59 Carneades and the Stoic Telos 1 A. A. LONG I. N the Second Century

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59 Carneades and the Stoic Telos 1 A. A. LONG I. N the Second Century

1 Carneades and the Stoic telos A. A. LONG I. n the second century B. C. Stoic ethics and epistemology came under attack from Carneades, the champion of the sceptical Academy. The arguments which he employed against the x«Toc- q>OCV't'OCO'LOCare familiar enough and well documented in Cicero's Academica and in Sextus Empiricus. The fact that Carneades also exposed difficulties in Stoic ethics, particularly those arising from definitions of the telos, and the probability that the Stoics modified their definitions in attempts to meet this criticism, also receive some treatment in most histories of the Stoa. The subject is interesting and important, for from the time of Panaetius Stoics concentrated attention on practical ethics, and interest in their logical basis and the desire for precise definitions languished. But immediately before this time certain Stoic philosophers, Antipater in particular (and some would include his predecessor Diogenes), were compelled to clarify their arguments and rethink some of their premises, and in doing so they clearly made the Stoa livelier and tougher intellectually than it was to become. Just how they did so, and what arguments they had to combat is an area difficult to map, where there is too much terra incognita and an insufficient supply of guides or equipment. Among recent scholars Pohlenz and Rieth have made valiant explorations of the ground. But the subject has never been discussed thoroughly in English and certainly warrants re-examination.2 This article is a further exercise in cartography, an attempt to set out the evidence for the controversy between Carneades and the Stoics concerning the telos and to see how far and how successfully they reacted to his criticism. Posidonius and Panaetius are mentioned only briefly since their theories, which have 3 been discussed elsewhere, fall outside this period.3 59 Most discussions of this subject have concentrated attention on Cicero's evidence in the De Finibus. This is undoubtedly important, particularly for its information about Carneades, but a more neglected and perhaps more instructive source for the variety of early Stoic definitions of the telos is Plutarch's De Communibus Notitiis.4 Plutarch who is on the side of Carneades takes Chrysippus as his main object of attack and frequently quotes him, citing the book in question. He does not refer to Diogenes by name and only once mentions Antipater, but he includes two chapters (26-7) which make what appears to be a combined attack on both of them and one vital reference to Antipater and Cameades (1072f6ff.). Plutarch is not concerned with sketching change and development in Stoicism; his object is to make a compre- hensive criticism of the theory and practice of Stoic ethics; the method is chiefly to show inconsistencies in statements made by Chrysippus, and in the first part of the book Plutarch deals with the paradoxical and obscure relationship between O'CpeT'qand the &3trXcpopoc.In so doing he frequently quotes a definition of the telos and a list and brief examination of these definitions will provide a useful starting-point for this discussion. I include passages in which 'such and such' is said to constitute happiness or the ?.€YcaTOVaYa6cw, for all definitions of the telos are aimed at explaining what the ,£yia<ov &yoc6&v, consists 5 II. PLUTARCH'S DEFINITIONS OF THE STOIC TELOS 1. To Tfi ?6aeL o?,o7?oy?w 1060d3 r6 xoc-ro'cwacv 1060 e 8 60 .

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3 Arcesilaus and Carneades
C:/ITOOLS/WMS/CUP/552750/WORKINGFOLDER/BCP/9780521874762C03.3D 58 [58–80] 24.9.2009 7:15AM harald thorsrud 3 Arcesilaus and Carneades Arcesilaus initiated a sceptical phase in the Academy after taking over in c. 268 BCE. He was motivated in part by an innovative reading of Plato’s dialogues. Where his predecessors found positive doctrines to be systematically developed, he found a dialectical method of arguing and the sceptical view that nothing can be known (akatalêpsia, De Or. 3.67,seeDL4.28, 4.32). He also advanced this conclusion in opposition to the ambitious system of the Stoics, claiming further that the appropriate response to the pervasive uncertainty generated by his method is the suspension of judgement (epochê). Arcesilaus’ dialectical method was practiced without signiﬁcant modiﬁcation in the Academy until Carneades, who became head sometime before 155 BCE.1 Carneades both continued and strength- ened Arcesilaus’ method (ND 1.11, Acad. 2.16, see also Acad. 1.46, and Eusebius, Praep. evang. 14.7.15). Sextus marks the change by referring to Plato’s Academy as Old, Arcesilaus’ as Middle, and Carneades’ as New (PH 1.220). Since the main interpretative issues regarding both Arcesilaus and Carneades depend on the concepts of akatalêpsia and epochê,we must try to determine what they mean, how they are related, and what attitude the Academics take towards them – i.e. in what sense, if any, are these their sceptical doctrines? iarcesilaus The view that Arcesilaus derived from Plato’s dialogues might have taken one of two very different forms. He might have discovered some arguments that show knowledge is not possible.
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