Political Sociology
STREAMS 9 Political Sociology
New ways of deeping democracy: the deliberative democracy. An approach to the models of j. Cohen and j. Habermas
Carmen Sancho 1
NEW WAYS OF DEEPING DEMOCRACY: THE DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY.
AN APPROACH TO THE MODELS OF J. COHEN AND J. HABERMAS
CARMEN SANCHO
This paper deals with Deliberative Democracy. A new conception of democracy which is based on debate and public reasoning among free and equal citizens. In deliberative democracy, collective decision-making requires the parties to give one another mutually acceptable reasons. Thus, it aims to overcome an individualistic view focused on personal interests and preferences and to encourage the public interest and the common good. I will begin with the main features of this new paradigm (I). Then I will examine in greater detail two different approaches of deliberative democracy: J. Cohen’s model (II) and J. Habermas’ model (III). Both authors have played a key role in developing deliberative theory. The analysis of both perspectives will allow us to establish, first, the main ideas of the debate and, second, the questions in dispute and the elements which should be developed more thoroughly. All this shapes the framework of this deliberative model whose aim is to comply with the growing demands of democratic progress.
I. WHAT IS DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY? During the last decades, democracy has suffered a double paradoxical process: on the one hand, the collapse of communism involves the conclusive triumph of democratic system; on the other hand, while democratic ideal spreads becoming a widely accepted goal, critics about its application arise from many and different fields. Democracy holds the legitimacy of being the best possible regime, but suspicions are being raised on the Establishment and institutional performance, as well as the indifference towards political parties. Liberal-representative democracy appears now as an imperfect democracy which needs to be enhanced and deepened; it is demanded an increased participation of citizenship as well as a different way of doing and understanding politics. It is in this context where the model of deliberative democracy fits. Its origin can be traced to the article by J. M. Bessette Deliberative Democracy: The Majority Principle in Republican Government, published in 1980, where the concept of deliberative democracy first appears.1 It is a way of understanding
1 J. M. Bessette: “Deliberative Democracy: The Majority Principle in Republican Government”, in R. A. Goldwin and W. A. Schambra (eds.): How Democratic Is The Constitution, Washington, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1980. However, the idea of deliberation is not entirely new. Back in Athens, the debate and the reflection previous to the political action were essential. Much later, with the emergence of modern democracy, the idea of deliberation will be highlighted as the guarantee of correction in political actions, since it allows to take decisions having in mind the common good of a country and it is subjected neither to personal nor partial interests. (Burke, Speech to the Electors of Bristol). But since Bessette’s article, it is no longer a question of attaching importance to the idea of deliberation inside politics but a question of the deliberative democracy appearing as a model of democracy with its own identity. 2 democracy based on dialogue, debate and discussion as the fundamental elements of the political process. During these last 20 years many authors have gradually taken an interest in this view of democracy and their proposals differ in numerous aspects.2 In any case, it is possible to outline a common framework in which all of them have their place and which was useful for identifying the key ideas present in deliberation. The deliberative conception if democracy is expressly built versus a way of understanding democracy labelled strategic perspective and which is associated with the predominant forms of democracy; that is, the liberal-representative model. Since one of the distinctive features of contemporary society is the coexistence of numerous and varied interests, values and beliefs, of different opinions on what to do and how to do it, we must ask ourselves: what is the most appropriate way of making political decisions in this context?; how is it possible to reconcile all these differences while ensuring citizens’ liberty and equality? According to the strategic perspective, there are two mechanisms which make it possible to answer these questions. The first is the aggregation of preferences, that is, the sum of different interests so that the majority interest will prevail over the rest. This is the standard procedure in elections. The second is the bargaining among conflicting interests. The final result will depend on the power and resources of each party. When making a political decision and when there are preferences in conflict, the parties negotiate until they reach an agreement. From this strategic view, the purpose of democracy is to generate collective decisions that respect individual preferences.. However, it cannot be said that the strategic perspective rules out public debate. But the goal of this debate is to persuade the other party to accept the proposals which favour one’s benefit. In other words, it is a question of evaluating the alternatives according to their coherence with one’s personal interests. On the other hand, the deliberative approach is focused on the collective search for the proposal that is best for all. It is true that there are different political preferences, but the process of political decision-making must be based on the exchange of reasons and arguments until reaching an agreement all the parties involved can accept. This way, it would not be a question of preserving personal preferences, but rather of producing political decisions favourable for the common good. Open and public
2 Some of the most important proponents of deliberation (besides those who will be studied on this paper) are: S. Benhabib: “Deliberative rationality and models of democratic legitimacy”, Constellations, nº1 (1), 1994, pp. 26-53; Democracy and difference: Contesting the boundaries of the political, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1996. J. Bohman: Public Deliberation: Pluralism, Complexity and Democracy, Cambridge, The MIT Press, 1996; “The coming of ages of deliberative democracy”, The Journal of Political Philosophy, nº6 (4), 1998, pp. 400-425. J. S. Dryzek: Discursive Democracy: Politics, Policy and Political Science, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1990; Deliberative Democracy and Beyond. Liberal, critics, contestation, New York, Oxford University Press, 2000. J. Fishkin: Democracia y deliberación. Nuevas perspectivas para la reforma democrática. Barcelona, Ariel, 1995. A. Gutmann and D. Thompson: Democracy and disagreement, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1996; “Why deliberative democracy is different?”, Social Philosophy and Policy, nº17 (1), 2000, pp.161-180. S. Macedo: (ed.) Deliberative politics: Essays on democracy and disagreement, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999. C. Nino: La constitución de la democracia deliberativa, Barcelona, Gedisa, 1997. 3 debate aimed towards this purpose allows to increase information, to improve the quality of the decisions and also making it possible a better disposition towards co-operation and a more political legitimacy. 3 At once I will come back to these questions since they are the main arguments in favour of deliberative democracy. But first it is necessary to make a brief excursus. As I have stated, the deliberative model is, at first, opposed to the liberal-representative model, although this does not mean that proponents of deliberation defend a system of direct democracy; only a minority actually does. Therefore, direct participation of citizens and deliberation do not always come together and, in fact, the degree of citizen participation varies from one theory to another.4 A proposal combining deliberation and representation is offered by John Rawls. Rousseau would represent the opposite extreme, that is, direct participation of citizens but without deliberation. To summarise, deliberative democracy implies a process of making political decisions based on the exchange of reasons and arguments. In this process all citizens participate (either directly or through their representatives) by going beyond their own personal interests and viewpoints in order to reflect on the common good. From this approach, virtues of deliberation improve democracy in five basic aspects. First, it enhances the legitimacy of political decisions.5 If the democratic exercise of political power is only legitimate when it is the outcome of the people’s will, then citizen participation in deliberation (understood as a formation process of the general will) seems to perfectly fit that demand for legitimacy. It is a will which is shaped during the deliberation process: it does not go before to political debate and it is not merely the sum of the different individual wills. In this process, citizens exchange ideas and opinions about what they consider to be the best political proposal. But -and this is essential in deliberative democracy- they must give reasons in favour or against these proposals in order to reach an agreement. However, these reasons cannot be considered true or false; at the most they can be considered strong or weak, whether they can get more or less support. This is why deliberation is particularly well-suited to the nature of political debate, which is very often a confrontation between different rules and values. But this does not mean decisions were arbitrary. Some values are more capable than others of getting approval from a reasonable audience. It is impossible to prove their validity, but they can be justified. And the power of this justification can only be measured by the extent and intensity by which it is accepted. Second, deliberation favours a greater quality of the decisions made due to an increased collaboration and information. Since it is not expressed in terms of contest or negotiation, public debate
3 For the analysis of these two perspectives in relation to the power implicit in all kinds of communication see: L. Pellizzoni: “The myth of the best argument: power, deliberation and reason”, British Journal of Sociology, nº52 (1), 2001, pp.59-86. 4 Félix Ovejero has recently distinguished four types of ideal democracy as the result of combining two dimensions: participation vs. representation and deliberation vs. negotiation. These ideal models are: assembly democracy (negotiation and participation); pure liberal democracy (negotiation and representation); republican democracy (deliberation and participation); and mixed liberal democracy (deliberation and representation). F. Ovejero: La libertad inhóspita, Barcelona, Paidós, 2002. 5 Manin is perhaps the author who best has linked both ideas: deliberation and political legitimacy. B. Manin: “On Legitimacy and political deliberation”, Political Theory nº15 (3), 1987, pp. 338-368. 4 allows a larger co-operation among those involved and makes it unnecessary to withhold information. In this way, through the exchange of reasons, opinions and ideas, the available information increases in two respects: new alternatives not previously considered can appear and, additionally, it is possible to analyse the consequences of each proposal. Thus the quality of decisions improves. Third, deliberation reinforces the common good over private interests. If the aim is to make collective decisions which have a bearing on common benefit, each opinion must be expressed in terms acceptable by all, making it necessary to transform personal interests into publicly defensible principles. In a public debate, no one can convince their audience of their viewpoint without being able to argue why he / she considers it to be good, just or advisable, and why should be considered as such by the others. In this sense, deliberation makes it difficult that the reasons put forward to support each proposal are exclusively based on personal interest.6 Fourth, deliberation improves citizens’ intellectual and moral abilities. Participation in public debates helps develop the capacity to reason and listen and favours co-operation and tolerance. The idea that political participation is beneficial to citizenship is a long-standing thought within democratic theory, ranging from Rousseau, Tocqueville or Mill to Arendt, Pateman or Barber.7 Deliberative democracy theorists take this line of argument and they apply to the participation in deliberation. Finally, deliberation generates fairer and more rational political decisions. It is true that deliberation does not completely guarantee the impartiality of results. However, since in deliberation problems are analysed in detail, the available information is more complete, and each proposal must be backed up by reasons acceptable by all, impartiality seems closer than it might with a simple vote or negotiation.8
The theories of Joshua Cohen and Jürgen Habermas can be considered the basis on which the model of deliberative democracy has been built. Cohen, in Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy, was the first one to design in detail the features of a deliberative procedure for collective decision-making. His ideas have subsequently been recovered, revised and/or criticised by other authors (including Habermas)
6 It is true that the possibility of deceit persists, but it becomes more difficult. And for several reasons: (1) There is more information. (2) The subsequent coherence must be taken in mind; if later it is proved that one was lying, one shows oneself up. This is related to the virtues of publicity (discourse publicity, not commercial), a fundamental element in classic democracy which today appears, among others, in H. Arendt or B. Barber. (3) In any case, the benefits from one’s proposal increase, affecting not only oneself but the rest. 7 H. Arendt: “Sobre la violencia”, in Crisis de la República, Madrid, Taurus, 1973. B. Barber: Strong Democracy, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1984. J. S. Mill: Del gobierno representativo, Madrid, Tecnos, 1985. C. Pateman: Participation and Democratic Theory, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1970. J. J. Rousseau: El Contrato Social, Madrid, Aguilar, 1973. A. Tocqueville: La Democracia en América (2 vol.), Madrid, Alianza, 1996. 8 For a critical reflection on these arguments, see: S. C. Stokes: “Patologías de la deliberación” y A. Przeworski: “Deliberación y dominación ideológica” in J. Elster (comp.) La democracia deliberativa, Barcelona, Gedisa, 2001. Their critic to deliberation lies on the possibility that deceit and manipulation of the communication will lead citizens to support beliefs which do not correspond with their best interests. J. Knight and J. Johnson, in “Aggregation and deliberation: Possibility of democracy legitimacy”, Political Theory, nº 22 (2), 1994, pp. 277-296, point directly to the link between deliberation and the increased legitimacy of political decisions. For a more general perspective, see: J. Johnson: “Argumentos a favor de la deliberación. Algunas consideraciones escépticas” en J. Elster (comp) op. cit. And M. Cooke: “Five arguments for deliberative democracy”, Political Studies nº48, 2000, pp. 947-969. 5 as the starting point for their own proposals. In Teoría de la Acción Comunicativa, Habermas differentiates between a kind of social action aimed at the understanding among citizens –communicative action– and an action aimed solely at the achievement of personal interests –strategic action–. Political implications of this opposition appear in Habermas’ conception of democracy stated in Facticidad y Validez. Both Cohen and Habermas define themselves as radical democrats. This implies a horizontal view of politics, where there is no gap between a decision making elite and the citizenship to whom those decisions are applied.9 In this sense, democracy is understood as a way of self-government requiring the legitimate exercise of power to arise from free communication among equal citizens. Nevertheless, only Cohen carries out this approach to its logical conclusion: he thinks citizens must directly participate in decision making. Habermas also defends citizens’ participation in deliberation, but within the boundaries of civil society, since decision making is the domain of political institutions.
II. JOSHUA COHEN’S MODEL: DELIBERATION, PUBLIC REASONING AND DIRECT PARTICIPATION. Cohen’s model of democracy is a model of deliberation where citizens participate directly in decision making. A deliberation which is mainly linked to public reasoning and not so much to discussion or information exchange. We will first pay attention to the procedure Cohen establishes for collective decision making was deliberative. (1). Starting form public reasoning, it is possible to reach a democratic model with substantive character. (2). Finally we will analyse how that citizen participation is articulated(3).
1. Outcomes of deliberation are only legitimate when they are based on a free and reasoned agreement among equal citizens. Therefore, the process of decision making must meet these conditions: reasonableness, freedom, equality and search for consensus. This is what Cohen calls the Ideal Deliberative Procedure: principles which must guide the institutionalisation of deliberation.10 Habermas takes this procedure in his theory of deliberative democracy, although, as we will see, he applies it differently. First, ideal deliberation is based on reasoning because the participants, that is, the citizens, are asked to give reasons for their political proposals, either supporting them or rejecting them. The commitment to deliberation as a way of decision making involves accepting that the determining factors of each policy are reasons and not power or different interests. Second, deliberation is free because the participants are not subjected to any restriction except for the limits imposed by the results. This means that they determine what issues will be discussed,
9 For an excellent development of the debate between vertical and horizontal democracies, see: G. Sartori: Teoría de la democracia. Vol.1. El debate contemporáneo, Madrid, Alianza, 2000. Particularly chapters 5 and 6. 10 J. Cohen: “Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy” in J. Bohman and W. Rehg (eds.): Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics, Cambridge, The MIT Press, 1997 [first published in A. Hamlin and P. Pettit (eds.): The Good Polity, Oxford, Blackwell, 1989]. 6 propose solutions to the different political problems, justify those solutions and make a decision. There are no a priori rules interfering in the analysis and evaluation of the different proposals, nor censure of the issues susceptible to deliberative discussion. Reaching an agreement through deliberation is reason enough to accept it. This is its only limitation. Third, in ideal deliberation, citizens are equal both formally and substantively. They are formally equal because they have the same right to participate in every step of the deliberation process (to introduce issues in the political debate, to propose solutions, and so on) and because they all have the same consideration. And they are substantially equal because the distribution of power or resources does not determine their opportunities to contribute to deliberation. Participants are not restricted by the system of existing rights, which is also a potential object of deliberation. Substantive equality seems to point to a more egalitarian distribution of material resources with the goal of eliminating those obstacles outside of the individuals that restrict their actual opportunities of participating in deliberation. It is the equality characteristic of socialism, linked elsewhere by Cohen to deliberative democracy11. Finally, deliberation seeks to reach an agreement about the political problems in discussion. An agreement based on public reasoning among free and equal citizens . However, there is no guarantee that this consensus will be reached, not even under these ideal circumstances. If that were the case, it would be necessary to resort to a certain kind of voting to end the deliberation. The important issue here is the process preceding the election, since that is what distinguishes deliberation from aggregation of preferences.
2. Deliberative democracy, Cohen underscores, does not only mean highlighting discussion over negotiation or election. Discussion is always valuable since it allows a greater available information in public debate.12 But the really distinctive feature of deliberation is that it takes root political justification with public reasoning. Deliberation is synonymous of public reasoning. The next step, therefore, is to establish the type of reasons valid for public debate, bearing in mind the characteristic pluralism of modern societies. That is, today they exist many different philosophies of life, cultures and traditions, each with its own concept of right and with its specific scale of values. In this context ideas, values or arguments will be considered valid as political reasons only if they can be acceptable by free, equal and reasonable citizens. The criterion of validity for an argument is not its veracity but its acceptability. Political justification requires that each citizen must offer convincing reasons when supporting or rejecting institutions, programs or policies.
11 J. Cohen: “The economic basis of deliberative democracy” Social Philosophy and Policy n.6 (2), 1989, p.25-50. In this work Cohen sketches (starting to deliberation as a mean to improve democracy) a kind of socialism which, without defending the collective property of the means of production, does establish measures such as public control of investment or self-management in working environments. However, it must be noted that Cohen has not subsequently carried on that line of analysis. 12 That is the reason why it is an ever-present element in any model of democracy, although the goals of that information exchange differ from one model to another. 7
However, if we lack a background of shared principles and values (pluralism) which allows us to give substance to the decisions made, must political agreement be restricted to an institutional design which guarantees the fairness of the decision making procedures?; does that mean that democracy must inevitably be procedural, with no place for substantive elements? Not necessarily. In fact, Cohen thinks that both, pluralism and substantive democracy, are possible through a deliberative decision-making insofar as public reasoning allow to reach a substantive agreement since it focuses debate on the common good13. All this is feasible without undermining the basic rights nor giving up the actual political participation of the citizenship14. In order to argue how public reasoning and common good are linked, Cohen uses a two-tiered discourse, even though he does not express it explicitly. The first level would refer to the ideal behaviour of citizens. The starting point is the fact that the commitment to deliberation implies that they do not come to public debate with preferences established in advance ready to impose them on others. When discussing how to solve a problem, citizens are not trying to satisfy their own interests but trying to find the best political solution for everyone. However, Cohen is aware that as long as people have personal preferences and interests, it remains a possibility of deceit. And this would be the second level, where the starting point is a strategic behaviour, that is, disguising personal interest as common good. In this case the line of argument is that having to find reasons compelling to others also has influence on the proposal each one submits. I may have reasons to support a certain political proposal which benefits me, but my own profit will not carry weight on public deliberation because it will not be a reason for others. Any reason in order to be accepted as valid, it must be independent from one’s profit and this leads to reformulate the political proposal so that it also benefits other people. Thus, a shift in preferences happens: it is no longer a question of taking advantage but of co-operating, at least, for a more general benefit. In spite of a certain strategic motivation may persist (to achieve something beneficial for all, but also for me), there is useful information for all citizens.
13 Aggregative conceptions of democracy are sceptical to this respect. Such is the case of Robert Dahl, for whom the concepts of common good in modern societies are either too imprecise to be useful as guides when designing and developing policies or so specific that they are unacceptable since their consequences are disastrous for society, inasmuch as they give priority to that common good over the basic rights –classic liberal argument. In short, common good views are only acceptable as far as they are procedural, that is, the very democratic process is the common good. R. Dahl: Democracy and Its Critics, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1989. Quoted by J. Cohen: “Procedure and Substance...”, .cit. p.420. 14 Closely linked with the issue of common good is another of the basic dilemmas of democracy, namely: the opposition between political rights –the liberties of the ancients– and non political rights –liberties of the moderns–. Traditionally, it has been considered that the former contribute to guarantee full equality in political process, and the latter protect the citizens’ private autonomy against potential inferences from the state or from other citizens. The problem is that although the political rights appear as constitutive elements of the democratic procedure which preserve the link between popular authorisation and political results, the non political rights seem to be based on values independent from the democratic values whose goal is to set limits and restrictions to that procedure in order to safeguard private autonomy. Cohen deals with these issues in “Procedure and Substance...”, op. cit. and in “Democracia y Libertad” en J. Elster (comp): La democracia deliberativa, Barcelona, Gedisa, 2001. 8
Now then, the shift of preferences taking place during the process does not come from an increase of information. This is why, for Cohen, the distinguished feature of deliberation is not discussion. Discussion does not protect citizens from a strategic behaviour which might lead to use information for manipulating, deceiving or misinforming. Deliberation, understood as public reasoning, favours the common good because reflection and analysis on the reasons one has for supporting or rejecting a specific policy may suggest new implications and consequences which were not part of the initial preferences and might surface as new reasons after the deliberation process. The ideas, interests or proposals that give shape to the common good are not previous to public debate, but those which survive deliberation.
3. The model of democracy Cohen defends stems from the premise that citizen participation of any kind, aspiring to fully develop the ideal of self-government must be deliberative, autonomous and institutional. We have already looked at how Cohen understands deliberation. Autonomy goes back to the idea of being the participants in deliberation themselves who select the issues to be discussed and propose solutions. Finally, it is necessary to institutionalise public spaces where citizens can actually take part in decision-making; namely, it is not enough to establish a public culture of political debate in keeping with the existing political institutions or instruments. This is the framework in which Cohen’s proposal of a directly-deliberative polyarchy (DDP)15 fits in. He want to combine the advantages of two different instruments. On the one hand, self-government at a local level is closer to the real problems and it is more efficient when it comes to solving them. Citizen participation favours the rise of those issues that reflect their worries and that, otherwise, might not be present; also, it make possible introduce relevant information about the main aspects of the issue discussed in the decision making; moreover, it allows to detect potential manipulations, deceptions and distortions of information, as well as undesired consequences of previous policies and decisions. When this is additionally done in a deliberative way, what we achieve is, first: encourage that the different proposals be weighed up, knowing that reasons considered acceptable by the rest must be submitted. Second, the very mutual reason-giving reinforces, in turn, the commitment to a way of understanding politics as a search for the common good and it strays from negotiation or competition of interests. And, finally, it tends to reduce disagreement since preferences are conformed by deliberation itself. On the other hand, and having in mind the short-sightedness which sometimes accompanies localism, Cohen introduces an element of deliberative co-ordination through the institutionalisation of communication mechanisms among the different local units. The main purpose of this connection refers to
15 The following lines about institutionalisation of the deliberation are based on “Reflections on Habermas...” op.cit. and specially on J. Cohen and C. Sabel: “Directly-Deliberative Polyarchy”, European Law Journal, n.3 (4), 1997, p.313-342. When using the term polyarchy they follow Robert Dahl. Thus, the concept of “directly-deliberative polyarchy” refers to a type of democracy where some degree of direct deliberation appears and the term “directly- deliberative democracy” is reserved to refer to an ideal model characterised for being fully deliberative and direct. 9 advantages of sharing experiences. Since the ultimate aim is to find the best possible solution to problems, these links make easy analyse divers and distant experiences and policies, their effectiveness and their advisability. Thus, each group’s proposals are examined and discussed not only from their own opinions, ideas and knowledge, but also in light of other local units’ experiences, difficulties and achievements. In this sense deliberative co-ordination improves quality of political decisions. Already existing institutions (legislatures, administrative agencies, courts and so on) are responsible for ensuring that all these conditions are complied. These institutions do not disappear and are still occupied by persons elected according to the conventional democratic procedures. Only their role in the decision making changes. Thus, for example, the task of legislatures would be basically to facilitate the problem solving in the local units of deliberation by establishing issue-defined areas where it would set general goals. They also help in organisation, assigning the necessary resources and supervising, in short, their performance. All this does not exclude its capacity to legislate in those matters which require a collective solution, always justifying its intervention. Whereas the task of administrative organisms would be to set the necessary infrastructure for the transmission of information, exchange of experiences and co- ordination among the different local units. In this way the costs of the deliberative process would be reduced. To conclude, it is a model of federalist overtone where political decision making belong to local units. Although legislatures, executives and administrative agencies keep the right to intervene when a certain question needs an answer at a national level; and, likewise, they must favour and collaborate in the consolidation of a deliberative politics. Through DDP Cohen tries to combine the virtues of deliberation with its application to real politics, specifying interesting factors about the institutional design. All this gives his proposal a unique relevancy in the debate about deliberation and the ways it might deepen democratic participation.
III. JÜRGEN HABERMAS’ MODEL: A TWO-TRACK DELIBERATION Habermas seeks to recover the radical contents of democracy, since he considers necessary to link more closely citizens and political practice. The old promise of a self-organised community of free and equal citizens is still possible in plural and complex modern societies, but from a new perspective, the one given by the theory of the discourse. I will talk first about the fundamental principles of Habermas’ model (1) and then I will analyse how he articulates deliberation and the role played by the citizenship (2).
1. Last decades have seen arise and develop an interesting debate between two powerful paradigms: liberalism and republicanism. From Habermas’ perspective, deliberative democracy appears as an alternative to both; it appears as a third approach which tries to capture the most significant aspects 10 of each of these paradigms and combines them so that the obstacles Habermas finds in each of them can be overcome16. Liberalism is based on the separation of state and society. Citizens have a series of subjective rights which the state has to protect and which guarantees a space of individual freedom where citizens can pursue their private interests. Democracy is understood as a set of procedures which allow to reach commitments among different interests and ensure the fairness of the results. The purpose of political process is basically to link society and state. This process is, essentially, a fight for positions of power among actors who behave strategically. The voters express their preferences through their vote; the total amount of votes determines who won the competition and gives license to hold an office-power. The aim of democratic process of opinion- and will-formation is to legitimate the exercise of that power. On the other hand, republicanism is based on the idea of society as political community. A community of free and equal citizens which through the practice of self-government become conscious of itself. In this case, the political process does not play the role of intermediary between society and state, but that of constitution of the political community. Through participation in that process, citizens become aware of their mutual dependency and form their relationships. This is the reason why the political process is not directed towards competition but towards dialogue and understanding: its goal is to reach an agreement about the good way of life. The political process of opinion- and will-formation is carried out deliberatively, based on a consensus product of a culture and a tradition common to all community members17.
1.1 General Principles Habermas’ deliberative democracy (or discursive democracy18) is basically focused on the process of opinion- and will-formation. This entails a shift in relation to Cohen, who focused on the decision making process, and involves a different articulation of deliberative democracy, as will be shown later. The political will-formation is the result neither of a commitment among different interests (liberalism) nor of a common culture or a collective identity (republicanism).
16 This is not the place to deal with this debate. For this reason, I will merely mention the main features Habermas attributes to both paradigms and from which he builds his own model. 17 Habermas claims to be in-between liberalism and republicanism, but the truth is he is closer to the latter. There is a close relation since they share two fundamental premises: first, the exercise of political power is based on dialogue and not on competition. This connects to Habermas’s theory of communicative action as an action directed towards understanding and not towards achievement of personal interests (strategic action associated to liberal views). Second, the idea of a group of citizens who govern themselves. Thus, the sense of radical democracy with which the author feels identified is maintained. However, Habermas also finds some difficulties in the republican model: a) political discourses are quite restricted to questions of collective identity, and b) the identification between society and political community. Concerning this last aspect, Habermas turns to the liberal model. 18 Deliberative democracy and discursive democracy are expressions Habermas uses without distinction. However, other authors do make a distinction. Such is the case of J. S. Dryzek, .cit., who suggests to reserve the term discursive democracy to refer to a democratic theory critical of the established power structures. Thus, discursive democracy would be a branch of deliberative democracy as opposed to the interpretation of deliberation made by the liberal-constitutional theory. 11
For Habermas, politics embraces three different dimensions. First, a pragmatic dimension that refers to the need of finding the most appropriate means to reach certain goals. Here, negotiation and commitment mechanisms (not only among the different goals but also in the best way to achieve them) have a great significance. Second, an ethical dimension related to conceptions of the good and the good life had by every community. In this case, political debate deals with issues concerning the collective identity, reflecting to what extent political proposals contribute to the common good. Finally, a moral dimension focuses on questions related to the idea of justice. The goal is to guarantee the fairness in the regulation of personal relationships and in the decision making. Public debate is, then, concerned about the impartiality of the political proposals, about the moral justifications of the possible solutions to a problem. Thus, the democratic process of opinion- and will-formation must be based on these three dimensions. It must develop bearing in mind the different ways through which the common will takes form: rational choice of means with respect to the ends, commitment and balance among different interests, ethical self-understanding, moral justifications and so on19. With regard to the scope of deliberation, Habermas thinks it must extend to all issues which can be regulated in the common interest of all. Nevertheless, this does not mean equating it with the classical separation between public and private sphere, where the private remains out. The very question of what is public and what is private have to be a topic of debate as well since the separation between both spheres is not established per se: it is always built and therefore susceptible of being discussed publicly.20 On the other hand, Habermas defends a model of democracy where, like in the liberal paradigm, there is a separation between state and society, but not identifying the latter with the market, as liberalism proposes. The public sphere and civil society, as their infrastructure, constitute a space different and apart from the state and the market.21 Therefore, the practice of self-government is no longer restricted to the global subject who represents the political community as collective actor. Nor is democracy understood as a mere commitment among different interests, regulated by the rule of law, in charge of guaranteeing that individual citizens can make their decisions individually and where, apart from the vote, it is not possible to make collective decisions. Discursive democracy is a formation-process of political will and opinion based
19 The inclusion of these three dimensions in deliberation constitutes one of the main points of disagreement between J. Rawls and J. Habermas. During the ‘90s both authors had an interesting dispute within the area of the political philosophy. This dispute has been collected in Spain by F. Vallespin, see J. Habermas and J. Rawls: Debate sobre el liberalismo político, Barcelona, Paidós and I.C.E. of the Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona, 1998. (Introduction by F. Vallespin). Rawls also supports a deliberative model of democracy based on the public use of reason, on the need for the political decisions to be based on reasons all participants can accept. However, he considers that in deliberation the only acceptable reasons are those which respect the principles of justice, and those related to conceptions of the good must be left out of the debate. Ethical questions have no place in a deliberation limited to the moral dimension. 20 Liberal theories mistrust these kinds of statements since they consider that, if all issues are susceptible of being publicly discussed, there will be an invasion of that sphere of individual freedom which constitutes one of their basic principles. 21 The concept of a social sphere in-between the public and the private is modern. The ancient political thought is alien to the differentiation between state and society, which come together under the idea of political community. Within this tradition of social sphere, it is important to emphasise the contributions by G. Hegel, A. de Tocqueville and H. Arendt. And more recently: J. Cohen and A. Arato: Civil Society and Political Theory, Cambridge, The MIT Press, 1992. M. Walzer: “La idea de sociedad civil”, Debats nº39, 1992, p. 30-40. 12 on dialogue and communication among citizens and between society and the political system. We will see then how this process takes place, and how deliberation is put into practice.
2. Although state and society constitute different spaces, radical democracy presupposes the practice of self-government by the citizenship. Habermas combines both principles establishing a two- track model for the democratic formation of opinion and political will. A formal way which corresponds with the political system –institutional sphere– and an informal way referred to society –public sphere–. The public sphere identifies with a context of discovering social problems and necessities. Its task is to perceive, identify, articulate and transmit to the institutional sphere the problems affecting citizens in their everyday lives and which require a collective, political solution. On the other hand, the institutional sphere is in charge of making political decisions. Habermas puts this sphere on a level with a context of justification since it must carry on with the work from the public sphere and give reasons for the selection it makes of those problems and for the decision made among alternative proposals for a solution. This differentiation of spheres and roles makes Habermas, unlike Cohen, focus deliberation on the process of opinion- and political will-formation and not directly on the decision making. In relation to the institutional sphere, Habermas takes Cohen’s ideal deliberative procedure. When the decision-making process is characterised by public reasoning, freedom, equality and search for consensus, outcomes are legitimate. The agreement reached after deliberation is neither a commitment among diverse preferences previous to the debate (liberalism) nor the result of shared, common values and tradition (republicanism). On the contrary, it is a consensus built during the process of submitting reasons and arguments. The result of that deliberation is the common good, that is, it represents what is collectively considered good for everybody. I will not extend further on this formal track for the democratic formation of the will since essentially Habermas follows Cohen’s model and limits its application to the institutions in charge of taking political decisions and where citizens do not participate directly. I will now develop the role civil society plays in this process.
2.1 Public Sphere and Civil Society The public sphere (öffentlichkeit) is the specific field for citizen participation, the field where public opinion is built. It is a sphere not regulated by procedures but formed as a network of flexible, open, and porous boundaries. It is the realm where ideas, opinions and discourses, about everything affecting individuals and their private lives, take form and are made public. But these ideas and discourses are public opinion only since they are structured according to the rules of a practice of public communication 13 held and followed in common. Agreement is possible as outcome of a more or less exhaustive controversy where proposals, information and reasons can be elaborated rationally22. In this way, Habermas links the formation of opinion and democratic will in the public sphere to the communicative interaction among citizens. This vision of citizen deliberation seems to refer to that idea of a public culture of political debate which Cohen considered unsatisfactory. But we must pay attention to the fact that for Habermas, the public sphere’s task is not to make decisions but to influence political power and control its exercise. In order to develop this labour, the public sphere must be a critical space where political decisions are revised and put before public reasoning for approval. Democratic deliberation demands that this public space not only perceive and identify the problems of citizens, but also should convincingly categorise, elaborate and interpret them in order to influence the institutional sphere. In his proposal on citizens’ direct participation Cohen plainly strays from this interpretation of radical democracy as a mere influence on political power. The organisational base of the public sphere is civil society. Its institutional core is neither a state nor an economic nucleus, but one formed by a group of associations, movements and organisations of voluntary nature which arise spontaneously and which allow to capture, articulate and echo society’s problems in order to transmit them to the space of the public opinion. The institutional existence of civil society is ensured when four conditions are fulfilled: first, plurality of groups and associations which capture different aspirations and ways of life; second, mechanisms which allow the messages of these groups to be publicised; third, an area of individual privacy where individuals can develop and make their own personal decisions. And finally, the existence of laws and basic rights which regulate and protect those plurality, publicity and privacy.23 In accordance with this last feature, Habermas talks about a civil society articulated in terms of basic rights. Freedom of association and freedom of speech protect plurality. Freedom of the press ensures the media infrastructure which allow the publicity of messages. Freedom of belief, of conscience and of movement, right to privacy and, in general, all human rights keep the private sphere as a protected space for the autonomous formation of the will. Thus, civil society keeps its autonomy and spontaneity. However, in order to avoid a distortion of the public opinion space, civil society must combine its own action and vitality with the guarantee provided by the basic rights. When using the institutions and fundamental guarantees, civil society also interprets and defines them and invests them with new and different meanings, thus contributing to its self-reproduction. In this sense, the act of civil society has a
22 “Para la estructuración de la opinión pública [lo fundamental] son las reglas de una práctica de comunicación pública mantenida y seguida en común. El asentimiento a temas y contribuciones sólo se forma como resultado de una controversia más o menos exhaustiva en la que las propuestas, las informaciones y las razones pueden elaborarse de formas más o menos racional”. J. Habermas: Facticidad y validez. Sobre el derecho y el Estado democrático de derecho en términos de teoría del discurso, Madrid, Trotta, 1998, P.442. 23 Habermas takes these four characteristics from J. L. Cohen and A. Arato, .cit. 14 double direction: towards the political system, exercising influence on decision making; and, reflexively, towards itself, establishing and widening its own identity and capacity of action24. In complex modern societies, Habermas affirms, the practice of self-government can only be applied if it is inferred from the overly-specific interpretation of a collective subject (the citizenship as a whole) which participates and decides collectively. Popular sovereignty is fulfilled through public discourses which bring to light issues that affect society as a whole, which interpret values, contribute to problem-resolution, generate good arguments and discredit the bad ones25. This is the reason why deliberative democracy requires an independent and mobilised public space which generates discourses, opinions and problem-solving reasons. And, in the last resort, forming and reproducing these spaces depend on a lively, inquiring political culture: one which is able to make itself be heard.
IV. BY WAY OF CONCLUSION Deliberative conception of democracy links the exercise of political power to public reasoning, dialogue and discussion. Two models of deliberation have been analysed. They differ with regard to the subjects of deliberation and, particularly, to the way these subjects participate. For Cohen, deliberative democracy is a system of social and institutional arrangements which make possible public debate among citizens. A debate joined to collective decision-making and, therefore, to the legitimisation of political power. The ideal of self-government is only fully developed when citizens can debate those issues they consider important, when they can judge the different proposals through deliberation and can do so in institutional spaces. In this sense, Cohen’s model implies an institutional change which must provide arenas for citizens participation in decision-making. Directly-deliberative polyarchy aims at that change. Habermas, on the other hand, links democratic deliberation to the process of opinion- and political will-formation. This process takes place in two different spheres: the institutional sphere, in charge of making political decisions; and the public sphere, whose organisational base is civil society. The latter is the suitable arena for citizens participation, the space where public opinion forms. The main task of the public sphere is to capture and articulate citizens’ problems in order to transmit them to the institutional sphere. For Habermas, the legitimacy of political decisions depends as much on the process of
24 In this task, civil society contend with other actors which do not arise from the public sphere but which seize that space. It is the case of political parties and groups of interest, which compete with civil society to have an influence on the institutional sphere and which, besides, do not get involved in the reproduction of public space, merely using it. Likewise, the media distorts public opinion space since they select messages, allow or refuse access of certain issues to the public opinion space and elaborate information. These difficulties, however, can be overcome in times of mobilization. Habermas considers the feminist or environmentalist movement examples of how these questions became public matters and were introduced into public debate. And all this was done through the initiatives of a mobilized civil society which managed to generate an atmosphere of crisis. 25 “La soberanía popular se realiza a través de discursos públicos que descubren temas de una relevancia que afecta a la sociedad en su conjunto, que interpretan valores, que contribuyen a la resolución de problemas, que producen buenos argumentos y que desacreditan los malos”. J. Habermas: Historia y crítica de la opinión pública, Mexico, Gustavo Gilli, 1994, p.31. Besides its relation with deliberative democracy, this is still the fundamental work of reference to understand the concept of public opinion in Habermas. 15 communication between both spheres as on civil society’s capacity to act; it not rests on a direct institutional citizens participation, as Cohen says. To sum up, two views of understanding citizen participation in deliberative democracy which have different effects on the existing political arrangement. But, in any case, a model which, from another perspective of the political process and its aim, can contribute, for the sake of improving democracy, to overcome some of the difficulties or critics hovering nowadays over our way of government.
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