Adaptation De L'arme Aérienne Aux Conflits Contemporains Et Processus

INTRODUCTION

Organisé par l'Institut d'Histoire des Conflits Contemporains et le Service Historique de l'Armée de l'Air, le colloque international "Adaptation de l'arme aérienne aux conflits contemporains et processus d'indépendance des armées de l'Air des origines à la fin de la Seconde Guerre Mondiale", placé sous le haut patronage de Monsieur le Ministre de la Défense, a réuni à Paris, à l'Ecole Militaire, du 4 au 7 septembre 1984, plus de 150 participants en provenance de 15 pays. Ce colloque associait, pour la première fois en France sur ce thème, universitaires et militaires de nombreux pays. Il donnait la possibilité de reconstituer rigoureusement et aussi complètement que possible les événements passés, de s'interroger sur leurs causes et leurs effets, d'approfondir les sages décisions ou les erreurs commises permettant ainsi de nourrir directement la réflexion préalable à l'action. Il s'est articulé autour de plusieurs thèmes : doctrine d'emploi, indépendance des moyens aériens, répercussions de l'apparition de l'arme nouvelle sur les systèmes militaires en place, emploi des forces aériennes - la présentation des exemples nationaux Italie, Allemagne, Canada, Norvège, Grande-Bretagne, Etats-Unis, France, a permis des débats, souvent vigoureux, qui ont entraîné des échanges passionnants. Il a été ainsi possible d'étudier la naissance des doctrines d'emploi de l'arme aérienne, le développement des théories nouvelles et les évolutions qui vont conduire les armées de l'Air à obtenir leur indépendance vis-à-vis des armées terrestres et navales. Trois thèmes ont dominé les exposés et les débats : l'aviation et les avions, l'aviation et ses rapports avec les armées de Terre et de Mer, l'aviation et son rôle tactique et stratégique. Ces thèmes ont posé la question des contraintes politiques, financières, techniques ainsi que celles de la prise des décisions. Ce colloque a confirmé que l'étude de l'aviation apparaît désormais comme inséparable de toute étude historique sur les conflits contemporains. Elle permet d'aborder sous des angles nouveaux, certains problèmes délicats à résoudre. L'aéronautique et l'espace sont certes des clés de l'avenir : ils apparaissent également, à l'issue de ce colloque, comme des clés du passé. Nous tenons à remercier toutes celles et tous ceux qui, tant au Service Historique de l'Armée de l'Air qu'à l'Institut d'Histoire des Conflits Contemporains, ont participé à la mise sur pied de ce colloque. Nos remerciements vont également au Ministère de la Défense et à l'Armée de l'Air qui, grâce à leur soutien et à leurs encouragements, ont permis la réalisation de ce colloque.

Claude CARLIER

COMITE D'HONNEUR DU COLLOQUE INTERNATIONAL

M. Charles HERNU Ministre de la Défense M. le Général Bernard CAPILLON Chef d'Etat-Major de l'Armée de l'Air Mme Hélène AHRWEILLER Recteur-chancelier des Universités de Paris M. L'Amiral Jacques CHATELLE Chef du Service Historique de la Marine M. le Général François CHEVRIER Directeur du Centre d'Enseignement Supérieur Aérien et Commandant l'Ecole Supérieure de Guerre Aérienne M. le Professeur André COR VISIER Président de la Commission Internationale d'Histoire Militaire Comparée M. le Général Jean DELMAS Chef du Service Historique de l'Armée de Terre M. Jean FAVIER Directeur Général des Archives de France M. le Général Nicolas FEVRE Commandant les Ecoles de l'Armée de l'Air M. le Général Georges FRICAUD-CHAGNAUD Président de la Fondation pour les Etudes de Défense Nationale M. le Général Gilbert GAGNEUX Commandant la IIle Région Aérienne M. le Général Fernand GAMBIEZ Directeur de l'Institut d'Histoire Militaire Comparée M. le Général Jean-Paul LANG Directeur de l'Institut des Hautes Etudes de Défense Nationale et de l'Enseignement Militaire Supérieur M. le Général Pierre LISSARAGUE Directeur du Musée de l'Air et de l'Espace M. le Professeur André MARTEL Directeur du Centre d'Histoire Militaire et d'Etudes de Défense Nationale et de l'U.A. 04 1019 du C.N.R.S. Université de Montpellier III. M. Henri MICHEL Président du Comité International d'Histoire de la Seconde Guerre Mondiale M. le Général de Division Aérienne Claude POZZO DI BORGO. M. le Professeur Jacques SOPPELSA Président de l'Université de Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne M. le Général Philippe VOUGNY Commandant l'Ecole de l'Air et l'Ecole Militaire de l'Air

COMITE D'ORGANISATION

M. le Professeur Guy PEDRONCINI Directeur de l'Institut d'Histoire des Conflits Contemporains M. le Général Charles CHRISTIENNE Directeur du Service Historique de l'Armée de l'Air Secrétaire Général du Colloque : M. Claude CARLIER Institut d'Histoire des Conflits Contemporains Directeur du Centre d'Histoire de l'Aéronautique et de l'Espace PROGRAMME DU COLLOQUE

Mardi 4 septembre 1984

Séance inaugurale du colloque en présence de M. Charles HERNU, ministre de la Défense. Séance placée sous la présidence de M. le professeur Henri MICHEL, président du Comité International d'Histoire de la Seconde Guerre Mondiale. Allocution de M. le ministre de la Défense. Allocution introductive du thème du colloque par M. le général Charles CHRISTIENNE, directeur du Service Historique de l'Armée de l'Air.

LES DOCTRINES AERIENNES

Président de séance M. le professeur André CORVISIER. G. ROCHAT - Douhet and the Italian Military Thought, 1919-1930. K.R. BOHME - Swedish Air Force Doctrine, 1918-1945. M. BENICHOU - 1911-1912 : Mise en place d'une doctrine d'emploi pour l'arme aérienne par l'armée française.

Président de séance Doctor Richard H. KOHN. P.-M. GALLOIS - 1939 : Doctrine française de guerre aérienne. M. ALEXANDER - "Force de frappe ou feu de paille ?" Général Maurice GAMELIN'S appraisal of military aviation before the Blietzkrieg of 1940. C. CARLIER - L'évolution des doctr ines de guerre aérienne à travers l'enseignement dispensé à l'Ecole supérieure de guerre de 1918 à 1928. Mercredi 5 septembre 1984

L'INDEPENDANCE DES MOYENS AERIENS

Président de séance M. le général Henri de BORDAS. J. HUSTON - General H.H. Arnold and struggle for independence for the U.S.A.A.F. H.A. PROBERT - The independence of the Royal Air Force, 1918-1945. A. GOLDBERG - The influence of organization on Naval Air Force, 1919-1945.

Président de séance M. le professeur Giorgio ROCHAT. H. BOOG - The problem of independence of Air Power in Germany M. FORGET - La coopération Air - Terre dans les forces allemandes pendant la guerre éclair : apparence et réalités. P. MASSON - La Marine française et la création de l'armée de l'Air. M. SPIVAK - Les problèmes posés à l'armée de Terre par la création du ministère de l'Air et les perspectives d'indépendance de l'armée de l'Air, 1928-1934.

Jeudi 6 septembre 1984

L'EMPLOI DES FORCES AERIENNES

Président de séance M. le directeur Horst BOOG. L. CEVA - Influence de la guerre d'Espagne sur l'armement et les conceptions d'emploi de l'aviation de l'Italie fasciste. B. GOLDMAN - The evolution of Tactical Air Command. B. PUJO - L'évolution de la pensée du général Foch sur l'emploi de l'aviation en 1915-1916. Président de séance Air Commodore H.A. PROBERT. P. FAÇON - Un exemple de l'adaptation de l'arme aérienne aux conflits contemporains : la division aérienne du général Duval de 1918. E. CHADEAU - Un jeu d'influences réciproques, doctrine d'emploi tactique et évolution industrielle aéronautique : le cas français (1912-1928). B. GONON - Les moteurs d'avions et l'évolution de l'arme aérienne de 1914 à 1940.

DES EXEMPLES NATIONAUX

Président de séance M. le professeur André MARTEL. A. APOSTOLO - The Italian Air Force from 1919 to 1923. A. CURAMI - The Italian aviation from 1923 to 1933. G. GARELLO - The Air Force Role during the Italian Fascism.

Président de séance M. le major-général John W. HUSTON. R. HIGHAM - British Air Force in Greece : independence in a peripherical role, 1940-1941. 3. PARISEAU - Propos à bâtons rompus et vols à tire d'aile : les faux départs de l'aviation royale du Canada. 0. RISTE - No strength in Unity : The Pre-History of the Royal Norwegian Air Force, 1912-1944.

Vendredi 7 septembre 1984

Président de séance M. le professeur Jean PARISEAU. J.-L. SUSINI - Le renouveau de la Luftwaffe dans le régime national-socialiste. M. HODEIR - Le Parlement et le Comité de la Défense nationale face aux problèmes de l'aviation militaire de 1919 à 1923. Séance de clôture, en présence de M. le général d'Armée Aérienne Bernard CAPILLON, chef d'Etat-Major de l'armée de l'Air. Séance placée sous la présidence de M. le général Fernand GAMBIEZ, directeur de l'Institut d'Histoire Militaire Comparée. Synthèse des travaux du colloque par M. le professeur Guy PEDRONCINI, directeur de l'Institut d'Histoire des Conflits Contemporains. Allocution du Chef d'Etat-Major de l'armée de l'Air. SEANCE INAUGURALE

ALLOCUTION DE MONSIEUR CHARLES HERNU MINISTRE DE LA DEFENSE

Messieurs les Parlementaires, Madame le Recteur des Universités de Paris, Monsieur le Secrétaire général pour l'Administration, Monsieur le Chef d'Etat-Major de l'Armée de l'Air, Monsieur le Secrétaire général de la Défense Nationale, Messieurs les Officiers généraux, Messieurs les Directeurs, Messieurs les Professeurs, Mesdames, Messieurs,

Ma présence aujourd'hui à l'Ecole Militaire, au sein de votre assemblée, riche d'une diversité peu commune, riche également d'éminentes personnalités, dont la compétence est incontestée, entend marquer tout l'intérêt que j'accorde à ce premier colloque organisé par l'Institut d'Histoire des Conflits Contemporains, colloque consacré à l'aviation. Vous savez que je me suis attaché à mettre cet Institut sur pied dès mon arrivée au Ministère de la Défense, afin que soit harmonieusement complété l'ensemble du dispositif français d'histoire militaire. Et je tiens à féliciter publiquement ici son directeur M. Guy Pédroncini ainsi que le général Christienne, directeur du Service Historique de l'Armée de l'Air et instigateur de ce colloque. Je voudrais également vous dire combien je suis heureux de relever la présence de nombreuses délégations étrangères, représentant quatorze pays, et je salue avec plaisir la présence de nombreux universitaires. A tous, j'adresse mes voeux de bienvenue et de travaux féconds. Je voudrais rapidement évoquer l'importance, la modernité et peut-être même l'actualité du sujet de vos futurs débats. En effet, parmi les thèmes majeurs qui intéressent la Défense, l'étude des conditions dans lesquelles un moyen nouveau, souvent révolutionnaire - et tel était le cas de l'arme aérienne - parvient à s'intégrer aux moyens plus anciens mérite la plus grande attention, car elle peut apporter d'utiles thèmes de réflexion pour l'avenir. Et, à cet égard, l'histoire de l'aviation militaire me semble particuliè- rement riche d'enseignements. L'importance du fait aérien par exemple est très rapidement et clairement apparue aux états-majors et aux combattants au cours de la Première Guerre Mondiale. Or, entre les deux guerres, cette leçon est incontestablement oubliée. D'où, l'impression ressentie par les aviateurs d'être enserrés dans un carcan et leur conviction qu'ils ne pourront briser cet encerclement qu'en obtenant leur indépen- dance. Cette revendication va provoquer des heurts - parfois même des conflits - entre aviateurs tenant souvent des thèses extrêmes et représentants des commandements terrestre et naval soucieux de solutions plus conformes à la tradition. Mais ce qui est, me semble-t-il, le plus intéressant de noter, c'est que ces conflits se retrouvent dans la quasi-totalité des pays qui ont décidé de se doter d'un système militaire complet. Certes, les conditions dans lesquelles naissent ces affrontements, les armées qu'ils concernent, les solutions qu'ils impliquent sont différentes. De même seront différentes les conséquences qui résulteront de ces atermoiements sur les nations belligérantes lors de la Seconde Guerre Mondiale. Ainsi, les Armées de l'Air de l'Axe remporteront dès leur entrée en guerre des succès certains, qu'il convient toutefois de relativiser : offensive, la Luftwaffe paiera en effet lourdement par la perte de nombreux équipages les résultats obtenus au cours de la bataille de France. Et elle se révèlera plus tard incapable de forcer la décision au-dessus des Iles Britanniques, donnant raison à Ader qui, au début de ce siècle, dans son livre prémonitoire sur L'aviation militaire, avait si bien su dépeindre la bataille d'Angleterre. Mais je crois qu'il convient là, également, de souligner un autre point historique important. Par la novation qu'elle constitue, par la puissance de feu qu'elle recèle, la capacité aérienne tente le pouvoir politique, qui cherche à obtenir à travers son emploi un effet psychologique immédiat au risque de s'éloigner de certaines règles essentielles au plan tactique, notamment le principe d'économie de m oyens. N'est-ce pas Hitler en effet qui, furieux d'avoir vu l'Armée de l'Air britannique violer le sanctuaire allemand, décidera fin 1940, de détourner les escadres de bombardement allemandes de leurs objectifs prioritaires. L'abandon par la Luftwaffe de la lutte pour la conquête de la supériorité aérienne puis son attaque terroriste des villes britanniques constitueront pour la Royal Air Force une chance supplémentaire. De même, le Japon, après l'attaque surprise de Pearl Harbour et les premiers succès remportés dans la campagne éclair du Pacifique, verra sceller définitivement son destin au cours de la bataille de Midway. Mais il faudra encore quelque temps pour que les Alliés se ressaisissent et produisent en nombre les avions qui leur permettront de reprendre l'offensive. Aussi me semble-t-il nécessaire d'insister maintenant sur un troisième point important : le rôle majeur qu'a joué et doit continuer à jouer l'industrie aéronautique. L'irruption du fait aérien a définitivement scellé l'union entre la conduite de la guerre et la mobilisation intensive des ressources industrielles d'une nation. Hier instrument prépondérant de la victoire finale, cette industrie - devenue aujourd'hui aérospatiale - est et demeure l'instrument indispensable de l'indépendance d'une nation, même si la raison veut pour son développement que s'instaure de plus en plus une coopération étroite entre alliés. Il est dans notre intérêt comme dans celui de nos partenaires européens que nous mobilisions nos énergies, nos intelligences, nos ressources scientifiques et techniques, nos capacités financières pour réaliser ensemble la génération à venir d'armes conventionnelles, et notamment aéronautique. A l'occasion des discussions en cours relatives à la production, par cinq pays européens d'un avion de combat, nous trouverons la capacité de donner à notre industrie les moyens d'assurer son développement, sa modernisation - en particulier technologique - et cela dans l'intérêt de nos armées, de notre économie et de tous ceux qui y consacrent leur travail. J'ai assisté, il y a peu, à l'arrivée du premier escadron de Mirage 2000 à Dijon, gage de la permanence opérationnelle de notre Armée de l'Air. Cet avion, magnifique réalisation nationale, est pour moi la meilleure illustration de notre savoir-faire. Nous n'avons rien à craindre à associer d'autres Etats à de futurs projets. Notre compétence, notre compétitivité sont incontestées. La coopération sera, pour nous, l'occasion de nouveaux progrès dont l'aéronautique française saura tirer le meilleur parti, j'en suis convaincu, car je connais les hommes qui conduisent les destinées de ces firmes prestigieuses que sont la SNIAS, les Avions Marcel Dassault, la SNECMA, la Thomson ou Matra pour ne citer que les plus importantes ; je connais également le dynamisme des ingénieurs, des techniciens et des ouvriers sans lesquels ces réalisations n'auraient pu voir le jour. Il est vrai qu'à certains égards, la coopération à laquelle nous aspirons est un défi que nous lançons à nous-mêmes. Je suis certain que nous saurons le relever car nous voulons que la France demeure parmi les tout premiers dans la compétition aéronautique et spatiale. J'ajoute qu'en tant que Ministre de la Défense, je veille tout particulièrement, la loi de programmation en est l'expression, à ce qu'il en soit ainsi. Ainsi donc, et je reviens au thème de votre colloque, à la fin du second conflit mondial, se trouvent confirmées les leçons de la première guerre : - nécessité absolue de conquérir la supériorité aérienne préalablement à toute autre action ; - rôle majeur de l'aviation tactique au service des autres armées, rôle considérable de l'aviation stratégique, instrument du pouvoir politique, devenue aujourd'hui avec l'arme atomique un moyen sans égal de dissuasion ; - importance fondamentale d'une industrie aéronautique et spatiale moder- ne et compétitive. Mais il faut aussi noter que tout au long de ce second conflit, la querelle qui opposait les Armées de Terre et de Mer à l'Armée de l'Air s'est apaisée, grâce à la définition et à la mise en place de structures de commandement d'une extrême souplesse. La rapidité d'action et de concentration de l'aviation, sa capacité d'inter- vention tous azimuts, son extrême souplesse d'emploi se sont en effet naturellement affirmées, confirmant ainsi que l'arme aérienne peut remplir sa mission au profit des autres armées sans être limitée dans ses actions par un cadre territorial trop étroit et de ce fait inadapté à ses possibilités. Ces quelques évocations montrent à l'évidence ce que je soulignais au début de mon propos : toute réflexion sur l'Histoire débouche toujours sur les problèmes du présent. Mais il serait grave de croire que tout se passe aujourd'hui comme hier. Et il serait plus grave encore d'admettre sans vérification que rien ne se passe comme hier...

C'est dans cet esprit que je déclare ouvert le Colloque international 1984 sur l'Armée aérienne.

ALLOCUTION INTRODUCTIVE DU THEME DU COLLOQUE

par le général Charles CHRISTIENNE Directeur du Service Historique de l'Armée de l'Air

Monsieur le Ministre, Monsieur le Président, Messieurs les Parlementaires, Mesdames et Messieurs, Mes chers collègues,

C'est avec le plus grand plaisir que j'ouvre les hostilités en présentant ce qu'il serait sans doute prétentieux d'appeler la problématique du colloque. Il me revient de préciser tout d'abord l'objet de ce colloque dont le titre volontairement compliqué cache ce que j'appellerai le noir dessein d'un aviateur historien ou d'un historien aviateur. Parlant aujourd'hui en mon nom personnel et m'appuyant uniquement sur l'histoire, je crois honnête de préciser que le vrai sujet dont nous devons traiter tourne autour du grand débat de l'indépendance de l'arme aérienne qui a lieu entre les deux guerres. Après m'être efforcé de rechercher aux sources de la Première Guerre Mondiale la naissance de l'idée des actions aériennes indépendantes, j'essaierai de susciter nos interrogations sur la nature et les causes de la dispute, son universalité, ses répercussions sur la pensée militaire. 3e tiens à préciser, et je le ferai de nouveau dans ma conclusion, que, bien que lié à l'Armée de l'Air par une passion vieille de 45 ans, je m'efforcerai à l'objectivité la plus totale et me garderai bien d'enfreindre la loi de l'historien en portant sur les événements et les hommes le moindre jugement moral. Le sujet proposé est né d'une constatation. A plusieurs reprises au cours de discussions de travail avec mes collègues étrangers, il m'est apparu que, dans pratiquement tous les pays, s'est posé entre les deux guerres le problème de l'indépendance de l'arme aérienne. Dire que le problème s'est posé est d'ailleurs un euphémisme. En fait, autour de cette notion d'indépendance qu'il faudra d'ailleurs nuancer et préciser, c'est une véritable querelle qui oppose les tenants de l'ortho- doxie qui entendent limiter l'aviation militaire au seul rôle d'auxiliaire des armées terrestres ou navales, à ceux qui, convaincus et par les leçons de la guerre et par leur foi dans le progrès technique, estiment que l'aviation militaire doit être érigée en armée placée sur un pied d'égalité avec l'Armée de Terre et la Marine. Il faut bien prendre conscience que cette bataille que se livrent les tenants des deux thèses est souvent d'une extrême violence. Il convient de rappeler les mésaventures survenues au général Mitchell, traduit en conseil de guerre, obligé de quitter l'armée et qui finira ses jours en 1936, sans savoir que, quelques années plus tard, l'aviation de bombardement américaine démontrerait la justesse de certaines de ses vues. Billy Mitchell, d'ailleurs, n'épargnait pas non plus ses opposants, lui dont Lord Trenchard disait, comme le rappelle le général Huston dans sa communication sur Arnold : qu'if Cteayait de. conveitii 4£4 contiadic.te.axi en lei tuant d'abord. De nombreux textes des années trente montrent la violence du débat.L'un d'entre eux publié en novembre 1928 par la respectable Revue des Veux Mondes est intitulé : un cas de noUe collective. : £a création du ministère de l'Air. L'auteur, présenté par la revue comme une personnalité hautement compétente pour tout ce qui touche à l'organisation de la Défense nationale, n'hésitait pas à affirmer qu'en créant une Armée de l'Air indépendante, soustraite aux traditions de discipli- ne, de modération, de réserve politique de ces deux vieilles Armées de Terre et de Mer, on réalisait un ensemble de conditions morales et matérielles qui feraient de l'Armée de l'Air, l'armée des coups d'Etat par excellence. L'outrance des propos est manifeste et l'idée de lancer les Potez 25 ou les LeO 20, avions d'arme de l'époque, à l'assaut du Palais-Bourbon ou de l'Elysée a dû, selon l'expression d'Etienne Riché, secrétaire de la Commission de l'Aéronauti- que de la Chambre, provoquer dans les escadrilles la plus franche et £a plus douce goûté. Ce débat, toujours passionné, parfois violent, n'est pas un débat nouveau. Il s'est posé dans une certaine mesure à toutes les aviations belligérantes de la guerre 14-18. Les raisons en sont évidentes. Au début de la campagne, l'arme aérienne en est à ses balbutiements. Son emploi en dépit des expériences menées et des théories développées, notamment par Clément Ader dans son livre, L'aviation militaire, écrit en 1898 et publié en 1911, n'est envisagé que limité à la recherche du renseignement et au réglage des tirs d'artillerie. Encore faut-il insister sur le fait que l'on accorde peu de crédits aux résultats obtenus. Les rapports des reconnaissances aériennes effec- tuées en septembre et qui relatent l'inflexion de l'Armée Von Kluck suscitent d'abord le doute. Pourtant, rapidement le haut commandement prend conscience de l'importance du fait aérien. Joffre écrit en novembre 1914 : l'aviation n'est pa6 seulement, comme on avait pu le supposer autrefois, un instrument de reconnaissance. Elle s'est tendue, sinon indispensable, du moins extrêmement utile pout le réglage du tir de l'artillerie. Elfe a montré, en outre, que par le lancement de projectiles à explosifs puissants, elle était en mesure d'agir comme arme onûenÚve, soit pour des missions éloignées, soit en liaison avec les autres troupes. Enfi.{n, elle a encore le devoir de pourchasser et de détruire les avions ennemis. Ainsi définie, la mission de l'arme aérienne préfigure bien ce qu'elle sera par la suite, mais de nombreuses contraintes vont s'opposer constamment à l'exten- sion du rôle de l'avion de combat. Ces contraintes naissent de la nature même de l'engin aérien. A l'entrée en guerre les avions en service sont lents, vulnérables, peu sûrs et mal adaptés au rôle qu'on prétend leur faire jouer. Par ailleurs, les progrès techniques sont continus et l'industrie aéronautique ne suit pas. Il ne s'agit pas en effet, comme pour les autres armes, de développer la production. Il faut dans le même temps produire plus et produire mieux. Le canon de 75 de la fin de la guerre est peu différent de celui du modèle initial de 1896. A l'opposé, le Bréguet XIV ou le Spad XIII marquent un progrès considérable par rapport aux Blériot et aux Déperdussin du début de la guerre. Cette amélioration des performances est clairement sentie par les aviateurs qui, anticipant les progrès à venir, imaginent les possibilités offertes aux combats futurs. Le combattant au sol comprend moins bien cette marche vers le progrès et voit mal ces engins fragiles, pour la plupart encore en toile et en bois, accomplissant ces exploits dont on les affirme capables. Je reviendrai sur ce point qui me paraît important. Pourtant, aussi bien sur le plan des techniques que sur celui de l'emploi, tout ou presque tout ce qui sera réalisé au cours de la Deuxième Guerre Mondiale a été accompli au cours de la Première. La photographie, la T.S.F., le bombardement lourd, l'avion canon apparaissent et se perfectionnent. De même, l'aviation navale se développe, montre son efficacité dans la lutte anti-sous-marine, et le premier porte-avions au monde, le Furious, opère en Mer du Nord. Si la tâche principale dévolue à l'aviation demeure l'observation et le réglage d'artillerie, les doctrines d'emploi de la chasse et du bombardement sont définies et appliquées. Le commandement terrestre comprend notamment la nécessité absolue d'obtenir le gain de la supériorité aérienne préalablement à toute attaque. Sans cette supériorité aérienne totale ou locale, il n'est pas possible de mettre en oeuvre de façon satisfaisante les avions de coopération qui évoluent sur le champ de bataille. L'acquisition de cette supériorité peut se faire soit par des actions directes - la chasse détruit en vol les avions ennemis - soit par des actions indirectes confiées au bombardement qui attaque les aérodromes ennemis et les lignes de ravitaillement. Pour obtenir des résultats efficaces, il faut utiliser au mieux les qualités de l'arme nouvelle : souplesse d'emploi et mobilité. Les hauts états-majors le comprennent bien et décident de regrouper des masses d'avions dans des commandements autonomes. Un bon exemple en est donné par Monsieur Facon qui étudie la Division aérienne française subordonnée directement au Grand Quartier Général et dont l'emploi se situe au niveau du groupe d'armées. Les commandants d'armée et les commandants de corps contestent cette création. Ils préféreraient de beaucoup que les moyens de cette grande unité soient répartis en petits paquets mis à leur disposition, notamment les avions de chasse chargés d'assurer dans leur secteur la sécurité de leurs avions d'observation et la survie de leurs troupes. Ils ne voient pas que cette conception d'emploi de la chasse n'est pas adaptée aux possibilités de l'arme et permet à l'ennemi qui mène l'offensive, et on le verra bien en mai 40, d'obtenir sur tout le front la supériorité numérique. Toutefois, le regroupement dans une grande unité aérienne de chasse et de bombardement ne prétend pas soustraire l'aviation aux ordres du commandement terrestre puisque cette grande unité reste en permanence subordonnée au commandant en chef et, au combat, prend ses ordres du commandant du groupe d'armées auprès duquel elle est détachée. Il n'en est pas de même pour l'aviation stratégique. Cette aviation stratégique, organisée en France dès la fin de 1914, est à partir de 1915 générale- ment utilisée sur les arrières du champ de bataille. En Allemagne les Zeppelins et les Gothas reçoivent mission, à partir du début de 1917, de bombarder Paris et Londres. La première bataille d'Angleterre aura plusieurs conséquences. Tout d'abord les Britanniques devront organiser dans leur île une défense aérienne qui à l'évidence ne peut être subordonnée au commandant en chef du corps expédition- naire. En outre, tout naturellement, sera mise sur pied une aviation stratégique de représailles qui s'attaquera à son tour aux villes allemandes. Là encore, il paraît difficile de subordonner aux chefs militaires un instrument qui par essence ne peut prendre ses ordres que du pouvoir politique. Cette logique conduit tout naturellement à la création de la R.A.F. en avril 1918 et, en mai 18, au regroupement du bombardement stratégique au sein de l'Independent Air Force, ancêtre du Bomber Command. De ce rapide examen de l'emploi de l'aviation au cours de la Première Guerre Mondiale, on pourrait conclure que les leçons de la guerre sont claires et qu'elles seront clairement perçues par tous les doctrinaires à venir. Les leçons de la guerre sont effectivement très claires pour l'historien d'aujourd'hui qui mène ses analyses en toute tranquillité et qui connaît la suite. Il est facile d'affirmer aujourd'hui que la guerre de 14, ce n'était pas seulement la guerre de tranchées de 1915-1917, mais aussi la guerre de mouvement de 1914 et celle de 1918, cette dernière préfigurant le Blietzkrieg avec ses attaques profondes de masses de chars précédées de masses d'avions. Il est beaucoup plus difficile de mener une telle analyse dans les années qui suivent la guerre. La boucherie a été telle que les pays, le commandement terrestre et de nombreux aviateurs ne retiennent du conflit que les horreurs de la guerre de tranchées. La doctrine de l'inviolabilité des fronts fortifiés est un dogme universel et ce dogme renforce considérablement la position de Douhet qui, constatant l'impuissance des Armées de Terre, affirme que seule l'aviation libérée des servitu- des terrestres peut en attaquant l'ennemi dans les oeuvres vives de sa nation le contraindre à capituler. C'est une thèse apparemment voisine que défend Mitchell, mais comme il se situe dans un pays protégé des dangers potentiels par l'immensité des deux grands océans qui le bordent, sa thèse est difficile à soutenir. Il y a là un point qu'il convient de souligner. La querelle de l'indépen- dance de l'aviation ne se présente pas de la même façon dans les divers pays. Les arguments mis en avant vont dépendre des conditions géographiques - les nations insulaires ont des réactions différentes des nations continentales - des conditions historiques - la R.A.F. est déjà créée à la fin de la guerre -, des conditions politiques - l'Allemagne à qui le traité de Versailles interdit toute aviation est confrontée à des problèmes différents de ceux de la France, et l'Amérique des années vingt, tentée de nouveau par l'isolationnisme, suit Mitchell lorsqu'il détruit les cuirassés, symbole de l'impérialisme, et le rejette lorsqu'il envisage le bombardement d'objectifs civils. Plus tard, ces conditions politiques joueront également en Allemagne et en Italie pour imposer aux états-majors terrestres des politiques aéronautiques qui servent la gloire du dictateur. Il est dommage que nous n'ayons pas la possibilité dans nos débats d'évoquer le cas russe et le cas japonais. Il aurait été intéressant de comprendre les succès initiaux puis les faiblesses de l'arme aérienne japonaise, succès initiaux et faiblesses qui semblent relever à la fois de conditions géographiques, de structures mentales et de choix politiques. Pour l'U.R.S.S., je ne suis pas sûr que les historiens soviétiques d'aujourd'hui acceptent de discuter librement d'un tel sujet. Si l'environnement géographique, historique et politique introduit des nuances dans les arguments développés pour soutenir ou pour refuser l'octroi (1) de leur indépendance aux forces aériennes, il semble que les motivations profondes et que les arguments développés se retrouvent dans tous les pays. Tout d'abord, quelle indépendance réclament les aviateurs? Ils ne préten- dent pas, sauf quelques rares extrêmistes, se soustraire à leurs devoirs vis-à-vis des armées terrestres ou navales, ils affirment seulement qu'ils ne pourront remplir leur mission de soutien que s'ils ont acquis préalablement la suprématie dans le ciel. Pour ce faire, ils devront être en mesure de mener en priorité une bataille aérienne indépendante des actions terrestres. Remarquons en passant que ces actions terrestres seront, conformément aux doctrines admises par les "grands chefs" militaires, purement défensives puisqu'à l'abri des lignes fortifiées les nations "forgeront l'acier victorieux" qui les conduira à la victoire. Ces actions indépendantes devront être essentiellement offensives car la meilleure façon de détruire les avions est de les attaquer au sol sur leurs bases de départ. Une telle indépendance suppose bien sûr l'égalité avec les autres armes et logiquement la subordination des trois armées à un département de la Défense qui coordonne leurs actions. Il est d'ailleurs bon de souligner que le problème d'organisation n'est fondamental que pour vaincre certaines résistances mentales. Si ces résistances n'existent pas, toutes les solutions sont bonnes et l'exemple de l'U.S. Army Air Force est là pour le prouver. L'entente entre Arnold et Marshall a permis, comme le montre si bien Jack Huston, une indépendance de fait des forces aériennes sans qu'il soit besoin de l'affirmer en droit. Mais les mots indépendance, Armée de l'Air, bataille aérienne choquent profondément les vieilles armées. La guette. de PAÜ? Maii tei hommet> n'habitent peu l'ait et tien de ce qui (1) ou le maintien de cette indépendance en ce qui concerne la K.A.r. est nécessaire à ta vie, saui la plaie., ne leur arrive par l'an. Aussi la guerre, quand il y a guerre, n'est-elle pas dan6 l'air et n'a-t-elle pas l'air comme objet. La guerre est iur la terre ou vivent les hommes et bar la met, puisque c'est par la me-1 qu'on leur apporte. les choses nécessaires à leur vie et à la poursuite de la guerre. H n'y a donc. qu'une division logique de la dépense nationale : protection du territoire, protection des communications maritimes, attaque du territoire de l'ennemi, attaque des communications maritimes. La première de ces tâches incombe au ministre de la Marine... L'aviation n'est qu'un moyen de plus d'attaquer ou de dépendre le territoire et les communications maritimes. Querelle de doctrine? Oui sans doute, mais n'est-ce que cela? Est-ce que les mots ne cachent pas autre chose? Reportons-nous à la fin de la guerre. Le plus rapidement possible les nations démobilisent leur armée et vont réduire considérablement leurs dépenses militaires. Le gâteau budgétaire ainsi réduit est déjà insuffisant pour contenter les armées traditionnelles. Accepter un nouveau partenaire, c'est accepter des dépenses nouvelles qui échapperont dans une grande mesure au contrôle des états-majors en place. La raison budgétaire s'oppose donc à la reconnaissance d'une armée nouvelle. D'ailleurs, ces aviateurs ne sont pas raisonnables. Ils entendent avoir accès à tous les grades de la hiérarchie et exercer des commandements jusque-là réservés à la hiérarchie traditionnelle. Il y a là un dilemme qui se pose, notamment en France, mais aussi aux U.S.A., ou bien confier les commandements aériens à des officiers distingués, qui ne connaissent rien à la technique aérienne, ou bien confier ces postes à des aviateurs qui n'ont pas un grade jugé nécessaire pour les occuper et à qui on ne peut pas donner un tel grade en raison de leur jeunesse et de leur insuffisance d'ancienneté. En outre, tout avantage consenti dans le domaine de l'avancement à l'arme nouvelle aura forcément des répercussions négatives sur la pyramide des grades des armes anciennes. A ces raisons purement matérielles s'ajoutent des raisons plus difficiles à définir et qui relèvent du psychisme collectif. Le simple fait que les aviateurs veulent couper le cordon ombilical qui les lie à leurs armes d'origine choque les tenants de ces armes. Il s'agit là d'un manquement grave a la tradition militaire et on le verra bien dans le mini-scandale que causera en France l'adoption de la nouvelle tenue des Forces aériennes qui délaisse le képi pour la casquette. Par ailleurs, ces aviateurs ont mauvaise réputation. Au cours de la guerre, ils ont fait l'objet, pour des raisons de propagande, d'une publicité que n'ont pas appréciée les obscurs combattants des tranchées. La gloire attachée aux "As", les succès féminins qu'on leur prête, les nuits tapageuses de certains d'entre eux dans les boîtes de nuit parisiennes ont été cause d'une animosité certaine qui oublie les risques considérables courus par les navigants dont les pertes au cours de la guerre ont été supérieures à 50%. Pour les officiers de l'ancienne armée, les aviateurs sont des "rigolos" quand on ne les traite pas de voyous. L'animosité, d'ailleurs, trouve ses armes dans l'outrance même de certains théoriciens et Mitchell aux Etats-Unis, Douhet en Europe prêtent d'autant plus le flanc à la critique que les thèses extrêmes qu'ils développent supposent pour être vérifiées l'existence de matériels qui n'existent pas au moment où ils s'expriment. Nous retrouvons ces deux attitudes d'esprit, l'une qui constate les performances du moment et s'y tient, l'autre qui note la progression des performances et extrapole les résultats à attendre dans un avenir plus ou moins lointain. Il convient ici de rappeler la révolution technique qui apparaît au début des années trente qui voient des avions très semblables à ceux de la grande guerre laisser la place aux avions modernes qui marqueront la Deuxième Guerre Mondiale. Cette révolution, souvent mal perçue par les aviateurs est a fortiori difficilement perceptible par les non-spécialistes. Il est à ce sujet intéressant de vérifier dans quelle mesure l'évolution de la pensée militaire prend en compte le progrès technique. Bien d'autres éléments, qu'il nous convient de définir, peuvent expliquer les difficultés d'adaptation de l'arme aérienne aux structures seules capables de lui permettre de faire face à l'épreuve de la guerre. En France, une des difficultés majeures vient de la vieille formule : une mission, un chef, des moyens. Pour le chef terrestre, la création de forces aériennes indépendantes est condamnable car les moyens aériens doivent, pour respecter la tradition, être placés sous son commandement direct. L'adaptation des forces aériennes tactiques au groupe d'armées qui fait l'originalité et le succès des forces aériennes alliées est une solution inconcevable dans l'état d'esprit général de l'avant-guerre. C'est tellement vrai que lorsque, l'Afrique du Nord libérée, le général Giraud prend en main le commandement en chef des armées françaises sa première idée, heureusement combattue par les Alliés, est de morceler l'aviation pour la subordonner aux divisions terrestres. La guerre, pourtant, va montrer la justesse de la pensée de ceux qui au cours de la Première Guerre Mondiale - et ils appartenaient au plus haut niveau de la hiérarchie militaire - avaient compris le rôle primordial dévolu désormais à l'aviation. Mais l'incompréhension manifestée vis-à-vis de l'arme aérienne entre les deux guerres aurait pu coûter cher aux nations alliées. Heureusement, comme le dit mon ami Probert, la R.A.F fut maintenue, grâce à elle la bataille d'Angleterre fut gagnée et, j'ajoute, le monde libre fut sauvé. Et maintenant il convient de conclure. Bien sûr les aviateurs présents dans cette salle sont attachés passion- nément à l'Armée de l'Air et certains ont connu les vicissitudes de l'avant-guerre et en ont souffert. L'historien, quant à lui, n'a pas à porter de jugement moral. Il se contente d'observer les faits et d'en proposer une interprétation. C'est ce que nous ferons tout au long de ce colloque. Je voudrais toutefois insister sur le fait qu'au-delà de la discussion de ce point particulier se pose le problème plus général du conservatisme social et que ceci vaut dans bien d'autres domaines que le seul domaine militaire. J'espère en conséquence que nos discussions pourront donner à penser aux sociologues, aux politologues, voire aux psychologues et aussi à tous les hommes engagés dans l'action. LES DOCTRINES AERIENNES

DOUHET AND THE ITALIAN MILITARY THOUGHT 1919-1930

Giorgio ROCHAT

1. Introduction. Giulio Douhet is unanimously considered to have been one of the aviation precursors and prophets and, without any doubt, he is the only Italian military theorist of international fame in the 20th century. Therefore it is not necessary for all those who are interested in the history of aviation either to avange his importance or to carry out a study on his thought, since it is well-known, at least in broad line, by all of them. Our aim is to study his thought against the background of his time, that is to say to compare it with the Italian debates on the new ways of directing a war and with the Italian aviation development. All that it is made possible as Douhet always remembered the Italian military and political reality, so letting us understand and judge his struggle better, in spite of his good knowledge and his deep interest in the aviation development in the other countries. In this paper neither Douhet's international fame nor his influence on foreign aviation development will be treated. All the same our study will be hindered by lack of space as well as by the few critical essays on Douhet at our disposal, since his thought is still an object of laudatory praise or guilty mutenesses rather than of methodical studies. 2. The control o& the air, 1921. Douhet's most famous work, which was translated into the main langua- ges, is 11 dominio deU'a'L.i.a, a small book of no more than one hundred pages, which was published by the Ministry of War in 1921 (1). In this work Douhet describes the extraordinary offensive possibilities of the aviation in resolute words ; but above all he points out the decisive importance of the control of the air : The control 06 the ait allows u.4 to 6top the enemy 6iom &lying and to keep this faculty 60'1. ourselve:s. Aircrahts which are able to carry more or le66 big quantities On bombs can be a reality. The construction On a reasonable number On Such aircrahts does not demand particular means. Active, explosive, incendiary and poisonous materials are manuhactured currently. It i.", easy to create a Meet able to drop hundreds and hundreds 06 tons On this active materials. The aviation capacity 06 material damage and moral harm is Aaz more higher than any other we know o6. The control 06 the air and an adequate power allow us to protect out territory and out seas against the enemy attacks (...), a.4 well a'" to exert such terrihying actions against the enemy so a'" to make it

(1) G. DOUHET, It dominio deU'a'L.i.a, ("The control of the air"). Essay on the art of air war, Rome, 1921. impossible for him react in some way. By these offensive actions it it, possible to neutralize the enemy's army and navy and to nxe.it any kind of destruction able, to wear down both the mo ml and the material opposition u&tt/ rapidly, on the inside of the enemy country. All that i6 an existing possibility, it is not future (1). Some basic principles to get victory are based on these statements : The necessary and sufficient condition to assure the national defence is to enable ourselves to conquer the control of the air in case a war should break out (...). All that a nation is willing to do in O'1.de.'L to assure its defence it must be done so that it may provide itself with all those means which are Suited to the conquest of the air in the event of a war (...). The control of the air can be achieved only by a suitable air force The national defence can only be assured by an air force that, in the event On a war, is suited to conquer the control of the air (...). (It is necessary) to reduce, both land and maritime forces progres- 6ively and a.-', progressively to increase suitable air forces to the control of the air (2). In Douhet opinion, the conquest of the control of the air can only be achieved by an air force which must consist of bombers of medium speed and with a sufficient plafond to fly over the Alpes, and also suited to carry two tons of bombs as far as 200-300 km, and of fighter planes having similar performances, or even a bit superior, but powerfully armed with machine-guns and partially armoured ; their task is to protect the bombers. Douhet does not rely on fighters, as they can only assure a temporary and an exclusively defensive control of the air ; and the antiaircraft artillery less still, as he considers it a useless waste of energies and of resources. The only reasonable defence against the aviation menaces is the attack : the air force must be used en masse since the opening of the hostility, better if by surprise and with the greatest resoluteness, with the only target of a full and definitive conquest of the control of the air by destroying the collection points, the Supplying and the manufacturing centres of the enemy aviation ; after that it will be able to avail itself of this control for a systematic destruction of the enemy's military and industrial establishments, as well as to wear down the moral opposition by bombing the towns. In this perspective, both the army and the navy are bound to lose their importance ; however Douhet does not dwell on the matter, on the contrary the two armed forces are given the possibility of carrying out tactical reconnaissances and of controlling gunnery by means of their aviation, turned into auxiliary aviations, provided that they take all the expenses upon themselves. He energically claims the necessity of a fully independent aviation and of an adequate development, as well as of a central system responsible for the study, the planning and the direction of the war in all its aspects. From what 1 have concisely stated (Douhet ends) it is possible to understand what stature (so to speak) the atrocities of an aerial warfare can reach. The submission to the offences inflicted by the enemy - in case we should not have means adequately suited to defend ourselves against the enemy's offences, and again in case we would not use our nO'1c.e.'" in order

(1) G. DOUHET, op.cit., p. 22-23. (2) Ibid., p. 26-28. to try a rough defence - it will be highly tragic ih we think On the. great possibilities and atrocities the enemy can cause on u6. And it is also tiagic to think that the decision On a war like that is likely to be caused by the breaking ohh On all the material and moral energies On a population who i6 subjected to such ne.a'LnU£ upheaval that harasses it without respite everywhere, till all the social Ue.", are undone. However, in return, by leading a war like that one, it will be. possible to come to a solution in a very short time, a'" its ac.UoY!6 hall upon the least resistant elements On the frghting countries with the highest violence. Perhaps, despite these atrocities, these wars may be more human than the past ones, because, ante. 'L all, they will co6t human lives and they will be less bloody. But those who are not ready to nac.e. them will be goners (1). 3. The military thought in the Italian post-war period. In order to understand this work of Douhet's it is necessary to bear in mind the current situation. In fact the Italian post-war period was characterized by a rich and animated discussion on the basic choices for a defensive national policy. Both the military circles and quite a good number of survivors and politicians took part in it. Most of the survivors wanted the contribution given by the country in the war to be brought out : they mainly debated on the necessity of passing from a pre-war barrack-army to an armed country able to mobilize all the forces of the country, mostly applying to reserve officers and to civilians. Of course the exact meaning of an armed country gave rise to several obscure and unrealistic interpre- tations ; but all of them were based on the trench-warfare experience and all of them privileged an organization based on the mobilization en masse of the citizens to the search of new fighting forms. Even the problem of the war crafts was not prior any more, since military stores were full of modern aircrafts and what's more industry had proved that they could cope with the demands from the front rapidly. Also the military ranks accepted to keep the trench-warfare as a point of reference for every prevision and discussion, therefore they were not interested in the search for new forms with which to direct a war made possible by technical progress. They essentially turned their efforts to the defence of the traditional structures of the army, which allowed them to exert a sole control ; therefore they rejected all the requests of renewal like the armed country and, with the consent of the liberal government and later of the fascist government, they maintained an army quite similar to the pre-war one, with more officers, guns, machine-guns, but few vehicles and even fewer tanks (2). The post-war debate, in brief, was essentially about enlistment, military organization and politic control of the army, leaving little space to technical concerns and to the development of the new fighting means and methods. Therefore Douhet met lots of difficulties to carry out such an advanced argumentation : in fact all those who maintained the extraordinary capacities of the new weapons took an unilateral side and they were unable to develop a thourough and acceptable speech and to establish a dialogue with the conservative military ranks, nor they managed to reach the public opinion and the great number of the survivors. Yet those innovators were numerous (they were all regular officers and young generals), who looked at submarines and torpedoes as the new protagonists of the sea-war, and at the dual concept plane/gas (they seldom mention tanks which were not used at the Italian front) as the weapon able to change completely the art of war, bringing

(1) Op-cit., p. 61-62. (2) See G. ROCHAT, L'esercito italiano da Uittorio Veneto a Mussolini, 1919-1925, Bari, 1967. to an end the mass-army and the trench-war. There is no way for us to mention all of them, but we will limit ourselves to quote a passage from a work of lieutenant-colonel Pentimalli's. His work is quite similar to Douhet's in some aspects : On the inauspicious day On 4th August 1914 should the Germans have been able to race 400 aixcrahts (...), each 06 them loaded with two tons On bombs, towards Paris (...) - a possibility that today is not teal at all - ox only 40 aircrahts each on them carrying two torn 06 poisonous gas, in a minutes' time France would, have lost, together with its capital, its biain and heart, cuo.i: would have ended that same day. Two million and a halh deads would have, saved the ten million deads, the millions On wounded and disabled people On the wa'L which lasted 6ouz years (1). An enlightened conservative as general Gatti, who had expounded the thought of the most interesting of these new theorists in the Coxxiere de.Ua Sera rightly ended by saying : In pxohessing and stating the. e.nne.c.t'" On science, on the ait On wax, in out opinion, young people have given too moxe importance to theoxy rather than to pxactice. They have quite seen, but like all the discovexs, they have gone beyond reality (2). Gatti did not understand that the unilateralism as well as the breaking off and the charge of these innovators, which made it so difficult to accept them, was a necessary reaction to deafness of the politic and military circles who had split up into two factions : those who supported an axmed nation and those who supported the pre-war army defence, but they all agreed on considering the trench-war the point of reference for any doctrine and development plan. The fact is that those new theorists did not manage to make their ideas felt and very soon they were overthrown by the conservative choices of the post-war military policy, and in the end their attempt to overcome the trench-war was forgotten very soon. Douhet is an exception, since he reached the fame and the influence that we know very well, despite his It dominio de.U'a'L.i.a contained the same elements of unilatera- lity and harsh breaking off with the outstanding ideas, which prevented the other innovators' success. Therefore we must ask ourselves what was that it made him so different from all the other avant-guard theorists and why his thought was bound to meet such success. Of course it is not enough to remember (even though it is not a less important element at all) that he was a brilliant writer who managed to combine an ability in reasoning, which neared the cartesian clearness (even if not devoid of abstractness), with a strong ideal and emotional charge as well as a remarkable polemical skilfulness. It is far more important to point out that thanks to his personal prestige and his politic ties he could strengthen his authority, and his complex vicissitudes are a confirmation. 4. Douhet's military and political career. He was born in Caserta in 1869 of a well-off family (his father was of Nice, volunteer in the campaigns during Risorgimento, in 1860 he opted for Italy, that's why he considered himself two times Italian ; his mother was of Vercelli),

(1) N. PENTIMALLI, La nazione oxganizzata, Rome, 1922, p. 52-53. (2) A. GATTI, L'axte della guexxa, in Coxxiexe della Sexa, 25th May 1923 ; cf. t'd., T'Le. anni di vita militate, Milan, 1924. Douhet was a regular officer in the corps of engineers (later regular officer of the Chief Staff). He showed a wide culture and brilliant capacities as writer about electro-technic, military transports and, since 1909, aviation subjects. In 1911 he was assigned to the aviation battalion, which included the army aircrafts ; he remained in charge from 1913-14, and he turned to the bomber aviation development (the construction of the Ca. 300 Caproni was an initiative of his) showing such intransigence that put himself against the Ministry and the Staff. Therefore he was discharged of aviation and sent to the front with the rank of Capo di Stato Maggiow (Chief of Staff) of a unit and later Capo di un Coipo d'Aimata (Chief of the Corps) after that he had been advanced to the rank of Colonnzllo (Colonel) ; but his claims for the development of the aviation remained unheard. His intelligent and ruthless criticisms on the conduct of the war (1) and his contacts with government environments hostile to Cadorna caused his arrest in Autumn 1916 on a charge of infringement of official secret and of denigration of the Comando Su.pre.mo (High Commands) action. He was sentenced to one year's military imprisonment, wholly expiated, and to dismission. In January 1918 he was recalled in charge with the rank of Viiettoie Geneiale del Commiiiaiiato d'Ae.wnauti.c.a (Ministerial Director of the Aviation Commissariat). In June he gave up this office owing to personal contrasts and disagreements on the aviation role and development. In April 1919 he founded the weekly Le. devoii ("The duty"), he wrote in and he ran it for two years : it was a warlike newspaper which held nationalist politic positions, it had quite a critical attitude versus liberal newspapers as well as versus all those who were in charge of the army. It also supported all the officers who were ousted by Cadorna, and furthered a campaign of praise of the past war (in April 1920 he was the first one who suggested it should be raised a monument dedicated to the memory of the Unknown Soldier), and of the aviation. The newspaper was also open to the publication of Douhet's melodramatic film-scripts (he also wrote plays which were rightly forgotten) (2). In the same years he obtained the review of the trial to which he was subjected in 1916, on this occasion he took up again service and rised to the rank of Generate (General) ; but as the commission consisted of Comandanti d'A'Lmata (Army Commanders) and Comandanti di Coipo d'Aimata (Corps Comman- ders) he was judged unfit for that rank, owing to hib te.mpe.r (a phrase which summed up all the negative judgments on his politic activity, on his struggle against the high commands and on his polemic character). He gave up the active service and continued his intensive campaign in support of aviation by writing in many newspapers, and especially by cooperating with the fascist party which had caught the importance of the new arm as propagandistic means better than anybody else. As we can see, even from these few information, Douhet enjoyed an indisputable fame in the military circles, even if he was known to have a difficult temper and to be an unilateral polemic ; in fact his li dominio de.U'a'L.i.a was published by the Ministry of War after general Diaz's favourable judgment. In Autumn 1922 Douhet wrote a certain number of significant articles about national defence and about the influence that aviation could exert in the Popoio d'ltalia, Mussolini's daily publication, which openly applied for the aviation. In fact soon after the March on Rome he was appointed Qiiettoie. Genevxle deii'Ae-Tonautk'ca Militate (General Director of the Military Aviation) ; but navy did not mean to give

(1) See Dia-Tio ciitico di gue.ua, 1915-16, by DOUHET, Turin, 1921-22, in which he develops a clear and acute criticism on the High Commands and the army, but his criticism is so harsh and unilateral that very often it turns into a bitter and forced work. (2) Douhet's most known work is the novel L'onoie.volz che non pote. piu me.ntiie, Rome, 1921, a satire addressed to the liberal Italy. It witnesses his malevolence versus the political class and the mediocrity of provincial life rather than his gifts of a brilliant and caustic writer. up his air forces especially because they were to pass under the command of a man who was openly against an inter-force collaboration, it opposed and asked for anulment of the appointment. Mussolini persisted in his purpose of an independent aviation, and in order to overcome the oppositions, he shouldered the responsability of the newly commissariat but he was compelled to do without Douhet (1). When in the weeks between November 1922 and January 1923 it was decided that both the army and the navy air forces were to be part of an aviation politically and militarly independent, Douhet, simultaneously, experienced the success of the struggle he led for the acknowledgement of the aviation role, in which he had a great share even if he was not the only protagonist, and the failure of his hope of gaining its control. He had not realized that Mussolini's interest in aviation was only suggested by propagandistic purposes : the fascist government would not force a review of the defence policy, as it wanted the support of both the army and the navy in order to strengthen his power (in fact he assigned the Ministry of War and the Navy Ministry to the two most influential representatives of the military conservatism, Diaz and Thaon di Ravel, according them unlimited powers in the management of the respective armed forces) he wanted to exploit aviation only for propagandistic purposes, only because he wanted to show his broad mindedness in more modern solutions. Within these limits, Douhet was of some help as supporter of the importance of the aviation, when he asked for a reorganization of the whole defence policy in compliance with his theories his utility faded. 5. Douhet and the Italian aviation. Douhet reacted by publishing his far-reaching work (at least in our opinion) entitled La di6e6a nazionaie ("On the national defence") early in 1923 ; it was a small book of little more than one hundred pages, where he resumed speaking about his thought paying great attention to possible polemics, and where he showed an unusual worry about the general cadres of the national defence. In its opening he definitely refused to consider the experience of W.W.I the point of reference on which to base any discussion and resolution concerning the organization of the conduction of war (even though, he said, he was well aware of being a minority) : A paót war is not (...) a teaching 60'1. the future : it can only be. a starting point towards future., providzd that we bear in out mind that bach starting point is to became a pa6t matter (...). All that is not gznzrally rzalized by a military mentality, which by its very nature., remains tied to the pa6t and to the traditions (...). Instead On looking at present W'Le.nuUy and at future bravely, as it must be. logic &or thoóe. who have to be. always ready to 6ace a war, they will took at pa6t (...). So it happen6 - and that is the truz teaching On the pa6t - that we lind ourselves mentally and matzrially unprzparzd to c.op& with it (2). It followed an interesting study on W.W.I, where Douhet pointed out an evident tendency on everybody's part to substitute human masses for machines, that, in his opinion, only consisted of machine-guns and artillery, without understanding the possibilities that tanks and motorization could offer. He was interested in the use of poison gas, as it was the only means which could be combined with the use of aviation, the only arm that did allow them to get over the wearing down war and its high costs :

(1) See G. ROCHAT, Italo Balbo aviatorz e. ministro de.U'Ae.'Lonautic.a, 1926-1933, Ferrara, 1979, p. 20-21. (2) G. DOUHET, La difrzsa nazionalz, Turin, 1923, p. 27-29. The book was published by a small publisher's may be at Douhet's expenses. The air farce is the o&fansive aim par excellence as it is able to move, to any direction .i.nd.i.nne. 'Le.nUy, it ha", a very high transfer speed and a wide operating range, together with a chemical weapon, it is baited far very evident actions against both the enemy's material and moral opposition (1). Therefore Douhet resumed speaking of the same topics as in his 11 dominio de.U'a'L.i.a, with the latest but wanting in judgment data (vezy shortly we will be told about aircrafas baited to carry 10 torn, on bombi within an operating range that &rom a military point oi view, has no limits). Afterwards he openly started criticizing the Italian air force line, although he gave the fascist government the merit for the independence and the role of the aviation. In this way he criticized the granting of an army and a navy auxiliary aviation (in accordance with the institutive decree of the aviation), as well as the importance which was still given to fighter flying. It must also be added that he did not agree on keeping too many specialities in addition to the essential ones, like bombing and fighting specialities that he considered of foundamental importance, considering the poor budget. He also criticized the excessive role given to pilots : in Douhet's opinion (who never wanted to get the flying licence) aviation was to consist of mass-bombardment aircrafts, in fact he longed for the development of automatic and radio-controlled systems. In expounding his thought he systematically tried to open a dialogue with politics and armed forces : Douhet insisted on the creation of a Ministry of National Defence, by which to lay down an organic military policy with everybody's cooperation, in order to settle the several demands, and at the same time willing to accept the aviation as a fixed arm. He ended by pointing out the importance and the urgency of this organization : The matter i6 to create a new world faom the present cahos. It is necessary to establish and to apply the air-organic, logistic, strategic and tactic principles, since, by now, it is not a ma.Ke.t On supplying vague air services any more, but cue mu6t devote ourselves to a real air farce whole-heartedly, by creating a Suitable and vital organization, as the air garrison oi our country mu6t be. The period ofa transition - the change faom the old and traditional farm On war to the new one - will make the problem even more difafacult, as all the countries in the world are likely to carry out plans in order to fand the best solution, and they wilt avoid letting other countries come to know the results On their studies. Those countries which are able to solve this problem as well a'" possible, will enjoy a remarkable advantage on the others, as they put them in condition to take the enemy by surprise (...). The more prudent you are in pondering, the bolder you are in venturing (2).

These positions did not advantage Douhet, who had to face the open hostility of the new aviation Head Officers as well as a growing difficulty in publishing his writings in the government press (the Vopolo d'ltalia published about ten of his rather insignificant articles in four years), while, by now, he was debarred from the press of the opposition (3). Douhet addressed two letters to Mussolini on (1) Ibid., p. 54. (2) Ibid., p. 99. (3) From a mental and cultural point of view, Douhet was not a fascist but a nationalist, with a harsh dislike for liberal governments and pre-war armed forces. He showed an aristocratic and technocratic idea of a policy. Despite that, he had no difficulty to join the fascist regime, even because his politic choices were always 17th June and on 3rd August 1924, where he complained about being kept aside and andwhere worse he asked: to be charged to straighten out aviation which seemed to go worse I have become convinced (he wrote on 17th June) that : civil aviation doei not exiit ; faom a technical, hiexaxchical, diiciplinaxy and moxal point On view militaxy aviation ii dehective ; the. oxganization ii cahotic and heavy ; thexe i6 lack oh de.a'L ideai and On a pxeciie line ; thexe axe. pexional intetests in neat contxait with genexal intexeiti ; the. aix fa ice6 axe une.qu.at to the iacxifacei iuitained by the. countty ; evexything ii a.pp&a.MMCC xathex than xeality. Thii my opinion, which by now i6 ipxeading, move.", me to a6f¿ the honou-z (1 have. nevex aiked fax anything) to devote myielh to 6t'La.i.ghte.n out oux aviation (1). Mussolini saw him, and he was but very polite to him. Douhet would have liked to resume his struggle, but it was impossible for him to find space in the press that, by now, it was enslaved to the regime. On 10th March 1925 he turned back to Mussolini still driving his disponibility into the Duce's head, but he had no success (2). So, in an unpublished memorandum dated 28th October 1925 (probably addressed again to Mussolini), he drew a very pessimistic picture of the situation : Exc&pf fax the CR (3), which may itill be. comidexed in e.xpe.'L.i.me.n- tal phaie, neithez an engine no'L an aixcxafct, which axe with the timei, have been put into service fax the lait thxee yeaxi, and oux aviation, &xom a qualitative point On view, ii itill iupplied with the 6ame axmi a'" it wa'" in Octobex 1922 and, on the whole, it can not be. uied - except fax the hew onei mentioned - but againit an enemy who hai alxeady Mown ove-z the Alpei, a'" in the caie imagined in the xecent manoeuvxei, and even in that caie, in conditioni On inhexioxity in equipment (4). Moreover there were neither clear rules on its use nor mobilization plans; the pilots were very-well trained (despite the high number of deads : 108 deadly accidents in 18 months), but he was demoralized by a patron and client system of managment ; the Heads had lost their reputation owing to the too many advance- ments they assigned to themselves. Within the framework of the aviation policy in the fascist period Douhet could not meet the consents of the aviation environments. 6. Douhet and the aviation of Balbo, 1927-30. In 1926-27, Balbo became the leader of the aviation. He was a clever and an unscrupulous man, he was against any doctrinaire dogmatism and he was also endowed with high propagandistic capacities. He immediatly realized that Douhet could be very useful as a theorist and a polemist for the aviation, without necessarly giving him the possibility of putting into practice his thoughts. Therefore he neither entrusted him with any command of responsability nor he worried about putting Douhet's doctrines into practice (as we will see afterwards), but he offered suggested by his interest in aviation. (1) The two letters are published in G. DOUHET, Scxitti inediti, Florence, 1951, by the Scuola di Guexxa A&t&a, (Air War Academy), p. 238-240. (2) G. DOUHET, Scxitti inediti, p. 242-45. (3) The Fiat CR. 1 fighter. (4) The memorandum, dated 28th October 1925, without heading, is kept in the Fondo Douhet (Douhet fund) in the Museo del Risorgimento in Milan. him the possibility of spreading his opinions by the most influential commands. In 1927, Douhet published the second edition, far more lengthened, of his It dominio deti'atia by the 16tituto Nazionaie di Cultura Faiciita (Fascist National Institute of Culture), and the following year, by the same Institute, he published the small book Probabili aipetti de.Ha guerra fautuiCL ("On a future war probable aspects") ; in the meanwhile he had started a close collaboration with the ministerial Rivata azronau- tica, for which he wrote about twenty pregnant articles in three years. He also started a collaboration with different daily publications and magazines, tirelessly spreading his theories. It was right in this period, from 1927 to the year of his death, early in 1930, that Douhet met his success by the aviation and by the public opinion. However he had to pay for all that. Douhet could go on developing and defending his thoughts freely, even when they were in neat contrast with the fascist aviation policy. In turn he was not allowed to let people realize this contrast, and he was warned not to move any criticism on Italian aviation but to praise Mussolini and Balbo's work. In 1929, he wrote : It ii not thank", to my merits but thank", to the. znlightzned de.ve.me.M On the Prime. Miniitzr (Muhiolini) that air faoice managed to rzach (in 1923) the same importance and dignity ah the other land and "'e.a-a'Lm"'. Air horce. put itbzlh the >>amz level and htatare a.4 army and navy. By patting the three military Miniitrizi into the. hands 06 only one pzuon, the head On the government, and by appointing a Capo di Stato Maggiore Generate (Chieh on Stann), out armi, -zeached a dzhinitivz and perfect genetai organization (1). This last statement, which is repeated in many other writings of the same period, is a clear demonstration that Douhet had surrendered, since he was well aware that the joining of the three armed forces under Mussolini and the Chief of Staff general Badoglio was a mere appearance (in fact rivalry and incomprehen- sion among the three arms will last for the whole fascist period) : the Miniitzro della Vihzia Nazionalz (Ministry of National Defence) that Douhet had suggested was quite different ! However Douhet sincerely praised Mussolini and Balbo because he recognized that thanks to them the aviation had raised to an independent arm. As far as all the other matters are concerned, Douhet had no difficulties in limiting his controversies, as he was deeply convinced that his theories were bound to prevail over the others owing to their plainess and logic ; he had accepted to "expurgate" his theories on the auxiliary aviation since his first edition of 11 dominio de.U'a'L.i.a. On that occasion he accepted to leave them to the army and the navy but afterwards he admitted that he had been pushed by a cowardly action (as he wrote in the added pages of the second edition) so as not to prevent his book from being published and publicized because of a too direct attack to the interests of the two armed forces. Douhet's rich literary work, from 1927 to 1930, can be grouped according to three different trends they show. The first group is concerned with the theme of his endless struggle : the importance of aviation and the necessity of its full independence in order to obtain the control of the air that, in his opinion, is the necessary and sufficient condition to get victory. The second group is concerned with his controversy against any possibility of collaboration among armed forces ; in this period he supported Balbo's resolute claims for a reduction (in prospect of its abolition) of the army and navy auxiliary aviations (2). Douhet states that those two auxiliary aviations (that he considers a potential menace to the aviation role) are of

(1) G. DOUHET, 'Riepilo gando, in Uiviita aeronautica, November 1929. (2) G. ROCHAT, Balbo aviatorz, cit., p.82 sq. no use and he urges their abolition so that they may leave any type of aircrafts under the direct control of the aviation. Since neither the army nor the navy had realized the necessity of a collaboration among the armed forces, it was easy for Balbo and Douhet to carry out and to justify the proud isolation of the air force, which made its own war by itself. Owing to this isolation they had to give up the torpedo-aircrafts (already tried successfully) and the aircraft-carriers. The third group of Douhet's works deals with another aspect of his thought, doubtless the weakest one. He had glimpsed the great possibilities that aviation could have since 1911, when the few existing aircrafts were only able to "squawk" like geese, according to his colourful expression ; his cleverness, and at the same time his limit, lay in his ability in developing both an abstract and a prophetic reasoning without feeling conditioned by the contingent reality, in this case by the poor performances of the available aircrafts. Like all the other post-war avant-guard theorists, Douhet was far beyond reality and he did not worry about putting into practice his theories. His insistence on the important role of the bomber aviation was not suggested by technical considerations, but by his longing to use its destructive power in the heaviest way possible, even beyond its real possibilities. On the contrary, the Italian air force development was greatly conditioned by concrete factors, such as technic progress, industrial interests, propagandistic requirements and pilots' requirements ; therefore it contemplated a certain variety of types and special branches. As Douhet was compelled to give up criticizing these choices, he would not endorse them but he ignored them and he went on insisting on the important role of the bomber aviation and on the terroristic availing of the air ; he overestimated the gas and the distructive effects without taking the enemy's possibilities of opposition into consideration. The coherence with which he supported his theories went to the detriment of their realization, as it made it impossible for him to compare them with the real development of the aviation. Douhet last work, La gueua dzl 79.. ("The war of 19.."), is quite significant ; it was published soon after his death in the Kivhta aziona.ixtic,a of March 1930. The editor suggested he should write a politic fiction novel, so Douhet in his book told about a war which broke out, in an unsettled year but not too far, between Germany and France the latter being supported by Belgium. Besides a great number of land and sea-forces, which were not considered, Douhet provided France with 5300 aircrafts ready for employment, and Belgium with 660 aircrafts. They were grouped into 14 different specialities and organically shared out between the army units and the land defence, except for 800 fighter and bomber aircrafts which were under the direct control of the Coma.nda.ntQ. in Capo (Commander in Chief). On the contrary the German aviation only included 1500 bomber aircrafts (800 of them were supplied with 2000 horse-power engines, 600 with 3000 horse-power engines and 100 with 6000 horse-power engines) they all were powerfully armed for close defence ; the aircraft with the 3000 horse-power engine, for exemple, could carry nine men, four guns, one machine-gun as well as five tons of bombs ; it had a fuel distance of 8 hours at the height of 3500 meters, and its performances depended on the load and the target (1). A few hours later the opening of the hostilities, this huge number of bomber aircrafts, shared out into ten unbending and compact columns, entered the French territory, rejected and destroyed the enemy fighters

(1) In 1921 Douhet gathered bomber aircrafts with fighter planes, which had similar performances, but with the task of an active defence against fighter aircrafts and aircraft artillery. In 1930 the increased engine power and load capacity made it possible to give the bomber aircrafts also the task of their own active defence, with the result of a further reduction in the types of aircrafts to employ, they were reduced to only one, the powerfully armed bomber aircraft, the anticipator of the famous "flying fortress" of W. W.II. losing quite a number of the 2000 horse-power engine aircrafts, unset the enemy war-deployment and bombed all the biggest French towns with gas, explosives and fluid incendiary substances. Germany took only one day to conquer the control of the air, and the following day it started a systematic destruction of all the communications and of all the enemy towns, causing so the French collapse which brought to the surrender. 7. Conclusion. Douhet's influence on the Italian military thought may be outlined in three moments. Soon after the war Douhet was one among the avant-guard theorists who immediately sensed the great offensive capacities of the new arm, and despite the many limits, they tried to impose it. Douhet towered above the others owing to his coherence of thought and his ability in spreading it. He was also advantaged by his ties with the politic right wing parties and by his collaboration with different politic periodic publications ; but above all he immediately sighted the future possibilities of the aviation, and that moved him to carry out a passionate struggle in order to obtain an independent organization for the new arm. His international success (that we have not considered here) is the result of his ability in combining a prophetic confidence of the aviation possibilities with a long and hard struggle so that the new arm might be acknowledged. Douhet had not a direct share in the creation and in the management of the Italian aviation because after the coming of fascism he had made too many enemies on the inside of the military and political environment, included the aviation circles, owing to his controversies and his bad temper. Between 1927 and 1930, Balbo let Douhet be known as the Italian aviation theorist. Balbo offered him positions of prestige but always without any power. Douhet became a firmly convinced supporter of Balbo's policy, who had based his policy on the acknowledgement of the aviation by giving a theoric justification to the struggle against the collaboration between army and navy. The new arm he was struggling for was to be the cause of the failures in 1940-43. Douhet did not accept Balbo's lines for the development of the aviation even if he could not criticize them, and went on asserting the important role of a massive bombing with terroristic targets on the base of an abstract reasoning which did not take account of the real performing capacities of the aircrafts that they had at their disposal. After his death, Douhet was still considered the theorist of the aviation independence and of its decisive role by the Italian aviation. However his thought was not verified critically, so his cleverness, his limits and contradictions were not underlined : also his works were published by following the same exploiting criteria in order to support Balbo's policy as well as the policy of his successors (1). Even after W.W.II Douhet was praised rather than studied (2), and very few attempts were made to resume back his thought against the background of his times, and to resume back his struggle against the circumstances which had caused it. On the other hand this seems to be the only way to understand the true role of both a difficult and a talented man.

(1) Besides the two editions 1932 (with Balbo's forewards) and 1955 by the Stato Maggiote. d&W Adionautica. (the Air Staff) of U dominio de.Wa.ua., we want to remember the publishing of Douhet's collection of writings : Le di CaMand!a, by G. PANTANO, Genoa, 1931 ; La guetra t'nteg-zate, with Balbo's forewards, by E. CANEVARI, Rome, 1936, Sctittt' inediti. (2) We have not either Douhet's bibliographies or a critical edition of his works of military interest, or a correct biography. GENERAL DOUHET'S MAIN WORKS

It does not exist a bibliography of general Douhet's works yet. We will only quote his main works dealing with aviation and with military policy, without mentioning his many articles that he published in the military and in the political press, and we will not mention his literary, theater and film productions either. 1. U doveie ("The duty") : political weekly publication, founded, edited and in good part written by Douhet himself, published in Rome from April 1919 to 1921 in the fall (75 issues of 4 pages, daily format), which deals with politics (with nationalistic influences and a strong avange for an active war), military policy, aviation and some literature. 2. U dominio de.œa'L.i.a ("The control of the air") published in Rome in 1921 by the Ministry of War ; lengthened second edition, Rome, 1927, by the 16tituto Nazionaie Faiciita di Cufiura (Fascist National Institute of Culture) ; third edition, Milan, 1932, with I. Balbo's forewards and three minor works : Vwbabili aipetti delia gue.Ha 6ututa ("On the future war probable aspects"), Rome, 1928, by the 16tituto Nazionaie Fa",c..i.6ta di Outturn. ; Uiepilogando ("Summing up") and La gue.ua. de.1 19.. ("The war of 19..") both published in the R.i.v.i.6ta aeionaatica, 1929-30 ; fourth edition, Rome, 1955 by the Stato Maggioxe. dett' AMCncm.t

Klaus-Richard BOHME

This paper deals with the doctrine of the Swedish air force from 1918 to 1945. This period can be described as follows : Phase 1 : 1918-1932, The struggle for a doctrine Phase 2 : 1932-1939, The establishment of a clearly understood doctrine Phase 3 : 1939-1945, A new doctrine under way. This paper also touches upon the importance of a clearly expressed doctrine in order to carry out proper procurement planning, which in the case of Sweden included the build up of a domestic aircraft industry. This paper is based entirely on my book Sve.n",lla vingai vaxdi. Flygvapndt och û£yg.i.ndu"'t'L.i.n, 1918-1945 ("Swedish Wings Grow. The Air Force and the Aircraft Industry, 1918-1945"), 1982 and the sources and literature listed therein.

Swedish military authorities first became interested in the air power in 1910. In 1912 both the army and the navy organized their own air units. These units were to be employed for reconnaissance. During this period the Swedish military was, of course, mainly influenced by the development of air power in France. One of the most eloquent advocates of Swedish air power was the Swedish military attache in Paris, from 1911 to 1915, captain Karl A.B. Amundson. Shortly before the outbreak of the First World War, however, Germany started to compete with France. The German influence grew stronger during the war and in the following decade, in spite of the French efforts to offset this development by, among other things, inviting large numbers of Swedish officers to France. During the war the Swedish air units had expanded mainly due to improvisation, much less as a result of proper planning. It is, however, only fair to say that difficulties in importing and producing air materiel in Sweden did not allow for detailed planning. Swedish air power's status and missions were discussed in connection with the analyses which preceded the Defence Resolution of 1925. These analyses were begun before the end of the war in November 1918, but were conducted for the most part by the Defence Review Commission appointed in 1919. The Commission, which presented its findings in 1923, recommended the retention of separate army and navy units and the establishment of common economic management. The Commission did not state which missions the two air forces would have, but it is clear that its members considered reconnaissance, interception, torpedo attack, and bombing in that order. On the question of the air units' status and missions the Commission was not in complete agreement. One of the Conservative representatives and the four Social Democrats wanted greater investment in air power for a more effective defence. The basic idea was that air power could assume some of the missions performed by coastal artillery units and torpedo boats and that it could be used against submarines. The Social Democrats demanded expressly, that the air force should be established as an independent service. This proposal was against military advice and was especially opposed by the navy. The older services feared of being stripped of funds in favor of an independent air force. More important still the navy, being the smaller service, assumed that an independent air force would be dominated by the army. But the army and the navy held completely different views on the use of air power. They were in agreement that the main problem Sweden had to solve was how to defend the country against the air attack of a more powerful enemy. During the interwar years the Swedes considered the Soviet Union and, after 1933, Germany as possible aggressors. In view of the technical limitations of contemporary aircraft only certain parts of Sweden lay within the operational radius of the Soviets and Germans as long as they operated from bases within their own territories. But if the enemy succeeded in establishing advanced bases on Aland and Gotland or on the Danish islands then Sweden's strategic situation would deteriorate significantly. The army was convinced that fighter aircraft provided the most effective air defence. Furthermore it was assumed that fighter aircraft would give Sweden mastery of the air even against a more powerful enemy, at least during a limited period of time and over a limited area. The army, of course, did not rule out bombing missions entirely, but expressly opposed the view that they should be the main task of the air units. According to the army this strategy could be carried out only by great powers, not by a small country like Sweden. In consequence, the army asked for reconnaissance and fighter aircraft. There is little doubt that the army's conception of air power seemed to have been influenced, if not entirely obtained from the German army. Swedish army officers especially referred to the former German flier and captain on the general staff, Hans Ritter. His book, Vzx LuMk'L.i.e.g, published in 1926, was widely known in army circles. The Swedish navy pointed out that there was a great need for close cooperation between sea and air power. After all it was assumed that any airborne attack on Sweden would come from across the sea either as an independent attack or in coordination with a naval operation. According to the navy, experience from the war showed that any air attack must be stopped through preemptive attacks against the enemy's bases. In addition, air attacks should be directed against the enemy's coastal areas, naval stations, etc. The navy had long considered this concept. Around the turn of the century the navy staff planned that in the event of war it would bombard the enemy's coast. Presumably because of Sweden's limited resources, this task was never made an established part of the navy's mission. Nor was the Swedish navy provided with the means to carry out such a mission. After the development of military air power, the navy began to realize that its old plans to carry the attack to the enemy and engage him in his war preparations on his own coast might at last be possible. Completely in line with this proposition lay the thought that through preemptive attacks on enemy air bases Sweden could defend herself against air attacks. Neither was it a new problem for the navy to prevent an enemy from establishing forward bases on the islands of Aland and Gotland. If an aggressor succeeded in gaining a foothold on one of the islands it was the navy's task to keep him bottled up there. It was on the basis of these tasks that the navy based its request for capital ships and bomber aircraft. The navy expressed at this time a decidedly clearer understanding of the employment of air power than did the army. And she was more foresighted than the army when it came to aircraft production. While the army designed aircraft suitable for the surplus engines in stock and therefore equipped itself with obsolete materiel the navy cooperated with the German constructor Ernst Heinkel, thereby getting the best aircraft of the day. The thinking of the Swedish navy was influenced by former German navy pilots. The concept of preemptive bomb attacks against enemy air bases was, however, obtained from the Royal Navy. But the very arguments used by the navies in England and Sweden could be used as arguments for an independent air force. In 1923, Carl Florman, who had been named assistant to the Swedish military attache in London the previous year and who experienced the lively debate concerning the Royal Air Force's status, published a pamphlet entitled Flygvapmt och Sv^ug^b nÖHVa'L ("The Air Force and Swedish Defence") in response to the Swedish Defence Review Commission's report. According to Florman, an independent air force could carry out the following missions : 1°) attack enemy air bases, 2°) bomb enemy operational bases, 3°) repel an amphibious landing and 4°) undertake strategic and tactical support of the army and the navy. In 1924 Florman became secretary of the special parliamentary commit- tee which dealt with the Defence Bill presented by the Conservative Government on the basis of the Commission's recommendations. Against the advice of the government's civilian and military experts Florman, who at about the same time in clandestine cooperation with the German firm Junkers started the Swedish civil airline AB Aerotransport, succeeded in convincing politicians from right to left that the air force should be organized as an independent service. When the Riksdag adopted the compromise between the Liberals and the Social Democrats on the defence question in 1925 it resolved at the same time that an independent Swedish air force should be established. The politicians considered organizing an independent air force as a means of rationalizing the armed forces. Their main interest was to keep defence costs low. They agreed upon an independent air force mainly for economic, and not for military reasons. This is demonstrated by the Riksdag's vote on the organization and economy of the air force. Accordingly the air force became an independent service on 1st July 1926. A commander-in-chief of the air force was appointed. He was to be assisted by a chief of staff. But in order to save the salary for one lieutenant colonel, the Riksdag expressly voted against an air force staff. All military and administrative matters of the air force were to be handled by the air force administation. Because the new service was very small, it was not provided with a separate office at the Royal Ministry of Defence. These functions were to be carried out by the navy's office. Air force officers were to be recruited from the army and the navy, and the air force was not considered in need of separate cadet training. The Riksdag also decided that the commander-in-chief and the chief of staff were not to be recruited from the same service. In all there were 67 officers on the pay roll of the air force. About the same number of army and naval officers were ordered to serve in the air force for a limited time. The Defence Resolution called for an air force consisting of 229 military aircraft and 85 trainers. According to the Riksdag, the air force would take-over 57 military aircraft and 50 trainers from the army and the navy on 1st July 1926. In order to purchase that number of aircraft, to maintain the materiel, and also to replace obsolete and destroyed aircraft, the Riksdag decided to spend SK 20 million during the period 1926-1936. This figure was based on poor calculations and lacked proper military planning. For example, the Riksdag assumed that there would be no rise in price of air materiel during this period. And the military experts went along with this assumption. In addition, they did not express a clear understanding of the use of the air force. Forced to accept an independent air force, the military avoided stating a doctrine because the army and navy held different views on this matter. But without a doctrine no proper procurement planning could be made. Thus the Defence Resolution did not say what kind of aircraft should be purchased. It only stated that the 229 military aircrafts were to be organized in four mixed units. Two units were to cooperate with the army, one with the navy, and one, in case of war, would be at the disposal of headquarters. The Defence Resolution also prescribed that the commander-in-chief of the air force had to make plans for materiel procurement in close collaboration with the chief of the army general staff and his counterpart in the navy. Obviously the air force was to be regarded as an auxiliary to the senior services and not their equal. No special ranks were created for air force officers. Instead they kept the ranks of their former services, and they were promoted according to the army and navy system. For example, a lieutenant colonel was made a colonel and a commander a captain. Air force officers who were promoted also tried to get promotion in their former service, as that gave them a choice between a career in the air force or in their former service. The first commander-in-chief of the air force, major general Amundson, was an enthusiastic and highly respected expert on air power. Yet he was not staff trained nor the kind of man to exercise real leadership. But most seriously he, and his chief of staff, captain N. Thor W. M. Liibeck, failed to realize the initial necessity of developing a doctrine on the use of air power. Without the guidance of such a doctrine it was impossible to compile instructions and to work out training- programs etc. ; in short to form a homogeneous service. The formation of a doctrine also was a prerequisite for proper materiel procurement planning. Lacking its own doctrine, the air force was under heavy pressure from the army and the navy. In extreme they took advantage of their right to interfere in air force matters, especially those concerning materiel procurement. But the senior services held different views on the use of air power and consequently, they were quarrelling over questions of tactics and materiel procurement. These battles added to the difficulties of the air force. Most of all they brought about unrest and animosity between air force officers. Officially, for instance in various committees and statements, the air force claimed fighter protection beings its main task. In practice the air force did not stick to such a doctrine, much less plan its materiel procurement accordingly. Therefore some big Swedish companies gave up the idea of starting aircraft production In 1931, that is to say five years after the establishment of the independent air force, the new service was in a sad state. Due to the problems noted above and the faulty calculations of the Riksdag in 1925, the air force could not carry out any flight training and could be expected to be of little military value. Its officer corps was split into different groups fighting among each other. This led to the appointment of two special commissions, in 1931 and 1933 respectively. These commissions consisted of highranking lawyers, industrialists, and officers. Among them was a captain on the army general staff, Axel Ljungdahl. The findings of the first commission brought about the dismissal of Amundson and Liibeck. Amundson's successor, major general Eric Virgin, did not succeed in improving the state of the air force to any notable degree. In all fairness, his failure was mainly due to the reluctance of the politicians in changing the organization of the air force according to the findings of the commission. These findings stressed the need for an air force staff. The politicians also were unwilling to spend more money on air materiel. On the other hand, Virgin had not stipulated any conditions before accepting the appointment as commander-in-chief of the air force. In 1934, however, Virgin voluntarily resigned his command. Among other things the commission of 1933 repeated the demand for an air force staff and more money for air materiel. But again the politicians took no immediate action. As in 1931, they were waiting for the findings of the Defence Commission, appointed in 1930. The Defence Resolution of 1925 had important consequences for the armed forces. By abandoning the defence organization of 1914 while retaining the principle of a survival defence, the politicians made possible - indeed compelled - some rethinking by the military establishment. As noted above, the air force was unsuccessful in developing a doctrine of its own. But so were the senior services. Especially the navy had great difficulties in developing its own doctrine under changing conditions. The parties of the left, which had voted in favor of the Defence Resolution of 1925, among other things strongly emphasized that the purpose of it was to retain unimpaired defence effectiveness at a lower cost by measures designed to heighten efficiency, for instance, by taking full advantage of recent progress in military technology. In time these ideas and desires found proponents within the armed forces. There too, especially in the army, the question of how best to put technological developments to use was being discussed. Younger army officers made two essential points. First, they felt that one should take advantage of the progress in military technology. Second, they considered that the democratic breakthrough of 1918, when universal suffrage was introduced, had altered the role of the armed forces in society, and that this should be acknowledged. The latter meant that both the expenditure ceiling and the goals of defence should be determined by the Riksdag and the government. Within those limits, military experts should be given a free hand to work out the details. Army officers of such conviction and ambitions were organized by major Helge Viktor Jung in the group which came to be known by the name of its journal, the Ny Militai Tidhkii^t ("New Military Journal"). These officers also shared the view that the Defence Resolution of 1925 had favored the navy. The 1925 Defence Resolution had not definitively established an expenditure ceiling for the navy ; instead a ten years plan for the navy's replacement constructions was adopted in 1927. Though this plan never was actually carried out, it called for annual expenditures of over SK 9 million during the first five years, or more than had been anticipated in 1925. The explanation for this was the positive attitude to the navy adopted by the parties of the left. They were generally impressed by and grateful for the way in which the navy had handled its "neutrality guard" assignment during the First World War. The term "neutrality guard" was a very diffuse one, but it was certainly one way of expressing gratitude that the war had bypassed the nation. The politicians positive attitude maybe explains why the navy was less willing to adapt to new conditions than the army and the air force, especially the officers organized in the group around Jung. From 1930, this group succeeded in influencing the future shape of the military defence posture as many of its members functioned as experts for the Defence Commission appointed that year. This Commission was appointed by a majority of the parties of the left, which wanted to maintain the expenditure ceiling of 1925. In the face of Hitler's Machtiibzmahmz, increasing international unrest and the failure of the League of Nations, the Defence Commission assumed a somewhat different character. On the basis of the report submitted by the Commis- sion in 1935, the Riksdag approved in 1936 a limited build up of primarily the army and the air force. The Riksdag expressly limited the role of the navy in favor of the air force. The group around Jung had succeeded in convincing the politicians that the "air force's neutrality guard" would be cheaper and more effective than its naval counterpart. How did the group around Jung achieve this ? The answer is : by the hard intellectual work of some, and especially one of its members, and because of the conditions.reluctance - one might even say the failure - of the navy to adapt to new As mentioned above, the air force did not develop a doctrine of its own, though it officially claimed the old army concept of fighter protection. One of the advocates of fighter protection was the young flight trained army officer, Ljung- dahl, who also was one of the most outstanding members of the group around Jung. This was the very same Ljungdahl, who, now a captain of the army general staff, was made a member of the commissions appointed in 1931 and 1933 respectively. By the same time, however, Ljungdahl had changed his way of thinking. Since 1930 he advocated the attack of enemy bases as the most effective air defence. Ljungdahl reasoned that available air warning systems did not give sufficient forewarning to fighter aircraft. Even if the fighters were scrambled in time, it was uncertain whether they could find the enemy, since there was no method available for directing fighter aircraft to their targets. Ljungdahl's concept was accepted in the fall of 1932 by both the chief of the army general staff and the commander-in-chief of the air force. By adopting Ljungdahl's doctrine the army and the air force had returned to the navy's old position. Thus it was only logical that they went further and argued that the air force could even protect Sweden from a naval invasion more efficiently, and therefore less expensively than could the navy. Hereby they made very successful use of arguments based on the effectiveness of dive bombing. They knew, although at first only from what they had seen in films, that the United States navy was practicing dive bombing, and they introduced that tactics in the Swedish air force. For a long time, however, the navy was able to use a very convincing counter argument. While Sweden was very capable of building naval vessels, she was incapable of building aircraft, or at least incapable of building them in mass. In case of war or blockade, therefore, the air force materiel would soon be exhausted. In order to diffuse this argument, the army and the air force demanded the development of a domestic aircraft industry. After 1932, when the air force adopted Ljungdahl's doctrine, it was made known to the industry that bombers were of foremost importance. But the question of how to assure the industry of continuous air production was still to be solved. Therefore, the commission appointed in 1933 was also instructed to find a solution to this problem. Again it was Ljungdahl who found the answer. If the Swedish air force continuously replaced its materiel in seven years cycles, it could easily phase in new aircraft and would always be equipped with modern materiel. By the same token the industry would be able to develop new aircraft and to keep production on an even level. Ljungdahl's doctrine and his principles of materiel replacement were expressly accepted by the Riksdag in 1936. At this time the industry was also convinced that the air force was capable of planning and carrying out its plans. This was so because the industry trusted the competence of the new commander-in-chief of the air force, major general Torsten Friis who, in 1934, had succeeded major general Virgin. By the Defence Resolution of 1936 the air force received its own office at the Ministry of Defence, an air force staff, a cadet training school, and a staff college. According to the Defence Resolution of 1936 the air force would consist of 144 bombers, 16 torpedo, 41 fighter, and 52 reconnaissance aircrafts, organized in 4 bomber, 1 fighter, and 2 reconnaissance wings. The marked over-representation of bombers resulted, however, not from military theory but from political and economic considerations. The air force had demanded one additional fighter and one additional reconnaissance wing, plus two reconnaissance squadrons to work in support of the army and the navy. The majority in the Riksdag opposed this request on economic grounds. By the new doctrine, however, priority was given to the procurement of bomber aircraft. In consequence the newly established Swedish aircraft industry started the production of the German Junkers Ju 86 and the American 102 Northrop AB-1 under licence. Even the first modern aircraft of Swedish design, the B 17, which came into production in December 1941, was a bomber. By this time it was obvious to some well informed and foresighted air force officers that the development of radar required a new doctrine. To the Swedes radar became known in principle in 1939. During a visit to England in November 1941, Ljungdahl, now an air force colonel, realized the possibility of directing fighter aircraft with the help of radar, though the British did not really show him how their system worked. From now on Ljungdahl strongly urged the development of a radar-guided fighter defence system. But Sweden had great difficulties in developing a radar system of her own. Thanks to some German support she managed to develop some radar equipment in the fall of 1944. But by then Sweden had been supported with English radar stations. In the fall of 1944, the Swedes also learned from a German aircraft, which had made a forced landing in Sweden, how to guide an aircraft by radar. But to the end of the Second World War Sweden lacked the knowledge and the equipment to build up a radar-guided fighter defence. Consequently, the Swedish air force did not announce a new doctrine but had to stick to the one adopted in 1932. In practice, however, this doctrine was somewhat modified. After the outbreak of the Second World War first degree priority was given to the strengthe- ning of the air force. During the years of military preparedness 1939 to 1945, 10 more wings were established and each wing was equipped with far more aircraft than had been decided necessary in 1936. As mentioned above, in 1936 there were to be established 7 wings - 4 bomber/torpedo, 1 fighter, 2 reconnaissance - with 257 aircraft. In 1945 there were 17 wings - 7 bomber/torpedo, 7 fighter, 3 reconnaissance - with 1018 aircraft. The increasing number of fighter was not due to a new doctrine. It merely shows the eagerness of the politicians to protect the civilian population against air attacks. Therefore they granted funds for fighter aircraft and anti-aircraft artillery. And the air force, of course, did not oppose this concept, though it was not strictly in line with its doctrine. Officially the new doctrine that fighter protection was the main task of the air force was declared first in 1946-1947, when the air force was equipped with a radar-guided fighter defence. Though this belongs to a new chapter in the history of the Swedish air force, it seems only proper to mention that thanks to Ljungdahl, who became chief of the air force staff in 1942 and commander-in-chief of the air force in 1954, Sweden built up a very good fighter defence system by international standards. Institut d'Histoire des Conflits Contemporains Hôtel National des Invalides 75 007 Paris

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