THE CHRISTIANIZATION OF PYRRHONISM ARCHIVES INTERNATIONALES D'HISTOIRE DES IDEES

INTERNATIONAL ARCHIVES OF THE HISTORY OF IDEAS

144

JOSE R. MAlA NETO

THE CHRISTIANIZATION OF PYRRHONISM Scepticism and Faith in Pascal, Kierkegaard, and Shestov

Founding Directors: P. Dibont (paris) and R.H. Popkin (Washington University, St. Louis & UCLA) Directors: Brian Copenhaver (University of California, Los Angeles, USA), Sarah Hutton (The University of Hertfordshire, United Kingdom), Richard Popkin (Washington Univer• sity, St Louis & University of California, Los Angeles, USA) Editorial Board: J.F. Battail (paris); F. Duchesneau (Montreal); A. Gabbey (New York); T. Gregory (Rome); J.D. North (Groningen); MJ. Petry (Rotterdam); J. Popkin (Lexington); Th. Verbeek (Utrecht) Advisory Editorial Board: J. Aubin (paris); A. Crombie (Oxford); H. Gadamer (Heidelberg); H. Gouhier (paris); K. Hanada (Hokkaido University); W. Kirsop (Melbourne); P.O. Kristeller (Columbia University); E. Labrousse (paris); A. Lossky (Los Angeles); J. Malarczyk (Lublin); E. de Olaso (C.I.F. Buenos Aires); J. Orcibal (paris); W. ROd (Mfinchen); G. Rousseau (Los Angeles); H. Rowen (Rutgers University, N.J.); J.P. Schobinger (ZUrich); J. Tans (Groningen) THE CHRISTIANIZATION OF PYRRHONISM Scepticism and Faith in Pascal, Kierkegaard, and Shestov

JOSE R. MAIA NETO Departamento de Filosofia Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais - Belo Horizonte MG-Brazil

SPRINGER-SCIENCE+BUSINESS MEDIA, B.V. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Maia Neta, Jose Raimundo, 1959- The Christianization of Pyrrhonis~ : scepticis. and faith in Pascal, Kierkegaard, and Shestov I by Jose R. Maia Neta. p. cm. -- (International archives of the history of ideas v. 144 = Archives internationales d'histoire des idees ; v. 144) Revision of thesis (doctoral)--Washington University, St. Leuis. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-94-010-4103-4 ISBN 978-94-011-0231-5 (eBook) DOI 10.1007/978-94-011-0231-5 1. Faith and reasen--Christianlty--Hlstory of doctrines. 2. Skepticlsm. 3. Pascal, Blalse, 1623-1662. 4. Klerkegaard, Slren, 1813-1855. 5. Shestov, Lev, 1866-1938. 1. Tltle. II. Serles: Archlves lnternatlonales d'hlstolre des ldees : 144. BT50.M245 1995 230' .042--dc20 95-1251

ISBN 978-94-010-4103-4

Printed on acid-free paper

Ali Rights Reserved © 1995 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht Originally published by Kluwer Academic Publishers in 1995 Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 1995 No part of the material protected by this copyright notice may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, inc1uding photocopying, recording or by any information storage and retrieval system, without written permission from the copyright owner. Contents

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS vii

ABBREVIATIONS ix

INTRODUCTION xi

CHAPTER 1. Before the Christianization of Pyrrhonism: Jansenism faces Sceptical Fideism 1.1. The Pelagian and the Manichean Threats 1.2. Michel de Montaigne 10 1.3. Pierre Charron 17 1.4. Saint-Cyran versus Garasse on Charron 25 1.5. Fran~ois De La Mothe Le Vayer 30

CHAPTER 2. Pascal's Christianization of Pyrrhonism 37 2.1. Conversation with Sacy about Epictetus and Montaigne 37 2.2. Undoing Ataraxia 47 2.3. Undoing Intellectual Integrity 53

CHAPTER 3. Kierkegaard's Christianization of Pyrrhonism 65 3.1. In Search of Genuine Sceptics: The Period before Author- ~ ~ 3.2. Abraham and the Sceptics: The Preface to Fear and Trembling 71 3.3. The Christians and the Sceptics: The Works by Johannes Climacus 73 3.4. Pascal and Kierkegaard 83

v vi Contents

CHAPTER 4. After the Christianization of Pyrrhonism: Shestov's Irrationalism 90 4.1. Shestov's Neo-Kantianism 90 4.2. Scepticism, Belief, and the Doctrine of the Fall 94 4.3. Shestov on Pascal 103 4.4. Shestov on Kierkegaard 109

CONCLUSION 120

APPENDIX 129

BIBLIOGRAPHY 137

INDEX 147 Acknowledgments

An earlier version of this book was presented as a doctoral thesis co-directed by Richard A. Watson and Richard H. Popkin to the Department of Philosophy at the Washington University In Saint Louis. I have benefitted immensely from Professors Watson's and Popkin's knowledge of modem philosophy and their tremendous willingness to help throughout the stages of my work. I thank the Brazilian Governmental agencies CNPq and CAPES and the Foundation for Intellectual History for continuous support. I also thank Constance Blackwell, Robert B. Barrett, Thomas M. Lennon, Anthony McKenna, Allan Gabbey, Lucian Krukowski, Jean-Luc Marion, Jean-Robert Armogathe and the late Steven S. Schwarz schild for reading earlier drafts of different chapters of this book. I thank all of them and two referees from Kluwer for many helpful suggestions.

Vll Abbreviations

Works by Sextus Empiricus: PH Pyrrhoneiai Hypotyposeis and M Adversus Mathematicos, 4 Vols, tr. R. G. Bury (London and Cam• bridge: Loeb Classical Library, 1933-44)

Work by Cicero: Ac Academica, tr. H. Rackham (London and Cambridge: Loeb Classical Libray, 1979, first ed., 1933)

Works by Pascal: La Pensees, ed. Louis Lafuma (tr. A. J. Krailsheimer. London: Penguin, 1966) OC Oeuvres completes, 4 Vols, ed. Jean Mesnard (Paris: Desclee de Brouwer, 1964-1992)

Works by Kierkegaard: Ff Fear and Trembling, ed. and tr. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983) PF Philosophical Fragments and JC Johannes Climacus or de omnibus dubitandum est, ed. and tr. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983)

CUP Concluding Unscientific Postscript, tr. David F. Swenson and Walter Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974) ix x Abbreviations

SD The Sickness unto Death, ed. and tr. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980) EPW Early Polemical Writings, ed. and tr. Julia Watkin (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990) TC Training in Christianity, tr. Walter Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1947) SKJ Soren Kierkegaard's Journals, 7 Vols., ed. and tr. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967)

Works by Shestov: ATP All Things Are Possible, tr. Bernard Martin (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1977) PC Potestas Clavium, tr. Bernard Martin (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1968) JB In Job Balances (On the Sources of the Eternal Truths), tr. Camilla Coventry and C. A. Macarteney (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1975) KEP Kierkegaard and the Existential Philosophy, tr. Elinor Hewitt (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1969) AJ Athens and Jerusalem, tr. Bernard Martin (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1966) SR Speculation et revelation, tr. Sylvie Luneau (Lausanne: L' Age d'Homme, 1981) LE Luther et l'Eglise, tr. Sophie Seve (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1957) Introduction

The problem of the relationship between Christian faith and philosophical reason is as old as Christianity itself. The expansion of the Gospel in the West, the increasing number of converted pagan philosophers, and the pro• gressive definition of the doctrine of the Church led to an increasing interaction between the historical Eastern religion and Western (pagan) philosophy. Consequently, the validity of this interaction and of how it should take place became crucial issues. Could - and should - a synthesis of the two tradi• tions be established? Did Christianity bring the truth the pagan philosophers were looking for as Paul suggests (Romans, 1: 19-23) or is the Christian truth of a completely different nature from and foolish indeed to philosoph• ical wisdom as the Apostle also says (1 Corinthians, 1: 17-25)? Some of those who hold the view that a synthesis or reconciliation of the Judeo-Christian religion with Greek-Roman philosophy cannot be established resort to ancient scepticism to explicate the opposition between philosoph• ical reason and religious faith. Of all Greek-Roman philosophies, only ancient scepticism stands in polemical opposition to philosophy in general. Thus scep• ticism offers the possibility of being an involuntary and indirect supporter of Jerusalem in the very center of Athens. l The utility of ancient scepticism to Christianity is nevertheless problem• atic because the distinction between "Athens" and "Jerusalem" is not restricted

1 There were two ancient schools of scepticism: Pyrrhonism, whose only surviving primary source is the works of Sextus Empiricus (circa 200 AD), and Academic scepticism, whose main ancient source is Cicero's (106-43 BC) Academica. Church Fathers such as Eusebius, Lactantius, Theodoret of Cyr, Tertullian, and Augustine mentioned and used Academic scepti• cism against philosophical wisdom. Religious-motivated interest in ancient scepticism revives in the Renaissance (see Schmitt, 1972, and Popkin, 1979) and remains relatively strong until the first half of the seventeenth century. It declines after the Enlightenment although it still finds supporters in the twentieth century (cf. Verdan, 1973. 1979).

Xl xii Introduction to the epistemological issue of reason and faith. Anthropology and ethics are also crucial in drawing a line between the two traditions. Different views of man, of how he ought to live and attain happiness, are also implicated. The Greek-Roman pagan philosophies relevant in this debate between Athens and Jerusalem are mostly post-Socratic, in particular Hellenistic. In these philoso• phies, the ethical ideals of happiness and virtue have primacy over other philosophical issues. The point of philosophical inquiry is not merely the attain• ment of knowledge but also the achievement of wisdom. The ancient sceptics reject knowledge as the path to wisdom but not wisdom itself. 2 Although in a less visible way than other philosophers, they do hold ethical commitments that exemplify Greek pagan philosophical wisdom. Because these ethical com• mitments are much harder to identify in the sceptics than in other ancient philosophers, Christian thinkers who make use of scepticism in their epis• temological battle against pagan philosophical wisdom may, implicitly or explicitly, deliberately or inadvertently, fail to expurgate these ethical com• mitments from Greek scepticism. Uncritical use of Greek scepticism thus leads to the paradoxical position of advocating epistemological discontinuity but - inadvertently or purposefully - assuming at least some degree of ethical and anthropological continuity. In this book, I argue that unlike most of the other modem Judeo-Christian thinkers who tum to ancient scepticism, Pascal, Kierkegaard, and Shestov are quite aware of this problem and manage to avoid it. I do not claim that others are not aware of the problem. In fact, I think most of them, certainly those I discuss in Chapter 1, are quite aware that by keeping, nay, by even developing the ancient sceptics' ethical commitments they are subjecting Christianity to scepticism. Whether this means that like many others in the period they believe that pagan and Christian wisdom are commensurable or whether their secret aim is to undermine Christianity, is a question I do not address. My point is that Pascal, Kierkegaard, and Shestov are strongly com• mitted to the view of radical discontinuity and believe that this discontinuity is fundamentally an ethical one. Yet they believe that scepticism can be helpful in Christianity or Judeo-Christianity. So they overcome the dilemma first by identifying and then by reversing or opposing the ancient sceptics' ethical com• mitments. This procedure I call the Christianization ofPyrrhonism. 3 This book

2 Cicero says that "it is the wise man that we are investigating" (Ac 11.66). See also Ac ll.llS. ) It might be more precise to call this procedure "the Christianization of ancient scepti• cism" since the ancient scepticism developed by Montaigne, Charron, and La Mothe Le Vayer, and Christianized by Pascal and Kierkegaard also has Academic features. But since Pyrrhonism is more important for all these thinkers who underline the similarities - instead of the differ• ences - of these two ancient sceptical schools, I often say "Pyrrhonism" referring to ancient scepticism in general. Introduction xiii thus fills a gap in the history of ideas. While much work has been done on the Christianization of Platonism, Aristoteleanism, and Stoicism, the transformations of ancient scepticism in view of making it consistent with Christian doctrines have remained almost unnoticed. The Christianization of Pyrrhonism endeavors to preserve the identity of Christianity vis-a-vis the pagan philosophies to a much greater extent than does the Christianization of Aristoteleanism, Platonism, and Stoicism. This book is thus a history of a heroic attempt to construct a genuine Judeo-Christian philosophy not indebted to the philosophical methods and basic assumptions held by Greek and Roman philosophers. A basic difference between Pascal, Kierkegaard, and Shestov4 and other modem thinkers who find scepticism useful in discussing the Christian religion is this. The others typically refer to ancient scepticism as propadeutic to Christian faith. The role they give to scepticism is a negative one. Scepticism is used to show that reason is not the path to wisdom. This, of course, per se does not lead to Christianity. But at least it gets the main competitor to Christian wisdom out of the way. Having reached the Pyrrhonian state, believers-to-be will be better prepared to receive the grace of God than they otherwise would be by pursuing or thinking that they possess dogmatic wisdom. I call the thinkers who hold this position Sceptical Fideists and discuss three of them - Montaigne, Charron and La Mothe Le Vayer.5 Pascal, Kierkegaard, and Shestov are strongly opposed to taking a Pyrrhonian stance even if only provisionally. Pascal and Kierkegaard use Pyrrhonism (and Shestov uses scepticism) in a way and for a purpose dif• ferent from those of the others. They use scepticism not as a position consistent with Christianity that a Christian is allowed to hold, but as a hermeneutic tool to clarify Christian (Shestov biblical) categories. Contrary to the Sceptical Fideists, they distinguish Judeo-Christianity from pagan philosophy including Pyrrhonism (scepticism) itself. The relationship between Greek scepticism and Christianity is not an external and sequential one as it is for the Sceptical Fideists. Rather, features of Greek scepticism, once carefully reconstructed - Christianized or depaganized - are built into their very views of Christianity.

4 Strictly speaking, Shestov does not Christianize Pyrrhonism. First because he is closer to Judaism than to Christianity. Nor does he "Judeo-Christianize" Pyrrhonism because he does not deal directly with the ancient sceptical philosophy. He stands after the Christianization of Pyrrhonism in the sense that he exhibits some developments of Pascal's and Kierkegaard's Christianization of Pyrrhonism. 5 "Fideism" in Montaigne, Charron, and La Mothe Le Vayer merely indicates their view that there is a radical opposition between reason and Christian faith. It indicates nothing about their personal religious beliefs and does not imply any view to the effect of the feebleness of reason but is entirely consistent with rationalism, as I make plain in Chapter 1. xiv Introduction

Conversely, the scepticism they find commensurable with Christianity is itself informed by Christian doctrines. The nature of Christianity is not the subject of this book. So when I discuss the "Christianization" of Pyrrhonism or use the terms "Christian", "Christianity" or "Judeo-Christianity", I mean Shestov's, Kierkegaard's, or Pascal's understanding of them. Their understanding is, of course, by no means uncontroversial. I explicate their views of Christianity in the corresponding chapters, although this also is not the main purpose of this work. Their views are not identical, although I do trace a line of development not only from Pascal to Kierkegaard but also from them to Shestov. By Pyrrhonism I mean the Hellenistic school that begins with Pyrrho of Elis from around 365 to 275 BC. A brief summary of Pyrrhonism is as follows: Pyrrhonists hold no belief (dogma) concerning anything non-evident.6 But Pyrrhonists do not deny the evident appearances that affect them.7 When a dog• matist (someone who holds beliefs in non-evident things) affirms that a certain appearance constitutes or indicates the external reality or essence of an object, the Pyrrhonist presents contradictory arguments or appearances that are as persuasive as those presented by the dogmatist. This procedure is called zetesis (inquiry) and leads - due to the equal persuasiveness - to a situation of equipol• lence (isoesthenia) ("this thought or appearance is no more true than that") in which the inquirer suspends judgment (epochej about the external reality or essence of the object under examination. Pyrrhonists do not affirm that every thesis can be opposed to another of equal weight. They limit themselves to reporting their impressions (i) that this equipollence has been their experi• ence, and that (ii) as soon as they suspend judgment, the practical aim of philosophy - tranquility (ataraxia) - is achieved. Pyrrhonism is a kind of therapy for treating the mental disturbance caused by conflicting appearances and beliefs - one cannot find repose in beliefs because there are always appear• ances and evidence that contradict them. Although they deny that this is to dogmatize, the Pyrrhonians hold at least three commitments. The first is the goal of ataraxia (PH 1.25-30).8 The other

6 "We say that [the sceptic] does not dogmatize using 'dogma' in the sense ... of assent to one of the non-evident objects of scientific inquiry, for the Pyrrhonian philosopher assents to nothing that is non-evident" (PH 1.l3). 1 "We do not overthrow the affective sense-impressions which induce our assent involun• tarily; and these impressions are 'the appearances'. And when we question whether the underlying object is such as it appears, we grant the fact that it appears, and our doubt does not concern the appearance itself but the account given of that appearance .... For example, honey appears to us to be sweet ... but whether it is also sweet in its essence is for us a matter of doubt, since this is not an appearance but a judgment regarding the appearance" (PH 1.19-20). 8 See Sedley (1983: 9-29) for a discussion of this topic. Introduction· xv two are also held by members of the other Hellenistic sceptic school - Academic scepticism, one is a commitment to the principle of non-contra• diction on which they base their investigation.9 The other is their commitment ta intellectual integrity on which they base their refusal to assent to any propo• sition that lacks demonstrative evidence.1O This follows from the view that it is unworthy of a sage to hold beliefs that might be false. II The ancient sceptics charge their opponent dogmatists with compromising intellectual integrity by coming too quickly to a belief. The sceptics claim that dogmatists give their assent to propositions before examining them through and through (Ac 11.8 and 87, PH 1.20 and III.280). The ancient sceptics do not hold any belief because they have found none that survives this rigorous investigation (zetesis), that is to say, sceptics withhold belief because they find no proposition that they can assent to whithout risk of being in error. 12 This point must be emphasized here because it is a crucial feature of ancient scepticism that is Christianized by Pascal, Kierkegaard, and Shestov: the ancient sceptics hold the Stoic rule that the sage must withdraw assent from any proposition for which evidence is not demonstrative (PH 1.13 and Ac 11.66 and 77). Pascal, Kierkegaard, and Shestov understand that this rule is a basic feature of Greek pagan wisdom that must be sharply opposed to Judeo• Christian wisdom, which is nondemonstrative. The Christianization of Pyrrhonism basically involves a reconstruction of Greek scepticism in terms of the doctrine of the Fall of man with the result that while the ancient sceptics' rejection of philosophy is preserved, their basic commitments are reversed: intellectual integrity is turned into incoherence and tranquility is turned into anxiety about faith and salvation. When 1 use the term "scepticism" unqualified, 1 mean the epistemological

9 Nussbaum (1991: 551-552) argues that sceptics can live their scepticism only if they are committed to the principle of non-contradiction and to ataraxia. 10 "[H]oc autem liberiores et solutiores sumus quod integra nobis est iudicandi potestas" [we are more free and untrammelled in that we possess our power of judgment uncurtailed] (Ac II.8). See also Long and Sedley (1987: Vol. 1,447). II Cicero reports that "so hidden in obscurity did he [Arcesilaus] believe that everything lies" that "no one must make any positive statement or affirmation or give the approval of his assent to any proposition, and a man must always restrain his rashness and hold it back from every slip, as it would be glaring rashness to give assent either to a falsehood or to something not certainly known, and nothing is more disgraceful than for assent and approval to outstrip knowledge and perception" (Ac 1.43-46). 12 "But in our view ... even if anything could be perceived, nevertheless the mere habit of assenting appears dangerous and slippery, and therefore since it is agreed that to give assent to anything that is either false or unknown is so serious a fault, preferably all assent is to be withheld, to avoid having a serious fall if one goes forward rashly" (Ac II.68). See also Annas (1990: 267-292). xvi Introduction position according to which doubt can be raised against knowledge claims, either against knowledge in general or against particular branches of it - historical, metaphysical, or logical. This position also includes modern kinds of scepticism. Cartesian scepticism is dealt with by Pascal, Humean scep• ticism by Kierkegaard and Shestov, and the Kantian solution to scepticism by Shestov. Another useful distinction is that made by Richard H. Popkin between "epis• temological scepticism" and "psychological scepticism". Epistemological scepticism is the position mentioned above. Psychological scepticism is suspension of judgment. As Popkin notes, psychological scepticism is a non• sequitur from epistemological scepticism. 13 Lack of conclusive evidence leads to epoche because the sceptic is committed to intellectual integrity. But as Popkin has pointed out, it is also a non-sequitor to go from lack of demon• strative evidence to withholding of belief. Some scholars argue that the sceptics can profess beliefs or "quasi-beliefs" without inconsistency provided they are aware that adequate rational grounds are lacking.14 It goes without saying that none of the three thinkers I discuss are Pyrrhonians. Apart from the always problematic subjective question of whether they really believe or not, i.e., whether they are psychological sceptics or not, they are not Pyrrhonians for the simple reason that the "Pyrrhonism" they work out is not the Greek but a Christianized reconstruction of it. I still call it "Pyrrhonism" because the Greek school is the substance that they qualify by Christianizing it. So they are not Pyrrhonians. But are they sceptics? Pascal, Kierkegaard, and Shestov constitute a tradition of the use of scep• ticism in Christian apologetics distinct from that of the Sceptical Fideists. I begin by examining the case of the Sceptical Fideists. Whereas it is largely assumed that Montaigne, Charron, and La Mothe Le Vayer are epistemo• logical sceptics, it is controversial whether they are psychological sceptics as well. Their avowals of faith, particularly La Mothe Le Vayer's, have been doubted and considered to be mere expedients taken to avoid trouble. IS Although I have no conclusive solution to the controversy, I argue in Chapter 1 that not only are they sceptics, but also, in a qualified way, Pyrrhonians.

13 Epistemological scepticism is the view that "no assertion of any type is based on rational evidence". Psychological scepticism is the view "that one should withhold assent from any propo• sition which does not have adequate rational grounds" (Popkin, 1980: 228; first published in 1951: 518-523). 14 For example, Annas (1990: 267-292) and Frede (1984: 255-278). "Quasi-belief' is, according to Belt (1990: 3-20), what the Academic sceptic can consistently hold. IS For example, by Grenier (1949: 1504-1513), Pintard (1943: 141-147,513-515), and Charles-Daubert (1980: 401-408). Introduction xvii

The qualifications are the following: (1) they may well have been sincere believers - I think a scholar cannot decide this matter - and (2) they are eclectic: they also hold Stoic and Epicurean views. But the point I make is that, unlike Pascal, Kierkegaard, and Shestov, they do hold the Pyrrhonian com• mitment to tranquility and the Academic-Pyrrhonian commitment to intellectual integrity. From the point of view of Pascal's Christianity, a view that sharply contrasts these pagan to Christian commitments, the Sceptical Fideists' Christianity is suspect. Whereas psychological scepticism is consistent with the views held by the Sceptical Fideists, some scholars even argue that belief is inconsistent with their views. 16 By contrast, Pascal's, Kierkegaard's, and Shestov's views make sense only if unqualified assent to basic Christian doctrines, original sin in the three cases, and Incarnation in the first two, is given. So they are not psychological sceptics but are they epistemological sceptics? Pascal holds that historical probable knowledge is possible and that grace is needed for metaphysical certain knowledge. Kierkegaard holds that meta• physical knowledge is possible but tautological (non-informative) and he is more sceptical about historical knowledge than Pascal. Shestov's episte• mological position is hard to determine. Empirical knowledge is possible but metaphysically groundless. Shestov strongly believes that metaphysical "knowledge" is possible but what he means by metaphysical truth and how he thinks this knowledge is obtained radically differs from traditional meta• physics and epistemology. He is a radical critic of modern metaphysicians such as Descartes, Spinoza, Hegel, and Husserl. As to the relevance of scepticism to their views in general, I do not claim to present a complete account. Although I do not think scepticism completely explains their views, I do believe that it does so to a larger extent than has been hitherto acknowledged. In the case of Kierkegaard, for example, I think scepticism explains even more than I treat in this book. I focus on the more philosophical writings of Johannes Climacus, but scepticism could shed some light also on Kierkegaard's religious and aesthetic works, in particular on Either/Or. I give some indications to this effect in Chapter 3. My approach is both historical and doctrinal. In the first chapter, I locate the background of the Christianization of Pyrrhonism in the Jansenist reaction to early modern attempts at reconciling Hellenistic philosophies to Christianity, and, in particular, to Sceptical Fideism. In the second chapter, I show Pascal's careful reconstruction of the Sceptical Fideism of Montaigne, Charron, and La Mothe Le Vayer in terms of Jansenist Christianity. I also build on histor• ical and doctrinal factors to show in Chapter 3 how Kierkegaard develops in

16 For example, Pintard (1943: I 43ff). xviii Introduction certain ways Pascal's use of scepticism in Christian apologetics by building on Sextus Empiricus and Hume to react to the Hegelian treatment of scepti• cism. I apply the same procedure to Shestov (Chapter 4) who reacts to the Kantian solution to scepticism by radicalizing the anti-rationalism of Pascal's and Kierkegaard's Christianized Pyrrhonism to the point of doing away with both Pyrrhonism and Christianity. He thus stands after the tradition of the Christianized Pyrrhonism. So, although I indicate basic similarities in their views, I also note differences, turns, and developments that I explicate in terms of contextual intellectual considerations, in terms of sequential influence (Shestov was influenced by and wrote on Kierkegaard and Pascal, Kierkegaard was influenced by and wrote on Pascal, Pascal was influenced by and wrote on the Sceptical Fideists, Montaigne and Charron), and in terms of the personal views of each.