The Bill Blackwood Law Enforcement Management Institute of Texas
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Tactical Behavioral Profiling Training for Texas Peace Officers
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A Leadership White Paper Submitted in Partial Fulfillment Required for Graduation from the Leadership Command College
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By Shane Wickson
Cleburne Police Department Cleburne, Texas May 2016
ABSTRACT
After defeating the Iraqi Army in the second Iraq war, the United States military was faced with an insurgency that relied heavily on asymmetric warfare, primarily improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and ambush attacks. To counter this, the United
States Marine Corps (USMC) created a course named Combat Hunter. This course was designed to detect imminent attacks and respond to them. The curriculum consists of teaching how to detect attacks and is called “tactical behavioral profiling.” It is based on six different scientific disciplines that have real world application, coupled with a simple rule that confirms with the solider whether they should take action. Tactical behavioral profiling was designed by a former police officer (Van Horne & Riley, 2014).
Currently, all training that pertains to pre-attack indicators or reading situations is done on the job or via elective coursework. These courses are not usually supported by the department and individual officers usually pay for and take the courses on their own.
The training is usually geared towards honing the officer’s “sixth sense” for danger, imparting an almost mystical approach. In contrast, tactical behavioral profiling is the systematic, scientific application of four levels of human behavior: the individual level, the group level, the environmental level, and the collective mood of the area (Van
Horne, 2014). Training in tactical behavioral profiling should be incorporated into the
Texas Basic Peace Officers Course. TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Abstract
Introduction ...... 1
Position ...... 4
Counter Position ...... 8
Recommendation ...... 11
References ...... 13
Appendix 1
INTRODUCTION
When the United States went into the second Iraq war, they quickly deposed
Saddam Hussein’s regular army. After that, they faced an insurgency, where the
enemy no longer was wearing the uniform but instead blended in with the civilian
population. The insurgents were dealing significant damage using improvised explosive
devices (IEDs) and other ambush attacks. In July of 2006, there were 1,666 IEDs that
exploded and 959 were discovered prior to detonation (Van Horne & Riley, 2014).
In 2007, the Marine Corps War-Fighting Lab, under a directive from United
States Marine Corps (USMC) General James Mattis, began designing a program to teach Marines how to better determine when an attack was imminent. The course designed became known as “Combat Hunter.” The Combat Hunter program worked on improving three core skills for the Marines: enhanced observational skills, combat tracking, and combat profiling. The combat profiling portion consists of “how to read the human terrain through an increased understanding of human behavior” (Van Horne &
Riley, Left of Bang, 2014, p. 25) and teaches Marines how to effectively identify insurgents in the civilian population. Interestingly, the combat profiling portion was
designed by a former police officer named Greg Williams (Van Horne & Riley, Left of
Bang, 2014). In the law enforcement community, where the application of this profiling is geared towards properly predicting behavior in a non-combat environment, it is more
correctly referred to as “tactical behavioral profiling.” Although the terms are
interchangeable, the term “combat profiling” will be used to refer to the Marine Corps
application, while the term “tactical behavioral profiling” will refer to the law enforcement
application. 2
Tactical behavioral profiling is the systematic, scientific application of four pillars of human behavior: how individuals behave, how groups behave, how people interact with the environment, and the collective mood of the area (Van Horne, 2014). Based on cues received from observing human behavior, tactical behavioral profiling allows the practitioner to infer the intent of a person or a group of people. Further, tactical behavioral profiling imparts a “bias for action” (Van Horne & Riley, Left of Bang, 2014, p.
49), meaning that once a police officer observes a cluster of anomalies in behavior, he must take some sort of action. Some types of action include observing, investigating, or
arresting (Van Horne & Riley, 2014).
Line of Duty Deaths (LODDs) are a problem in the law enforcement community.
In the ten year period between 2005 and 2014, Texas lost a total of 140 law
enforcement officers in the line of duty. Of those, 62 (44.29%) were because of
“felonious assault” - categorized as “assault”, “stabbed”, “gunfire”, “vehicular assault”.
Based on percentages, this tracks close to the national average of 42.61% for that
same time period (http://www.odmp.org/).
Texas LODD 2005-2014
Cause of Death Count
Accidental 1
Animal related 1
Assault 2
Automobile accident 33
Drowned 4
Duty related illness 2 3
Fall 1
Gunfire 43
Gunfire (Accidental) 3
Heart attack 13
Motorcycle accident 9
Struck by vehicle 7
Training accident 1
Vehicle pursuit 3
Vehicular assault 17
Grand Total 140
Figure 1. Texas LODD by Cause, 2005-2014
The second big driver of line of duty deaths are vehicle related. Another 52
LODDs (37.14%) could be contributed to “Vehicle Related”, meaning they were listed as
“automobile accident”, “motorcycle accident”, “struck by vehicle”, or “vehicle pursuit”.
This is slightly higher than the national average of 33.60% for that same time period. All
other LODD causes comprised only 26 deaths (http://www.odmp.org/).
Year Total Felonious Assault Vehicle Related
2005 166 69 41.57% 54 32.53%
2006 159 70 44.03% 57 35.85%
2007 203 77 37.93% 72 35.47%
2008 159 59 37.11% 60 37.74%
2009 140 57 40.71% 48 34.29% 4
2010 177 78 44.07% 60 33.90%
2011 180 87 48.33% 48 26.67%
2012 130 65 50.00% 38 29.23%
2013 110 37 33.64% 41 37.27%
2014 121 59 48.76% 40 33.06% 10 year average 42.61% 33.60%
Figure 2. National LODD, Felonious Assault and Vehicle Related, 2005-2014
In law enforcement, situational awareness, pre-attack indicators, and other
related training is not handled at the police academy, but learned on the job. Or the
officer attends courses on their own to piece together their own personal strategy. This
will not suffice in the modern era of policing. Tactical behavioral profiling should be
included in every police academy as a requirement for the basic peace officer
certification.
POSITION
Tactical behavioral profiling is a structured system that is designed to take the
“magic” out of reading a situation and identifying out of the ordinary behavior. The
USMC Combat Hunter program instructs Marines on how to quickly establish a baseline
of what is normal behavior in an area and then how to pick out behaviors that do not fit the baseline. These abnormal behaviors are defined as “anomalies.” Once anomalies have been observed, the course instructs Marines to make a decision on how to act - the mnemonic for this is BAD, for “Baseline + Anomaly = Decision” (Clark & Dick, 2014).
What that decision should be is based on what clusters of anomalies are observed (Van 5
Horne & Riley, Left of Bang, 2014). By drilling this concept using real world examples, the student learns to make rapid, intuitive decisions.
The manner in which this training can be accomplished has already been researched by the USMC. The basics of combat profiling are taught with the assistance of the “information warfare mission planning and command and control targeting system
(IMPACTS) combat profiling training system” (Puglisi, et al., 2012, p. 28). The system presents the student with an illustration of a combat profiling problem or principle, then instructs them on the principle, then guides them through deliberate practice on that principle (Puglisi, et al., 2012). The students are also subjected to live role playing exercises that model the principles (Poole, 2009).
The four pillars of tactical behavioral profiling are broken down into six well established scientific domains: kinesics, the study of body language; biometrics, the study of the body’s automatic response to stress; proxemics, the study of how people use the space around them; geographics, the study of how people relate to the environment around them; iconography, the study of what symbols people use or adorn themselves with; and atmospherics, the study of the general “mood” of the area (Van
Horne & Riley, Left of Bang, 2014). Kinesics is often colloquially referred to as “body language”. Body language has become a pop culture phenomenon lately. It is on a recurring segment on the O’Reilly Factor featuring Tonya Reiman
(http://www.bodylanguageuniversity.com/). It was also featured on the television series
“Lie to Me”, based loosely on the work of Dr. Paul Ekman (Paul Ekman Group, n.d.).
Van Horne and Riley (2014) quote Gavin De Becker, author of the seminal work “Gift of
Fear”, as stating “Everything a person does is created twice – once in the mind and 6
once in its execution – ideas and impulses are pre-incident indicators for action” (p. 69).
Thus, a practitioner can infer someone’s intent as they decide on their next course of action if they know what to look for.
Biometrics is often grouped into “body language” as well. It is established science that stresses the effects of several autonomous body functions as the body prepares to go into freeze, flight, or fight mode. It is also the study of how emotions
“leak” from a subject, mainly through facial expressions. This is the foundation of a lot of Ekman’s famous work (Ekman, 2007). Observing the automatic responses to someone under stress is the foundation of this part of tactical behavioral profiling.
Proxemics, the study of how people use space around them, was coined by cultural anthropologist Edward T. Hall in 1963. Hall noted that people divided their personal space into three zones, the intimate, the personal, and the social (Van Horne
& Riley, 2014). By observing the interaction between two people, one can then determine the boundaries of their relationship. It is also the study of human movement.
Human movement can be indicative of a person’s intent, even across cultures (Barretta,
Todd, Miller, & Blythe, 2005). It is even possible to identify the natural leader of a group
of people based on how everyone in the group is behaving (Van Horne & Riley, Left of
Bang, 2014).
Iconography, the study of the signs and symbols people use to identify
themselves, is already a practice widely used by law enforcement. Officers receive
training on gang identifiers, such as tattoos and clothing, as early as the academy. The
Florida Department of Corrections posts gang identifier information on its website 7
(http://www.dc.state.fl.us/pub/gangs/index.html). Iconography also refers to the study of territorial markings and graffiti (Van Horne & Riley, 2014).
Geographics is the study of how people relate to their environment. It is focused
on breaking terrain down into three arenas: the home base of the actor, the area in
which they operate or commit crimes, and the natural paths of movement through the
terrain. People behave differently around areas that are private or off limits than in
areas that are public. People are also known take the path of least resistance through
an area. By knowing these natural paths, a profiler can predict how people travel
through an area (Van Horne & Riley, 2014).
Atmospherics, the study of the general mood of an area, has been a part of the
human experience from the beginning and is best described as the movie cliché of “it’s
quiet, too quiet”. Van Horne & Riley (2014) reference the quiet before an attack in
Vietnam, where the villagers, livestock, and natural wildlife were quiet before an
ambush. The cliché is true: art does indeed reflect life in this respect.
To summarize, the six domains of tactical behavioral profiling are not mystical
powers. They are instead separate areas of study backed by science and real world
examples. These form a solid foundation from which to instruct law enforcement.
Perhaps the best reason to adopt tactical behavioral profiling training in law
enforcement is that it is a natural extension of the 21st Century law enforcement
officer’s role in counter-terrorism. Many large departments, such as New York and Los
Angeles, have dedicated counter-terrorism units to handle these incidents. Since the
9/11 attacks, it has become accepted that all local law enforcement will be on the front
lines of counter- terrorism activities. The center for Problem Oriented Policing states 8
that local police are in the best position to conduct counter-terrorism operations for two
specific reasons. The first is that crime and terrorism are not fundamentally different.
The second, and perhaps most important, is that the local police are in the best position
to identify targets, threats, and to coordinate the response (Newman & Clarke, 2008).
Greg Williams, the designer of the combat profiling portion of the Combat Hunter
program, stated “All terrorists and criminals follow the same patterns” (Poole, 2009, para. 7).
Consider the Boston Marathon Bombing from 2013. Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) agents reviewing videos of the scene after the blast noted that
Dzhokhar Tsarnaev was exhibiting behavior that was not consistent with the other people fleeing the attack. Specifically, Tsarnaev was calmly walking away, while the other victims were showing surprise and fear as they fled. This led to Tsarnaev being
identified as “suspect #2” (Van Horne, 2013). Establishing a baseline and noting
anomalies is the basis of tactical behavioral profiling. Local law enforcement officers
who have been through that training will be better positioned to recognize and respond
to those anomalies and will be uniquely positioned to stop a potential terror attack.
COUNTER POSITION
The Texas Commission on Law Enforcement (TCOLE) sets the training
standards for Texas peace officers. The current curriculum, which basic police
academies must adhere to, has 643 hours of required instruction (TCOLE, 2013). This
works out to over 16 weeks of training, and many academies provide extended
coursework that runs in excess of 20 weeks. The Tarrant County College Police
Academy is 19 weeks in length (Tarrant County College District, 2015). The Dallas 9
Police Depart, which runs its own academy, has 35 weeks of academy training
(http://www.dallaspolice.net/recruiting/recruiting.html).
Many recruits will spend more than six months in training before they are even commissioned and enter the field training program. In addition to the costs associated with operating a training academy, the department will have spent a half of a year’s salary on an officer before they even can begin to evaluate their field performance. The addition of even a few days of extra training places a significant cost burden on the department.
When considering cost, the cost of failing to train officers to more effectively see attacks coming has to be considered. Putting aside the actual emotional impact of an officer being killed or seriously wounded on duty, the bottom line dollar cost to a department is significant. In addition to losing all of the money spent on basic training, they lose all the money spent on subsequent training, as well as an immeasurable amount of street experience.
Further, it would be impossible to calculate the ripple effect of the productivity lost as the rest of the department and surrounding law enforcement community reacts to the loss of an officer. In a 1997 study conducted by Concerns of Police Survivors, more than 90% of the departments reported that a LODD had an emotional effect on other officers in the department. The report further provided that 25% of the departments instituted psychological counseling for the officers in response to a LODD (Violanti,
2015). And it does not account for the work lost to decreased productivity and increased absenteeism. Clearly, the cost of a few extra days of training at the basic peace officer level is well worth the investment. 10
It is well known in law enforcement circles that the average tour of duty of an
officer killed in the line of duty is in excess of 10 years. In Texas, in the 10 years from
2005 to 2014, it works out to 11 years and 9 months (see Figure 2 in the Appendix). It does not appear that officers being killed in the line of duty is a “rookie problem.”
While those statistics are entirely correct, that is not the problem that should be
targeted. By introducing the concepts of tactical behavioral profiling early in the career
of the police officer, it becomes an ingrained part of their daily routine. Starting early will
also allow the officer to continue to build on that foundation to increase their survivability
across their career. Refresher training can be added to ensure officers maintain their
skillset. Further, between 2005 and 2014, officers with less than 5 years of experience
comprise 26.43% of LODDs..
The final concern raised when examining the concept of teaching tactical behavioral profiling regards intuition. The program is designed to provide the students with information that allows them to make quick decisions based on intuition. The concern is that intuition cannot be taught quickly; the officer either has it or will have to
learn it through years of experience.
This position is based on a fallacy that confuses “instinct” with intuition. Holt
(2013) stated that: “Intuition is based on topical competency that can be enhanced through experience and training while instinct is innate and preprogrammed before any situational experience occurs” (p. 6). Holt (2013) continued on to argue that intuitive
based decision making models are more effective for SWAT teams. Research into
deception detecting practices showed that subjects that intuitive approaches to
deception detection performed better than deliberative processes (Albrechtsen, 11
Meissner, & Susa, 2009). Finally, De Becker (2010) argued that intuition is not the gut,
but a cognitive process, a pattern of thinking. Thinking can indeed be trained.
RECOMMENDATION
The largest driver of LODDs in law enforcement is from felonious assaults.
Tactical behavioral profiling is a structured system that teaches the practitioner how to
read a situation and intuitively identify who is out of place and why. Tactical behavioral profiling can be taught quickly using technology driven instruction combined with role playing. Tactical behavioral profiling teaches skills that naturally dovetail with law enforcements participation in counter-terrorism. Tactical behavioral profiling training needs to be introduced into the police curriculum early in the career of police officers.
Tactical behavioral profiling is an established system that is currently being taught as part of the USMC Combat Hunter program. It is based on clearly researched scientific models that have demonstrated positive outcomes. Also, it is a clear extension of the 21st century police officer’s role in counter-terrorism operations.
While the cost of more police training would be significant, it pales in the cost to the department and the community at large when a police officer is lost in a line of duty death. Others argue that intuition cannot be taught, but the scientific research paints a different picture. Further, this argument is predicated on confusing “instinct” and
“intuition”.
Given the above, it is imperative upon TCOLE to create a tactical behavioral profiling course targeted at police officer trainees in the academy and make it part of the
Basic Police Officer Course. This would introduce the profiling concepts to officers at their earliest learning stages. Further, it would ingrain it into the culture at that time. 12
The classroom course work should be structured in a computer aided learning environment, modeled after the current USMC learning environment. This should also be coupled with comprehensive field projects. The course work could be written by
TCOLE or they could contract with the USMC or the private contractors working in this arena. If TCOLE wished to foster continual learning, they could also create an intermediate or advanced class that they make a prerequisite for the corresponding peace officer license.
The tactical behavioral profiling curriculum of the USMC Combat Hunter program was designed by a former police officer and based on scientific principles (Van Horne &
Riley, 2014). In short, the military learned from law enforcement and implemented a solid system to reduce soldier deaths. In turn, law enforcement should learn from the military’s systematic approach to teaching this subject and implement training to reduce police officer deaths. The reduction of LODDs would ripple from the family, to the community, and out to society as a whole. 13
REFERENCES
Albrechtsen, J. S., Meissner, C. A., & Susa, K. J. (2009, January). Can intuition
improve deception detection performance? Journal of Experimental Social
Psychology, 45(4), 1052-1055.
Barretta, H. C., Todd, P. M., Miller, G. F., & Blythe, P. W. (2005, July). Accurate
judgments of intention from motion cues alone: a cross cultural study. Evolution
and Human Behavior, 26(4), 313-331.
Clark, L. B., & Dick, C. J. (2014, November). Combat hunter: The vernacular of future
conflicts or lessons forgotten? Marine Corps Gazette, 92(9), 84-89.
De Becker, G. (2010). The Gift of fear [Kindle version]. Retrieved from Amazon.com
Ekman, P. (2007). Emotions revealed, second edition: recognizing faces and feelings
to improve communication and emotional life. New York: Henry Holt.
Holt, R. (2013, July). Intuitive decision process training for tactical team leaders.
Huntsville, TX: The Bill Blackwood Law Enforcement Management Institute of
Texas.
Newman, G. E., & Clarke, R. V. (2008). Policing terrorism: An executive's guide.
Retrieved from
http://www.popcenter.org/library/reading/pdfs/policingterrorism.pdf
Paul Ekman Group. (n.d.). 'Lie to me'. Retrieved from http://www.paulekman.com/lie-
to-me/
Poole, E. (2009, January 16). On the hunt: USMC’s combat hunter course. Retrieved
from http://www.tactical-life.com/firearms/usmcs-combat-hunter/ 14
Puglisi, M., Geyer, A., Walker, A., Freeman, J., Marceau, R., & Marc, Y. (2012, June).
Building experts in the Marine Corps. Marine Corp Gazette, 96(6), 27-29.
Tarrant County College District. (2015, January 15). Police academy. Retrieved from
http://www.tccd.edu/Courses_and_Programs/Program_Offerings/Criminal_Justic
e/Police_Academy/index.html
TCOLE. (2013). Abstract. Retrieved from
http://www.tcole.texas.gov/sites/default/files/CourseCMU/BPOC January
2013_1.zip
Van Horne, P. (2013, May). Being faster than your enemy. Retrieved from
http://www.cp-journal.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Being-Faster-Than-Your-
Enemy.pdf
Van Horne, P. (2014, Spring/Summer). The next level of tactical awareness - Getting
left of bang. ITOA News, 27(2), 28-29.
Van Horne, P., & Riley, J. (2014). Left of Bang. New York: Black Irish Entertainment.
Violanti, J. M. (2015, January). Line-of-duty deaths: Survivor responses and
departmental policies study II: 1997. Retrieved from
http://www.nationalcops.org/assets/research.pdf 15
APPENDIX
Figure 1. Texas LODD Causes in the 10 years from 2005-2014
Felonious Assault is Assault, Gunfire, Stabbed (none recorded), and Vehicular Assault. Vehicle Related is Automobile Accident, Motorcycle Accident, Struck by Vehicle, and Vehicle
Pursuit. 16
Figure 2. Texas LODD Officer Names, End of Watch, Cause of Death, and Tour of
Duty
Name EOW COD Tour
Sergeant Alejandro "Alex" Martinez 11/21/2014 Automobile accident NA
Constable Robert Parker White 11/1/2014 Assault 18
Deputy Sheriff Jesse Valdez, III 10/29/2014 Vehicular assault 11
Sergeant Michael Joe Naylor 10/9/2014 Gunfire NA
Senior Deputy Jessica Laura Hollis 9/18/2014 Drowned 7
Constable Cleve Johnson 8/28/2014 Automobile accident 34
Chief of Police Michael Pimentel 8/23/2014 Gunfire 43
Chief of Police Lee Dixon 6/19/2014 Gunfire 18
Sergeant Paul A. Buckles 5/30/2014 Heart attack 26
Detective Charles Dinwiddie 5/11/2014 Gunfire 18
Police Officer Marc Uland Kelley 3/14/2014 Heart attack 3
Police Officer Robert C. Deckard, Jr. 12/20/2013 Gunfire 7
Sergeant Investigator Fredrich Adam Sowders 12/19/2013 Gunfire 7
Deputy Sheriff Adam J. Davis 12/11/2013 Automobile accident 7
Police Chief Steven K. Fleming 11/1/2013 Fall 22
Lieutenant Clay D. Crabb 10/16/2013 Automobile accident 19
Deputy Sheriff Billy F. "Bubba" Kennedy 10/2/2013 Gunfire 14
Deputy Sheriff Michael Neal Freeman 9/8/2013 Vehicle pursuit 28
Sergeant Jorge Luis "JL" Garcia 8/9/2013 Automobile accident 27
Police Officer Robert Layden "Bobby" Hornsby 7/14/2013 Gunfire 4 17
Sergeant Lance Allen "Lou" McLean 6/29/2013 Gunfire 9
Police Officer William Jason Sprague 6/15/2013 Vehicular assault 2
Police Officer Larry Dale Candelari 4/26/2013 Struck by vehicle 23
Deputy Sheriff Chad Christian Key 4/20/2013 Vehicular assault 4
Police Officer Edrees Mukhtar 12/29/2012 Automobile accident 1.58
Corporal Jimmie Deveril Norman 12/24/2012 Gunfire 23
Patrolman Angel David Garcia 12/16/2012 Struck by vehicle 0.75
Patrolman Jonathan Keith Molina 10/5/2012 Assault 4
Sergeant Paul Hernandez 10/4/2012 Heart attack 35.67
Constable Brian David Bachmann 8/13/2012 Gunfire 20
Deputy Sheriff Joshua Shane Mitchell 8/1/2012 Gunfire 6
Police Officer Joshua Stanley Williams 7/28/2012 Vehicular assault 17
Deputy Sheriff Michael Ray Smith 6/8/2012 Automobile accident 2.5
Senior Police Officer Jaime D. Padron 4/6/2012 Gunfire 17
Trooper Javier Arana, Jr. 3/24/2012 Automobile accident 2
Corporal Kevin Lee Aigner 9/10/2011 Duty related illness 15
Sergeant Mark Luis Scianna 8/27/2011 Automobile accident 28
Police Officer Bryan Mitchell Hebert 7/8/2011 Vehicular assault 10
Deputy Sheriff Charles Allen VanMeter 6/26/2011 Automobile accident 5
Police Officer Kevin Scott Will 5/29/2011 Vehicular assault 1.67
Sergeant Kenneth Gary Vann, Sr. 5/28/2011 Gunfire 24.5
Corrections Officer IV Craig Allan Orrell 5/12/2011 Heart attack NA
Deputy Sheriff Clifton Leigh Taylor 4/23/2011 Gunfire 3 18
Deputy Sheriff Sherri Katherine Jones 4/18/2011 Gunfire 6
Deputy Sheriff Robert Leo Britton, Jr. 3/28/2011 Animal related 19
Police Officer Stephanie Ann Brown 3/15/2011 Vehicular assault 3
Police Officer Kevin Paul Marceau 1/14/2011 Struck by vehicle 7
Deputy Sheriff John Norsworthy 1/4/2011 Automobile accident 2
Police Officer Jillian Michelle Smith 12/28/2010 Gunfire 0.83
Deputy Sheriff Michael Ray Schaefer 12/25/2010 Heart attack NA
Police Officer Andrew Jordan Rameas 12/20/2010 Motorcycle accident 13
Trooper Jonathan Thomas McDonald 11/15/2010 Automobile accident NA
Police Officer Sergio Arturo Antillon 10/29/2010 Vehicular assault 0.17
Deputy Sheriff Odell McDuffie, Jr. 10/25/2010 Automobile accident 17
Patrolman Karl Raymond McDonough 10/13/2010 Vehicular assault 4
Corporal David Ralph Slaton 9/20/2010 Automobile accident 36
Corrections Officer Kellie Pena 9/3/2010 Heart attack 7
Police Officer Leonard Allen Reed 8/18/2010 Motorcycle accident 4
Police Officer Craig Lamont Shaw 6/20/2010 Gunfire 5
Deputy Sheriff Eddie Lynn Wotipka 6/10/2010 Drowned 17
Police Officer Eydelmen Mani 5/19/2010 Automobile accident 7
Officer Rodney Tomlinson Holder 4/29/2010 Motorcycle accident 28
Deputy Sheriff Jacob Rene Rayos 4/11/2010 Automobile accident NA
Constable John William Brown 4/10/2010 Heart attack NA
Officer Timothy Joseph Zurovetz 3/24/2010 Automobile accident 6.17
Police Officer Craig Gordon Story 1/13/2010 Motorcycle accident 7 19
Detention Officer Dionicio M. Camacho 10/23/2009 Heart attack 0.33
Sergeant Timothy Gerard Olsovsky 10/7/2009 Heart attack 24
Deputy Sheriff Francis David Blake 10/3/2009 Automobile accident 5
Police Officer Jesse Thomas Hamilton 8/21/2009 Gunfire 4
Deputy Sheriff Shane Thomas Detwiler 7/13/2009 Gunfire 6
Police Officer Henry Canales 6/23/2009 Gunfire 16
Deputy Sheriff D. Robert Martin Harvey 4/26/2009 Automobile accident 7.58
Sergeant Randy Dewayne White 4/2/2009 Vehicle pursuit 5
Lieutenant Stuart Jay Alexander 3/11/2009 Vehicular assault 20
Detention Officer Cesar Arreola 1/18/2009 Duty related illness 2.17
Senior Corporal Norman Stephen Smith 1/6/2009 Gunfire 18
Police Officer Mark Steven Simmons 12/17/2008 Automobile accident 6
Police Officer Timothy Scott Abernethy 12/7/2008 Gunfire 11
Police Officer Robert A. Davis 12/1/2008 Struck by vehicle 1
Sheriff Steven Brent Lee, Sr. 11/27/2008 Vehicle pursuit 30
Game Warden George Harold Whatley, Jr. 10/10/2008 Heart attack 1
Detective Thomas L. "Tommy" Keen 9/15/2008 Accidental 35
Police Officer Gary Allen Gryder 6/29/2008 Vehicular assault 23
Sergeant Barbara Leggett Shumate 6/13/2008 Automobile accident 10
Police Officer Everett William Dennis 6/3/2008 Automobile accident 2
Trooper James Scott Burns 4/29/2008 Gunfire 5
Police Officer Caran R. Coward 4/26/2008 Gunfire 3
Senior Corporal Victor Antonio Lozada, Sr. 2/22/2008 Motorcycle accident 20 20
Corporal Harry Lane Thielepape, Jr. 2/20/2008 Gunfire 12
Police Officer Matthew Barret Thebeau 1/20/2008 Automobile accident 2
Deputy Constable David Joubert, Sr. 1/12/2008 Motorcycle accident 13
Police Officer James Saavedra 12/19/2007 Gunfire (Accidental) NA
Investigator Dale Clint Sherrill 10/19/2007 Automobile accident 10
Deputy Constable Jason Norling 10/1/2007 Struck by vehicle 8
Corrections Officer Susan Louise Canfield 9/24/2007 Vehicular assault 7
Detective Mario Moreno 9/21/2007 Gunfire 11
Police Officer David Camden 9/14/2007 Motorcycle accident 14
Corporal Abel Marquez 9/12/2007 Gunfire 7.08
Corporal Arlie Jones 9/8/2007 Gunfire 23
Corporal John "Scott" Gardner 9/8/2007 Gunfire 4.42
Police Officer Dayle Weston "Wes" Hardy 7/7/2007 Motorcycle accident 12
Deputy Sheriff Michael Page 6/30/2007 Gunfire 8
Officer Jeffrey Howard "Jeff" McCoy 6/5/2007 Vehicular assault 18
Game Warden Teyran "Ty" Patterson 5/30/2007 Drowned 2
Deputy Sheriff Paul Steven Habelt 5/17/2007 Gunfire 43
Deputy Sheriff Tony Price Ogburn 5/17/2007 Gunfire 8
Police Officer Lisa Beaulieu 4/27/2007 Vehicular assault 6
Police Officer Andrew Esparza 4/13/2007 Automobile accident 2
Senior Corporal Mark Timothy Nix 3/23/2007 Gunfire 7
Game Warden Justin Hurst 3/17/2007 Gunfire 5
Trooper Todd Holmes 3/14/2007 Automobile accident 2.17 21
Chief of Police Ernest V. Mendoza 1/19/2007 Vehicular assault 25
Deputy Sheriff Rahamy Mitchell 1/7/2007 Automobile accident 6
Officer Dwayne N. Freeto 12/17/2006 Vehicular assault 0.75
Officer Rodney Joseph Johnson 9/21/2006 Gunfire 12
Lieutenant James Lee Sunderland, Sr. 6/30/2006 Automobile accident 18
Officer Valentine D. "Val" Lopez, Jr. 6/21/2006 Gunfire 31
Constable Dale David Geddie 6/7/2006 Gunfire 12.5
Patrolman Gregory Dean Stewart 5/15/2006 Gunfire 7
Trooper Eduardo Chavez 5/2/2006 Automobile accident 7
Deputy Sheriff Donald Ellis Wass 4/23/2006 Motorcycle accident 10
Chief of Police Richard Allen Brush 3/27/2006 Heart attack 41
Trooper Matthew DeWayne Myrick 1/20/2006 Automobile accident 2
Trooper Billy Jack Zachary 1/1/2006 Struck by vehicle 1
Deputy Sheriff Lester Dewayne Tatum 12/28/2005 Automobile accident 15
Deputy Sheriff Jason Alexander Oliff 12/5/2005 Struck by vehicle 4
Officer Henry "Hank" Nava, Jr. 12/1/2005 Gunfire 18
Sergeant Michael Scott Neal 11/22/2005 Gunfire (Accidental) 3
Police Officer Brian Howard Jackson 11/13/2005 Gunfire 5
Officer Reuben Becerra DeLeon, Jr. 10/26/2005 Gunfire 0.67
Patrolman John Randolph Wheeler 10/14/2005 Vehicular assault 12
Sergeant Ruben Orozco, Sr. 9/17/2005 Automobile accident 26
Sergeant Denny F. Gallaway, Jr. 9/15/2005 Drowned 11
Deputy Sheriff Michael Bancroft 8/23/2005 Automobile accident NA 22
Reserve Deputy Constable Nehemiah Pickens 7/5/2005 Gunfire(Accidental) 4
Trooper Jimmy Ray Carty, Jr. 5/26/2005 Training accident 7
Deputy Sheriff Andrew Harrison Taylor 5/9/2005 Gunfire 3
Police Officer Eric Jay Van Fossan 2/26/2005 Heart attack 11
Patrol Officer Lloyd Auther Rogers 1/18/2005 Heart attack 9
Average Tour of Duty: 11 Years, 9 months
KIA with less than 5 years of service: 37 (26.43%)