Deliberative Democracy As Open, Not (Just) Representative Democracy

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Deliberative Democracy as Open, Not (Just) Representative Democracy

Hélène Landemore

Abstract: Deliberative democracy is at risk of becoming collateral damage of the current crisis of represen- Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/146/3/51/1830975/daed_a_00446.pdf by guest on 02 October 2021 tative democracy. If deliberative democracy is necessarily representative and if representation betrays the true meaning of democracy as rule of, by, and for the people, then how can deliberative democracy retain any validity as a theory of political legitimacy? Any tight connection between deliberative democracy and representative democracy thus risks making deliberative democracy obsolete: a dated paradigm fit for a precrisis order, but maladjusted to the world of Occupy, the Pirate Party, the Zapatistas, and other anti- representative movements. This essay argues that the problem comes from a particular and historically sit- uated understanding of representative democracy as rule by elected elites. I argue that in order to retain its normative appeal and political relevance, deliberative democracy should dissociate itself from representative democracy thus understood and reinvent itself as the core of a more truly democratic paradigm, which I call “open democracy.” In open democracy, popular rule means the mediated but real exercise of power by ordinary citizens. This new paradigm privileges nonelectoral forms of representation and in it, power is meant to remain constantly inclusive of and accessible–in other words open–to ordinary citizens.

The motivating concern for this essay is the impact that the crisis of representative democracy, widely diagnosed by political commentators and democratic theorists alike, has or should have on deliberative democracy as a mainstream theory of democratic legitimacy. To the extent that the fate of deliberative democracy has become intimately intertwined with representative democracy as both a normative paradigm and a set of particular historical institutions, HÉLÈNE LANDEMORE is Associ- and to the extent that representative democracy is ate Professor of Political Science at under attack precisely for being representative and Yale University. Her publications keeping ordinary citizens at arm’s length of the real include Democratic Reason: Politics, site of decision and power, deliberative democrats Collective Intelligence, and the Rule of the Many (2013), Hume: Probabilité should be worried about the status of their theory. et choix raisonnable (2004), and Col- Deliberative democracy risks becoming collateral lective Wisdom: Principles and Mech- damage of the problems currently facing represen- anisms (ed. with Jon Elster, 2012). tative democracy.

51 Deliberative Deliberative democrats thus need to Deliberative democracy is a theory of Democracy clarify the relationship between delibera- democratic legitimacy that traces the au- as Open, Not (Just) tion and representation and, more gener- thority of laws and policies to the public Representative ally, deliberative democracy as a theory of exchange of arguments among free and Democracy legitimacy, on the one hand, and represen- equal citizens. This theory was developed tative democracy as a specific institution- in the late 1980s and 1990s as an alterna- al instantiation of democracy, on the other. tive to the then-dominant theory of aggre- This clarification should reveal that while gative democracy, whereby democratic le- the connection between deliberation and gitimacy stems simply from the proper ag- representation might indeed be essential, gregation of votes in free and fair elections

at least in mass societies, the relation be- pitting various elites against one another. Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/146/3/51/1830975/daed_a_00446.pdf by guest on 02 October 2021 tween deliberative democracy as a theory The relation of deliberative democracy of legitimacy and representative democ- to representative democracy has always racy as a historical paradigm is essentially been undertheorized. Early proponents contingent: it is possible to separate the of the theory assumed direct democracy two. I suggest that deliberative democracy as their base model.1 Nothing much was is better seen as an independent theoretical supposed to change, normatively speak- module that is compatible with, and indeed ing, when deliberation took place among better suited to, a different set of institutional elected representatives rather than the peo- principles than the one called “representa- ple themselves. The legitimacy was sim- tive democracy.” I propose that deliberative ply transferred to the outcomes of the de- democracy should be made a central part of liberation among representatives, as if it a new and more attractive paradigm of de- played out as a perfect substitute for democracy, which I call open democracy. liberation among all citizens. To ensure a The first section of this essay scrutinizes seamless translation of democratic legit- the relation of deliberation and represen- imacy from the direct to the representa- tation in mainstream theories of deliber- tive context, most people resorted to the ative democracy and shows the problems then-dominant theory of representation that arise when deliberative democracy is formulated by political scientist Hannah confused or too tightly associated with rep- Pitkin in 1967. At an abstract level, repre- resentative democracy. The second section sentation is, for Pitkin, the conceptual solu- shows that representative democracy can- tion to the problem of “making present” not be salvaged as a normative model of de- that which is absent. Democratic legitima- mocracy because it fails at least three basic cy was found at the level of a representative criteria we should expect a genuinely demo- assembly making present and pursuing the cratic rule to satisfy (namely agenda-setting, interests of people who could not be pres- effective participation, and enlightened un- ent all at once. derstanding). The third section sketches out Given that direct deliberation among all an alternative: open democracy. Open de- citizens is widely assumed to be impossible mocracy is meant as a more authentically on the scale of the modern nation-state,2 democratic paradigm in which deliberation this simplifying premise of the early de- among free and equal members–the core liberative democrats was perfectly under- of deliberative democracy–is made a cen- standable, and most other deliberative the- tral institutional principle. As a result, I ar- orists took it onboard. Philosopher Jürgen gue that open democracy offers to delibera- Habermas, in a way, merely complicated tive democrats a more hospitable home than the picture by conceptualizing two kinds representative democracy. of deliberation happening in two distinct

52 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences deliberative “tracks.” The first kind of de- tives allows for a reflexive delay between Hélène liberation was meant to be formal and the expression of raw judgments and pref- Landemore decision-oriented, taking place within the erences, on the one hand, and the crafting walls of Parliament. The other, taking place of policy outcomes, on the other.6 Repre- among the public, was decentralized, dis- sentation also allows a circular process of tributed, informal, and diffuse, with the as- communication between representatives sumed function of setting the agenda for and the represented. Representative de- Parliament.3 Habermas additionally posit- mocracy is, for Urbinati, a more accom- ed a porous demarcation between the two plished form of democracy than direct tracks, so as to allow for feedback loops be- democracy precisely because it allows for

tween the two spheres. In so doing, he plau- a discursive exchange to occur over time Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/146/3/51/1830975/daed_a_00446.pdf by guest on 02 October 2021 sibly extended the early version of delibera- between representatives and represented. tive democracy, making it applicable to the If this account of the link between delib- actual world of representative democracies. eration and representation in mainstream More recently, however, democratic the- democratic theory is correct, what happens orists have modified and tightened the nor- to the paradigm of deliberative democracy mative link between deliberation and repre- as a theory of political legitimacy when rep- sentation to the point that one can hardly be resentative democracy itself comes under conceptualized without the other. The first attack? What happens when the relation- move has been to show that representation ship assumed and described by Habermas is, in a nutshell, the essence of democracy. between representatives and represented For politics scholar David Plotke, “repre- no longer seems a plausible or normatively sentation is democracy” in the sense that appealing theory of the way things work representative practices are always “con- and ought to work, in particular because it stitutive” of democracy.4 Representation is no longer credible that the informal pub- no longer consists primarily in making lic sphere can set up the agenda for the more present the absent, but in constructing the formal one? What happens when repre- demos and its interests. Similarly, for po- sentation no longer is democracy, as Plot- litical theorist Sofia Näsström, representa- ke has it, but becomes instead, as Rousseau tive democracy is a “tautology” because it warned long ago, its very demise? is only through representative structures There is no question, at this point, that and practices that the demos constitutes representative democracy is in the midst of itself.5 If the authors behind this so-called a serious crisis, at least if one is to judge by constructive turn are right, though, then the the recent numbers of books and articles on task of deliberation among citizens is not the topic.7 Institutionally, the symptoms are delegated to representatives only for rea- well-known: voting absenteeism, the de- sons of size and convenience. Deliberation cline of parties as vehicles for mass partici- must become the affair of representatives, pation,8 abysmal rates of approval for pol- rather than directly that of citizens them- iticians and legislatures across much of the selves, in order to be truly democratic. Western world, the rise of populist move- Political theorist Nadia Urbinati’s theory ments and the return of calls for more direct of representative democracy exemplifies forms of democracy–as are some of the a similar view. For Urbinati, deliberation causes–in the United States, a near com- among a smaller number of representa- plete lack of correlation between majority tives is not just equivalent but superior to preferences and policy outcomes when elite direct deliberation among all citizens. This preferences differ from those of the major- is because deliberation among representa- ity,9 rising economic inequalities across the

146 (3) Summer 2017 53 Deliberative Western world, and a sense that democ- This electoral and elitist character of rep- Democracy racies have been emptied of their mean- resentative democracy runs deep. It is un- as Open, 10 Not (Just) ing, if not altogether replaced by the rule surprisingly evidenced in the way politi- Representative of experts, bureaucrats, and judges.11 By cal theorists have captured the institutional Democracy contrast, both populist and authoritarian principles of representative democracy. movements are on the rise. These move- These, it turns out, fall short of being dem- ments have in common an antirepresenta- ocratic. In order to show this, I apply to tive stance that signals the problems with Bernard Manin and Nadia Urbinati’s list representative democracy and is some- of principles of representative democracy times meant to hasten its demise. the five criteria that Robert Dahl advances

While it is likely that the crisis of repre- in his classic Democracy and Its Critics as the Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/146/3/51/1830975/daed_a_00446.pdf by guest on 02 October 2021 sentative democracy is in part due to exter- benchmarks of authentic democratic asso- nal factors (such as globalization and tech- ciations: 1) effective participation; 2) voting nological change or what some see as the equality at the decisive stage; 3) enlightened crisis of capitalism in the West), it can also understanding; 4) control of the agenda; plausibly be traced to more fundamental and 5) inclusion of all adults. These five cri- design flaws. To understand what may be teria are, according to Dahl, “criteria that a wrong with representative democracy per process for governing an association would se, it helps to look critically at its core prin- have to meet in order to satisfy the require- ciples, a task to which I now turn. ment that all the members are equally entitled to participate in the association’s de- Representative democracy is the para- cision about its policies.”15 digm we associate with the form of democ- Effective participation means that there racy that emerged in the eighteenth century must be a direct connection between pop- at the time of the French and American rev- ular involvement and ultimate decision- olutions. It can be defined as a regime cen- making. Voting equality at the decisive tered on the elections of elites who act as stage means, very simply, “one person, one trustees of and make decisions on behalf vote” at the stage when decisions are made of the larger population.12 In theory, repre- final. Enlightened understanding means sentation need not involve election (I will that citizens must be able to pass informed return to this point). In practice, however, judgment on the matters deliberated or elections have become part of the very defi- voted on. Control of the agenda means that nition of representative democracy, partly the set of issues deliberated on should be because the theories developed to justify it defined by the citizens themselves.16 Inclu- crucially associate popular sovereignty with sion of all adults means that all adult mem- democratic authorization, and democratic bers of the demos (itself more polemically authorization, in turn, with consent ex- defined by Dahl as the people directly af- pressed through the ballot box.13 Thus, al- fected by the laws and policy outcomes) be though democratic representation need not given a share of power. imply elections, representative democracy Now, let us use these five democratic cri- has come to mean electoral democracy.14 As teria to assess the four institutional prin- a result, a core feature of representative de- ciples that Manin has articulated as cap- mocracy is the delegation of agenda-setting, turing the core of “representative gov- deliberation, and decision-making to a sub- ernment” (historically the first version set of the polity that is distinct from ordi- of representative democracy): 1) periodic nary people and explicitly identified and elections; 2) independence of the repre- chosen as a separate elite. sentatives; 3) freedom of opinion; and

54 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences 4) trial by discussion.17 The first princi- which the franchise is universal and voting Hélène ple, periodic elections, is the most cen- rights strictly equal so that, by default, cri- Landemore tral and is the one that most people asso- teria 2 and 5 (equality at the decisive stage ciate with democracy. It is a principle of and inclusion of all adults) are met. Even the authorization of representatives, re- then, or so I argue, the principles of what newed at periodic intervals. The periodic- we are now supposed to call (and are used ity is crucial in that, in theory, it ensures to calling) representative democracy still not only renewed consent and thus autho- fail three out of Dahl’s five criteria. rization, but also the accountability and re- Indeed, neither effective participation, sponsiveness of the representatives. Elec- nor agenda-setting, nor enlightened un-

tions thus double as democratic principle derstanding are credibly ensured by the Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/146/3/51/1830975/daed_a_00446.pdf by guest on 02 October 2021 and accountability mechanism. The sec- mere ability to elect one’s leaders every ond principle, the relative independence four years and, in between, publicly crit- of elites from their constituents, ensures a icize their decisions from outside the sites meaningful space for the exercise of judg- of decisive power. Representative democra- ment by the representatives, who can de- cy does not, in theory, require any form of part from their constituents’ preferences popular participation besides voting and, as needed. The third principle–freedom because it also does not credibly accommo- of opinion–counterbalances the second by date, let alone commit to, agenda-setting by ensuring that representatives, despite their ordinary citizens, it even weakens voting as freedom of judgment, can be criticized for a form of effective participation. Access to their decisions and choices. Popular pres- power is only possible through becoming sure does not jeopardize representatives’ elected, a path that, even in theory, is open independence but supposedly ensures, like only to people endowed with certain qual- periodic election, a form of accountability ities and, in practice, is mostly restricted to and responsiveness, including, crucially, people with either money or connections. in the period between elections. Manin’s Nor does representative democracy require last feature of representative government or guarantee enlightened understanding on is that public decisions are subject to trial the part of citizens. On the contrary, peri- by discussion, a feature one may equate odic elections and the independence of rep- with the deliberation at the heart of de- resentatives are intended to compensate for liberative democrats’ theories. the assumed absence of popular enlight- How does this list of the established prac- enment about political issues. On certain tices of representative government fare in Schumpeterian or “realist” versions of rep- light of Dahl’s normative criteria? Arguably resentative democracy, no room is made for it satisfies none of them. First, the principle democratic deliberation among ordinary of periodic elections does not specify uni- citizens as a vehicle for individual and col- versal franchise or the principle of “one per- lective enlightenment, since the latter is son, one vote,” and is thus fully compatible seen as either pointless or even counterpro- with voting systems based on a tax thresh- ductive.18 Representative democracy, final- old and plural voting schemes. As such, ly, also allows for the possibility of a com- representative government can violate plete disconnect between the decisions of both the second and last criteria: namely, representatives and the preferences of the voting equality at the decisive stage and represented, at least to the extent that the inclusiveness. But let us assume that these critical bite of “freedom of opinion” proves principles of representative government insufficient to bind elected representatives should today be applied only to a system in to their constituents’ preferences.

146 (3) Summer 2017 55 Deliberative The only democratic credentials of rep- perspectives, and interests of the popula- Democracy resentative democracy therefore seem to tion are not only reported on, but also made as Open, Not (Just) reside with the authorization and account- present in the political sphere in a way that Representative ability supposedly ensured by the princi- reflects some minimal amount of identifi- Democracy ple of periodic elections in a context of cation and similarities between represented universal suffrage and equal voting rights. and representatives. The argument that authorization at the Because of these two addenda, Urbinati’s voting booth and accountability through picture of representative democracy is more retrospective voting amounts to genuine democratic and thus more normatively at- rule of the people may have worked in the tractive than representative democracy as it

eighteenth century, when such a promise can be theorized on the basis of Manin’s his- Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/146/3/51/1830975/daed_a_00446.pdf by guest on 02 October 2021 seemed radical compared with past and ex- torical account. Urbinati’s theory, howev- isting regimes. But today, at the beginning er, accepts as a given the premise that dem- of the twenty-first century, who can still ar- ocratic representation must be electoral and, gue this with a straight face? The reality is despite the promise of a participatory model that representative government was mostly of representation, seemingly limits citi- designed to maintain the people at a safe zens’ possibility for action to judgment, crit- distance from any actual decision-making icism, and deliberation, all of them decou- power. Manin wrote that representative pled from actual decision-making power. As government, as a set of institutional prin- in Manin’s representative government, in ciples, replaced the ability to hold office Urbinati’s representative democracy, citi- that citizens enjoyed in Ancient Athens zens can protest and criticize all they want, with the mere ability to consent to power. but they are not meant to have any form of Expanding the franchise over the last two direct access to the decision-making pro- hundred years has allowed the advocates cess. Similarly, the ability to set the agen- of representative government to call it rep- da is missing from her model. Citizens can resentative democracy without altering this hope to influence the representatives’ agen- fundamental and problematic fact.19 da only through the blunt mechanism of Urbinati’s normative theory of represen- elections and the indirect pressure of pub- tative democracy arguably elevates this his- lic opinion. torical substitution (of consent for exercise Like that of other prominent deliberative of power) to the status of normative ideal. democrats, such as Habermas, Urbinati’s Urbinati’s list of principles of represen- theory assumes a reflexive and smooth cir- tative democracy includes all of Manin’s, cularity between the sphere of opinion for- embraced as normatively desirable in their mation through which ordinary citizens ex- own right, rather than merely recognized as change ideas and form views in decentral- de facto historical practices.20 But she also ized and unregulated ways and the sphere makes two crucial additions to the list: ad- of the formal will expressed by party rep- vocacy and representativity. Advocacy could resentatives and government officials. Yet be read as a stronger version of Manin’s the dichotomization between the spheres third principle of freedom of public opin- of opinion and will operates as, or at least ion in that representatives are supposed to tolerates, de facto closure of government to listen to the criticisms and views voiced in ordinary citizens. In Habermas, the “sluice” the public sphere, integrate them into their metaphor that is supposed to capture the re- reflections, and make it their duty to make lation between the two deliberative tracks those claims known and considered. Rep- (the formal and the informal) similarly resentativity means ensuring that the views, suggests a filtering mechanism separating

56 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences the unstructured deliberations of the peo- deliberative democrats ensure that delib- Hélène ple from those of elected elites. In the end, erative democracy is authentically dem- Landemore such dichotomies function as a way to close ocratic if it must also be representative? off the sphere of actual power and effective One way out is to try and bypass repre- deliberation to ordinary citizens. sentation altogether by developing models The history of representative democracy of inclusive deliberation among all citizens, and its conceptual elevation to a norma- as opposed to just their representatives. The tive ideal reveal that the crucial novelty of digital revolution has created the hope that this regime is not so much the indirectness the need for representation is now over and of the rule.21 Rather, the innovation is the that all citizens can and should now deliber-

regime form’s reflexiveness, and the fact ate with each other at once, online, in what Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/146/3/51/1830975/daed_a_00446.pdf by guest on 02 October 2021 that this reflexiveness is ensured by plac- can be theorized as “mass online delibera- ing agenda-setting, deliberation, and deci- tion.”22 The recent “systemic” turn in de- sion-making power in the hands of elected liberative democracy may perhaps be read elites as opposed to ordinary citizens. Rep- as a similar extension of the hope of real- resentative democracy thus marks the pas- izing direct deliberation on a mass scale.23 sage from a citizen-centric and people-cen- Such an approach has to assume either that tric model of democracy to an elite-centric the people and its interests are self-reveal- and government-centric one. This elitism ing in immediate ways or can be constructed and government centricity are present in all in nonrepresentative ways. institutional versions of representative de- Another way out–more promising, in mocracy that have evolved since the eigh- my view–is to acknowledge that democ- teenth century: parliamentary, party, and racy is always representative but that “rep- now audience democracy. These three iter- resentative democracy” as a historical par- ations marked important expansions of the adigm is but one model of indirect or (more franchise just as they maintained, and argu- aptly) deliberative and reflexive democracy. ably deepened, the rift between the people But here, too, there are two possible strate- and the class of law- and policy-makers sup- gies. One is to reclaim the concept of repre- posed to represent them. In other words, sentation and build into it new, more dem- to put it bluntly, representative democracy ocratic meanings. This is the path currently as we know it has turned out to be an ex- taken by a number of democratic theorists. clusionary paradigm, not a truly demo- Michael Saward, for example, has argued cratic one. It satisfies, at best, only two of for “making representation strange again” Dahl’s democratic criteria (inclusiveness and redefining it away from electoral au- and equality at the decisive stage), failing to thorization, as well as one-to-one or one- meet the crucial standards of effective par- to-many relationships mediated by voting ticipation, enlightened understanding, and only, and toward a pluralized understand- control of the agenda. ing of representation as “claim-making.” In the same vein, a number of democratic the- If what I just said is true, it has potentially orists have started advocating for nonelec- worrying implications for deliberative de- toral forms of democratic representation. mocracy. Deliberative democrats cannot at In theory, nothing precludes us from re- the same time claim that proper delibera- covering the term representative democracy tion is only possible, and indeed desirable, to mean a truly democratic system. But my in representative bodies and that their the- sense is that, at this point, we are better off ory of legitimacy is unaffected by the cri- starting fresh, and this is for at least four rea- sis of representative democracy. How can sons. The first is semantic. If we accept the

146 (3) Summer 2017 57 Deliberative constructive turn and the view that “rep- size that my analysis presupposes the lexical Democracy resentation is democracy,” as Plotke has priority of two higher-order principles that as Open, Not (Just) it, then the expression “representative de- should be at the core of any form of democ- Representative mocracy” is largely redundant and uninfor- racy: namely, inclusiveness and equality. Democracy mative. We need a better, more meaningful Inclusiveness means both that every adult name. A second reason to abandon repre- member of the demos is entitled to a share of sentative democracy is historical. Represen- power and that the definition of the demos tative democracy was born as an alternative itself is inclusive.26 Equality means that this to democracy: the mixed regime known as share of power must be equal for all. Con- “representative government.” It was only cretely, equality will often mean “one per-

slowly and painfully (and only somewhat) son, one vote” where voting (as distinct Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/146/3/51/1830975/daed_a_00446.pdf by guest on 02 October 2021 democratized over the last two centuries, from elections) is needed. This principle of with exclusionary trends arising to combat equality also means that each voice should each move toward inclusion. Despite theo- be given the same ex ante chance of being rists’ best efforts, one can only do so much to heard where deliberation is needed. Finally, change a fundamentally elitist and antidem- equality means that each individual has the ocratic construct into one in which power same opportunity of being a representative is exercised by ordinary citizens. The third where representation is needed. These two reason is pragmatic: it is simply too difficult higher-order principles, inclusiveness and at this point to clear the name of a paradigm equality, have to be assumed as underlying that is, the world over, associated with elec- (or lexically prior to) any of the other, lower- toral (and thus partly elitist) democracy.24 order principles that follow. Finally, a fourth reason has to do with the de Building on this, I propose that the main facto association of representative democra- five institutional principles of open de- cy with the nation-state and a narrow under- mocracy are: standing of what counts as “political.” In to- 1) Deliberation day’s global age, one can argue that our un- 2) The majoritarian principle derstanding of democracy should be more 3) Complex representation ambitious, expanding both laterally (to the 4) Rotation economic sphere) and vertically (to the in- 5) Openness. ternational level).25 My own suggestion, therefore, is to move The first principle, deliberation, forms entirely past and beyond “representative de- the core of the theory of democratic legit- mocracy.” Instead, deliberative democrats imacy that deliberative democrats have should build a new paradigm that places at convincingly developed over the last thir- its core democratic deliberation as a source ty years.27 Deliberation applied in the dem- of political legitimacy, meets basic demo- ocratic context is usually defined as the cratic standards such as effective participa- public exchange of reasons among free tion, agenda-control, and enlightened un- and equals. It is, to some degree, similar derstanding, and accommodates the reali- to Manin’s and Urbinati’s “trial by discus- ties and expectations of twenty-first-century sion” principle, except that deliberation is citizens. I offer below what I take to be an at- not assumed to involve ordinary citizens tractive version of such a new paradigm of only as members of a diffuse civil society democracy: open democracy. without access to direct decision-making power (as in Manin’s, Habermas’s, or Urbi- Let me offer a list of principles for open nati’s model). In this paradigm, democratic democracy. But before I do, let me empha- deliberation, whether direct or performed

58 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences through representatives, must involve or- Rotation, as a fourth principle, ensures Hélène dinary citizens. This principle helps ensure that power be made to circulate and not Landemore that the system meets Dahl’s requirement stay with any subset of the polity for longer of “enlightened understanding.” than strictly necessary. In the context of ran- The second principle is the majoritar- domly selected assemblies characteristic of ian principle. It is, strangely, the princi- lottocratic representation, periodic rotation ple that often makes most people recoil in would have the beneficial effect of impeding fear of the “tyranny of the majority.” Yet group-think, corruption, the formation of above and beyond elections, majority rule static coalitions, and the creation of a sep- or some variant of it (such as majority judg- arate class of rulers. The mandates for ran- 28

ment) is also the principle most widely domly selected or elected assemblies could Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/146/3/51/1830975/daed_a_00446.pdf by guest on 02 October 2021 associated with democracy. To the extent last from a few months to a few years, but that voting is necessary to resolve disagree- this principle makes it clear that the practice ments when deliberation does not produce of politics as a profession and politicians as a consensus, a default decision rule must be a separate caste is not part of this new ideal in place. The most democratic one, barring of democracy. While there should be plen- any good countervailing arguments to pos- ty of room for expert administrators in the it voting thresholds and minority vetoes, is machinery of government, the law and pol- some version of majority rule, for which icy decisions should ultimately be vetted by both strictly procedural and epistemic rea- ordinary citizens (properly educated for and sons can be adduced.29 The majoritarian informed about the tasks at hand), not ex- principle is the only principle that prevents perts or career politicians. To the extent that the domination of any minority. open democracy may still accommodate The third principle, complex representa- elected politicians, the ideal would ensure a tion, acknowledges that delegation of au- significant turnover of the personnel occupy- thority is both unavoidable in any reason- ing these elected functions, not just through ably sized polity and desirable on its own, the periodicity of elections (which, as we now insofar as it allows for the discovery, articu- know, may ensure some responsiveness and lation, and even construction of shared in- accountability but does little for actual turn- terests. In a democratic context, however, over of the political personnel) but also, for representation should not necessarily (or example, through term limits. at all) translate into electoral modes of rep- Openness, finally, is an umbrella con- resentation. Thus, the principles of open cept for both direct popular participation democracy do not explicitly include the of different types and transparency.31 Be- principle of elections because elections, far cause representation always creates the from being a, let alone the democratic prin- risk of robbing the people of the capacity ciple, are merely one selection mechanism for effective participation, agenda-setting, among others.30 Instead, lottery-based rep- and enlightened understanding, one needs resentation–or “lottocratic representation” to introduce the counterbalancing principle of the kind arguably central to Ancient of openness, in which, in the ideal, citizens Athens–becomes the default democratic can make their voices heard at any point in mode of representation, though not nec- time, initiate laws when they are not satis- essarily the only one. In some contexts, fied with the agenda set by representative self-selection–and perhaps even reinvent- authorities, and keep an informed eye on ed forms of electoral representation–may every step of the political process. also prove an appropriate form of demo- Openness thus prevents the closure and cratic representation. entrenchment of the divide between repre-

146 (3) Summer 2017 59 Deliberative sented and representative that may accom- tive democracy. Unlike representative de- Democracy pany representation. Openness means that mocracy, which is fully compatible with as Open, Not (Just) power should flow through the body poli- purely aggregative (usually Schumpeterian Representative tic, rather than stagnate with a few people. or “realist”) models of democracy, open Democracy Openness should translate into process democracy explicitly places deliberation at transparency much of the time (though not its normative core. It also acknowledges the always transparency about substance). It majoritarian principle as pointing to a cer- should also translate into a citizens’ right of tain type of democratic default rule when initiative and other modes of direct, effec- deliberation does not produce a consensus tive participation. The principle of open- and disagreement subsists. And at least at

ness is uniquely enabled by late-twentieth- the theoretical level, open democracy mea- Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/146/3/51/1830975/daed_a_00446.pdf by guest on 02 October 2021 and early-twenty-first-century technolo- sures up to basic democratic criteria that gies, such as the Internet, smartphones, representative democracy fails to satisfy, and social media. It is what makes open including effective participation, agenda- democracy most distinctive. setting, and enlightened understanding. In These five institutional principles are open democracy, ordinary citizens have a meant to operate under specific and en- meaningful chance to participate in law- abling conditions: liberal and what might and policy-making. They can be chosen by more inclusively be termed “empower- lotteries to occupy a position in significant ment” rights. Such rights constrain from political assemblies, something that under the outside the five institutional principles the right implementation should happen listed above. They also enable them by en- often enough. Even if they are not selected suring that everyone, including minority by the lottery process, citizens can freely members, is given a meaningful voice in access crowdsourcing platforms through the democratic process. Such rights may which their voice can be heard and can need to translate into quotas or parity laws make a difference to the outcome. In open ensuring that deliberations take into ac- democracy, ordinary citizens are also in count minority perspectives, especially in control of the agenda, either indirectly via contexts in which systematic minorities are randomly selected assemblies or more di- at risk of exclusion. Empowerment rights rectly via procedures such as a constitution- may also translate into rights of initiative, ally entrenched citizen’s initiative or a right which allow the discontents to challenge of referral. Having control of the agenda the status quo provided they garner a min- and a say in deliberation early in the pro- imal amount of support. Finally, to count- cess in turn renders voting, typically in a er the oppressive potential of the state, em- referendum, a genuinely effective form of fi- powerment rights may translate into spe- nal say and participation. The principles of cific protection rights for whistleblowers. deliberation combined with complex rep- These empowerment rights, however, need resentation and openness thus spreads en- not amount to full-fledged countermajori- lightened understanding among citizens. tarian constraints (such as vetoes, superma- In open democracy, democracy no lon- jority thresholds, or the creation of inde- ger means merely consenting to pow- pendent courts and agencies), which would er, as it does in our current understand- impede, rather than enable the principles of ing of representative democracy. It does open democracy. not always mean holding office, as it did in ancient democracy. But it means be- Let us now review the crucial differences ing able to access and thus hold power, between open democracy and representa- whether as a simple citizen able to influ-

60 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences ence the agenda of the legislative assembly periodic elections, parties, and geography- Hélène through an initiative, the content of repre- based constituencies) as is representative Landemore sentatives’ deliberations through crowd- democracy, it opens itself to entirely new sourcing platforms,32 and the outcome of applications, including in firms, online a vote in a referendum whose options were communities, and at various levels of the shaped by his views; or even more directly, international stage. Open democracy al- by being chosen to participate in a ran- lows us to reinvent democratic politics for domly selected assembly charged with set- the twenty-first century. ting the agenda or making the law. I have not mentioned in this list of prin- In order for deliberative democracy to re-

ciples the nature of the relation between main relevant in the crisis of representa- Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/146/3/51/1830975/daed_a_00446.pdf by guest on 02 October 2021 representatives and represented, because tive democracy, its advocates must distance in this new paradigm, the representative themselves from the paradigm of represen- relationship should be able to take many tative democracy, at least as this essay has forms as long as it is broadly democratic reconstructed an important critical read- (a question that needs a lot more investiga- ing of it. There are probably many ways to tion than can be conducted here). Most im- rescue deliberative democracy from the cri- portant, anyone should be able to be a rep- sis of representative democracy. The strate- resentative. This is what lottocratic repre- gy pursued here is to break entirely the cur- sentation would ensure by default, though rent association between deliberative de- one could envision a reimagined elector- mocracy and representative democracy al system along the lines of what is some- by sketching a new paradigm of democra- times theorized as “delegative” or “liquid” cy that maintains deliberation among free democracy, in which people can give their and equal individuals as the core of demo- votes to anyone they like, either for a spec- cratic legitimacy, but also complicates our ified amount of time or just to work on cer- understanding of democratic representa- tain issues, with the option of recall at any tion and detaches it from electoral mecha- time and the possibility of retaining the nisms. In this new paradigm of open democ- right to direct input throughout.33 racy, deliberation, the majoritarian princi- Open democracy, finally, marks a distinct ple, complex representation, rotation, and historical stage in the unfolding of the ideal openness would bring power back to the of democracy, including deliberative de- people, instantiating the ideal of people’s mocracy. Because it is not as tied down to es- rule (demokratia) more fully than represen- tablished practices and institutions (such as tative democracy as we know it.

endnotes 1 Joshua Cohen, “Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy,” in The Good Polity, ed. Alan Hamlin and Philip Pettit (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989). Otherwise anticipated by many other authors from Aristotle to Madison and John Stuart Mill, as well as, in its contemporary version, Joseph Bessette. 2 One could argue that Bruce Ackerman and James Fishkin’s Deliberation Day, as well as con- stitutional moments, count as direct deliberation on a national scale, but the reality is that they are more akin to deliberation among clusters of individuals occurring across the coun- try, with no evidence that these clusters add up to what genuine mass deliberation should look like: namely, one single, integrated conversation among all individuals gathered in the same room.

146 (3) Summer 2017 61 Deliberative 3 Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy, Democracy trans. William Rehg (Cambridge, Mass.: The mit Press, 1996). as Open, 4 Not (Just) David Plotke, “Representation is Democracy,” Constellations 4 (1) (1997): 19–34; Sofia Näsström, Representative “Representation as Tautology,” European Journal of Political Theory 5 (3) (2006): 321–342; Nadia Democracy Urbinati, Representative Democracy: Principles and Genealogy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006), 328; Nadia Urbinati and Mark Warren, “The Concept of Representation in Contem- porary Political Theory,” Annual Review of Political Science 11 (2008): 387–412; and Lisa Disch, “Toward a Mobilization Conception of Democratic Representation,” American Political Science Review 105 (1) (2011): 100–114. 5 Näsström, “Representation as Tautology.” 6 This model departs from traditional views on the role of representatives (such as Madison’s

or Burke’s) in that no assumption is made that the judgments of the representatives are in any Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/146/3/51/1830975/daed_a_00446.pdf by guest on 02 October 2021 way superior to those of the ordinary citizens. 7 Jack Hayward, ed., The Crisis of Representation in Europe (Abingdon, United Kingdom: Routledge, 1996); Colin Crouch, Post-Democracy (Cambridge: Polity, 2004); Pippa Norris, Democratic Deficit: Criti- cal Citizens Revisited (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Donatella della Porta, Can Democracy Be Saved? Participation, Deliberation, and Social Movements (Cambridge: Polity, 2013); Yannis Papadopoulos, Democracy in Crisis: Politics, Governance, and Policy (London: Palgrave, Mac- Millan, 2013); and Simon Tormey, The End of Representative Politics (Cambridge: Polity, 2015). 8 See Peter Mair, Ruling the Void: The Hollowing Out of Western Democracy (New York: Verso, 2013). 9 Martin Gilens and Benjamin Page, “Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest-Groups, and Average Citizens,” Perspectives on Politics 12 (3) (2014): 564–581. 10 Colin Crouch, Post-Democracy (Cambridge: Polity, 2004); and John Keane, The Life and Death of Democracy (New York, London: W. W. Norton & Company, 2009). 11 Frank Vibert, The Rise of the Unelected (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); and Papadopoulos, Democracy in Crisis. 12 Bernard Manin, The Principles of Representative Government (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). 13 Ibid. 14 For example, see ibid., 18; and Eric Nelson, “Prerogative, Popular Sovereignty, and the Amer- ican Founding,” in Popular Sovereignty in Historical Perspective, ed. Richard Bourke and Quentin Skinner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016). 15 Robert Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1998), 37–38. 16 Political scientists in the twentieth century learned that power involves not only deciding (the most visible “face” of power) but also agenda-setting. See Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, “Two Faces of Power,” American Political Science Review 56 (4) (1962): 947–952; and Ste- ven Lukes, Power: A Radical View (London: Macmillan Press, 1974). 17 Bernard Manin, The Principles of Representative Government (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). These four principles are not ideal criteria (like Dahl’s) but mere idealizations of established historical practices; thus, their fuction is essentially descriptive rather than normative. 18 See Christopher Achen and Larry Bartels, Democracy for Realists: Why Elections Do Not Produce Re- sponsive Government (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2016); and Ian Shapiro, “Col- lusion in Restraint of Democracy: Against Political Deliberation,” Dædalus 146 (3) (Summer 2017). 19 Manin, The Principles of Representative Government, 79. 20 Though she does not list them explicitly in her book, Urbinati mentions that she accepts all of Manin’s principles in Hélène Landemore, “Is Representative Democracy Really Demo-

62 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences cratic? Interview of Bernard Manin and Nadia Urbinati, New York, April 10, 2007,” http:// Hélène www.booksandideas.net/Is-representative-democracy-really.html. Landemore 21 For example, agenda-setting in Ancient Athens, the classic archetype of “direct” democracy, was done by a randomly selected subset of citizens, the Boule–arguably a representative, rather than direct, assembly. 22 Cyril Velikanov, “Mass Online Deliberation,” unpublished article, https://www.academia.edu/ 12031548/Mass_Online_Deliberation (accessed December 25, 2016). 23 John Parkinson and Jane Mansbridge, Deliberative Systems: Deliberative Democracy at the Large Scale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012). 24 Consider the Freedom House definition of democracy as a political system “whose leaders are elected in competitive multi-party and multi-candidate processes in which opposition parties have a legitimate chance of attaining power or participating in power.” Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/146/3/51/1830975/daed_a_00446.pdf by guest on 02 October 2021 25 For a defense of democracy in the firm, see Hélène Landemore and Isabelle Ferreras, “Toward a Justification of the Firm-State Analogy: In Defense of Workplace Democracy,” Political Theory 44 (1) (2016): 53–81. 26 The exact criterion for inclusiveness may be too controversial to specify further, since the “all-affected” principle is often seen as too general and any restriction based on nationality, geography, or ethnicity too arbitrary. 27 By itself, deliberation is not a democratic principle. Deliberation becomes democratic when it is constrained by the underlying higher-order principles of inclusiveness and equality. Addi- tionally, deliberation must take place publicly in order to count as democratic. Embedded in the ideal of deliberation as a condition of legitimacy is another principle, orthogonal to that of equality: namely, the principle of substantive merit. Although all should have an equal chance of being heard, arguments should be judged on the merits. It is therefore legitimate that not all voices influence the outcome equally. 28 See Michel Balinski and Rida Lariki, Majority Judgment: Measuring, Ranking, and Electing (Cam- bridge, Mass.: The mit Press, 2011). In this book, Balinski and Lariki suggest substituting the traditional interpretation of majority rule as a collective ranking of the available alternatives with an interpretation of majority rule as a collective judgment or evaluation of these same alternatives (as in, typically, wine competitions). 29 I have myself offered an argument for the epistemic properties of democracy based on democratic inclusiveness as a proxy for the cognitive diversity necessary for smart deliberation. See Hélène Landemore, Democratic Reason: Politics, Collective Intelligence, and the Rule of the Many (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2013). 30 It is possible to imagine elections falling closer to democracy than they currently do on the con- tinuum between oligarchic and democratic device. Nonetheless, elections are a fundamentally Janus-faced selection mechanism that functions to exclude as well as include. Because their democratic credentials are only partial, elections should not be raised to the level of democratic principle. One could even imagine democracies that would do away with elections entirely, if elections proved too difficult to reconcile with the equality of opportunities to become a representative. For example, see David Van Reybrouk, Against Elections: The Case for Democracy (New York: Random House, 2016). 31 See the Obama administration’s concept of “open government.” Although the implementation fell short of the promise, the concept remains enticing as an umbrella for democratic val- ues such as transparency, participation, and collaboration. 32 For examples of crowdsourcing as a participatory tool in policy processes, see Hélène Lande- more, “Inclusive Constitution-Making: The Icelandic Experiment,” Journal of Political Philosophy 23 (2) (2015): 166–191. 33 See Bryan Ford, “Delegative Democracy,” unpublished article (2002), http://www.bryno saurus.com/log/2002/0515-DelegativeDemocracy.pdf.

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