 illustrates that Senegal has multiple, notable parties that compete in elections and attempt to forge stable constituencies among voters, but that party creation is more often a tool to lobby for state resources while minimizing or abstaining from electoral contestation on the party label. It is easier to understand these patterns of party formation once we recognize the different incentives for party creation that exist in non- democracies, specifically in competitive authoritarian regimes. This requires refining assumptions inherent in the literature on party formation in democracies and electoral autocracies, as well as re-contextualizing social science findings about party formation that are based upon these assumptions.

Senegal and Existing Theories of Party Formation Past comparative politics research has addressed party formation through a focus on the effective number of parties in a country. These studies have shown that the number of parties depends on election rules and the configuration of social cleavages representing broad-based conflicts that divide the electorate at founding electoral moments (Cox 1997; Duverger 1963; Lipset and Rokkan 1967). Plurality or first-past-the post rules (for translating votes into seats) reward larger, coordinated parties to a greater extent than proportional rules, which are more inclusive of smaller parties with more niche constituencies. Whether they are religious, class-based, regional, ethnic, or otherwise, the social cleavages that divide citizens during critical founding moments of electoral competition are also expected 2 THEORIES OF PARTY-BUILDING: AFRICA, COMPETITIVE… 31 to shape the number of parties that emerge, with a greater number of non-overlapping cleavages in society incentivizing a higher number of parties. The most statistically sophisticated studies testing these hypotheses in sub-Saharan Africa find that countries with first-past-the-post electoral systems and/or lower levels of ethnic fragmentation have a lower effective number of parties (Brambor et al. 2007; Mozaffar et al. 2003).1 However, there has been active debate about whether these factors are as potent in Africa as they are in Europe and North America.2 One reason for the debate is that African party systems have developed from different historical sequences and in different political and economic contexts than those observed in the advanced industrial democracies. In the latter, the advent of multiparty electoral competition was confined to a small elite well before mass suffrage was extended. This sequencing of events facilitated the development of programmatic parties in Europe and North America, which through this process acquired institutionalized party systems (Shefter 1977). Industrialization occurred in tandem with the rise of multiparty politics, eventually amplifying pressures from below for the extension of mass suffrage and facilitating the emergence of stable party systems (Manning 2005). In much of Africa, the sequencing of political development that shapes current party systems was more compressed. In francophone Africa, there had been mass suffrage with the 1946 Lamine Guèye Law and the 1956 Loi-cadre reform, but multiparty politics then was short-lived after decolonization as authoritarian regimes predominated in the 1960s; similar patterns prevailed in anglophone African regimes like Ghana (Collier 1982; Zolberg 1966). When the end of the Cold War triggered the conditions facilitating the “democratic experiments” of the 1990s, domestic popular protest and international donor pressures led to the advent of multiparty politics and the re-extension of mass suffrage simultaneously. Industrialization did not usually accompany these political developments. These conditions often fostered more fluid party systems in which “parties are not in the first instance reflections of social cleavages so much as the creations of elites” (Manning 2005: 722; Osei 2012). In Africa, many of these party systems include patronage-based ruling parties led by presidents who rely on clientelism for legitimacy and have strong, relatively unchecked constitutional powers. Their discretionary power over the public sector economy also limits the extent to which opposition politicians have autonomous resources and capabilities to challenge incumbents. Presidential power and resources facilitate opposition fragmentation, 32 C. L. KELLY which makes turnover more difficult. Such systems “create disincentives for opposition party consolidation and incentives for individual ‘big men’ to maintain small, highly personalized parties or to join the winning party” (Van de Walle 2007: 61). Few individuals who form parties in this context will have the will or capacity to mobilize a wide range of supporters across conflict lines permeating society. As previously mentioned, unlike most of its African counterparts, Senegal fits the Western sequencing of political development since it did have a century of multiparty competition among an exclusive elite in the Four Communes before the French extended mass suffrage near the end of colonial rule.3 However, even in Senegal, neither election rules nor social cleavages can fully account for the total number of registered parties. Senegal’s electoral system is somewhat permissive of party formation. As of 1983, Senegal had a mixed system that applies a combination of plurality and proportional voting rules to the allocation of local and legislative seats. There are several sources of this permissiveness. First, in 1992, Senegal’s political leaders agreed on a new electoral code allowing coalitions rather than just parties to compete in various races. This made it easier for small parties to pursue election-oriented goals even if they could not afford to run candidates on their own labels (Kanté 1994). Second, municipal election rules also changed in ways that lowered the barriers for small parties to win office, with the addition of a proportional representation component in 1996 (Vengroff and Ndiaye 1998; Mozaffar and Vengroff 2002). Each of these changes reduced the proportion of the vote needed to win local or national office and intensified incentives for smaller parties to contest elections. To some extent, Senegal’s two-round system for presidential elections also incentivizes such behavior. Relative to single- round systems, opposition figures who can afford to stand as candidates in a two-round system benefit from doing so since even a loss sets them up to strike patronage deals with the top two candidates seeking to consolidate voter support in any runoff (Arriola 2012). However, the incentives to create smaller parties have also likely been tempered by the decreasing share of National Assembly seats allocated through a nationwide list with proportional representation and the increasing number of departmental seats allocated through plurality rules.4 Regardless of the extent to which this holds, however, the institutional explanations that emphasize how electoral rules shape individual incentives to run for office do not provide insight into why some of the new parties formed in Senegal do not compete for local or national office. 2 THEORIES OF PARTY-BUILDING: AFRICA, COMPETITIVE… 33

Furthermore, party registration laws have not changed since the 1981 Law on Political Parties, whose passage President Diouf oversaw. The law established minimal barriers to party registration. Since then, citizens who seek to create a new party need only to submit a dossier with the party’s formal, written statutes, minutes from the first General Assembly establishing the party, and a list of the party’s founding members. The Ministry of Interior is responsible for vetting the statutes and verifying the citizenship and biographical information of the party leaders before issuing any party’s registration (FKA/CESTI 2001: 26–27). These formal rules did not stimulate much party proliferation during the first decade of Diouf’s presidency, although party formation began to increase noticeably around 1998, at the end of his rule. Wade preserved the same party registration rules as Diouf, but instead presided over an acceleration in party creation during his administration, with the number of registered parties nearly tripling during his presidency. Thus, the registration rules facilitated party formation throughout the Diouf and Wade presidencies, but there has been no change in them alone that would correlate with the increase in party formation under Wade. Social cleavages also cannot fully explain why so many Senegalese politicians create parties. The social cleavage approach “is predicated on the idea that social identities such as class, religion, ethnicity, and region provide the basis for common interests and thereby create enduring partisan sympathies” (Mainwaring 1999: 22). Party politics in Senegal does not conform to these expectations. Although there is a salient urban-rural cleavage, it has not permitted party leaders to forge permanent bases of voters loyal to their organizations; even as the identity of the ruling party has changed, rural voters have always tended to support the ruling party, and urban voters have always been more accommodating to opposition parties. Moreover, ethnic, religious, and linguistic cleavages are of low salience for the forging of partisan identities (Cruise O’Brien 2003; Diouf 1994). Joking kinship ties bridge potential ethnic, linguistic, and religious divisions; “Wolofization” has not led to a rise in ethnic party formation around hardened linguistic or ethnic identities in Senegal; and strong local leaders often function as electoral intermediaries who have the will and capacity to mobilize multiethnic clientelist networks to deliver votes for certain candidates (Elischer 2012; Koter 2016; Smith 2013). The existence of cross-cutting cleavages of this sort would lead social scientists to predict the consolidation of partisan identities across overlapping affinity groups, leading to a relatively low number of parties. However, 34 C. L. KELLY the political parties resulting from proliferation in Senegal do not always conform to these expectations. Overall, many of Senegal’s parties are personalistic vehicles. They do not reliably unite individuals with cross- cutting interests under a common banner and thus cannot always effectively restrain parochialism. Of these three abovementioned social identities—ethnicity, linguistic group, and religion—religion is the one whose role in party politics has arguably changed the most over the last two decades. The leaders (Khalifas General) of the Mouridiyya and the Tijaniyya, the country’s two most popular Sufi Muslim religious orders, historically refrained from competing as candidates in party politics. Instead, during Senegal’s authoritarian period, they were more indirectly involved in electoral mobilization. Through the 1988 presidential elections, the Mouride Khalifa General issued orders (ndigels) instructing disciples to vote for the ruling Socialist Party (PS). Yet since the onset of the economic crisis and social unrest in the late 1980s and early 1990s that fostered political liberalization, the Khalifas General have chosen not to issue ndigels. Nevertheless, they remain popular figures for aspiring candidates of all partisan stripes to visit for blessings on the campaign trail.5 The use of party formation to make religious appeals increased after the 1992 electoral code created space for more substantial opposition competition in party politics. In this period, multiple parties were created by religious thinkers, movement leaders, and individuals from the lower echelons of the religious families running the Sufi orders. Several such figures initially brought the consideration of religious ideals and policy issues into Senegalese party politics, and several lead organizations that have grown into parliamentary parties (Villalón 2013). However, few of them have functioned as primarily confessional parties and do not consistently use religion “as a primary issue for political mobilization and the construction of political identities” (Kalyvas 1996: 19).6 Many such party leaders more consistently behaved in personalistic ways that benefited themselves and their families; they did not as consistently do the maximum that was politically possible to advocate for changes in state policy on the role of religion in public life.7 In all, less than a dozen of the hundreds of parties created under Diouf and Wade have been formed by members of the families running Senegal’s Sufi orders or by people making overt religious appeals. Scholars studying the “Third Wave” of democratization have also challenged the literature on electoral institutions and social cleavages (Huntington 1991). They point out that party systems in countries that 2 THEORIES OF PARTY-BUILDING: AFRICA, COMPETITIVE… 35 had post-Third Wave transitions tend to be more fluid and more “subject to elite and state shaping…from above” than the party systems in earlier-democratizing Western countries that inspired classic theories (Mainwaring 1999: 55). Because elites are less constrained by factors like institutions and social cleavages in post-Third Wave regimes, their use of the state to achieve their goals more centrally shapes incentives for party formation. Two types of elite actors are important. Presidents have more room to use the state to create structural incentives for politicians to form parties. Political elites also have more “autonomy to switch parties, foster party mergers, and induce party schisms” (56). The research presented herein confirms that elites play an important role in shaping party systems from above in Senegal, where the strategies of the president and the personal incentives of ambitious politicians to access patronage play into party proliferation. In particular, it uses Senegal as a case study of party-building incentives in a competitive authoritarian regime, in which presidents have greater capacity than in democracies to “use public resources to build parties and create an uneven playing field” and politicians face the challenges of engaging in contestation and opposition under these skewed conditions (Mainwaring 1999: 56). In contrast, existing work has identified the different types of political stakes and sources of uncertainty that can drive party formation and competition. It has also generalized about party-building in a wider range of cases, including “developing democracies,” “fragile democracies,” and “authoritarian regimes with elections” (Lupu and Riedl 2013; Mainwaring 2003).8 Through its focus on competitive authoritarianism specifically, the book thus has a slightly different focus than other recent research on party- building in post-Third Wave regimes.

Competitive Authoritarianism and Party Proliferation To fully account for party formation in Senegal, we must recognize the different incentives for party creation that exist in non-democracies, specifically in competitive authoritarian regimes. Theories of party-building in democracies and autocracies do not predict proliferation, particularly of parties that are not primarily election-oriented. Parties are considered the building blocks of democracy and accountability, especially in institutionalized party systems like those in the “first wave” of democratizing countries from Europe and North America (Lipset 2000). Research based on political development in democratic, 36 C. L. KELLY institutionalized systems conceives of parties as primarily election-oriented, either as vote-maximizing entities (Aldrich 1995; Downs 1957) or else as vehicles for pursuing an ideological or programmatic platform that mobi- lizes a niche group of voters (Duverger 1963; Kitschelt 1989). As mentioned earlier, these notions do not fully reflect the reality in places like Senegal, where party creation is more often a means of gaining access to state resources than a tool for regularly competing in elections. This puts the case of party creation in Senegal in tension with several premises in classic political science research on parties in democracies. The first premise is that parties are fundamentally composed of seekers of elected office. Even in canonical accounts holding that parties are “endogenous institutions” that politicians form and shape according to their problem-solving needs, all of the problems that they are purported to solve relate to winning office: namely, resolving disputes within groups of political hopefuls, mobilizing supporters, and presenting coherent platforms. Since parties are assumed to have a “primary purpose of winning control of the government,” patronage seeking motivates party formation only insofar as it facilitates the future electoral success of the organization’s candidates (Hale 2006: 10). This premise about the purpose and function of political parties certainly applies to some of the most prominent party organizations in Senegal and other African countries. However, it is problematic to assume that most African parties are vote-maximizing, or even primarily election- oriented, since some of them never run in elections on their own label but are able to capture state benefits and resources, and others run in elections once or twice and wield limited legislative clout (Van de Walle and Butler 1999; LeBas 2011; Manning 2005). In accounts based on Western experiences, there is minimal attention to the strategies of politicians who form parties but do not seek office on a regular basis, or at all. The lack of attention to this is of particular concern in Africa and other post-Third Wave regimes in which parties are often atomistic, personalized entities rather than team-oriented, mass organizations. Of the 174 Senegalese parties registered by mid-2011, at least 79 had negotiated their way into the Coalition Around the President for the 21st Century (Cap 21), President Wade’s ruling entourage that provided party leaders with monthly salaries, bags of rice, and regular access to a presidential intermediary in exchange for their long-term support for the Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS). This suggests that patronage negotiation takes primacy over electoral contestation, not to mention vote maximization. 2 THEORIES OF PARTY-BUILDING: AFRICA, COMPETITIVE… 37

Additional theories of party competition based on democracies rest upon the premise that parties form when there is space for them to develop ideologically or programmatically distinctive platforms as routes to electoral success (Downs 1957; Duverger 1963). Yet many parties in African countries are not ideologically or programmatically differentiated from one another (Marcus and Ratsimbaharison 2005; Van de Walle 2007). Party programs are key features of African politics, but “when parties discuss issues, they focus on establishing their own competence in an issue area, rather than claiming ownership of ideological space” (Bleck and Van de Walle 2011: 1125). For instance, in Senegal, Marxist ideology motivated formation of several parties after independence. Although there is dimensionality according to parties’ historical commitment to various ideologies, most Senegalese parties today do not pursue political agendas, recruit members, or condition their participation in government on these principles (Diop 2011). Theories about party formation under dominant-party authoritarianism also fail to predict the extent of party formation experienced in Senegal. Most studies of parties and elections under authoritarianism highlight features of the regime type that discourage opposition in general, rather than party formation in particular. However, widespread party formation is not expected under authoritarianism for some of the same reasons that the opposition is weak in these regimes. For one thing, in dominant-party autocracies, governments hold flawed elections in which the incumbent’s victory is practically a foregone conclusion (Greene 2007; Magaloni 2006). The government is often able to use electoral fraud and repression to shape election outcomes. Under such conditions, opposition parties do not have serious chances of displacing incumbents. Even when local and legislative races permit opposition figures to win elected offices, authorities monitor and limit the number of offices and the margins of victory. Furthermore, authoritarian leaders have the repressive capacity to punish dissenters, which deters most opponents from forming associations. From Russia to Mexico, state repression against regime opponents increases the cost of forming autonomous associations, including new parties (Fish 1995). Most ambitious politicians, even if they have trouble advancing within the ruling party or disagree with the ruling party’s policies, are unlikely to join the opposition because of the “cost associated with targeted physical intimidation, beatings, or even killings of opposition activists that occur episodically in some (but not all) dominant party systems” (Greene 2007: 5). 38 C. L. KELLY

Finally, patronage-oriented politicians must belong to the ruling party to access wealth-generating reserve domains in the state economy. For instance, authoritarian rule in Mexico’s dominant-party autocracy was based on leaders limiting privatization and maintaining a large public sector economy. By joining the opposition or forming an opposition party, opponents would forego the possibility of high-level government employment, as well as the access to “a stipend, kickbacks, or access to an old boys’ network of business contacts and favors” that ruling party politicians often enjoy (Greene 2007: 5). Because ruling parties offer mechanisms for providing these benefits while also adjudicating conflicts between elites for these rewards, they ensure that the authoritarian status quo persists, and that elites rarely defect to the opposition, much less form parties (Brownlee 2007). The only explicit theory of opposition party formation, which is based on Mexican authoritarianism, demonstrates how each of the above facets of dominant-party authoritarianism tempers party proliferation (Greene 2007). Ultimately, opposition party formation is rare because only radical ideologues are willing to bear the costs of never winning elections, never accessing patronage, and being potentially subject to violent reprisals—all in exchange for expressing their oppositional stance. Much like theories of party formation in democracies, then, the theory of opposition party formation under dominant-party autocracy does not predict the kinds of widespread party formation we see in Senegal. The patronage-seeking nature of many parties emerging from proliferation is especially striking relative to the autocracy literature’s emphasis on ruling party membership as the only path to accessing state resources. Senegal was formerly a dominant-party autocracy under Senghor and the initial decade of Diouf’s presidency. Yet, much like the case that inspired these theories, different inducements and constraints appear to have influenced politicians’ decisions about party creation during the later years of the Diouf presidency and throughout the Wade presidency.

Party Creators’ Non-electoral Goals Are Amplified by Competitive Authoritarianism Given the limits of these literatures, the book analyzes how competitive authoritarianism can shape the logics of party formation differently than in democracies and autocracies. Focusing on Senegal under Diouf and Wade, Chap. 3 argues that a key feature of competitive authoritarianism—the 2 THEORIES OF PARTY-BUILDING: AFRICA, COMPETITIVE… 39 uneven playing field—both enabled presidents to encourage party formation when necessary and influenced individual politicians’ logics of party creation and their parties’ fundamental purposes. Unlike in autocracies with sham elections, competitive authoritarian regimes have elections that serve as the main route to power, even if they are not perfectly free and fair. Yet, more so than politicians in liberal democracies, individuals in competitive authoritarian regimes who create parties make their decisions knowing the difficulties that they will have surviving outside of the state. Thus, many of the parties that emerge in a competitive authoritarian regime are likely to be state-oriented from their inception and minimize the time they spend in opposition before rallying behind the president, the gatekeeper of state resources and privileges. The uneven playing field intensifies incentives for both ambitious, career-oriented politicians and for rent-seeking elites to create parties to lobby the president for patronage. Politicians may therefore form parties that are not election-oriented but still find them worthwhile vehicles for participating in politics outside of the electoral sphere in order to link themselves directly to the state.

2.2 Trajectories of Opposition: Adversarial vs. Collaborative Party Behavior In Senegal, ever since President Diouf began forming oversized multiparty governments in the 1990s, an increasing number of politicians have created parties to negotiate access to the state, but few parties have opposed the president throughout his tenure (consistent opposition). Many party leaders sought to be brought permanently into the presidential entourage in exchange for patronage (co-optation); others negotiated more contingent, tailored agreements with the president to gain access to the government and provide support to the ruling coalition in electoral and other forms (tactical alliances). Investigating the determinants of such trajectories, Chap. 4 explains why so few parties that began in opposition remained there throughout the five national elections spanning the Wade presidency (2000–2012). There is a robust body of political science research on the conditions under which opposition parties will coalesce in any single election against the president. However, scholarship has not yet accounted for African parties’ long-term trajectories, which result from party leaders making several sequential decisions to oppose or collaborate with the president over a series of consecutive national elections. Examining and refining hypotheses originating in research on oppositional behavior in single elections, 40 C. L. KELLY

Chap. 4 theorizes and demonstrates how party leaders’ resource endowments, political networks, and initial patterns of electoral participation interact to shape their organizations’ longer-term trajectories.

Existing Research on Party Behavior Most work on African opposition has focused on short-term party behavior, namely opposition coordination against incumbents in particular elections or the electoral coalition choices of parties in single contests. These studies find that the private resource access of party leaders, party ideology, and party institutionalization shape single-shot electoral coalition choices (Arriola 2012; Gandhi and Reuter 2013; Kuenzi and Lambright 2001; Randall and Svasand 2002; Wahman 2011). However, it is unclear whether these factors shape parties’ oppositional behavior across multiple elections in the same ways that they do in single elections. One possibility is that highly institutionalized parties will more consistently oppose the ruling party because they have more stable bases of supporters than other parties do. Institutionalized parties have a label, a presence in voters’ minds, and a reputation for involvement in national elections (Mainwaring and Scully 1995). This reputation bolsters their chances of winning when in the opposition, because a party’s “stable existence” provides it “time to build a reputation for cooperation” and become a focal point for opposition party coordination (Gandhi and Reuter 2013: 153). However, most parties in Africa have not consistently participated in elections since their birth. Afrobarometer surveys reveal parties’ low levels of legitimacy regardless of their age, renown, and territorial implantation (Bleck and Van de Walle 2011). Many of Senegal’s most institutionalized parties have joined the government on various occasions. Tactical alliances or co-optation are common even among older and more socially rooted parties, including leftist parties that historically resisted authoritarianism. Another hypothesis holds that parties with ideological or policy-based preferences that differ from the ruling party are likely to spend more consecutive elections in opposition. A coherent ideology can provide “starting capital” to party-builders and a way to differentiate themselves from competitors (Hale 2006). Parties with “distinctive policy agendas in relation to the incumbent government” may also be more likely to form opposition electoral coalitions (Wahman 2011: 655). However, many African parties no longer distinguish themselves from each other according to these factors (Bleck and Van de Walle 2011). In Senegal, even the leftist parties that 2 THEORIES OF PARTY-BUILDING: AFRICA, COMPETITIVE… 41 existed underground before the 1976 “law of the three trends” and the 1981 law allowing unlimited multipartism have become significantly patronage-based parties with similar policy demands. A third factor, organizational resources inherited from authoritarian rule, also shapes opposition. LeBas (2011) focuses on the organizational capital that corporate institutions provide to parties. In countries where authoritarian rulers chose not to suppress labor unions, the unions later functioned as mobilizing structures for opposition parties. These parties could function as consistent opponents when leaders polarized conflict between their parties and the ruling coalition to make defection from the opposition costly. Authoritarian president Senghor integrated labor unions into the ruling party, but unions have not been the basis of opposition party-building under multipartism. Subsequent presidents have disabled unions from potentially fostering strong parties capable of consistent opposition, via fragmentation of these organizations. President Wade has encouraged the fragmentation of unions, and Senegalese union leaders forbid party recruitment within their organization’s formal ranks.9 This fragmentation is common in much of francophone Africa (ILO 2010). Unions are thus not always the organizations with the most mobilizing potential for parties, because many must be coordinated in order to generate the mass mobilization conducive to opposition. Riedl (2014) analyzes how authoritarian strategies for incorporating political elites into the government can facilitate institutionalized party systems. Local elites who are included in the authoritarian state system tend to support the president during later, democratic transitions, thereby empowering the president to shape the transitional agenda to benefit the ruling party. This results in a party system with “a coherent and enduring anti-incumbent regime cleavage” around which opposition parties can coordinate (12–13). Presumably, this kind of cleavage would facilitate consistent opposition in Ghana and Senegal, the two cases that Riedl analyzes where elite incorporation occurred under authoritarianism.10 From this perspective, Senegalese party trajectories exhibit more variation than expected. Few Ghanaian parties pursue tactical alliances or negotiate permanent co-optation into the president’s entourage, whereas in Senegal, co-optation and tactical alliances are widespread. Major opposition leaders, including Abdoulaye Wade before 2000, have joined the government, and ruling party elites like Macky Sall have been willing to leave the ruling party to join the opposition and run against the president. 42 C. L. KELLY

A final possibility is that party leaders’ resource access could influence party trajectories, with poorer parties cooperating with the ruling party more often. Arriola (2012) explains opposition coalescence based on this logic, finding that it becomes more likely as privatization increases the availability of private credit, deprives presidents of “the capacity to command the political allegiance of business,” and enables businessmen to fund promising opponents without jeopardizing their commercial activities (19). However, the diffusion of private finance into an economy does not guarantee that those who access the financing will use it for oppositional purposes. Furthermore, few opposition parties can rely on private resource flows to entirely replace the state support that presidents can withdraw if they become politically threatening. Thus, even in Senegal, which has undergone significant privatization, parties rarely follow consistent opposition strategies. This research solidly establishes a causal link between private capital and opposition coalescence, but it overlooks the role that international private financing in particular—and such financing in conjunction with a party leader’s state or civil society experience—plays in fostering the sustained oppositional behavior of particular parties.

Independent Financing and State Experience Matter Together Evidence from Senegal suggests that private resource access helps to explain variation in party trajectories, but it alone does not tell the whole story. Consistent opposition strategies are most often pursued by party leaders with access to a particular kind of private finance—internationally secured private finance that the president cannot manipulate—combined with state or civil society experience that they acquired before they created their own parties. The combination of both endowments provides party leaders with the resources and political potential sufficient for them to invest in running against incumbents consistently over time. Party leaders’ prior experience as ministers or leaders of national-level civil society organizations allows them to signal their knowledge about running the state and market themselves as viable replacements to incumbent politicians. Building such reputations can help party leaders in their attempts to gain the material and symbolic support of “opinion leaders” like marabouts, traditional leaders, business elites, and Senegalese in the diaspora. Having a record of state experience suggests that a politician 2 THEORIES OF PARTY-BUILDING: AFRICA, COMPETITIVE… 43 is familiar with the inner workings of the government and knows how to run the state; such experience allows party heads to build constituencies of followers who can potentially mobilize behind them when they create parties. Party founders who have led civil society organizations with broad- based urban constituencies can also use their experience to signal competence and legitimacy. However, party leaders’ ability to make these claims depends on whether their organizations have sought to pursue political and social reforms, as well as whether they can show that through that process, they have developed knowledge and expertise about how the government works. Party leaders’ access to international private financing enables them to pay the deposits needed to run in elections and to engage in clientelist political competition for the highest offices, which citizens expect from prominent candidates and which make the party leader’s investment in electoral competition potentially worthwhile. These sources of independent financing are especially key on the uneven playing field, where the ruling party’s access to the state yields “hyper-incumbency advantage” and even rich challenger parties struggle to match the president’s financial clout (Levitsky and Way 2010). Without sources of independent financing, the president can use the state to block politicians’ access to money, which impedes their capacity for autonomous political activity, including consistent opposition. These two resource endowments also matter together. Party leaders with both state experience and international private financing often have enough serious electoral potential as presidential challengers to resist the opportunities that presidents provide for government collaboration. They have the state experience to rival the president’s competencies and the independent financing to launch a campaign that does not match that of the ruling party, but that significantly challenges it on the uneven playing field. In these rare cases, party leaders know that they have serious enough potential to win the presidency that a consistent opposition strategy is desirable. However, consistent opposition trajectories were rare in Senegal under Wade because most party leaders lacked one or both of the endowments. Under such conditions, they were better off investing their limited resources into collaborating with the president, through temporary tactical alliances or more permanent co-optation into the ruling coalition. 44 C. L. KELLY

How Presidents Try to Shape Trajectories Presidents generally seek to fragment and destabilize the opposition in order to ensure their own re-election and the ruling party’s command of a legislative majority; as Chap. 4 posits, President Wade’s core survival strategy was to negotiate with the leaders of parties that were most threatening to the ruling coalition’s prospects to win future presidencies and legislative majorities. However, presidents in competitive authoritarian regimes are constrained in the amount of repression they can use, and often they turn to positive inducements to incentivize opponents to collaborate, sometimes by extending offers to various party leaders to collaborate with the ruling coalition instead of building opposition outside of it. Indeed, on Senegal’s uneven playing field, Wade sought to use his advantageous access to state institutions, resources, and media to convince opponents to join the ruling coalition, where he could most effectively fragment their organizations. Letting serious opponents into the government can be politically risky; it gives adversaries state experience and name recognition among voters. However, there are also short-term benefits that can offset the potential long-term costs. Namely, bringing electorally threatening opposition parties into the government gives presidents the opportunity to pit key elites within these parties against each other and foster party splits that diminish these organizations’ electoral clout. International private financing and prior state or civil society experience are bargaining chips for party leaders in potential negotiations with the president when he offers opposition parties inducements to collaborate. The president is interested in co-opting the leaders of parties that are electorally threatening. He is not always successful because those party leaders often have some resource endowments that help them to resist co- optation, whether financing, experience, or both. Presidents thus tend to target party leaders with a variety of goals, resource endowments, and vote-mobilizing capabilities with offers of collaboration. Party leaders with different combinations of these endowments in turn exhibit different preferences and capacities to resist collaboration.

2.3 Presidential Turnover and the Advantages of Ex-regime Insiders Despite the paucity of opposition parties that remain outside of government in the long run, Senegal has experienced two turnovers over the past 14 years. The most striking part of this reality has been that former gov- 2 THEORIES OF PARTY-BUILDING: AFRICA, COMPETITIVE… 45 ernment collaborators, rather than the committed outsiders that people generally associate with the opposition, have been the agents of the president’s defeat when turnover occurred (2000, 2012), or were the front- running opponents in elections that incumbent presidents won (1993, 2007). Chapter 5 analyzes the sources of ex-regime insiders’ electoral advantage in Senegal. For the purposes of the chapter, regime insiders are defined as politicians who had accepted ministerial appointments and had the opportunity to access various forms of state resources before they ran for office in the opposition. Although not all insiders translate their opportunities to access the state into electoral performance that sidelines outsiders, insider advantage has been a consistent aspect of presidential competition in Senegal. In 1993 and 2000, Wade was the front-running opposition candidate and each time left PS governments to campaign; in 2007, Wade’s ex-Prime Minister, Idrissa Seck, was the second-place finisher; and in 2012, Seck’s successor as Prime Minister, Macky Sall, defeated Wade. In accounting for why some elections with insider advantage resulted in turnover while others yielded incumbent re-election, the existing literature provides ample evidence of the contributions of structural factors to turnover. It specifies the role of contingent factors and their interaction with structural factors less well. The explanation presented in Chap. 5 combines relevant structural factors from the cross-country literature with temporally varied, local contingencies to explain the 1993, 2000, 2007, and 2012 presidential election outcomes.

Existing Research on Insider Advantage Only a few studies explicitly address the sources of insider advantage. Way (2005) was the first to document the phenomenon in post-communist authoritarian regimes. He finds that when ruling parties have weak mechanisms for preventing elite defection and also lack monopolistic control of the economy, then “prime ministers, close advisers, and other allies are often in a particularly good position to build up resources and (because of access to state media) popularity that can be used to challenge incumbent control.” In particular, insiders who develop “autonomous patronage networks” are dangerous defectors from the president’s perspective (236). Pinkston (2016) examines similar patterns in Benin. Because of economic barriers to self-financing in the country, most politicians who get elected to parliament are regime insiders, meaning that they had access to the state through contracts or appointments before they entered politics. State 46 C. L. KELLY access enables insider politicians to distribute enough patronage and gain enough electoral momentum to have hope of attracting private financiers with the resource flows to threaten incumbents. More implicitly, Rakner and Van de Walle (2009) evoke ex-insider advantages by emphasizing the need for more outsiders to win local office in order to build competitive, nationwide parties that can rival those of incumbents. Few other studies have explicitly analyzed the role of insider advantage in African elections. Research on opposition coalescence in Africa often also accounts for presidential turnover, but it does not generally seek to distinguish insiders’ and outsiders’ roles in the process. Such studies show that turnover becomes more plausible when rival opposition parties coordinate operations and pool their limited material resources to back a single candidate. Coalescence itself depends on politicians’ perceived chances of winning, the economic climate, expectations about electoral transparency, the identities of other challengers, and the internal cohesion of the parties needed to coordinate effectively (Van de Walle 2006). In addition, the research finds that opposition coalescence and turnover are more likely in open-seat presidential races (Cheeseman 2010). These outcomes are also more likely when economic privatization frees businessmen from having to rely on the state for economic opportunities. Under these conditions, businessmen are more independent of the state and financing opposition candidates becomes a more viable option (Arriola 2012). This body of research has been groundbreaking in political science and African studies. Yet, because it focuses on explaining why we get coalescence rather than who brings it about, it has not fully theorized potentially important distinctions between the resource profiles and the political behaviors of insiders and outsiders. These profiles influence the incentives that politicians have to facilitate opposition coalescence, as well as the credentials that they possess to convince potential financiers to invest in their candidacies.

Sources of Insider Advantage No opponents can completely overcome their resource deficiency relative to the president on the uneven playing field. However, insiders can often narrow the resource gap more significantly than outsiders because they previously had access to the state. The trajectories and performance of insiders and outsiders in the 1993, 2000, 2007, and 2012 presidential races demonstrate that state access often provides material and reputa- 2 THEORIES OF PARTY-BUILDING: AFRICA, COMPETITIVE… 47 tional benefits to regime insiders. When they are ministers, insiders’ access to the state exposes them to career advancement opportunities that outsiders do not enjoy, including control over patronage as a means to cultivate followers, government experience and coverage in the media that fosters name recognition among voters, and networking with domestic and international figures who are potential future sources of political support. Although insider advantage does not cause turnover, the insiders who make the most of their access to the state gain both the financial capital and public reputations that bolster their chances of ousting incumbents. Regime insiders’ access to the state through government appointments is, first of all, financially useful. Ministers accumulate wealth and reputations as statesmen that, in certain cases, better equip them to compete against the president later. Whether it is before or after they enter the opposition, insiders can distribute the resources that they acquire during their time in government to demonstrate their ability to provide material benefits to potential constituents. Some regime insiders also control lower-level appointments within their ministerial domain. This gives an insider the chance to develop networks of clients whose government jobs depend on that insider’s ongoing ministerial tenure. Relative to outsiders, insiders therefore have greater chances of developing the clientelist networks needed to garner voter support and catalyze the bandwagoning needed to defeat incumbents (Van de Walle 2006). Through these mechanisms, some insiders leave the president’s entourage with significant blocs of cadres invested in their future electoral success. This has been true especially for insiders who had careers in the ruling party; for instance, 11 ruling party Members of Parliament followed ex-Prime Minister Idrissa Seck out of the PDS when he left in 2005 (Diop 2011: 369). In addition, insiders can use the social networks they developed as statesmen to attract political backing from foreign heads of state, businessmen, and members of the diaspora. Working in the government also often helps ministers gain exposure in the media and develop name recognition among voters, which reinforces their advantages over outsiders. Their actual government experience, as well as the media’s documentation of it, allows them to build reputations as statesmen before leaving the government to run against the president. Insiders also have the potential to garner significant media attention when they break away from the government to enter the opposition. This coverage feeds into the waves of popular sympathy that some insiders 48 C. L. KELLY enjoy in the subsequent presidential election. For example, the media extensively covered the downfall within the ruling party of Wade’s ex- Prime Ministers, Idrissa Seck and Macky Sall, as well as their entry into the opposition. Both men went into their first presidential elections riding on waves of popular sympathy, largely due to citizens’ perceptions that Wade had liquidated them in unjust ways.

How Insider Advantage Can (Sometimes) Foster Turnover Only in some cases do insiders defeat the presidents that they oppose. As rare events, Senegal’s two turnovers in 2000 and 2012 appear to be a function not only of the largely structural factors cited in the literature, but also of contingent factors related to regime insiders’ choices about when to join the opposition and how to behave within it. Cross-national studies identify several structural factors that increase the chances of turnover in Africa (Cheeseman 2010; Gandhi and Reuter 2013; Howard and Roessler 2006; Van de Walle 2006),11 and some—like economic performance and opposition coalescence—apply to Senegal. However, contingencies are also key to explaining the specific election outcomes of turnover and incumbent re-election. The presence of two more specific conditions prior to the turnovers of 2000 and 2012 differentiates them from incumbent re-elections of 1993 and 2007: prolonged uncertainty about succession within the ruling party, as well as the leading insider’s resistance to the president’s attempts to collaborate with him as the campaign approaches. Prolonged uncertainty about succession within the ruling party increases former insiders’ chances of attracting the support of former colleagues. Operationally, prolonged uncertainty about succession refers to a pre-election context in which party members and the electorate widely perceive that the president’s leadership—of the ruling party and the country—will end sometime in the cycle after the election about to be contested.12 In Senegal, these conditions held in 2000, 2007, and 2012. Crises often result from ambitious elites’ sustained apprehensions about their place within the ruling party. Although the president has not yet retired, leadership disputes emerge and endure near the party’s summit. Elites who hope to succeed the president at an approaching but unspecified time feel the need to position themselves in anticipation of the key moment. Within weak ruling parties whose leaders rely primarily on patronage to resolve disputes, there are limited means to appease all of these elites, whose chances of defection rise as the prolonged succession battle plays out. 2 THEORIES OF PARTY-BUILDING: AFRICA, COMPETITIVE… 49

The resistance of ex-insider candidates to reconciling with the president is also important because it preserves ex-insiders’ ability to brand themselves as genuine alternatives to the incumbent. This was not something that leading ex-insider opponents, Abdoulaye Wade and Idrissa Seck, succeeded in doing in 1993 and 2007 respectively. In addition, like all opposition figures, ex-insiders must convince a largely clientelist electorate to take a chance on voting for them. Thus, they must simultaneously signal that they would run the state in ways that would materially benefit their followers, and that they intend to change the political status quo prevail- ing under the sitting president. Although negotiations with the president are a common element of Senegalese politics, those that occur between ex-insiders and the president just months before a presidential contest can damage the prospects of ex-insider presidential candidates, such that the ex-insider’s association with the president effectively discredits him as a true alternative to the incumbent.

2.4 Logics of Ruling Party Loyalty and Defection The defeat of Abdoulaye Wade in the 2012 presidential election provoked further questions about the role of political parties and party proliferation in Senegalese politics. Macky Sall, a former regime insider, had been Wade’s Prime Minister, 2007 presidential campaign manager, and President of the National Assembly before leaving the Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS). Sall created the Alliance for the Republic (APR) party in December 2008, less than four years before he won the presidency campaigning on that party’s ticket. Sall’s quick rise, along with the relative youth of the political party he used to ascend to the presidency, has not gone unnoticed by other ambitious politicians. Loyalty to the ruling party was the surest route to personal advancement, public offices, and wealth during the era of Socialist Party dominance (1960–2000), but since then, defection has become a popular, additional way to pursue personalist and patronage-based goals. In contemporary Senegal, members of a party face a constant series of choices about how best to advance their careers. They can: (1) stay in their existing party, (2) leave their party for another party or coalition, (3) leave their party to create a new party, or (4) renounce partisanship, whether by ending all involvement in politics or supporting coalitions or movements but terminating membership in a party. Party creation has tended to serve a mix of functions, allowing some elites to exit their existing party and 50 C. L. KELLY make a clean political break from it, while permitting others to have an instrument for negotiating their way back into their original party on new terms, after losing an intraparty conflict. Chapter 6 seeks to contextualize the dynamics of party loyalty and party defection in the PDS before and during the era of party proliferation, as the total number of registered parties has increased and the party system has de-institutionalized (Resnick 2013). It combines political economy theories of exit, voice, and loyalty with African studies research on party dominance and defection, which are yet to be applied together to the case of Senegal.

Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in the PDS Context The renowned political economist, Albert Hirschman (1970), offers a model of exit, voice, and loyalty that has been used widely in the social sciences to account for individual behavior in firms, organizations, and states—including party systems. His theory holds that when the quality of an organization’s output declines, members of an organization can either leave the organization (“the exit option”) or express dissatisfaction to leaders of the organization (“the voice option”). Exhibiting loyalty to an organization during a decline can delay the exit of other individuals considering defection, particularly if loyalists are “quality-conscious” party members whose reluctance to defect signals that there is still hope of using voice to improve the organization through internal reform. Loyalty thereby affords an organization more time to respond to decline, creating opportunities for organizational self-correction in lieu of mass defection (79). Within African studies, social science research on party dominance most directly addresses the dynamics of loyalty and defection. In this literature, the structural variables shaping party defection include the ruling party’s degree of control over the country’s political and economic resources, the ideological polarization of the party system, the legal and bureaucratic costs of creating new parties, and the degree of enforcement of rules to resolve intraparty disputes. First, the greater a party’s monopolization of political and economic resources, the lower the likelihood of elite defection. As a result, ruling party elites who are motivated primarily by the desire for personal advancement and patronage are not expected to leave the ruling party in countries where there is an uneven playing field. Defection is assumed to be too costly in terms of the amount of political and economic opportunities foregone, including easier access to the state, government, and media. 2 THEORIES OF PARTY-BUILDING: AFRICA, COMPETITIVE… 51

A similar logic applies in theories tailored to Africa’s dominant party systems, which hold that they are pervaded by “a culture of personalized politics and patronage networks” (Doorenspleet and Nijzink 2013: 17). Such a culture encourages loyalty among ruling party stalwarts, as well as party switching among opponents, because the ruling party is the most expedient vehicle for accessing power when it singlehandedly controls a legislative majority. Although the decline of ruling party dominance in Senegal amplified incentives for elite defection in the PDS era, it did not suppress personalism or patronage-seeking behavior. Loyalty to the ruling party was the surest route to personal advancement, public offices, and wealth during the era of Socialist Party dominance (1960–2000). Since then, however, party system fluidity and volatility have increased, party proliferation has accelerated, and defections are increasingly seen as additional ways for politicians to pursue personalist and patronage-based goals. Private sector opportunities have become accessible to certain defectors in Senegal’s lib- eralized economy, which has given certain opposition politicians more autonomy than in the PS era. This has in turn made party loyalty less financially necessary than before. As shown in Chap.4 , politicians with sources of international private financing can use their control of independent resources to pursue their political agendas even if they defect. Second, comparative analysis of party-building in Africa suggests that the greater the ideological polarization of a country’s party system, the lower the likelihood of defection from any of the parties with a polarized brand. Party cohesion is particularly high in countries whose ruling parties had roots in violent liberation struggles prior to independence. In these countries, peacetime politics often involved competition between parties that had evolved out of armed groups and derived from the social and ideological cleavages that defined the armed conflict. Because the legacies of the liberation struggles created lasting political polarization, citizens developed strong senses of party identity that continue to make party switching and party creation difficult, if not potentially career-ending, for most politicians (LeBas 2011; Levitsky and Way 2012). In this way, the parties built in the wake of the liberation movements have been more successful in “transcending cleavages, attracting broad support, and co-opting different groups” (Doorenspleet and Nijzink 2013: 13). The party systems in Senegal and its West African neighbors were not built upon the remnants of liberation struggles like those in Namibia, Mozambique, or Zimbabwe. Relative to these countries, Senegal has 52 C. L. KELLY lower levels of partisan polarization, which enables the behavior of defectors who want to switch parties or create new ones without jeopardizing their political careers. The transaction costs of defection in Senegal are lower, both for this reason and because the legal and bureaucratic costs of forming new parties are low. The ruling party’s enforcement of internal rules also affects organizational cohesion. Fewer party cadres are likely to defect when there are transparent and well-enforced methods for selecting election candidates and leaders of party organs. It is paramount that a party’s dispute resolution mechanisms be institutionalized and legitimate in order to effectively regulate competition between ambitious elites for electoral candidacies and for internal party posts. Party loyalty is more likely when party members who lose a nomination or post can be convinced that they will have regular, rule-bound opportunities for advancement (Brownlee 2007; Diop 2011). The PDS had well-established, formal party rules and procedures from its founding, but the application of these rules and procedures has varied. Even before 2000, internal elections within the party’s local and national structures, which should have occurred every two years according to PDS statutes, did not take place fully or on schedule. Advancement within the party hierarchy depended upon the whims of Wade, the principal leader and financier of the PDS. These circumstances have been a double-edged sword for organizational cohesion. On the one hand, Wade is widely admired because he mentored many PDS politicians and embodies the PDS’s historical legacy in his role as leader of the country’s most prominent post-independence opposition party. Thus, many political elites have strong affective ties to the PDS that reinforce loyalty. On the other hand, the PDS’s lack of consistently enforced internal rules creates overlapping claims to power within the party that are not sustainable in the long term. The personalization of power in the party has enabled the selective application of rules and procedures and has made it difficult for politicians who advance to the top of the PDS hierarchy to survive and thrive there in the long run.

Party Defection Serves Multiple Political Purposes Overall, this book’s research finds that the inconsistent application of party rules and personalized power dynamics has consistently contributed to individuals’ decisions to leave the PDS. However, when the conven- 2 THEORIES OF PARTY-BUILDING: AFRICA, COMPETITIVE… 53 tional forces that could serve as brakes on defection—ideologically polarized party systems, significant legal and bureaucratic costs to party creation, and strongly enforced internal party rules and procedures—are weak, then factors like contingencies, local attitudes and expectations about political negotiations and collaborations, and political elites’ senses of honor, integrity, and justice also come into play. Loyalty and defection are best understood by accounting for the ways that these personal factors interact with the enforcement of party rules to influence party cohesion. This research finds that the PDS old guard tends to be more loyal, but exercising voice within the party became more difficult—even for some of them—as Wade’s presidency progressed. After alternance, the party struggled to meet two competing needs: maintaining enough supporters to remain immediately electorally competitive and holding transparent internal elections for local and national party leadership positions. Many elites, even those in favor of internal elections, worried that these competitions would foster division and defections, weakening the party’s electoral performance. The longer that internal elections were delayed, and the more common that party proliferation became, the more party creation by marginalized PDS elites became a tool for voice-oriented behaviors in addition to exit. In other words, over time, party creation was increasingly used both as a means of permanent exit from the PDS as well as a tool for attempting to use voice (in an unconventional sense of the term) outside of the PDS to contest perceived injustices before attempting to negotiate a return to the party.

2.5 Conclusion This chapter has outlined why we might often expect politicians’ logics of party formation to be different under competitive authoritarianism than under democracy. It has also laid out how the proliferation of many primarily patronage-oriented parties in Senegal has been accompanied by a paucity of parties that consistently oppose the government and by presidential turnover that regime insiders catalyze, as opposed to weathered outsiders. These dynamics play into political elites’ logics of party loyalty and party defection, the latter of which often take the form of party creation when the defectors are prominent, well-known politicians from Senegal’s most electorally popular parties. The remainder of the book analyzes the sources of these different patterns. 54 C. L. KELLY

Notes 1. Brambor et al. (2007) make the methodological point that Mozaffar et al. (2003) did not include the constitutive terms of the electoral institutions- ethnic fragmentation interaction term, which affects the study results. 2. See LeBas (2011) for an excellent review. 3. As Collier (1982) specifies, “the French citizens of Senegal (natives either of France or of the communes) elected a deputy to the French National Assembly in Paris from 1848 until the post-World War II reforms, with the exception of the period during the Second Empire” (82). A very limited suffrage was extended in 1925 to a select few in select urban areas of Dahomey, Ivory Coast, Guinea, and Mali to elect three non-citizens to each colony’s advisory administrative council, but the scale of suffrage and scope of representation were very limited compared to Senegal. 4. In 1983 and 1988, there were 120 National Assembly seats, split 60–60 (plurality-proportional); in 1993, the split was 50–70 and in 1998, there were 140 seats with a 70–70 split. Plurality rules became increasingly dominant under Wade, with a 65–55 split in 2001. In 2007 and 2012, there were 150 deputies split 90–60 and in 2017, there were 165 deputies split 105–60. The political science research is divided about the effects one should expect mixed systems to have on incentives for party formation. 5. There were other, less overt ways that the Khalifas General sent their disciples messages about presidential candidates. For instance, in 2007, the Khalifa General of the Mourides announced that “… right after the [Mouride Magal] pilgrimage President Wade would personally oversee great state infrastructure projects in the holy city of Touba” (Koter 2013: 671). 6. Nor do we observe many parties formed as unintended consequences of interest group alliances, which can in some cases mobilize a broad-based cleavage that had previously been muted in the party sphere, as was the case for confessional party formation in Europe. 7. Chapter 3 discusses this point in greater detail. The Social Front for Development (FSD/BJ) of Cheikh Abdoulaye Dièye and his son Cheikh Bamba Dièye, as well as Imam Mbaye Niang of the Movement for Democratic and Social Reform (MRDS), come the closest to fitting Kalyvas’ definition of confessional party, but even the FSD/BJ has somewhat pivoted its platform away from the religious issues that inspired Abdoulaye Dièye to form the party. 8. There is likely some overlap between the post-Third Wave regimes that are competitive authoritarian and the regimes falling into these other categories based on more permissive definitions of democracy. Senegal under Wade is a case that Levistky & Way classify as competitive authoritarian, 2 THEORIES OF PARTY-BUILDING: AFRICA, COMPETITIVE… 55

but that could fall into the “developing democracy” or “fragile democracy” category based on less stringent criteria. 9. Interviews with Mody Guiro (leader of CNTS union), 8/6/12, Dakar; Cheikh Diop (leader of CNTS-FC union), 8/2/12, Dakar; Amadou Lamine Diouf (leader of CDSL union), 8/3/12. 10. Party trajectories per se are not the focus of Riedl’s book, but the hypothesis about consistent opposition is derived from the elements of her theory of party system institutionalization. 11. Leading cross-national studies find that presidential resignation or death, opposition coalescence, and economic crisis increase the chances of turnover. 12. An impending succession begins when the president either states—or chooses not to dispel a predominant expectation among the political elite—that he will not complete the term that he is seeking to win in an upcoming election. Impending successions are thus identifiable through press coverage of the president’s preparation for campaigns, party documents about candidacy, and secondary accounts by local experts closely following the president’s communications with the voting public.

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Party Formation and Proliferation on Senegal’s Uneven Playing Field

Party proliferation has been the subject of recent sustained attention in Senegal. There has been renewed public debate about electoral laws and the ways that they should be used to shape the number of political parties. The question became particularly salient after the 2017 National Assembly elections, when an all-time high of 47 distinct parties and coalitions presented lists of candidates, creating a staggering number of choices for voters and increasing the state’s election administration costs. In April 2018, President Macky Sall proposed a draft loi de parrainage (sponsorship law) seeking to increase barriers to entry in future races. Among other elements, the law required all presidential candidates to obtain the signatures of 0.8% of registered voters spread across 7 of 14 geographic regions in order to appear on the ballot. Defending the proposal, Sall said, “We have 300 political parties in Senegal as I speak. If we do nothing to rationalize candidacies, we will soon come to a point where we will be blocked in our elections…and it is my role as leader to anticipate [these problems] or else face reproach” (Quoted in Mbaye 2018). Some opposition leaders denounced the law as a thinly veiled attempt to bureaucratically handicap the President’s potential contenders in 2019.

Others argued that the law erected undue barriers to the freedoms of expression and association, relegating political party members to the same onerous requirements to collect elector signatures that independent candidates had to follow to be on the ballot. Other civil society figures pointed out that the administration could more effectively address the issues at hand by effectively enforcing the 1981 Law on Political Parties, which allows the Ministry of Interior to de-register parties when they fail to prove that they have a headquarters, hold regular meetings, and keep transparent financial records on an annual basis. Galvanized by these contentious debates, protesters took to the Dakar streets when the National Assembly voted on the law. Across the city, the state frequently greeted protesters with tear gas and other aggressive police actions; inside the National Assembly, the majority parliamentary group rejected the opposition’s request for debate and the parliamentary opposition boycotted the vote. Nevertheless, the constitutional revision passed and was promulgated that May. In June, the Assembly revised the electoral code to harmonize it with the provisions of the new law.1 The President’s reference to the country’s 300 registered parties during the parrainage debate is just one of the most recent ways that Senegalese people have expressed concern about party proliferation and its consequences. Senegalese legislators in the International Organization of Francophonie (OIF) were among those who wrote the Commission of Parliamentary Affairs report on this subject in 2001, concluding that “the proliferation of parties brings about the dilution of power, a poor visibility of existing political actors, and…damage to democracy” (Abdrahman 2001: 271). Citizens lament the preponderance of “telephone booth parties,” parochial parties of so few members that they could all fit into a telephone booth together. These tendencies came into relief under Abdoulaye Wade but have continued under Sall. In 2016, the political scientist, Babacar Justin Ndiaye, told Jeune Afrique that “the goal of these microparties, some of which only exist on paper, is to occupy the media space before integrating a coalition and proceeding to collect their rewards” (Quoted in Bâ 2016). In 2017, Moundiaye Cissé, the leader of a prominent development NGO, reiterated what OIF legislators had lamented 15 years earlier, stating that “there is an efflorescence of political parties that distorts the clarity of the politics in play,” and that party proliferation “is a menace for democracy” (Badiane 2017: 13). This chapter explores multiple aspects of these claims, seeking to answer several questions. Why have so many politicians formed parties in Senegal? What are the logics of party formation that contribute to proliferation and 3 PARTY FORMATION AND PROLIFERATION ON SENEGAL’S UNEVEN… 61 what factors influence these logics? The chapter offers answers to these questions based on descriptive statistics and qualitative analysis of dis- course about party creation. The research herein features a combination of government data on parties and elections, as well as quantitative and qualitative data gathered through interviews with party leaders, journalists, professors, and civil society leaders immersed in domestic politics. The results show that the logics of party formation are complex, multiple, and layered. Senegal has various parties that compete in elections and attempt to forge stable constituencies among voters. However, the proportion of parties that are primarily election-oriented is low; party creation is more often an effective tool to lobby for state resources and negotiate patronage from the president than it is a means of regular electoral contestation or vote maximization. The existence of an uneven playing field, a hallmark of competitive authoritarian regimes, amplifies incentives for this kind of proliferation. It does so by enabling presidents to reward and perpetuate patronage-oriented party formation, as well as by motivating politicians to refrain from regularized electoral competition that is difficult and costly. Presidents can craft reward systems that encourage proliferation, deploying their skewed access to state resources, institutions, and the media. Politicians who make decisions about creating parties in this context are aware of the difficulties that they will have surviving without support from the state. The parties emerging under these circumstances are thus more likely to be patronage-oriented in the first place, channeling their support toward the president. The limited degree of electoral contestation that most parties pursue under these conditions raises a question about proliferation: why do so many politicians create parties in Senegal if not to contest elections? Building on research about the “local understanding and use” of concepts like democracy, political legitimacy, and electoral processes, the analysis herein seeks to inductively study what various politicians say about what purposes party formation serves for them, as well as what they actually do with their parties once they are formed (Schaffer 1998: x; Comaroff and Comaroff 2012). Section 3.1 describes patterns of party proliferation in Senegal throughout the multiparty period. Section 3.2 offers explanations for the timing and duration of proliferation, analyzing how political opportunity structures and presidential styles of governing the party system correlate with patterns of proliferation. Section 3.3 provides insight into the multiple, layered logics that interviewees cite as motivations for party formation, including ideology, programmatic goals, intraparty conflict, and political norms about seniority and status. It demonstrates that despite these 62 C. L. KELLY

layered logics, under Wade, parties that never contested national elections or did so erratically were more common than parties that regularly contested them. Section 3.4 analyzes how the uneven playing field has reified the conditions for proliferation, not only under Abdou Diouf and Abdoulaye Wade but also under Sall, whose regime is considered more democratic, but still struggles in the domain of civil liberties and the rule of law. Section 3.5 concludes.

3.1 Patterns of Party Proliferation As stated in Chap. 1, party proliferation is a fairly recent phenomenon in Senegal. Party formation accelerated from the late 1990s onward, nearly two decades after Senegal held its first post-independence multiparty presidential elections in 1978. This pattern contrasts with what social scientists would expect to see: spikes in party formation just before a country’s founding set of multiparty elections, as well as subsequent declines in the number of parties. These dynamics are considered part of a natural process in which politicians react to new rules of the game, use initial elections to measure their electoral competitiveness, and adjust their ambitions and activities accordingly. Consequently, the number of registered parties should decline after founding elections, as the leaders of newfound parties that do not perform well in initial elections disappear or fuse with other, more successful parties to increase their chances of winning office in future races. Nevertheless, by mid-2011—nearly 20 years after most African countries’ shifts to multiparty politics and over 30 years after Senegal’s shift in this direction—Senegal had 174 registered parties, a number that had tripled from 58 parties at the end of the year 2000. The total number of parties continued to rise thereafter, reaching 300 in mid-2018. These patterns illustrate that party formation was more than just a temporary reaction to the new kinds of political opportunities after the transition to multiparty politics in the 1970s.

The Timeline of Proliferation Party proliferation was not a marked feature of Senegal’s transition to multipartism from 1974 to 1981. The country’s first president, Leopold Sédar Senghor, ran a de facto single-party state from 1963 until 1974, when he approved Abdoulaye Wade’s request to establish the Senegalese 3 PARTY FORMATION AND PROLIFERATION ON SENEGAL’S UNEVEN… 63

Democratic Party (PDS), under the condition that the PDS would not be an opponent, but instead a “party of contribution” to the ruling Socialist Party (PS). In 1976, Senghor passed the “law of the three trends,” declaring the PS as Senegal’s official social democratic party, the PDS the official liberal-democratic party, and the African Independence Party (PAI) as the state-approved Marxist party. These measures ensured the controlled liberalization of the political arena and precluded participation by other potentially threatening parties. The National Democratic Assembly (Rassemblement Nationale Démocratique, RND), led by Professor Cheikh Anta Diop, sought formal recognition before the passage of the 1976 law. However, the administration refused to register the party until 1981 despite the approval of a fourth, conservative ideological current in 1978, represented by the Senegalese Republican Movement (Mouvement Républicain Sénégalais, MRS) (RND 1999). Senghor’s successor, President Abdou Diouf, expanded citizens’ rights to create parties. The 1981 Political Parties Law, which remains in force today, ended direct state control over the number of parties, allowing anyone who meets the administrative requirements to form a party. By the end of 1981, there were 14 registered political parties (Nzouankeu 1984). Many had been clandestine opposition groups during single-party authoritarianism under Senghor and had well-established ideological support bases. They included the RND, the Democratic League-Movement for the Workers’ Party (Ligue Démocratique/Mouvement pour le Parti du Travail, LD/MPT), led by Abdoulaye Bathily; and the Party of Independence and Workers (Parti de l’Indépendance et du Travail, PIT) led by Amath Dansokho. Bathily and Dansokho had been active in the PAI before forming their own leftist parties in the 1970s. Several others who created parties in 1981 had also severed ties with other Senegalese parties to create their own organizations. This was the case for ex-Prime Minister, Mamadou Dia, who founded the Movement for Socialism and Unity (Mouvement pour le Socialisme et l’Unité, MSU) and for Oumar Wone, the physician and former anti-colonial activist who created the Senegalese Popular Party (Parti Populaire Sénégalais, PPS). Dia had established the Senegalese Democratic Bloc (Bloc Démocratique Sénégalais, BDS), the PS’s precursor, with President Senghor but was imprisoned for 11 years afterwards under accusations of fomenting a coup d’état. After Dia got amnesty, he became involved in the RND, only later to create the MSU (FKA/CESTI 2001: 106). Wone had been in the PAI but left it a decade before creating the PPS (157). 64 C. L. KELLY

Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the rate of party formation increased mildly. A few (mostly leftist) parties fused or disappeared, but the overall number of registered parties increased as competition continued. By the end of 1997, the number of parties had increased to 26. At that time, Landing Savané had become leader of And-Jëf/African Party for Democracy and Socialism (And-Jëf/Parti Africain pour la Démocratie et Socialisme, AJ/PADS), which formed through the fusion of several leftist parties and movements. Exiting parties also splintered and led to new party formation. The Assembly of African Workers—Senegal (Rassemblement des Travailleurs Africains—Sénégal, RTA/S), led by El Hadji Momar Sambe, broke away from AJ/PADS and was formally registered in 1995. When Cheikh Anta Diop, founding father of the RND, died in 1986, the party’s leadership succession process fostered the creation of the Union for Democracy and Federalism (Union pour la Démocratie et le Fédéralisme/Mboolo mi, UDF) and the Senegalese Patriotic Assembly (Union Patriotique Sénégalais/Jammi Rewmi, RPS). Beginning in the late 1980s, ideological and patronage-based disputes within the PDS also fostered splits that led to the creation of new parties, most notably the PDS/Renovation (PDS/R) of the PDS’s former youth leader, Serigne Diop, and the Centrist Bloc Lions (Bloc Centristes Gaïndé, BCG) of the Dakar businessman, Jean-Paul Dias. Religious figures still did not often form parties, although the Moustarchidine movement led by Moustapha Sy actively opposed the re-election of Abdou Diouf in 1993. One exception was the party of Cheikh Abdoulaye Dièye, an Islamic intellectual who created the Democratic and Social Front (Front Démocratique et Sociale/Benno Jubel, FSD/BJ) in 1996. The FSD/BJ grew out of a neighborhood development movement that Dièye led in Saint-Louis, but it also made religion’s relationship to the secular state a more prominent element in national political debates. Party creation began to accelerate in the late 1990s, markedly around the 1998 National Assembly elections and the 2000 presidential race that led to Senegal’s first change in the ruling party in 40 years. The number of parties more than doubled between 1998 and 2000 alone, the two years when citizens and party elites were increasingly cognizant of the ruling party’s weakness. By March 1998, the date of the National Assembly elections in which the PS won just over 50% of the vote, there were 29 registered parties; by the end of the year 2000, less than nine months after Wade won the 2000 presidential elections, the number rose to 58. By the 3 PARTY FORMATION AND PROLIFERATION ON SENEGAL’S UNEVEN… 65 end of 2007, soon after Wade was re-elected, Senegal boasted over 100 parties. In 2012, Macky Sall took office in a system with over 200 parties, and the number grew to nearly 300 by mid-2018.

A Paucity of Primarily Election-Oriented Parties Table 3.1 summarizes the characteristics of all 46 parties registered during Senegal’s initial wave of proliferation (1998–2003), which coincided with alternance. The author gathered data on parties’ electoral participation through interviews with party leaders and Senegalese political analysts, newspaper research on party activity, electoral coalition rosters, and national election data. The latter tracks the participation and performance of various parties and coalitions in elections but does not indicate the composition of competing coalitions, making it difficult to break down electoral activity party-by-party without doing archival research or interviews with party and coalition leaders to fill gaps. Due to the laborious nature of this work, the author strategically focused in depth upon the 46 sampled parties created around alternance.2 Overall, the analysis reveals a paucity of primarily election-oriented parties during the period of study. The full range of parties in this sample includes those that consistently contest national elections, those that do sometimes, and others that never do. However, the proportion of parties that regularly contest national elections is low; it is more common for parties to run in elections on a limited, unsystematic basis or for them not to contest national elections at all. The fact that most parties are not primarily election-oriented contrasts with the canonical definition of parties as teams of politicians vying for elected office. Understanding Senegal’s patterns of party proliferation thus also requires analyzing why politicians would create parties if not primarily to contest elections.

Table 3.1 Parties Degree of contestation Frequency of parties running on their label in national races, by Regular contestation 6 degree of contestation Limited contestation 9 No contestation 31

Sources: Journal Officiel de la République du Sénégal 1998, 2000, 2001, 2007, 2012; Kamara 2007 66 C. L. KELLY

Parties that regularly contested national elections on their own during the Wade presidency are the rarest type. These parties are defined as having run candidates on their own labels in at least all National Assembly elections held since they were formed, if not also in presidential contests. The Alliance of Forces for Progress (Alliance des Forces du Progrès, AFP) led by Moustapha Niasse and the Union for Democratic Renewal (Union pour le Rénouveau Démocratique, URD) led by Djibo Kâ are prime examples. The AFP, established in 1999 after Niasse ended an illustrious career in the PS, ran against President Diouf in 2000. After a brief stint as Prime Minister that ended before the first National Assembly elections of the Wade era, Niasse led the AFP’s opposition campaigns in all of the national- level elections during the Wade presidency. Kâ, too, was a prominent statesman who left the PS after party leadership forbade him to establish a faction. He formed the URD, which supported Diouf in 2000 and ran on its own label in all national-level races under Wade thereafter. The URD continued to run on its own in National Assembly races even after Kâ allied with President Wade in 2004 and chose not to run for president against him in 2007 or 2012. Parties that run in elections for a limited time on their own are more common. These parties often contest elections soon after their founding, but do not do so regularly, or have leaders who only intend to do so temporarily. For instance, the African Renaissance Party (Parti de la Rénaissance Africaine, Parena) was founded by Marième Wone Ly just before the 2000 elections, but it did not contest multiple national elections alone. Ly was the first woman to create her own party, leaving her position as the women’s wing leader in the Convention of Democrats and Patriots/The Remedy (Convention des Démocrates et Patriotes, CDP/ Garab gi), a parliamentary party. She increased her name recognition by announcing a run for president in 2000, yet withdrew without paying the fees to make her candidacy official. Parena then ran on its own label for the National Assembly in 2001. Ly had stated her intent to “contest the local elections, the legislatives, and why not the 2007 presidency if God is willing” (quoted in FKA/CESTI 2001: 156). However, after an unsuccessful bid for a parliamentary seat, Parena joined the presidential entourage in 2004 and never again ran independently. Along similar lines, the Senegalese Liberal Party (Parti Libéral Sénégalais, PLS) was created to prove its leader’s electoral worth for a limited time. From its inception in 1998, Ousmane Ngom indicated that the PLS’s purpose was to negotiate his clientele’s re-entry into his party of 3 PARTY FORMATION AND PROLIFERATION ON SENEGAL’S UNEVEN… 67 origin, the PDS, after the party structure changed in 1997. Ngom created the PLS in 1998, ran in the 1999 Senatorial race, and contested the 2001 National Assembly election. During the campaign, the PLS was in the opposition, yet Ngom attended private negotiations with Wade at the Presidential Palace. After winning a parliamentary seat in 2001, his negotiations intensified. By 2003, the PLS had effectively fused with the PDS. Politically, Ngom reintegrated the PDS and took ministerial appointments in Wade’s governments but did not formally de-register the party. The PLS is thus best classified as a party of limited contestation during the Wade era, given that it ran on its own label in the 1998 and 2001 National Assembly elections but did not in 2007 or 2012. Many parties never contest national elections. There are two variants of this type of party: those that collaborate with the president and those whose leaders work with prominent opposition leaders. The Popular Front (Front Populaire, FP) is an example of the former. It was created by Bacar Dia, a physician from an elite Halpulaar family, who had been a state employee as doctor-in-chief at Gaston Berger University in Saint-Louis and the Senegalese Water Company (Sénégalaise des Eaux, SDE). The FP was registered in 2003, after President Wade courted Dia for over a year, inviting him on official trips abroad and “convincing [him] to enter the government.”3 Although Dia had no ministerial experience, Wade appointed him several times, first as Minister of National, Regional, and International Parliamentary Relations, then as Minister of Infrastructure, government spokesperson, and Minister of Communication. Toward the end of Wade’s second term, Dia dissented with the president’s attempts to foster a filial succession within the presidency and the PDS, as well as with his push to amend the constitution to establish a vice-presidency. Dia eventually left Wade’s entourage to join Idrissa Seck’s 2012 presidential campaign. The Senegalese Popular Bloc (Bloc Populaire Sénégalais, BPS) repre- sents the second variant of parties that never contest national elections. It has never run on its own label in national races, but its leader, Souleymane Ndiaye “Brin,” has consistently endorsed Ousmane Tanor Dieng of the PS. Brin was a former leader of Senegal’s sports associations (navétanes) both nationally and in his hometown of Thiès. The PS courted him throughout the 1990s. Yet he resisted joining the PS and instead created a micro-party that “is not power-seeking” nationally and whose main goal is “the defense of ideas,” which does not require a mass following.4 Maintaining a micro-party has helped Brin avoid having to fight for a 68 C. L. KELLY prominent place within the PS’s large party hierarchy, while still benefiting from alliances with the PS on the local level. The party has also advanced some non-electoral priorities, including “the quest for permanent political engagement in service of [the] country and its disadvantaged youth,” as well as “organizing marches, submitting petitions, and holding conferences.” Brin is representative of several party leaders with leftist roots who gain expressive benefits from being in the opposition, despite not seeking national elected office or negotiating immediate access to the state.

Other Characteristics of the Sampled Parties The 46 founders featured in this chapter have additional political, economic, and social characteristics of note.5 Demographically, most of them have organizations that are based in Dakar and its suburbs like Rufisque, Guediawaye, and Pikine. The modal ethnicity of the sampled party leaders is Wolof, which is not particularly surprising since the Wolof constitute Senegal’s largest ethnic group. Additionally, most party leaders (an estimated 74%) have family names suggesting that their ancestors were not from a lower caste in Senegal’s precolonial societies. Casted individuals have ancestors who did not hail from the families of freemen or slaves, but were instead griots, courtesans, or manual laborers (woodcutters, sculp- tors, jewelers, metalworkers, etc.) (Gellar 2005: 20).6 These trends fit with other findings that politicians of casted origins continue to be less prominent in politics, either as party founders or officeholders (Mbow2000 ). The party leaders also tend to be well-educated, older men with a variety of occupations and financial resources. The average age of founders in the sample is 60; only one was female. Their modal level of education was a post-high school vocational diploma, which encompasses credentials like teacher certification diplomas, training to be a government administrator, correspondence courses, and formal training in journalism. People with various levels of higher education (bachelor’s, master’s, or doctorate) out- number those with various levels of less education. In terms of occupation, founders are most often private sector businessmen or private consultants, as well as teachers.7 Seventy-two percent of founders had belonged to another party before founding their own8; of those with that previous party experience, 45% had been members of the PS before alternance and 54% had been national- level staff in the PS or another party before founding their own organizations.9 Only one person in the sample had created a party before. Most 3 PARTY FORMATION AND PROLIFERATION ON SENEGAL’S UNEVEN… 69 founders had been involved in some sort of civil society group prior to creating their own parties, and several had already led organizations with regional or national renown. The most notable examples of figures who were successful in translating their civil society followings into party-based support include Abdou Latif Guèye, who had directed since 1982 the nationally renowned non-governmental organization, Jamra, as well as Talla Sylla, whose Alliance for Progress and Justice/Jëf-Jël (Alliance pour le Progrès et la Justice/Jëf-Jël ) party grew out of the Youth for Turnover (Jeunesse pour l’Alternance, JPA) association he had been building since 1993.10 Others attempted to convert mutual aid associations, political reflection groups, and social movements into parties.11

3.2 What Explains the Timing and Duration of Proliferation? Two contextual factors help to explain why party creation began to accelerate in 1998 and continued thereafter. New political opportunities that arose around the time of Senegal’s first change in the ruling party in 2000 (alternance) are clearly associated with the country’s initial acceleration in the number of parties. Presidential styles of governance of the party system also mattered, with Wade’s active encouragement of party creation during his presidency contributing to marked increases relative to the Diouf era, when the president was only a passive enabler of the phenomenon.

Changes in Political Opportunities Around Alternance One of the singular political moments in Senegalese history was the 2000 handover of power from Abdou Diouf to Abdoulaye Wade. Because the PS had ruled Senegal for its first 40 years of independence, the decline of the PS’s electoral dominance was a watershed moment in the country’s politics. Many politicians who were active in the 1990s sensed the PS’s weakening over the course of the decade, as the ongoing effects of Senegal’s participation in structural adjustment programs and fluctuations in food prices on the global export market increased the scarcity of patronage available for incumbents to distribute. As the PS’s electoral margins declined throughout the 1990s and patronage scarcity in the ruling party became more acute, politicians gained a heightened sense of opportunity for turnover. 70 C. L. KELLY

When the number of registered parties began to accelerate in 1998, Senegal was experiencing a particularly intense moment of economic difficulty and ruling party weakness. First, the ruling PS’s electoral hegemony had declined significantly from 71.3% of the vote in the 1988 National Assembly elections, 56.6% in 1993, and 50.2% in 1998. Party formation became more attractive in this context because cascades of support for electoral opposition figures were more likely. Some politicians anticipating a turnover wanted to ready themselves by setting up organizational structures to vie for local and legislative offices that would become more feasible to contest after alternance; others sought to make their presence in the political sphere better known by forming parties and using them to bandwagon behind Wade or negotiate alliances with Diouf before the 2000 elections. Second, the decline of the peanut economy and the long-term effects of structural adjustment had created economic grievances in the late 1980s and 1990s that fostered urban unrest and damaged Diouf’s popularity. After the establishment of a democratic electoral code in 1992, the playing field remained uneven, but opposition candidates had greater chances of winning thanks to increased access to state media, expansion of the electorate to include those 18–21, ballot secrecy, and improved measures for domestic election observation and ballot counting. Amid this increased uncertainty, the Khalifas General of Senegal’s Sufi Muslim orders ceased to command their disciples to vote for the ruling party as they had in prior decades. Third, the PS weakened after its 1996 Party Congress, when President Diouf designated his chief of staff, Ousmane Tanor Dieng, as his successor within the PS and forbade internal factions. This set the scene for the defections of several PS barons with clientelistic followings, particularly those who had become sidelined within (or had quit) PS party institutions (Diop et al. 2000). The defections of Djibo Kâ in 1998 and Moustapha Niasse in 1999 were telltale signs of ruling party weakness. Both had been members of the PS since their youth, had been ministers with prominent portfolios under Senghor and Diouf, and had been long-standing members of the PS Political Bureau. Their exits emboldened existing and potential opposition figures as the 2000 presidential race approached. The Diouf administration also initiated constitutional changes in 1998, including a removal of the two-term limit for the presidency (Fall 2011). These last-minute institutional changes were followed in 1999 by Diouf’s revival of the Senate, an institution that was partially packable by the 3 PARTY FORMATION AND PROLIFERATION ON SENEGAL’S UNEVEN… 71

president and partially selected by other elected officials, the majority of whom were PS members. These reforms also suggested that the ruling party was under stress and seeking additional ways to distribute patronage and consolidate power before the 2000 elections. These dynamics colored politicians’ assessments of political opportunities in the Senegalese party system. Between the 1998 National Assembly elections and the 2000 presidential election, many politicians perceived that Diouf’s defeat was a serious possibility (Diop 2011). As Imam Mbaye Niang, the leader of the Movement for Social and Democratic Reform (Mouvement pour la Réforme Démocratique et Sociale, MRDS) put it, as the 2000 elections approached, the PS “had started to be denounced by our compatriots” because “the cost of living was high.”12 Pape Mody Sow, leader of the Party for Hope and Progress (Parti de l’Espoir et du Progrès, PEP), also indicated that 1998 was the year when he and his followers decided that their goal was to “get rid of Diouf and facilitate a sharing of power.”13 Aliou Seck, leader of the National Movement of Servants of the Masses (Mouvement National de Serviteurs des Masses, MNSM), recalls that after Djibo Kâ’s formation of the URD and its strong performance in the 1998 race, it was clear that the PS would fall if there were additional defections.14 Party formation, which increased markedly between 1998 and 2000, allowed ambitious politicians to preserve the autonomy they would need in order to forge alliances with whoever ended up winning office. However, the acceleration in party formation continued well after Senegal’s presidential turnover in 2000, which suggests that patronage scarcity and ruling party weakness are not the sole causes of proliferation. In the 2007 presidential election, Wade’s victory was not as fundamentally in question as Diouf’s had been in 2000. The ruling PDS had experienced a major defection—that of Wade’s ex-Prime Minister and high-level party official, Idrissa Seck—and social tensions were high due to rising utility prices, unemployment, and high costs of living. However, Wade had only been governing for six years, and voters were generally willing to give him more time to keep all of his campaign promises, some because of the desire to delay the political uncertainty of another turnover, and others because of the visible improvements in public infrastructure during his first term (Diop 2011: 302; Magrin 2007). Despite a lower likelihood of alternance in 2007 and fewer opportunities for new parties to access power through a rupture in the existing system of governance, Senegal had 79 registered parties at the end of 2004 and 96 by the time of the 2007 presidential elections. 72 C. L. KELLY

These patterns do not rule out the possibility that Senegal’s alternance in 2000 generated permanent changes in popular perceptions of political opportunity, with politicians consistently perceiving higher chances of winning office after turnover. Nevertheless, comparative patterns suggest that proliferation may not be solely a function of political opportunity calculations tied to prospects for turnover. In Burkina Faso, there were 40 parties at the start of 2001, ten years after the country’s transition to multipartism, and 123 in 2009, several years before the end of Blaise Compaoré’s 27 years of rule in 2014. In Cameroon, proliferation has accelerated from 175 parties at the start of 2002, ten years after the shift to multipartism under Paul Biya, to 304 parties to date. This pattern pre- vails despite the fact that Cameroon has yet to experience a presidential turnover through the ballot box.

Presidential Styles of Governing the Party System Another factor explaining the spike in party formation after 1998 is Abdoulaye Wade’s power retention strategy. Wade reinforced proliferation after he became president in 2000, using powers that were magnified on an uneven playing field to reward the creation of patronage-oriented parties, particularly those that collaborated with him and joined the ruling coalition after their founding. Both President Diouf (1981–2000) and President Wade (2000–2012) passively enabled proliferation. Neither used his party’s command of parliamentary majorities to amend the 1981 Political Parties Law, which sets low administrative barriers to party formation. (Politicians who seek to form parties are only required to provide biographical information about themselves and two other party officers, party statutes, and minutes from the first General Assembly establishing the organization). However, in contrast to Diouf, who relied largely on this legal measure to regulate citizen incentives for party creation, Wade took additional, active measures to promote party formation by institu- tionalizing the distribution of rewards to party leaders who joined his ruling coalition. By rewarding the political parties that joined the ruling entourage with material support and linkages to the state, Wade more overtly and actively fostered party formation as a divide-and-rule tactic than Diouf had. To an extent, these differences can be explained by the different electoral imperatives that the two presidents faced. Through the 1998 National Assembly elections, Diouf headed a ruling party that was capable of mobi- 3 PARTY FORMATION AND PROLIFERATION ON SENEGAL’S UNEVEN… 73 lizing over 50% of the Senegalese vote on its own. With the ruling party itself, along with just a few allied parties and support movements, Diouf could reasonably hope to mobilize a presidential majority in future elections. He did not consistently encourage party creation or promote it as the main way of fragmenting the opposition. Instead, he focused on temporarily co-opting Senegal’s major parliamentary parties in between national elections, bringing their leaders into his governments and, in some cases, weakening their images as committed opponents. In contrast, Wade took office with a ruling party that had not won over 50% of the vote on its own in the first round of the 2000 elections, despite having unseated Diouf through the bandwagoning of other opposition parties in the runoff. As president, Wade needed to ensure that he could mobilize over 50% of the vote in future races. However, he needed to find a way to achieve that without relying heavily upon allies whose parties were independent enough to consider abandoning the ruling coalition during presidential campaigns, whether to run on their own or to join another opposition coalition. Thus, while seeking to bring major opposition parties into his governments as Diouf had, Wade additionally cultivated an oversized coalition of many small parties that splintered from major opposition parties or originated in civil society. Wade had an interest in attracting even smaller parties because the most loyal partisan allies were often parties led by politicians with smaller voter clienteles. To this end, Wade created the Coalition Around the President for the 21st Century (Cap 21), a club through which almost any party leader could access regularized streams of small-scale patronage in exchange for loyalty to Wade. The president’s reward system encouraged new party leaders to support the ruling coalition while also tempting members of larger, pre-existing opposition parties to break away, create their own organizations, and support him. In this way, the Cap 21 encouraged splintering from parliamentary opposition parties, reinforcing the fragmentation of groups that might have otherwise posed greater electoral threats to the PDS. Table 3.2 tracks patterns of splintering among all 46 parties founded 1998–2003, the five years surrounding Senegal’s firstalternance in 2000. It breaks parties into three categories: those that splintered from parties that had run on their own labels at least once in a national election (“electorally relevant opposition parties”), those that were the result of splintering from the PDS (the ruling party during most of the period of study), and those that were not the direct result of the splintering of parties in the system 74 C. L. KELLY

Table 3.2 Presidential co-optation of new parties, 1998–2003

Party origins Total Number (%) co-opted

Split from electorally relevant opposition 20 14 (70%) Split from ruling party 5 4 (80%) Externally mobilized 17 12 (71%) No data 2

Sources: Author’s fieldwork interviews, coalition rosters, Senegalese national newspapers

(“externally mobilized parties”). Overall, 25 of 46 parties had split from the ruling party or electorally relevant opposition parties and 18 of them were eventually (if not immediately) co-opted by Wade. Twenty split from opposition parties that had run at least once in a presidential or legislative election, and 12 of the parties that eventually joined Wade’s camp had founders who had split from an electorally relevant opposition party and had been national-level leaders in that party. Thus, the defection of opposition politicians who then created pro-Wade parties further fragmented the opposition and reduced its cohesiveness and mobilizing power.

3.3 What Explains the Types of Parties Resulting from Proliferation? There are multiple, layered logics of party formation in Senegal. Party leaders often articulate logics of party creation that are based on factors like ideology, programmatic goals, intraparty conflict, normative dynamics related to seniority and social status. Yet in addition, statistics about the behavior of newly founded parties—as well as critical analysis by Senegalese academics and pundits—suggest that many parties are formed more primarily for negotiating access to the state than for regularly contesting elections. Most party leaders make decisions about party formation based upon a mix of several of these different logics; nevertheless, across many cases, one of the most common characteristics of parties is their negotiation of patronage from the president.

Party Formation as Patronage Negotiation Although founders often use other types of logics to describe their reason- ing for creating a party, there is ample evidence that parties are often tools 3 PARTY FORMATION AND PROLIFERATION ON SENEGAL’S UNEVEN… 75 for negotiating patronage that does not hinge upon regularly contesting national elections. Prior to the 2012 presidential elections, only 43 of Senegal’s 174 registered parties had ever run for seats in the National Assembly and 15 of these 43 only ever ran one time. The number of parties that consistently ran on their own labels and on multiple occasions in national elections is even lower. Of the parties created between 1998 and 2003, only 16 of 46 ran on their own label for these national offices at least once, and just 12 ran more than once. Similarly, on the local level, some of the sampled parties hold offices, but their leaders are quite limited in the scope of the power that they wield. Senegal’s mayors and presidents of rural communities (présidents des communuautés rurales, PCRs) are chosen according to majority rule by the members of the council of any given locality, and many leaders of registered parties do not even reach this echelon of local power. In the 1996 municipal elections, the ruling PS controlled nearly all mayorships and PCR positions. By 2002, in the first local races under Wade, a wider range of parties gained access to these posts, but the ruling PDS continued to dominate, commanding 58% of mayorships and 55% of rural councilorships.15 Furthermore, regardless of their initial participation in elections, around two-thirds of the party leaders in the 1998–2003 sample moved into the president’s ruling coalition after their birth. This pattern is partially a function of the incentives for coalition-building in Senegal’s electoral system and of constant increases in the financial costs of running a party ticket. But the bulk of the coalescence occurring is with the ruling party rather than with opposition parties. Such rallying around the president is striking in Senegal’s strong presidential system because coalition- building is not institutionally necessary for the formation of a government or the construction of a legislative majority. Yet, many of these Senegalese parties’ alliances with incumbents last across several elections. Among all 174 parties founded by mid-2011, the best conservative estimate is that 45% (at least 79) have negotiated their way into the president’s graces in return for perks that he can provide through the state. The estimate is conservative because these 79 parties all publicly negotiated their way into power, either by joining the Cap 21 or by pursuing a bilateral alliance with the PDS. Other party leaders may have negotiated more informal collaborations that we cannot detect by consulting coalition rosters and newspaper reports. 76 C. L. KELLY

A cursory look at sources of party splits in Senegal also suggests that some immediate benefits to party creation come from patronage that founders can extract by joining the president’s ruling entourage. On several occasions, parties have split as a result of internal debate about keeping the party in the opposition versus integrating the president’s ruling coalition. For example, the Union for Democratic Renewal/Front for Turnover (URD/Front pour l’Alternance, URD/FAL) split from the URD when Djibo Kâ chose to negotiate with Abdou Diouf between the two rounds of the 2000 election and oppose Abdoulaye Wade in the historic runoff. The very name of the party reflects the patronage-oriented source of the conflict; FAL signals that the members of URD/FAL distinguish themselves from Djibo Kâ’s URD on the basis of their membership in Wade’s FAL coalition in 2000.16 The URD/FAL bandwagoned with Wade and received a ministerial post in Wade’s first government. Similar divergences affected the MSU. Founded by ex-Prime Minister Mamadou Dia in 1981, the MSU bandwagoned behind Wade in the 2000 runoff, but was riven with disagreement between the founding father and the party coordinator, Mamadou Bamba Ndiaye, about whether to ally with the PDS in the 2001 National Assembly elections (FKA/CESTI 2001: 133). In February 2001, Dia replaced Ndiaye, but Ndiaye claimed legitimacy as the party coordinator because there had been no party congress to justify the replacement. Ndiaye led a faction of the party called MSU/ Cap 21 that allied with Wade, joined the Cap 21, and accessed patronage unconnected to electoral performance. In 2006, as another presidential election approached, Ndiaye transformed MSU/Cap 21 into the People’s Movement for Socialism (Mouvement Populaire Socialiste, MPS) in order “to continue to participate” in politics as the MSU splintered into several different factions favoring various presidential candidates.17 Other party splits occurred after a party had entered into a tactical alliance with the Wade government. These splits were a direct product of debates among parties’ top staff members about whether to continue accessing state resources that they had been enjoying. Mbaye Diack, the former third-in-command of the LD/MPT, did not receive one of the three ministerial posts that Wade offered the LD in his government during the first five years of his rule. But when the LD Political Bureau decided to leave the Wade government, Wade offered Diack an appointment as Adjunct Secretary General of the Presidency and Diack formed a new party, the Union of Emerging Patriotic Forces (Union des Forces Patriotiques Emergentes, UFPE), in order to remain in the ruling coalition 3 PARTY FORMATION AND PROLIFERATION ON SENEGAL’S UNEVEN… 77

(Diop 2011). Similar dynamics rippled through AJ/PADS. Landing Savané, the party president, had refused to join Diouf’s governments, but was a minister in Wade’s government throughout all seven years of his first term along with AJ’s deputy, Mamadou Diop Decroix. Savané also ran for president in 2007 while remaining in Wade’s government, which confused certain AJ party members and Senegalese voters. In response, a faction of old guard AJ/PADS officials, calledYoonu Askan wi (YAW, Path of the People), denounced Savané and Decroix for continuing in their government appointments and demanded their return to the opposition. YAW became a party in 2008, after its members were excluded from AJ/PADS. A variety of parties with less well-known leaders who were not as likely to negotiate their way into high-level, non-elected posts were still able to work within parameters that Wade set to access smaller-scale patronage. Members of the Cap 21 were promised weekly meetings with an intermediary appointed by the president; monthly salaries of 300,000 FCFA ($150 USD); opportunities to meet in groups with the president himself; funding to campaign for the president in their home areas and to develop their image as networked politicians; and possibilities to enter the president’s broader social network, which provided party leaders and their followers the social capital to solve personal problems that require access to the state. Some also traveled with the president, received diplomatic pass- ports, and retained visibility to the administration that they believed increased their chances of gaining state employment. Because people could ensure that they “ha[d] rice and 250,000 FCFA per month” if they joined the ruling coalition after creating their organizations,18 party formation became “alimentary,” providing “shortcuts” to wealth or business success and allowing individuals to “approach Wade to receive money.” 19 These “parties of negotiation” with the government have become “portals of entry” into the president’s orbit and “shortcuts for obtaining a piece of the pie.”20 For instance, two people indicated that they founded parties after Wade won the presidency in order to join the ruling camp and help the president govern; another interviewee said that he created a party to “access the rewards distributed by the PDS” after fighting for years within civil society to improve working conditions.21 Although many of the organizations that participate in the Cap 21 have small bases of voter support and little capacity to win elections, they are still viewed as fostering a “legacy” for their creators.22 Party creation contributes to patronage negotiation by helping lesser-known politicians build reputations in the public sphere. Generally, party formation involves pomp 78 C. L. KELLY and circumstance, as “one leaves a [previous] party with one’s followers in order to come together in rallies [around the new party leader] that strongly resemble enthronement ceremonies” (Savané 1998). In forming a party, politicians are “displaying themselves,”23 often through the announcement of their party’s birth to the Senegalese media. Even “small parties that make noise”24 create for their leaders “a possibility to be named to posts and directorships”25 and set them up to “strike a deal with those in power.”26 By sparking public debates, mobilizations, or protests, new party leaders attempt to gain the president’s attention and make him “believe that you have a big group behind you.”27 Joining another politician’s party is less desirable because it requires becoming a “simple” organizational member, whereas the alternative is to become a party leader and therefore a direct interlocutor for one’s own interests. Only some party leaders build organizations that actually make them viable interlocutors. However, even for politicians who do not attain this goal, having a party can be lucrative during election campaigns even if the party does not present any candidates. Several interviewees mention that party founders can bandwagon with the president or with rich opposition candidates and secure material benefits with minimal commitments to their own party’s investment in electoral competition. Viable candidates make this possible by funding some of the leaders of small parties to campaign for them in their native localities. This allows party founders to exert material and moral clout within their communities in the name of the president, while their party gains renown for being the ruling coalition’s intermediary.28 Thus, politicians do not always have to win or even contest elections in order to meet their fundamental goals. Some create parties “to get themselves behind someone who has the possibility of winning,” not necessarily because they seek elected office themselves, but because they are “impatient” for state employment.29 However, it is not just the leaders of telephone booth parties who extract patronage from the president. Negotiating patronage was also a key activity of other party leaders who had run in national elections. Perhaps the most forthcoming about using his party to negotiate his way back into power was Ousmane Ngom, who left the PDS in 1998 to form the PLS, contested the 2001 legislative elections, and rejoined the PDS in 2003, becoming minister in Wade’s subsequent governments. Aloïse Gorgui Dione, creator of the Democratic Union of Progressive Patriotic Forces (Union Démocratique des Forces Progressistes Patriotiques, UDFPP), led the city of Fatick’s fifth branch (“tendance E”) of the PS for two and a half 3 PARTY FORMATION AND PROLIFERATION ON SENEGAL’S UNEVEN… 79 decades before forming his own party in 2001 in response to the “historic” 2000 elections. Although his party did not win a seat in the 2001 National Assembly elections, he mobilized 10,395 votes for his party just a month after the government formally registered it. He relied on this reputation and his connection to the Sine-Saloum region to garner the attention of the president and join the Cap 21, after which he was appointed Senator when Wade revived the institution in 2007. Similarly, after initially running in a national election, Marième Wone Ly of Parena formed a local electoral coalition with several new party leaders, all of whom joined Wade’s entourage within the first five years of their existence. Ly initially gained a technical counselor post in the administration when she joined the entourage in 2004 and Wade appointed her Senator in 2007.30 Bacar Dia, who did not even contest a national election with his party, the FP, had an even more illustrious stint in multiple ministries.31 Election-oriented party leaders like Djibo Kâ also engaged in patronage negotiation from early on in their party’s lives. The URD focused immediately on vying for power through elections because “the participation in the elections of May 1998 was necessary to evaluate, concretely and politically, the pertinence of the ideas and the vision that the Renouveau [informal faction within the PS] embodied” (Kâ 2005: 233). However, Kâ also met with both Diouf and Wade before the 2000 presidential runoff, negotiating with the candidates for patronage promises and ultimately going with Diouf. Thus, less than two years after leaving the PS—ostensibly for its lack of internal democracy and its rejection of the Renouveau’s right to exist—Kâ was striking deals with his former leader (Niang 2004). A tactical alliance with Wade after alternance bore further material fruit for Kâ from 2004 to 2012.

Ideological Objectives Ideology is another motivation for party creation cited by certain leaders. For instance, Samba Diouldé Thiam, who had belonged to the PIT—one of Senegal’s oldest leftist parties—said he founded the Party of Renaissance and Citizenship (Parti de la Renaissance et de la Citoyenneté, PRC) because he wanted to engage in politics “based either on ideas or ideology.” He wanted to create a “new kind of leftist party” that did not forsake its ideals to access power, referring to the PIT’s entry into several of President Diouf’s governments in the 1990s.32 Similarly, Ousmane Guèye worked with the humanist movement in Italy to found Senegal’s Humanist Party 80 C. L. KELLY

(Parti Humaniste, PH), which espouses internationally-endorsed ideals pursued by humanist parties around the world.33 Mbaye Niang, who was a government bureaucrat and religious leader of the Leopold Sédar Senghor Airport Mosque in Yoff, declared that he created the MRDS to promote the implementation of Islamic law and education systems in the country, policies that align with the reformist Islam that he preaches and promotes.34 However, as one Senegalese skeptic declared, “there cannot possibly be 160 different ideologies in Senegal!” If ideology motivated most politicians forming parties, then we would expect most parties to articulate specific, differentiable platforms and to ally with other actors sharing their commitments. Currently, most parties do not articulate particularly well- definedideologies in order to attract new recruits. Leaders often catego- rize their parties as “leftist,” “liberal,” or “neutral,” but these categories are not the basis of these party leaders’ subsequent coalition choices. Even the Senegalese parties that used to more accurately represent particular ideologies under Senghor have become more pragmatic. Formerly Marxist parties have joined PS and PDS governments and retain at best a small old guard committed to the parties’ original ideological principles, which had played more salient political roles during Senegal’s decolonization from France and the first three decades of independence (Diop2011 ; Morgenthau 1964).

Programmatic and Policy Objectives Programmatic goals are another declared motivation for party formation. For example, Abdou Latif Guèye, who had been a prominent Muslim NGO leader before founding the Assembly of Senegalese Democrats (Rassemblement Démocratique Sénégalais, RDS) in 2000, sought to pass an anti-drug enforcement law.35 He achieved this through painstaking efforts, by allying the RDS with the PDS in the 2001 legislative elections, getting elected to the National Assembly on the ruling party list, and using the relatively non-partisan nature of the law to build a parliamentary coalition for it. Building a policy agenda in a different way, the state bureaucrat and Islamic intellectual, Cheikh Abdoulaye Dièye, created the FSD/BJ party after it had already been functioning as an association “dedicated to revitalizing the city of Saint-Louis through the infusion of Amadou Bamba’s philosophy of life into politics” (Diallo and Kelly 2016: 13). Dièye stood for re-thinking “the use of the word laïque (secular) in the 3 PARTY FORMATION AND PROLIFERATION ON SENEGAL’S UNEVEN… 81 constitution, and the long-established (1972) family law, which he called for reforming along Islamic lines” (Villalón 2015: 323). Ousseynou Fall, the grandson of Cheikh Ibra Fall, founder of the Baye Fall branch of Mouridism, sought to mobilize parts of the Mouride electorate behind him to promote the principles of Cheikh Ahmadu Bamba. Constitutional issues (albeit different ones) were also important to Oumar Khassimou Dia, who helped to create the Circle of Young Socialist Professionals (Cercle des Jeunes Cadres Socialistes, CEJECAS) within the PS. After CEJECAS came out in favor of a parliamentary regime contrary to the rest of the party, PS leaders forbade CEJECAS from holding meetings at the PS headquarters. Unable to change the direction of the party as they had hoped, Dia and several others then created the Movement for Democracy and Socialism (Mouvement pour la Démocratie et le Socialisme/Naxx Jarinu, MDS/NJ) to promote “generational alternation” in politics (FKA/CESTI 2001: 108).36 Several green parties have also pursued programmatic goals and policy change in Senegal. One of the most prominent has been the Senegalese Ecological Assembly—The Greens (Rassemblement Ecologique du Sénégal- Les Verts, RES-Les Verts). The party’s leader, Ousmane Sow Huchard, wrote and promoted an ecological philosophy that influences the party’s actions. In addition to advancing the ideals of “eco-citizenship,” “active citizenship,” and “participatory democracy,” Huchard has represented RES-Les Verts in the National Assembly and called for audits of Senegal’s 2001 environmental code, audits of Senegal’s fishing agreements with international and industrial actors, the re-establishment of anti-tobacco laws, and investment in solar energy, among other policies and initiatives (Diop 2001; Barbier 2008; Fall 2005).37 The economy is another popular issue for new party leaders. Doudou Ndoye, an ex-minister from the PS government, an ex-founding member of the PDS, and a renowned constitutional lawyer from Dakar’s ethnically Lébou community, created the Union for the Republic (Union pour la République, UPR). It stood for rule of law, prevention of corruption, suppression of the death penalty, modification of the national domain law, and land rights for farmers (UPR 2000). The prominent Dakar businessman, Mamour Cissé, talked about founding the Social Democratic Party (Parti Social Démocrate, PSD/Jant bi) because “since the 1980s there ha[d] been no development policy in Senegal” and he wanted to help his country consider alternatives to relying on the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (Bacaly and Sané 2005). Along similar lines, 82 C. L. KELLY

Marième Wane Ly founded Parena with the hope of “improving the living conditions of the people.”38 An ex-police officer from Louga, Amadou Moctar Ndiaye, created the Assembly for Unity and Peace (Rassemblement pour l’Unité et la Paix, RUP) to assure that people get “the vital minimum to live.”39 Moustapha Fall “Ché,” a Kaolack native known for leftist activism under Senghor, founded Patriotic Action for Liberation (Action Patriotique pour la Libératon/Dog bumu gacce, APL), which went door to door to denounce “the skyrocketing of prices, the exorbitant cost of living, inflation, unemployment, and dictatorship” before the 2002 local elections (Quoted in Sud Quotidien 2001). However, these parties do not differ as much on these issues as they would if programmatic and policy goals were the main factor driving party formation in the system as a whole. Programmatic and policy objectives are central concerns for some Senegalese parties, but not others. For instance, certain politicians express generalized dissatisfaction with the programmatic or policy status quo but do not propose or promote specific reforms. Furthermore, multiple parties claim to stand for similar issues; party competition thus often hinges upon valence issues, meaning that politicians seek to promote themselves as the person best placed to deliver on policies that multiple candidates support (Bleck and Van de Walle 2011). Finally, while some parties have promoted programmatic causes throughout their existence, whether in opposition or the ruling coalition, others have accessed patronage through the Cap 21 or by fusing with the PDS without bargaining for progress on the issues that they had espoused when they created their party.

Grievances About Lack of Internal Democracy in Existing Parties A third possibility is that party creation results from democratic deficits within Senegal’s major parties, which exacerbates intraparty conflicts about the career advancement of elites within them. Under these conditions, party formation may be a tool for people to protest their exclusion from positions of power within their previous party. Djibo Kâ described his decades of work in the PS and the URD as standing for “the battle for internal democracy in parties.” When he created the URD in 1998, he had been working for seven years with a group of colleagues in the PS to develop the Renewal (Renouveau) faction. They had provided to Abdou Diouf “a document illustrative of the fundamentally antidemocratic methods and practices that characterized the PS’ 3 PARTY FORMATION AND PROLIFERATION ON SENEGAL’S UNEVEN… 83 internal elections in 1994–5” and asked him to “arbitrate so that internal democracy and transparency were rules within the PS” (Kâ 2005: 231). Tension intensified around the PS’s 1996 Party Congress, when Diouf unilaterally designated Ousmane Tanor Dieng as his successor and forbade debate about allowing party factions (Diop et al. 2000). In the same year, the PS leadership excluded Kâ from the Political Bureau and temporarily suspended him from the party. With no democratic resolution to the Renouveau’s demands, he and his followers resigned in 1998. Niasse’s objections about the PS differed from Kâ’s, but he too cited the 1996 Party Congress in some early explanations of his decision to leave the PS. After delivering the famous “I Choose Hope” speech in 1999 announcing his plans to form the AFP, he declared, “My rupture with the PS is not a new development. It has existed since 1996 when I refused to participate in the [PS’s] congress without debates” (Quoted in Sud Quotidien 1999). However, Niasse did not leave the PS because he wanted to lead a party faction; he did so because he disagreed with the ways that the country and the party were governed. He disapproved of Diouf leaving the management of the PS to Tanor Dieng and others who “had not been there before,” “had never belonged to a political party,” and did not “understand the value and the nature of the link between a leader and his followers,” whereas Niasse and many others had decades of institutional memory and experience helping the party work.40 Other ex-PS members cited the deficiencies of internal party governance to explain their motivation to leave and form their own parties instead. Abdourahim Agne, an ex-PS spokesman who created the Reform Party (Parti de la Réforme, PR) in 2001, did so in order to “engag[e] in politics in a different way” and break from PS practices of governance. He formed the PR rather than joining another existing party because “all parties are similar; so to join another party…would entail pretty much the same practices that I left behind within the PS.”41 Current president Macky Sall also denounced the PDS’ “monarchical devolution of power” when he was demoted within the ruling party and left to create the Alliance for the Republic (APR) (Sarr 2011). Party creation was attractive to politicians decrying a lack of internal democracy within their existing organizations because the alternative— switching to another leader’s party—is perceived as futile for one’s career advancement. For instance, Bacar Dia created the FP upon leaving the URD because in all existing parties, “there would be a leader who had been there for 30 years” and he would have been “held back.”42 Similarly, 84 C. L. KELLY

Omar Thiam, an ex-PAI staff member, created his own party after losing controversial internal elections, because fighting his way back to the PAI leadership would have taken four to six years and he “needed to take a shortcut.”43 Marième Wone Ly of Parena left the CDP, despite her high- level position as National President of Women, because she experienced difficulties advancing into positions with authority over both men and women.44 These motivations to leave that related to internal democracy often worked in tandem with actions that advanced patronage-seeking goals: Ly’s exit, for instance, bore fruit after she joined the Cap 21 and Wade appointed her Senator. Even party creators who aligned themselves with major opposition figures were fond of the idea that forming a party helps one gain access to non-electoral political opportunities. Adama Kamara, a teacher and union- ist who helped establish the Senegalese Party of Progress (Parti Sénégalais du Progrès, PSP) in Thiès, explained that he and other founders created the PSP in 1998 for many reasons: to react to the macroeconomic decline, create conditions for alternance, and pressure Wade to engage in more coherent policymaking. To boot, he and his co-founders who had been in other parties “did not have a means to express themselves, because generally there is a lack of internal democracy in parties.” They created the PSP in order to amplify their voices more than they would have been within other, existing parties. After the PSP’s establishment, Kamara served as Moustapha Niasse’s Special Counselor for the 2012 presidential elections; he believes that he would not have had the opportunity had he not headed his own party that was separate from Niasse’s AFP.45

Seniority and Status Norms Politicians may also create parties due not just to the lack of internal democracy, but also to the status disputes that play out as elites position themselves in party hierarchies. For instance, status logics were invoked by politicians who had been high-level officials in parliamentary parties that others led, including the CDP/Garab gi led by Iba Der Thiam as well as the FSD/BJ led by Cheikh Abdoulaye Dièye and his son, Cheikh Bamba Dièye. Samir Abdourizk, a Rufisque-born citizen of Lebanese descent, founded the Citizens’ Democracy (Démocratie Citoyenne, DC) party in 2000 after leaving the CDP, around the same time that Abiboulaye Ndiaye, a school inspector from Saint-Louis, broke away from the FSD/BJ to create the Social Front for Restoration (Front Social pour la Restauration, 3 PARTY FORMATION AND PROLIFERATION ON SENEGAL’S UNEVEN… 85

FSR/Laabal). According to Abdourizk, party formation was a means of asserting that other politicians could not “always profit from [him]” by relegating him to “playing a second-tier role” in their organizations; Ndiaye recounted that joining another party would not have accurately reflected his “level” because “if one is a party leader, one is a level above” being in someone else’s party.46 Iba Der Thiam, the founder of the CDP, also employs a status logic in his narrative of party creation. As a former leftist, PAI party member, union leader, and Ecole Normale Supérieur professor under Senghor, Thiam served as Minister of Education from 1983–1988. When Thiam lost his appointment in 1988, he attributed the loss to Jean Collin, the Secretary General of the Presidency who often functioned as a gatekeeper to Diouf. Thiam created the CDP in response, citing his desire to become the “son of the country” who helped to reduce Collin’s influence. Thiam also used age hierarchies to justify his choice to create a new party, indicat- ing that actors like Abdoulaye Bathily of the LD/MPT were a generation younger and had been his juniors in the labor movement. With his own party, Thiam also garnered attention to himself by running for president in 1993 and 2000, winning less than 2% of the vote before collaborating with Wade, heading the Cap 21, and fusing the CDP with the PDS in 2002.47 Status-based logics were also part of the motivation for the businessman, mayor of Rufisque, and former PS regional leader, Mbaye-Jacques Diop, to create the Party for Progress and Citizenship (Parti pour le Progrès et la Citoyenneté, PPC) in 2000. Older than other politicians who left the ruling PS in the late 1990s, like Niasse and Kâ, Diop had founded in 1954 the Youth Movement of the BDS, the PS’s precursor. Diop remained in the PS until 2000, when he first took his followers to the AFP but subsequently left to form the PPC. Diop had been part of the Socialist family since before independence but had been denied party and government positions that he believed he merited based on his popularity. These grievances began in the 1980s, were quelled temporarily in 1987 when he was elected mayor of Rufisque, and further intensified in December 1996, after Tanor Dieng became Diouf’s successor within the PS. At the time, Diop was a candidate for President of the Regional Council of Dakar and the party chose a younger, Tanor-aligned political rival as candidate instead. With the rise of Tanor’s allies in the PS, Diop lost his spot in the Political Bureau (Diop 2013). 86 C. L. KELLY

The PPC was part of Diop’s reaction to the “incompetence” of Tanor Dieng’s leadership and the technocrats with little party experience who subsequently joined PS institutions (Quoted in FKA/CESTI 2001: 120). However, it was also an assertion of his equality with other PS defectors who were a generation younger than he was. For example, Diop briefly explored the possibility of joining the AFP led by Niasse, his junior in age, but his wife and friends encouraged him to form the PPC instead. This was because “his political itinerary that made him one of the oldest political actors, along with his trajectory and experience, ought to permit him to put his hat in the ring and create his own political party” (Diop 2008: 113). Were status or internal democracy the main driver of party formation, then we would expect exit from the party to be relatively permanent, bar- ring rectifications to internal party rules or to appointments to party and government positions that spark people’s initial defections. Yet, politicians did not always create new parties with the intention of permanently leaving the parties to which they had previously belonged. For instance, multiple ex-PDS officials used party formation to voice dissent about their treatment within the PDS, demonstrate their independent political worth, and negotiate their way back into the party.48 These instances of “exit as voice” further demonstrate how parties can be tools for patronage negotiation. Both the ex-PDS second-in-command from the early 1990s (Ousmane Ngom) and the second-in-command from the early 2000s (Idrissa Seck) pursued such strategies. Ngom, who “never imagined doing politics outside of the PDS,” negotiated his way back into the PDS after four years in opposition as the leader of the PLS, which had poached an estimated four-fifths of the career professionals (cadres) from the PDS (Quoted in Tanama 2001). He reintegrated the PDS and went on to take multiple ministerial appointments, but never regained his position as second-in-command. Omar Sarr, one of the ex-PDS National Assembly members who followed ex-Prime Minister Idrissa Seck out of the PDS and founded the Rewmi party, also stated that Seck had planned to reintegrate the PDS.49 The multiple instances of founders using parties to negotiate their way into (or back into) power, along with the generalized quantitative finding that most party leaders in the 1998–2003 sample negotiated their way into the state after creating their parties, suggest that people’s desire for the patronage linked to accessing the state may reinforce their motivation to rely on hierarchical social logics as justifications for creating new parties. 3 PARTY FORMATION AND PROLIFERATION ON SENEGAL’S UNEVEN… 87

3.4 Party Proliferation in Senegal Under Competitive Authoritarianism and Democracy In competitive authoritarian regimes, including under Diouf and Wade, the existence of an uneven playing field reifies incentives for the proliferation of political parties, especially parties that are more patronage-seeking than election-oriented. However, this relationship is subject to several qualifications and limitations as well. First of all, the conclusions drawn from analyzing Senegal over time are, by nature, tentative. Keeping this caveat in mind, the Senegalese case provides some initial evidence that presidents in competitive authoritarian regimes benefit from the extensive disparity in resources between the ruling party and the opposition and, compared to what their room for maneuver would be in a democracy, are empowered to more overtly use their control of the state to encourage the proliferation of parties that are susceptible to co-optation. The establishment of the Cap 21, the revival of packable institutions like the Senate and the Economic and Social Council to reward PDS members and opposition defectors, and the use of the Division of Criminal Investigation (DIC) to intimidate, arrest, and immo- bilize opposition politicians and independent journalists, are just three ways that Wade used Senegal’s uneven playing field to weaken potential challengers and fragment the party system. Furthermore, a specific blend of the different structural features of competitive authoritarianism reified incentives for party proliferation in Senegal. In particular, as illustrated in Chap. 1, the competitive authoritarian regimes that Diouf and Wade ran became less heavily reliant on electoral fraud over time, and more centrally focused on suppressing civil liberties and using the uneven playing field to perpetuate power. This shift happened gradually, becoming more noticeable at the end of Diouf’s presidency and continuing under Wade.50 Party proliferation occurred in tandem, becoming more marked as presidents had increasingly limited capacities for overt electoral fraud and repression, but remained capable of hindering full exercise of civil liberties and the rule of law to disable the opposition. Comparative analysis of Senegalese party origins and behavior lends some credence to the hypothesis that many politicians are constrained—or even motivated—to form parties that are primarily patronage-oriented, rather than primarily election-oriented when two conditions obtain: joining and remaining in the opposition is attainable only with great financial 88 C. L. KELLY and political difficulty, and presidents use the uneven playing field to encourage widespread rallying around the ruling party. A minority of politicians actually point to patronage-seeking as their sole or main personal motivation for creating a party; nevertheless, the sheer number of new parties that moved into the presidential entourage during the Wade presidency provides evidence that opposition parties were systematically pulled toward the ruling coalition in that competitive authoritarian period. Finally, although party proliferation initially took root during competitive authoritarian rule in countries as diverse as Burkina Faso, Benin, Cameroon, Gabon, Mali, and Senegal, it has endured regardless of whether these countries have remained competitive authoritarian (like Cameroon and Gabon), democratized (like Benin), or fluctuated between these regime types over time (like Burkina Faso, Senegal, and Mali). Senegal under Wade, for example, fluctuated between “free” and “partly free” rat- ings from Freedom House. Party proliferation continued under Sall, who initially oversaw democratizing reforms but followed these with significant retrenchment measures. The number of registered parties has risen from over 200 when he became president to over 300 now. The logics of party formation among some of the most notable parties formed in this period also resemble the range of ideological, programmatic, internal democratic, status-based, and patronage-based motivations that prevailed under Wade. For example, the ex-Minister of Youth under Wade, Aliou Sow, founded the Movement for Democracy and Work (Mouvement pour la Démocratie/Liggeey, MPD/ Liggey) in order to “create my own liberal-Wadeist party to keep and assume my identity as such” after leaving the PDS (Sow 2014: 156). Malick Gackou, the AFP’s former adjunct Secretary General, created The Great Party (Le Grand Parti, GP) in 2015, after Niasse announced that the AFP would support Macky Sall’s presidential candidacy in 2019. With an economics Ph.D., Gackou presented an extensive development program as part of his pitch. Similar difficulties with the internal decision-making processes of the PDS eventually led former PDS minister and youth leader Modou Diagne “Fada” to create the Republican Liberal Democrats (Libéraux Démocrates Républicains/Yessal, LDR) party and former National Assembly and Senate President Pape Diop to register the Democratic Convergence/ Common Vision (Convergence Démocratique/Bokk Gis Gis, CD/BGG) as a party. Wade’s former Prime Minister, Souleymane Ndéné Ndiaye, indicated that he created the National Union for the People/Success (Union 3 PARTY FORMATION AND PROLIFERATION ON SENEGAL’S UNEVEN… 89

Nationale pour le Peuple/Tekki, UNP) “to win power” at a time when he “did not want to die politically,” but could no longer be in the PDS with the rise of Karim Wade, someone with less experience than he.51 Much like under Wade, there are many instances of newly created parties joining the presidential entourage within several years of formation. Sow, Fada, and Ndéné Ndiaye have all joined the mouvance présidentielle, which attests to the utility of their parties for gravitating into the ruling entourage. Sall’s management of incentives for party creation perpetuated certain Wadian practices and discarded others. For instance, Sall has not publi- cized the existence of a formalized institution like the Cap 21 to reward the parties that join the presidential entourage. The press has not pro- duced consistent reports about the type and frequency of patronage rewards that members of the entourage receive.52 Parties from the “Macky 2012” coalition that campaigned with Sall throughout the race have advertised “the openness of the coalition to all political forces, citizens, and local leaders in hope of massifying the mouvance présidentielle,” which suggests that the grouping is open to most parties that seek admission (APS 2014). However, Sall has provided the most visible rewards to APR partisans and members of other parliamentary parties, like the AFP and the PS that formed the Bennoo Bokk Yakaar (United in Hope, BBY) coalition supporting Sall in the 2012 runoff against Wade. Sall’s focus on rewarding these major party allies, at the expense of smaller satellite parties, is a function of his stricter institutional constraints relative to Wade. Both Wade and Sall knew when they took office that they could not rely on their parties alone to mobilize future majorities in presidential elections, given that Sall won 26.6% and Wade 30.2% of the popular vote in the first round of the respective presidential races that brought them to power. Yet unlike Wade, Sall was also dependent on other parliamentary parties for his control of a legislative majority. While PDS members always occupied a majority of the seats in the National Assembly under Wade, that was no longer the case for Sall after the 2012 National Assembly elections, when APR politicians held just 65 of the 150 seats on their own, while the APR’s BBY coalition controlled 119 with other parties like the PS, AFP, and Rewmi. Sall’s dependence on the electoral coalition to retain electoral hegemony helps to explain his focus on rewarding parliamentary parties in BBY over maintaining institutions like the Cap 21. To date, however, these practices have not stopped party proliferation overall. 90 C. L. KELLY

3.5 Conclusion By illustrating that party formation was more primarily patronage-oriented than it was election-oriented among the full range of parties formed around alternance, the research from this chapter supports the insight that politics in poor democracies and competitive authoritarian regimes is driven by politicians’ desire to access the state (Van de Walle and Butler 1999; Van de Walle 2007). The findings also challenge the idea that locally relevant uses for parties always directly relate to electoral mobilization and competition. Evidence from Senegal shows that parties are indeed, as the classic literature claims, “endogenous institutions” that politicians shape to meet their problem-solving needs (Aldrich 1995). However, unlike the classic literature, the chapter shows that Senegalese politicians do not always use parties to solve problems directly related to vote mobilization and electoral competition. Beyond these purposes, politicians use parties as vehicles for achieving some degree of social ascension, building reputations and careers in the public sphere, and negotiating access to the state, including government or state appointments or smaller-scale forms of patronage that do not depend directly on their electoral performance. The patronage-oriented logics of party formation in Senegal affect long-term party behavior, the focus of Chap. 4. Opposition parties are often described as vehicles for voicing alternatives to the ideas and policies that incumbents propose, serving as counterweights to the ruling party and fostering accountability and government responsiveness. But in Senegal, many of them have collaborated with the president despite the fact that until 2012, coalitions were not necessary to form a government or construct a legislative majority. Chapter 4 demonstrates that party founders’ decisions to pursue consistent opposition are shaped by the degree and type of resources that they possess to overcome structural disadvantages in elections on an uneven playing field. The consistent opposition considered so fundamental to democracy is rare because party leaders do not usually possess the endowments that together make it worthwhile to consistently oppose the ruling party in elections: namely, experience as high-level administrators before creating a party, as well as international private financing. 3 PARTY FORMATION AND PROLIFERATION ON SENEGAL’S UNEVEN… 91

Notes 1. Each presidential candidacy must be supported by 0.8–1% of electors. At least 2000 must come from each of seven of the country’s 14 regions, and individual electors may only provide their signature for one candidate. 2. The analysis of party types among the 46 created between 1998 and 2003 is restricted to their activities throughout the Wade era—and not extended to the Sall era—because there is no pre-existing data available covering the coalition choices of all sampled parties. Election results report the results for parties that run on their own labels in an election as well as the names of coalitions in the running, but do not report on coalition composition. To track party behavior, the author spent a year constructing a dataset by personally interviewing party leaders in the sample in 2012. 3. Interview with Bacar Dia, 7/20/12, Saint-Louis. 4. Interview with Souleymane Ndiaye, 1/23/12, Thiès. 5. There is some missing data because a couple of party founders were not findable and because the interviewees did not always provide all of the relevant information. The percentages reported in text reflect conservative estimates of each trend, based on a denominator of 46, the total number of party leaders intended to be included in the sample. The denominator of 46 is used as opposed to the actual number of founders (sometimes less than the full 46) that were codable on the variable in question. The footnotes that follow provide percentages that correspond to the conservative estimate, along with raw numbers to reflect the actual number of people coded. 6. This data should be considered an impressionistic snapshot at best. An estimate of caste was determined based on their knowledge of common caste-based distinctions historically reflected in family names. (As people of different castes intermarry, the “shortcut” becomes less accurate, which is the data’s main potential source of error). 7. Both constitute 24% of the sample according to the conservative estimate with a denominator of 46 (11 of 43 founders with data on this variable). 8. Seventy-seven percent of the sample according to the conservative estimate, or 33 of 43 founders codable on this dimension. 9. Fourteen of the 33 codable individuals with prior experience had been national-level PS staff; 14 had been national-level staff in another party. 10. Interview with Ndiaga Sylla, 3/21/12, Dakar. 11. Interview with Aliou Seck, 7/3/12, Diourbel; Interview with Amadou Moctar Ndiaye, 7/20/12, Louga; Interview with Samba Diouldé Thiam, 11/22/11, Dakar; Interview with Djibril Mbaye, 2/28/12, Dakar; Interview with Moustapha Fall “Ché,” 4/10/12, Kaolack. 12. Interview with Imam Mbaye Niang, 1/9/12, Dakar. 92 C. L. KELLY

13. Interview with Pape Mody Sow and Attye Farès, 6/11/15, Diamaguène. 14. Interview with Aliou Seck, op. cit. 15. Not all leaders could readily provide precise statistics on the location and number of posts controlled. For the author, as well, the exact numbers of municipal-level elected offices controlled by each party were difficult to obtain. It is often not possible to infer from election results where a particular party ran for office or won candidates because election results are reported on the coalition level (rather than by the names of parties com- posing the coalition) and coalition names and coalition composition vary across communes d’arrondissements, communes, and communautés rurales. The author gathered information about the party affiliation of mayors and presidents of rural communities (présidents des communuautés rurales, PCRs) by asking several political party administrators to identify the affiliations of the mayors and PCRs elected in 1996, 2002, and 2009. Lists of mayors and PCRs were available through archival research at the PS and the National Association of Senegalese mayors. 16. Interview with Blaise Ndiaye, 3/15/12, Dakar. 17. Interview with Mamadou Bamba Ndiaye, 10/18/11, Dakar. 18. Interview with Mamour Cissé, 5/2/12, Dakar. 19. Interview with Mbaye Diouf, 3/3/12, Dakar; Interview with Mamour Cissé, op. cit. 20. Interview with Tamsir Jupiter Ndiaye, 1/18/12, Dakar. 21. Interview with Mousseyesse Niang, 2/17/12, Dakar. 22. Interview with Abdoulaye Diallo, 3/21/12, Dakar. 23. Interview with El Hadji Momar Sambe, 11/8/11. 24. Interview with Ibrahima Diongue, op. cit. 25. Interview with Tamsir Jupiter Ndiaye, op cit., Interview with Amadou Mayoro Fall, 4/22/12, Thiès. 26. Interview with El Hadji Momar Sambe, op. cit. 27. Interview with Georges Nesta Diop, 3/22/12, Khar Yallah. 28. Interview with Mame Comba Diop, 3/5/12, Dakar. Interview with El Hadji Hamidou Diallo, 7/10/10, Dakar. 29. Interview with Daouda Diedhiou, 2/5/12, Dakar. 30. Interview with Marième Wone Ly, 2/17/12, Dakar; Interview with Aloïse Gorgui Dione, 6/5/12, Dakar. 31. Interview with Bacar Dia, 7/1/12, Saint-Louis. 32. Interview with Samba Diouldé Thiam, 11/22/11, Dakar. 33. Interview with Ousmane Guèye, 2/28/12, Parcelles Assainies. 34. Interview with Mbaye Niang, 1/9/12, Dakar. 35. Interview with Mame Mactar Gueye, 8/17/10, Dakar. 36. Interview with Oumar Khassimou Dia, 3/7/12, Parcelles Assainies. 37. Interview with Huchard, op. cit. 3 PARTY FORMATION AND PROLIFERATION ON SENEGAL’S UNEVEN… 93

38. Interview with Marième Wane Ly, 2/17/12, Dakar. 39. Interview with Amadou Moctar Ndiaye, 7/20/12, Louga. 40. Interview with Moustapha Niasse, 7/21/15, Dakar. 41. Interview with Abdourahim Agne, May 2012, Dakar. 42. Interview with Bacar Dia, op. cit. 43. Interview with Omar Thiam, 3/5/12, Dakar. 44. Interview with Marième Wane Ly, op. cit. 45. Interview with Adama Kamara, 1/19/12, Pikine. 46. Interview with Samir Abdourizk, 7/25/12, Dakar, Interview with Abiboulaye Ndiaye, 2/29/12, Dakar. 47. Interview with Iba Der Thiam, 8/7/10, Dakar. 48. These dynamics, termed “exit as voice,” are discussed in Chap. 6. 49. Interview with Omar Sarr, 7/21/10, Dakar. 50. The trend is an increase in electoral transparency over time. However, the curtailment of civil liberties and the uneven playing field were major features of regimes under both Diouf and Wade. Thus, both Diouf’s and Wade’s regimes can be defined as competitive authoritarian, but under Wade it did not feature clear-cut electoral malpractice as much as Diouf’s. Even under Diouf, the administration’s constraints increased. Compared to 1988, when there were protests about electoral fraud, by the start of party proliferation in 1998, the administration had less freedom to flout electoral transparency. 51. Interview with Souleymane Ndéné Ndiaye, 6/27/15, Dakar. 52. These patterns were not were not possible to substantiate through fieldwork and were not present in allafrica.com coverage of Le Soleil, Sud Quotidien, and Walfadjri. Anonymous sources reported to Walfadjri that select parties in the presidential camp had received 10–15 million CFA francs at one point, and that at another time, each member of the camp had received 1 million CFA francs. However, certain other members denied receiving financial support. See Georges Nesta Diop, “Macky offre un million à chaque parti allié,” Walfadjri, September 30, 2014.

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Bacaly, Mathieu, and Idrissa Sané. 2005. Mamour Cissé, leader PSD-Jant bi: ‘Il y a une nécessité, aujourd’hui, que les hommes politiques aient un métier’. Le Soleil, August 9. Badiane, Djibril. 2017. Entretiens: Moundiaye Cissé, Directeur Exécutif de l’ONG 3D. In L’Info en 3D: Bulletin Sémestriel d’Informations de l’ONG 3D, vol. 1, 12–13. https://issuu.com/ong3d/docs/ong_3d_bsi1. Barbier, Gabriel. 2008. Ousmane Sow Huchard sur le différend Wade/Macky. Walfadjri, January 7. http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/200801080304.html Bleck, Jaimie, and Nicolas Van de Walle. 2011. Parties and Issues in Francophone Africa: Towards a Theory of Non-Mobilization. Democratization 18 (5): 1125–1145. Comaroff, Jean, and John Comaroff. 2012. Theory from the South. Or, How Euro- America Is Evolving Toward Africa. Boulder: Paradigm Publishers. Diallo, El Hadji Samba Amadou, and Catherine Lena Kelly. 2016. SufiTuruq and the Politics of Democratization in Senegal. Journal of Religious and Political Practice 2 (2): 193–211. Diop, Khoudia. 2001. Législatives anticipées 2001—Portrait Samba Diouldé Thiam. Journal de l’Economie, April 11. http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/ 200104110530.html Diop, Sidy. 2008. Mbaye-Jacques…! Dakar: Editions Panafrika. Diop, Omar. 2011. Partis politiques, démocratie et réalités sociales au Sénégal. Essai critique pour une etude realiste du multipartisme. Paris: Karthala. Diop, Mbaye-Jacques. 2013. Une vie de combats. Paris: L’Harmattan. Diop, Momar-Coumba, Mamadou Diouf, and Aminata Diaw. 2000. Le Baobab a été déracine: L’alternance au Sénégal. Politique africaine 78: 157–179. Fall, Samba. 2005. RES-Les Verts demandent le rétablissement de la loi anti-tabac. Le Soleil, June 1. http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/200506020132.html Fall, Ismaïla Madior. 2011. Les révisions constitutionnelles au Sénégal. Révisions consolidantes et révisions déconsolidantes de la démocratie sénégalaise. Dakar: CREDILA. Fondation Konrad Adenauer/Centre d’Etudes des Sciences et Techniques de l’Information (FKA/CESTI). 2001. Cahiers de l’alternance: Annuaire de partis politiques. Dakar. Gellar, Sheldon. 2005. Democracy in Senegal. Tocquevillean Analytics in Africa. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Kâ, Djibo. 2005. Un Petit Berger au Service de la République et de la Démocratie. Dakar: Nouvelles Editions Africaines du Sénégal. Kamara, Mamadou. 2007. Les élections au Sénégal: Role, place, et responsabilités des différents acteurs. Dakar: Sénégalaise de l’Imprimerie. Magrin, Géraud. 2007. Sopi or not sopi? A propos des élections présidentielles de février 2007 au Sénégal. EchoGéo, July 20. http://echogeo.revues.org/838 3 PARTY FORMATION AND PROLIFERATION ON SENEGAL’S UNEVEN… 95

Mbaye, O. Noel. 2018. Le chef de l’état après l’adoption de la loi sur le parrainage: ‘Nous sommes prets à discuter des modalités d’application’. Le Soleil, April 21. http://www.lesoleil.sn/2016-03-22-23-17-43/item/77783-le-chef-de-l- etat-apres-l-adoption-de-la-loi-sur-le-parrainage-nous-sommes-prets-a-discuter- des-modalites-d-application.html Mbow, Penda. 2000. Démocratie, droits humains, et caste au Sénégal. Journal des Africanistes 70 (1–2): 71–91. Morgenthau, Ruth Schacter. 1964. Political Parties in French-Speaking West Africa. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Niang, Mody. 2004. Me Wade et l’Alternance: le rêve brisé du Sopi. Dakar: Saint-Paul. Nzouankeu, Jean-Muriel. 1984. Les partis politiques sénégalais. Dakar: Editions Clairafrique. Rassemblement National Démocratique. 1999. Le combat politique de Cheikh Anta Diop. Du BMS au RND. Dakar: Imprimerie du Midi. Sarr, Diène Farba. 2011. Macky Sall: Un combat pour la République. Dakar: Editions Sentinelles. Savané, Vieux. 1998. Stratégie de positionnement. Sud Quotidien, January 10. Schaffer, Frederic. 1998. Democracy in Translation. Understanding Politics in an Unfamiliar Culture. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Sow, Aliou. 2014. Le courage d’agir. Une nouvelle vision de la politique au Sénégal. Paris: L’Harmattan. Sud Quotidien. 1999. Moustapha Niasse contre-attaque: ‘Ils volent et trafiquent sur les marchés de l’état’, June 25. ———. 2001. Un nouveau parti dans la bataille des municipales à Kaolack. June 3. http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/200107030309.html Tanama, Josias. 2001. Législatives anticipées 2001-Portrait Ousmane Ngom: Premier grand format après son départ du PDS. Le Journal de l’Economie, April 11. Union pour la République. 2000. La charte du parti de l’UPR. Dakar: Sénégalaise de l’Imprimerie. Van de Walle, Nicolas. 2007. Meet the New Boss, Same as the Old Boss? The Evolution of Political Clientelism in Africa. In Patrons, Clients, and Policies: Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition, ed. Herbert Kitschelt and Steven Wilkinson. New York: Cambridge University Press. Van de Walle, Nicolas, and Kimberly Smiddy Butler. 1999. Political Parties and Party Systems in Africa’s Emerging Democracies. Cambridge Review of International Affairs 13 (1): 14–28. Villalón, Leonardo. 2015. Cautious Democrats: Religious Actors and Democratization Processes in Senegal. Politics & Religion 8: 305–333. CHAPTER 4

Negotiators or Adversaries? Tracing the Sources of Party Trajectories

The existence of parties that are active in the opposition both during and between elections is a fundamental element of democracy. Opposition parties are expected to resist co-optation or collaboration with the ruling party in order to preserve their legitimacy as distinctive alternatives to incumbents (Diop 2011; Stepan 2007). Especially when coalition-building is not institutionally necessary to govern, the long-term consistency of a party’s opposition enables it to serve as an effective counterweight to the ruling party by monitoring and critiquing its activities. Whether or not they coalesce against incumbents, opposition parties under these conditions are expected to rival those in government and “present a viable alternative to the political status quo” (Arriola 2012: 5; LeBas 2011). When they function this way, opposition parties often bolster political accountability and state effectiveness (Grzymala-Busse 2007; Lipset 2000). However, many African parties that initially oppose a particular president fail to persist in their opposition throughout that president’s tenure. In Cameroon, President Paul Biya co-opted Bello Bouba Maïgari of the National Union for Democracy and Progress (UNDP) and certain members of the United People’s Congress (UPC), well-known opposition

© The Author(s) 2020 97 C. L. Kelly, Party Proliferation and Political Contestation in Africa, Contemporary African Political Economy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-19617-2_4 98 C. L. KELLY parties in the 1990s (Diop 2006: 313; Takougang 2004). Similarly, several parties created by former members of Zambia’s Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD)—including the Agenda for Zambia, the National Citizens’ Coalition, and the Heritage Party—opposed the MMD in presidential elections and entered the ruling coalition or fused with the MMD thereafter (The Post 2003; National Democratic Institute 2003). In Gabon, by the mid-2000s, 29 of 35 registered parties were in the president’s ruling coalition despite the ruling party’s control of a legislative majority on its own (Levitsky and Way 2010: 265, citing Africa Confidential 2005). In Senegal, consistent opposition was particularly rare under Wade, who was president during much of the country’s initial spike in party creation. During his two terms (2000–2012), parties that collaborated with the ruling party, whether sporadically or permanently, were more common than parties that consistently opposed the government in consecutive national-level elections. Some party leaders sought to be co-opted into the presidential entourage in exchange for patronage; other party leaders ran against the ruling party but joined the government between elections. Over the five presidential and parliamentary elections spanning the Wade presidency, nearly two-thirds of the 46 parties created during Senegal’s initial wave of proliferation (1998–2003) either joined the president’s ruling coalition and remained there or forged intermittent, tactical alliances with the ruling party. Just five remained opponents throughout Wade’s presidency. These tendencies toward tactical alliances and co-optation—as opposed to consistent opposition—emerged despite the fact that the ruling Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS) controlled a legislative majority throughout Wade’s presidency, such that no party leader’s collaboration with the PDS was required for institutional reasons. This chapter analyzes why, during the initial acceleration in party formation in Senegal, certain groups of politicians were able to oppose incumbents throughout ex-President Wade’s tenure but many others did not, even if they began Wade’s presidency in the opposition. The case of Senegal under Wade is used to show that the pursuit of consistent opposition was shaped by the degree and type of resource endowments that party leaders possessed to overcome structural disadvantages on the uneven playing field. Namely, party leaders’ prior experience as either high-level state administrators or prominent grassroots civil society figures before they created their own party, as well as their access to sources of private financing independent of the state, together facilitated their willingness and ability to oppose incumbents consistently. Experience as former state administrators or civil society figures allowed party leaders to market themselves as 4 NEGOTIATORS OR ADVERSARIES? TRACING THE SOURCES OF PARTY… 99 legitimate replacements to incumbents. Access to international private financing empowered party leaders to engage intensively in clientelist competition. Only the few party leaders with high levels of both endowments resisted collaborating with the ruling party and instead functioned as adversaries; they were the rare people with the resources and the political potential to invest in running against incumbents consistently. Party leaders lacking one or both endowments generally could not level the playing field enough to seriously challenge the president. They instead collaborated with the ruling party in the hope of accessing endowments that they lacked. Section 4.1 describes the types and frequencies of long-term party trajectories to be explained in contemporary Senegal. Section 4.2 highlights the key independent variables shaping party trajectories, marshaling evidence from some of Senegal’s older post-independence parties to identify the mechanisms behind these patterns. Section 4.3 demonstrates how long-term party behaviors correlate with party leaders’ experience and financing. Case studies in Sect. 4.4 demonstrate how these relationships work. Section 4.5 concludes.

4.1 Varieties of Party Trajectories in Senegal Long-term party trajectories are defined as the series of decisions that party leaders make about whether to oppose or collaborate with the president over the course of several national elections. The development of a long- term trajectory is an iterative process. Rather than planning any long-term party trajectory in advance, party leaders often make separate, one-off decisions about whether to oppose or collaborate in each electoral moment. A single, long-term party trajectory is thus a classification of the nature of a party leader’s aggregate set of actions over a particular series of elections. These actions are a function of a party leader’s choices, but those choices are also conditioned by organizational and resource-based constraints.

Types of Party Trajectories There are three principal party strategies to explain in Senegal under Wade. Leaders pursuing consistent opposition continually remain outside of the government, whether running national-level candidates alone or in an electoral coalition, across all five presidential and National Assembly elections spanning the Wade presidency. Between elections, they do not join the Wade 100 C. L. KELLY government. Across the cycle of multiple consecutive elections, they “resist integration into the regime” in order to monitor, critique, and compete with incumbents (Stepan 2007: 662). Party leaders pursuing consistent opposition neither accept government appointments from the president nor campaign for the ruling coalition in elections.1 Party leaders who pursue tactical alliances join the ruling coalition in some elections but may run on their own in others. Tactical alliances often entail party leaders joining some form of oversized presidential majority government that includes multiple (former) opposition parties on non-programmatic terms. The president solicits an opposition party leader’s participation in a tactical alliance by negotiating an agreement specific to their two parties. Generally, the president provides the other party ministerial portfolios and directorships in exchange for supporting the ruling party in certain elections. For example, after Wade became president, other party leaders like Djibo Kâ of the Union for Democratic Renewal (URD) and Landing Savané of And-Jëf (AJ/ PADS) ran on their own party labels in national elections but did so without breaking their longer-term alliances with President Wade and his ruling coalition. Co-optation refers to a party engaging in permanent, sustained collaboration with a particular politician’s coalition (usually, the president’s) without that party ever running autonomously in national elections. It involves campaigning for the ruling coalition across multiple elections without negotiating privileges through a bilateral agreement. Leaders who pursue this strategy often create parties that begin their lives in the opposition but gravitate toward the president’s entourage to escape the difficulties of being an opponent on the uneven playing field. Under Wade, this sometimes took the form of party leaders fusing their party with the PDS. More often, however, it took the form of party leaders joining the Coalition Around the President for the 21st Century (Cap 21), a coalition which the PDS had used to co-opt over 65 registered parties by the 2012 presidential elections (Cap 21 2012). Another, less common variant of co-optation occurs among certain parties whose leaders are always in the opposition but join the entourages of electorally threatening opposition figures from major parties without functioning as national-level opposition leaders themselves. Their organizations play supporting roles as satellite parties in a front-running candidate’s electoral coalition but do so within one or more opposition coalitions instead of the Cap 21.2 4 NEGOTIATORS OR ADVERSARIES? TRACING THE SOURCES OF PARTY… 101

Frequencies of Party Trajectories The rest of the chapter analyzes the determinants of these three kinds of long-term party trajectories among a chronological sample of 46 Senegalese parties registered during the country’s first wave of party proliferation (1998–2003). The data characterizes each party’s trajectory during all five national-level elections of the Wade presidency and captures information about party leaders’ resource endowments and experiences as statesmen that are critical to testing hypotheses about the sources of different party trajectories. Collaboration, whether it took the form of a tactical alliance or co-optation, predominated. Twenty-five parties were co-opted into the ruling coalition via the Cap 21 and the leaders of an additional three parties forged tactical alliances with the president. Eight additional parties sought co-optation into the coalitions of major opposition figures. Thirty- two percent of parties in the sample had leaders who consistently refused to ally with the president across the five national elections analyzed. However, this statistic includes not only the parties whose trajectories qualify as consistent opposition but also the parties whose leaders sought co-optation into the coalitions of some of the major opposition figures exhibiting consistent opposition.3 Just five parties, or 12% of the total number sampled, pursued consistent opposition overall.4 Consistent opposition remains rare, even when we restrict our analysis to the 16 of the 46 parties that, in one of the first two elections after their founding, were able to run national-level election candidates on their new organizational label. Just four (25%) of these parties with this kind of “vote-mobilizing potential” engaged in trajectories of consistent opposition; three (18%) forged tactical alliances; and nine (56%) were co-opted.

4.2 Theorizing the Sources of Party Trajectories Scholarship has not yet accounted for long-term party trajectories. Most work on African opposition has focused on short-term party behavior, namely, opposition coordination against incumbents in particular elections and the electoral coalition choices of parties in single contests. These studies find that a variety of factors shape these short-term coalition choices, including party institutionalization (Gandhi and Reuter 2013; Kuenzi and Lambright 2001; Randall and Svasand 2002; Wahman 2011), ideology (Greene 2007), and access to private sector finance (Arriola 2012; Boone et al. 1998). However, it is unclear whether these factors 102 C. L. KELLY have a similar impact on longer-term party trajectories. The analysis presented herein suggests that research pointing to the importance of private capital for single instances of opposition overlooks how international private financing in particular—especially in conjunction with state experience—can foster longer-term consistent opposition, both in presidential and legislative elections. Similarly, studies accounting for the emergence of robust opposition parties emphasize the importance of potential opponents’ access to organizational resources that facilitate mass party-building (Koter 2016; LeBas 2011; Riedl 2014). These comparative historical accounts, too, propose explanations for the degree of parties’ electoral mobilization, opposition party strength, and party system institutionalization—each of which is conceptually related to, but not the same as, the long-term party trajectories that this chapter seeks to explain in Wade-era Senegal. Focusing on cross-country variation, these theories find that countries whose authoritarian leaders integrated local elites (like chiefs and marabouts) as well as corporatist organizations (like labor unions) into the ruling party, rather than repressing or replacing them, now have more durable opposition parties. However, the capacity of these theories to account for within-country variation as well is thus far unclear.

A Theory of Party Trajectories Figure 4.1 maps the relationships that this chapter detects within the sample of 46 parties and then illustrates them through descriptive statistical analysis and case studies. The central claim is that party leaders’ decisions

YES Consistent YES International opposition private financing? State/civil society High variance NO experience? Tactical alliances

YES Co-optation ON International private financing? Co-optation NO

Fig. 4.1 Factors shaping party trajectories over time 4 NEGOTIATORS OR ADVERSARIES? TRACING THE SOURCES OF PARTY… 103 about their parties’ trajectories are shaped by the degree and type of resources they possess to overcome structural disadvantages on the uneven playing field, where serious resource disparities can inhibit all but a few experienced and rich party leaders from acquiring the sustained capacity to resist tactical alliances and co-optation. Consistent opposition trajectories are most popular among party leaders with access to internationally secured private finance that the president cannot manipulate, as well as state or civil society experience that they acquired before they created their own parties. The higher the levels of both experience and financing that a party leader has, the more he moves away from being a long-term collabo- rator with the president, to someone able to negotiate more contingent, tactical alliances with the ruling party, to an adversary always working to replace incumbents. First, party leaders’ experience as national-level state administrators, or as the leaders of nationally oriented civil society organizations, allows them to present themselves as viable rivals to incumbents. Party leaders who cannot signal administrative competence struggle to win over a geographically diverse electorate. Ministerial experience, in particular, allows politicians to signal that they understand the inner workings of the national government and know how to run the state. National-level state experience or experience leading nationwide civil society movements can help politicians build constituencies willing to mobilize behind them if they create parties. Because ministers are covered by the Senegalese media, politicians with state experience before they form parties also have opportunities to build reputations as functional statesmen, especially among the media-savvy and demographically influential urban electorate. When party founders have previously headed associations with broad-based constituencies that are nationally known, their record of leadership or activism in such organizations bolsters their electoral legitimacy. Second, access to independent sources of private finance gives party leaders the capacity to engage in clientelist political competition for the highest offices, which is common in African politics. Independent sources of financing are often international, whether from private consulting, commerce, or personal connections among the Senegalese diaspora or foreign dignitaries and friends.5 This financing is key on the uneven playing field, where even rich challenger parties cannot match the president’s financial clout. The president can block politicians’ access to money when they lack independent financing, which can impede their autonomous political activity, including consistent opposition. Under these conditions, 104 C. L. KELLY politicians who depend solely upon income derived from the state or upon domestic sources of private sector revenue are often too precariously situated to pursue trajectories of consistent opposition, try as they might to persist. Prior state or civil society experience and international private financing are bargaining chips for party leaders in potential negotiations with the president, who can shape party trajectories by seeking to fragment and destabilize the most electorally threatening opposition parties. But presidents in competitive authoritarian regimes are constrained in their ability to use large-scale repression to this end; instead, they tend to use inducements (namely, access to state institutions and resources) to lure opponents into collaborative relationships, which can neutralize otherwise potentially adversarial and electorally threatening organizations. At the same time, party leaders’ goals, capabilities, and resources mediate their reactions to the president’s attempts to co-opt their organizations. The president is ideally seeking to permanently co-opt the leaders of the parties that are likely to become the most threatening to his retention of power. Trying to bring them into the government gives presidents the opportunity to pit party elites against each other and foster opposition party splits. Although he prioritizes targeting for co-optation the parties with electoral relevance, it is precisely these parties whose leaders often have at least some financing or experience. This makes them both potentially powerful negotiators and potentially damaging electoral adversaries whose permanent loyalty to the ruling coalition is difficult to ensure. However, not all party leaders want to collaborate with the president. In those cases, the president’s objective then becomes using patronage to temporarily divide and weaken his opponents. For example, arranging more temporary, tactical alliances with certain parties can underscore latent organizational cleavages, namely, between ideological hard-liners committed to opposing incumbents and pragmatists interested in participating in policymaking in order to widen the party’s popular appeal and access state resources. When parties end tactical alliances, the president can attempt to further fragment the party offering certain individuals additional patronage in exchange for splitting from their original party and staying in the ruling coalition. Alongside efforts to weaken electorally relevant parties, the president may also work to manufacture future presidential majorities by co-opting smaller parties. These constitute relationships in which the president gives small-scale patronage to satellite party leaders in exchange for their long- 4 NEGOTIATORS OR ADVERSARIES? TRACING THE SOURCES OF PARTY… 105 standing commitment to campaign and mobilize smaller voter groups for the ruling coalition. Although the parties that participate in this arrangement are not electorally weighty, the president can mobilize them to praise the government, flooding the public sphere with positive analyses of the ruling coalition in order to have a psychological effect on voters.6 Party leaders with both endowments when they form their own parties tend to be more willing and able to compete with incumbents and resist collaboration with them. Their combination of resources gives them a real chance of winning elections if they invest in adversarial competition. They have the public service record to rival the president’s competencies (or the organizational leadership experience to challenge the president’s authority on critical grassroots issues), as well as the independent financing to launch a nimble campaign. Party leaders with either experience or financing have some bargaining power with the president, but their deficiencies in one domain prevent them from developing the profile and the following of an electoral opponent who could seriously threaten the incumbent’s hold on power. These party leaders may therefore exhibit more variation in their trajectories, with some holding out to function as consistent opponents despite their resource deficiencies, and others negotiating tactical alliances or long- term co-optation, depending on their personal situations, ideals, expressive benefits, and idiosyncrasies. Most often, however, these politicians will calculate that they are better off investing their limited resources into collaborating with incumbents through either tactical alliances or co-optation. Party founders who lack both experience and financing have the least bargaining power and are most likely to be co-opted. Co-optation is the norm but the type of co-optation (by the president versus by a prominent opposition leader with presidential ambitions) often depends upon the party leader’s prior personal affiliations with the politicians leading the major coalitions competing in upcoming races. These relationships are especially marked among parties with vote- mobilizing potential. Parties with this characteristic were successful at rapidly developing a recognizable party label for their organization. Parties with vote-mobilizing potential are operationalized as those that have the will and financial capacity to run their own list of candidates in one of the first two national-level elections after the party’s creation. Although parties with vote-mobilizing potential are thus some of the president’s prime targets for co-optation, it is also precisely those parties whose leaders often have at least 106 C. L. KELLY some financing or experience. This makes them both potentially powerful negotiators of tactical alliances and potentially damaging electoral adversaries who might consider pursuing consistent opposition strategies. In contrast, parties without leaders who are willing and capable to pursue an initial, capital-intensive push into electoral politics tend toward co-optation instead of tactical alliances or consistent opposition.

Mechanisms Behind the Strategies Senegal’s most electorally successful parties in the 1990s have histories that illuminate the mechanisms through which party leaders’ endowments of experience and financing shape long-term party trajectories. Various party leaders’ statements from the period—whether in memoirs, the mainstream press, or internal party reports—provide insight into the perceived importance of the theorized endowments for consistent opposition.

The PDS: Why International Private Financing Matters During the Diouf presidency, the PDS ran in opposition to the ruling Socialist Party (PS) during each national-level election. However, Wade regularly negotiated for the PDS to enter PS governments in between those elections, pursuing tactical alliances as a trajectory. Although the PDS thus did not pursue consistent opposition in that period, Wade’s use of resources to forge the PDS’s direction illustrates the importance of state experience and autonomous financing for developing thecapacity to oppose. At the start of the Diouf presidency in 1981, Wade had some of the most promising sources of international private financing, despite lacking state or civil society experience. The PDS grew into a more conventional opposition party as Wade branched out into private sector consulting. While working as an economics professor at the University Cheikh Anta Diop of Dakar, Wade also began contracting for the African Development Bank in Abidjan. He eventually moved into full-time international consulting for various African leaders. Through these and other endeavors, he “earned quite a sum of money,” some of which he used to mount opposition campaigns focused on “doing right by Senegal” (Wade 2006: 121–123). Diouf extended opportunities to certain opposition parties, including the PDS, to join a series of “enlarged presidential majority governments” 4 NEGOTIATORS OR ADVERSARIES? TRACING THE SOURCES OF PARTY… 107 after the social unrest and electoral violence of 1988. These governments came about because Diouf faced domestic and international pressure to reduce tensions in the wake of the PS’s repressive and fraudulent election- related practices. Opposition leaders like Wade had been imprisoned during post-election strikes after mobilizing students and workers to call for reforms to the electoral code. By the time Diouf formed the first enlarged presidential majority government in 1991, Wade had a stock of private wealth to bolster his political career. These international private sector resources were a double-edged sword. While they helped Wade finance presidential and National Assembly campaigns on the uneven playing field, they also made Wade one of Diouf’s prime targets for inclusion in the enlarged governments. The PDS’s leadership in the opposition gave it negotiating power with the PS. Talk of collaboration began as Wade was in prison awaiting trial after the opposition had violently contested the integrity of the 1988 presidential elections. While Wade was still in prison, Diouf contacted him through intermediaries about creating a government that included PDS members (Mendy 1995). Wade alleges that the Secretary General of the Presidency, Jean Collin, also approached him about the possibility of amending the constitution, creating a Vice Presidency, and naming Wade to the new position in exchange for the PDS’s participation in Diouf’s government (Wade 2006: 215–16). This deal never materialized, but the Diouf administration continued to court the PDS. In this context, Wade’s access to non-state sources of financing likely gave the PDS some leeway to selectively consider the government’s overtures. Negotiations about the vice presidency allegedly continued after the PDS entered the first enlarged presidential majority government, even as the 1993 elections neared (Villalón 1994). The case of Wade and the PDS also illustrates the potential importance that international (as opposed to domestic) private financing can play in increasing a party’s likelihood of considering a trajectory of consistent opposition. The financial dynamics of Wade’s choices about the PDS trajectory also illustrate the importance of international capital in particular. Wade was unable to maintain a trajectory of consistent opposition during and between elections, even with the international private financing he was earning from consulting. However, had he possessed only domestic sources of private financing, the difficulties would have been greater because the government scrupulously sought to limit the income that Wade derived at home. For instance, when Wade began consulting for the 108 C. L. KELLY

African Development Bank, a notable source of international private financing, the Senegalese government subsequently chose to apply the legal code requiring him to choose between his two jobs in Senegal, one as a professor at the University Cheikh Anta Diop of Dakar and another as a lawyer (Wade 2006: 122). This offset some of the income that Wade would gain through flows of international private financing. The Diouf government was less effective at stopping alleged flows of financing to Wade from international figures, like Gabonese President Omar Bongo, as well as from domestic actors like Serigne Cheikh Mbacké, who was then leader of the Mouride Muslim sect, which has robust international commercial connections (Wade 2006: 202, 124–5). By this logic, parties that were worse off than the PDS was and lacked any forms of international private financing should have been more subject to the ebbs and flows of the uneven playing field.

The PDS and the Left: Why State and Civil Society Experience Matters Two of Senegal’s well-known leftist parties from the 1990s, the Party of Independence and Work (PIT) and the Democratic League/Movement for the Labor Party (LD/MPT), resembled the PDS in that their leaders did not pursue consistent opposition strategies under Diouf. Like Wade, Amath Dansokho and Abdoulaye Bathily lacked state experience when they initially created their own parties. Unlike Wade, however, Dansokho and Bathily also lacked international private financing. Several aspects of both the PDS’s and the leftist parties’ trajectories illustrate that consistent opposition is difficult to achieve when party leaders lack state experience. Wade’s memoirs indicate that he knew that acquiring state experience was necessary for the PDS to become a more viable opposition party in the long run. He ended the PDS’s first tactical alliance with the PS in 1992—despite Diouf’s entreaties that he remain in the government—because Wade wanted to run for president in 1993 and needed to distance himself from the ruling party in time to launch a credible campaign. He acknowledged that this choice entailed a stark tradeoff in resources and party capabilities:

…we knew that in leaving power we would lose some material means, as well as the stature accorded to a minister by the Territorial Administration. Our stint in the government also gave us the opportunity to make ourselves better known, through our use of the radio and television. (Wade 2006: 221) 4 NEGOTIATORS OR ADVERSARIES? TRACING THE SOURCES OF PARTY… 109

PDS leaders needed state experience to demonstrate their ability to run the country; they needed state resources to fortify the clientelist networks they were building for future elections; and they needed to join the government to increase their visibility to the public and advertise their newfound expertise. Leftist party elites also forged tactical alliances with President Diouf in the 1990s in order to acquire state experience, which they considered essential components of building their parties’ capabilities, despite the internal controversies their participation often created. In the LD/MPT, tactical alliances were popular because they helped party leaders acquire state experience, build reputations as competent high-level administrators, and increase their name recognition in Senegal. Party elites knew that developing this endowment was necessary for bolstering their organization’s future capacity to more consistently oppose incumbents. For instance, after Bathily and other LD/MPT elites like Yéro Deh served in the 1993 presidential majority government, Diouf invited the party into another such government in 1995. At the LD/MPT’s third party congress, members debated the merits of continued involvement. On the one hand, LD politicians were aware that the tactical alliance had reduced party cohesion; ideological hard-liners were discontent with the party’s transition “from a class party to a mass party.” They called for abstention from the government and the “restoration of [the party’s prior] reputation for contestation.” On the other hand, the party’s pragmatists wanted to remain in government. In their view, the party’s presence in the Diouf government advertised LD leaders’ capabilities. It also created opportunities “to prodigiously expand its national and international following and to thereby establish itself in the Senegalese collective consciousness” (LD/MPT 1995: 23). In 1995, LD elites ultimately concluded that acquiring state experience was a pressing necessity if the party hoped to win power through opposition channels in future elections:

It is by staying in the government that the LD/MPT will provide itself with the best chance of affirming itself as a significant political force and of effectively participating in the upcoming elections, which will be the most important ones yet for its leadership, including the 1998 legislative elections and the 2000 presidential race, which ought to foster the emergence of a new generation of leaders heading national institutions. (23) 110 C. L. KELLY

Even when pursuing tactical alliances, however, party leaders took the risk of destabilizing their party or weakening its reputation for opposition. For example, the LD/MPT’s former president, Abdoulaye Bathily, has acknowledged the tradeoffs that joining Diouf’s governments entailed. He held that “a sophisticated sense of patriotism was required to enter the government, knowing full well the unpopular measures that it was going to pursue” and believed that the party “took huge risks” by assuming that it could help to infuse a “new ethics of public administration” into the Diouf government (Sall 1998; LD/MPT 1995: 21). To some LD and PIT members who remained committed to their parties’ roots in leftist ideology, the Senegalese labor movement, and clandestine opposition under Senghor, their parties’ participation in the Diouf government further signaled the end of those organizations’ pristine oppositional stance against government abuse and overreach. Under Wade, tactical alliances continued to help party leaders gain much-coveted state experience while exposing them to reputational risks and internal fractures. And-Jëf/African Party for Democracy and Socialism (AJ/PADS) was a leftist party founded by the statistician and former communist activist Landing Savané, who lacked both prior state experience and international private financing when he created the organization. Savané had categorically refused to forge tactical alliances with Diouf, rejecting ministerial appointments on several occasions. However, Savané, Dansokho, and Bathily all bandwagoned to support Wade in his 2000 presidential runoff against Diouf. All three leaders entered the first post-alter nance government, with Savané serving as Minister of Mines, Craft, and Industry. Much as it had been for the PIT and the LD/MPT under Diouf, the state experience that AJ/PADS leaders acquired by in the Wade government did not provide abundant opportunities to reform patterns of governance. Nevertheless, Savané defended the party’s government participation by reminding the public that AJ had to follow the PDS’s lead on programmatic issues since Wade was president and that “one can be among robbers without being a robber” (Quoted in Kane and Anne 2002; Diagne 2002b). The AJ’s interest in retaining its government appointments also seemed to extend beyond an interest in accessing the state to change policies. Savané and his deputy, Mamadou Diop Decroix, remained in Wade’s subsequent post-alternance governments, even when leaders like Moustapha Niasse of the Alliance of Forces for Progress (AFP) and Dansokho of the PIT left after Wade broke the programmatic promises that he had made to gain their support in 2000. Savané and Mamadou Diop Decroix even 4 NEGOTIATORS OR ADVERSARIES? TRACING THE SOURCES OF PARTY… 111 remained ministers into 2007, with Savané running for president that year while in Wade’s entourage. AJ/PADS suffered a series of defections due to their leaders’ continued participation in the government. In late 2007, an aspiring party faction called Yoonu Askan wi (Path of the People, YAW) asked Savané and Decroix to stop taking government posts and return to the opposition to advance the party’s original ideals. YAW was excluded from AJ/PADS and became a new party; meanwhile, in 2009, AJ/PADS split as Savané and Decroix began a series of prolonged legal battles about the leadership of the party and Wade invited Decroix back into the government. There were also rumors that the two were disputing not only over control of the party but also the 10 million FCFA that Wade had offered to the party during its tactical alliance with the PDS (Fall 2008; Massaly 2011).

Historical Scope Conditions These arguments best apply to Senegal after Diouf created opportunities for opposition party leaders to collaborate with the government. Opposition party leaders’ state experience and international private financing were limited during the first decade of Diouf’s presidency (1981–2000). In the 1980s, Diouf presided over a hegemonic, clientelist party and did not need other parties to mobilize presidential and legislative majorities. Politicians within the PS could access opportunities to acquire state or civil society experience and international private financing, and a few public intellectuals without party affiliations were appointed ministers in the 1980s. However, no politicians who represented opposition parties at the time had opportunities to acquire ministerial-level state experience. Civil society experience was more possible to come by, but associations with mobilizing potential were often absorbed or co-opted by the PS. In turn, virtually no opposition party leader had both the experience and financing hypothesized to foster consistent opposition; the parties that qualified as consistent opponents at the time fulfilled these roles not by choice but by default since Diouf did not offer opportunities for tactical alliances or co-optation. However, Diouf’s reliance on the hegemonic party alone to manufacture electoral majorities became less reliable as economic crisis and social unrest intensified in the late 1980s. The PS retained its legislative supermajority, but in 1991, 1993, 1995, and 1998, Diouf invited certain opposition parties into enlarged presidential majority governments. Diouf took particular care to extend such opportunities to party leaders with vote- mobilizing potential. Although not all such parties were willing to take the 112 C. L. KELLY president up on his offers, several key opposition party staff from the PDS, LD/MPT, PIT, and PDS/R gained state experience (Diop and Diouf 1990: 361). As these parties moved in and out of the opposition and some of their staff broke away to create their own parties, the distribution of state experience across the political arena widened. The distribution was further extended after Wade came to power, seeking to build a support base that expanded beyond the 30% that the PDS won on its own in the first round of the 2000 elections. Initially, Wade focused on encouraging the defections of individual cadres from the PS since the PDS possessed but a few of its own members with the prior government experience that Wade needed to run the state effectively (Diop 2013). However, in 2001, Wade lost the support of the parties who had allied with the PDS in 2000, including the AFP, the PIT, and the National Assembly for Democracy (RND), who had collectively garnered 20% of the vote. To compensate for the loss in his government’s electoral clout, Wade constantly faced the need to cultivate enough party leaders as allies in order to mobilize the necessary votes to win the upcoming presidential elections. Opportunities for parties to pursue trajectories of co-optation and tactical alliances expanded accordingly, as Wade created the Cap 21 and regularly called for opposition participation in his governments. International private financing had also become a more relevant endowment by the end of PS rule. By the late 1990s, “liberalization of commerce ha[d] decisively expanded space for operation and possibilities for accumulation,” which “circumscribed the ability of state agents to mediate access to the commercial sector” (Boone et al. 1998: 72). By alternance, the Senegalese economy had been privatized to a more significant extent than many other African countries with multiparty elections and access to credit was no longer solely available for ruling party allies (Arriola 2012). Although still uncommon, opposition party leaders with access to private financing became less rare than it had been before.

4.3 Tracing the Influence of State Experience and International Private Financing Descriptive statistical analysis attests to the correlation between party leader endowments of experience and financing, on the one hand, and long-term party trajectories, on the other. 4 NEGOTIATORS OR ADVERSARIES? TRACING THE SOURCES OF PARTY… 113

Data Codings and Sources To classify long-term party trajectories as consistent opposition, tactical alliances, or co-optation, each of the 46 sampled parties’ actions were coded based on its leaders’ coalition choices in the five national elections spanning Wade’s rule (the first rounds of the 2000, 2007, and 2012 presidential races, and the 2001 and 2007 National Assembly elections). Coalition rosters, interviews, local newspapers, and other secondary sources were used to determine parties’ behavior in each race since official election results do not indicate the party composition of the coalitions contesting the race. Aggregating each of a party’s shorter-term choices of affiliation into a single classification (consistent opposition, tactical alliance, or co-optation) allows us to identify which parties supported the ruling party across all elections during the Wade presidency, which parties functioned as consistent opponents, and which parties shifted their support over the period of study. Generally, the direction of change is from the opposition to the ruling party. Reversals are rare. Specifically, party leaders are coded as pursuing consistent opposition if their party ran in the opposition alone or in coalition in all of the Wade-era elections during which the party existed. Parties are coded as pursuing tactical alliances if their leaders supported the ruling coalition through a bilateral alliance with the PDS during Wade’s presidency. Depending on the terms of a tactical alliance, party leaders may run on their own in certain elections or they may run with the ruling coalition in all races. Party leaders are coded as co-opted if they immediately or eventually join Wade’s ruling coalition through a Cap 21 membership and never subsequently run on their own in national elections. The party leaders who consistently follow the same major opposition leader but never contest national elections alone are also coded as co-opted. The dataset also tracks each party leader’s international private financing and experience in the state and civil society before forming a party. Access to international private financing is coded based on qualitative assessments of party founders’ personal resources that are limited in detail due to the sensitive nature of the topic. The variable is difficult to measure because party leaders themselves are often the major source, the government does not enforce documentation of party financing, and foreign party financing by third parties is illegal (Fall 2011, 2012). Ultimately, party leaders coded as having high levels of financing were reported—in personal interviews, in the press, or by Senegalese analysts—as having 114 C. L. KELLY direct personal access to private sector income. These people have made fortunes through their own international careers, often through commerce and consulting.7 Those with medium levels lack direct access to ongoing flows of international private income but reportedly have family or close friends with such access. Those with low levels of international private financing are not known to have had any direct or indirect access to international sources of international private sector income. The measurement of party leaders’ state and civil society experience is relatively accurate because there is official government and archival documentation of all politicians who have been ministers and experience is a less sensitive subject to raise in interviews.8 Party leaders are coded as having state or civil society experience when they had either been a minister before creating a party or had led civil society groups with nationwide urban constituencies. Politicians exhibiting high levels of experience either had over five years of ministerial experience before creating their parties or had built social movements with nationwide followings before founding their parties. Party leaders with medium experience served fewer years as ministers or ran localized civil society organizations. Those coded as low had not been ministers or major association leaders.

Patterns in the Full Sample For the 46 parties founded 1998–2003, Table 4.1 displays the frequencies of each type of party trajectory, sorted by party leaders’ combinations of endowments. Generally, over two-thirds of the sampled parties have leaders who collaborated with incumbents through tactical alliances or

Table 4.1 Frequencies of party trajectories by endowment combinations

No financing Financing OR Financing AND No experience Experience Experience

Consistent opposition (n=5) 0 (0%)a 3 (29%)a 2 (29%) Tactical alliance (n=3) 0 (0%)a 2 (14%)a 1 (14%) Co-optation (n=33) 21 (100%)a 8 (57%)a 4 (57%) No data (n=5) 4 1 0 TOTAL (n=46) 25 14 7

Source: Original data collected and coded by author a% of people following a trajectory, based on the total number of people with complete profiles 4 NEGOTIATORS OR ADVERSARIES? TRACING THE SOURCES OF PARTY… 115

co-optation; just five parties exhibited trajectories of consistent opposition. Several additional patterns also stand out. First, co-optation is the most common trajectory among parties in all categories of endowments. All 21 (100%) of the sampled party leaders with neither experience nor financing pursued long-term trajectories of co-optation.9 Many of their parties are “telephone booth parties,” which are not electorally competitive and most often join the Cap 21. Co-optation is also the most common trajectory for parties led by the subset of sampled politicians with one or both endowments. Fifty-seven percent of such party leaders were co-opted under Wade. However, none of the party leaders with both endowments whose organizations were ultimately co- opted possessed high levels of both state or civil society experience and international private financing; instead, these parties’ leaders had medium levels of both endowments or else high levels of one endowment and medium levels of the other. Second, nearly all of the parties that did not exhibit vote-mobilizing potential followed trajectories of co-optation. All but 3 of the 30 parties without vote-mobilizing potential—henceforth referred to as microparties—were headed by leaders who lacked both international private financing and state experience or else lacked one of those two endowments by the time they created parties.10 Based on this chapter’s theory, it is, therefore, unsurprising that 29 of the 30 micro-party leaders pursued trajectories of co-optation. Although there is practically no variation on the type of trajectory that these leaders followed, there are still two different types of coalitions into which almost all micro-party leaders sought co-optation. Twenty-one of 30 followed the predictable path, allying with Wade at some point during his rule. An additional nine parties became satellites in the coalitions of opposition leaders like Ousmane Tanor Dieng (PS), Moustapha Niasse (AFP), and Idrissa Seck (Rewmi). These opposition leaders were known to “financially maintain the smaller parties” that rally around them but to a lesser extent than what Wade could do through the Cap 21 (Diallo 2004).11 A third notable trend is that party leaders lacking a formative political experience on the Senegalese left more consistently gravitated into the ruling coalition under Wade, with 14 of 21 such leaders in the sample following trajectories of co-optation into Wade’s mouvance présidentielle. Conversely, the micro-party leaders co-opted into opposition coalitions had been historically involved in leftist politics. Five of the six sampled party leaders who had previously belonged to one of Senegal’s three 116 C. L. KELLY major leftist parties (LD/MPT, PIT, AJ/PADS) joined the coalitions of major opposition figures like Dieng and Niasse, who are socially and politically connected to the more moderate-left Socialist element of Senegalese politics. However, their gravitation in this direction was not based primarily on ideology. When asked to explain their reasons for choosing co-optation in the opposition as opposed to the ruling coalition, some cited the expressive benefits that they got from participating in the political opposition. For example, Souleymane Ndiaye Brin of the Senegalese People’s Bloc (BPS) describes the party as a tool of “political engagement for political engagement’s sake,” which entails “organizing marches, submitting petitions, and holding conferences.”12 Others explained that they pursued a trajectory of co-optation outside of Wade’s mouvance présidentielle thanks to the personal connections they had forged with opposition figures like Niasse and Dieng. Mbaye Diouf of the Front for Democracy and Progress (FDP) remained allied to the AFP and its leader, Moustapha Niasse, throughout the Wade presidency. Even when Wade approached Diouf to encourage the FDP to join the ruling coalition in the mid-2000s, Diouf politely rejected the president “for subjective and entirely personal reasons,” namely, years of working with Niasse.13 Brin echoed this sentiment with regard to his relationship with the PS’s president, Ousmane Tanor Dieng.

Trajectories of Parties with Vote-Mobilizing Potential There are stronger relationships between experience, financing, and consistent opposition when we control for their vote-mobilizing potential. As previously mentioned, parties with such potential are operationalized as those that have run on their own label in one of the first two national elections after their founding. Sixteen of the 46 sampled parties meet this criterion.14 Twelve of them ran more than once in national elections under Wade after their creation, but only four remained outside of the ruling coalition throughout Wade’s presidency. Table 4.2 displays the relationships between party leader endowments and party trajectories. Even within this subset of 16 parties and their leaders, those with neither experience nor financing were most prone to co-optation, whereas those with both experience and financing pursued consistent opposition slightly more often than other trajectories. Party leaders with one endowment but not the other tended to choose a wider range of strategies than parties 4 NEGOTIATORS OR ADVERSARIES? TRACING THE SOURCES OF PARTY… 117

Table 4.2 Frequencies of trajectories of parties with vote-mobilizing potential

No financing Financing OR Financing AND No experience Experience Experience

Consistent opposition (n=4) 0 (0%) 2 (25%) 2 (50%) Tactical alliance (n=3) 0 (0%) 2 (25%) 1 (25%) Co-optation (n=9) 4 (100%) 4 (50%) 1 (25%) TOTAL (n=16) 4 8 4 whose leaders possessed neither endowment; they also chose the full range of trajectories at higher frequencies than party leaders with both endowments. Relative to party leaders with neither experience nor financing, party leaders with one endowment more frequently negotiate tactical alliances or attempt to engage in consistent opposition. Relative to party leaders with both resources, they are more prone to collaborating with the president. Table 4.3 provides further insight into these patterns based on an expansion of the independent variables into measures of low, medium, and high levels of experience and financing. There is only one party founder with high levels of both experience and independent financing and he pursued consistent opposition; the six politicians with high levels of just one endowment were evenly dispersed, with two pursuing each of the three trajectories; and seven of the nine founders with high levels of neither endowment were co-opted. As illustrated above, consistent opposition correlates with higher levels of both experience and financing. More specifically, consistent opposition occurs only among the parties whose leaders have high levels of both financing and experience, or among parties whose leaders have high levels of one and medium levels of the other; it never occurs among parties with medium or lower levels of both endowments. Holding independent financing constant at a high level, consistent opposition becomes popular as party leaders’ levels of experience increase (first division, Table 4.3). Reducing financing to a medium level, we find that changes in experience are less strongly correlated with consistent opposition. However, party leaders with higher experience are more prone to either consistent opposition or tactical alliances than they are to co-optation (second division, Table 4.3). When financing is held constant at low levels, co-optation is most common among people who lack state or civil society experience (third division, Table 4.3). Overall, these patterns suggest that it is espe- 118 C. L. KELLY

Table 4.3 List of parties by levels of each endowment

Party Independent State or civil society Long-term strategy financing experience

PR (Abdourahim Agne) High Low Tactical alliance PAS (Djibril Mbaye) High Low Co-optation PPC (Mbaye-Jacques Diop) High Low Co-optation RES-Les Verts (Ousmane High Medium (civil society) Consistent Sow Huchard) opposition AFP (Moustapha Niasse) High High (state) Consistent opposition

MRDS (Imam Mbaye Medium Medium (civil society) Consistent Niang) opposition MDC (Ousseynou Fall) Medium Medium (civil society) Co-optation Jëf-Jël (Talla Sylla) Medium High (civil society) Consistent opposition URD (Djibo Kâ) Medium High (state) Tactical alliance

UDFP (Aloïse Gorgui Low Low Co-optation Dione) Parena (Marième Wone Ly) Low Low Co-optation PRC (Samba Diouldé Low Low Co-optation Thiam) MDS/NJ (Oumar Low Low Co-optation Hassimou Dia) PSD/Jant bi (Mamour Low Medium (civil society) Tactical alliance Cissé) UPR (Doudou Ndoye) Low Medium (state) Co-optation PLS (Ousmane Ngom) Low Medium (state) Co-optation

Source: Original data collected by author, building on FKA/CESTI 2001 cially at high levels of financing that increases in a party leader’s experience yield consistent opposition; at lower levels of financing, increases in experience instead just foster greater variance in the strategies pursued.

4.4 Comparative Case Studies of Senegalese Parties and Party Leaders Comparative case studies illuminate the mechanisms behind the patterns described above. They demonstrate how party leaders’ resource endowments, political networks, and initial patterns of electoral participation interacted to shape their long-term trajectories under Wade. Four core case studies (Table 4.4) were selected to represent each of 4 NEGOTIATORS OR ADVERSARIES? TRACING THE SOURCES OF PARTY… 119

Table 4.4 Case studies

No international private International private financing financing

No state/civil society Samba Diouldé Thiam (PRC) Mbaye-Jacques Diop experience (PPC) State/civil society Djibo Kâ (URD) Moustapha Niasse (AFP) experience four theoretically relevant categories of endowments that party leaders may possess (high experience and high financing, high experience only, high financing only, or high levels of neither endowment). The choice of cases was based on the quality of archival and interview evidence available among the eligible party leaders who represent the full range of values on the independent variables in the theory. The case studies illustrate two points. First, as a party founder’s level of each endowment increases, the more he has the potential to move from acting as a minor negotiator with the president and prone to co-optation, to becoming a tough negotiator who is more capable of tactical alliances, to being an adversary who opposes incumbents full-time. Second, while financing and experience can critically shape party trajectories, these variables are not the only ones that matter. Other factors—including the party leader’s political origins, the party’s presence and appeal on the local level, and the degree to which party leaders are willing to pursue niche programmatic and policy issues on the legislative level—also play into the long- term trajectories of parties and their leaders’ strategic choices therein.

Four Core Case Studies The four core case studies focus on Moustapha Niasse of the Alliance of Forces for Progress (AFP), Djibo Kâ of the Union for Democratic Renewal (URD), Mbaye-Jacques Diop of the Party for Progress and Citizenship (PPC), and Samba Diouldé Thiam of the Party for Renaissance and Citizenship (PRC). AFP followed a trajectory of consistent opposition and its leader, Niasse, had high levels of both experience and financing. Kâ of the URD had high levels of experience but medium levels of financing and struck a tactical alliance with Wade. With high levels of financing but low levels of experience, Mbaye-Jacques Diop led the PPC into a fusion with the PDS, one of several forms of co-optation. Samba Diouldé Thiam of 120 C. L. KELLY the PRC had low levels of experience and international private financing and chose to align the PRC with the ruling coalition until Wade attempted to change the constitution and run for a third term.

Party Leaders with Both Experience and Financing Rarely are there parties whose leaders have both the experience and the financing that give them sufficient legitimacy and vote-mobilizing capacity to continually challenge incumbents in all national elections. Moustapha Niasse of the Alliance of Forces for Progress (AFP) was the only party leader in the sample with high levels of both experience and financing, and those endowments empowered him to pursue a consistent opposition trajectory. Niasse created the AFP in 1999, building on a long career in the state. He led the youth wing of the Senegalese Progressive Union (Union Progressiste Sénégalais, UPS), the PS’s precursor, and then served as Senghor’s Chief of Staff in the late 1970s. After multiple ministerial stints in the 1980s, including as Minister of Foreign Affairs, Niasse took nine years off and entered the private sector, returning a second time as Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1993. During his hiatus from public service, Niasse acquired several international oil companies. He “has lived off of petrol subsidies since his first crossing of the desert in 1984” and “maintains a high standard of living primarily thanks to revenues from petrol compan[ies]” (Seneweb 2013). Niasse also established an international consulting company. He attributes its success to his “rather fluid address book” that includes African heads of state he met while minister.15 Niasse thus had over a decade of ministerial experience, as well as international private financing, when he announced his departure from the PS on July 16, 1999, and created the AFP. As mentioned in Chap. 3, the rise of Ousmane Tanor Dieng within the PS began to cause concern to Niasse in the mid-1990s. He noticed that “Tanor and his team gained influence, and it was from that moment that errors began to be made.” Niasse discussed his concerns with President Diouf, highlighting his concern that Tanor’s team “consisted largely of bureaucrats [who] had never been political party cadres.”16 After leaving his ministerial post in 1996, Niasse subsequently paused his international work as a special envoy in 1999, created the AFP, and returned to campaign for president in 2000. The AFP followed a trajectory of consistent opposition by running in the opposition in all five national elections of the Wade presidency. President Diouf attempted to negotiate the AFP’s alliance with the ruling 4 NEGOTIATORS OR ADVERSARIES? TRACING THE SOURCES OF PARTY… 121 party in the 2000 runoff, but Niasse refused, remaining true to the AFP’s original oppositional stance in the campaign and allying with Wade, the opponent. Niasse then served for several months as Wade’s Prime Minister in 2000, but the AFP still warrants classification as a consistent opposition party for several reasons. First, it meets the coding rules for a consistent opposition party by virtue of its presentation of opposition candidates in each national election under Wade. Second, Niasse’s brief Prime Ministership did not occur on the basis of co-optation or a tactical alliance; the AFP’s government participation hinged upon the PDS’s respect of a programmatic pact, which addressed specific opposition policy demands like adopting a parliamentary system in Senegal.17 Niasse resigned, and the AFP rejoined the opposition when Wade reneged on the programmatic agreement (Niang 2004). The AFP ran in the opposition again in the 2001 National Assembly elections. When Wade attempted to bring the AFP back into the ruling coalition on eight different occasions, Niasse refused to join (Guissé 2003). In 2003, for instance, Wade invited Niasse, Ousmane Tanor Dieng, and (later that year) Kâ into the government, but Niasse remarked to his followers, “we are in the opposition and we will stay there… we will pursue our battle so that a true, open, peaceful, solid democracy and the changes that it must still undergo are finally achieved” (Quoted in Diop2005 ). In 2005, Niasse rejected Wade’s overtures again when he proposed forming a government with opposition parties including the AFP (Diouf 2005). Niasse recounts that “the party was created in 1999 to foster change relative to what had been done [to govern Senegal] and therefore each time [that Wade invited the AFP into government] and the party found that the mode of governing the country was not desirable, it stayed in the opposition.”18 Niasse’s possession of both key endowments before creating the AFP prepared him for consistent opposition. He made continual bids for the presidency and his party competed in most constituencies in parliamentary elections. These bids were facilitated by his access to international income that the government could not block; for example, Niasse credits his international private financing for his ability to run for president in 2000, when serious campaigning cost at least 5–6 million USD and helicopters for cross-country travel cost $10,000 per day.19 Not only did the renown that Niasse developed over decades of work as a minister make it worthwhile for him to invest in consistent opposition, but his access to international private sector revenue shielded him from dependency on state jobs for political financing. 122 C. L. KELLY

Party Leaders with Either Experience or Financing The trajectories of parties whose leaders possess either financing or experience, but not both, vary most widely. Founders with high levels of either endowment are best equipped to use their limited endowments to negotiate with the president. They can sometimes forge initial tactical alliances and then sporadically renegotiate the terms of collaboration, but often their endowments are not sufficient to make consistent opposition a feasible long-term trajectory. Although some such party leaders initially run against the ruling coalition, they are most often temporary opponents, using their initial positioning to negotiate collaboration with incumbents eventually. Conversely, founders with medium levels of just one resource often depend on the president’s goodwill to access wealth and patronage. They do not always have enough clout to renegotiate the terms of their collaboration and are more prone to co-optation. Aside from lacking international private financing, Djibo Kâ, who created the Union for Democratic Renewal (URD) in 1998, is much like Niasse of the AFP. Both launched their political careers by leading the PS’s Youth Movement. Kâ then served as Senghor’s Deputy Chief of Staff while Niasse was Chief of Staff. Each acquired over a decade of ministerial experience (including Minister of Foreign Affairs) and served in the PS Political Bureau. Each left the PS after the 1996 Party Congress and swiftly built major parties by using their name recognition and investments from friends. Both were concerned about the internal management of the PS, but Kâ was the first to leave it. From 1991 to 1995, Kâ campaigned for internal democracy in the PS, promoting a “renewal” faction. After the 1996 Congress, several renewal proponents were excluded from the PS, and Kâ resigned (Kâ 2005). Kâ had as much state experience as Niasse but did not develop reliable sources of international private financing.20 Because Kâ was almost constantly in public service jobs under PS rule, he did not have many opportunities to engage in international business opportunities. He created a consulting company in 1996 when he stepped down as minister before the PS “congress without debates,” but he left the company’s administration to others when he returned to public office in 2004. The firm was not particularly successful. He also found it difficult to get domestic private financing “because Senegalese businessmen… are with the government solely for their commercial interests. If you are in the opposition, they flee from you.”21 4 NEGOTIATORS OR ADVERSARIES? TRACING THE SOURCES OF PARTY… 123

These endowments pushed the URD and AFP in different directions. The first major difference in party trajectories was in 2000. Before the runoff, Kâ negotiated with Diouf and Wade for future posts. The URD sided with Diouf, who promised to make Kâ Prime Minister. Niasse’s refusal to negotiate with Diouf in 2000 contrasts with the tactical alliances that Kâ forged with Wade in 2004 after opposing him beforehand. After the 2000 election, the strategic choices of Niasse and Kâ continued to diverge. After Diouf lost in 2000, Kâ called for a “credible opposition” that stays outside of government (Diagne 2002a). He rejected Wade’s attempts to bring the URD into the ruling coalition in 2001 and 2003 because he did not get along with Prime Minister Idrissa Seck.22 However, when Seck stepped down and Wade asked the URD to join a “rally around the essential” with the PDS in 2004, Kâ negotiated a tactical alliance. Twenty-four politicians from the PDS and the URD developed a memorandum of understanding. Kâ and Wade then continued negotiating privately; URD demands were purported to include control of up to seven ministries (Bousso 2004). Ultimately, Wade gave the URD control of three. Kâ remained one of Wade’s closest allies even through his loss in the 2012 elections. Kâ’s ongoing capacity to forge a tactical alliance left the URD some electoral room for maneuver: he ran the URD on its own in the 2007 legislative elections but stood down from the 2007 presidential race according to the terms of his tactical alliance with Wade. This allowed the URD to maintain an autonomous support base and thereby preserve a means of negotiation with Wade during their collaboration. Nevertheless, room for negotiation was limited: unlike Niasse, Kâ depended on Wade for material resources, which he needed to maintain the following within the URD that he had amassed based on his reputation as a statesman. Kâ admits that Wade “helped the [URD] party a lot, which is what allowed us to breathe new life into it, but this also weakened me in other ways.” As Kâ became more involved in the government, he chose not to run for president in 2007 and 2012 “through loyalty” to Wade. This “long-term strategic alliance” left the URD dependent upon the PDS’s success for legitimacy.23 Without this proximity to the president, Kâ would have had few resources to maintain the URD’s following, given his lack of direct access to international private financing. Mbaye-Jacques Diop of the Party for Progress and Citizenship (PPC) obtained the international private financing that made his fortune when he was in maritime commerce, decades before he founded the PPC, but he 124 C. L. KELLY never attained a ministerial rank in government. Nevertheless, Diop’s financial clout then made him a powerful regional figure within the PS, which he joined in 1958 and left in 2000 (FKA/CESTI 2001).24 With such wealth, Diop gained influence in the peri-urban area of Rufisque, where he had grown up in a family of humble economic origins. Rufisque was a key city to conquer in any presidential race, and Diop served as mayor of it from 1987 to 2002, providing employment and mentoring to community members as well.25 However, Diop lacked state experience due to rivalries within the PS, which were heightened by his wealth and local popularity. Ultimately, he instead created the PPC and negotiated his party’s fusion with the PDS, a form of co-optation. Diop’s financing helped him develop an initial political base. In Rufisque, Diop used his wealth and his mayorship to build a clientelist network. Leaving the PS after the first round of the 2000 elections, Diop created the PPC, which won 18,500 votes in the 2001 National Assembly race. As a retired millionaire, Diop was capable of negotiating with Wade; however, as a millionaire without the ability to replenish his stocks of wealth, Diop’s medium levels of international private financing made him less capable of negotiating with Wade than Kâ was with high levels of state experience. Beyond these limitations, Diop’s desire to acquire high-level state experience seems to have pushed him to stop opposing Wade. After the PPC proved its electoral clout in the 2001 legislative elections and the 2002 municipal elections were upcoming, Diop took advantage of the opportunity to permanently fuse the PPC with the PDS. Diop reaf- firmed the PPC’s membership in the Cap 21 but also announced that he would run separately for mayor of Rufisque if not nominated within the PDS coalition (Monnier 2002). Diop’s local clout made his threat a central element of negotiations between PPC and PDS. He was appointed honorary deputy mayor while gaining a seat in the PDS Directing Committee in exchange for not pursuing the 2002 mayorship (Diakhaté 2002; Diop 2008). Fusion offered Diop less room for maneuver than Kâ enjoyed with Wade. While the URD gained control of several ministries after joining Wade’s entourage, Diop and his supporters lobbied for over a year to gain ministerial-level appointments. During the PPC’s negotiations with the PDS, it had been rumored that Diop expected an appointment as Minister of Decentralization in exchange for fusion (MJD 2002). However, Diop’s limited financing and his party’s vote-mobilizing capacity was not powerful enough to guarantee him the post immediately. When no appointment 4 NEGOTIATORS OR ADVERSARIES? TRACING THE SOURCES OF PARTY… 125 materialized, Diop and his supporters from the ex-PPC, who struggled to merge into PDS party structures, mobilized for Diop’s promotion. They stated that “in a fusion, we join not only in order to give, but also to receive” (Quoted in Tall 2003). Wade eventually made Diop President of the Republic’s Council for Economic and Social Affairs (Conseil de la République pour les affaires économiques et sociales, CRAES) from 2004–7. However, Diop later regret- ted fusing the PPC with the PDS because, he said, “I lost my liberty of expression, as well as esteem” in the political community.26 Even after he lost his position in the CRAES, Diop remained in Wade’s ruling coalition through the latter’s defeat in 2012. He stayed in the mouvance présidenti- elle even as he took issue with the rise of Karim Wade within the PDS as of 2009. Diop resurrected the PPC in the 2012 National Assembly elections, but only did so after Wade lost the 2012 presidential race, dissolved the Cap 21, and “liberated” his partisan allies to shape their own destinies under a new presidency.

Leaders with Neither Financing nor Experience Most party leaders with neither financing nor experience were co-opted. Such founders, who were often major figures on the Senegalese left under authoritarianism or who came from families with traditional or religious authority, sometimes sought to negotiate patronage with the president while in the Cap 21. However, most founders with neither endowment just collected the small-scale benefits that the president provided members of the Cap 21. Samba Diouldé Thiam created the Party for Renaissance and Citizenship (PRC) in 2000, after decades of political activity in the Senegalese left but without ministerial experience or independent private financing. Thiam had been a public high school teacher until 1970, when he became the full-time Permanent Secretary of the African Independence Party (PAI). He later served as the second-in-command in the Party for Independence and Work (PIT), a PAI splinter, but left after he was bypassed for two ministerial posts that Diouf offered the PIT in 1991. Thiam was denied similar opportunities after he co-founded the Union for Democratic Renewal/Front for Turnover (URD/FAL), a party that splintered from the URD after Kâ supported Diouf in the 2000 presidential runoff. Thiam then created his own party, the PRC, which Wade co-opted after the 2001 National Assembly elections (Diop 2001). 126 C. L. KELLY

Although Thiam was more successful in accessing presidential patronage than many other counterparts without experience and financing, he still had relatively low leverage with the president about the terms of his collaboration. Initially, Thiam’s reputation as a legend of the Senegalese left helped him become one of Wade’s interlocutors after forming the PRC in 2000. That year, Wade appointed Thiam for several months as Chairman of the Board (Président du Conseil d’Administration, PCA) of the state newspaper, Le Soleil, and, in 2001, for several months as Minister of Planning. After running in the 2001 National Assembly election without winning a seat, the PRC pursued a trajectory of co- optation by joining the Cap 21. Thiam did not withdraw his party from the Cap 21 until 2010 when Wade controversially sought to seek a third term (Massaly 2009). Thiam then supported Macky Sall in the 2012 presidential race but remained in the ruling coalition until that watershed moment.27 Without years of ministerial experience and international private financing, Thiam was unable to strictly condition his collaboration with Wade. Thiam’s appointments as PCA and minister are better results than many of his counterparts lacking both endowments have achieved. However, Wade then swept Thiam aside after his brief appointments in 2001, only bringing Thiam back into a government job in 2003, when the ruling coalition was weaker. Wade then re-named Thiam PCA of Le Soleil, where he remained until he was elected to the National Assembly on the PDS candidate list in 2007. However, Thiam had little negotiating power when he disagreed with Wade’s attempt on June 23, 2011, to modify the constitution, in which Wade proposed an amendment that would allow him to run for a third presidential term and appoint a vice president. In 2009, Thiam voiced opposition to the idea that led to the 2011 proposal while asserting loyalty to the ruling coalition. In 2011, after a year of unsuccessfully seeking to change the situation, Thiam escalated his criticism within the mouvance présidentielle. He asked: “What terrible menaces are weighing down on Senegal and the Senegalese, or on the president’s timeline, that justify the executive branch enriching itself further by adding the post of vice president, which is just another means for the president to distribute patronage?” (Quoted in Massaly 2009). The situation escalated later that year when the PRC left the PDS’s parliamentary group in the National Assembly. Soon thereafter, the PRC joined Macky Sall’s campaign. 4 NEGOTIATORS OR ADVERSARIES? TRACING THE SOURCES OF PARTY… 127

Other Party Leaders Pursuing Limited Forms of Consistent Opposition Several other parties in the sample exhibited consistent opposition in legislative (but not presidential) elections without their leaders possessing the high levels of both endowments hypothesized to foster it. For instance, the Assembly of Ecologists of Senegal-The Greens (RES-Les Verts) and the Movement for Democratic and Social Reform (MRDS) had leaders who lacked sufficient experience and financing to challenge the president in elections on a regular basis; in fact, Ousmane Sow Huchard of RES-Les Verts and Mbaye Niang of MRDS abstained from participating in presidential election campaigns altogether. However, consistent opposition remained an attractive option to these party leaders whose organizations each ran on their own in the opposition in all National Assembly and local races during the Wade presidency. RES-Les Verts and MRDS promoted specific, ideologically motivated reforms that distinguished them from other parties in the system. The programmatic goals of these two niche parties provided their leaders with an alternative motivation for consistent opposition that partially substituted for their deficiencies in experience or financing, but only in legislative elections.28 With high levels of international private financing and medium levels of state and civil society experience, Huchard led RES-Les Verts, a party that ran on its own label in both National Assembly elections under Wade, winning one seat each time. However, RES-Les Verts did not run or join any coalitions for the 2000, 2007, and 2012 presidential elections. Huchard established RES-Les Verts in 1999, following an illustrious career as an anthropologist and an internationally renowned musician.29 By the time he founded RES-Les Verts, Huchard had high levels of international private financing from his consulting cabinet and his musical career. Huchard had medium levels of civil society experience due to the prestigious but non-ministerial state jobs he held that related to his arts expertise, as well as his membership in Senegal’s Civil Forum, a national transparency NGO.30 Although Huchard’s level of financing does not match that of Niasse, RES-Les Verts has a programmatic basis that partially substituted for these deficiencies. The party’s ethos is based on a tract of “green philosophy” that Huchard wrote, invoking “eco-citizenship,” “active citizenship,” and “participatory democracy” (Barbier 2008).31 President Wade did not adopt many explicitly eco-friendly policies, so while RES-Les Verts 128 C. L. KELLY remained committed to dialogue with the government, it carved out a niche in the parliamentary opposition to draw attention to the green cause. RES-Les Verts consistently advocated for audits of domestic codes and international agreements related to the environment, the reinstate- ment of anti-tobacco laws, the establishment of an annual day without cars, and investment in solar energy (Diop 2001; Fall 2005; Sène and Mbengue 2007). These platforms were the impetus for RES-Les Verts to function as a critical opposition party that kept its distance from the president. In the National Assembly, Huchard also remained independent of any parliamentary group in order to preserve his ability to “determine whether [each] law is good or bad from an ecological standpoint” (Quoted in Diagne 2007). Accordingly, Huchard indicated that RES-Les Verts would “accompany” the Wade government when it chose to adopt sound environmental policies; however, he also criticized weaknesses in post- alternance policies (Barbier 2008, Diagne 2007). In these ways, the commitment of RES-Les Verts to implementing a specific reform program, combined with Huchard’s considerable stock of financing, helped to deter the party from collaborating with the ruling coalition, despite the fact that Huchard’s level of state and civil society experience was lower than the levels that are hypothesized to facilitate consistent opposition. The MRDS’s leader, Imam Mbaye Niang, had medium levels of both international private financing and civil society experience. Niang was not reported to have direct sources of such financing but had close connections to people with it through his work as imam of the mosque at Dakar’s Léopold Sédar Senghor airport. Fluent in French, Niang was educated in Arabic-speaking, Islamic schools in Senegal and then at the Civil Aviation School in Tunis.32 His civil society experience came from running the airport mosque—which has connected him to religious leaders from other African and Middle Eastern countries—along with his leadership of the union of airport workers as a bureaucrat in the Agency for Aerial Navigation Safety in Africa and Madagascar (Agence pour la Sécurité de la Navigation Aérienne en Afrique et à Madagascar, ASECNA). The MRDS has a distinctive programmatic focus and pursued the same long-term strategy as RES-Les Verts under Wade. Niang mobilized an initial group of followers within Senegal’s (relatively small) reformist Muslim community and won a seat in the National Assembly in 2001 and 2007. Niang, like Huchard, insisted on remaining an independent Member 4 NEGOTIATORS OR ADVERSARIES? TRACING THE SOURCES OF PARTY… 129 of Parliament. The MRDS also did not campaign in the 2000 or 2007 presidential elections. The MRDS broke its pattern of non-participation in presidential races in 2012, when it campaigned for Macky Sall. Although Niang lacked high levels of experience and financing, the programmatic nature of the MRDS’s political goals instead fostered the organization’s consistent opposition trajectory in each National Assembly race under Wade. The MRDS called for a “moralization” of politics, including the infusion of conservative Islamic values and principles into state and society. Religiously motivated advocacy for programmatic reforms allowed the MRDS to maintain a small but electorally significant set of followers committed to ideas like integrating Koranic schools (daaras) into the national education system, as well as establishing a Muslim legal code (sharia) in Senegal (Dramé 2003; MRDS 2014: 22). The MRDS also denounced Western programming on Senegalese television and praised the criminal penalties that Senegalese law imposes on homosexuals. With his followers’ contributions and his personal income, Niang regularly ran the MRDS in legislative elections and drew on his experience and renown to mobilize voters on these niche issues. However, neither his financing nor his experience was sufficient to facilitate Niang’s engagement in active, consistent opposition across multiple presidential races. Generally, the cases of Huchard (RES-Les Verts) and Niang (MRDS) suggest that programmatic commitments to niche policy issues—or a personal proclivity for engaging in opposition for the sake of opposition—can serve as partial substitutes for experience or financing when a party leader lacks high levels of one or the other. However, the AFP led by Niasse was the only party in the sample that ran on its own label in all of the Wade-era national-level elections after its founding. Unlike the AFP, the parties of Huchard and Niang both abstained from running alone or supporting an opposition coalition in at least one, if not multiple, presidential races. Their cases suggest that as parties’ levels of each endowment decrease, their ability to function as consistent opponents on the presidential level in addition to the legislative level can diminish or even disappear.

4.5 Conclusion This chapter illustrated that consistent opposition trajectories were difficult to sustain on the uneven playing field in Senegal during Wade’s presidency. Party trajectories depended upon party leaders’ incentives, which 130 C. L. KELLY were shaped by their international private financing and state or civil society experience. Only a rare set of Senegalese politicians, those with both state or civil society experience and international private financing, tended to resist long-term collaboration with the president. Party leaders’ access to such financing enabled them to engage in the clientelist competition that citizens expect of serious contenders for national office; ministerial- level experience allowed party leaders to present themselves as challengers able to run the state. Descriptive statistical analysis of all Senegalese parties founded 1998–2003 established the correlation between party leaders’ endowments and parties’ long-term trajectories, and comparative case studies of parties with varying combinations of endowments illustrated the mechanisms of how party leaders’ endowments shaped their multiple, consecutive choices throughout the Wade presidency about how their parties would behave. The chapter’s conclusions are hypothesis-generating and, therefore, tentative. Nevertheless, the analysis yields original insights about party leaders’ backgrounds, state experience, and international private financing, as well as about the political and economic mechanisms that link party leaders’ endowments to party trajectories. However, the findings also raise an additional puzzle: if politicians with both endowments are the regime’s most consistent opponents, why were they were not the ones who fostered Senegal’s two presidential turnovers? The next chapter, focused on explaining these turnovers, argues that the rarity of consistent opposition parties has not damaged prospects for turnover. However, it has shaped the ways that presidential defeat occurs. Namely, when consistent opposition parties are rare, ex-regime insiders can emerge as the president’s major electoral challengers. In Senegal, both the 2000 and 2012 presidential turnovers followed this pattern. Both Wade, who won against incumbent Diouf in 2000, and Sall, who defeated Wade in 2012, had served in the governments of their adversaries before running against them.

Notes 1. Because the ruling party enjoyed a legislative majority on its own throughout the period under study, the definition of consistent opposition does not allow for opposition alliances with the government that would be “acceptable” opposition party behavior in either presidential or parliamentary systems in which no single party has the majority. 4 NEGOTIATORS OR ADVERSARIES? TRACING THE SOURCES OF PARTY… 131

2. These party trajectories are coded as co-optation because of the satellite role they opt to play, albeit within the opposition. Alone, the leaders of these parties are not able to present themselves as viable, alternative, national-level political leaders, so they are not coded as consistent opposition forces. 3. There are 13 parties that refused to work with Wade, whether through the pursuit of consistent opposition or through the pursuit of co-optation into a regularly competing opposition figure’s coalition. There was complete data on long-term party trajectories for 41 of 46 parties in the sample. Thus, 32% is the estimate of parties consistently refusing to co-operate with Wade (13 of 41 parties with full data available). 4. Twelve percent is the estimate based on five of 41 parties with complete data. 5. Accumulating international private financing does not necessarily entail corruption, whose detection, if it is even part of the story, is beyond the scope of this book. 6. Interviews with Abdou Lô, 3/12/12, Omar Sarr, 8/6/10. 7. The sampled party leaders coded as high: own international oil companies, worked in international maritime commerce, acquired international shipping companies, have international consultancies, or worked in US law firms. 8. The roster for 1998–2012 is available through the Official Journal of the Republic of Senegal, as well as ministerial profiles in Ndiaye and Ndiaye2006 . 9. The results reported from the full sample are based on a binary coding of whether party leaders have each endowment or not. Party leaders with medium or high levels of either endowment count as having it; leaders with low levels lack it. 10. Seventeen of 30 had neither endowment; five had one endowment; three had both; and five had missing data. 11. Interview with Mbaye Niang, 1/9/12, Dakar; Tanor Dieng dismisses this claim, but figures like Alioune Tine of the African Assembly of Human Rights (RADDHO), assert its truth. See Interview with Tine, 6/18/12, Dakar. 12. Interview with Souleymane Ndiaye, 1/23/12, Thiès. 13. Interview with Mbaye Diouf, 3/3/12, Dakar. 14. Although the Reform Party (PR) did not run in the first presidential and legislative elections that occurred after its founding, it is included in the PR in the sample of party leaders with vote-mobilizing potential because Agne headed one of Senegal’s three major opposition coalitions in the local elections two years the PR’s birth. 15. Interview with Mousapha Niasse, 7/5/15, Dakar. 16. Ibid. 17. They had agreed upon a platform for a parliamentary system, no individual accumulation of multiple political posts, the decentralization of executive power, the pursuit of audits, etc. (Niang 2004: 22). 132 C. L. KELLY

18. Interview with Moustapha Niasse, 7/5/15, Dakar. 19. Ibid. 20. Niasse’s initial ability to access international private financing may have helped him place third in the 2000 elections. This is one reason that Wade was interested in making Niasse his Prime Minister in exchange for his support in the 2000 runoff. Once Niasse accepted this offer and joined Wade’s camp, Kâ (the fourth place finisher) had to choose between taking a lower rung in the future Wade government or taking Diouf’s promise of the Prime Ministership. 21. Interview with Djibo Kâ, 7/22/15, Dakar. 22. Ibid. 23. Ibid. 24. Interview with Mbaye-Jacques Diop, 6/5/12, Rufisque. 25. Interview with Amadou Sène Niang, 10/26/11, Dakar. 26. Interview with Diop, op.cit. 27. Interview with Samba Diouldé Thiam, 11/22/11, Dakar. 28. The Alliance for Justice/Jëf-Jël, founded by Talla Sylla, also engaged in a trajectory of consistent opposition but without always running in opposition on the presidential level but was less committed to specific programmatic issues on a consistent basis than RES-Les Verts or MRDS. Jëf-Jël grew out of Youth for Turnover (JPA), a nationwide student movement that Sylla had started in the early 1990s as a graduate student in France, after leading the Senegalese student union in his hometown, Thiès. Sylla was widely known for his incendiary style of public speaking, often geared toward criticizing government corruption, and attracted disaffected urban youth through focus on this issue, particularly during Wade’s first term (FKA/CESTI 2001). Without extensive international private financing to run, and facing the internal difficulties within Jëf-Jël that arose as he invested more into a parallel movement, Wallu Askanu Senegal (The Senegalese People’s Part), Sylla did not run for president in 2012. 29. Interview with Ousmane Sow Huchard, 2/18/12, Dakar. 30. Interview with Huchard, op. cit. He was the chief curator of the Dynamic Museum of Dakar (1983–1988), technical counselor in the Minister of Culture (1986–1988), commissar for foreign art expositions (1989–1990), and president of the Scientific Committee of the Biennale of Contemporary Art in Dakar (1993–1999). 31. Interview with Huchard, op. cit. 32. Interview with Niang, op. cit. 4 NEGOTIATORS OR ADVERSARIES? TRACING THE SOURCES OF PARTY… 133

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Defeating Presidents from Within: Regime Insiders and Turnover in Senegal

In 2000, the Socialist Party (PS) experienced its first presidential defeat and Abdoulaye Wade of the Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS) won the race. His victory occurred in the context of ordinary citizens’ economic malaise, the defection of several major ruling party elites, the electoral mobilization of youth on an unprecedented level, and the coalescence of the opposition behind a single candidate. He campaigned on the same slogan that he had in the 1993 elections: sopi (“change” in Wolof, Senegal’s lingua franca). Senegalese voters re-elected Wade in 2007, based on the claim that he needed more time to enact all of the reforms that he had promised citizens in 2000 (Galvan 2009; Resnick 2014). However, in 2012, slogans referring to the infrastructure projects that became the Wade administration’s hallmark, like “Change: Always in Progress” (Le Sopi: Toujours en marche), did not prevent him from losing the presidential contest to one of his ex-Prime Ministers, Macky Sall, who headed the fledgling Alliance for the Republic (APR) party. In March 2012, Wade passed the torch to Sall, the very man who had run Wade’s re-election campaign in 2007 and who had, as Wade’s Prime Minister, predicted 50 years of PDS rule (Fall 2014).

The rise and decline of Wade’s rhetoric of sopi was swift, given the extent to which presidents benefit from the uneven playing field and can deprive opponents of the resources and wherewithal to win elections. Yet, the fact that turnover itself occurred in Senegal is not surprising. What is more striking is that regardless of turnover, “regime insiders” have been the incumbent’s most serious challengers in the 1993, 2000, 2007, and 2012 presidential elections. Insiders are politicians who have accessed state resources as ministers in former governments before they emerge to oppose the president. Although insider advantage does not always ensure turnover, those who make the most of these advantages gain both the financial capital and the public reputations that make it possible to defeat incumbents. When insider advantages are large, those who unseat the president may end up being former government collaborators, rather than the committed outsiders conventionally defined as the opposition. Insiders are not the causes of turnover but can be the agents of turnover when it occurs. Africanist scholars have already identified several factors that increase the chances of turnover across countries, and several—including opposition coalescence and patronage scarcity in the ruling party—help account for events in Senegal. However, these theories neglect important contingencies that shaped the political context before alternance in 2000 and 2012 but were not key elements of political contestation before incumbent victories in 1993 and 2007. Namely, before turnover, there was uncertainty about the timing of succession within the ruling party, and the leading insider candidate resisted the president’s attempts to negotiate collaboration or reconciliation with him close to the campaign. Section 5.1 discusses the sources of insider advantage. It identifies various opportunities that insiders’ access to the state gives them to develop a competitive edge over other opposition candidates in presidential elections. Section 5.2 uses information about presidential candidates in Senegal’s 1993, 2000, 2007, and 2012 elections to illustrate these mechanisms and evaluate the extent to which insiders have historically outper- formed outsiders in these contests. Section 5.3 discusses how turnover happened in 2000 and 2012 (but not in 1993 and 2007), tracing how uncertainty about the timing of succession and insider candidates’ resistance to negotiating patronage played out during each campaign. It also applies cross-national theories of turnover to these specific outcomes. Section 5.4 addresses the implications of insider advantage for democratization. Section 5.5 concludes. 5 DEFEATING PRESIDENTS FROM WITHIN: REGIME INSIDERS… 139

5.1 Who Are Insiders and What Is Insider Advantage? Ex-regime insiders have been the president’s most serious threats in all of Senegal’s presidential elections since 1993. They are politicians who have enjoyed access to the state by serving as a minister before they run for office in the opposition. By these standards, the category “insider” can include opposition party leaders who eventually join presidential majority governments and work with the ruling party, like Abdoulaye Wade of the PDS or Abdoulaye Bathily of the Democratic League/Movement for the Labor Party (LD/MPT); it can also encompass politicians who have pursued their careers within the ruling party but eventually break away to create their own parties. This latter group includes, for example, Moustapha Niasse of the AFP and Djibo Kâ of the URD during the time of PS rule and Idrissa Seck of Rewmi and Macky Sall of the APR under Wade. Insider advantage is widespread in Africa. In Mali, current President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta, who took power as head of the Rally for Mali (Rassemblement pour le Mali, RPM) party in 2013, had seven years of state experience during the presidency of Alpha Oumar Konaré as Minister of Foreign Affairs and Prime Minister. Similarly, Soumaila Cissé, Mali’s front- running opposition candidate in the 2018 presidential race, has ten years of prior ministerial experience. Both Keita and Cissé have been top per- formers in past presidential elections. Zambia’s former president, Michael Sata, was a member of the ex-ruling party, the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD), and was a minister before he formed the Patriotic Front (PF) and ran against the MMD. In several elections before winning the 2011 presidential race, the PF performed as well as opposition parties led by outsiders, including the United Party for National Development, led by private sector businessmen (Resnick 2014). Insiders are operationalized as politicians who have accessed state resources through ministerial appointments since Senegal’s independence in 1960. Taking this long view of insider status makes sense given that several types of capital that insiders acquire through ministerial appointments do not deplete quickly over time, including the public renown they build up through privileged media access as well as the contacts they forge with influential domestic and international elites. Politicians are considered insiders during any presidential election that follows their decision to leave a ministerial position within the state to run against the president. Politicians who have not accessed the state at the ministerial level or have not accessed the state at all in their political careers all count as outsiders. 140 C. L. KELLY

Mechanisms of Insider Advantage Insider advantage is consistent with theoretical expectations about African election campaigns, which are often characterized by competitive clientelism (Beck 2008). Presidential candidates vie for votes by distributing material benefits to individuals and communities, illustrating their capacity to provide for prospective constituents. Among all types of opponents, ex-regime insiders may be best equipped to engage in large-scale vote- mobilizing efforts in order to pose significant electoral threats to the president. They are more likely to be formidable challengers because several built up financial and political capital while in the state. Access to the state provides insiders with several types of opportunities to advance their political careers that outsiders do not enjoy. First, as former ministers, regime insiders have accumulated wealth and reputations as statesmen that equip them to compete against the president later. State salaries are not sufficient to function as an insider candidate’s main source of political financing in a race against the president, but they are sources of initial financial capital that politicians can invest into developing a political profile to facilitate electoral success. At the same time, ministerial service gives politicians visibility to the public that helps them build their profiles as statesmen who have the administrative capabilities to govern. Second, the media access that insiders enjoy while working within these state institutions reinforces their advantages over outsiders. Working in the government often gets ministers exposure in the media and helps them develop name recognition among voters as well as rich and powerful elites. Government experience puts insiders in contact with different portions of the Senegalese populace, through meetings, speeches, and nationwide travel. The media’s documentation of their experience also allows them to build reputations as statesmen. Third, insiders have the opportunity to cultivate followers through the distribution of patronage while they are ministers. This gives them the chance to develop networks of clients whose government jobs depend on the insider’s continued success in government. Relative to outsiders, insiders therefore have greater chances of developing the clientelist networks needed to garner widespread voter support and catalyze opposition coordination. Some insiders are able to leave the president’s entourage with significant blocs of cadres whose prospects for employment or political ascension depend on the insider’s future electoral success. Finally, access to the state provides insiders the opportunity to network with domestic and international elites who are potential sources of political support. Insiders can use the social networks they developed as 5 DEFEATING PRESIDENTS FROM WITHIN: REGIME INSIDERS… 141 statesmen to court the foreign heads of state, businessmen, and diaspora they worked with while in office. Not all insiders are likely to have equal opportunity to access these benefits, and not all of them end up converting their access to opportunity within the state into better performance than outsiders in presidential races. Part of this variation depends on personal characteristics and idiosyncrasies. Another part is due to the interdependence of different candidates’ electoral performance. More high-performing insiders, like Wade, Seck, Sall, Niasse, and Kâ, limit the degree of success that other insider candidates can experience in any given election. Nevertheless, evidence from Senegal shows that the insiders who do successfully exploit their access to the state to improve their political capital and their public image are better than outsiders at leveling the playing field in competition against the president.

5.2 What Is the History of Insider Advantage in Senegal? Insider advantage has been a regular feature of presidential competition in Senegal since the passage of the democratic electoral code in 1992. In the presidential elections that followed in 1993, 2000, 2007, and 2012, insiders tended to perform better than outsiders.

The Performance of Insiders and Outsiders On average, insiders won higher percentages of the vote than outsiders in the 1993, 2000, 2007, and 2012 races. The overall vote share of all insider and outsider candidates was calculated by the candidate-year across all four presidential elections. A difference-in-means test, conducted on the averages of the percentage of the total vote share that insiders and outsiders won, reveals that insiders performed significantly better than outsiders overall across these four elections, winning an average 9.56% of the vote share compared to outsiders’ average 0.78% of the vote share. The difference in means is statistically significant at the 99% level.1 The second pattern is that insiders were a much greater proportion of the viable opposition candidates in all four races. Insider advantage is apparent even when we generously define viable opposition candidates as politicians who win just 5% of the vote or higher (Table 5.1). Every single candidate since 1993 who received at least this much of the vote in presidential elections was an insider. No politician who counted as an outsider by these standards was a viable opposition candidate. Instead, in each 142 C. L. KELLY

Table 5.1 Insiders and outsiders with over 5% of the vote, 1993–2012

1993 2000 2007 2012

Insiders over 5% Wade Wade Seck Sall Niasse Niasse Niasse Kâ Tanor Dieng Tanor Dieng Seck Outsiders over 5% None None None None

Sources: Election returns and ministerial appointments, Journal Officiel de la République du Sénégal election, the majority of opposition candidates scoring less than 5% were outsiders. Moreover, the front-running opposition candidates in all four elections count as insiders even if we only label as insiders the politicians who have served as ministers within the last electoral cycle (i.e., after the prior presidential election). Some of the third- and fourth-place finishers in these races remain insiders by these standards as well,2 and the proportion of candidates under the 5% bar who are outsiders still surpasses that of insiders.3

Insiders as Opposition Front-Runners However, not all insiders in Senegal translate their opportunities to access the state into electoral performance that sidelines outsiders. Two kinds of insiders have succeeded in becoming opposition front-runners: opponents who join an adversary’s government and ruling party elites who break away to run against their superiors. In 1993 and 2000, Abdoulaye Wade was the leading opposition candidate, each time leaving PS governments that his party had joined in order to campaign in the opposition during the races. In 2007 and 2012, prominent members of the ruling party itself broke away to become the president’s leading opponents. Wade’s ex- Prime Minister, Idrissa Seck, was the second-place finisher in 2007; and Seck’s successor as Prime Minister, Macky Sall, defeated Wade in 2012.

Wade in 1993 and 2000: The Opponent Who Joined the Government In the 1993 presidential elections, Diouf’s main challenger, Wade, was an insider: although an opposition party leader, he had been a government minister until late 1992. Wade was thus not an insider who originated from the ruling party itself. He had been Senegal’s most prominent opposition leader since 1974, although the PDS had been pragmatic about the existing regime since its birth. 5 DEFEATING PRESIDENTS FROM WITHIN: REGIME INSIDERS… 143

Wade was not the only insider running in the opposition in 1993, but he was the strongest performer. Diouf won in the first round, garnering 58.4% of the vote to Wade’s second-place finish with 32.0%. The only other insider in the race was Iba Der Thiam, a public intellectual who had been Minister of Education under Diouf in the late 1980s. He ran for president in 1993, just after creating his own party, but only garnered 1.6% of the vote. All other opposition candidates were either civil society figures or the leaders of leftist parties who had been in the clandestine opposition to the PS under Senghor. Abdoulaye Bathily of the Democratic League (LD/MPT), Landing Savané of And-Jëf (AJ/PADS), Madior Diouf of the National Democratic Assembly (RND), and Babacar Niang of the Party of People’s Liberation (PLP) had never been ministers in the government. Each commanded no more than 3% of the vote. Wade, on the other hand, enjoyed widespread popularity after decades in opposition and over a year as minister in Diouf’s enlarged presidential majority government. Joining the government in April 1991 and leaving it before his 1993 campaign, Wade was able to attract urban youth frus- trated with the high unemployment rates under the 1985–1992 structural adjustment program (Gerard 1993; Diop 2006). However, young voters did not turn out, which ended up reinforcing Diouf’s structural electoral advantages. Wade was the opposition front-runner again in 2000, having served as minister along with several PDS colleagues in Diouf’s 1995 and 1998 governments. However, unlike in 1993, several other ex-regime insiders were also candidates. Within the PS, Diouf’s declaration that Ousmane Tanor Dieng would be his successor, as well as the rise of Dieng’s allies as of 1996, hastened the defection of two major insiders, Djibo Kâ and Moustapha Niasse (Diop et al. 2000). Both created parties that reduced PS support enough to facilitate a runoff, with Niasse taking 16% and Kâ just over 7%, while the PS scored 41% in the first round. It was with the support of Niasse, the third-place finisher, that Wade won the runoff with 59% of the vote. The other remaining insider, Iba Der Thiam, again scored less than 2% along with the outsider candidates, Ousseynou Fall, Cheikh Abdoulaye Dièye, and Mademba Sock. Wade was the most competitive opposition candidate in part because of the alliances he forged with other parties, many of which were also led by insiders. The coalition that Wade led in the first round of 2000, bringing him 31% of the vote, was the brainchild of both insiders and outsiders on the Senegalese left. In 1999, it was at the behest of Abdoulaye Bathily and 144 C. L. KELLY

Amath Dansokho—leaders of the LD/MPT and the PIT—that Wade returned from France to run for president. Both Bathily and Dansokho had become insiders from participating in Diouf’s enlarged governments during the 1990s. After Bathily ran for president in 1993, various leftist leaders—including Bathily himself, Dansokho, and Savané of AJ/PADS— had concluded that reaching a runoff required opposition unity. They identified Wade as the most promising agent of turnover and supported his campaign (Diop et al. 2000: 171).

Seck in 2007 and Sall in 2012: Ruling Party Elites Who Broke Away In 2007, President Wade’s main opponent was a different kind of insider than he himself had been under Diouf. Idrissa Seck, who took second in the 2007 presidential contest, did not originate in the opposition. He did not become an insider by joining governments; instead, he had built his entire political career within the PDS and had been Wade’s Prime Minister before leaving the party to oppose him.4 As Prime Minister, Seck was subject to increasing speculation about his presidential ambitions, as well as his leadership ambitions in the PDS. In 2004, Seck even boldly declared in the press, “Yes, I want to succeed Wade.” (Quoted in Diop 2007). Faced with rising tensions related to leadership disputes within the PDS, Wade ended Seck’s tenure as Prime Minister in 2004. In protest, 11 PDS deputies in the National Assembly formed their own parliamentary group, which led the PDS Directing Committee to suspend Seck and the frondeurs in 2005. The government also charged Seck with the misman- agement of 43 billion FCFA in public funds for the Chantiers de Thiès, a set of public infrastructure projects in Seck’s hometown. Cleared of the charges after several months in prison, Seck then created a party, Rewmi, in 2006. Although Seck lost to Wade, garnering 15% in the first round to Wade’s 56%, he was the best-performing opposition candidate. However, all candidates who won more than 5% of the vote were insiders. Ousmane Tanor Dieng, the third-place finisher who got 13%, had been Minister of Presidential Affairs for the PS in the 1990s before taking over the party from Diouf. He and Moustapha Niasse, who took fourth place, both insisted on running in 2007, impeding the opposition’s stated goal of designating a single candidate. However, 11 of the 15 candidates scored less than 5% of the vote. Insiders from Senegal’s leftist parties, including Bathily and Savané, garnered just over 2% of the vote while numerous outsider candidates did not even break 1%. They included Talla Sylla, a 5 DEFEATING PRESIDENTS FROM WITHIN: REGIME INSIDERS… 145 polemical ex-student leader who had turned his youth association into a political party before Wade became President. They also included independent candidates like Mame Adama Guèye, a renowned lawyer and human rights activist. In 2012, Wade’s ex-Prime Minister, Macky Sall, was the front-running opposition figure. In 2000, Wade appointed him Director General of the Senegalese Petroleum Company (Société des Pétroles du Sénégal, PETROSEN) and Minister of Mines; several other ministerial appointments followed. Sall replaced Seck in 2004 and was Prime Minister until 2007, when he was also Wade’s presidential campaign director. As such, Sall was a potential dauphin to President Wade within the PDS. However, after the 2007 elections, the president began to pave the way for his son, Karim Wade, to succeed him. Sall’s difficulties began when, as the President of the National Assembly, he called Karim to account in front of parliament about projects that Karim Wade had directed through the National Agency of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (Agence Nationale de l’Organisation de la Conférence Islamique, ANOCI). The PDS Directing Committee subsequently changed the party’s institutional structure to eliminate Sall’s deputy position within the party (Fall 2007). President Wade then exploited the PDS’s legislative majority to pass a bill reducing the National Assembly presidential term from five years to one. The proposal passed in November 2008. Sall resigned and founded his own party, the APR, before running against Wade in 2012. Sall ultimately defeated Wade, first winning 27% to Wade’s 35% in the election’s first round but capturing 66% of the vote in the runoff. As in 2007, all opposition candidates who won more than 5% of the vote were insiders, but Sall was the most recent defector from the government. Moustapha Niasse, who took third, had not been in government since 2001, when he had briefly been Wade’s first Prime Minister; Ousmane Tanor Dieng, who took fourth, had never been in Wade’s governments but had significant experience from PS rule; and Idrissa Seck, who took fifth, had been Minister and Prime Minister before. He temporarily fused Rewmi with the PDS in 2009 but had not joined the government after the 2007 elections. Other insiders and outsiders won no greater than 2% of the vote. There was increased citizen engagement in the 2012 election, which worked to Sall’s advantage. Wade formally declared his intentions to run for a third term in 2011.5 That June, he proposed a constitutional amendment that would have legally enabled such a run. The 2012 campaign was 146 C. L. KELLY shaped by sustained civil society mobilization against these institutional manipulations, as well as against the Constitutional Council’s validation of Wade’s third-term candidacy. In this polarized setting, Sall won the unified support of other opposition candidates after he advanced to the runoff and (belatedly) endorsed the Assises Nationales, a national dialogue process. Through the Assises, a commission led by the retired politician Amadou Makhtar-Mbow proposed a series political, economic, and social reforms to resolve Senegal’s “multidimensional crisis” on the basis of participatory town hall meetings that hundreds of party, union, and civil society groups supported country-wide (Assises Nationales 2009).

Mechanisms of Insider Advantage in Senegal Not all Senegalese insiders developed the same degree of advantage over outsiders from their access to the state. However, insiders as a group often benefited from opportunities to build financial capital, government experience, political followings, and popular recognition.

Name Recognition and State Salaries In several cases, ministerial service gave insiders the opportunity to gain name recognition among the public, as well as a state salary that could help them build initial financial capital to compete against the president later. Abdoulaye Wade acknowledges that the PDS benefitted from both of these opportunities when it joined PS governments in the 1990s. LD/ MPT leaders also found that their ministerial appointments in Diouf’s enlarged presidential majority government “placed the party in a quite comfortable situation” (1995: 21). The state salaries that ministerial posts bring these parties enable their leaders to develop profiles as statesmen while also more pragmatically accessing financial capital needed to pay registration fees for the party to appear on the ballot. Even Wade, who had some limited international private sector resources, commented that “each time I went to elections, I spent everything I had, thinking that I would be elected that time… and then I would find myself short of money” when the incumbent won again (Wade 2006: 202). Salaries thus constitute modest, albeit important, augmentations to insiders’ financing.

Control Over Patronage to Attract Followers Some regime insiders also capitalized on opportunities to use their high- level access to the state to develop networks of followers who later sup- 5 DEFEATING PRESIDENTS FROM WITHIN: REGIME INSIDERS… 147 ported their presidential bids. For instance, 11 PDS Members of Parliament followed ex-Prime Minister Idrissa Seck out of the PDS in 2005. In addition, Seck had met and mentored people from his hometown like Yankhoba Diattara, a young student leader at the University of Dakar. In the 1990s, when Seck was a minister in one of Diouf’s governments, he provided Diattara with student housing and introduced him to other professionals, as he did for several other students from Thiès. Eventually, Seck recruited Diattara into the PDS youth wing. Subsequently, as Seck rose within the PDS and fell out of favor, Diattara followed his mentor out of the PDS and formed a party that Seck used to run in elections when he initially had trouble registering Rewmi. At the time, Diattara and other students who followed Seck were hopeful that they could return to the party, but their position depended on whether Seck gained control of it.6

Connections to Rich Elites Several insiders also relied on the social networks they developed to domestic and international elites while they were ministers to gain political support. For instance, both Djibo Kâ and Moustapha Niasse—ex-insider candidates in the 2000 election—had been Minister of Foreign Affairs in PS governments. During the 2000 campaign period, Kâ was allegedly in contact with wealthy foreign leaders who knew him already, including King Fahd of Saudi Arabia, the President of Gabon, Omar Bongo, and the President of the Republic of Congo, Denis Sassou-Nguesso. However, Kâ denies that he visited these leaders and that they offered him anything in exchange for supporting Abdou Diouf (2005: 284). Similarly, Moustapha Niasse had relationships with King Hassan II of Morocco, Bongo, and other leaders in the Persian Gulf (Coulibaly 1999: 164). Before he ran for president in 2000, he continued to cultivate his international diplomatic profile as the UN Special Envoy for the Great Lakes. During his campaign for president in 2012, Macky Sall benefited from connections he had developed as a statesman with Presidents Laurent Gbagbo of Côte d’Ivoire and Blaise Compaoré of Burkina Faso (Seck 2009a, b). After Sall created the APR and decided to run for president, he also requested a meeting with President Bongo, who had allegedly supported Wade when he was an opposition candidate in the 1990s (Wade 2006; Seck 2009a, b). The network that Sall developed in the government also put him in touch with businessmen in the Senegalese diaspora who supported his 2012 campaign. For instance, Sall had met a major financier, Harouna 148 C. L. KELLY

Dia, when he was Wade’s 2007 presidential campaign director (Carayol 2012). Also through Wade, Macky Sall had cultivated connections with Abdoulaye Sally Sall, a Senegalese businessman based in Gabon who had previously been a PDS colleague. By the time that Macky Sall left the PDS in 2008, he had strong connections with Abdoulaye Sall, who had the capacity to mobilize diaspora votes. Wade was aware of these affinities and put Abdoulaye Sall’s property, communications, and financial transactions under surveillance soon before Macky Sall was demoted (Diop 2013a: 341). On the domestic front, too, some insiders attracted privately wealthy supporters to build electoral momentum. Before Niasse ran in 2000, he convinced four privately wealthy professionals to help him build his party, assigning each of them regions of the country in which they were “responsible for bringing life to the party and attracting supporters.”7 They included an architect who had built the Central Bank of the West African States (BCEAO), a doctor with a private practice in Dakar, a marabout with extensive connections in Africa and the Middle East, and an agricultural engineer. Moreover, before Idrissa Seck contested the 2007 election, he developed close connections as Prime Minister to Bara Tall, a private sector businessman from Seck’s hometown, Thiès, who later contributed to Seck’s 2007 presidential campaign. Tall was the Director General and owner of Jean Lefèbre Senegal, a lucrative construction company. As Prime Minister, Seck approved the attribution of a contract for lighting in Thiès to Tall’s company, authorizing it in place of the Minister of Finance. When Seck clashed with Wade in 2004, the president, who had unsuccessfully sought Tall’s assistance in fostering Seck’s political downfall, brought corruption charges against Seck and investigated Tall.8

Advantageous Media Access The media access that insiders enjoy as statesmen also reinforces their advantages over outsiders. Working in the government often gets ministers exposure in the media and helps them develop name recognition among voters and among rich and powerful elites. Their actual government experience puts insiders in contact with different portions of the populace, through meetings, speeches, and programming. For instance, leaders of the LD/MPT, which had several ministers in the 1991 and 1995 Diouf governments, judged that joining them had “increas[ed] in a prodigious way [the party’s] domestic and international audience” (1995: 23). 5 DEFEATING PRESIDENTS FROM WITHIN: REGIME INSIDERS… 149

Because they are often well-known before they even oppose the president, insiders also have the potential to attract media attention when they break away from the government to join the opposition. This coverage feeds into the waves of popular sympathy that some insiders benefit from in the first elections they contest as opponents. For example, the media extensively covered the downfall of both of Wade’s ex-Prime Ministers, Idrissa Seck and Macky Sall. Both went into their first presidential elections as Wade’s opponents riding on waves of popular sympathy, as a critical mass of citizens interpreted Seck’s expulsion and Sall’s resignation as injustices. Not all publicity about insiders’ exit from the ruling coalition is image-bolstering, but even negative coverage provides politicians with exposure that outsiders struggle to obtain. Outsiders also acknowledge the importance of “selling your image” in the media but complain of unequal access.9 For example, as the leader of the Social Democratic Front (FSD/BJ), Cheikh Bamba Dièye ran as an outsider presidential candidate in 2007 and 2012. His father, the Islamic intellectual Cheikh Abdoulaye Dièye, who founded the party in 1996, ran for president in 2000. Dièye, the son, recounts the difficulty of building his image without state access. When he took over the party after his father died in 2002, Dièye was “an unknown person” in the national political arena. Because of the media’s skewed coverage of the opposition, he initially did door-to-door campaigning in various locales; when the party won a seat in the 2007 National Assembly, he provoked some limited media coverage by debating issues like the budget.

Variation in Opportunity Among Insiders Not all insiders develop the same level of advantage. Rather than a cer- tainty, advantage is a probabilistic feature of Senegalese politics that depends on insiders’ varying capacities to exploit the opportunities they have to access the state as ministers. The first reason for the variation in insider advantage is that more high-performing insiders, like Wade, Seck, Sall, Niasse, and Kâ, crowd out the electoral market for insider candidates. Other insiders who had fewer resources and less popular appeal performed similar to many outsiders in Senegal. Moreover, insiders vary in their degree of access to opportunities provided through state service for developing advantages over outsiders. For instance, the public intellectual Iba Der Thiam was Minister of Education until shortly after Diouf won the 1988 presidential elections. Because of 150 C. L. KELLY this ministerial service after the 1988 race, Thiam was an insider in the 1993 race, in which he won less than 2% of the vote. Although the Tidjani marabout El Hadj Malick Sy offered Thiam logistical support for the campaign,10 Thiam did not have major constituencies that followed him out of Diouf’s government nor did he have the international financial connections that more electorally successful insiders possessed after their exits. After running as an outsider in 1993, Abdoulaye Bathily of the LD/ MPT was Minister of the Environment for five years in Diouf’s enlarged presidential majority government and spent another five years as minister under Wade. Yet in 2007, when Bathily ran for president, he was still unable to command more than 3% of the vote, remaining at the same percentage of support as in 1993. Along the same lines, Cheikh Tidiane Gadio contested the 2012 race after serving nine years as Wade’s Minister of Foreign Affairs. Although he had extensive professional and international business connections, he won just 1% of the vote. These varied trajectories illustrate that some, but not all, insiders end up transforming their access to the state into an electoral advantage.

5.3 Dynamics of Presidential Turnover in the Context of Insider Advantage Ex-regime insiders were major opposition contenders in the four presidential elections studied here, but what makes it more likely that insiders will actually win these elections? Probabilistic assessments of turnover based on cross-national analysis point to factors like opposition coalescence and economic performance, which partially explain Senegal’s turnovers in 2000 and 2012. However, fully understanding the interdependent outcomes of Senegal’s 1993, 2000, 2007, and 2012 elections requires additional contextual nuancing. Paying attention to the interaction of contingent and structural factors is especially key if we hope to understand not just the causes but also the who and the how of these turnovers. The first relevant theory is that the formation of a unified opposition coalition causes turnover (Van de Walle 2006). Opposition parties in competitive authoritarian regimes often “lack access to sufficient material resources to build a broad, nationwide political party that is capable of mounting an effective challenge to the incumbent’s hold on power” (Howard and Roessler 2006: 371). But when rival opposition parties coordinate with each other, designating and pooling resources behind a single candidate, then turnover becomes more plausible. 5 DEFEATING PRESIDENTS FROM WITHIN: REGIME INSIDERS… 151

This theory holds some weight in Senegal. Temporary, programmatic pacts between opposition parties were features of Senegal’s presidential runoffs, each of which led to turnover. Before the Diouf-Wade runoff in 2000, Wade negotiated an agreement about the policies he would implement in exchange for the support of other opposition parties, supplement- ing these promises with ministerial appointments to his newfound allies (Niang 2004). A similar combination of patronage and programmatic dealings occurred in 2012 between Sall and other first-round presidential candidates. Before the runoff, Sall reluctantly endorsed the Assises Nationales proposals while also courting the support of various opponents who had campaigned on the Assises since municipal elections in 2009. These programmatic pacts are a feature of the turnovers in 2000 and 2012 that was absent from the incumbent victories in 1993 and 2007. In 1993, just after the reform of the electoral code, “opposition unity [wa]s difficult to achieve because the small, underfunded splinter parties under- standably wish to capitalize on the freedom and equal media access that mark campaign periods” (Kanté 1994: 102). In 2007, the opposition sought to designate a single candidate but Wade co-opted several opposition leaders and others like Niasse and Tanor Dieng both insisted on running. However, the relationship between opposition coalescence and turnover is potentially endogenous. That is, countries in which opposition coordination is structurally possible may already be more prone to turnover than countries without such structural possibilities, before coalescence even occurs to facilitate the outcome. Both coalescence and turnover may be caused by other factors that themselves foster opposition pacts and collaboration in a runoff, including the perceived chances of winning, the economic climate, expectations about electoral transparency, and the internal cohesion of various parties (Van de Walle 2006). This leads other scholars to consider less proximate factors. A second set of theories holds that poor economic performance fosters elite defections from the ruling party. Poor performance, whether it entails swift declines in GDP growth or soaring inflation, reduces the degree of state resources that presidents control. When presidents have less patronage to distribute, they are less able to secure the loyalty of ruling party elites, who recalculate the costs and benefits of organizational loyalty and defection and become more likely to defect and “capitalize upon popular and elite discontent with the regime in the hope of successfully challenging the incumbent in elections” (Reuter and Gandhi 2010: 84). Poor economic performance also “makes it more difficult for the incumbent 152 C. L. KELLY regime… to rig an election, buy votes, co-opt opposition leaders, and employ the military and police to harass opposition voters and supporters” (Howard and Roessler 2006: 373). However, neither the PS’s defeat in 2000 nor the PDS’s loss in 2012 occurred in the context of macroeconomic performance that was markedly worse than what prevailed around incumbent re-elections in 1993 and 2007. Using data from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (2013), Fig. 5.1 displays Senegal’s fluctuations in GDP growth and inflation, measures employed in the leading studies of economic decline and turnover. The first and third (solid) vertical lines from the left on each plot mark the 1993 and 2007 elections, which did not result in turnover, while the second and fourth (dotted) vertical lines locate the 2000 and 2012 contests, in which incumbents lost. Neither indicator fully accounts for the difference between turnover and incumbent re-election because neither is

Fig. 5.1 Economic conditions at successful and failed alternations 5 DEFEATING PRESIDENTS FROM WITHIN: REGIME INSIDERS… 153 systematically lower for the years around races with turnover relative to the years around races without it. Furthermore, turnovers were not preceded by any single directional trend in GDP growth or inflation that consistently differed from those preceding incumbent victories. The remainder of the chapter analyzes the micro-level dynamics of who the main actors behind turnover were and how the process played out, since they are not specified by the above theories. Because the present analysis seeks to explain the outcomes of Senegal’s last four elections, a small set of specific events, contingency plays a major role in addition to structural factors. Studying the contingencies of Senegal’s 1993, 2000, 2007, and 2012 elections can help identify the ways in which initial elections influenced the outcomes of subsequent ones, since actors learn from prior strategic mistakes and successes and voters use the past to judge candidate viability and future chances of turnover.

Contingent Factors and Turnover The presence of insider candidates in elections is not causally related to turnover since they were major contenders in Senegal’s 1993, 2000, 2007, and 2012 races, which varied in their outcomes. However, the conditions under which regime insiders left the government and the ways that they then behaved toward the president shaped how much turnover was possible. Two particular things seemed to make the difference between turnover and incumbent re-election. In 2000 and 2012, but not in 1993 and 2007, regime insiders emerged before the election when there was uncertainty about the timing of succession within the ruling party, and they resisted the president’s attempts to negotiate collaboration or reconciliation with them soon before the campaign. An impending succession within the ruling party, but uncertainty about the timing of it, is the first characteristic of Senegalese elections that have ended in turnover. Operationally, a succession is impending when the president announces that he will not run for president again after the election in question, and either states (or fails to refute the political elite’s widespread expectation) that he will not complete the term for which he seeks re-election. Ex-regime insiders may have greater chances of poaching supporters from the ruling party during these impending successions, which weaken organizational cohesion. Leadership disputes emerge and endure as elites anticipate the president’s retirement, but battles of positioning are prolonged given the president’s 154 C. L. KELLY unspecified moment of retirement. When the president relies on patronage to resolve disputes within the ruling party, there are limited means to continually appease elites in prolonged succession battles. The second factor, insiders’ resistance to reconciliation with the president, is an important tool for insiders to convince voters to support them. Insider candidates must signal to voters that they represent a change from the status quo under the current president. Only under these circumstances might Senegal’s largely clientelist voters risk voting for an opposition candidate who lacks access to the state. Because of their prior association with the president and the government, insiders face the burden of proving that they are actually interested in displacing the president rather than just using their candidacy to negotiate with him. At the same time, insiders must emphasize to voters the extent of their government experience, which they often owe to the sitting president. Insiders thus face the challenge of striking a delicate balance, distancing themselves from the incumbent but also reminding voters of their proximity to power. To these ends, negotiations with the president are a common element of Senegalese politics. Although they are not always detrimental to electoral success, negotiations appear to damage the prospects of insider presidential candidates when they occur close to a presidential contest, such that the insider’s association with the president effectively discredits his image as a viable, distinctive alternative to the status quo. This chapter’s indicator of resistance to reconciliation is whether publicly known negotiations occurred between an insider and the president during the year before that insider ran against the president. Table 5.2 summarizes the relationships to be traced. The presence of regime insiders as opposition candidates is a background condition in all four elections in question. During the 1993 race, which resulted in incumbent re-election, the ruling party was not subject to an impending succession. In 2007, when Wade was re-elected, there was an impending

Table 5.2 Features of incumbent re-election and turnover in Senegal

Election Impending succession Insider resistance Turnover?

1993 No No NO 2000 Yes Yes YES 2007 Yes No NO 2012 Yes Yes YES 5 DEFEATING PRESIDENTS FROM WITHIN: REGIME INSIDERS… 155 succession, but the front-running insider opposition candidate did not resist reconciliation with the president. Only in 2000 and 2012, when Senegal experienced turnover, were both features part of the electoral context.

1993: Diouf Is Re-elected—No Impending Succession and No Insider Resistance The 1993 elections lacked both of these contextual features and did not end in turnover. First, since there was no impending succession, the ruling party was not especially fragile. Although Diouf is reported to have been thinking about the succession that would inevitably be required within the PS, he fostered no doubt that he would complete the 1993 term as president if he won the race (Coulibaly 1999: 147). Second, there was no insider candidate who resisted the president’s overtures to continue associating with him. Wade was the only insider candidate running in these elections, and he was the front-running opposition leader. As such, the public eye was focused on him as he became amenable to Diouf’s overtures for collaboration before the presidential campaign. When Wade announced his candidacy less than a year before the race, he and three other PDS members were still ministers in Senegal’s first enlarged presidential majority government. Even after announcing his candidacy, Wade remained minister for several more months before leaving to campaign in the opposition. By choosing not to resist such co-optation so close to the election and after he became a candidate, Wade did not send the electorate reliable signals that he would indeed bring the change that he promised if they voted for him. His statements about the terms of his involvement in the Diouf government blurred the distinction between his politics and those of the president. Wade expressed confidence in the PDS’s prospects to win the election, especially with the new electoral code. He encouraged citizens to separate PS-PDS relations from the personal relations between himself and Diouf. Wade also clarified that he and Diouf “plan[ned] on collaborating again after the election campaign, regardless of what trans- pired” but that they had never struck any deals (Quoted in Fall et al. 1992). Wade’s call for collaboration with Diouf and the PS sparked disapproval among other opposition parties, precisely because of the confusing mix of governing party and opposition party roles that the PDS adopted soon before the 1993 elections. Although Wade tried to justify his stance, oppo- 156 C. L. KELLY sition leaders criticized Wade for leaving the government when it was making improvements to citizens’ lives, for entering the government without a clear programmatic goal, and for “trying to have his cake and eat it too” by running for president while advertising his openness to collaborating with the incumbent (Samb 1992a, b, c). The consequences of Wade’s lack of resistance to a continued partner- ship with Diouf also became clear when the PDS left the government in October 1992, just four months before the elections. Wade announced the PDS’s withdrawal but did so reluctantly given that the Diouf entourage had allegedly discussed the possibility of creating a vice-presidency to offer Wade, or at least of Wade and Diouf running on a joint ticket (Diop and Diouf 1990; Le Soleil 1992). Wade justified the PDS’s exit from the government based on claims that Diouf had held meetings that excluded PDS appointees and had transferred PDS ministerial competencies to parts of the administration under PS control (PDS 1992: 3). On the popular front, Wade declared that the PDS had left the government to help Senegalese citizens realize turnover. When accepting the PDS presidential nomination in 1993, Wade justified that the party’s participation in the government had been “to keep our country from descend- ing into chaos and to do work that Senegalese people have generally appreciated.” In addition, he attempted to expose a principled logic behind his collaboration with Diouf, noting that “when we encountered… everything that is decidedly negative and impossible to change in the Socialists’ mentalities and practices, we came back to our natural milieu, the opposition” (PDS 1992: 4). Despite these attempts to justify the PDS’s trajectory, the opposition campaign that Wade waged in 1993 failed to advance him into any runoff against Diouf.

2000: A First Turnover—Impending Succession and Insider Resistance In the 2000 elections, which ended in turnover, there was both uncertainty about the timing of succession and a resistant insider candidate. Diouf’s advancing age created uncertainty about his candidacy in 2000; when he did declare his candidacy, he was not expected to complete his term if he won (Diop et al. 2000: 166). The impending succession followed on the heels of more general succession-related strife within the PS, after Diouf named Tanor Dieng his future successor in 1996. However, it 5 DEFEATING PRESIDENTS FROM WITHIN: REGIME INSIDERS… 157 was in 1993, when the PS Central Committee evaluated the party’s performance in the presidential elections, that “certain Socialist militants were already proposing the end of Abdou Diouf’s daily management of the party” (Coulibaly 1999: 149). With Tanor Dieng designated as the successor, and with Diouf forbidding factions within the PS to contest this decision, everyone knew who Diouf’s successor would be. However, the succession’s timing remained undetermined in the 2000 pre-election context. This prolonged party elites’ uncertainty about their room for maneuver in the organization. Wade, the front-running insider, also made a cleaner break than in 1993 from his involvement with the government as the campaign approached. The PDS had sent five ministers into the 1995 government, withdrew before the 1996 municipal elections, re-entered it in 1998, and left it again two months before the National Assembly elections. Yet, in the year before the 2000 race, Wade made no collaborative overtures to Diouf. Wade’s last public call for an enlarged presidential majority government was in October 1998, after he had formed a prospective alliance with Senegal’s major leftist parties, the Pôle de Gauche, for the 2000 race (Diop 1998). After other leaders in the Pôle condemned this behavior, Wade deferred to his allies and made no further overtures. Thereafter, Wade reinforced his separation from incumbents by rejecting Diouf’s July 1999 invitation for the opposition to discuss joining the government. Speaking for Wade, the PDS’s deputy, Idrissa Seck, categorically refused, distin- guishing the PDS’s behavior from the 1993 pre-electoral context (Wade 1999). During the campaign, Wade also denied accusations of having held secret talks in France with Diouf in 1999 about creating a vice-presidential post in which he would serve if Diouf won in 2000. Reinforcing the resistant stance that he was crafting, Wade denied the charges, asserting that “until the next presidential election, I have nothing to discuss with Abdou Diouf ” (Quoted in Sarr 1999). He emphasized his alliance with the Pôle de Gauche, including his agreements to jointly govern with other opposition parties in the coalition if he won in 2000. Wade thereby crafted a more consistent image as a principled opponent in 2000 by avoiding public displays of support for collaboration with the PS and the president. Heightened fragmentation within the ruling party, along with Wade’s resistance to collaboration, facilitated the opposition coalescence around Wade in the runoff that led to turnover. 158 C. L. KELLY

2007: Wade Is Re-elected—Impending Succession Without Insider Resistance The 2007 race, which did not result in turnover, exhibited just one of the two contextual features conducive to it: uncertainty about the timing of succession within the ruling party. In 2007, Wade declared that it would be the last time for him to run for president. PDS elites therefore knew that a successor was on the verge of designation but were not yet sure who it would be. Sall, Wade’s Prime Minister at the time, was an obvious candidate, and there were whisperings about the president’s ambitions for his son, Karim. Seck had already fallen from Wade’s graces, but the president had initiated negotiations with him in prison that also raised the possibility that Seck would return to the PDS and take it over (Diop 2009a; Mane 2007b). Thus, before the 2007 elections, the impending succession underscored the fractured internal state of the ruling party, whose elite had not held full-fledged internal elections since 1996. The second contingency that correlates with turnover was not part of the 2007 pre-election context. That is, Idrissa Seck, the primary insider candidate in the opposition, did not resist Wade’s attempts to negotiate a reconciliation during the campaign. “Idy” left the PDS riding on a wave of popular sympathy, largely due to the way that Wade had liquidated him. He capitalized on this sympathy by signaling early his intent to run for president in 2007, officially declaring his candidacy in April 2006. A talented orator and campaign strategist, he refashioned his political image to emphasize Wade’s use of the state to foster his downfall. Seck wrote on his 2007 campaign website that “In th[e] new Senegal, I especially hope for an end to the use of our security forces and judicial powers for the settling of political disputes.” Underscoring his resilience in the face of such foul play, he described himself as

…the only politician in the history of Senegal to have been the object of such a complete mobilization of the resources of the State over such a long period, accompanied by a campaign of planetary denigration, without even the smallest bit of damage being done to my honorability. (Seck 2006)

Nevertheless, Seck’s subsequent attempts to reconcile with President Wade before the 2007 campaign may have damaged his electoral prospects. His willingness to negotiate with his former boss fostered speculations about how much he really wanted to change the political status quo. 5 DEFEATING PRESIDENTS FROM WITHIN: REGIME INSIDERS… 159

It appears that Seck’s combination of negotiations with and opposition to Wade had the effect of “isolating Seck from the rest of the opposition and fostering the public opinion that he was a leader who was unreliable about his engagements” (Diop 2013b: 81). Several examples illustrate how this might have happened. First, while in prison, Seck was suspected of collud- ing with Wade to regain his position as successor within the PDS. Seck denied making any deals with Wade while in prison, but upon his release, there was speculation about whether Seck had negotiated an accord known as the Protocol of Reubeuss. This was rumored to be a long-term financial deal, with Wade financing Seck to run in the 2007 and 2012 elections. Seck denied these allegations, admitting that Wade approached him but claiming that he rejected such overtures (Diop 2009a: 43–45). Wade’s overtures for reconciliation with Seck continued as the 2007 campaign drew closer. As late as a month before the 2007 elections, Seck was attending midnight meetings with Wade at the presidential palace, putatively in order to find a way for him to return to the PDS. In January, Wade sent Mbaye-Jacques Diop, one of Senegal’s oldest politicians in the mouvance présidentielle, to Seck to propose reconciliation. When Seck responded negatively to Diop’s attempted mediation, the Tidjani marabout Abdoul Aziz Sy “Junior” convinced both parties to negotiate during several meetings at the Palace. After the first meeting, while Wade announced Seck’s return to the PDS, Seck remained silent on the issue (Mane 2007a; Samb 2007b). The second meeting fostered further speculations about Seck’s complicity with Wade, with reports that the two drew up a pact in which Seck would withdraw his candidacy from the 2007 election in exchange for joining a national unity government (Mane 2007c; Samb 2007a). Ultimately, Seck was unable to convert his insider advantages into a campaign that was forceful enough to foster turnover, despite his attempts both to justify his negotiations and to condemn Wade’s management of the state. Before he began meeting Wade at the Presidential Palace in January 2007, Seck compared Rewmi to the PDS, stating that:

politically, we do not share the same vision of change, whose meaning [Wade] has altered, nor do we share the same perception of the state, which he has effectively discredited. Ethically, we do not approve of his brutal and anti-democratic manner of settling disputes through aggression, imprison- ment, and exclusion, and I approve even less of his familial way of managing national resources. (L’Observateur 2007) 160 C. L. KELLY

Seck also denied allegations that he had negotiated a post with Wade during his meetings at the Palace and issued public statements that he would run against Wade and support the opposition candidate who entered any runoff. Yet overall, his “back-and-forth negotiations to return to the PDS after forming his own political party, Rewmi, and running against Wade in 2007 undermined his credibility in the eyes of many Senegalese, who saw him as an opportunist” (Gellar 2013: 127).

2012: A Second Turnover—Impending Succession and Insider Resistance Both of the contingent factors that correspond to turnover in Senegal were present in the 2012 race. Before the 2012 election, Wade’s changing humors about retirement reignited the uncertainty about succession that the PDS had already endured in the last electoral cycle. In 2007, he had publicly expressed the belief that his pursuit of a third term would be unconstitutional (Kelly 2012: 127). Wade thus surprised the country when he announced that he would run again in 2012. The motivations for this change of heart were purportedly functions of the president’s need to secure the political future of his son, Karim, who had lost the 2009 municipal elections in Dakar, where he had aspired to be mayor. Since then, a group of Karim’s followers, the Generation of the Concrete (Génération du Concret), had gained prominence in the government and the party. Karim’s rise increased the controversy about the PDS’s future leadership, both among party elites and the public. Furthermore, Wade’s “advanced age and his frequent promises that, if elected, he would not serve a full term, contributed to the omnipresent speculation about the possible father-son succession” (Koter 2013: 673). The impending succession fostered an increasing number of defections from the PDS and the ruling coalition as Wade’s filial succession plan became more transparent. These patterns became acute in 2011, when Wade tried to use the PDS legislative majority to modify the constitution to allow candidates to win presidential elections with only 25% of the vote and to designate a vice-president. Many in the party and the public suspected that President Wade would choose Karim Wade as vice-president in order to facilitate presidential succession. This idea contributed to the mass mobilization against the constitutional amendment through the June 23 Movement (M23) (Diop 2013b: 83–86). The mobilizations were followed by the Constitutional Council’s approval of Wade’s candidacy in January 2012. 5 DEFEATING PRESIDENTS FROM WITHIN: REGIME INSIDERS… 161

In this context, Sall showed unwavering resistance to reconciliation with President Wade. After creating the APR, Sall immediately asserted that he had no interest in reconciliation with Wade. In one of his first press conferences as APR president, Sall declared, “I am not in the sphere of the liberal family… I do not want to extend the PDS… Our priority is the national implantation of the party” (Quoted in Mane 2008). Sall gained popular sympathy for the way his work with Wade had ended, including in Touba, the religious capital for the Mouride Sufi order, where several elected representatives had disapproved of Wade’s maneuvers to push Sall out of the party. Building on popular sympathy, Sall also promptly announced his intention to run against the PDS in the March 2009 municipal elections, in which the APR won hundreds of thousands of votes and the mayorship of Sall’s hometown, Fatick. Capitalizing on this momentum, Sall maintained a strategy of resistance from then through the 2012 campaign. Wade, on several occasions, called for a reunification of the “liberal family,” reaching out to ex-PDS elites with opposition parties to join the presidential entourage. On each occasion, Sall resisted Wade’s attempts to sully his image as a clear alternative leader. In January 2009, as Idrissa Seck negotiated with Wade to return to the PDS, Sall announced that his own “return to the PDS [wa]s out of the question” (Quoted in Kane 2009b). Sall’s refusals continued, even after the Wade regime tried to block his international sources of private financing.11 After Wade convinced Seck to return to the PDS, Seck also unsuccessfully appealed to Sall to return to the party (Kane 2009a). In July 2009, Sall stated that “the priority now is the APR’s massification with a view toward defeating the future liberal candidate [for president] in 2012” (Quoted in Diop 2009c). Even after subsequent solicitations, his message remained the same:

The order of the day is not my return to the PDS or anywhere else. The order of the day is elsewhere, to work to massify the APR which already has hundreds of thousands of sympathizers, adherents, and militants. (Quoted in Ndoye 2009)

One possible logic behind such refusals is that “if Macky Sall today chose to return to Wade, he would risk losing the sympathy of the Senegalese. Not to mention that a good number of [APR] militants are not ready to follow Macky Sall into Wade’s new party” (Diop 2009b). 162 C. L. KELLY

5.4 How Have Turnovers in Senegal Related to Democratization? Turnover does not always yield democratization. Regardless of whether insiders or outsiders are the agents of turnover, democratization is difficult, especially when parties are weak and defection is not detrimental to people’s political careers. However, there are additional reasons that insider-induced turnovers may be less promising for democracy than those fostered by outsiders. If ex-regime insiders have been involved in previous non-democratic governments, they may not be the country’s most committed democrats once elected. Their ability to vie seriously for the presidency may also indicate weak opposition and a lack of outsiders capable of sustained competition against incumbents. In this context, insiders can often take control of regimes in which “much of the institutional architec- ture of competitive authoritarianism is left intact,” facilitating its continu- ation (Levitsky and Way 2010: 355). Turnover is more likely to bring gradual democratization when civil society activities facilitate both opposition parties’ ability to coordinate and citizens’ sustained mobilization for good governance. Democratization may also be more likely if these factors create sufficient pressures for the president to limit manipulation of the uneven playing field. In Senegal, both presidential turnovers were induced by some form of ex-regime insider, and neither has fully fostered democratization in the liberal form. Although Senegal is one of West Africa’s oldest electoral democracies, the extent to which it has achieved a form of democracy that encompasses sufficiently consistent respect for civil liberties and the rule of law remains subject to debate. On the one hand, some experts started calling Senegal a democracy in various forms at least a decade ago based on the country’s landmark alternance in 2000, regularized free and fair elections, and widespread political freedoms. Nevertheless, specialists assessing Wade’s presidential years write critically about many practices. Some, like the regular use of the Division of Criminal Investigation to inconvenience or intimidate opponents (Dahou and Foucher 2004; Diop 2006; Mbow 2008) and the deliberate, executive-driven creation of an array of packable institutions like the Senate and the Economic and Social Council (Fall 2011a, b) are clear signs of competitive authoritarian rule. Others—like the “politicized use of audits” (Diop 2011: 448) and election dispute adjudication practices that foster “persistent suspicion of electoral justice” 5 DEFEATING PRESIDENTS FROM WITHIN: REGIME INSIDERS… 163

(Diop 2011: 433)—are each evidence of democratic erosion. Together, they arguably signal significant deviation from the liberal democratic regime type. The Sall administration, too, has towed the line between competitive authoritarianism and democracy, abolishing and later resurrecting various packable institutions, selectively applying the law to political opponents, and intermittently clamping down on freedom of expression and assembly, particularly in the two years before the 2019 presidential elections. Early on, Sall oversaw considerable improvements from the Wade era in government respect for civil liberties and fundamental freedoms. However, as the 2014 municipal elections and 2017 National Assembly elections came to pass, the administration increasingly interfered with certain journalists and press outlets critical of the government. For instance, when Walfadjri aired criticisms of President Sall’s proposals for the referendum, the state detained a journalist and tried to cut its broadcast frequency (Freedom House 2017). The regime also became more conservative about the types of peaceful protests and meetings that the Ministry of Interior authorized, from those that the PDS requested when Abdoulaye Wade returned to Senegal in 2014 to others promoting the “no” vote on the 2016 constitutional referendum that Sall proposed. These trends continued as the National Assembly considered the sponsorship law (loi de parrainage) for electoral candidacies. The Ministry of Interior rejected several requests for demonstrations and police arrested opposition figures like Idrissa Seck, Malick Gackou, and the rapper Kilifeu during popular protests about the law (Freedom House 2017, 2018). The passage of the 2018 loi de parrainage—which imposed significant new barriers to party-sponsored electoral candidacies—also fostered accusations that Sall did not respect the spirit of the democratic process, even if he followed formal democratic rules to enact the reforms. The Minister of Justice, a well-known law professor, pitched the law as “clean- ing up Senegalese democracy” and “rationalizing candidacies in presidential, legislative, and local elections” (Quoted in Louarn 2018). However, many opposition and civil society actors did not trust the presidentially appointed Constitutional Council and Ministry of Interior to verify sponsorship signatures fairly. They also worried that the ruling party could easily manipulate the sponsorship process by using its vast resources to solicit millions of sponsorship signatures for Sall and thereby “weed out” other potential opponents from acquiring enough to qualify, given that 164 C. L. KELLY citizens can only sign for one candidate (Liffran 2018; Le Soleil 2018). After the law passed, the opposition filed a complaint with the Constitutional Council, but the Council—appointed entirely by Sall— claimed it lacked the jurisdiction to weigh in. Finally, the administration selectively enforced the law against Sall’s two foremost would-be contenders in the 2019 presidential race by pursuing corruption charges against Karim Wade and Khalifa Sall. In 2013, the state preventively detained Wade on charges of illicit enrichment from his stint as “Super Minister” with multiple portfolios during his father’s second presidential term; he was found guilty and sentenced to six years in prison in 2015. Sall, too, was detained in 2017 while the state investigated him for embezzlement, criminal conspiracy, forgery, and falsification of records based on the allegation that he created false receipts to balance the mayoral office’s emergency cash funds (caisse d’avance). At the time of writing in December 2018, Sall had been convicted of fraud and sentenced to five years in prison, but awaited judgment on his cassation appeal. Thus, both men’s candidacies were potentially subject to invalidation based on electoral laws, which prohibit the candidacy of people with prison sentences of five or more years with criminal convictions.12 Neither investigation was entirely unfounded, particularly that of Wade, who had allegedly committed more grand offenses. Khalifa Sall admitted that he spent caisse d’avance funds for political purposes, but his defense argued that the caisse d’avance consisted of political funds by definition, that politicians had been using the caisse this way since the times of Senghor, and that Sall had used none of those funds for private gain. Such practices are so historically entrenched and widespread, they argued, that the state’s pursuit of Sall and Sall alone for employing them constituted selective and politicized application of anti-corruption laws. The ruling party’s timely pursuit of Sall in particular suggests that Senegal may again drift into (or, at least, be approaching the borderline of) competitive authoritarian territory, as the Sall administration strategically uses the law to shape critical electoral dynamics. Perhaps, then, it is not surprising that Senegal’s scores on indices that capture various core elements of liberal democracy have fluctuated over time. On Freedom House’s Freedom in the World index, Senegal initially achieved “free” status at the end of 2002; returned to “partially free” status at the end of 2008, after Macky Sall’s ouster from the National Assembly Presidency; and once again got “free” at the end of 2012 in light of Sall’s initial reforms. It has since remained “free” despite incr easing 5 DEFEATING PRESIDENTS FROM WITHIN: REGIME INSIDERS… 165 concerns about rule of law and certain civil liberties over the last several years, as the Sall administration has walked a fine line between democracy and competitive authoritarianism (Freedom House 2003, 2009, 2013, 2014, 2017, 2018).

Comparing Senegal’s Insider-Induced Turnovers This book holds that Senegal’s first insider-driven turnover (2000) did not foster democratization and that the second one (2012) fostered initial democratization trends, followed by some competitive authoritarian backsliding. Fortunately, however, Senegal has a centuries-long history of elections dating back to the Four Communes, a history of peaceful, civil, and tolerant political contestation, and a reputation for engaged citizenship and vibrant public debate. These virtues have shaped many Senegalese into citizens who resist competitive authoritarian retrenchment. Both of Senegal’s insider-driven turnovers had ambivalent implications for democratization, despite some differences in the political backgrounds and power retention tactics of Wade and Sall. Once in office, both insiders deliberately increased the unevenness of the playing field, particularly as subsequent elections approached. This dynamic was evi- dent by the end of Wade’s first term (continuing through his second) and emerged under Sall in 2014. Although Wade more consistently sought to crack down on opponents and journalists through legal and extralegal means, both Wade and Sall attempted to handicap political competitors through corruption accusations, investigations, and prose- cutions. Thus far, it appears that it was Wade who oversaw more competitive authoritarian backsliding than Sall. However, the Sall regime risks facilitating a similar magnitude of backsliding (albeit from a higher starting point on various democracy indices) if crackdowns on assembly and speech acts or politicized legal pursuits of opposition figures continue after the 2019 elections. It is unclear whether outsider-induced turnovers would have yielded the same oscillations between competitive authoritarianism and democracy that Senegal has experienced after its two insider-driven turnovers. Further longitudinal research in Senegal on this topic will not be possible unless at least one outsider-induced turnover takes place in the future. Existing studies of turnovers throughout Africa show that alternations in the party in power often narrow the gap between ruling party supporters and other citizens in terms of their trust in government institutions, confidence that 166 C. L. KELLY politicians can be held accountable, satisfaction with democracy, and accordance of legitimacy to the state (Cho and Logan 2014; Moehler and Lindberg 2009). Yet, there are no explicit studies of whether these effects are different in degree or direction after insider-driven turnovers rather than outsider-driven ones. The possibility warrants future cross-country research as well as longitudinal single-country research. However, demand for democratization can come from below even if leaders from the top do not consistently cultivate it. Senegal’s patterns of insider advantage and outsider marginalization have left space for other parts of civil society to promote democratization. For instance, citizens’ movements are on the rise. They “both reflect and facilitate the spread of democratic norms that incorporate Senegalese traditions of solidarity, tolerance, and equitable sharing of public/community resources” (Gellar 2013: 148). They have been involved (along with many parties) in the Assises Nationales. Movements like the M23 and Don’t Touch My Constitution, in conjunction with the Assises, led to increased citizen mobilization during the 2012 presidential elections and created more lasting constituencies for the institutional reforms that Sall signed onto during his runoff campaign against Wade. Civil society has remained vibrant under Sall, with leaders of several citizens’ movements winning parliamentary seats in 2012 and two parties created by religious community leaders securing seats in 2017. Despite the increasing vibrancy of Senegalese civil society, which has helped regime outsiders make their political voices heard, citizens do not always view such outsiders as democrats. Sometimes, this is because of their unwillingness to cooperate with incumbents for what some citizens perceive to be the greater good. For instance, the rural Wolof concept of demokarassi accommodates opposition leaders joining the government in order to be involved in running the state (Cruise O’Brien 2003). Demokarassi orients voters to choose their affiliations to parties and politicians through communitarian, consensus-based decision-making about who will promote collective welfare rather than through individualistic, majoritarian logics (Schaffer 1998). However, these alternative understandings of democracy, too, have limitations within Senegalese society. Voters in urban areas, where the logic of demokarassi is less pervasive, are more wary of such pragmatic negotiations. Voters with this skepticism— which has endured for decades (Villalón 1994: 189)—do not necessarily privilege insider behavior over outsider resistance to incumbents. 5 DEFEATING PRESIDENTS FROM WITHIN: REGIME INSIDERS… 167

5.5 Conclusion This chapter has analyzed the sources of insider advantage in Senegal’s 1993, 2000, 2007, and 2012 presidential elections. In each race, front- running opposition candidates were ex-regime insiders who had recently enjoyed access to the state through collaboration with the ruling party or prior membership in the ruling party. The analysis also shows that by co- opting opposition parties into oversized ruling coalitions, and by liquidat- ing rivals within the ruling party through selective enforcement of the law, Senegalese presidents incubate potential opposition within the state’s ranks, not just outside of them. Especially when magnified by the uneven playing field, insider advantages make it difficult even for committed democrats to vie for the presidency without having to collaborate with the government for financial and reputational reasons. We may be looking for opposition in the wrong place sometimes when we restrict our analysis to organizations and politicians outside of the state. However, only certain insiders end up defeating the president from within. Overall, structural factors like poor economic performance and opposition coalescence bolstered Senegal’s prospects for turnover in 2000 and 2012. Yet, the context in which insiders emerged from the presidential camp and the strategies they adopted toward former allies also mattered. In the cases of both the PS in 2000 and the PDS in 2012, ruling party defection also hastened presidential defeat. Chapter 6 describes the loyalty and defection decisions that PDS members faced when the party was in power, placing these decisions into the historical context of the PDS’s organizational development and illustrating several core elements entering into the calculus of exit, voice, and loyalty to one of Senegal’s ruling parties during its moments of strength and vulnerability.

Notes 1. Even if we more restrictively operationalize insiders as candidates who have been ministers just within the last electoral cycle, the difference in means is striking, with insiders (N = 10) winning an average of 13.3% of the vote share and outsiders (N = 31) winning an average of 0.24%. The difference is statistically significant at the 99% level. 2. The insiders for 1993 and 2000 remain the same; for 2007, Seck and Niasse count as insiders but Tanor Dieng is an outsider; and for 2012, only Sall remains an insider. Thus, there would be no outsiders with over 5% in 1993 and 2000; one of three in 2007, and three of four in 2012. 168 C. L. KELLY

3. Insider candidates with under 5% would constitute 33% (2/6) in 1993, 0% (0/4) in 2000; 27% (3/11) in 2007; and 13% (1/8) in 2012. 4. Seck had spent his entire political career in the PDS, culminating in his Prime Ministership. Thus, in the 2007 elections, his opposition “relegated to second tier the classical opposition” of outsiders (Diop 2006: 119–120). 5. He announced, “maa waxoon, waxeet,” (“I take back what I said”), refer- encing prior promises not to run again. 6. Interview with Diattara, 4/22/12, Thiès. 7. Interview with Oumar Hassimou Dia, 5/3/12, Dakar. Interview with Babou Dieng, 5/11/12, Dakar. 8. Interview with Tall, 6/5/12, Dakar. 9. Interview with Dièye, 8/13/10, Saint-Louis. 10. Interview with Thiam, 8/7/10, Dakar. 11. After the PDS in France defected to Sall, authorities confiscated Sall’s pass- port on his return to Dakar. Sall was accused of laundering money, as was Abdoulaye Sall. 12. Both trials were criticized for flaws in upholding the rule of law. The UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention declared Karim Wade’s two-year- long detention arbitrary. The ECOWAS Court of Justice found that Sall was denied rights to counsel and due process, as well as subjected to arbitrary detention for several months based on parliamentary immunity.

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Diop, Abdou Salam. 1998. Voie balisée pour la sortie du gouvernement. Walfadjri, March 7–8. Diop, Momar-Coumba. 2006. Le Sénégal à la Croisée des Chemins. Politique africaine 104: 103–126. Diop, Sidy. 2007. Retour d’Idrissa Seck au PDS, leçons d’un accord pré-électoral. Le Soleil, January 23. http://fr.allafrica.com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/stories/200701230204.html Diop, Abdoul Aziz. 2009a. Une succession en démocratie. Les Sénégalais face à l’inattendu. Paris: L’Harmattan. Diop, Georges Nesta. 2009b. Macky Sall s’explique: Pourquoi j’ai écrit au Président Bongo. Walfadjri, January 29. http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/200901290537.html ———. 2009c. Retrouvailles de la famille libérale—Macky Sall décline la main tendue de Idrissa Seck. Walfadjri, July 21. http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/ 200907210695.html Diop, Omar. 2011. Partis politiques, démocratie et réalités sociales au Sénégal. Essai critique pour une étude réaliste du multipartisme. Paris: Karthala. Diop, Alioune Badara. 2013a. Le ‘prophète du Sopi’ et l’électorat halpulaar: une histoire d’amour tardive qui finit mal. InLe Sénégal sous Abdoulaye Wade: le Sopi à l’épreuve du pouvoir, ed. Momar-Coumba Diop, 319–360. Paris: Karthala. Diop, Momar-Coumba. 2013b. Etat, pouvoirs, et société: Essai sur les trajectoires du Sénégal contemporain. In Le Sénégal sous Abdoulaye Wade: le Sopi à l’épreuve du pouvoir, ed. Momar-Coumba Diop, 41–96. Paris: Karthala. Diop, Momar-Coumba, and Mamadou Diouf. 1990. Le Sénégal sous Abdou Diouf. Etat et société. Paris: Karthala. Diop, Momar-Coumba, Mamadou Diouf, and Aminata Diaw. 2000. Le Baobab a été déracine: L’alternance au Sénégal. Politique africaine 78: 157–179. Fall, Harouna. 2007. Suppression du poste de No2 du PDS et éviction de Macky de l’Assemblée. Le Quotidien, November 6. Fall, Ismaila Madior. 2011a. Les revisions constitutionnelles au Sénégal. Révisions consolidantes et révsions déconsolidantes de la démocratie sénéglaiase. Dakar: CREDILA. ———. 2011b. Senegal. In Election Management Bodies in West Africa, ed. Mathias Hounkpé Fall, Adele Jinadu, and Pascal Kambale, 162–208. Dakar: Open Society Foundations. Fall, Pape Amadou. 2014. Macky Sall doit nous édifier. La Gazette, January 12. http://www.lagazette.sn/macky-sall-doit-nous-edifier/ Fall, Cheikh Tidiane, Abdallah Faye, and Modou Mamoune Faye. 1992. Gouvernement d’union nationales de transition. Me Wade retire sa proposi- tion. Le Soleil, September 1. Freedom House. 2003. Senegal. In Freedom in the World 2003. New York: Freedom House. 170 C. L. KELLY

———. 2009. Senegal. In Freedom in the World 2009. New York: Freedom House. ———. 2013. Senegal. In Freedom in the World 2013. New York: Freedom House. ———. 2014. Senegal. In Freedom in the World 2014. New York: Freedom House. ———. 2017. Senegal. In Freedom in the World 2017. New York: Freedom House. ———. 2018. Senegal. In Freedom in the World 2018. New York: Freedom House. Galvan, Dennis. 2009. The Presidential and Parliamentary Elections in Senegal, February and June 2007. Electoral Studies 28: 492–517. Gellar, Sheldon. 2013. The Rise of Citizen Movements and the Consolidation of Democracy Under the Abdoulaye Wade Regime (2000–2012). In Le Sénégal sous Abdoulaye Wade. Le sopi à l’épreuve du pouvoir, ed. Momar-Coumba Diop and Mamadou Diouf, 97–118. Paris: Karthala. Gerard, Jérome. 1993. Election présidentielle au Sénégal (février 1993): ‘Sopi’ pour la jeunesse urbaine. Politique africaine 50: 108–115. Howard, Marc, and Philip Roessler. 2006. Liberalizing Electoral Outcomes in Competitive Authoritarian Regimes. American Journal of Political Science 50 (2): 362–378. Kâ, Djibo. 2005. Un Petit Berger au Service de la République et de la Démocratie. Dakar: Nouvelles Editions Africaines du Sénégal. Kane, Aguibou. 2009a. Rétrouvailles de la famille libérale—Wade face à un impératif de survie. Walfadjri, September 14. http://fr.allafrica.com/ 200909141325.html Kane, Bocar Alpha. 2009b. Macky Sall depuis Maintes-la-Jolie: ‘Un retour au PDS est exclu’. L’Observateur, January 19. Kanté, Babacar. 1994. Senegal’s Empty Elections. Journal of Democracy 5 (1): 96–108. Kelly, Catherine. 2012. Senegal: What Will Turnover Bring? Journal of Democracy 23 (2): 121–131. Koter, Dominika. 2013. Urban and Rural Voting Patterns in Senegal: The Spatial Aspects of Incumbency. Journal of Modern African Studies 51 (4): 653–679. L’Observateur. 2007. Le candidat Idy déroule son programme. January 4. LD/MPT. 1995. Le temps des mutations: Le parti, la crise, le gouvernement. Actes du séminaire organisée à l’occasion du quatorzième anniversaire de la légalisation de la LD/MPT. Dakar. Le Soleil. 1992. Serigne Diop, Secrétaire Général du PDS/R: ‘Wade mal à l’aise’. September 1. ———. 2018. Loi sur le parrainage: L’opposition exige le retrait du texte. April 18. http://www.lesoleil.sn/2016-03-22-23-17-43/item/77733-loi-sur-le- parrainage-l-opposition-exige-le-retrait-du-texte.html Levitsky, Steven, and Lucan Way. 2010. Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War. New York: Cambridge University Press. Liffran, Olivier. 2018. Présidentielle au Sénégal: Karim Wade bientôt hors course? Jeune Afrique, April 6. http://www.jeuneafrique.com/548768/politique/ presidentielle-au-senegal-karim-wade-bientot-hors-course/ 5 DEFEATING PRESIDENTS FROM WITHIN: REGIME INSIDERS… 171

Louarn, Jean-Jacques. 2018. Sénégal: ‘Le parrainage citoyen est introduit dans la constitution depuis 1991’. RFI, April 22. http://www.rfi.fr/ emission/20180422-senegal-le-parrainage-citoyen-est-introduit-constitution- depuis-1991 Mane, Latir. 2007a. Chronique d’une retrouvaille. Wade et Idy trompent leur monde. L’Observateur, January 18. ———. 2007b. Macky Sall poignardé dans le dos. Idy consacré dauphin de Wade? L’Observateur, January 18. ———. 2007c. Installation d’une situation de report de l’élection présidentielle. La voie est libre avec l’article 34 de la Constitution. L’Observateur, January 31. ———. 2008. Macky Sall, President APR/Yakaar, ‘Je ne suis pas dans une dynamique de famille libérale’. L’Observateur, December 2. Mbow, Penda. 2008. Senegal: The Return of Personalism. Journal of Democracy 19 (1): 156–169. Moehler, Devra, and Staffan Lindberg. 2009. Narrowing the Legitimacy Gap: Turnovers as a Cause of Democratic Consolidation. Journal of Politics 71 (4): 1448–1466. Ndoye, El Hadji Gorgui Wade. 2009. Macky Sall—‘Mon retour au PDS n’est pas à l’ordre du jour. Walfadjri, November 4. http://fr.allafrica.com.ezpprod1. hul.harvard.edu/stories/200911040835.html Niang, Mody. 2004. Me Wade et l’Alternance: le rêve brisé du Sopi. Dakar: Saint-Paul. Parti Démocratique Sénégalais. 1992. Congrès d’investiture, Dakar: Les 17–18 et 19 décembre 1992, Stade Iba Mar Diop, Résolution d’Investiture. Dakar. Resnick, Danielle. 2014. Urban Poverty and Party Populism in African Democracies. New York: Cambridge University Press. Reuter, Ora John, and Jennifer Gandhi. 2010. Economic Performance and Elite Defection from Hegemonic Parties. British Journal of Political Science 41 (1): 83–110. Samb, Pape Boubacar. 1992a. Ibrahima Sène, Membre du Bureau Politique du PIT, ‘C’est dommage que certains quittent le bateau’. Le Soleil, October 19. ———. 1992b. Madior Diouf (RND), ‘Il faut un programme’. Le Soleil, October 19. ———. 1992c. Abdou Fall (PLP), ‘On ne peut courir deux lièvres à la fois’. Le Soleil, October 19. Samb, Serigne Saliou. 2007a. Mise en place d’un gouvernement d’union nationale: Les termes du protocole du 22 janvier. L’Observateur, January 23. ———. 2007b. La déclaration de Idy attendue aujourd’hui ou demain. Le palais suspend un communiqué qui devait consacrer l’échec des négociations avec Wade. L’Observateur, January 25. Sarr, Moussa. 1999. Wade nie tout contact avec Diouf. Walfadjri, November 19. Schaffer, Frederic. 1998. Democracy in Translation. Understanding Politics in an Unfamiliar Culture. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 172 C. L. KELLY

Seck, Idrissa. 2006. Entrée de Idrissa Seck dans la campagne électorale. Lettre à tous les Sénégalais. November 16. http://www.seneweb.com/news/Politique/ entree-de-idrissa-seck-dans-la-campagne-electorale-lettre-tous-les-s-n-galais_ n_5603.html Seck, Cheikh Yerim. 2009a. Macky Sall au poste. Jeune Afrique, February 5. http://www.jeuneafrique.com/205402/societe/macky-sall-au-poste/ Seck, Mamadou. 2009b. La Police traque le réseau de Macky et confisque son passeport. L’Observateur, January 28. Van de Walle, Nicolas. 2006. Tipping Games: When Do Opposition Parties Coalesce? In Electoral Authoritarianism. The Dynamics of Unfree Competition, ed. Andreas Schedler, 105–127. Boulder: Lynne Rienner. Villalón, Leonardo. 1994. Democratizing a (Quasi) Democracy: The Senegalese Elections of 1993. African Affairs 93 (371): 163–193. Wade, Ibrahima Khalil. 1999. Diouf ouvert au dialogue: L’opposition divisée devant l’appel. Walfadjri, July 24–25. Wade, Abdoulaye. 2006. Une vie pour Afrique. Entretiens avec Jean-Marc Kaflèche et Gilles Delafon. Neuilly-sur-Seine: Michel Lafon. World Bank. 2013. World Development Indicators [Data File and Codebook Online]. The World Bank. http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world- development-indicators CHAPTER 6

Party Loyalty and Defection from the Ruling Party Under Proliferation

The defections of prominent individuals from the Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS) hastened Wade’s defeat in the 2012 presidential election. These defections were largely the result of the factors discussed in Chap. 5. However, they merit further attention because they reveal how Senegalese politicians evaluate and enact concepts like party loyalty and party switching in the context of party proliferation. Drawing upon archival research, newspaper coverage, and interviews with current and former PDS elites, this chapter illuminates the logics of defection from the PDS and the changes over time in Senegalese politicians’ propensities for the exit, voice, and loyalty behaviors theorized by the economist Albert Hirschman. The analysis thereby provides insight into the strengths and weaknesses of the PDS and the Senegalese party system. Previous chapters demonstrate that Wade fragmented the opposition by encouraging party proliferation among politicians outside the PDS and by seeking to co-opt many of these parties into the PDS’s ruling coalition, either on the basis of tactical alliances or through membership in the Coalition Around the President for the 21st Century (Cap 21). This

© The Author(s) 2020 173 C. L. Kelly, Party Proliferation and Political Contestation in Africa, Contemporary African Political Economy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-19617-2_6 174 C. L. KELLY chapter turns the tables, focusing on two internal party dynamics: defection from and loyalty to the PDS. Even when the PDS controlled access to state resources from 2000 to 2012, certain party elites who had been Wade’s mentees, peers, or advisors chose to leave their positions as party or state leaders despite their proximity to power. Conversely, even after the PDS lost the presidency in 2012, and there were fewer material incentives for people to stay in the party, certain high-level political figures chose to remain. Why do some party elites leave ruling parties despite the losses they will incur by exiting, and why do other party elites choose to stay in ex-ruling parties after they lose power? How have PDS party elites evaluated and pursued the loyalty and defection options available for their political advancement over time? The chapter argues that the PDS became more internally divided over the course of Wade’s presidency and that these developments helped to bolster PDS politicians’ perceptions of party creation as a viable reaction to difficulties or injustices they experienced in the PDS. As uncertainty about the institutional mechanisms for advancing within the PDS mounted, party creation was used both as a means of permanent exit from the PDS (often accompanied by vigorous “voice from without”) and as a tool for attempting to use voice outside of the PDS to negotiate a return (“exit as voice”). Section 6.1 begins by describing various forms of loyalty and defection and situating the PDS within the literature on African party systems and party cohesion. After a brief history of loyalty and defection in the PDS in Sect. 6.2, Sect. 6.3 analyzes the loyalty and defection behaviors of all current and former PDS members who became government ministers while in the party. It shows that those who joined the PDS after alternance had lower propensities for loyalty, and that this shift toward defection was also accompanied by declines in the exclusivity of the PDS’s main executive institution, as well as increases in the fluidity of Senegal’s party system. Section6.4 presents case studies of the loyalty and defection choices in this context of former ministers, legislators, mayors, and regional and local party leaders at several key points in the PDS’s development. Section 6.5 concludes.

6.1 Contextualizing Logics of Loyalty and Defection in Senegal Generally, PDS members have faced four, mutually exclusive, short-term choices as they have pursued political careers within the party: (1) stay in the party, (2) leave the PDS for another party or coalition, (3) leave the PDS to create a new party, or (4) renounce partisanship, whether by 6 PARTY LOYALTY AND DEFECTION FROM THE RULING PARTY… 175 ending all involvement in politics or by supporting coalitions or movements but terminating membership in a party. These choices can be combined in the long term. Certain people created new parties to negotiate their way back into the PDS (a 2–1 combination) or built movements that they converted into parties (a 4–2 combination). In rarer cases, people remained in the party for decades but then curtailed involvement in politics (a 1–4 combination) or left the PDS for another party or coalition only later to end involvement in politics (a 3–4 combination). In the social sciences, individual choices about party loyalty and defection are not usually studied in their own right. Often, they are folded into studies of party switching, which empirically analyze legislators’ floor- crossing actions (Desposato 2006; Poteete 2012; Young 2014). Yet, beyond current members of parliament, several other types of party members make exit, voice, and loyalty choices that influence party cohesion, performance, and survival. The party’s ability to retain former ministers, local elected officials, and leaders of internal party institutions also matters. Examining the party membership patterns among all current and former PDS elites with ministerial experience, this chapter analyzes the incentives for loyalty and defection among a different set of political actors than those usually emphasized. This exercise demonstrates the relevance of various types of elites’ incentives in accounting for party cohesion. Research on party dominance also touches upon the dynamics of loyalty and defection. In this literature, the same structural variables that are used to account for ruling party dominance and the difficulties of opposition coalescence in Africa are applied to explain the personal loyalty and defection choices that shape party cohesion. Social scientists rely on a variety of structural variables to make sense of specific country cases. In particular, they suggest that defection is less likely in countries with high levels of ruling party control over resources, ideologically polarized party systems that make party switching politically damaging, high legal and bureaucratic barriers to party formation, and low levels of personalization of party structures, such that the whims of the party president are not the main basis for selecting party officials and election candidates (Doorenspleet and Nijzink 2013; LeBas 2011; Levitsky and Way 2012; Osei 2012). Structural variables certainly play a role in explaining defection. Senegal lacks the ideologically polarized party system, high legal and bureaucratic costs of party creation, and strongly enforced internal party rules and procedures that have reined in defection in other African party systems. However, personal, cultural, and contextual factors—like individuals’ personal goals, formative experiences in the PDS, local attitudes and 176 C. L. KELLY

expectations about political negotiations and collaborations, and elites’ sense of honor, integrity, and justice—also shape how PDS elites understand and evaluate their loyalty and defection options. In Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States, Hirschman (1970: 4) holds that consumers of a product or members of an organization may pursue one of two options when the quality of the organization’s output declines: leave the organization (“the exit option”) or express dissatisfaction to leaders of the organization (“the voice option”). Remaining loyal to an organization during a decline can slow the exits of others, encourage others to use voice to solve internal problems, and “neutralize within certain limits the tendency of the most quality-conscious customers or members to be the first to exit.” Loyalty thereby allows an organization more time to adjust the quality of its out- puts after a decline and “prevent deterioration from becoming cumula- tive” (79). This chapter traces the dynamics of exit, voice, and loyalty to the PDS across three key periods: the party’s foundational phase in opposition (1974–2000); its presidential phase (2000–2012); and its return to opposition (2012–present). Generally, exit and voice have been shaped by both structural factors and more contingent, personalized factors, as the case studies show. Nevertheless, it is possible to draw several overarching conclusions. In particular, the longer that internal elections within the PDS were delayed after 1996, and the more common that party proliferation became in Senegal after 1998, the more party creation became a tool for both voice-oriented behaviors aimed at the PDS, as well as permanent exits from the PDS. In this sense, exit and voice functioned more as com- plements and less as substitutes than they had before. As voice within the PDS remained ineffective at reforming the party, party creation became a result of both permanent exits from the PDS and temporary exits that new party leaders used as forms of voice for negotiating their reintegration into the PDS.

6.2 A Brief History of Loyalty and Defection The incentive structures within the PDS for these behaviors have often shifted but can be distinguished into three chronological phases of the PDS’s institutional development. 6 PARTY LOYALTY AND DEFECTION FROM THE RULING PARTY… 177

The PDS in Opposition: 1974–2000 On July 31, 1974, at the Hotel Croix du Sud in Dakar, Abdoulaye Wade held his first press conference as the Secretary General of the PDS. Wade had persuaded President Senghor to approve the PDS as a “party of contribution” in 1974 (Diop 2011: 42; Fall 2011). However, as the 1976, 1978, and 1981 changes to political party laws became more permissive of opposition party formation, the PDS became a more adversarial opposition party. The PDS was Senegal’s most popular opposition party from the 1978 legislative elections through the 2000 presidential contest that brought Wade to power. Several conditions shaped the cohesion of the PDS during its initial decades in opposition. First, Wade built the party by recruiting others who were willing to work outside of ruling party structures within an authoritarian (and later, competitive authoritarian) regime. The ruling party’s control over the state and the economy in this era ensured that many ambitious politicians would join the Socialist Party (PS) to advance their careers. Second, Wade created the party after attempting to join the PS in 1960 through local structures and in 1970 in the election of the Secretary General of the Coordination of the Kébémer district. Research by Desouches (1983: 22) suggests that Wade won the election based on the local vote count, but that PS officials declared Wade’s adversary the winner. Motivated by these experiences to work outside the PS, Wade built the PDS by melding regional political support groups (Manga 2013). He joined forces with Fara Ndiaye, the PDS’s first Adjunct Secretary General, who had consulted for the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) on the needs of rural Senegalese citizens (Desouches 1983: 37). They initially recruited marginalized PS officials, political activists from Casamance, and young, urban professionals (Desouches 1983: 41–42; Manga 2013: 269). For the party’s Directing Committee (Comité Directeur, CD), Wade selected “rather specific members” from “regions that were strongly PDS,” including Ousmane Ngom (a young lawyer from Saint-Louis), Joseph Ndong (a young teacher from Senghor’s hometown, Joal, a PS stronghold), Marcel Bassene (a youth activist from Casamance), and Laye Diop Diatta (an ex-PS leader from Casamance).1 Leadership within certain districts (départements) was established before the party leadership determined city, rural community, village, and sub-village structures and regional structures (Desouches 1983). The difficulty of building the party on an uneven playing field fostered 178 C. L. KELLY bonding among the PDS’s early adherents and made many feel invested in Wade and the party. PDS institutions were also smaller at their inception, giving early adherents tangible influence on the party’s direction. The CD, for example, began with only 12 members who met regularly to discuss policy priorities. Despite initially propitious conditions for cohesion, the PDS was not immune to defection. During its first 26 years in opposition, the PDS experienced multiple government attempts to poach members, sap morale, and reduce the party’s electoral success. The PDS’s “militants de la pre- mière heure” (early members) had to be constantly vigilant of government attempts to abuse the law to punish PDS militants. In the 1980s, several major figures left the PDS in ways that heightened dedicated opponents’ “phobia”2 of falling prey to the PS’s divide-and-rule tactics. One example was the 1986 departure of the PDS’s Adjunct Secretary General, Fara Ndiaye. As the first president of the PDS’s Parliamentary Group in the 1983 National Assembly, Ndiaye faced PS attempts to “dismantle” the Group. His exhaustion at dealing with these tactics may have even motivated his exit from the party.3 In addition, several ex-PDS elites created new parties rather than joining the ruling PS. Serigne Diop, a former youth wing leader and party cadre with legal training, left the PDS to form the PDS/Renovation (PDS/R) in 1987 after a dispute about the PDS’s ideological bent. Furthermore, Jean-Paul Dias, a wealthy businessman and ex-minister who had led the PDS’s regional and departmental structures for Dakar, created the Centrist Bloc of Gaïnde (BCG) after disputes over electoral candidacies led him to leave the PDS in 1993. Later, Ousmane Ngom, who was Wade’s adjunct in the PDS throughout the 1990s, left to form the Senegalese Liberal Party (PLS) in 1998 after he lost control over nomina- tions for legislative candidacies. Meanwhile, the politics of selecting party personnel intensified within the PDS. Multiple interviewees confirm that 1996 was the last time the PDS held internal elections for all tiers of local and national leadership positions within the party. Although partial procedures occurred in 1998 and 2006–2007, Wade and Macky Sall used their personal influences to skew them and they were never completed. At the same time, some PDS cadres were apprehensive about moving forward with internal elections for fear that they would divide the party and threaten the PDS’s ability to mobilize votes. 6 PARTY LOYALTY AND DEFECTION FROM THE RULING PARTY… 179

The PDS in Power: 2000–2012 Incentives for loyalty and defection changed drastically in March 2000, when Abdoulaye Wade won the presidential elections in a runoff against Diouf. The PDS came to power with a groundswell of support from a multifaceted opposition coalition, as well as an old guard of “militants who believed in the PDS.”4 But after Wade became president in 2000, “the party was more or less abandoned” and PDS leadership focused prin- cipally upon running the state.5 Wade welcomed the arrival of transhumants, nomadic politicians who switched party affiliation after alternance from the PS to the PDS, ostensibly to access state resources. As they joined the PDS, Wade relied on them to apply their skills as former ministers, bureaucrats, and state company heads in new government positions. In contrast, other than the five PDS members who had participated in Diouf’s enlarged presidential majority governments, people who had joined the PDS during its “années de braise” (formative years in opposition) lacked experience running the state. Tensions between the old guard and new- comers weakened party cohesion. The old guard noticed that the quality of party loyalty within the PDS declined after 2000. Before, there had been “youth with strong convictions” who were “prepared to die for the party,” but after 2000, new youth who were “more oriented toward fighting for placement” into government and party posts entered the party.6 Furthermore, “the party [had] organized itself and organized protests and tours” while in opposition, and “there was a certain vitality of the Political Bureau, the National Secretariat, and all of the horizontal and vertical party organs.” Yet in the early 2000s, the PDS “abandoned [that] method of work” and, eventually, “the PDS was no longer capable of mobilizing people for development objectives.”7 These developments also fostered institutional changes that reduced party cohesion. To increase prospects for loyalty among statesmen who integrated the PDS after 2000, Wade informally changed the membership rules for the Directing Committee (CD), bringing all ministers and National Assembly members into the group. As a result, old guard CD members felt that their importance had dwindled and that the distribution of power did not acknowledge their loyalty. As it expanded, the CD also became less conducive to collective deliberation and less useful for voicing opinions about the party. 180 C. L. KELLY

The personalization of power by Wade’s Prime Ministers also changed the nature of party cohesion. Idrissa Seck (2002–2004) and Macky Sall (2004–2006) were both able to propose their ideal ministerial cabinet to President Wade and place their own allies within the party into government positions. Wade tended not to modify these proposed appointments, which left Seck and Sall space to build their own followings within the PDS. As a result, when Seck fell out of favor with Wade in 2004, he left the PDS to form the Rewmi (Nation) party with several PDS parliamen- tarians. As Seck’s successor, Sall oversaw internal elections for National Assembly candidates in 2006–2007. This gave him an additional opportunity, beyond ministerial cabinet formation, to solidify his personal bases of support among PDS members in different regions of Senegal. When Sall fell out of Wade’s favor and resigned from the PDS in 2008, he was able to form his own party with a variety of former PDS professionals. Further rifts within the PDS developed as the Génération du Concret (Generation of the Concrete, GC), a Karim Wade support movement, developed on the fringes of the party and outside of it during Abdoulaye Wade’s second term. The GC consisted mostly of youth under 35 who did not have a place in the PDS or the government but wanted more political clout. The movement launched after Karim Wade and a young, French- educated engineer, Abdoulaye Baldé, collaborated on the PDS’s campaign for the 2001 National Assembly elections.8 When Senegal won the bid to host the 11th Summit of the Organization of the Islamic Conference in 2006, Karim Wade and Baldé worked together on the infrastructure reforms needed to accommodate visitors for the Summit, with Wade as President of the National Agency of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (Agence Nationale de l’Organisation de la Conférence Islamique, ANOCI) and Baldé as the Executive Director.9 In 2007, Wade and Baldé formed the GC movement, which key party personnel saw as Karim Wade supporters and unpopular power-seekers who were “outside of the party and even against the party.”10 The GC exacerbated popular suspicion that President Wade was preparing his son for succession within the PDS. Rumors about Wade’s agenda for the “dévolution du pouvoir monarchique” (monarchical devolution of power to his son, Karim) intensified during the 2009 municipal elections, as the PDS ran Pape Diop as the head of its candidate list in Dakar. Then the mayor of Dakar and previously the President of the National Assembly (2002–2007), Diop was an experienced statesman and a popular choice. As head of the candidate list, many assumed that Diop 6 PARTY LOYALTY AND DEFECTION FROM THE RULING PARTY… 181 was the person that the PDS would vote into the mayoral position were the party to win a majority of seats in the Dakar city council. However, the GC wanted Karim Wade to be the PDS’s mayoral candidate for Dakar. Their insistence on this created some confusion among voters as to who would ultimately prevail if the PDS won.11 When the PDS lost the local elections in Dakar and Khalifa Sall of the PS became mayor, President Wade began focusing on other ways to promote his son. In June 2011, he unsuccessfully attempted to change the constitution to facilitate his pursuit of a third presidential term, as well as to create a vice presidential post that many believed he would use to make Karim his executive branch successor. The potentially dynastic nature of succession within the PDS fostered grievances among multiple, high-level PDS elites. The politics of the GC also created new sources of strife in the PDS as GC members began accessing benefits that would normally accrue to loyal and experienced party members, including ministerial positions, as of 2009. Additional problems arose when Karim Wade encouraged GC followers to join the PDS and consolidate support for his father in the 2012 elections.12 Some PDS elites considered the GC “a group of friends who wanted to have positions of responsibility and influence” and “a clique of opportunists saying that Karim Wade [wa]s in the leading position with his father” within party leadership structures.13 One party member recounts that the GC’s rise “truly killed the PDS” because it “discouraged the early adherents to the PDS” and those who joined the party early on in Abdoulaye Wade’s presidency.14

The Return to Opposition: 2012–Present PDS ranks thinned considerably after Abdoulaye Wade’s defeat in 2012. Both the PDS old guard and post-alternance members considered the wake of the 2012 electoral defeat a point when they could leave the party honorably, given that they had not deserted earlier during those elections, a critical moment of competition. The cascade of defections from the PDS fostered several changes in the party structures and created new sources of competition for power within the organization. In May 2012, Wade named Oumar Sarr the PDS’s Adjunct Secretary General and went to France, remaining there until 2014. Sarr assessed that the PDS had lost in 2012 because the party had been disorganized on the local level and had progressively acquired “a team of leaders… who… were not interested in 182 C. L. KELLY the party and were interested in the state and the subsidies that they could get from the state.” Thus, one of the first institutional changes that Sarr pursued with Wade’s blessing was to expand the PDS’s CD. The party’s most pressing need was to retain viable PDS candidates and pockets of supportive voters for the 2012 legislative and 2014 municipal elections. Wade expanded the CD from 120 members to 400 in order to reward more people who stayed in the PDS in that period.15 In 2013, further challenges arose within the PDS with the imprison- ment of Karim Wade on charges of illicit enrichment from his time as minister during his father’s presidency. His preventive detention began in April 2013, his trial at the Court of the Repression of Illicit Enrichment (Cour de la Repression d’Enrichissement Illicite, CREI) began in July 2014, and he was found guilty of certain charges, sentenced to six years in prison, and fined $229 million in March 2015. Abdoulaye Wade returned to Senegal in April 2014 as Karim Wade’s trial progressed. The trial’s rhythm shaped the evolution of PDS preparations for upcoming elections. Originally, the party leadership had planned to hold a congress that August to choose a presidential candidate. However, the CD ended up selecting a candidate in March 2015, right before Karim Wade’s judgment at the CREI. From March 5 to March 20, card-carrying PDS members were allowed to present their dossiers for candidacy to a nine- person commission. Aspiring candidates thus had little time to mobilize, given the unexpected timing of the candidate selection process and an original period of one week to declare candidacy (although that deadline was later extended) (Dieng 2015). At the Political Bureau meeting on March 21 that launched an extraordinary party congress, each PDS federation and horizontal structure that was present had four votes to cast. However, members of the CD, who were customarily courtesy members of the Political Bureau and granted additional votes in Congressional pro- ceedings, learned at the Congress that they were not allowed to cast those additional votes.16 Through that procedure, 257 of 268 delegates voted for Karim Wade as the PDS’s next presidential candidate. The PDS lost several of its most prominent, remaining members after the congress. For example, ex-Prime Minister Souleymane Ndéné Ndiaye left the PDS to form his own party. In his view, despite the emergency congress,

there is no criterion that establishes the popularity of Karim Wade. Karim Wade has never held elected office. I have political, electoral, and social 6 PARTY LOYALTY AND DEFECTION FROM THE RULING PARTY… 183

representativeness. I have more experience than Karim Wade. I cannot place myself behind Karim Wade. I was a Member of Parliament several times [and] I was elected municipal counselor several times.

Furthermore, Ndiaye denounced Karim Wade’s candidacy because “he knows only Dakar, Touba, and Kébémer,” is new to the party, and is not especially fluent in Wolof.17 Other rising stars in the PDS initially remained in the party and contested internal procedures. In June 2015, Modou Diagne “Fada,” the leader of the PDS’s opposition parliamentary group, issued a manifesto backed by a core group of PDS militants calling for more transparent rules and party governance. Fada was supported by Aida Mbodj in the push for elections for local party positions. Mbodj used her Abdoulaye Wade- approved support movement, National Alliance for Democracy (Alliance Nationale pour la Démocratie, AND), to preserve her personal base within the PDS while supporting procedural changes. However, these efforts were not particularly successful forms of voice. By November 2015, Fada and his followers had been excluded from the PDS. Mbodj remained in the party but ran on a separate candidate list in the 2017 National Assembly race.

6.3 Quantifying Changes over Time In all three phases of the PDS’s development, organizational cohesion hinged upon Abdoulaye Wade’s ability to retain the membership of the party’s sitting legislators, as well as former ministers, local elected officials, leaders of internal party structures and institutions, and other community- based “opinion leaders” (like chefs de quartier).18 A comprehensive analysis of loyalty and defection would track each of these types of party elites but is not possible with available data. Nevertheless, the present analysis moves from the previous literature’s focus on the incentives of parliamen- tarians and turns to those of ministers. Using original data on the PDS membership patterns of all former PDS ministers, it explores how some of the party’s most privileged members conceive of their loyalty and defection options. Analyzing the loyalty and defection behaviors of former ministers has several merits. Wade and his most trusted advisors selected each former minister to represent the PDS in positions that were highly visible to the public. Ministers also tended to be some of the most politically ambitious 184 C. L. KELLY

Table 6.1 Trajectories of former PDS ministers in mid-2015

Stayed in Joined APR Created Other Unknown PDS party

Joined before 2000 (n = 37) 22 4 4 3 4a (59%) (11%) (11%) (8%) (11%) Joined after 2000 (n = 38) 14 7 3 6 8a (37%) (18%) (8%) (13%) (8%) Total (n = 75) 36 11 7 9 12 (48%) (15%) (9%) (12%) (16%) aIn the unknown category, the four people who joined before 2000 and five of the eight people who joined after 2000 were no longer in the PDS, but their trajectory was unknown. The remaining three were entirely untraceable members of the party, often due to successful past performance in legislative and local elections that helped them build the legitimacy to vie for executive branch appointments. However, they owe their ministerial position almost entirely to Wade (which was not the case to the same extent for people in elected positions). Ministers therefore have some of the strongest patronage-based reasons to remain loyal to the PDS. Table 6.1 displays results from the analysis of all current and former PDS members who became government ministers while in the party. The dataset combines information from three PDS members who are critical elements of the party’s institutional memory, ministerial appointments published in the Journal Officiel de la République du Sénégal, and archival documents.19 The data captures the appointment dates of all former ministers who were PDS members, indicates whether they joined the PDS before or after the 2000 transition, notes whether they served as ministers while the PDS controlled the presidency, and classifies the type of loyalty or defection behavior that they had exhibited as of summer 2015, when the PDS had been back in the opposition for three years. When possible, multiple party members with institutional memory were consulted to vali- date estimates about when people in the dataset left the PDS and whether they joined another party, created their own, or renounced partisanship. Ninety PDS members had been ministers by summer 2015.20 Nine were removed from the dataset due to incomplete information, and six were not fully analyzed because their time of entry into the PDS was unknown.21 This left a sample of 75 former ministers. Forty-eight percent of ex-PDS ministers opted to remain in the PDS after their appointments 6 PARTY LOYALTY AND DEFECTION FROM THE RULING PARTY… 185 ended. However, seven of them had “frozen” their activities in the party, and two were engaged in the fronde led by Modou Diagne “Fada.” Around 15% of former PDS ministers had joined the new ruling party, the Alliance for the Republic (APR). Some had switched directly from the PDS to the APR, while others had left the PDS and formed personal support movements beforehand. Slightly over 20% of the former ministers pursued other strategies, such as joining other opposition parties like Rewmi (run by ex-Prime Minister Idrissa Seck), creating new political parties, building the Bokk Gis Gis coalition for the 2012 National Assembly race, or creating personal support movements. There are notable differences in the most common trajectories of those who had joined the party before 2000 compared to those who became members after 2000. Despite an even split in the sample sizes of ministers who had joined the PDS before alternance (37 of 75) and after (38 of 75), remaining loyal to the PDS was more common among people who had been part of the PDS since its initial period in opposition; 59% of pre- alternance adherents pursued this path, compared to 37% of post- alternance adherents. Joining the APR was slightly more popular among post-alternance PDS members (18%) than among pre-alternance members (11%), as were other defection strategies beyond joining the APR or creating a new party. Thirteen percent of post-alternance adherents pursued other alternatives versus just 8% of pre-alternance adherents. Party creation was fairly equally pursued among both types of PDS members (11% among pre-alternance and 8% among post-alternance figures, amounting to seven new parties created by former PDS ministers). Two major institutional patterns correlate with this trend. As the PDS acquired a set of post-alternance adherents with lower propensities for loyalty, the exclusivity of the PDS’s executive institutions declined and the fluidity of the Senegalese party system increased.

Exclusivity Declines in the PDS Directing Committee According to party statutes, the CD implements decisions made by the Party Congress or Political Bureau. Originally a 12-member institution, the CD was initially used for key members of the party to meet outside of the larger National Secretariat in order to “rapidly deliberate on important questions.” From the start, Wade chose the 12 members, including founders from the PDS’s regional strongholds and leaders of the PDS’s women and youth wings. By 1998, two years before the PDS defeated the PS in 186 C. L. KELLY the presidential elections, the CD had grown informally to accommodate 35–40 members, including certain national-level PDS officeholders. This expansion accelerated after alternance, when Wade admitted all PDS ministers and some National Assembly members to the CD, increasing membership to 75. The CD had 100–120 members by 2007, after Wade admitted Senators and parastatal heads as well. In 2012, multiple stake- holders chose to expand the CD to 400, as the PDS sought to reward people who stayed in the party after its defeat. One founding member of the PDS described this form of the CD as “a veritable Sandaga Market,” likening it to Dakar’s chaotic downtown commercial district. As CD membership became less selective, each member’s relative power declined. With expansion, the CD also became less of a venue for productive discussion and reflection on important decisions facing the party. Instead, it was “providing information [about the party] and educating younger members.”22 As the institution’s de facto function changed, its policy-shaping power was reduced as well.

Party System Fluidity Increases The fluidity of party boundaries and brands in Senegal increased over time, too (Resnick 2013). In the 1993 legislative elections, citizens had just six party or coalition lists to assess in order to decide whether and how to vote. In 1998, voters had 18 lists of parties or coalitions to choose from, and in 2001, there were 24 lists. The number declined to 14 in 2007 due to the opposition boycott of the National Assembly race. However, 24 lists were presented in 2012, followed by 47 in 2017. The party and coalition labels that voters had to judge did not remain consistent across elections. Although a number of political parties continuously participated in National Assembly elections from 1993 to 2017, these parties have not always run on their own party label for each race, and the names of the coalitions they have joined have not remained stable over time. For instance, only four of the 24 entities present in 2012 appeared on the 2017 ballot again with the same label. Figure 6.1 displays two relevant statistics for each National Assembly election: the percentage of party or coalition labels from the previous legislative race that reappear in that election with the same label as before (“% labels from previous race reappearing”); and the percentage of party or coalition lists that are running candidates on that label for the first time (“% lists with new label name”). The retention rate for party and coalition labels across pairs of consecutive National Assembly elections declines 6 PARTY LOYALTY AND DEFECTION FROM THE RULING PARTY… 187

Fig. 6.1 Party label changes over time from 67% of 1993 labels being retained in 1998 to 9% of 2012 labels being retained in 2017. Between 1998 and 2012, retention statistics fluctuated between 25% and 50%, partially due to the 2007 boycott. In contrast, the percentage of party or coalition labels competing for the first time with their registered names declined from 77% in 1998 to 54% in 2007 but rose to 70% in 2012 and over 90% in 2017. The fluidity of party brands creates more work for citizens seeking to cast informed votes. These dynamics also coincide with the growing tendency for party leaders to collaborate or strike deals with parties or coalitions they previously opposed. The institutionalization of specific political parties only partially miti- gates these negative effects of party system fluidity. For instance, the PDS’s historical significance and its notable performance in each election help ensure that its coalition name remains well known even though it changes in each race. Coalition Wade (2001), Coalition Sopi (2007), and Coalition Gagnante/Wattu Senegal (2017) were all well known as PDS-led. There was similar popular knowledge of changing label names associated with parties like the PS, APR, and Alliance of Forces for Progress (AFP). However, these major parties still face other challenges to their institutionalization, including personalism and the contingent enforcement of formal internal rules. For the PDS, defections of elites like Pape Diop and Mamadou Seck after Wade’s 2012 defeat underscore that the party “ha[s] long revolved around the rise and fall of one man rather than advancing a larger agenda and vision to which party members could make a commitment” (Resnick 2013: 642). 188 C. L. KELLY

6.4 Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Case Studies Case studies provide greater insight into the different meanings of loyalty and defection for PDS politicians, as well as the mechanisms governing their decision-making about the form of loyalty or defection they pursued in the context of an increasingly exclusive PDS and a more fluid party system. The case studies are based on information gathered during field research from summer 2015, including semi-structured interviews with current and former PDS party elites who had served in appointed and elected positions, belonged to party institutions like the National Secretariat and the CD, or held departmental and regional leadership positions in the party. Additional data comes from Senegalese newspapers, archival documents, and books written by local analysts. The case studies focus on four types of current and former PDS elites: those who created their own parties, those who switched parties, those who renounced partisanship, and those who remained loyal to the PDS throughout their political careers. The author analyzes their actions through the lens of Hirschman’s theory of exit, voice, and loyalty, in which exit is the classic economic mechanism for dealing with quality declines within an organization while voice is “political action par excellence.” Hirschman considers exit an economic response because he assumes that it is an impersonal transaction in which “any face-to-face confrontation between customer and firm with its imponderable and unpredictable elements is avoided.” Voice, he contends, “can be graduated, all the way from faint grumbling to violent protest; it implies articulation of one’s critical opinions rather than a private ‘secret’ vote in the anonymity of the supermarket” (1970: 16). However, as the case studies illustrate, exits in the Senegalese party system have not tended to be private actions devoid of grumblings or protests, as per Hirschman’s stylized form. Politicians, particularly those who exited in order to create their own new parties, had an interest in making their exits contentious and publicly visible. Different levels of loyalty condition an individual’s propensity for exit and voice. Hirschman theorizes that in political parties, “loyalty holds exit at bay and activates voice” (1970: 77). When internal conditions allow for party members who are unhappy with the organization to effectively exercise voice, then loyalty reduces the immediate draw of exit among members who care deeply about the party in and of itself. Yet, a member’s voice is also rendered more powerful by her threat of exit. Members with lower 6 PARTY LOYALTY AND DEFECTION FROM THE RULING PARTY… 189 levels of loyalty are more likely to exit quietly, whereas members with high levels of loyalty may threaten to exit but wait to observe the organization’s response to their threat before considering further action (82–83). There are also conditions under which exit and voice become two relatively similar (rather than contrasting) choices. That happens when members of a party consider the organization to be producing public goods whose effects they will continue to experience even if they leave the party. Then, “the alternative is now not so much between voice and exit as between voice from within and voice from without (after exit)” (104). As the case studies show, several forms of party loyalty and defection observed among PDS members do not fit squarely into just one of Hirschman’s exit and voice categories but, instead, combine elements of both. Particularly as party politics became more competitive around alternance, the PDS leadership reacted to several actions that might have otherwise constituted “voice from within” the party in ways that transformed them into a loud and ostentatious exit. Ex-PDS elites who were not well-served by the PDS’s de facto application of rules and procedures, and who formed alternative candidate lists or support groups, were often (though not always) expelled from the party and forced to exercise “voice from without,” even if exit had not been their original or ultimate intent.

Party Creation Tensions within the PDS increased after Wade became president, with the arrival of transhumants and increased delays in holding internal elections. As these internal dynamics intensified and the party system’s fluidity increased, party creation became an attractive tool for both exit- and voice-oriented behaviors in relation to the PDS. Generally, as uncertainty about the institutional mechanisms for advancing within the PDS increased over time, party creation was used in multiple ways; for some, it was a means of exiting permanently from the PDS (and exercising “voice from without, often noisily and noticeably), and for others, it was a tool for attempting to use voice outside of the PDS to negotiate a return (even if the expression of that voice required temporary exit). While sometimes the exit part of the latter “exit as voice” strategy was forced, as in the cases of Modou Diagne Fada with Waar wi, on other occasions, the exit element was planned, as with Ousmane Ngom. 190 C. L. KELLY

Initial Cases Some of the first defections from the PDS leading to the creation of new parties occurred in the late 1980s and early 1990s when the PS was solidly dominant. In this period, newfound party leaders did not use exit as a form of voice to negotiate their return to the PDS on more favorable terms. Instead, they pursued exit with the intention of staying outside of the PDS despite their affective ties to the organization, although in some cases, they ended up returning to the PDS later on. Serigne Diop, one of the first youth organizers in the PDS who helped build the party’s youth wing, the Union of Young Laborers (Union des Jeunesses Travaillistes, UJT), broke away to create the PDS/Renovation (PDS/R) in 1987. Diop recounts that as of 1980, “the behavior of the party was different than what was indicated in its statutes.” Initially, the PDS had espoused a doctrine of socialisme travailliste (labor-based socialism) but was forced to take on the “liberal democratic” label mandated by the 1976 Law of the Three Trends since the PS had chosen the “democratic socialism” label for itself, thereby leaving the PDS to choose either a liberal or a Marxist ideological framework to participate in the party system. Diop took issue with the PDS’s “progressive references to liberalism” after the 1981 Political Parties Law allowed parties to define their own ideological orientations and thereby gave the PDS an opportunity to return to its initial doctrine. He also took issue with Wade’s unilateral decision that the PDS would not run candidates in the 1984 local elections.23 Exit was required when the PDS Disciplinary Committee excluded him from the party in 1985. Diop and colleagues from the PDS Coordination des Cadres formed the core of the PDS/R, which campaigned for President Diouf in the 1988 elections (Diop and Diouf 1990: 17). Representing the PDS/R, Diop also participated in an enlarged presidential majority government in 1993 and won a National Assembly seat in 1998, working alongside former PDS colleagues who also participated in those governments. In 1993, the PDS lost the allegiance of Jean-Paul Dias, a member of the PDS Directing Committee who had been one of several elites in charge of building the list of PDS candidates for the 1993 legislative race. A public servant from Senegal’s National Administration School (Ecole Nationale d’Administration, ENA) who had joined the PDS in 1987, Dias led several parts of the party branch in Dakar “based on the decision of Abdoulaye Wade.”24 When Diouf invited the PDS into government in 1991, Wade 6 PARTY LOYALTY AND DEFECTION FROM THE RULING PARTY… 191 chose Dias to become Minister of African Integration. His difficulties began after he acquired that experience. As leader of the PDS’s département- level structure (fédération) and regional-level structure (convention régio- nale) for Dakar before the 1993 National Assembly elections, Dias sought to run on the PDS’s candidate list for Dakar. This would have allowed him to test his popularity for a possible mayoral run in the 1996 local elections. He contends that Wade ordered him to run as head of the national list of candidates instead, which did not provide the same opportunities to further cultivate the concentrated, geographic base of supporters that he had built. To boot, when the PDS candidacy commission met, they placed Dias on the national list in a spot that he felt did not respect his seniority. Dias then retracted his candidacy and created the Bloc des Centristes Gaïnde (BCG), which he treated like a non-governmental organization but registered as a party.25 In these two cases, party creation ended up functioning as a tool of exit in the pre-alternance era, but as a means of voice in the mid-2000s. The PDS/R eventually fused with the PDS in 2001 and Diop agreed to join Wade’s government in 2002 (Diop 2006: 475). In explaining his return to the PDS, Diop remarked that his base would not have understood why he had agreed to work with the Diouf government in the 1990s but refuse a post in the new government run by Wade. (However, Diop left the PDS again in 2009 to become Mediator of the Republic).26 The BCG also negotiated a short-lived fusion with the PDS from 2003 to 2005, after which Dias revived the party and contested multiple elections. For each of these opposition-era exiters, party creation provided a means to (temporarily) negotiate re-entry into the ruling party and the state.

Turning Point In later cases, party creation functioned as a tool of exit and of voice at different moments—namely, as a tool of exit in the short term but as a more lasting mechanism of voice vis-à-vis the leadership of the original party in the longer term. By the eve of the 1998 National Assembly elections, the PS had but a fragile dominance. It was in this context that Ousmane Ngom left the PDS and formed the Senegalese Liberal Party (PLS) with the intention to use exit as voice. He sought to use party formation to express his desire for a better standing within the PDS; he also contested legislative elections with the PLS in 1998 to quantify his popular legitimacy and prove that he had enough electoral clout to negotiate for high-level standing and patronage access within the PDS. 192 C. L. KELLY

Ngom’s difficulties within the PDS began in the mid-1990s, at an advanced stage of his political career. A founding member of the PDS, Ngom had joined the PDS while still in high school. He joined party institutions like the National Secretariat in college, when Wade appointed him editor of the party newspaper, Le Démocrate. By the 1988 presidential elections, Ngom had become Wade’s spokesman. He joined Wade in two enlarged presidential majority governments, as Minister of Labor in 1991 and Minister of Public Health in 1995. Ngom’s creation of the PLS was sparked by Wade’s changes to the party structure in 1997. While Ngom was still Minister of Health, Wade broke with tradition and appointed two Adjunct Secretaries General for the PDS: Ngom (who had previously been the sole adjunct) and Idrissa Seck. Ngom perceived his new role as a demotion. In addition, Ngom and Seck had conflicting visions about candidate placement on the PDS’s national and departmental lists for the 1998 National Assembly race. As Ngom perceived Wade to take Seck’s side in this conflict, he concluded that he “could not fight with Wade, the founding father” of the party and left to form the PLS, taking many of the PDS’s prominent working professionals with him.27 Ngom’s formation of the PLS illustrates that it is not necessarily true that “by exiting one renders his arguments unanswerable” to those who run the organization that one leaves (Hirschman 1970: 126). The PLS supported Diouf in the 2000 presidential race and gained representation in the 2001 National Assembly before Ngom opted to return to the PDS and fuse the PLS with it in 2003. From then until early 2016, Ngom remained loyal to the PDS and served in multiple, high-profile ministerial posts. Thus, by leaving the PDS with a cadre of talented supporters, Ngom was able to win a National Assembly seat and illustrate his modest vote- mobilizing capabilities. His “exit as voice” strategy actually ended up facilitating negotiations with the PDS and Ngom’s return not only to the party but also to government posts that he might not have successfully captured had he stayed in the PDS in 1998 and failed to win a National Assembly seat on the PDS ticket. In contrast, exit as voice did not work to restore Ngom to the second-in-command position that he had occupied in the PDS before 1998 nor did it foster sustainable change in the party procedures that had motivated his exit in the first place.

Cases During PDS Rule The attempts of Modou Diagne “Fada” to exercise voice led to PDS Disciplinary Committee actions that forced him to exit and use “voice 6 PARTY LOYALTY AND DEFECTION FROM THE RULING PARTY… 193 from without.” Fada led the PDS youth wing from 1995 to 2004 while also pursuing opportunities in government. In 1995, he joined Wade’s ministerial cabinet when he was in Diouf’s government; in 1997, Fada became Wade’s adjunct. After Wade left the government, Fada was elected to the National Assembly in 1998 and was appointed Minister of Youth after Wade’s victory in 2000. He was subsequently Minister of Environment through 2004, when Prime Minister Idrissa Seck left the government. Fada’s grievances within the PDS began when Seck left the party in 2005. Because Fada and Seck were close friends, Fada lost power within the PDS during and after Seck’s departure. Wade ended his tenure as Minister of Environment in 2005 and replaced Fada with Thierno Lô, another young politician from Fada’s hometown of Darou Mousty. Beyond “creating tensions in the village,” the reshuffle was perceived by Fada “as a humiliation.” At that point, he reduced his attendance at PDS meetings. Difficulties intensified when Wade charged the new Prime Minister, Macky Sall, to organize PDS candidate selection for the National Assembly elections. In 2006, after Sall visited Darou Mousty, Fada was not endorsed for the position that he felt he deserved based on his popularity.28 In 2007, Fada and several colleagues with similar grievances organized an alternative list of candidates, known as the Waar wi (The Path) coalition, which ran in the National Assembly elections against the PDS. They created an electoral coalition rather than a party since “the goal of the maneuver was always to return to the party [PDS].” The PDS Disciplinary Committee treated this aggressive attempt at voice as an exit, holding that by creating the alternative list, Waar wi members had “auto-excluded” themselves from the PDS. Waar wi leaders refused to accept their exclusion and Fada insisted that he remained “a child of the party.”29 Fada’s associate, Ababacar Bâ, reiterated that Waar wi members had always believed that “the struggle should be within the party” since they always stood for the PDS’s ideals. Like Fada, he had joined the PDS in his youth and felt that “you should not construct the party for decades and leave it.”30 Thus, while PDS leaders spoke of Waar wi’s formation as an exit, Waar wi leaders claim that their coalition was intended to foster their exercise of voice “from within” the PDS. As was also the case when Ousmane Ngom attempted “exit as voice,” the formation of Waar wi appeared to facilitate negotiation between Fada and Wade. The coalition won 20,000 votes and three parliamentary seats in the 2007 National Assembly race. In 2008, delegations from Waar wi and the PDS met to discuss reunification. When it occurred, Fada commented: 194 C. L. KELLY

“We never left the PDS. It’s not a return, but a reunification of leaders sharing the same vision, that of Maître Wade” (Quoted in Dione 2008). Fada reports having refused several ministerial offers before coming back into the government as Minister of Health and Prevention. In 2015, Fada created his own party but only after the PDS expelled him again. When the PDS named Karim Wade its next presidential candidate in 2015, Fada led the PDS’s Parliamentary Group and remained an influential party elite. That June, Fada and his followers sent Abdoulaye Wade a memorandum proposing several “mechanisms to keep everyone in the house,” including collective maintenance of the party’s core texts; consensual, ongoing discussion and debate about policy ideas; and democratic designations of PDS candidates in elections. While accepting Karim Wade’s presidential candidacy, Fada argued that the presidential candidate should focus on campaigning, leaving the management of the party to someone else who could devote himself to it full time.31 Just after the release of the memorandum, Fada expressed a preference to stay in the PDS, noting that “Wade is not eternal, but Wade’s vision could be eternal” if the PDS established mechanisms to facilitate “generational alternation in power.” He was excluded from the PDS in November 2015 and founded the Republican Liberal Democrats Party (LDR/Yessal) several months later. As the PDS showed mounting evidence of taking a dynastic turn, several other high-profile elites also left the party, including Pape Diop, who had joined in 1974. One of the “only serious businessmen who dared to belong to an opposition party” in the 1980s, Diop worked in the export sector and started financing PDS activities in the 1988 elections.32 In 1992, he became party treasurer and a CD member and was then elected to represent Dakar in the National Assembly in 1993, 1998, and 2001. Diop also became Mayor of Dakar in the 2002 municipal elections and was President of the National Assembly (2001–2007) and the Senate (2007–2012) (Cissé n.d.). Diop considered himself the second-in-command of the PDS after he became President of the National Assembly and Mayor of Dakar in 2002, largely because of the strategic electoral importance of Dakar for winning the presidency. His grievances within the party became personal during the 2009 municipal elections, when the PDS sent conflicting messages to the public about whether Diop or Karim Wade was the party’s actual mayoral candidate for Dakar.33 Diop’s challenges within the PDS mounted after the party lost Dakar in the 2009 elections and Wade was defeated in 6 PARTY LOYALTY AND DEFECTION FROM THE RULING PARTY… 195

2012. In preparing for National Assembly elections several months later, Diop aspired to head the PDS’s candidate list but Wade refused. As Diop and several other accomplished statesmen from the PDS became unhappy with their placement on these lists, they created their own list, Bokk Gis Gis (Common Vision, BGG)—much as Fada had in 2007—and were excluded from the party. As had been the case with Waar wi, the aggressive attempt to exercise voice via BGG led the PDS to react to the voice by forc- ing an exit. After his expulsion from the PDS, Diop knew that his political survival depended on the 2012 National Assembly race. (He recounted, “If I had not participated in these elections, I would have disappeared from the political scene.”) Thus, Diop worked with Mamadou Seck (President of the Senate, 2008–2012), Ousmane Masseck Ndiaye (President of the Social and Economic Council, 2009–2012), and Abdoulaye Baldé to ensure that BGG presented candidates on both a national list and in all 45 departments of Senegal. Diop thought of the election as “a form of primary” that could help quantify his popularity. BGG took third in the 2012 elections, winning four seats in the National Assembly and 143,000 votes.34 After the elections, Diop converted the coalition into a full-fledged political party, Democratic Convergence-Common Vision (Convergence Démocratique-Bokk Gis Gis, CD-BGG). Although he considered returning full time to his career in the private sector, Diop decided that he did not have the right to engage many people in his coalition only to abandon the cause after one election. When BGG became a party, Mamadou Seck, Abdoulaye Baldé, and other statesmen who had coalesced with Diop in 2012 left to pursue separate endeavors. Nevertheless, CD-BGG made progress in the 2014 municipal elections, winning a total of 196,000 votes in 247 of over 500 collectivities, as well as 27 mayorships. However, in the 2017 National Assembly race, Diop integrated the PDS’s coalition list (placed in third position on the national list), ultimately using his newfound party to collaborate with his party of origin, despite the protests of certain officers in CD-BGG (Gomis 2017). Over just five years, the PDS and a party born out of a split from the PDS were back to collaborating.

People Who Joined Another Party Other PDS members pursued more conventional exit options in response to their grievances. Most of the time, after 2012, Senegal’s uneven playing field motivated those who left the PDS to join the ruling party, Alliance 196 C. L. KELLY for the Republic (APR). Several of the ex-PDS ministers who joined other parties had built personal political support movements beforehand, which helped them illustrate their mobilizing power before making a switch. Such switches to the ruling party from an opposition party are often referred to as transhumance, which has a negative connotation, but the fluidity of the Senegalese party system does not foster strong incentives for deterrence (Diop 2011). Due to the vibrant press in Senegal, exiters labeled as transhumants often have opportunities to explain the logic behind their decision to switch parties, even if citizens do not always accept these justifications. Once again in this context, contrary to Hirschman’s stylized model, exit does not always rule out further communication about exiters’ reasons for it. Aminata Tall was one influential PDS member who left the party and created her own movement before joining the APR. After joining the PDS in 1978, Tall quickly rose through party ranks by way of her education and professionalism. She entered Diouf’s 1991 government with Wade, Jean-Paul Dias, and Ousmane Ngom. She was elected Secretary General of the PDS’s women’s federation, as well as Vice President of the Senegalese National Assembly in 1998. When Wade took power, he suc- cessively appointed Tall Minister of Family and National Solidarity, Minister of Social Development and National Solidarity, Minister of State for the President’s Office, and Minister of Local Government and Decentralization. However, in 2008, Tall resigned as Secretary General of the PDS women’s federation amid rumors that Wade “intended to replace Awa Diop and Aminata Tall by Awa Ndiaye and Innocence Ntap Ndiaye, known to be close to Karim Wade’s ‘Génération du Concret’” (Leral. net 2008). Exercising voice in response to what she perceived as her increasing marginalization within the party, Tall convened the PDS Federation of Diourbel in 2009, which called for better treatment of Diourbel’s leaders in the party and the government. Wade appointed Tall Secretary General at the Presidency soon thereafter (APS 2009). Despite such progress, Tall continued building a personal support group, And Jappale Rewmi ak Aminata Tall (Working Together to Serve the Country with Aminata Tall). Tall converted her personal support group into a movement when she left the PDS. She chose to exit in response to a cabinet reshuffle, through which Wade ended her tenure as Secretary General at the Presidential Palace and offered her a position as Minister of Public Employment in March 2011 (Carayol 2012; RFI 2011). 6 PARTY LOYALTY AND DEFECTION FROM THE RULING PARTY… 197

Six months after she left the PDS, Tall launched a movement, Set-Sellal (Synergie pour l’éthique et la transparence, Synergy for Ethics and Transparency) and announced that she would run for president. The announcement garnered much attention, but Tall ultimately joined the APR and renounced her presidential bid. When the APR and Set-Sellal fused in November 2012, Tall became Secretary General of the Presidency and a member of the APR’s National Executive Secretariat (Dione 2012). In January 2013, Sall appointed her President of the Economic, Social, and Environmental Council. At the time of writing, Tall’s initial five-year mandate has reached its end and President Sall has renewed her for a second one. Abdou Fall followed a similar path. Although he joined the PDS in 1998, much later than Tall, he, too, quickly ascended PDS and government ranks. Originally a leftist politician, Fall created the Social and Democratic Convention (Convention Démocratique et Sociale, CDS) party, which fused with the PDS before the 1998 National Assembly elections. The fusion was the first in PDS history and one of the only fusions before the PDS became the ruling party. Thereafter, Wade made Fall a CD member, which gave him more power and visibility. Fall was also appointed minister on multiple occasions, elected to the National Assembly, and elected mayor of Dakar’s HLM neighborhood before becoming PDS spokesperson in 2004. By 2011, when Fall left the PDS, he had become Wade’s Political Chief of Staff. Similar to the way that Tall converted her personal support group into a movement, Fall founded a movement after leaving the PDS that built on the Club de Convergence Plurielle (Pluralist Convergence Club), an apolitical discussion group focused on democracy and development that he had created in October 2010. Working these connections after leaving the PDS, Fall established a civil society organization in November 2011 focused on civic engagement, Alternative Citoyenne-Andu Nawle (Citizen’s Alternative).35 Fall’s exit from the PDS in 2011 coincided with what he perceived to be a decline in the extent to which he, as the Chief of Staff, was consulted on key decisions. By then, the party had gone “from being a democratic party to a dynastic party,” with declines in the frequency with which PDS institutions met to review policy issues. Adamant that he “would not create yet another party,” Fall instead used the following from his movement to collectively mobilize an electoral coalition with other, former PDS colleagues.36 For the 2012 National Assembly race, Fall joined Pape Diop, 198 C. L. KELLY

Ousmane Masseck Ndiaye, Mamadou Seck, and Abdoulaye Baldé in the Bokk Gis Gis coalition. Fall was the campaign director but did not end up filling one of the four parliamentary seats that the coalition won. Fall then used his personal reputation and his movement to integrate the APR (Dione 2015). He joined APR’s National Executive Secretariat in 2015 while continuing to lead Andu Nawle (Le Soleil 2017).

People Who Joined Other Coalitions or Renounced Partisanship On rare occasions, PDS members who left the party then renounced their partisan identity entirely, either leaving politics or participating in coalitions without acquiring a new party affiliation. These behaviors are forms of exit without voice. In line with Hirschman’s definition of exit, they are relatively discreet acts pursued by politicians who allow their actions to speak for themselves. Thus far, the elites who have renounced politics or party affiliations have not sought to use their departures from the PDS to create controversy about the injustices they experienced, foster reform, or renegotiate entry into the party based on posts and patronage. Although less polemical and contentious than the exits pursued by politicians seeking to join the APR or pursue “exit as voice,” renunciations of party identity by well-known members are still noticeable to other politicians and certain parts of the public. In this sense, the action is neither “a private ‘secret’ vote in the anonymity of the supermarket” (which is Hirschman’s definition of exit), nor a full-fledged, loud, and clear “articulation of one’s critical opinions” (which is how he describes voice). One of the only PDS elites who left party politics entirely was Mamadou Seck, the former President of the National Assembly (2008–2012). He left the PDS with Pape Diop in 2012 after the PDS lost the presidency, Oumar Sarr became the PDS’s new National Coordinator, and conflicts arose in the selection of PDS candidates for the National Assembly elections. With the elections set for July 2012, Diop, Seck, and others formed the BGG coalition in April. Seck told the press that “the path of things would have been different if there had been serious discussions [within the PDS] seeking to learn lessons about what had just happened in the 2012 presidential elections” and “about what had been happening since 2009 and June 23 [2011]” (Xalimasn.com 2012). BGG won 143,000 votes that July, which translated into four National Assembly seats. Various BGG members had differing intentions after the race. Diop turned the coalition into a party, while others like Seck were more ambivalent about 6 PARTY LOYALTY AND DEFECTION FROM THE RULING PARTY… 199 their next steps. Seck was entitled to one of the seats that BGG had won but declined it, allowing someone further down the coalition list to gain experience. Soon thereafter, Seck left politics and served as the Chairman of the Board for the Bank of Dakar through January 2016 (Diallo 2016; Dieng 2012). Other people, like Seynabou Wade, left the PDS and participated in electoral coalitions without committing to a new political party identity. Wade came from a socialist family but was one of the first adherents to the PDS in 1975, at age 19. She joined the PDS after witnessing “social injus- tice” in Dakar’s Colobane neighborhood, where at the time, there were problems with potable water and unpaved roads. In this context, Wade began reading the PDS newspaper, The Democrat, and decided to join the PDS’s UJT, where she became regional secretary (1978–1985). By the early 1990s, she had become Secretary General of a PDS federation in Dakar. In the PDS Women’s Federation, she was President Awa Diop’s campaign manager for the partial internal elections in 1998; she also belonged to the National Secretariat and CD before alternance and was elected to the National Assembly in 1998. Seynabou Wade’s path in the PDS changed abruptly after the 2000 elections. She recounts that “when we took power, I was no longer a member of the CD, and that very much shocked me.” The influx of ex-PS members into the PDS also led to changes “that were arbitrary and unjust to the people who had spent time in the party.” The CD’s expansion and reshuffling diminished the voices of the old guard. The new CD contained “people whom we did not even know, who did not understand what we had endured to get into power.” Despite these difficulties, Wade was elected to the National Assembly for the PDS in 2007. She remained loyal to the PDS while it was in power because, she says, “why work so hard to get into power only then to let other people take my place?”37 The PDS’s internal politics fostered further grievances for Seynabou Wade and many others as personal support movements became more common and the GC gained ground. As early as Idrissa Seck’s departure in 2004, Seynabou Wade perceived that the PDS had become “a grouping of associations” pursuing individuals’ personal interests. She was among the pre- and post-alternance party members who were disappointed by Karim Wade’s rapid rise within the PDS, given that he had not been a long-standing member. After the PDS’s losses in the 2009 municipal elections, she slowed her activities in the party, not even attending meetings of an enlarged CD to which she was invited. 200 C. L. KELLY

After over 30 years with the PDS, Seynabou Wade decided in 2011 to leave the party, but she delayed her exit until after the 2012 elections when she felt it would no longer be considered “lax.” In 2011, she was accused of ordering an arson in the Colobane Market and renounced her parliamentary immunity to facilitate the police investigation. She suspected that President Wade had allowed the Minister of Interior to pursue the case. Despite her disappointment, she remained loyal to the party that year, “when if I had left the PDS, I would have been deserting it, because all of Senegal was against us.”38 Seynabou Wade did not adopt another party identity after the PDS lost power, but she shifted allegiances between various coalitions. At the behest of Pape Diop, she ran on the National Assembly candidate list for BGG in 2012. When Diop turned BGG into a party, she supported it because of the generosity he had shown in offering her a prime spot on its 2012 candidate list. Nevertheless, she chose to remain independent rather than enrolling in the PDS-led, opposition parliamentary group that BGG joined (Leral.net 2015).

People Who Stayed in the PDS Even as exits increased around 2012, a number of the party’s prominent members stayed in the PDS. Several of them exemplify Hirschman’s definition of loyalty, the “postponement of exit” from a party “despite dissatisfaction and qualms” (1970: 104). At the time of writing, loyalists tend to fall into two categories. Some remain attached to Wade and the PDS because of its historical legacy and the role they see themselves playing in its perpetuation. Their sense of duty to ensure the PDS’s survival makes exit personally costly and renders them less dependent on voice for validation within the party. Others with less long-term roots in the party are less motivated by the PDS’s historical legacy but have managed to carve out zones of control that help them exercise voice within the party without being forced to exit and exercise that voice “from without.” The loyalists whose support depends upon these voice options have more precarious prospects of staying in the party. Joseph Ndong joined the PDS despite his origins in Joal, the birthplace of Leopold Senghor and a PS stronghold. He became a member in 1974, when he was studying at the University of Dakar. Ndong became interested in the PDS after reading Le Démocrate and Serigne Diop introduced him to Abdoulaye Wade and Fara Ndiaye. He persevered in his support for the PDS despite the scandal it created in Joal because he believed that the 6 PARTY LOYALTY AND DEFECTION FROM THE RULING PARTY… 201

PS was “more concerned with maintaining power than with solving the population’s problems,” disapproved of violence that he associated with the PS, and opposed the National Domain Law passed under PS rule. Ndong had formative opportunities and experiences with the PDS. Because few youth initially joined the party, he had “the opportunity to lead, to travel throughout Senegal, and to raise consciousness.” When Serigne Diop left the PDS in 1985, Wade tasked Ndong with revitalizing the UJT and provided a car and gas to assist Ndong in winning back those who had left with Diop. Ndong subsequently served as the PDS’s Director of Electoral Operations in the 1988 presidential race, answering to the Campaign Director, Idrissa Seck. As he rose through party ranks, Ndong received recognition for his dedication. He led the UJT until 1991, when he became a deputy in the National Assembly, replacing Wade when he left the Assembly to be a minister under Diouf. He was re-elected to the National Assembly in 1993 and became Secretary General of the Federation of Mbour in 1996. After alternance, Ndong was appointed Minister of Sports (2000–2002), Ministerial Counselor (2003–2004), and Minister of the Post, Telecommunications, and New Information Technologies (2004–2007). When Prime Minister Macky Sall replaced Ndong with one of his own supporters in a reshuffle, Ndong shifted focus to his legislative career. At several points in the life of the party, Ndong chose to forgo opportunities to leave the PDS. In 1998, Ousmane Ngom asked Ndong to join the PLS. Ndong declined, despite his reverence and sympathy for Ngom, a friend since the PDS’s founding. He remained drawn to the PDS through the ideals and the friendship that he shared with Wade. In Serer culture, “a man is judged by his constancy,” so he felt that his desertion of the party after he brought it to Joal would reflect badly upon his character to his supporters. Ndong also felt close to former Prime Minister Souleymane Ndéné Ndiaye, who left the PDS to form the National People’s Union (UNP) in 2015. Both Ndiaye and Ndong were opposed to Karim Wade being the PDS’s candidate in the next presidential elections and believed that the PDS’s first priority in opposition was winning back its electoral base, which would happen fastest with the continued leadership of Abdoulaye Wade. Despite the controversial nomination procedures that made Karim Wade the candidate in 2015 and pushed Ndiaye to form his own party, Ndong remained a loyal (but bemused) member of the PDS, working to “promote the ideals of the PDS, but only within the PDS.”39 202 C. L. KELLY

Ibra Diouf was also an early PDS militant, drawn into the party through personal contacts with Abdoulaye Wade. Diouf’s uncle was a founding member of the PDS and a friend of Adjunct Secretary General Boubacar Sall. Serigne Diop recruited Diouf into the PDS student wing, the UJT, in 1975 and introduced him to Abdoulaye Wade. In the early 1980s, Diouf (who was a professor in Pikine) was encouraged to become Secretary General of the PDS administrative unit (section) for his village of birth, Touba Toul, while his uncle was the section President. After helping to fortify the PDS’s presence in rural Senegal through that service, Diouf was elected head of the PDS’s union of teachers in 1991 and thereby became a member of the PDS Political Bureau. As the party’s National Secretary for Education, Diouf trained members on voting rights, candidate selection, and the state’s decentralization policies after alternance. After Wade became president, Diouf was appointed and elected to national-level posts, including Technical Counselor (2000) and deputy in the National Assembly (2001, 2007). Wade also chose Diouf to represent Senegal in the parliaments of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union. Diouf withstood several periods of tension in the PDS that led to the defection of some esteemed colleagues. For instance, Diouf was disappointed to see Serigne Diop leave the PDS in 1985 after their collaboration in the UJT. He sought to encourage Diop to stay in the PDS despite his grievances, or at least to “maintain cordial rapports” with Wade. Diouf also confirmed that tensions were high after 2000, withtranshumance from the PS, as well as after 2009, with the rise of the GC. In the latter period, Diouf met with Wade to discuss how to address divisions within the PDS between the old guard and GC. Remaining loyal was also easier for him than other old guard colleagues in 2015, when Karim Wade became the PDS’s presidential candidate. Diouf explained that he supported Karim’s candidacy because he was convinced that PDS supporters in rural Senegal wanted it; he also believed that Karim would have won the nomination regardless of the voting rules used at the Party Congress. Loyalty may also have been easier for Diouf because of his outlook on party politics. He contends that “working in a party is to experience highs and lows” and to weather exposure to “centrifugal forces.” Now in his 60s, Diouf is invested in the party as an end in itself, convinced that he cannot leave the PDS “given my experience and my trajectory” and his capacity to continue training party youth. He remains loyal not only because he “benefitted from the aura of Maître Wade… and his resources” 6 PARTY LOYALTY AND DEFECTION FROM THE RULING PARTY… 203 but also because “the PDS is an element of common heritage and [he] invested all [his] physical and intellectual forces to make the PDS what it is today.”40 Aida Mbodj joined the PDS soon after 2000. She was “born into the PS” in Bambey, where she learned to write by helping her mother fill out party cards for new PS members. She later joined the PS herself but did not secure major party leadership positions. With a family and community that was close to Serigne Mourtala Mbacké, the son of Cheikh Ahmadou Bamba (the founder of Mouridism), Mbodj says that she obeyed Mbacké when he told her to support Wade after alternance. Furthermore, Mbodj had not felt effectively integrated into the PS and thus believed that she was “very free to go work with Abdoulaye Wade, who meanwhile recognized my merit, my representativeness, [and] my political culture.” In the PDS, Mbodj had both successes and challenges. Wade immediately made her a CD member. Mbodj also became a prominent member of the PDS’s Women’s Federation. Awa Diop, who was not a French- educated elite, had long led the federation, and continued to do so after Mbodj joined the party. Mbodj felt that her education, personality, and beliefs “would not permit [her] to rally behind anyone else” and was frus- trated by the absence of internal elections within the PDS after 1996.41 Mbodj therefore also sought to become a leader within the PDS outside of the women’s wing. She was appointed Minister of Women, Family, and Social Development (2004–2007) and Minister of Family and Women’s Organizations (2009–2012). Mbodj was also elected to the National Assembly, where she served between appointments in several important roles, including the Assembly Bureau’s 4th Vice President (2007) and President of the Liberal Democratic Parliamentary Group (2016). As one of the few PDS candidates who won a mayorship in 2009, Mbodj knew that her personal vote-mobilizing capacity was critical for the PDS in 2012, when she designed “Ma Carte, Ma Caution” (My Card, My Deposit), an initiative among PDS women to raise money for Wade’s candidacy registration fee. At the time of writing, Mbodj remains in the PDS but is working to preserve her personal support base. As the PDS’s post-2012 power struggles ensued, Mbodj pursued several forms of voice. Before the 2014 municipal elections, she persuaded Wade to allow her to create her own movement, the National Alliance for Democracy (Alliance Nationale pour la Démocratie, AND), through which she organizes and maintains followers within the party. As a vehicle for the advancement of Mbodj’s political ambitions, AND has allowed her 204 C. L. KELLY

to pool my affinities. For example, there are people who asked me not to join the government and to stay in the PDS, and I am staying in the PDS. [But] there are [also] people who want to accompany me, who believe in me, who identify with my political culture but who don’t want to be in the PDS.

With both types of people in the AND informing her next moves, Mbodj believed that she had the legitimacy to “maintain [her] freedom of opinion” within the PDS.42 Mbodj also collaborated somewhat with Modou Diagne Fada, who had beat Mbodj for control of the PDS’s Liberal and Democratic Parliamentary Group in 2012. They had both won the 2014 municipal elections in their home departments, a rare feat for PDS candidates in that race. With popularity and legitimacy at home, they were eager for internal elections within the PDS. For this reason, Mbodj helped with Fada’s memorandum (although she did not join his faction or party). Finally, Mbodj exercised an extreme form of voice in the 2017 National Assembly race by refusing to combine the AND’s list of candidates with those of the PDS. Instead, she led the And Saxal Liggey (Working Together to Increase Employment) coalition. After failed negotiations with PDS Adjunct Secretary General, Oumar Sarr, about AND members’ placement on a PDS-led list, Mbodj nevertheless declared: “I will never fail Wade. What links me to him is stronger. I will seek the majority [with And Saxal Liggey] in order to return to my father” (Le Quotidien 2017). When interviewed in 2015, Mbodj indicated that she “cannot just leave to others my investment in the PDS.” However, she also declared that to survive, the PDS needed to “hold internal elections and give each person what belongs to her, based on her representativeness.” It remains to be seen whether her logic of voice based on this grievance turns into exit or not, especially now that she has a seat in the National Assembly and does not belong to the PDS’s parliamentary group, and considered a presidential run in 2019.

6.5 Conclusion To contextualize the dynamics of party defection, this chapter described when and why loyalty to the PDS was more desirable than exit or voice for a range of current and ex-PDS elites. The analysis highlighted difficult decisions about party loyalty, party switching, and party creation that these people faced, whether in the PDS’s initial opposition phase (1974–2000), its presidential phase (2000–2012), or its return to opposition thereafter. 6 PARTY LOYALTY AND DEFECTION FROM THE RULING PARTY… 205

Collectively, case studies suggest that the PDS’s inconsistently enforced rules—whether about the CD, election candidacies, party posts, or reflection on the party’s successes and failures—created conflicting claims to power within the PDS that weakened cohesion. Furthermore, the personalization of power at the top of the PDS structures—with almost all procedures and decisions depending on the revered founding father, Abdoulaye Wade—made it difficult for politicians who advance to the highest echelons of party leadership to survive there without being subject to suspicion about their future ambitions. These factors, along with more contingent factors like people’s personal goals, their formative experiences in the PDS, and their senses of honor, justice, and integrity, shaped their decisions about whether to remain loyal to the PDS or defect by creating a new party, switching parties, or renouncing partisanship. Temporal dynamics also mattered. Among all former PDS ministers, remaining loyal to the PDS was more common among those who had joined the PDS during its original period in opposition than among people who had joined the party after Wade took power in 2000. After alternance, internal elections continued to be postponed, the exclusivity of the CD declined and made the CD less useful for shaping the party’s direction, and party leadership tended to focus more on running the state than on admin- istering the party. As uncertainty about the institutional mechanisms for advancing within the PDS increased over time, party creation was used for several reasons: as a means of permanent exit from the PDS (often accompanied by vigorous “voice from without”) and as a tool for attempting to use voice outside of the PDS to negotiate a return (“exit as voice”). Party creation has also been used as a stepping stone after 2012 for integrating the APR, the new ruling party, but the cases from this chapter show that forming personal support movements can also serve that purpose. In contrast, those who in mid-2015 had continued to remain loyal to the PDS did so either because they were deeply rooted in the PDS’s historical development as Senegal’s first major post-independence, post-authoritarian opposition party or because they had managed to maintain fiefdoms of personal control within the PDS that remained unchallenged. None of the factors that this chapter identified as shaping the dynamics of loyalty and defection are unique to the PDS; many other Senegalese parties are also led by a founding father who is the organization’s main source of historical and financial capital. They face similar challenges in enforcing internal procedures and managing the career advancement of party elites. The PDS’s shifts into and out of executive power made it subject to a flux of arrivals and departures that non-ruling parties have not 206 C. L. KELLY experienced to the same extent. However, the underlying rules, procedures, and practices shaping adherents’ interactions within the PDS are similar to those of other major parties. In these ways, this chapter’s study of the PDS is emblematic of core challenges and dynamics faced by multiple Senegalese parties. Chapters 3, 4, 5, and 6 have analyzed the sources of several elements of politics in Senegal’s fluid party system: the proliferation of legally registered parties; the rarity with which these parties adopt strategies of consistent opposition; the occurrence of two turnovers in 2000 and 2012 despite the uneven playing field; and the tendency for party creation to serve a mix of exit and voice purposes after party leaders defected from the PDS. However, an important question remains. What are the policy implications of these findings from Senegal and what do they indicate more comparatively about party formation and party-building in Africa? The book’s conclusion places the empirical findings into a broader context.

Notes 1. Interview with Joseph Ndong, 6/4/15, Joal. 2. Ibid. 3. Interview with Abdoulaye Faye, 6/22/15, Dakar. 4. Ibid. 5. Interview with Ousmane Ngom, 6/10/15, Dakar. 6. Interview with Modou Diagne Fada, 6/8/15, Dakar. 7. Interview with Ibra Diouf, 7/10/15, Dakar. 8. Interview with Abdoulaye Baldé, 7/9/15, Dakar. 9. For details on public criticisms of ANOCI expenditures, see Coulibaly 2009. 10. Interview with Oumar Sarr, op. cit. 11. In municipal elections, each party or coalition presents a list of candidates for municipal counselor. Once counselors are elected, they vote for the mayor of their geographic unit. The party or coalition that wins the majority of counselors control who from their list (generally, the top-listed person) is voted mayor. 12. Interview with Bara Gaye, 6/1/15, Dakar. 13. Interview with Souleymane Ndéné Ndiaye, 6/27/15, Dakar; Interview with Ousmane Ngom, 6/10/15, Dakar. 14. Interview with Seynabou Wade, 7/15/15, Dakar. 15. Interview with Modou Diagne Fada, op.cit.; Interview with Oumar Sarr, op.cit. 16. Interview with Joseph Ndong, op.cit.; CD members not voting was confirmed in Interview with Woré Sarr, 6/28/15, Guediawaye. However, 6 PARTY LOYALTY AND DEFECTION FROM THE RULING PARTY… 207

there are conflicting statements by PDS officials about CD members’ enfranchisement in Babacar Dione, “Appel à candidatures du PDS—Me Wade réussira-t-il à préserver l’unité du parti?” Sud Quotidien, March 18, 2015. http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201503181464.html; Nando Cabral Gomis, “Présidentielle de 2017—Le PDS lance sa course à la candidature,” Sud Quotidien, March 6, 2015. http://fr.allafrica.com/ stories/201503061293.html 17. Interview with Souleymane Ndéné Ndiaye, op.cit. 18. The marabouts heading major Sufi orders refrain from direct participation in party politics, but their willingness to receive presidential candidates as visitors and worshippers has also been critical to politicians’ success. Certain “minor” marabouts have become candidates, movement leaders, or party members recently (Diallo and Kelly 2016). 19. Another major source was Ndiaye and Ndiaye 2006. 20. Only five PDS members took ministerial posts in Diouf’s 1991 and 1995 governments, and three were also ministers during Wade’s presidency. Of the 132 ministers appointed by Wade, 88 were identified as PDS members. 21. Of these six people, two had joined the APR, two were reported as no longer in the PDS but the rest of their trajectory was unknown, one was no longer in the PDS, and one had an entirely unknown trajectory. 22. Interview with Modou Diagne “Fada,” op.cit. 23. Interview with Diop, 2/9/12, Dakar. 24. Interview with Jean-Paul Dias, 6/16/15, Dakar. 25. Ibid. 26. Interview with Serigne Diop, op.cit. 27. Interview with Ngom, op. cit. 28. Interview with Modou Diagne “Fada,” op. cit. 29. Ibid. 30. Interview with Ababacar Bâ,” 11/12/11, Dakar. 31. Interview with Modou Diagne “Fada,” op.cit. 32. Interview with Pape Diop, 6/22/15, Dakar. 33. In municipal elections, each party or coalition presents a list of candidates for municipal counselor, and once the counselors are elected, they in turn vote for the mayor of their geographic unit. Thus, the party or coalition that wins the majority of municipal counselors can choose who their mayoral candidate will be. Generally, the identity of that candidate is revealed during the campaign period to influence the choices of voters. 34. Interview with Pape Diop, op.cit. 35. Interview with Abdou Fall, 6/6/15, Dakar. 36. Ibid. 37. Interview with Seynabou Wade, op.cit. 208 C. L. KELLY

38. Ibid. 39. Interview with Joseph Ndong, op.cit. 40. Interview with Ibra Diouf, 7/10/15, Dakar. 41. Interview with Aida Mbodj, 7/20/15, Dakar. 42. Ibid.

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Conclusion and Notes on Comparative and Policy Perspectives on Party Proliferation in Africa

At the end of the Cold War, the launch of “democratic experiments” ush- ered in constitutional reform and transitions to multiparty politics throughout much of sub-Saharan Africa. While some of the resulting transitions merely paved the way for new, more electoral forms of authoritarian rule, others yielded more substantive changes to the quality of multiparty competition, civil liberties, and rule of law that bolstered various forms of competitive authoritarian or democratic rule over the three subsequent decades. Party politics in both competitive authoritarian and democratic regimes took shape in some ways that were predictable and in others that were unexpected. As is also often the case in other parts of the world, institutional and ideational factors—including electoral rules, social cleavages, and ideologies—shaped the effective number of parties present in parliament or running in elections. In addition, the private sector resources of party leaders, as well as party ideology and party institutionalization, help to explain individual parties’ coalition choices in particular elections. However, certain patterns of party politics found in Senegal—including the proliferation of registered political parties decades after the initial transition to multiparty politics—stand out for theoretical and practical

© The Author(s) 2020 211 C. L. Kelly, Party Proliferation and Political Contestation in Africa, Contemporary African Political Economy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-19617-2_7 212 C. L. KELLY reasons. Existing theories cannot fully account for the proliferation of registered parties, and African academics, policymakers, and citizens have long expressed concern about it not only in Senegal but also in other francophone African countries like Mali, Burkina Faso, and Cameroon. For the scholarly and policy constituencies engaged with democracy, rule of law, and governance issues in this region of the world, it is critical to understand the sources and consequences of party proliferation and related patterns of political contestation in the context of Africa’s recent waves of democratization. This book has examined party proliferation, party trajectories, presidential turnovers, and patterns of party loyalty and defection in contemporary Senegal, a critical case of party-building in the region because of its distinctive political history. Not only had Senegal transitioned to multiparty politics in 1978, over a decade earlier than many of its sub-Saharan African counterparts that did this in the early 1990s, but Senegal also had small constituencies of urban voters who had enjoyed the suffrage since 1848 under French colonial rule and whose practices of political participation influenced other, rural parts of the country as well (Gellar 2005: 40). In light of its longer history of multiparty electoral politics than many other African countries, Senegal is a place where institutional theories of party formation and trajectories would predict low levels of party proliferation and high levels of consistent opposition. Yet, in reality, Senegal has exhibited higher degrees of proliferation and lower quantities of consistent opposition than expected. Relative to other African countries, this made Senegal particularly useful to analyze as a “least-likely crucial case” of proliferation and a “most-likely crucial case” of trajectories of consistent opposition. The single-country focus involved taking a micro-level, comparative look at the formation and trajectories of all of the parties registered within the five years spanning Senegal’s first post-independence change in the party in power (alternance) in 2000. This meant that the book project involved the collection of detailed, individual-level data on party leaders, as well as party-level data on the trajectories that each party pursued throughout the entire 12 years of the Wade presidency (2000–2012). The data thus covered a wide range of partisan actors, encompassing those whose organizations became major electoral rivals to the ruling party and those whose organizations did not. Analysis of this fine-grained, qualitative, and quantitative information facilitated discoveries about fundamental elements of Senegalese party politics: how certain parties become election-oriented entities while others erratically run in elections but regularly seek patronage; how party leaders’ different resource profiles map onto various strategic behaviors over time; and where on this spectrum we 7 CONCLUSION AND NOTES ON COMPARATIVE AND POLICY PERSPECTIVES… 213 can locate those of the insiders who seriously challenge the president. Through this process, the book has drawn several time- and context- specific conclusions that should be considered hypothesis-generating for the study of similar phenomena in other African countries. Section 7.1 reviews the conclusions that this book has drawn about Senegal; Sect. 7.2 presents the comparative, cross-country implications of those conclusions; Sect. 7.3 discusses policy implications for domestic and international policymakers and practitioners; and Sect. 7.4 addresses the future of parties in Senegal.

7.1 Conclusions About Senegal The book draws four generalized conclusions about Senegal. First, party formation was often a means of patronage negotiation on the uneven playing field. Research in this book has shown that a considerable set of Senegalese parties is primarily concerned with patronage negotiation, which does not necessarily entail vote-seeking or regular contestation of elections on the party label. Some Senegalese parties consistently contest national elections, others do sometimes, and there are still others that never do. However, the proportion of parties that become primarily election-oriented and forge stable constituencies among voters is low. Instead, in contemporary Senegal, party creation is often more a way to get the president’s attention, seek patronage, and minimize investments in elections than it is a means of regular electoral contestation. Beyond structuring the president’s choice to use party proliferation as a tool to fragment the opposition and reinforce his power, the uneven playing field, a hallmark of competitive authoritarian regimes, helps to explain why politicians would form parties that are not primarily election- oriented but might nevertheless find them worthwhile vehicles for engaging in politics. Especially when incumbency advantage is so significant that it is imperative for many opposition politicians to collaborate with the president intermittently in order to survive, the parties that emerge are likely to be more consistently state-oriented and less consistently election- oriented than theories based on liberal democracies would predict. Party creation becomes not just a tool for those politicians with the capacity to attract the financial and human capital necessary to win elections to challenge those in power; it also constitutes an outlet for less prosperous politicians who lack these resources to lobby for a piece of the state pie. Party strategies are constrained, often excluding consistent opposition. Opposition parties are generally considered vehicles for voicing alternatives 214 C. L. KELLY to the ideas and policies that incumbents propose, serving as counterweights to the ruling party and fostering accountability and government responsiveness. But in Senegal, where a significant subset of party founders is more concerned with negotiating patronage than with winning office, parties rarely oppose incumbents consistently over time. During the Wade presidency (2000–2012), collaboration with the government— whether through short-term tactical alliances or long-term membership in the ruling entourage—was more common than consistent opposition to the government over multiple elections. Party founders’ decisions to pursue consistent opposition are shaped by the degree and type of resources that they possess to overcome structural disadvantages in electoral competition on the uneven playing field. The consistent opposition considered so fundamental to democracy is rare because party leaders do not usually possess the endowments that together make it worthwhile to invest in running constantly against the ruling party: namely, national-level state or civil society experience before creating a party and access to international private financing that is independent of the state. In this context, ex-regime insiders have become the president’s most threatening political challengers. Although presidents attempt to shape the party system in ways that bolster their chances of re-election, turnover remains a distinct possibility even in competitive authoritarian regimes. Ex-regime insiders were the best-performing opponents in Senegal’s 1993, 2000, 2007, and 2012 elections. This was the case because insiders have been able to convert their recent, high-level access to the state— something that outsiders lack—into a means of amassing both the baseline level of financial capital and the political credibility as statesmen that they need to attract significant blocs of supporters. Especially when the uneven playing field makes it logistically and financially difficult to adopt strategies of consistent opposition, and when ruling parties are weak due to a dependence on patronage for cohesion, ex-regime insiders have the potential to develop the capacity and means to outperform outsiders as challengers in presidential elections. Despite the ubiquity of insider advantage in Senegal’s recent presidential elections, turnover occurred in just two of them. Alternance in 2000 and 2012 was linked to two political conditions shaping ex-insiders’ emergence and behavior: an unresolved succession crisis in the ruling party that motivates insiders to defect, and the ex- insider’s subsequent resistance to the president’s attempts to reconcile with him as the campaign approaches. In addition, party defection fueled further party creation, especially when uncertainty about the institutional mechanisms for advancing 7 CONCLUSION AND NOTES ON COMPARATIVE AND POLICY PERSPECTIVES… 215 within the ruling party was heightened. Through studying loyalty and defection in the Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS), the country’s foremost opposition party before it ruled Senegal from 2000 to 2012, the book showed that temporal, structural, and contingent dynamics all helped to shape prominent members’ ideas and choices about party loyalty, party switching, and party creation. Temporally, of all former PDS ministers, those who had joined the PDS during its original period in opposition were more likely to remain loyal to it over time than those who had joined the PDS after Wade became president in 2000. Structurally, the PDS’s rise to power led to increased uncertainty about the rules governing career advancement within the party, decreased exclusivity and policymaking power of the party’s Directing Committee, and more protracted internal divisions. Structural and temporal dynamics interacted with contingent factors like people’s personal goals, their formative experiences in the PDS, and their senses of honor, justice, and integrity to influence their ultimate decisions about party loyalty and defection. Defection in the form of party creation became more useful not just in its conventional sense, as a means of relatively uncontentious and permanent exit from the PDS (to use Hirschman’s (1970) well-known terms), but also as a means of permanent exit accompanied by vigorous “voice from without,” and additionally as a tool for attempting to use voice outside of the PDS to negotiate a return (“exit as voice”). Party creation was also used as a stepping stone after 2012 for integrating the Alliance for the Republic (APR), the new ruling party.

7.2 Comparative Implications Each book chapter has focused on explaining some aspect of political parties in contemporary Senegal. However, the empirical patterns motivating the research presented in each chapter can also be found in other countries in various regions of Africa. The proliferation of registered parties is a challenge that many citizens and politicians face in their party systems. Since the African legislators in the International Organization of Francophonie (OIF) expressed concern about party proliferation in 2001, the trend has intensified, particularly in francophone African countries (Abdrahman 2001). At the time of writing in late 2018, Cameroon and Senegal have approximately 300 parties, Benin over 250, Mali around 200, and Burkina Faso and Madagascar about 150. Several anglophone countries also have notable numbers of registered parties, with Kenya hosting 65 and Malawi 53. Other studies 216 C. L. KELLY have found that party proliferation takes place on various scales in Guinea, Togo, Côte d’Ivoire, and Niger (Akakpo and Camara 2015). In most countries, the number of registered parties has accelerated since the advent of multiparty competition. This has been the case, for instance, in Senegal, Benin, Mali, and Cameroon. However, the governments of certain countries have sought to deregister parties that do not meet the legal standards for existence. In Kenya, the number of parties went from 300 before the 2007 elections to just 47 as of March 2010 after the Interim Independent Election Commission audited registered parties and shut down those that did not follow the rules in the Political Parties Act (Mosoku 2010; EISA 2010). In Madagascar, the number of parties decreased to 195 from its peak of approximately 350 after the Ministry of Interior began enforcing the 2011 Political Parties Law requiring all registered parties to have at least 200 members, an objective, statutes, a platform, and an address (Madaplus.info 2018). Since 2016, Burkinabè lawmakers have also been considering more strict enforcement of existing party formation laws on the books, and in 2018, the Beninese government instituted changes to party formation requirements by increasing the number of members required for registration (Gamai 2018; RFI 2016). With the 2018 passage of the sponsorship law (loi de parrainage) in Senegal, the government chose a more complicated approach: regulating the number of electoral candidacies more stringently than before, yet leaving the country’s permissive party creation rules untouched. Given its comparative focus within Senegal across individuals and parties, this book does not provide comprehensive answers about the determinants of party formation in other countries where party proliferation exists. Nevertheless, several potential hypotheses are worth exploring outside of Senegal. First, there is some initial evidence that several other countries have parties that are often more primarily patronage-oriented than election-oriented. In Cameroon, for instance, there were over 200 registered parties by the 2007 local and legislative elections, but only 33 contested the former and 45 the latter (Tandé 2009: 126). President Biya is alleged to approach particular elites and ask them to create parties when he suspects that they will join his ruling coalition, which he rewards with patronage (Pigeaud 2011). Similarly, in Mali, before the 2012 coup, there were well over 100 registered parties and “political fragmentation [wa]s strongly linked to the personality of leaders and splits often ar[o]se out of misunderstandings or discontent about the distribution of posts” (Baudais and Chauzal 2006: 66).1 Office-seeking was not the only activity of these 7 CONCLUSION AND NOTES ON COMPARATIVE AND POLICY PERSPECTIVES… 217 parties, given that in the 2009 local elections, only 69 of over 120 ran candidates (Mali MATCL 2011). Second, proliferation is present in both competitive authoritarian regimes, like Cameroon, Madagascar, and Gabon, and in poor democracies with competitive authoritarian pasts, like Mali, Benin, and (during the Sall presidency, at least until recently) Senegal. It is thus a feature of the party system in a diverse set of countries with different legacies of conflict, sources of wealth, histories of military and civilian rule, and salience of identity-based political cleavages. In Senegal, party proliferation has not fostered the broad-based accessibility of politicians and the government to the demands of ordinary citizens. However, the inability of political parties by themselves to address these demands created space for associations, “citizens’ movements,” and other civil society forces to work with certain parties to craft more participatory forms of citizen consultation that have the potential to bolster democracy. Future cross-national research on the sources and consequences of proliferation might consider how to produc- tively exploit this variation to test whether the types of parties resulting from proliferation are systematically similar or different and whether the nature of these parties tends to have positive or negative influences on democracy, rule of law, and governance outcomes. A challenge of studying parties outside of Europe and North America is that “much of the classical literature takes party-building for granted” (Levitsky et al. 2016: 3), leaving little room for scholars to problematize the very emergence of parties with territorial breadth and administrative depth or the activities of parties that do not grow into these kinds of organizations. This book has employed an inductive method for studying party politics, relying on interviews with primary sources and qualitative data- gathering to shed light on the purposes served by creating a party in Senegalese society. Gathering the information needed to generate these conclusions usually required accessing party leaders themselves, as well as primary sources with local knowledge about politics, to develop a micro- level body of evidence about the reasons why politicians choose to create those organizations, along with the motivations that presidents have to accommodate their existence. If replicated elsewhere, this kind of study will facilitate more in-depth, cross-country comparisons of the micro- foundations of proliferation. There is also suggestive evidence across Africa that consistent opposition trajectories are difficult to sustain in competitive authoritarian regimes and new democracies with competitive authoritarian legacies of party pro- 218 C. L. KELLY liferation. In this context, party trajectories depend largely upon party leaders’ incentives, which are shaped by their international private financing and state experience. For instance, Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta created the Rally for Mali (RPM) after seven years of ministerial experience and international private financing from his work for European economic institutions. With high levels of both endowments, Keita led RPM through five elections of consistent opposition before becoming president in 2013. Gabon’s National Woodcutters’ Rally, led by Catholic priest Paul Mba Abessole, had a trajectory of co-optation, as predicted. A long-standing leader of a nationwide group, Abessole had high levels of experience but little international private financing. After opposing incumbents and refusing ministerial appointments in the 1990s, Abessole brought his party into President Bongo’s ruling coalition in the early 2000s (Diop 2006: 314). In Kenya, Raila Odinga had no ministerial experience and medium international private financing before creating the National Democratic Party, which fused with the ruling party in 2002. However, Mali, Gabon, and Kenya—which have two-round systems for presidential elections and no histories of armed liberation movements— are more similar to Senegal than countries like Zambia or Mozambique. Zambia’ s single-round system for presidential elections makes opposition victory in them less difficult and may explain the consistent opposition of the United Party for National Development under Haikande Hichilema, who has international private financing but lacks state experience. In Mozambique, the identity-based legacies of the armed liberation struggle, whose opposing sides have transformed into the country’s political parties, make party identities more stable and cohesive than in Senegal. These scope conditions could aid in further testing this theory of party trajectories as additional data on party leaders and trajectories becomes available outside of Senegal. Along similar lines, extensions of the argument about insider advantage in Senegal’s presidential elections, as well as ruling party loyalty and defection, are most likely to be relevant in other countries that have weak ruling parties and lack a history of ideologically polarizing, armed liberation struggle. In Senegal, both the Socialist Party (PS) (in 1993 and 2000) and the PDS (in 2007 and 2012) were weak in that their cohesion depended upon the president’s ability to distribute patronage to its members. In this way, Senegal’s party system is comparable to those in countries like Mali, Benin, Cameroon, and Kenya, where social ties to ruling and opposition parties were not historically forged through ideologically polarized or vio- 7 CONCLUSION AND NOTES ON COMPARATIVE AND POLICY PERSPECTIVES… 219 lent revolutionary conflict.2 In contrast, in places like Zimbabwe and Mozambique, the boundaries between parties are polarized and the costs of insider defections are higher because party cohesion hinges upon “the identities, norms, and organizational structures forged during periods of sustained, violent, and ideologically-driven conflict” that directly preceded these countries’ independence (Levitsky and Way 2012: 869). The electorate is less likely to shift its existing party allegiances in order to rally behind a regime insider who suddenly emerges to challenge the president; polarized cleavages between the ruling party and existing opposition parties anchor the party loyalty of both voters and the insider politicians who might otherwise strike out on their own. This means that politicians’ defection—even if it is in service of forming a new party as is sometimes the case for insiders—is a more contentious act than in countries with parties that have more fluid memberships due to their dependence on patronage distribution. Based on the above understandings of the historical origins and contemporary sources of legitimacy of African ruling parties, we might expect the patterns that this book revealed in Senegal to be more likely to apply to other countries with weak, patronage-based ruling parties whose boundaries have not been historically defined by violent and ideologically polarizing conflict. Because of the book’s focus on explaining variation within Senegal, its conclusions are hypothesis-generating for cross-national studies of the phenomena discussed in these pages. For the same reasons, the proposed scope conditions for applicability across African countries are also tentative. However, the proposed scope conditions could aid in additional tests of the theories and relationships presented in previous chapters when additional micro-level data on party leaders, party trajectories, and political elites’ ways of operationalizing exit, voice, and loyalty become available.

7.3 Policy Implications The book’s findings about party proliferation, long-term party trajectories, insider advantages in presidential elections, and elites’ choices about party loyalty and defection also have the potential to enhance evidence- based approaches to political party strengthening and foreign assistance on democracy, rule of law, and governance issues. Political party aid has been a part of the US and European governments’ foreign assistance portfolios for decades. The resulting party- and party system-strengthening programs are often implemented by organiza- 220 C. L. KELLY tions like the National Democratic Institute, the International Republican Institute, the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy, and the German Stiftungen, among others. Standard approaches to such assistance emphasize promoting transparent multiparty politics, increasing the capacity of party personnel, and building representative political parties that promote programmatic platforms with widespread appeal and high levels of clarity and accessibility to citizens (NDI 2008: 4; USAID DRG Strategy 2013). To meet goals related to bolstering parties’ organizational capacity, many programs have historically sponsored activities designed to contribute to at least one of three major issues: facilitating the development of stronger programmatic platforms and policy positions; increasing internal democracy within party organizations; and improving gender equality and the inclusion of marginalized groups within formal party structures (Carothers 2006). Later iterations of programming sought to address the party system more holistically in addition to several individual parties within it. Practitioners also increasingly implement such programming not only during but also between campaign periods (Carothers 2006; NDI 2014a: 3). Academics and certain practitioners have raised several relevant critiques of party and party systems aid. First, analysts criticize foreign assistance providers for using Western models of parties to set their expectations about the kind of transformation that they hope to support among parties in developing countries (Burnell and Gerrits 2013). Democratic parties worldwide are expected to “propose policies that they believe to be in the best interest of their constituencies, compete in elections based on those policy positions, and implement them once in government or advocate for them in opposition” (NDI 2014a: 9). However, party leaders themselves often see their organizations serving various political, economic, social, and cultural purposes, not all of which prioritize or include all of the core functions that donors and implementers are hoping to help parties serve (Carothers 2006: 178–181). This is certainly the case for some parties in Senegal born during the recent period of proliferation. Secondly, and moreover, party aid implementers are well-prepared to provide technical assistance. This includes, for instance, activities geared toward building party leaders’ capacity to develop programmatic platforms, conducting grassroots outreach campaigns, increasing the inclusion of women and youth, and strengthening their fundraising capacities (Carothers 2006). However, they are less naturally placed to address broader political and economic issues that may motivate people to form 7 CONCLUSION AND NOTES ON COMPARATIVE AND POLICY PERSPECTIVES… 221 parties that serve something other than core democratic functions in the first place. Comparative historical political science research shows that countries with histories and sequences of political and economic development different from those that prevailed in early modern North America and Western Europe have often been subject to structural forces yielding party systems with more entrenched, patronage-based parties. The patterns of distributive politics and behavioral incentives perpetuated through these systems can constitute formidable structural barriers to the emergence of transparent, inclusive, and programmatic politics (Shefter 1977, 1994; Van de Walle 2007). These historical factors have yielded political and economic systems that are difficult to change from a program design perspective, particularly when technical capacity-building and support are the main resources that implementing organizations can provide. Even certain practitioners agree that programs focused largely on technical capacity-building are “useful, but not highly so” because their technical bent pushes them in directions that are “not focused on the major problems of democracy in the countries in which they are implemented” (Mitchell 2016: 7). Recent developments in the democracy, human rights, and governance (DRG) field have fostered some advancements in relation to these critiques. Applied political economy analysis is increasingly integrated into United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and European-funded DRG programs, and practitioners are encouraged to “think and work politically,” which involves using the results of such analysis to continuously adapt programming to respond to local political realities. Though still part of an “almost revolution,” party and party system assistance programs have sought to roll out more “politically smart” design, monitoring, and evaluation in light of cogent arguments in favor of it (Carothers and de Gramont 2013). For instance, in 2014, the National Democratic Institute published a new, “Will, Space, and Capacity” toolkit for designing, theorizing, and monitoring and evaluat- ing political party and party systems assistance. The organization’s political party program guide is accompanied by a context analysis tool that helps practitioners design programs based on a critical analysis of interactions between political space (“the environment in which political parties operate and how they interact with it”), political will (“the incentives that influence political parties and the individual actors within them”), and party leaders’ and members’ capacity for “organizational management, outreach, and policy formulation” (2014a: 14–15). However, even 222 C. L. KELLY with sophisticated and thoughtful tools like these, aid practitioners are limited in their ability to address the political space and political will issues when their root causes lie outside of the sphere of parties themselves. Thus, “in most cases, transformational change in individual parties and the party system will not be realistic” (2014b: 18). Through its micro-level look at Senegal, this book has shown that the proliferation of parties formed primarily for patronage negotiation—as well as the paucity of consistent opposition parties—are influenced by political, economic, and personal factors that are challenging to shift through development programming alone. Major influences on party behavior include the evenness of the playing field, the availability of international private financing, politicians’ opportunities to acquire state experience, and the extent to which people have credible reasons to believe that forming a party will help them achieve political, social, or economic ascension. Technically focused aid interventions can improve some party leaders’ platforms, inclusion strategies, or organizational management skills. However, these capacity-building outcomes do not often have a sizeable, direct influence on the political and economic factors that shape incentive structures throughout the party system. On the one hand, case studies from the book provide some evidence that proliferation is partially a result of people’s grievances about the inconsistent enforcement of internal rules within existing parties, as well as the difficulties that women and youth under 35 have advancing their careers within such parties. Insofar as we take the US government’s continued provision of foreign assistance for political parties and party systems as a given, the prime concerns of “classic” capacity-building programs remain relevant. The merits of increased party inclusion, improved enforcement of internal rules for selecting party leaders and election candidates, and greater programmatic engagements between party representatives and citizens are clear. On the other hand, the strategies that foreign aid practitioners employ to address these concerns are not often holistic enough to foster sustainable, system-wide change. Bigger picture, cross-sectoral approaches are needed to engage not just with the signs of weak parties or fluid party systems (like personalist party structures, low salience of programmatic competition, insufficient integration of women and youth) but also with the structural factors that enable these signs to appear (like the uneven playing field, presidential dominance over the legislature and judiciary, and the role of private sector financing and wealth in party politics). In 7 CONCLUSION AND NOTES ON COMPARATIVE AND POLICY PERSPECTIVES… 223

Senegal, for example, the strength of the executive branch relative to the legislature and judiciary is an issue that local changemakers, foreign diplomats, and international development actors must consider addressing if they hope to facilitate the institutional changes that will convince the leaders of personalist or patronage-based parties that it is in their interest to recruit a more diverse set of followers, become more election-oriented, or increase their emphasis on making policy-oriented and programmatic appeals.3 Stronger checks and balances may also help to level the playing field and constrain presidents in their ability to use state resources to shape the party system to their advantage. To place healthy checks on the executive branch powers that have enabled presidents to encourage party proliferation and fragment the opposition, policymakers and practitioners might also consider addressing several rights- and rule of law-related issues. Over the last year alone, for instance, there have been worrying increases in the Ministry of Interior’s denial of permits for protests and assemblies related to core political issues like electoral integrity, the sponsorship law, the trial of Khalifa Sall, and the state’s denial of Karim Wade’s voter registration. Moreover, the impression that the government was politicizing the delivery of justice in the Khalifa Sall case intensified when the Court of Justice of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) determined that Sall’s detention had been arbitrary between August and September 2017, and that the state had wrongfully denied him rights to counsel and due process during that time. Days before the initial verdict in the Khalifa Sall case, Judge Ibrahima Dème resigned from the bench, citing a lack of judicial independence reflecting “not only the President’s failure in his constitutional obligation to guarantee the independence of the institution” but also the failure of “an important part of the judicial hierarchy who spread within the body a culture of submission that progressively replaced a long culture of honor, dignity, and independence” (Dème, in Seneweb 2018). In these domains, domestic and international pressures in favor of peaceful civic engagement during the election campaign will be important, as well as support to Senegalese magistrates’ ongoing efforts to reduce direct executive branch influence in judicial disciplinary and career advancement bodies like the Senegalese Council of Magistrates (Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature, CSM). A more independent judiciary would complement the increased checks on presidential power that the legislature has wielded since the July 2012 National Assembly elections. As this book has demonstrated, President 224 C. L. KELLY

Wade weakened the opposition by encouraging telephone booth party formation, including major parliamentary parties in his governments, and engaging in distributive politics with the leaders of both kinds of organizations. This strategy worked for 12 years when the ruling party controlled a legislative majority entirely on its own. President Sall appears to have invested more of his patronage resources into his parliamentary allies, leaving less for the micro-parties that supported him before the APR became dependent on the Benno Bokk Yakaar coalition for a National Assembly majority in late 2012. These legislative constraints have fashioned the National Assembly into a more powerful potential check on the executive branch than before, which makes parliamentary strengthening programs as salient tools now as they might have ever been for reinforcing an equili- brated balance of power between presidents, parliaments, and courts. Finally, the passage of the 2018 sponsorship law (loi de parrainage) increased barriers to candidacy for politicians seeking to run and did so in a way that was not the most expedient for controlling the number and type of parties in Senegal. As mentioned previously, the president proposed legislation requiring electoral candidates to collect voter signatures to appear on the ballot, rather than simply improving the state’s enforcement of the 1981 Political Parties Law, which requires parties to provide annual financial information, proof of regular meetings, and proof of a headquarters (Ndong 2018). While many Senegalese would likely agree that legal reforms to address the negative consequences of party proliferation are warranted, the conditions under which the reforms were adopted (not fully debated and accompanied by multiple arrests of opposition figures in the streets) have garnered criticism (Maillard 2018; Ndiaye 2018). There is also some concern about how well the relevant Senegalese bodies responsible for validating sponsorship signatures and approving candidacies—the Ministry of Interior (an arm of the executive branch) and the Constitutional Council (whose members are appointed by the President)— will use impartiality when enforcing the sponsorship law (WANEP 2018). Ensuring the actual and perceived neutrality of these institutions is critical for sustaining legitimacy of Senegalese institutions and electoral processes, but pressure for that must come from citizens and domestic policymakers, not external actors. 7 CONCLUSION AND NOTES ON COMPARATIVE AND POLICY PERSPECTIVES… 225

7.4 Whither Parties in Senegal? Democracy, so the maxim goes, is unthinkable save in terms of parties (Schattschneider 1942). When parties actually facilitate the aggregation of citizens’ broad-based interests, provide political representation, and groom candidates for elected office, they empower citizens to hold public officials accountable. However, the relationship between the number of parties in a country and its level of democracy—or quality of governance, for that matter—is not linear. For democracy and governance to work, citizens must be convinced that caring about parties and participating in elections gets them what they need, whether that is better government services, personal or community-based patronage, programmatic or ideological satisfaction, or something else. However, the presence of many parties in a system can dilute the power of the opposition, particularly when it is a function of the incumbent’s legal and political ability to facilitate the splintering of parliamentary opposition parties. Furthermore, when the parties that participate in elections are economically vulnerable and prone to change their coalitional behaviors across races, they can make vote choices opaque and unclear to citizens and erode popular confidence in parties as critical vehicles of interest articulation and accountability. These dynamics explain the concern expressed in 2015 by Moustapha Niasse, the President of Senegal’s National Assembly, who suggests that “coalitions will gain stability, permanence, and political clout—that is to say, contact with reality and with the preoccupations of the grassroots population of Senegalese—if these coalitions contain real political parties,” but at the same time laments the proliferation of “telephone booth parties” in Senegal.4 In contemporary Senegal, party proliferation is an indicator of several features of the political landscape. On the one hand, proliferation reflects the willingness of many Senegalese citizens to get involved in politics and to use the party system to engage in a mix of distributive and programmatic politics. On the other hand, the notable presence of many “telephone booth parties” can frustrate citizens seeking to use parties to facilitate large-scale social and political change or to hold elected representatives accountable to the public. Senegal’s proliferation is also a result of the dominance of the executive branch and weak checks from the legislature and the judiciary that are common across sub-Saharan Africa (Carothers 2006; Van de Walle 2003). The institutional configuration gives presidents quite significant legal, political, and financial power to fragment the 226 C. L. KELLY party system and encourage “telephone booth” party formation as desired. In Senegal under Wade, this yielded a political landscape with a wide variety of parties: some largely election-oriented and others primarily patronage-oriented; some with geographically diverse and others with limited pockets of support; and some with many members and others with very few. Overall, party proliferation itself has neither definitively fostered nor structurally impeded democratization in Senegal. On the systemic level, party proliferation has not consistently fostered the broad-based accountability of politicians and the government to the demands of citizens. Certain parties have had some success on this front, while others have not made this a priority. However, in this context, associations, “citizens’ movements,” and other civil society forces have had opportunities to engage in and even lead more participatory forms of citizen participation in governance and politics. On the individual level, specific party leaders’ goals and their parties’ main functions have also influenced their propensity to facilitate democratization, whether through exercising and defending fundamental freedoms and civil liberties, channeling elite and popular support to check presidential powers, or mounting consistent electoral opposition to a specific incumbent. Primarily election-oriented parties are more likely than primarily patronage-oriented parties to make such efforts. However, the generalized influence of proliferation on democratization is mixed, given that the leaders of parties resulting from proliferation vary greatly in their will and capacity to fulfill these roles. Overall, the book has sought to illustrate that the proliferation of primarily patronage-oriented parties and the paucity of parties pursuing trajectories of consistent opposition are patterns that the uneven playing field sustained, if not amplified, over the course of competitive authoritarianism under Diouf and Wade. While the book focused on Wade-era Senegal, proliferation and inconsistent opposition continue under President Sall, who oversaw some democratic reforms during the first few years of his term but is now arguably presiding over democratic erosion, if not a competitive authoritarian resurgence, before the presidential elections in February 2019. Party proliferation has continued throughout his presidency even after the ruling party lost unilateral control of a legislative majority in the 2012 National Assembly elections and became dependent on other parties in its electoral coalition for a majority. At the time of writing, Senegal has approximately 300 registered parties and even major actors in Sall’s ruling coalition, like Niasse quoted above, still lament the instability of party alliances 7 CONCLUSION AND NOTES ON COMPARATIVE AND POLICY PERSPECTIVES… 227 and coalitions. In these ways, certain legacies of Senegal’s recent competitive authoritarian past continue to shape party politics now, even as organizations like Freedom House have deemed Senegal “free” according to their liberal democratic criteria. African academics, politicians, and pundits have now been speaking and writing about party proliferation and its potentially deleterious effects on politics and policy for over a decade. The pattern has gained such notice from people in countries ranging from Senegal, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Gabon, and Mali, among others. However, the various African countries touched by proliferation also differ in the extent to which their citizens trust political parties and believe that having many political parties is important for ensuring access to a full range of relevant policy choices. Relative to people in several other countries with proliferation that participated in the Afrobarometer Round 7 surveys, Senegalese citizens are more likely to affirm that “political parties create division and confusion” and less likely to express support for the idea that “many political parties are needed to make sure that Senegalese have real choices in who governs them” (Afrobarometer 2018). More so now than ever, any policy measures aimed at helping Senegalese citizens get what they want out of their elected representatives—and out of the governance process more generally—will have to be not only politically smart and technically sound. They will also have to yield tangible progress on policy and programmatic issues, as well as visible changes to the structure of the party system, if they are to win the “hearts and minds” of citizens who have become disillusioned with parties and the personalistic, patronage-based battles in which those parties are often core tools. These kinds of changes are certainly possible in the longer term. They will be more likely to resonate with people if they are designed with the current realities of the party system and the existen- tial purpose of the full range of party types in mind.

Notes 1. Many split from the former ruling party, the Alliance for Democracy in Mali (ADEMA), just as a variety of founders in Senegal were at some point officials within the PS. 2. Unlike several of these countries, Senegal met Sartori’s (1976) criteria of a dominant party regime in the early 1990s, in that the ruling PS had won at least 50% of the votes in the last three parliamentary elections as of 1993 (for more on the importance of this standard of dominance, see Doorenspleet 228 C. L. KELLY

and Nijzink 2013; Hartmann 2013). However, by this definition, the PS’s one-party dominance ended in 2001, when the PDS won a parliamentary majority for the first time. The decline of party dominance drastically reduced incentives for loyalty to the specific party in power because no single party was widely expected to continue controlling state resources indefi- nitely. These conditions also increased the viability of party switching and ruling party defection more generally as patronage-seeking strategies. 3. As shown by Bleck and Van de Walle (2011), African parties do not always lack policy-oriented or programmatic agendas; instead, the kinds of policies and programs that various parties promote tend to converge on “valence issues” that many different organizations espouse. Parties therefore are not easily differentiable by the policy or programmatic positions they take, even when they are engaged on policy and programmatic issues. This is a result of structural factors shaping African party systems that party-strengthening programs cannot change on their own, especially when those programs are not accompanied by fundamental changes in politicians’ political, economic, and social incentive structures within the existing distributive political framework. 4. Interview with Moustapha Niasse, 7/21/15, Dakar.

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A pour la Sécurité de la Navigation Abdoulaye Wade presidency, 7, 10, 13, Aérienne en Afrique et à 18, 19, 38, 39, 88, 98, 99, 106, Madagascar (ASECNA), 128 113, 212, 214 Agenda for Zambia, 98 Abdourizk, Samir, 84 Agne, Abdourahim, 83 Abessole, Paul Mba, 218 Alliance for Progress and Justice Acceleration in party formation, 19, (Alliance pour le Progrès et la 33, 62, 69, 71, 72, 98 Justice/Jef-Jel), 69 Access state resources, 179 Alliance for the Republic (APR), 49, Access to state resources, 8, 15, 38, 83, 137, 139, 145, 161, 61, 174 195–196, 215, 224 Access to the state, 5, 29, 43, 45–47, Alliance of Forces for 68, 74, 77, 90, 140, 149, Progress/Alliance des Forces du 150, 154 Progrès (AFP), 66, 89, 110, 112, African Development Bank, 106, 108 119, 120, 139, 187 African Independence Party (Parti Alternance Africain de I’Indépendance, PAI), candidate selection, 182 3, 63, 84, 125 Directing Committee, 182, 186 African Renaissance Party (Parti de la Political Bureau, 182 Rénaissance Africaine, Parena), in 2000, 150, 151, 214 (see also 66, 79, 82, 84 Presidential turnover) African Union, 202 in 2012 (see also Presidential Afrobarometer, 40, 227 turnover) Agency for Aerial Navigation Safety in Alternative Citoyenne-Andu Nawle Africa and Madagascar/Agence (Citizen’s Alternative), 197

And Jappale Rewmi ak Aminata Tall Bokk Gis Gis (Common Vision, BGG), (Working Together to Serve the 185, 195, 198, 200 Country with Aminata Tall), 196 Bongo, Omar, 108, 147, 218 And-Jëf/African Party for Democracy Burkina Faso, 72, 212, 216, 227 and Socialism/And-Jëf/Parti party proliferation, 2, 88, 215 Africain pour la Démocratie et Socialisme (AJ/PADS), 64, 77, 100, 116, 143, 144 C Applied political economy analysis, 221 Cameroon/Cameroonian, 16, 72, 97, Archival research, 18, 173 212, 216–218, 227 Assembly for Unity and National Union for Democracy and Peace/Rassemblement pour Progress (UNDP), 97 l’Unité et la Paix (RUP), 82 party proliferation, 2, 88, 215 Assembly of African Workers— United People’s Congress (UPC), 97 Senegal/Rassemblement des Candidate selection procedures, 12 Travailleurs Africains—Sénégal Caste, 68 (RTA/S), 64 Central Bank of the West African Assembly of Senegalese Democrats States (BCEAO), 148 (Rassemblement Démocratique Centrist Bloc Lions/Bloc Centristes Sénégalais, RDS), 80 Gaïndé (BCG), 64, 178, 191 Assises, 166 Chantiers de Thiès, 144 Assises Nationales, 146, 151, 166 Checks and balances, 223, 225 Attempted to change the Circle of Young Socialist Professionals constitution, 181 (Cercle des Jeunes Cadres Authoritarian retrenchment, 165 Socialistes, CEJECAS), 81 Cissé, Mamour, 81 Cissé, Moundiaye, 60 B Cissé, Soumaila, 139 Bâ, Ababacar, 193 Citizens’ Democracy/Démocratie Baldé, Abdoulaye, 180, 195, 198 Citoyenne (DC), 84 Bamba, Cheikh Ahmadou, 81, 203 Citizens’ movements, 166, 217, 226 Bank of Dakar, 199 Civil Forum, 127 Bassene, Marcel, 177 Civil liberties, 13, 14, 62, 87, 162, 211 Bathily, Abdoulaye, 63, 85, 108–110, Civil society, 103, 217, 226 139, 143, 144, 150 Civil society experience, 111 Benin, 216–218 Clientelism, 31, 43, 99, 103 insider advantage, 45 clientelist electorate, 49 party proliferation, 2, 88, 215 competition, 130 party system, 17 competitive, 140 popular protest, 2 networks, 33, 47, 109, 140 Bennoo Bokk Yakaar (United in Hope, in parties, 111 BBY) coalition, 89, 224 strategies, 10 Biya, Paul, 72, 97, 216 voters, 154 INDEX 233

Club de Convergence Plurielle (Pluralist Convention of Democrats and Convergence Club), 197 Patriots/The Remedy Coalescence of the opposition, 137 (Convention des Démocrates et Coalition Around the President for the Patriotes, CDP/Garab gi), 66, 84 21st Century (Cap 21), 36, 73, Co-optation, 19, 39, 40, 43, 73, 87, 75, 77, 82, 84, 85, 100, 112, 100, 101, 103–105, 113, 115, 113, 124, 126, 173 167, 173, 218 Coalition-building, 75 Corruption, 81, 165, 182 Coalition Gagnante/Wattu Senegal Côte d’Ivoire, 216 (2017), 187 Council for Economic and Social Coalition Sopi (2007), 187 Affairs/Conseil de la République Coalition Wade (2001), 187 pour les affaires économiques et Cold War, 3 sociales (CRAES), 125 Collin, Jean, 107 Council for the Republic for Economic Colobane Market, 200 and Social Affairs/Conseil de la Compaoré, Blaise, 72 République pour les Affaires Comparative case studies, 18, 20, Economiques et Sociales 118, 130 (CRAES), 15 Competitive authoritarian Court of the Repression of Illicit backsliding, 165 Enrichment/Cour de la Repression Competitive authoritarianism, 7, 29, d’Enrichissement Illicite 35, 39, 44, 150, 164, 177, 214, (CREI), 182 217, 226 backsliding, 226 legacies, 20; party proliferation, D 217–218 Dansokho, Amath, 63, 108, party-building incentives, 6, 30, 211 110, 144 in Senegal, 19, 163; Senegal as a Decroix, Mamadou Diop, 77, 110 critical case, 13 Defections, 175, 188, 214 Consistent opposition, 4, 10, 16, 19, Deh, Yéro, 109 30, 39, 42, 43, 99, 101, 103, Dème, Ibrahima (Judge), 223 106, 113, 115, 127, 129, 212, Democracy/democracies, 163 214, 217, 218, 226 electoral definitions, 13 Constitutional Council, 160, 163, 224 liberal, 39, 164, 227 Constitutional Council’s validation of minimalist definitions, 13 Wade’s third-term candidacy, 146 procedural minimum definition, Constitutional reform, 126 13, 14 attempts, 126; on June 23, 2011, 126 retrenchment, 7 Contingencies, 45 Democratic and Social Front/Front Contingent factors, 45, 48, 138, 153, Démocratique et Sociale/Benno 160, 205 Jubel (FSD/BJ), 64, 80, 84 234 INDEX

Democratic Convergence/Common Diop, Cheikh Anta, 63, 64 Vision (Convergence Diop, Mbaye-Jacques, 85, 119, Démocratique/Bokk Gis Gis (CD/ 123, 159 BGG), 88, 195 international private financing, 124 Democratic experiments, 2, 7, 31, 211 party fusion, 125 Democratic League-Movement for the state and civil society experience, Workers’ Party/Ligue 123–124 Démocratique/Mouvement pour le Diop, Pape, 88, 180, 187, 194, 197, Parti du Travail (LD/MPT), 63, 198, 200 108, 112, 116, 139, 143, 144, Diop, Serigne, 178, 190, 200, 202 148, 150 Diouf, Abdou, 3, 33, 38, 63, 69, 82, Political Bureau, 76 147, 155, 156, 192, 193 tactical alliance, 76 Diouf, Amadou, 111, 130, 143, 144 Democratic Union of Progressive Diouf, Ibra, 202 Patriotic Forces (Union Diouf, Madior, 143 Démocratique des Forces Diouf, Mamadou, 14 Progressistes Patriotiques Diouf, Mbaye, 116 (UDFPP)), 78 Directing Committee/Comité Democratization, 4, 18, 21, 138, 162, Directeur (CD), 177 165, 166, 212, 226 Division of Criminal Investigation reforms, 7 (DIC), 15, 87, 162 Third Wave, 34 Dominance of the executive branch, Demokarassi, 166 222, 225 Descriptive statistical analysis, 19–20, Dominant-party authoritarianism, see 112, 130 Dominant-party autocracy “Dévolution du pouvoir Dominant-party autocracy, 29, 37, 38 monarchique,” 180 Mexico, 37, 38 Dia, Bacar, 79, 83 Dominant party systems, 51 Dia, Mamadou, 63, 76 Don’t Touch My Constitution, 166 Dia, Oumar Khassimou, 81 Downs, Anthony, 8, 9 Diack, Mbaye, 76 Diagne, Modou “Fada,” 88, 183, 185, 189, 192, 204 E Dias, Jean-Paul, 64, 178, 190 Economic and Social Council, 15 Diaspora, 47, 141, 147 Economic Community of West African Diattara, Yankhoba, 147 States (ECOWAS), 202 Dieng, Ousmane Tanor, 67, 70, 83, Court of Justice, 223 85, 115, 120, 143–145, 151, 156 Economic performance, 34, 48, 150, Dièye, Cheikh Abdoulaye, 64, 80, 84, 151, 167 143, 149 Economic, Social, and Environmental Dièye, Cheikh Bamba, 84, 149 Council, 197 Dione, Aloïse Gorgui, 78 Effective number of parties (ENP), 9, Diop, Awa, 196, 199, 203 31, 211 INDEX 235

Electoral code, 14, 32, 155 G democratic, 141 Gabon, 16, 98, 147, 148, 217, Electorally relevant opposition 218, 227 parties, 73 National Woodcutters’ Rally, 218 Electoral rules, 3, 30, 32, 211 party proliferation, 88 first-past-the-post rules, 30, 31 popular protest, 2 plurality rules, 30, 32 Gackou, Malick, 88, 163 proportional representation, 32 Gadio, Cheikh Tidiane, 150 proportional rules, 30 Gaston Berger University, 67 single-round system, 218 Generation of the Concrete (GC), two-round systems, 218 160, 180, 181, 196, 199, 202 Enlarged presidential majority Ghana, 31, 41 governments, 106, 107, 139, The Great Party/Le Grand Parti 146, 150, 179 (GP), 88 Exit, 12, 20, 21, 50, 188–191, 193, Guèye, Abdou Latif, 69, 80 195, 197, 198, 200, 204–206, 215 Guèye, Mame Adama, 145 as voice, 86, 174, 189, 191–193, Guèye, Ousmane, 79 198, 205, 215 Guinea, 216 Ex-regime insiders, 4, 7, 11, 20, 45, 130, 138, 139, 144, 146, 150, 154, 213, 214 H advantages over outsiders, 140, 146 Hichilema, Haikande, 218 candidates, 141, 149, 154, 155 Hirschman, Albert, 20, 50, 173, 176, high-performing, 141 188, 189, 196, 198, 200 Externally mobilized parties, 73 theory of exit, voice, and loyalty, Ezzan Law, 15 173, 188, 219 Huchard, Ousmane Sow, 81, 127, 129 civil society experience, 127 F Humanist Party/Parti Humaniste Fall, Abdou, 197 (PH), 80 Fall, Cheikh Ibra, 81 Fall, Moustapha Ché, 82 Fall, Ousseynou, 81, 143 I Fluid party brands, 187 Ideologically polarized party Foreign assistance, 219, 220, 222 systems, 175 Four Communes, 16, 17, 32, 165 Ideologies, 211 Freedom House, 7, 88, 164, 227 and party polarization, 175 French National Assembly, 17 and party systems polarization, 12 Front for Democracy and Progress reforms motivated by, 127 (Front pour la Démocratie et le Incumbency advantage, 213 Progrès, FDP), 116 Insider advantage, 45, 138, 140, 141, Fused, 197 149, 167 236 INDEX

Institutionalized parties, 40 L Institutionalized party systems, 31, 102 Least-likely crucial case, 3 Intentions to run for a third term, 145 Le Soleil, 126 Internal election, 12, 52, 53, 83, 84, Levitsky, Steven, 8 158, 176, 178, 180, 189, 199, Liberal democracy, 213 203–205 Lô, Thierno, 193 See also Internal party rules and Logics of party formation, 39, 53, procedures 74, 90 Internal party rules and procedures, Loyalty, 12, 20, 21, 50, 176, 188, 53, 175 189, 200, 202, 204 Internal rules, 187 Ly, Marième Wone, 79, 81, 84 International Organization of Francophonie (OIF), 4, 60, 215 International private financing, 10, 19, M 42, 43, 99, 102, 103, 106, 108, “Ma Carte, Ma Caution” (My Card, 111–113, 121, 130, 161, 214, My Deposit), 203 218, 222 Madagascar, 216, 217 party proliferation, 2, 215 2011 Political Parties Law, 216 J Maïgari, Bello Bouba, 97 Jamra, 69 Makhtar-Mbow, Amadou, 146 Judicial independence, 223 Malawi, 2, 215 June 23 Movement (M23), 160, 166 Mali, 4, 17, 139, 212, 216–218, 227 party proliferation, 2, 88, 215 K popular protest, 2 Kâ, Djibo, 66, 71, 76, 79, 82, 119, Rally for Mali (Rassemblement pour 141, 143, 149 le Mali, RPM), 139, 218 as ex-regime insider, 147 Mbacké, Serigne Cheikh, 108 international private financing, 122 Mbacké, Serigne Mourtala, 203 tactical alliance, 123 Mbodj, Aida, 183, 203 Kamara, Adama, 84 Media, 6, 44, 47, 60, 78, 103 Keïta, Ibrahim Boubacar, 139, 218 access to, 11, 61, 140; ex-regime Kenya, 16, 215, 216, 218 insiders, 47, 148; opposition, 15 National Democratic Party, 218 increased access, 70 party proliferation, 2 private, 15 Khalifa Sall, 164 skewed coverage of the opposition, Kilifeu, 163 149 King Fahd, 147 state, 15, 45 King Hassan II, 147 Mexico, 38 Konaré, Alpha Oumar, 139 Morocco, 147 Koranic schools (daaras), 129 Moustarchidine movement, 14 INDEX 237

Mouvance présidentielle, 89, 115, 116, National Assembly, 15, 60, 107, 127, 125, 126, 159 128, 145, 149, 163, 164, Movement for Democracy and 178–180, 186, 192, 194–199, Socialism/Mouvement pour la 201–204, 224 Démocratie et le Socialisme/Naxx National Democratic Assembly Jarinu (MDS/NJ), 81 (Rassemblement Nationale Movement for Democracy and Démocratique, RND), 63, Work/Mouvement pour la 112, 143 Démocratie/Liggeey (MPD/ National Domain Law, 201 Liggey), 88 National Movement of Servants of the Movement for Democratic and Social Masses/Mouvement National de Reform (Mouvement pour la Serviteurs des Masses (MNSM), 71 Réforme Démocratique et Sociale, National Union for the People/ MRDS), 71, 80, 127–129 Success/Union Nationale pour le consistent opposition, 129 Peuple/Tekki (UNP), 89, 201 Movement for Socialism an Unity Navétanes, 67 (Mouvement pour le Socialisme et Ndiaye, Abiboulaye, 84 l’Unité, MSU), 63, 76 Ndiaye, Amadou Moctar, 82 Movement for Socialism and Unity/ Ndiaye, Awa, 196 Cap 21 (Mouvement pour le Ndiaye, Fara, 177, 178, 200 Socialisme et l’Unité/Cap 21), 76 Ndiaye, Innocence Ntap, 196 Mozambique, 51, 218, 219 Ndiaye, Justin, 60 party proliferation, 2 Ndiaye, Mamadou Bamba, 76 MSU, see Movement for Socialism Ndiaye, Ousmane Masseck, 195, 198 and Unity Ndiaye, Souleymane “Brin,” 116 Muslim legal code (Sharia), 80, 129 Ndiaye, Souleymane Ndéné, 88, 182, 201 Ndigel, 34 N Ndong, Joseph, 177, 200 Namibia, 51 Ndoye, Doudou, 81 National Administration School/Ecole Ngom, Ousmane, 66, 78, 177, 189, Nationale d’Administration 192, 201 (ENA), 190 “exit as voice,” 86, 191 National Agency of the Organization Niang, Babacar, 143 of the Islamic Conference/Agence Niang, Mbaye (Imam), 71, 80, Nationale de l’Organisation de la 127–129 Conférence Islamique (ANOCI), Niasse, Moustapha, 5, 66, 83, 88, 145, 180 110, 115, 119, 120, 139, 141, National Alliance for 143–145, 147, 149, 151, 225 Democracy/Alliance Nationale consistent opposition, 120 pour la Démocratie (AND), domestic private financing, 148 183, 203 international private financing, 120 238 INDEX

Niasse, Moustapha (cont.) Party creation, 30, 35, 36, 38, 49, Prime Ministership, 121 53, 174 state and civil society experience, 120 canonical accounts, 36 UN Special Envoy for the Great classic theories, 8, 35, 65, 90 Lakes, 147 temporary spike, 3 Niger, 216 as a tool of exit and of voice, 191 1946 Lamine Guèye Law, 31 Party defection, 4, 5, 12, 18, 21, 30, 1956 Loi-cadre reform, 31 45, 48, 51, 151, 162, 167, 173, 1976 Law of the Three Trends, 63, 190 181, 183, 184, 187–189, 204, 1978 National Assembly election, 177 205, 214, 215, 219 1978 presidential election, 62 of ex-regime insiders, 219 1981 Law on Political Parties, 33, 41, logics of, 21, 50, 173 60, 63, 190, 224 from the PDS, 183, 190 1981 Political Parties Law, 72 from the PS, 70 1984 municipal election, 190 from the ruling party, 151 1988 National Assembly election, 70 Party for Hope and Progress/Parti de 1988 presidential election, 34, 149, 201 l’Espoir et du Progrès (PEP), 71 1993 National Assembly election, 14, Party for Progress and Citizenship 186, 190 (Parti pour le Progrès et la 1993 presidential election, 11, 14, 48, Citoyenneté, PPC), 85, 119, 123 138, 142, 150–152, 155 Party fusion, 3, 82, 85, 98, 100, 124, 1996 municipal election, 75, 157, 191 145, 191, 197, 218 1998 National Assembly election, 64, Party loyalty, 3, 5, 18, 21, 50, 173, 67, 71, 72, 191, 192 179, 189, 215 Party of Independence and Workers/Parti de l’Indépendance O et du Travail (PIT), 63, 79, 108, Odinga, Raila, 218 110, 112, 116, 144 Opposition coalescence, 11, 46, 48, Party of People’s Liberation (Parti de la 138, 150, 151, 157, 167, 175 Libération du Peuple, PLP), 143 Opposition coordination, 40, 101, Party of Renaissance and Citizenship 140, 151 (Parti de la Renaissance et de la Opposition fragmentation, 31 Citoyenneté, PRC), 79, 119, 125 Organization of the Islamic Party registration rules, 33 Conference, 180 Party switching, 173 Outsider-induced turnovers, 165 Party system fluidity, 31, 51, 187–189, 222 Party trajectories, 99 P Passively enabled party proliferation, 72 Packable institutions, 15, 163 Patriotic Action for Liberation/Action Party and party system assistance, see Patriotique pour la Libératon/Dog Political party aid bumu gacce (APL), 82 INDEX 239

Patronage, 46, 48, 140, 151, 154, Presidential power, 31 191, 198, 213, 214, 218 Presidential system, 75 distribution of, 4, 10, 219 Presidential turnover, 3, 11, 30, 46, negotiation of, 5, 9, 29, 36, 74, 77, 130, 138, 150–153, 156, 162 79, 86, 213, 222; insider agents of, 138 candidates’ resistance to, 138 in 2000, 4, 11, 19, 45, 69, 130, scarcity, 11, 69, 71; in the ruling 167, 206, 212 party, 138 in 2012, 4, 11, 45, 130, 151, 206 seeking, 36, 51 (see also Alternance) Patronage-oriented parties, 221, 226 in 2012 Alternance, 130 ruling parties, 20, 219 insider-induced, 162, 165 PDS/Renovation (PDS/R), 112, 178, Programmatic pacts, 121, 151 190, 191 Programmatic politics, 127, 129 People’s Movement for Socialism as partial substitutes for experience (Mouvement Populaire Socialiste, or financing, 129 MPS), 76 Proposed a constitutional Personalization of party structures, 175 amendment, 145 Pôle de Gauche, 157 Protocol of Reubeuss, 159 Policy implications, 21, 206, 213, PS, see Socialist Party/Parti Socialiste 219–224 Political opportunity, 3 Political party aid, 219 R critiques of, 220 Rassemblement Nationale of the German Stiftungen, 220 Démocratique (RND), 63 of the International Republican Reform Party (Parti de la Réforme, Institute, 220 PR), 83 of the National Democratic Regime outsiders, 4, 45, 141, Institute, 220, 221 162, 214 of the Netherlands Institute for candidates, 141, 143, 144 Multiparty Democracy, 220 as presidential candidates, 11 technical assistance, 220 Renewal (Renouveau) faction, 79, 82 technical capacity-building, 221 Republican Liberal Democrats Party Political party strengthening, 219 (LDR/Yessal), 194 Popular Front/Front Populaire (FP), Republic of Congo, 147 67, 79, 83 Resistance to reconciliation, 154, 161 Popular protest, 31 Rewmi (Nation), 86, 89, 139, 144, Post-alternance adherents, 185 145, 147, 159, 160 Post-Third Wave regimes, 35 RND, see Rassemblement Nationale Pre-alternance adherents, 185 Démocratique Presidential election Rule of law, 21, 62, 81, 87, 162, 211, incumbent victories in 1993 and 212, 217, 219, 223 2007, 45 Ruling party dominance, 175 Presidential phase (2000–2012), 204 Russia, 37 240 INDEX

S Senegalese civil society, 166 Sall, Abdoulaye Sally, 148 Senegalese Council of Sall, Boubacar, 202 Magistrates/Conseil Supérieur de Sall, Khalifa, 164, 181, 217, 223, la Magistrature (CSM), 223 224, 226 Senegalese Democratic Bloc (BDS), Sall, Macky, 7, 11, 20, 41, 45, 49, 59, 63, 85 60, 83, 129, 130, 137, 141, 142, “I Choose Hope” speech, 83 145, 146, 148, 149, 151, 158, 1996 Party Congress, 70 163, 178, 180, 193 Political Bureau, 85 advantageous media access (see also in 2000 (see also 2000 presidential Media) election) as President of the National Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS), 3, Assembly, 145 15, 20, 21, 49, 63, 106, 112, Prime Ministership, 48, 201 139, 146, 148, 155, 156, Sambe, El Hadji Momar, 64 158, 174, 181, 188, 191, Sandaga Market, 186 193, 195–197, 199, 200, Sarr, Omar, 86 215, 218 Sarr, Oumar, 181, 198, 204 candidate selection, 193, 198 Sassou-Nguesso, Denis, 147 Coordination des Cadres, 190 Sata, Michael, 139 defeat in 2012 (see also Alternance) Saudi Arabia, 147 Directing Committee/Comité Savané, Landing, 77, 110, 143, 144 Directeur (CD), 12, 21, 124, Seck, Aliou, 71 144, 145, 177, 179, 185, 186, Seck, Idrissa, 45, 47, 49, 67, 71, 115, 188, 190, 194, 197, 199, 203, 123, 139, 141, 144, 145, 205, 215; exclusivity, 205 147–149, 157, 158, 163, 180, Disciplinary Committee, 185, 192, 193, 198, 199, 201 190, 192, 193 advantageous media access (see also dynamics of exit, voice, Media) and loyalty, 176 corruption charges, 148 formal rules, 52 and “exit as voice,” 86 foundational phase in opposition as an opposition front-runner, (1974–2000), 21, 176 142, 144 impending succession, 155 and origins of Rewmi party, 147 initial opposition phase Prime Ministership, 48 (1974–2000), 204 reconciliation with Abdoulaye internal election, 52, 53, 158, 176, Wade, 161 180, 189, 203–205 Seck, Mamadou, 187, 195, 198, 199 internal rules, 52; inconsistent Selectively enforced the law, 164 enforcement, 205 Semi-structured interviews, 18, 19, 173 leadership disputes, 144 Senate, 15, 70, 87, 194, 195 Liberal and Democratic Senegal Parliamentary Group, 194, diaspora, 42 203, 204 INDEX 241

monarchical devolution of power, Senegalese Water 83, 180 Company/Sénégalaise des Eaux National Secretariat, 21, 179, 185, (SDE), 67 188, 192, 199 Senghor, Léopold Sédar, 3, 38, 41, old guard, 179 62, 63, 120, 164, 177, 200 Party Congress, 185 Set-Sellal (Synergie pour l’éthique et la as party of contribution, 12, 63, 177 transparence, Synergy for Ethics Political Bureau, 179, 185, 202 and Transparency), 197 post-alternance adherents, 185 Social and Democratic presidential phase (2000–2012), Convention/Convention 21, 176 Démocratique et Sociale (CDS), 197 return to opposition (2012-present), Social cleavages, 3, 30, 32, 33, 211 21, 176, 204 cross-cutting, 33 victory in 2000 (see also Alternance) Social Democratic Front (Front Women’s Federation, 196, 199, 203 Démocratique et Sociale/Benno Senegalese Ecological Assembly—The Jubel, FSD/BJ), 149 Greens/Rassemblement Ecologique Social Democratic Party/Parti Social du Sénégal-Les Verts (RES-Les Démocrate (PSD/Jant bi), 81 Verts), 81, 127 Social Front for Restoration/Front Senegalese Liberal Party/Parti Libéral Social pour la Restauration (FSR/ Sénégalais (PLS), 66, 86, 178, Laabal), 85 191, 192 Socialist Party/Parti Socialiste (PS), Senegalese Party of Progress/Parti 12, 20, 34, 49, 63, 68, 79, 81, Sénégalais du Progrès (PSP), 84 85, 89, 107, 111, 120, 124, 139, Senegalese Patriotic Assembly/Union 143, 155, 157, 178, 181, 187, Patriotique Sénégalais/Jammi 190, 200, 203, 218 Rewmi (RPS), 64 Central Committee, 157 Senegalese People’s Bloc (Bloc defeat in 2000 (see also Alternance) Populaire Sénégalais, BPS), 116 dominance, 51 Senegalese Petroleum followings, 70 Company/Société des Pétroles du 1996 Party Congress, 83, 122 Sénégal (PETROSEN), 145 Political Bureau, 70, 83, 122 Senegalese Popular Bloc (Bloc Youth Movement, 120, 122 Populaire Sénégalais, BPS), 67 Sock, Mademba, 143 Senegalese Popular Party/Parti Sopi, 137, 138 Populaire Sénégalais (PPS), 63 Sow, Aliou, 88 Senegalese Progressive Union/Union Sow, Pape Mody, 71 Progressiste Sénégalais (UPS), 120 State and civil society experience, 10, Senegalese Republican Movement 19, 42, 98, 114, 130, 214 (Mouvement Républicain State experience, 43, 102, 103, 108, Sénégalais, MRS), 63 109, 111, 222 242 INDEX

Succession, 11 Transitions to multiparty politics, 3, crisis, 214 16, 211 filial, 160 Senegal, 3, 212 impending, 156, 158, 160 See also Democratic experiments; presidential, 160 Multiparty transition ruling parties, 48, 138; timing of, Turnover, 160, 214 138, 153 2000 presidential election, 71, 73, 79, Sufi Muslim orders, 70 113, 127, 129, 138, 147, 150, Khalifas General, 70 152, 156, 177 Mouridism, 81, 108, 161, 203 defeat of PS, 152 Moustarchidine movement, 64 runoff, 110, 151 Tijaniyya, 34 2001 National Assembly election, 76, Sufi orders, 34 113, 121, 125, 126, 180 Mouridiyya, 34 2002 municipal election, 124 Sy, Abdoul Aziz “Junior,” 159 2007 National Assembly election, Sy, El Hadj Malick, 150 14, 113 Sy, Moustapha, 14, 64 2007 presidential election, 71, 113, Sylla, Talla, 14, 69, 144 123, 127, 129, 138, 144, 148, 150–152, 159 2008 Sponsorship law (loi de T parrainage), 216 Tactical alliances, 19, 39, 40, 43, 100, 2009 municipal election, 161, 180, 101, 103, 104, 106, 108–110, 194, 199 113, 114, 123, 173, 214 2012 National Assembly election, Tall, Aminata, 196 125, 226 Tall, Bara, 148 2012 presidential election, investigation of, 148 113, 125, 127, 138, 150, Jean Lefèbre Senegal, 148 152, 159, 160 Telephone booth parties, 5, 60, 78, defeat of PDS, 49, 152, 160, 173 115, 224, 225 runoff, 89 Thiam, Iba Der, 85, 143, 149, 150 2014 municipal election, 182, Thiam, Omar, 84 195, 203 Thiam, Samba Diouldé, 79, 119, 125 2017 National Assembly election, 59, co-optation, 126 183, 204 international private financing, 125 And Saxal Liggey (Working state and civil society Together to Increase experience, 125 Employment) coalition, 204 Tidjani, 159 2018 sponsorship law (loi de Togo, 216 parrainage), 59, 163, 223, 224 Touba, 161 2019 presidential election, 163, Transhumance, 202 165, 226 Transhumants, 179, 189, 196 2019 presidential race, 164 INDEX 243

U W Uncertainty about the timing of Waar wi, 189, 193 succession within the Wade, Abdoulaye, 7, 41, 44, 49, 60, ruling party, 153 62, 69, 129, 130, 137, 139, 141, Uneven playing field, 6, 8, 10, 143–146, 148, 149, 151, 155, 13, 15, 19, 20, 29, 39, 43, 157, 158, 160–162, 177, 178, 61, 87, 98, 103, 129, 138, 182, 189, 194, 200–202 162, 167, 177, 195, 206, as ex-regime insider, 142 213, 214, 222 defeat in 2012, 49, 181, 187 Union for Democracy and intentions to run for a third term, 160 Federalism/Union pour la as opposition figure, 3 Démocratie et le Fédéralisme/ personalization of power, 205 Mboolo mi (UDF), 64 power retention strategy, 72 Union for Democratic Renewal/Front re-election in 2007 (see also 2007 for Turnover (Front pour presidential election) l’Alternance, URD/FAL), Wade, Karim, 89, 145, 158, 160, 66, 76, 79, 82, 100, 119, 180–182, 194, 199, 201, 122, 125, 139 223, 224 Union for the Republic/Union pour la corruption charges, 164 République (UPR), 81 presidential candidacy, 202 Union of Emerging Patriotic 2009 municipal election, 160 Forces/Union des Forces Wade presidency, 7 Patriotiques Emergentes Wade, Seynabou, 199 (UFPE), 76 Wone, Oumar, 63 Union of Young Laborers/Union des Jeunesses Travaillistes, (UJT), 190, 199, 201, 202 Y United Nations Educational, Scientific, Yoonu Askan wi/Path of the People and Cultural Organization (YAW), 77, 111 (UNESCO), 177 Youth for Turnover/Jeunesse pour United States Agency for International l’Alternance (JPA), 69 Development (USAID), 221 University Cheikh Anta Diop of Dakar, 106, 108, 147, 200 Z Zambia, 17, 98, 139, 218 Heritage Party, 98 V Movement for Multiparty Voice, 12, 20, 21, 50, 188–191, 193, Democracy (MMD), 98, 139 195, 196, 198, 200, 204, 206 National Citizens’ Coalition, 98 from within, 189 Patriotic Front (PF), 139 from without, 174, 189, 192–193, popular protest, 2 200, 205, 215 United Party for National Vote-mobilizing potential, 101, 105, Development, 139, 218 111, 115, 116 Zimbabwe, 51, 219