NATIONAL BOLSHEVISM in WEIMAR GERMANY Allianceof Political Extremes Against Democracy
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NATIONAL BOLSHEVISM IN WEIMAR GERMANY Allianceof Political Extremes Against Democracy BY ABRAHAM ASCHER AND GUENTER LEWY JLhe sharewhich both the nationalist right and theCommunist lefthad in bringingabout the downfallof Weimardemocracy hasbeen generally recognized by students of German history. But the equallycommon view thatthese forces of extremisminde- pendentlycarried on theiragitation against the Republicneeds revision.While these movements seemingly represented the two poles of the politicalspectrum, in actualitythey had consider- able attractionfor each other. As a matterof fact,at certain crucialmoments during the 1920sthis attraction culminated in seriousattempts to achievea workingalliance and an ideological synthesis.This startlingrapprochement between right and left, knownin Germanyas NationalBolshevism, was facilitatedby thefriendly relations between democratic Germany and Commu- nistRussia after World War I. SinceNational Bolshevism had adherentsamong both extremes of the Germanpolitical scene, it neverreally emerged as one welldefined doctrine with the same meaning for all itsadvocates. It alwaysremained a seriesof nebulousgeneralities to which each side gave its own interpretation,designed to serveits par- ticularinterests. The Communistsresorted to National Bol- shevismin orderto exploitthe nationalisticsentiment so wide- spreadin Germany;nationalists espoused it to enlistthe socialist massesfor their program of liberationfrom Versailles and impe- rialistexpansion. The commonground was their conviction that each stoodto benefitfrom an alliancebetween the two "pro- letariannations," Russia and Germany,against the capitalist West. NATIONAL BOLSHEVISM 451 i The senseof outrage against the terms of theTreaty of Versailles gaverise to thefirst phase of NationalBolshevism. It appeared withinCommunist ranks primarily because of Soviet Russia's fear that the Versaillessettlement would enable the West to extendits supremacyover Germany. In Moscowin March1919 theFirst Congress of the Communist International denounced the Alliesfor planning to turnthe Germans into "miserable starving slavesof Entente capital." The designof the "allied imperialists," the Cominternannounced, was to forceGermany into "a kind of Holy Allianceof capitalistsagainst the workers'revolution." To arousemass sentiment against these plans, the Communist Internationalcoined the slogans: "Long live the revoltof the workersagainst their oppressors! Down with the Versailles peace, downwith the new Brest!" 1 In Germanythis vehement rejection of Versaillesformed the cornerstoneof the Communistparty's struggleagainst the West and its advocacyof an alliancewith Soviet Russia- a constanttheme throughoutthe life of the WeimarRepublic. A small group of militantswithin the GermanCommunist Party(KPD) soon expressedthe anti-Westernline in distinctly nationalisticterms. The leadingspokesmen for this faction were twoHamburg intellectuals, Heinrich Laufenberg and FritzWolff- heim(both were subsequently expelled from the partyfor their syndicalistviews, and in April1920 were instrumental in forming the GermanCommunist Workers Party, or KAPD). In a pam- phletwritten in November1919 2 theyheld "blatanttreason" responsiblefor Germany's disaster. Resorting to the"stab in the back"charge, later a prominentfeature of Nazi propaganda,they arguedthat Germanyhad not reallybeen completelycrushed on thebattlefield. Rather, Germany's defeat had been sealedby "politicians"who, fearful above all of an armedproletariat, had iT/ie CommunistInternational, vol. i (1919) pp. 118, 121, 162. 2 Heinrich Laufenbergand Fritz Wolffheim,Revolutionärer Volkskrieg oder konterrevolutionärerBürgerkrieg? (Hamburg 1920) . 452 SOCIAL RESEARCH succumbedto the West. Traitorshad accepted the dishonorable termsof the Allies, surrenderedGerman territoryto the "merci- less imperialists/'and broughtabout the death of hundredsof thousandsof innocentvictims by starvation. Germany'seconomy now faced the danger of being transformedinto an object of exploitationby internationalfinance capital. Her workerswere on the verge of being convertedinto coolies and slaves. Germanycould be extricatedfrom her overpoweringmisery, thoughtLaufenberg and Wolffheim,only if throughrevolution she were convertedinto a proletarianstate - forbourgeois society had proveditself incapable of coping with the national question. "The smashingof the capitaliststate and its ruling class is the preconditionfor the marshalingof all national energiesagainst ' theimperialism of theforeign enemy* (p. 10). Such a totalmobil- ization of the German people, adopted earlier,might well have enabled Germanyto resistthe impositionof the VersaillesTreaty. Now it would result in national solidarity,the necessarycondi- tion for "the breakingof Germany'schains and the creationof a new society. Only the proletariandictatorship, the sovietrule ... can achieve thisgoal" (p. 9). In addition,the workers'state would need an alliance with Russia to wage a successfulstruggle of liberation against Western imperialism. Such collaboration theyconsidered eminently feasible, since Russia needed German technicalskills to establishsocialism fully. For the purpose of defendingthe victorious revolution,of regainingthe lost territories,and of eliminatingall "imperialist bufferstates," Germany, they urged, ought to createa new People's Army. "The classlessnation has no interestin imperialistcon- quest,since it cannottolerate the exploitation of foreigncountries. Politicallyit will thereforealways remain on the defensive,but, of course,this does not rule out the use of a militaryoffensive 8 forpurposes of protection." The officialCommunist leadership rejected the National Bol- « Otto Lindemann,with the collaborationof Heinrich Laufenbergand Fritz Wolffheim,Das revolutionäreHeer (Hamburg1920) p. 27. NATIONAL BOLSHEVISM 453 shevism of Laufenberg and Wolffheim. In an ambiguously 4 phrased statementLenin, writingon "left-wingCommunism," referredto theirviews as "preposterousabsurdities," and called it "stupidityand not revolutionär iness" to advocate "absolutely, unconditionallyand immediately. liberation from the Ver- sailles Peace." The demands of the world revolutionmust be the primaryconsideration in determiningthe strategyagainst Western imperialism. In view of Germany'smilitary collapse, actual warfareagainst the Ententewould endangernot only the revolutionin Germanybut also the "internationalSoviet move- ment." It was a crime to "accept battle at a time when it is obviouslyadvantageous to the enemy and not to us." Implicit in his argumentwas the fear that a furtherdefeat of Germany would bring "the imperialistsof France, England, etc." to the veryborders of Russia. Karl Radek, Russia's foremostexpert on Germanaffairs, leveled a more forthrightattack on the two Hamburg National Bol- sheviks.5 He bluntlyadmitted that the securityof Soviet Russia had to be the paramountconcern in the formulationof Com- munistforeign policy. As a devastatedcountry, Russia, the iso- lated bastion of socialism,had to be given a breathingspell. Furthermore,both Germanyand Russia had a vital interestin initiatingtrade relationswith the Anglo-Saxoncountries, rather thanin wagingwar againstthem. Should war breakout, however, the German workers,Radek argued, would surely be betrayed by their own ruling class. The German bourgeoisie,interested primarilyin maintainingits class privileges,undoubtedly pre- ferredoccupation by the Entente to a soviet dictatorship. The invaders might confiscatepart of their profits,the revolution everything.The successfulconduct of hostilitieswould therefore require the completesuppression of the treacherousbourgeoisie insteadof the proclamationof a Burgfrieden(suspension of party " * V. I. Lenin, 'LeftWing' Communism, an InfantileDisorder," in SelectedWorks, vol.2 (Moscow1947) p. 614. ß Karl Radek,Die auswärtigePolitik des deutschenKommunismus und der Ham- burgerNationale Bolschewismus (Vienna n.d.). 454 SOCIAL RESEARCH strife),as Laufenbergand Wolffheimso naivelyadvocated. The German workingclass would have to fightagainst "Entente cap- ital" in alliance with the internationalproletariat and not with the Germanbourgeoisie. In thesecircumstances, Radek thought, the demand for a "revolutionarywar" emanated not fromcon- siderationsof genuine radicalismbut from "nationalisticimpa- tience"- to him a characteristicfeature of petty-bourgeois thinking. Radek's sharp attack on Laufenbergand Wolffheimdid not constitutea categoricalrejection of theirviews. He insistedthat the party could not tolerate elements with "petty-bourgeois prejudices" within its ranks. "But under certain futurecondi- tions," said Radek (p. 3), "the CommunistParty can establish contact with National Bolshevism." It was the party'sduty to "proffera hand" to thosesincere bourgeois elements, intellectuals and officerswho had the courage to forgotheir class privileges and turn to the KPD to save the nation. "Concern for the national question can also be one of the paths leading to Communism"(p. 2). Radek's hesitationto close the door on all cooperationwith the nationalistswas well grounded. In 1919, while in a Berlin prison for alleged participationin the Januaryuprising of the GermanCommunists, Radek had actuallycome into contactwith severalsuch "sincerenationalists." One of them,General Eugen Freiherrvon Reibnitz, Radek describedas the "firstrepresenta- " 6 tive of the specieslabeled 'National Bolsheviks/ This former intimateof Ludendorffagitated within the officercorps not only foran alliance with Soviet