NATIONAL BOLSHEVISM in WEIMAR GERMANY Allianceof Political Extremes Against Democracy

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NATIONAL BOLSHEVISM IN WEIMAR GERMANY Allianceof Political Extremes Against Democracy

BY ABRAHAM ASCHER AND GUENTER LEWY

JLhe sharewhich both the nationalist right and theCommunist lefthad in bringingabout the downfallof Weimardemocracy hasbeen generally recognized by students of German history. But the equallycommon view thatthese forces of extremisminde- pendentlycarried on theiragitation against the Republicneeds revision.While these movements seemingly represented the two poles of the politicalspectrum, in actualitythey had considerable attractionfor each other. As a matterof fact,at certain crucialmoments during the 1920sthis attraction culminated in seriousattempts to achievea workingalliance and an ideological synthesis.This startlingrapprochement between right and left, knownin Germanyas NationalBolshevism, was facilitatedby thefriendly relations between democratic Germany and Commu- nistRussia after World War I. SinceNational Bolshevism had adherentsamong both extremes of the Germanpolitical scene, it neverreally emerged as one welldefined doctrine with the same meaning for all itsadvocates. It alwaysremained a seriesof nebulousgeneralities to which each side gave its own interpretation,designed to serveits par- ticularinterests. The Communistsresorted to National Bol- shevismin orderto exploitthe nationalisticsentiment so wide- spreadin Germany;nationalists espoused it to enlistthe socialist massesfor their program of liberationfrom Versailles and imperialistexpansion. The commonground was their conviction that each stoodto benefitfrom an alliancebetween the two "pro- letariannations," Russia and Germany,against the capitalist West. NATIONAL BOLSHEVISM 451 i The senseof outrage against the terms of theTreaty of Versailles gaverise to thefirst phase of NationalBolshevism. It appeared withinCommunist ranks primarily because of Soviet Russia's fear that the Versaillessettlement would enable the West to extendits supremacyover Germany. In Moscowin March1919 theFirst Congress of the Communist International denounced the Alliesfor planning to turnthe Germans into "miserable starving slavesof Entente capital." The designof the "allied imperialists," the Cominternannounced, was to forceGermany into "a kind of Holy Allianceof capitalistsagainst the workers'revolution." To arousemass sentiment against these plans, the Communist Internationalcoined the slogans: "Long live the revoltof the workersagainst their oppressors! Down with the Versailles peace, downwith the new Brest!" 1 In Germanythis vehement rejection of Versaillesformed the cornerstoneof the Communistparty's struggleagainst the West and its advocacyof an alliancewith Soviet Russia- a constanttheme throughoutthe life of the WeimarRepublic. A small group of militantswithin the GermanCommunist Party(KPD) soon expressedthe anti-Westernline in distinctly nationalisticterms. The leadingspokesmen for this faction were twoHamburg intellectuals, Heinrich Laufenberg and FritzWolff- heim(both were subsequently expelled from the partyfor their syndicalistviews, and in April1920 were instrumental in forming the GermanCommunist Workers Party, or KAPD). In a pam- phletwritten in November1919 2 theyheld "blatanttreason" responsiblefor Germany's disaster. Resorting to the"stab in the back"charge, later a prominentfeature of Nazi propaganda,they arguedthat Germanyhad not reallybeen completelycrushed on thebattlefield. Rather, Germany's defeat had been sealedby "politicians"who, fearful above all of an armedproletariat, had

iT/ie CommunistInternational, vol. i (1919) pp. 118, 121, 162. 2 Heinrich Laufenbergand Fritz Wolffheim,Revolutionärer Volkskrieg oder konterrevolutionärerBürgerkrieg? (Hamburg 1920) . 452 SOCIAL RESEARCH succumbedto the West. Traitorshad accepted the dishonorable termsof the Allies, surrenderedGerman territoryto the "merci- less imperialists/'and broughtabout the death of hundredsof thousandsof innocentvictims by starvation. Germany'seconomy now faced the danger of being transformedinto an object of exploitationby internationalfinance capital. Her workerswere on the verge of being convertedinto coolies and slaves. Germanycould be extricatedfrom her overpoweringmisery, thoughtLaufenberg and Wolffheim,only if throughrevolution she were convertedinto a proletarianstate - forbourgeois society had proveditself incapable of coping with the national question. "The smashingof the capitaliststate and its ruling class is the preconditionfor the marshalingof all national energiesagainst ' theimperialism of theforeign enemy* (p. 10). Such a totalmobil- ization of the German people, adopted earlier,might well have enabled Germanyto resistthe impositionof the VersaillesTreaty. Now it would result in national solidarity,the necessarycondi- tion for "the breakingof Germany'schains and the creationof a new society. Only the proletariandictatorship, the sovietrule ... can achieve thisgoal" (p. 9). In addition,the workers'state would need an alliance with Russia to wage a successfulstruggle of liberation against Western imperialism. Such collaboration theyconsidered eminently feasible, since Russia needed German technicalskills to establishsocialism fully. For the purpose of defendingthe victorious revolution,of regainingthe lost territories,and of eliminatingall "imperialist bufferstates," Germany, they urged, ought to createa new People's Army. "The classlessnation has no interestin imperialistcon- quest,since it cannottolerate the exploitation of foreigncountries. Politicallyit will thereforealways remain on the defensive,but, of course,this does not rule out the use of a militaryoffensive 8 forpurposes of protection." The officialCommunist leadership rejected the National Bol-

« Otto Lindemann,with the collaborationof Heinrich Laufenbergand Fritz Wolffheim,Das revolutionäreHeer (Hamburg1920) p. 27. NATIONAL BOLSHEVISM 453 shevism of Laufenberg and Wolffheim. In an ambiguously 4 phrased statementLenin, writingon "left-wingCommunism," referredto theirviews as "preposterousabsurdities," and called it "stupidityand not revolutionär iness" to advocate "absolutely, unconditionallyand immediately. . . liberation from the Ver- sailles Peace." The demands of the world revolutionmust be the primaryconsideration in determiningthe strategyagainst Western imperialism. In view of Germany'smilitary collapse, actual warfareagainst the Ententewould endangernot only the revolutionin Germanybut also the "internationalSoviet movement." It was a crime to "accept battle at a time when it is obviouslyadvantageous to the enemy and not to us." Implicit in his argumentwas the fear that a furtherdefeat of Germany would bring "the imperialistsof France, England, etc." to the veryborders of Russia. Karl Radek, Russia's foremostexpert on Germanaffairs, leveled a more forthrightattack on the two Hamburg National Bol- sheviks.5 He bluntlyadmitted that the securityof Soviet Russia had to be the paramountconcern in the formulationof Com- munistforeign policy. As a devastatedcountry, Russia, the iso- lated bastion of socialism,had to be given a breathingspell. Furthermore,both Germanyand Russia had a vital interestin initiatingtrade relationswith the Anglo-Saxoncountries, rather thanin wagingwar againstthem. Should war breakout, however, the German workers,Radek argued, would surely be betrayed by their own ruling class. The German bourgeoisie,interested primarilyin maintainingits class privileges,undoubtedly pre- ferredoccupation by the Entente to a soviet dictatorship. The invaders might confiscatepart of their profits,the revolution everything.The successfulconduct of hostilitieswould therefore require the completesuppression of the treacherousbourgeoisie insteadof the proclamationof a Burgfrieden(suspension of party " * V. I. Lenin, 'LeftWing' Communism, an InfantileDisorder," in SelectedWorks, vol.2 (Moscow1947) p. 614. ß Karl Radek,Die auswärtigePolitik des deutschenKommunismus und der Ham- burgerNationale Bolschewismus (Vienna n.d.). 454 SOCIAL RESEARCH strife),as Laufenbergand Wolffheimso naivelyadvocated. The German workingclass would have to fightagainst "Entente capital" in alliance with the internationalproletariat and not with the Germanbourgeoisie. In thesecircumstances, Radek thought, the demand for a "revolutionarywar" emanated not fromcon- siderationsof genuine radicalismbut from "nationalisticimpa- tience"- to him a characteristicfeature of petty-bourgeois thinking. Radek's sharp attack on Laufenbergand Wolffheimdid not constitutea categoricalrejection of theirviews. He insistedthat the party could not tolerate elements with "petty-bourgeois prejudices" within its ranks. "But under certain futurecondi- tions," said Radek (p. 3), "the CommunistParty can establish contact with National Bolshevism." It was the party'sduty to "proffera hand" to thosesincere bourgeois elements, intellectuals and officerswho had the courage to forgotheir class privileges and turn to the KPD to save the nation. "Concern for the national question can also be one of the paths leading to Communism"(p. 2). Radek's hesitationto close the door on all cooperationwith the nationalistswas well grounded. In 1919, while in a Berlin prison for alleged participationin the Januaryuprising of the GermanCommunists, Radek had actuallycome into contactwith severalsuch "sincerenationalists." One of them,General Eugen Freiherrvon Reibnitz, Radek describedas the "firstrepresenta- " 6 tive of the specieslabeled 'National Bolsheviks/ This former intimateof Ludendorffagitated within the officercorps not only foran alliance with Soviet Russia but also fora so-called"peace- ful revolution." For a revival of Germany'seconomy Reibnitz consideredit essentialto give the workersa dominant position by nationalizing industryand setting up factorycommittees. Similar ideas were voiced by Rear Admiral Hintze who, deeply

e Edward Hallett Carr, "Radek's 'Political Salon' in Berlin 1919," in Soviet Studies, translation of Radek's reminiscences, vol. 3 (1952) p. 427. This article is a partial which appeared in Krasnaya Nov of October 1926. NATIONAL BOLSHEVISM 455 shakenby Germany'sfate, insisted on "a changeof regime'*as the sine qua non of her restorationto greatness. A more comprehensivetheory of National Bolshevism,devel- oped on the right,was that of Paul Eltzbacher,professor of eco- nomicsin Berlin.7 So distressedwas he by Germany'ssad plight thathe was willingto throwhimself into the armsof Bolshevism. The Bolshevizationof Germanyseemed to him the only course of action that could save the countryfrom an infinitelyworse calamity,domination by "Americanand Englishcapital." "Even if the dictatorshipof the proletariatwere farmore dreadfulthan it is in reality,"he wrote(p. 28), "it means at least that Germany will be ruled by Germans. Who would not preferto submit to the dictationof his German brothersrather than let himselfbe enslavedand exploitedby cold-bloodedEnglishmen and vengeful Frenchmen?" Eltzbacherdid not suggestthat in adoptingthe dictatorshipof the proletariatthe German people should blindly imitate the Russian example, particularlythe violent form it had assumed there. At the same time he could not but be fascinatedby the energyand ruthlessnessdisplayed by Bolshevism. It was entirely free from "exaggeratedregard for the libertyof the individual and sentimentaltenderness," and fullyrecognized that the "state representscoercion" (p. 21). Animated by "powerfulidealistic ardor," it constituteda comfortingcontrast to Social Democracy and democracyin general. "With mercilessdetermination [Bol- shevism]compels the individual to subordinatehis intereststo thoseof the community. It has the courage to act and therefore possessescreative power" (p. 38). Eltzbacher believed that the adoption of Bolshevism would pave theway for a Russo-Germanalliance, thussecuring Germany againstthe Polish dangerand enabling her to keep the leftbank of the Rhine. Since, according to Article VI of the firstSov- iet Constitution,Bolshevism opposed the exploitation of weak nations, he deemed completelyunfounded the fear that "once

7 Paul Eltzbacher, Der Bolschewismus und die deutsche Zukunft (Jena 1919). 456 SOCIAL RESEARCH Germanyhas accepted BolshevismRussia will attemptto dominate her" (p. 26). Indeed, only prosperouscapitalist nations had to fearBolshevism; Germany "had nothingto lose but her chains." Perhaps even more desperate in its tone and in its hostility to Westerninstitutions and ideals was the "German Manifesto," whichresulted from discussions between several small nationalist groups. It denouncedpolitical parties as "hotbedsof professional quarrelsomeness"imported from France. Democracy,the legacy of Versailles,should be replaced, it stated,by a systemof gov- ernmentin which "the decisive voice is exercisednot by votes, money,and idle talk, but by vigorousaction." Germanycould be saved only if her youth joined the ranks of a radical labor movementand stood ready to attack Germany'sand Russia's mortalenemy, French capitalism and militarism. To succeed in this program the anonymousauthor urged: "We must adopt any and all meanswhich serve the strugglefor liberation. And I insist: all means!" 8 Despite these rousing calls to action, National Bolshevismin this firstphase essentiallyremained a movementof leaders with- out followers. Weary of war and preoccupied with satisfying their most elementaryneeds, the mass of German people were unwillingto risk anotherholocaust. The isolationof thosewho propoundedNational Bolshevikviews was intensifiedby the sus- picion with which both Communists and many nationalists regardedthis new doctrine. By September1920 Laufenbergand Wolffheimhad been expelled from both the KPD and the KAPD; a monthearlier General Weygandhad defeatedthe Red Armybefore Warsaw, and its decliningprestige resulted in dis- illusionmentin nationalistcircles with Russia as a potentialsavior.

1923 was a critical year for the Weimar Republic. Germany's while veryexistence as a sovereignpower seemed to be at stake,

8 See Karl Otto Paetel, ed., SozialrevolutionärerNationalismus (Flarchheim 1930) pp. 28, 27. NATIONAL BOLSHEVISM 457 internallythe countryfaced economic collapse. On January11 French and Belgian troopshad begun to occupy the Ruhr, the heart of industrialGermany, in order to collect the reparations that had not been fully forthcoming. Too weak to meet the invasion with force,the German governmentsupported passive resistance. Productionin the Ruhr came to a standstill,violence flaredup sporadically. In addition, inflationshook the entire nation, ruining the middle class and throwingthe workersinto a destitutestate. The reaction in Germanyto these eventswas threefold:strong patriotic protest against the seizure of German territoryswept the country;within the workingclass growing numbersturned to radicalismon the left; and for the firsttime extremismon the rightassumed the characterof a mass movement. This coincidence of a national and a social emergency produced the second phase of National Bolshevism. To exploit the criticalsituation the KPD, despitehesitation on the part of some leaders,joined the "strugglefor national liberation," a policy it had shunned only three years earlier. A few days afterthe occupationof the Ruhr the Communistsappealed to the Germanproletariat to "fightagainst the Frenchimperialist 9 invasion." Parrotingthe rightists,the partycalled for"the over- 10 throwof the governmentof national dishonor and treason/' The change in attitudewas motivatedby a desire to capitalize on the deep-seatednationalistic feeling. "It is essential/'urged the theoreticalorgan of the KPD, "thatwe exploit thissentiment 11 to avoid it being used against us/' The partyalso hoped to weaken the growingVölkische movement,consisting of numerous,widely scatteredextremist groups whose political views were rather nebulous and whose actual strengthit is difficultaccurately to ascertain. Basically, they espousedvehement nationalism and racial antisemitism,and were » InternationalePresse-Korrespondenz, vol. 3 (1923) p« 153« 10Bericht über die Verhandlungendes IX. Parteitagsder KommunistischenPartei Deutschlands,Frankfurt a.M., April j-10, 1924 (Berlin 1924)p. 42. 11Leonid and A. Friedrich,"Der Mittelstand,Nationalbolschewismus und die Partei,"in Die Internationale,vol. 6 (1923) p. 115. 458 SOCIAL RESEARCH thereforeideologically closely linked to theyoung National Social- ist movement,which most of them ultimatelyjoined. For the Communiststhe new line assumedparticular importance in view of the growingsupport that the partywas gaining among the 12 workersduring the firsthalf of 1923; the KPD thereforefelt that if only it could win over the pettybourgeois elements swell- ing the ranks of the nationalists,or at the very least neutralize them, its chances in the struggle for power would improve considerably. Such a coursefitted in well with Russian foreignpolicy, which ever since 1918 had counted on Germanyto serve as a bulwark againstthe West. The Sovietleaders had alwaysregarded France as one of their most dangerous enemies, and the specter of a French advance into Germanyheightened their fears. Izvestia gave expressionto this alarm when it declared on January21: "The complete domination of Germanyis a serious threat to Soviet Russia. It would make French imperialismour immedi- ate neighbor." The Russians even opposed any attemptat a Communistrevolution in Germany,since such a disturbance mightweaken thatcountry's ability to resistFrance.13 The Com- interntherefore decided that Germany'sstruggle against France was that of an "enslaved country" defending herself against "Westernimperialism," and deservedthe wholeheartedsupport of the revolutionaryinternational proletariat. "Our sympathy," said Litvinovon January27, "is with Germany,as it is with any 14 oppressednation." In developingthe thesis of Germany's"progressive role" the Communistsmanipulated traditionalMarxist categories.15The

12Arthur Rosenberg,A History of the German Republic, tr. by Jan F. D. Morrow and Marie Sieveking(London 1936) p. 194. is See W. G. Krivitsky,In Stalin's Secret Service (New York and London 1939) Soviet Docu- p. 43, and Trotsky'scomments on March 1, 1923, in Jane Degras, ed., ments on Foreign Policy, vol. 1, 1917-24 (London 1951) p. 376. 14 Quoted in Louis Fischer, The Soviets in World Affairs,vol. 1 (New York 1930) p. 450. 15 Quotations in this and the two following paragraphs are from Internattonale Presse-Korrespondenz,vol. 3 (1923), as follows: E. Varga, "Wirtschaft und Wirt- NATIONAL BOLSHEVISM 459 conceptof the class strugglewas transposedto the level of international conflict. At its Second Congressin 1920 the Comintern had already drawn a distinctionbetween two types of states, "exploiters"and "exploitednations/' The world proletariat,the Congresshad urged,must conclude a united frontwith the sub- jugated peoples in order to destroy"international imperialism." As a resultof the impositionof the VersaillesTreaty, Germany now was classifiedan exploited nation, and the same tactic was thereforeemployed in her case. The noted Russian economic analyst,Eugen Varga, pointed out that Germany'seconomy had become so weak and fallen so completelyunder the domination of England and France that Germanycould "no longercontinue to existas an independentpower"; in fact,she had been reduced to the statusof a colony. The occupation of the Ruhr seemed finalproof of Germany'splight as "an object of Frenchimperialist policy." The Frenchinvasion, argued the Communists,not merelyrep- resenteda simple act of aggressionbut, as Frölich wrote,pointed up France's role as the "most powerfulagent of the counterrevolution." Still thriving,French capitalismhad at its disposal a highlyefficient and reliable stateapparatus and a mightyarmy with which it aimed to subjugate the entire continent. France had organized and financednumerous expeditionsin order to crushthe Bolsheviks,and had taken the lead in the establishment of the Cordon Sanitaire surroundingRussia. France therefore constitutedthe greatestdanger to the world revolutionarymove- ment,greater even than Mussolini and Noske, the "butcher of the German proletariat." In thesecircumstances, declared the KPD, the party'shistorical task was to assume leadershipin Germany's"social and national struggle for liberation." "Poincaré's threat to the German

Schaftspolitikim vierten Vierteljahr 1922," p. 129; Paul Frölich, "Der Ruhrkrieg und die deutschen Kommunisten," p. 214; Karl Radek, "Das machtlose Deutsch- land," p. 389, and "Der Faschismus,wir und die deutsche Sozialdemokratie,"p. 649; Neurath, "FünfterVerhandlungstag der ErweitertenExekutive der Kommunistischen Internationale,"p. 900. 46o SOCIAL RESEARCH nation," warned Radek, "is in effecta threat to the German revolution." The workingclass musttherefore have the courage, he said, "to put itselfat the head of the nation, to accept the burdenand honorof leadingthe people and fusethe class struggle withthe quest fornational emancipation"; a workers'government would not even shrinkfrom waging war against the Versailles victors. In short, exhorted Neurath, a leading Communist, instead of "intransigent internationalismwe need flexible internationalism." The situation in 1923, the Communisttheorist Thalheimer asserted,must not be confusedwith that of 1914. At that time - the German left had rightlycondemned the Social Democrats the so-called"Social patriots"- forparticipation in an imperialist war foughtin the interestof a reactionarybourgeoisie. The war on the Ruhr, on the otherhand, was "objectivelyrevolutionary," despite the leading role played by such capitalistsas Cuno and Stinnes. "The German bourgeoisie,however counterrevolution- aryit maybe internally,has, owing to the cowardiceof the petty- bourgeoisdemocrats (above all the Social Democrats)taken up a position which makes it appear externallyrevolutionary. Like Bismarckin 1864-70 and for similar historicalreasons, it has assumed this external revolutionarycharacter against its own will." 16 Troubled lestthese strange pronouncements give the impression that nationalismhad been unquestioninglyembraced and had made superfluousthe class war against the internalenemy, the partyhastened to affirmits oppositionto the Germanbourgeoisie. It issued the double-edgedslogan: "Beat Poincaré in the Ruhr and Cuno at the Spree." The proletariathad to maintain the vigorous fightagainst the ruling circles, which continued to exploit the workersand which could not be trustedto remain faithfulto the national cause. Only afterthe defeatof the bourgeoisie could genuine national liberationbe attained. In theory i« AugustThalheimer, "Some Tactical Problemsof the War in the Ruhr," in The CommunistInternational, no. 25 (n.d.)p. 101. NATIONAL BOLSHEVISM 461 such a "war on two fronts"was possible; in practice,however, the party,by so stronglyemphasizing resistance to France, could not but moderatesomewhat its traditionallyfierce hostility toward its own governmentand the bourgeoisie. Increasingly,in party pronouncements,the term Volk appeared alongside that of 17 "proletariat." By midyear 1923 Russia's world position had deterioratedto such an extentthat the Communistscould no longerafford their moderation. The sharpeningtensions between Soviet Russia and England over influencein the Near East and India had brought the two countriesto the brink of diplomatic rupture. Fearful of the Kremlin'sdesigns on the Dardanelles, Turkey had abandoned her hithertofriendly attitude toward Russia and aligned herselfwith Britain. In Persia, Afghanistan,and India British authoritiesclaimed to have discovereda networkof Soviet agents fomentingrevolutionary activities. The seriesof crisesin Anglo- Russian relationsculminated in May in the Curzon ultimatum, which threatenedthe cancelationof all trade agreementsunless the Communistsceased their "pernicious activities." Russia's fearsof the West now gave way to panic. Already frightened by France'sadvance into Germany,the Sovietgovernment viewed the English ultimatumas anothermove towarda new interven- tion.18 "Soviet Russia and the German workers,"warned Inpre- korr(vol. 3, p. 682), "are to be strangledtogether. A new world war is beingprepared." The formationof a Russian-Germanbloc seemed imperative. At the initiativeof the Comintern,therefore,the KPD's coy flirtationwith nationalism turned into ardent wooing of nationalistextremists. The inaugurationof thiscampaign was assignedto Karl Radek, who enjoyed a reputationfor ideological versatility.As already mentioned,Radek had toyed with National Bolshevikideas for a numberof years,and he was convincedthat such a positiondid

it Heinz Schürer,Die politischeArbeiterbewegung Deutschlands in der Nach- kriegszeit(Leipzig 1933) p. 60. is Louis Fischer(cited above, note 14) vol. 1, p. 443. 462 SOCIAL RESEARCH not imply a concessionto nationalism. In fact,on June 16 he noted to the Enlarged Executive of the Cominternin Moscow thatCommunists "must condemn nationalism in all its forms."19 Four days later the same Radek, again addressingthat group, delivered a startlingspeech, glorifyingthe heroism of Leo Schlageter,who had been executedin May by the Frenchfor acts of sabotage in the Ruhr.20 A memberof the Freikorpsand an organizerfor the Nazi party,he had gone to the Ruhr early in 1923 to fightthe invaders. Friendsbetrayed him to the French authorities,and during his trial he in turn revealed the names of severalof his accomplices.21The condemnationof Schlageter created a stir throughoutGermany; rightists raised him to the statusof a national hero, and the Nazis reveredhim as one of their early martyrs. It was this man who inspired Radek to tender an olive branch to the nationalistsby invitingthem to coordinatetheir efforts with those of the Communists. Schlageter,Radek contended in this speech (p. 153), was a "martyrof Germannationalism" whom Communists ought to hold in highregard: as "a courageoussoldier of the counter-revolution, he deservesto be sincerelyhonored by us, the soldiers of the revolution." True, Schlageterhad firedon Germanworkers, but, as Radek hastenedto add, he had not acted "fromselfish motives"; 22 he had been "convincedhe was servingthe German people."

19Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz,vol. 3 (1923) P- 902. 20 Karl Radek, "Leo Schlageter- The Wanderer into the Void," in Labour Monthly (London) vol. 5 (1923) pp. 152-57. Der Wanderer ins Nichts (The Wan- derer into the Void) was a novel that appeared in 1920, relating the story of a Freikorps officerwho died fightingagainst Spartakus. 21Robert G. L. Waite, Vanguard of Nazism: The Free Corps Movement in Postwar Germany, 1918-1923 (Cambridge, Mass., 1952) pp. 236-37. 22 In answer to a reproach for these compliments,Radek later offeredan explana- tion: "I always have high regard for those who are willing to risk their lives for their ideals, even though they are class enemies against whom I shall fight to the limit. On the other hand, I have nothing but scorn for people who dare not put themselvesinto jeopardy for either the revolution or the counter-revolutionand who can do nothing but wail like old women." See Karl Radek, "Der Faschismus, wir und die deutschen Sozialdemokraten," in Schlageter: Eine Auseinandersetzung zwischen Karl Radek, Paul Frölich, Graf Ernst Reventlow, Moeller van den Brück (Berlin n.d.) p. 6, hereaftercited as Schlageter Auseinandersetzung. NATIONAL BOLSHEVISM 463 Idealisticnationalists such as Schlageterhad to be givencredit for realizingthat deep social cleavageswithin Germany prevented the attainmentof national emancipation. They appreciatedthe fact that an exploited,wretched working class could not be relied on to defendthe nation. Yet, Radek pointedout, theyfailed to per- ceive the only effectiveremedy. Justas the emancipationof the peasants had been necessaryin order to win the battle against Napoleon after Prussia's shatteringdefeat at Jena, so now the workershad to be freedonce more fromtheir fetters in order to expel theFrench invaders. Perhapsthe mostserious shortcoming of the nationalists,Radek maintainedin thisspeech, was theirfailure to detectthe betrayal of thosewho posed as the championsof the national cause. Sin- cere patriotsmust break with the profiteers,speculators, and in- dustrial magnateswho were enslaving the German and ' people sending 'securitiesabroad so that theymay be enrichedand the " countryimpoverished. They must make common cause with thevast majority of the Germanpeople, they"must create a united frontof brain and hand workers. . . Only old prejudicesstand in the way." Thus united, "Germanywill be able to draw upon a vast potentialof resistancewhich in turn will overcomeall ob- stacles. If the cause of the people is made the cause of the nation, then the cause of the nation will become the cause of the people" (p. 156). Then Germanywill findthe way toward an alliance with the "Russian workersand peasantsin order to throwoff the yoke of Ententecapital." Radek concludedhis speechwith an emotionalappeal (p. 157): ". . . we believe that the greatmajority of the nationalist-minded massesbelong not to thecamp of the capitalistsbut to the camp of theworkers. We wantto find,and we shall find,the path to those masses. We shall see to it thatmen like Schlageter,who are pre- pared to die fora commoncause, will become not wanderersinto the void, but wanderersinto a betterfuture for the whole of man- kind; we shall make sure that theywill not spill their blood for the profitof the coal and iron barons,but in the cause of the great 464 SOCIAL RESEARCH toiling German people, who are a part of the familyof peoples fightingfor their emancipation . . . Schlageterhimself cannot now hear this declaration,but we are convincedthat there are hundredsof Schlageterswho will hear it and understandit." Radek's "SchlageterSpeech" was publicized throughoutGer- many. As the statementof a leading figureof the Communist International,it clearly revealed that National Bolshevismhad finallywon the officialendorsement of the Communistleadership. The Politburo of the Russian Bolshevikparty had concurredin the enunciationof the Schlageterline, and Zinoviev,as head of the Comintern,had givenhis writtenconsent to the speech,after 23 its deliverydescribing it as "correctand good." Though the National Bolshevismin the Schlageterspeech did not constitute a radical innovation,the factthat it bore this stamp of approval indicatedthe seriousnessof the Communists'intentions. Russia's plight,it seemed,required daringremedies. In pronouncements still permeatedwith Marxistterminology the partynow declared thatit mustwelcome aid fromany quarter. "Whoeveris sincere in his intentionsof marchingwith us part of the way (ein Stück Wegs) will findus willing,"said Paul Frölich in the Schlageter Auseinandersetzung(p. 23). By mid-1923,then, the KPD's "flexi- bility"had reacheda point wherethe partycould call forrevolu- tionaryaction againstthe class enemyand at the same time eulo- gize a man who had taken pride in massacringproletarians. The clarion call of Radek strucka responsivechord among rightistelements. In JulyRote Fahne, the KPD's leading daily newspaper,brought out a special issue entitled"Germany's Way." It carriedthe Schlageterspeech on the frontpage. On Radek's suggestiontwo nationalists, Graf Ernst Reventlow and Moellervan den Brück,submitted their replies to the Communistpaper, which

23See Zinoviev,Address to the ThirteenthParty Conference, in Pravda,January 25, 1924,quoted in SeymourRotter, Soviet and CominternPolicy toward Germany, 1919-1 923: A Case Studyof Strategyand Tactics,unpublished dissertation (Col- umbia, 1954) pp. 374-75; also Protokoll:Fünfter Kongress der Kommunistischen Internationale,quoted in EdwardHallett Carr,The Interregnum,1923-1924 (New York 1954) p. 180. NATIONAL BOLSHEVISM 465 displayedthem prominentlyin the same issue. Both were im- portantright-wing publicists with considerable influence. Revent- low, editorof the notoriouslyantisemitic weekly Reichswart, later became a full-fledgedNazi; Moeller van den Brück ardentlyadvo- cated imperialistexpansion and is regardedas a precursorof Na- tional Socialism.24 Like all nationalists,they were deeply concerned with the eliminationof class antagonisms. It was their fearthat a divided nation precluded the pursuitof an aggressive foreignpolicy by Germany. They were thereforeparticularly pleased to witnessthe Communists'apparent conversion from defendersof the proletariatto championsof the nation. Eager to establish contact with these potential allies, Reventlow and Moeller clasped the hand Radek extended. To write in Rote Fahne appeared to them a unique opportunity"to disseminate völkisch-sozialeideas among young Communistidealists and to 25 enlisttheir support." Could it be thatRadek, the arch manipu- lator,was beingmanipulated? The admirationRadek had expressedfor the "heroic nationalists" found its counterpartin the respectReventlow and Moeller feltfor the dynamicqualities supposedlydisplayed by the Com- munists. They regardedthem as determinedidealists who "pos- sess genuine patrioticfeelings." Furthermore,Reventlow contended,Völkische and Communistswere drawn together by certain commoninterests. Both held the new democracyresponsible for an inept,vacillating, and spinelessforeign policy. Both Völkische and Communistsstrove for radical changeby recourseto extreme measures,and shared an eagernessto destroythe "Weimar system." All other parties,committed to parliamentarism,wasted theirtime talkingin the Reichstagand "promotingtheir selfish interests." Conservativeand Communistrevolutionaries, on the other hand, loathed democracyand liberalism,which emanated

24 For an excellent exposition of Moeller's ideas see Fritz R. Stern, Cultural Despair and the Politics of Discontent: A Study of the Rise of the "Germanic" Ideology, unpublished dissertation (Columbia, 1953) pp. 147-200. 25 Graf Ernst "'Ein Stück Reventlow, Wegs'?" in Die Tat, vol. 23 (1931-32) p. 991- 466 SOCIAL RESEARCH froman individualisticand egotisticalconception of life.26 They shareda bitterhatred for capitalism,which was characterizedby exploitation,stress on materialisticvalues, and class conflict.They sought"an abandonmentof the institutionsof privateproperty, the nationalizationof banks, trustsand state control over land 27 etc." Finally,Reventlow and Moeller argued, both Völkische and Communistsput theirtrust in Russia, which,as an oppressed and "proletariannation," was the natural ally of "proletarian Germany"against the West and all it stood for. Despite theseaffinities, Reventlow and Moeller also saw serious obstaclesin the way of any real cooperation. Importantideologi- cal barriersstill separatedthe two groups. The Völkische,they counseled,must insiston a German type of socialism,one free fromthe destructivenotions of class struggle,proletarian dictatorship,and an enervatinginternationalism. Germany had to create her own socialism,based on the idea of the Volksgemeinschaft (people's community),which would lead to an "organic unity" 28 groundedon the "cooperationof all estates." Such a new order, theymaintained, could be realizedonly with the eliminationof all Jewishinfluence, a step that the Communists,both in Germany and in Russia, would have to take to prove themselvesacceptable allies. Vituperativeattacks on the Völkischeby the Communists must cease. And, of course,Russia would have to forgoany at- tempt to dominate Germany. If these conditions were met, Reventlowconcluded, the Völkischewould not be averse to the proposal to marchtogether ein Stück Wegs. As he put it in the Schlageter Auseinandersetzung(p. 19): "Should Mr. Radek and the CommunistInternational, for which he spoke, be ready for such cooperation,let themfollow words by deeds. We Völkische are not prejudiced,and are willingto acceptsupport from anyone. 26 Arthur Moeller van den Brück, Das dritte Reich, 3rd ed. (Hamburg 1931) p. 201. 27 Graf Ernst Reventlow, Völkisch-kommunistischeEinigung? (Leipzig 1924) pp. 43-44- 28 Arthur Moeller van den Brück, Das Recht der jungen Völker: Sammlung politischer Aufsätze (Berlin 1932) p. 66. NATIONAL BOLSHEVISM 467 Butwe will not consider sacrificing the 'substance' of our völkische idealsor having them infringed upon." Fromits very inception early in 1923National Bolshevism was notlimited to meretheoretical disputations on thehighest levels. Frequentdiscussions took place between individual Völkische and Communists,and sometimeseven between Nazis and Communists, aboutthe need for a unitedfront against France. Speakersfrom all thesemovements shared the same platforms and carefullyad- justedthe contents of theiraddresses so as to win applausefrom mixedaudiences.29 The Communistsasserted that fascism - a term used by themindiscriminately to describeall extremerightist groups- was a politicalmovement with a definitesocial content thathad tobe foughtnot simply by force but primarily with ideas. The crucialtask of the party was to wean the Mittelstand from the clutchesof fascists.This could be accomplishedonly by putting "thestrongest emphasis on nationalismin our propaganda."30 It couldnot be done"if, as hitherto,our pressrestricts itself to rant- ingabout fascist storm troopers, about heroes of the rubber cudgel , theirstores of armsand thefinancial backing of theNational So- cialists[by big business]."31 In fact,as a KPD circularfor or- ganizersamong nationalist officers exhorted: "One has to speak withofficers very courteously and amiably,to addressthem by the titleTour Excellency.'References to Marxand partyjargon are tobe avoided."32

29See Carr,Interregnum (cited above, note 23) p. 182. The Communists,clamor- ing fornationalist support, are said to have resortedto antisemitism.Ruth Fischer, in particular,has been chargedwith attacking"Jewish capitalists." She herself deniesthat this implied antisemitism. In a letterof May 30, 1955,she pointedout to the presentwriters that she "triedto explain to National Socialiststudents the need to fightnot onlyJewish but also Gentilecapitalists." See also Ruth Fischer, Stalin and German Communism:A Study in the Origins of the State Party (Cambridge,Mass., 1948) p. 283. 30 Paul Böttcher,"Der Weg und Wille zur Macht: Ergebnisseder Erweiterten Exekutiveder KommunistischenInternationale," in Die Internationale,vol. 6 (1923) p. 426. si Friedrich(cited above, note 11) p. 118. 32 Reportedin Vorwärts,evening ed., August 8, 1923. See also Ruth Fischer (citedabove, note 29) p. 282. In the lightof such pronouncementsone readswith 468 SOCIAL RESEARCH When the Nazi partyinvited a Communistspeaker to a public debate,the partysent HermannRemmele, who triedto minimize the differencesbetween the two groupsby the followingremarks: "At thevery beginning, I wish to make one thingclear. The Na- tional Socialist Party,like all other socialist organizations,has withinits ranksa numberof convincedand honestpeople. Dedi- cated to a cause we reject,they pledge to it theirlives. This cour- 33 age and braverywe honor and respect." AnotherCommunist speakerat a political rallyorganized by Reventlowdeclared that "The timeis not faroff when Völkischeand Communistswill be able to unite" (Berliner Tageblatt, February9, 1924). And a Nazi agitator publicly expressed the hope that "despite deep- seated differencesit will be possible to act togetheragainst the commonenemy" (Die Rote Fahne, August4, 1923). There is evidenceof actual militarycooperation between Völk- ischeand Communistsduring the criticalyear 1923. They aided each otherin the procurementof arms; in numerousacts of sabotage,committed in the Ruhr againstthe French,members of the two groups worked hand in hand; theyfought together against separatistsin the Rhineland,and were usually "led by nationalist 34 Prussianofficers." Völkischeand Communistsalso joined hands in Upper Silesia, the scene of protractedfighting between Poles and Germansover the dispositionof that area, and of repeated strikewaves. ExtensiveCommunist agitation among Freikorps units, veiled in nationalisticterminology, succeeded in persuadingsome of them to supporta Communist-ledstrike. Freikorpsmen marchedat the head of demonstrationsand participatedin attackson the police.

amazement Mr. Carr's statement in Interregnum (cited above, note 23) that "the 'Schlageter line' representedno sort of compromise with Fascist doctrine or Fascist policy" (p. 184). 33 "Rede des Genossen Remmele in der Faschistenversammlungin Stuttgart," in Die Rote Fahne (Berlin), August 10, 1923. 34 Erich Müller, "Zur Geschichte des Nationalbolschewismus," in Deutsches Volkstum,vol. 34 (1932) p. 788. See also Erwin Barth, "Die Abwehrkämpfean der Ruhr," in Die Neue Zeit,'vöi. 41, part 1 (1923) p. 464. On armament aid see Ruth Fischer (cited above, note 29) p. 286. NATIONAL BOLSHEVISM 469 In theview of one Communistwriter, the fact that both the party ofthe proletariat and theFreikorps now were concerned with the fateof thenation opened the way to theconversion of the Frei- korps"from supporters and defendersof capitalism. . . intode- 35 fendersof the workingclass." A Freikorpsleader in Upper Silesiarelates that many Communists used to greethim as "Herr Chef." Whenapprised of the error, they would retort: "Once the bulletsstart flying, we willfight together." Repeatedly, he points out, Communistsexpressed the wish to "join forcesunder my leadership."36 Fromthese incidents it is not to be inferredthat theFreikorps as a wholeaccepted National Bolshevism. Yet there can be littledoubt that there existed a strongmutual attraction. To manyof theFreebooters Bolshevism had becomethe symbol of activismand of oppositionto liberalismand bourgeoiscom- placency.37This fascinationwith the Bolshevikmentality led a Freikorpsofficer to referto his menas Rechtsbolschewisten(Bol- sheviksof the right).38 Neitherthe theory nor thepractice of NationalBolshevism in itssecond phase found universal approval within the ranks of the GermanCommunist party or thecamp of thenationalists. The Communistleft wing feared that the Schlageter line woulddivert theparty from its revolutionary role and weakenits resistance to fascism.The rightwing favored a unitedfront with the Social Democratsrather than with the nationalists. Pressured from both sidesand embarrassedby the appearance of KPD posterson which theSoviet star found itself next to theswastika, the KPD stepped up itsantifascist agitation, which had never been fully abandoned.39 The CentralCommittee called forantifascist demonstrations on July29. Whenthe police forbade public meetings, the KPD ex- 35 Felix Schmidt, "Betrachtungen zum oberschlesischenStreik," in Die Interna- tionale, vol. 6 (1923) p. 411. 36 Peter von Wir Heydebreck, Wehr-Wölfe:Erinnerungen eines Freikorps-Führers (Leipzig 1931) pp. 189-Q0. 37Waite (cited above, note 21) pp. 271-72. 38 Manfred von Killinger, Kampf um OberschiestenCLeiozit? iqza' n

40 Edward Hallett Carr, German-SovietRelations between the two World Wars, 1919-1939 (Baltimore 1951) p. 72. 41 Erich Müller, Nationalbolschewismus (Hamburg 1933) p. 22. 42 See Franz Borkenau, The Communist International (London 1938) pp. 246-48. 43 Carr, Interregnum (cited above, note 23) p. 183. NATIONAL BOLSHEVISM 471 " 44 munistscould marchtogether with Völkische'ein StückWegs/ With national tensionssubsiding and the countryon the road to economicprosperity, it seemedjudicious to shelve the programof National Bolshevism. m The period of stabilityduring the mid-twentieswas but the calm beforethe storm. The worldwidedepression which began in 1929 deeply affectedGermany. Unemploymentrose to spectacular heights;the plight of thelower middle class became desperate,and agriculturetoo founditself in dire straits. The problemof reparations had once more become acute; the Young Plan of 1929 did not impresslarge segmentsof the Germanpeople as a viable solu- tion. Unable adequately to cope with these difficulties,the re- publican regime increasinglylost the confidenceof the masses. The rampantdiscontent bred political extremism. Both Nazis and Communistsnow scored phenomenalelectoral victories, and the destinyof Germanyseemed to lie in the hands of one of these movements. Under the stressof domesticand foreigncrises National Bol- shevismappeared for the thirdtime. Among the nationalistsit was born out of a virulenthatred for the ailing capitalistsystem, and intensifiedhostility toward the Versaillespowers. The Com- munistsreturned to National Bolshevismin an attemptto stave offthe rapidly gaining National Socialists,and to prevent any rapprochementbetween Germanyand the West, which Russia considereda threatto hersecurity. The prevailinghostile attitude toward the Young Plan provided the KPD with an incentiveto play the nationalisticcard once more. The partycondemned the new reparationssettlement on the ground that it exposed the workersto exploitation of the harshestkind. Accordingto the Communistsit constituteda be- trayalof the German toiling massesby the German bourgeoisie and the Social Democracyto internationalcapital. Ernst Thael- 44 Verhandlungendes IX. Parteitagsder KPD (cited above, note 10) p. 375. 472 SOCIAL RESEARCH mann,the unquestionedleader of the party,took pride in the fact that Communistswent furthereven than the Nazis. The latter, he said, acknowledgedthat once in power theywould pay those reparationsGermany could afford,while the KPD unequivocally rejectedall reparations.45Furthermore, reflecting the ever-pres- ent anxietiesof the Sovietleaders, who scentedin the Young Plan another conspiracyagainst Russia, Thaelmann insistedthat the agreement"is not onlyof importancefor Germany, but represents 4(5 a plot ofthe international bourgeoisie against the SovietUnion." In preparationfor the crucial Reichstagelections in September 1930 the Cominternordered the KPD to lay even more stresson the nationalistictheme. To take the wind out of thé sails of the Nazis, the Central Committeeannounced its "Program of Na- tionaland Social Liberation"to a startledelectorate on August24. Denouncing the nationalisticslogans of the Hitleritesas dema- gogic, the party solemnlypromised to tear up "the predatory VersaillesTreaty" and the Young Plan. "Only social revolution by the workingclass will be able to solve the national problems facing Germany." The programcalled on the toilers to break with the deceitfulfascists and abandon the "treacherousSocial Democracy,"the partyof the VersaillesTreaty.47 The resortto nationalismmay have aided the Communists,but the Nazis proved infinitelymore skillfulin the use of the same weapon (from1928 to 1930 the former'sshare in the totalvote in- creased by 24 percent,the latter'sby 604 percent- though nationalismwas not,of course,the onlyfactor involved). Seemingly unperturbed,the KPD persistedin espousingthis line. Indeed, as the Nazis stepped up their nationalisticcampaign, the Com- munistsdid theirutmost to outdo them. In an Inprekorrarticle theychided the Nazis for their meekness:"What demands does

^Verhandlungen des Reichstags, vol. 426 (Berlin 1930) February 11, 1930, p. 3938. 46 Ernst Thaelmann, "Die Probleme der KPD auf der Sitzung des Erweiterten Praesidiums des EKKI," in Die KommunistischeInternationale, vol. 11 (1930) p. 528. 47 The complete program may be found in Flechtheim (cited above, note 39) pp. 281-84. NATIONAL BOLSHEVISM 473 Hitlermake upon France [in Mein Kampf]? Does he wantto re- gain the territorieslost in 1918? No. He condemnsthe . . . demandfor restoration of the 1914boundaries . . . Thus Hitlerat once surrendersthe Germanpopulation of Alsace,Eupen, and Malmedy,which went to Belgium,and probablyeven Danzig and theparts of Upper Silesia which fell to Poland." On thequestion of "regainingthe lostcolonies" the articleaccused the Nazis of ambiguity,"willingness to bargain,"and appeasementof the West- ern imperialists.There could be onlyone explanationfor this timidity:"It is treason! Those betrayedand cheatedwill be the Germanmasses, who expectreal nationalliberation from Hitler. Insteadan evenmore shameful enslavement awaits them! Hitler, 'theliberator/ thus ends up at thepoint where the servile policy of the past 13 yearshas held us: in subservienceto Frenchim- perialism."In conclusionthe article strongly urged the KPD to bringhome to themasses the essential truth that Germany's sole real friendwas the SovietUnion. The Nazis werethe "mortal enemies"of Germany'sstruggle for national liberation, and "only Communismwill breakthe chain of Versailles!"48 The KPD's protestationsof patriotismfailed to accomplishthe desiredend. The Nazi riseto powercould not be stopped,at least notby these means. Even after the National Socialists had proved theirenergy and ruthlessnessby smashingthe tradeunions and crushingall politicalopposition, the Communists continued, from exile,to tauntthem for their supposed insincerity on thenational question. Whathad happened,asked a KPD appealin May 1933, to Hitler'sboast thathe would tear up the VersaillesTreaty? Hitler,the declaration assured, would never accomplish that feat, forhe "recognizesVersailles and pays interest on thetribute! That is theplain truth,just as it is indisputablethat he abandonsthe Germansin Alsace,Danzig, the Corridorand UpperSilesia, and SouthernTyrol who weretorn away from their fatherland. He

48T. Neubauer, "Die auswärtigePolitik des deutschenNationalsozialismus; Hitlerund Frankreich,"in InternationalePresse-Korrespondenz, vol. 12 (1932);quota- tionsfrom pp. 1253,1255, 1256. 474 SOCIAL RESEARCH leaves them under the terrorof the Versailles victorswithout 49 puttingup any resistance." Hitler was not long in provinghis "sincerity." The Communiststaunted no more. The Communistsalways maintainedthat the adoption of nationalism did not involve any ideological compromise. They spoke of "tacticalmanoeuvres" within the frameworkof "revolu- tionaryinternationalism." On theright, however, the thirdphase of National Bolshevismwas characterizedby a genuineideological reorientation. Overwhelmedby the disintegrationof German society on every level, many nationalists reacted vehemently againstboth capitalismand democracy,which theyheld responsi- ble for the country'scalamity. Eager to overcomea "decadent parliamentarism,"they shunned all formalorganization. Instead, theydrew togetherin numeroussmall literarycircles, as devotees of certainperiodicals, in secretsocieties and illicit semi-military formations(Kampfbünde).50 None of thesehad a clearlydefined politicalprogram, but all were inspiredby one absorbingaim, to findan immediateand radical solutionto Germany'sills. A National Bolshevik strand appeared even within the Nazi party,and was responsiblefor a split in that organization. With Hitler'srefusal to accept Otto Strasser'sfervent anticapitalism and Easternorientation in foreignpolicy, the latter,on July4, 1930, led his followersout of the movement,with the slogan "The So- cialistsleave the NSDAP." He then foundedthe "Black Front," a secretiveloose union of several anti-Nazi right-wingorganiza- tions. Acknowledgingits indebtednessto Moeller van den Brück, the coalition definedits positionas follows:"The Black Front is nationalisticand socialisticin spirit,martial and rusticin form, and völkischin essence."51 49"Kämpft für Arbeit,Brot, Freiheit,Sozialismus," Ein Aufrufder KPD, in Rundschauüber Politik, Wirtschaftund Arbeiterbewegung(Basel), vol. 2 (1933) P- 391- soFor an excellentsurvey of thesevarious groups see ArminMohler, Die Kon- servativeRevolution in Deutschland,1918-1932: Grundriss ihrer Weltanschauungen (Stuttgart1950). si RichardSchapke, Die SchwarzeFront: Von den Zielen und Aufgabenund vom Kampfeder deutschenRevolution (Leipzig 1933) p. 76. Leading positionin the NATIONAL BOLSHEVISM 475 The most forcefulstatement of rightistNational Bolshevism during the early 1930s is to be found in the writingsof Karl O. Paetel and ErnstNiekisch. The formerled the "Gruppe Sozial- ' revolutionärerNationalisten* (Organization of Social-Revolution- aryNationalists), which derived most of itssupport from the Youth Movement (Bündische Jugend). In the traditionof the World War I and Freikorpsgenerations, these groups exhibited an almost mysticalreverence for the nation. But forthe followers of Paetel 52 nationalliberation presupposed social regeneration. They hoped to build "a Reich of true justice,honor, liberty, and dignityfor all its people" (Wulf), a Germanythat would enjoy freedomand genuine organic unity. A state based on such principles,the Paetel circlebelieved, could be establishedonly when the capital- isticorder had been overthrown. Capitalismwas tearingthe nation apart into warringfactions. The German bourgeoisiemade commoncause with the Westernexploiters. The way out of this morasslay in supportof the oppressedrevolutionary proletariat, whichby means of a successfulclass strugglewould put an end to fraternalstrife and achieve a true Volksgemeinschaft.Both the NSDAP and the KPD were essentiallyproletarian parties, thought Paetel,and the social-revolutionarynationalists ought therefore to heal therift between them. The Paetel group also sharplyattacked Western culture which, theyalleged, was corruptingand ruining Germany. Urbanism, liberalism,and parliamentarismwere the elementsof decay to be rootedout, for theykept the nation divided and in constanttur- moil. Against these foreignvalues they posited those of the

"Black Front" was held by Strasser'sown circle, the "Kampfgenossenschaftrevolu- tionärer Nationalsozialisten." Some of the other units were the "Bund Oberland," the "Tat-Kreis," and the "Wehrwolf" group. For a full discussion see Adolf Ehrt, - Totale Krise Totale Revolution? Die "Schwarze Front" des völkischen National- ismus (Berlin 1933) pp. 49-75. For a summary exposition of Otto Strasser'sviews see his Aufbau des deutschen Sozialismus (Leipzig 1932) . 52 Subsequent quotations of Wulf, Becker, and Paetel himself are from the work edited by Paetel (cited above, note 8), as follows: Friedrich Wulf, "Sozialismus und Nation," p. 42; Rolf Becker, "Bauer und soziale Revolution," p. 69; Karl O. Paetel, "Standort,"p. 78. 476 SOCIAL RESEARCH German peasantrooted in native soil. "Born out of the deepest Germanicblood and anti-Romanand anti-Westernsentiment, the peasant representsfor us the pivot of the social revolution" (Becker). The existinginstitutions overthrown, a "German soviet state"was to be founded"which would make possiblethe self-governmentof the toilingmasses." The waywould thenbe open for an alliance withSoviet Russia, also an "oppressednation." A forcecapable of attainingthe new order,argued Paetel himself,was in the processof formation. This "German front"be- longed neitherto the rightnor to the left. It stood above the quibbling parties,it was independentof partybureaucrats and dogma: "Anyone from either extremewho is concerned about Germanyand socialismbelongs to us. We are not interestedin his partylabel." Paetel's intellectualdevelopment, it has been said with some justification,had reached "an advanced stage of Bolshevization," 5S and "nationalismwas merelyused by him to attainBolshevism." Ernst Niekisch shared most of Paetel's ideas, but differedin puttingprimary emphasis on the ideals of Prussianism. He may thereforebe characterizedas a "PrussianBolshevik." The slogan of the circle he headed, the "Widerstandsbewegung,"was, appro- - - priatelyenough, "Sparta Potsdam Moscow," and its emblem consistedof a Prussianeagle, a sword,and thehammer and sickle.54 Niekischbemoaned the fact that Germanyhad forsakenthe tra- ditionsof Potsdam,and admiredSoviet Russia forhaving adopted them. The Easterncolossus had achieved stabilityand strength because it had cultivatedan ethos of revolutionaryactivism, of work and dedication to the community. He commended the Bolsheviksfor not toleratinginternal discord, a "babbling parlia- ment," and for introducingorder and authoritariandiscipline. In his Entscheidung,published in Berlin in 1930,he declared (p.

53Ehrt (cited above, note 51) p. 56. 54Klemensvon Klemperer,The ConservativeRevolution in Germany,1913 throughthe Early Yearsof the Republic,unpublished dissertation (Harvard, 1949) p. 305. NATIONAL BOLSHEVISM 477 134): "The ruthlessbravery and roughnessof Communismreveal a hardymilitary spirit; it contains more Prussian severitythan Communistsrealize or Prussiansthemselves suspect." If Germanywas once again to be imbued with the spirit of Prussianism,Niekisch maintained,all Westerninfluences would have to be weeded out. The nation would have to break irrevoc- ablywith the ideals of humanitarianism,rationalism, and all other liberalvalues. Insteadof livingin large,teeming cities, which en- courage "cringingdocility," Germans ought to returnto the soil, to a rusticand primitiveway of life,to self-imposedpoverty which alone produceswarlike virtues. They mustfree themselves from theshackles of "Christianitywhich stunts their heroism and makes themsusceptible to enslavementby Rome" (Entscheidung,p. 153). In short,Germany had to tear herselfaway from Europe and enterthe mainstreamof "Germanic-Slaviccivilization." In Niekisch'sview no means could be spared to liberate Ger- many from foreign oppression. "For an enslaved people no weaponsare forbidden." Germanymight have to wage war against the enemy'scivilian population. "Fortunatelythe progressof - technologyand science airplanes, advances in chemistryand - bacteriology makesit possibleto conductsuch a war" (Entscheid- ung,p. 149). When applied forthe purpose of nationalemancipa- tion the mostbarbaric measures were justified. The Communistswere not slow in perceivingthe opportunities offeredby these tendenciesin the nationalistcamp. One alert observerin Moscow noted that in their theoreticalformulations some of the rightistswere "approachingMarxism." 55 And the KPD, respondingto the signal fromMoscow, once again decided to fightfascism with an "ideological offensive."Anxious to stem the Nazi tide not merelywith the stickbut also with the carrot, Heinz Neumann,a daringyoung party leader, attended Nazi meetings. At a rally chaired by Goebbels, Neumann is said to have offeredthe servicesof his partyand the mightof the Red Army 55 Otto Pohl, "DeutscherNationalradikalismus und die Ostrichtungder Politik," in MoskauerRundschau, vol. 1, no. 27-28 (1929)p. 1. 478 SOCIAL RESEARCH foran assaultagainst Western capitalism. He is quoted as having pled with the stormtroopersnot to reject his offer:"Young So- cialists! Brave fightersfor the nation: the Communistsdo not 56 want to engage in fraternalstrife with the National Socialists." The KPD's agitationsucceeded in convertinga number of Na- tional Bolshevikofficers and intellectuals,such as Captain Beppo Römer, the head of the FreikorpsBund Oberland, which had a long recordof collaborationwith the Communists.57Junkers like Ludwig Renn (pseudonymfor Arnold Vieth von Gollsenau) and Count Alexander Stenbock-Fermoralso joined the Communists. One of the converts,the writerBodo Uhse, had run the gamut in his membership,from the Freikorps,the NSDAP, the Strasser circle,to the KPD. The party'sattempts to induce nationaliststo join its ranksis known as the "ScheringerCourse," so called because of the widely publicized case of Lieutenant Scheringer. Early in 1931, while servinga prison sentencefor carryingon Nazi propaganda in the Reichswehr,Scheringer had yielded to the enticementsof the Communists,accepting their assertion that theyrepresented the only true nationalistforce.58 He became a Communistorganizer, and claimed to have succeededin "produc- ing a healthynucleus for Communism"among the rank-and-file and the leadershipof the Nazi StormTroops.59 There is some evidenceto indicatethat one of the aims of Hitler's blood purge of June 30, 1934, was to eliminate National Bolshevismwithin theNazi party.60 With the consolidationof the Nazi regime in June 1934 any open manifestationof National Bolshevismbecame impossible. The Communistshad by now realized that the nationalismthey se Quoted in Georg Schwarz, Völker höret die Zentrale: KPD bankerott (Berlin 1933) P- 206. 57 Müller (cited above, note 41) p. 36; Ehrt (cited above, note 51) p. 44. ss See Spartakus, German Communists (London 1Q44) p. 67. 59 See Scheringer's letter of June 14, 1934, in Manchester Guardian, July 20, 1934- «o Lionel Kochan, Russia and the Weimar Republic (Cambridge, Eng., 1954) p. 174. See also Hitler's speech of July 13, 1934, in Norman H. Baynes, ed., The Speeches of Hitler, vol. 1 (London 1942) p. 315. NATIONAL BOLSHEVISM 479 had so ardentlyencouraged had backfired.61It had turned into a monstrousforce that could not be controlled. Indeed, Hitler began to put into effecthis programof expansion,which endan- gered not only the "capitalistWest" but also the "socialistEast." The National Bolshevikline had to be discarded. Russia needed theWest.

In National Bolshevismthe two extremesof German political life met. This does not implythat all ideologicaldifferences between themdisappeared. The Communistsremained committed to their basicallyrationalistic approach, to the idea of transitoryprole- tarian hegemony,and to the ultimategoal of a classlesssociety. The thinkingof the rightistscontinued to reflecttheir mysticism; theystill clung to racism,to the leadershipprinciple, and to the ideal of a hierarchicallyordered community. Furthermore, it must not be assumedthat National Bolshevismwas of equal significance forboth rightand left. For the Communistsit was basicallyan aspect of their overall strategy. They embraced nationalismin order to woo thosesocial strataamong whom the Völkische,and laterthe Nazis, were makingthe greatestheadway. The right,on the other hand, had a real ideological commitmentto National Bolshevism. They ardentlyespoused aggressivenationalism as well as somekind of programof social and economicamelioration. Despite thesedifferences, right and leftwere broughttogether by certain affinitiesof temperamentand, above all, by common hatreds. Both loathed the "Weimar System"and both were ob- sessedwith bitter hostility toward the West. The inabilityof the Germangovernments from 1919 to 1932 to solve eitherthe national or the social problemsbesetting Germany providedfertile soil forsuch extremism. Nationalismwas largely abandoned to the enemies of the Republic; as a result of wide- spread economicmisery, socialism became a manipulativetool of 6i See WilhelmPieck, Zur Geschichteder KommunistischenPartei Deutschlands: 30 JahreKampf (Berlin 1949) pp. 25-26. 48o SOCIAL RESEARCH demagogues. Wheneverthese foreign-policyand domesticissues reached the criticalpoint at the same time,National Bolshevism came to the fore. This curious amalgamwas then advanced as a solutionto bothproblems. Since it appeared to manyGermans that the onlydynamic solu- tionswere offered by extremistswho rejectedthe entiresocial and politicalframework, democracy could not but suffer. The simul- taneousonslaught from the rightand the leftincreasingly under- mined the young, fragile Republic. The traditionalpolitical divisionsbecame blurred. Communistsadopted nationalism.Na- tionalistsadvocated socialism. The KPD hailed former"fascist ' " hoodlums' as "gallant heroes. Arch-conservativesclamored for the Bolshevizationof Germany. In thisclimate of confusionand politicaldemoralization the real issueswere lost, making it possible for thatparty most adept at manipulatingthe frustrationsof the Germanpeople finallyto win out. For the rightthis denouementwas essentiallywelcome. The Communistshad intendedit to be different.Obsessed with the securityof the Soviet Union, theyhad fanned the flamesof nationalismin orderto buttressthe wall againstthe West. They also hoped that the general turmoilwould enable them to ride into power. They scornedan alliance with the democraticforces, the last hope forthe preservationof the Republic. Instead,the Com- munistscentered their fire on theSocial Democrats. They deluded themselvesinto believing that a shortperiod even of Nazi rule would be but a prelude to theirfinal triumph. In subordinating their policies to the national interestsof the Soviet Union, the Communistsfailed to advance eithertheir own or Russia's cause. In fact,this strategy cost Germanyand Russia dearly.