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The Crooked Path of Dummer's Treaty: Anglo-Wabanaki Diplomacy and the Quest for Aboriginal Rights

HARALD E.L. PRINS Kansas State University

For several hundred years, the Wabanaki have fought hard for interna­ tional recognition of their aboriginal rights. In a long series of diplomatic conferences even the most experienced Native ambassadors, orators, and other leaders seemed doomed in their quest for fair and peaceful settle­ ments. Not only were the Native warriors outnumbered and outgunned by their enemies, they also faced serious communication problems. Their conferences and council fires on the colonial frontier often involved numerous participants not only speaking very different languages but also hailing from very distinct cultures. Often, Wabanaki diplomats depended on outside interpreters unskilled in the language of international diplo­ macy and unfamiliar with the complexities of political concepts. Com­ pounding these translation problems, they also faced risks of deliberate distortion of what was actually said or written down. Beyond language and law, there were other cross-cultural differences to contend with. Especially in their negotiations with European colonial officials, Wabanaki diplomats stumbled over sometimes radically differ­ ent ideas about allegiance and alliance, sovereignty and friendship, sub­ mission and protection, power and property. Misunderstandings were especially obvious concerning arguments about what is now known as "aboriginal title," a contested concept that remains highly controversial to this day. In the next few pages, following an ethnohistorical tradition of relat­ ing recorded texts to their contextual matrix, I discuss how contemporary disputes about aboriginal rights are deeply embedded in several centuries of ethnic conflict, cross-cultural misunderstanding and self-interested dis­ tortion (see also Wolf 1999:16). Among the critical questions raised dur­ ing aboriginal rights court trials is the fundamental problem of historical evidence: How can we know what really happened during historical encounters between two rivals when only the dominant party has pro-

Papers of the 33rd Algonquian Conference, ed. M.C. Wolfart (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba, 2002), pp 360-377. THE CROOKED PATH OF DUMMER'S TREATY 361

duced and preserved the written documents we now rely on for our knowledge about the past? What about the perspective of the vanquished Native peoples who relied on oral knowledge when they negotiated com­ plex treaties so many years ago and committed their experiences and thoughts to collective memory? Can we really discern the Wabanaki per­ spective by probing colonial texts (re)produced by their victorious oppo­ nents or self-interested foreign allies? Do historically selected passages of aboriginal speeches as rendered by English or French interpreters accu­ rately reflect what aboriginal chieftains or diplomats actually said and meant? And if these aboriginal leaders did not (fully) understand the , how could they verify that these official documents truthfully reflected what they had said and agreed to? As an ethnohistorian and cultural anthropologist directly involved in contemporary aboriginal rights issues, my interest in this problem is more than academic. In a recent case argued before the Supreme Court of New­ foundland, I served as one of the expert witnesses for the Miawpukek First Nation, the island's federally recognized Mi'kmaq Band at Conne River. Among the experts on the opposite side was a history professor at the University of , Stephen Patterson, who testified on behalf of the Canadian federal government ("Her Majesty the Queen in Right of "). This historian agreed "that there is a dearth of written evidence that reflects what Native people may have been thinking about, or may have discussed with relation to a treaty." Nevertheless, he asserted, it is possible to "discern what the Native perspective was [by relying] extensively on contextual evidence." Such evidence, he explained, includes not only the full text of the particular treaty document, but also the recorded minutes and the identification of the interpreters providing translations (SCN 2001:147-48). Representing the Miawpukek, Mi'kmaq attorney Shayne McDonald questioned this Anglo-Canadian historian, asking if European colonial documents "can give us an appreciation of the Mi'kmaq perspective in terms of their [own particular] views on the treaty process, the issues on the ground at the time of the treaty signing?" In response to this former Miawpukek chief, the Crown's expert witness conceded, "we don't always know what it is in the heads of the Mi'kmaq...." Arguing that it is possible to interpret Mi'kmaq behavior, he contended that his theoretical approach is simply "to assume that the ... Native people are rational peo- 362 HARALD E.L. PRINS

pie who understand their own best interest, who know what's good for them and to act accordingly" (ibid.: 24-26, my emphasis). Bringing tangible specificity to a critical examination of such easy assumptions, my discussion focuses on Dummer's Treaty hammered out between 1725 and 1727. A political landmark with far-reaching conse­ quences for the aboriginal peoples in Northeast America, this treaty became the political pivot of future Anglo-Wabanaki diplomacy. The baseline for a series of important Anglo-Wabanaki treaties in the 18th century, it remains relevant to the outcome of aboriginal rights cases involving the Wabanaki, in particular the Mi'kmaq, , Passama- quoddy, and tribal nations still inhabiting and the Mari­ time Provinces (Ghere 1984, 1995; Kenneth M. Morrison 1984, Prins 1989, 1992, 1994, 1996). I begin my discussion with a brief overview of the and the and peace scenario that existed on the Anglo-Wabanaki frontier between 1688 and 1725, leading up to Dum­ mer's Treaty.

THE WABANAKI CONFEDERACY: ANGLO-WABANAKI AND TREATIES In the final quarter of the 17th century, a loosely affiliated group of north­ eastern Algonquian tribal communities in the borderlands between , French , and formed a pan-tribal alliance known as the Wabanaki Confederacy. Threatened by the growing numbers of English settlers invading their lands and increasingly brazen raids by their ancient enemies, these Algonquians understood that their very survival was at stake and committed themselves to a bond of peace with each other. Emerging in the complex political landscape increasingly dominated by Anglo-French colonial disputes, their alliance remained a potent force for more than 150 years (Nicolar 1893, Prince 1898, Walker 1998). Although its composition could fluctuate somewhat according to time and circumstances, the core of this pan-tribal alliance originally con­ sisted of a group of neighboring communities and extended to similar clusters of Maliseet and . Later, it widened even more and included the more numerous Mi'kmaq (Speck 1915:498; Ibid. 1919:36). Members had their own names for this confederacy. For THE CROOKED PATH OF DUMMER'S TREATY 363 instance, the Mi'kmaq usually referred to it as buduswagan 'convention council', based on the word/wta 's 'orator'. Their Maliseet and Passama- quoddy neighbors also used this name. In addition, the Passamaquoddy called it tolakutinaya, which literally means to 'be related to one another' (Leavitt & Francis 1990:38-39). The Penobscot named it bezegowak, meaning 'those united into one', or gizangowak, which signifies 'com­ pletely united' (Speck 1915:495). The firstAnglo-Wabanak i War (1676-1678) came on the heels of the Algonquian struggle against English colonial expansionism in southern New England commonly known as King Philip's War (1675-1676). Wabanaki warriors continued skirmishing in the borderlands until treaties formally ended the fightingi n 1678. The outbreak of the second Anglo- Wabanaki War (1688-1698, commonly called King William's War) took place within a much wider political theater as it was directly connected to an ongoing dynastic power struggle in referred to as the War of the Grand Alliance. Spilling over to the North American colonies, this multinational conflict not only involved French and English troops, but also dragged in the colonial border tribes (Prins 1996:123-29). Mi'kmaq, Maliseet, Passamaquoddy, and Abenaki warriors generally sided with the French and became actively involved as frontier guerillas against English colonists. During several major raids Mi'kmaqs from the Gulf of St. Lawrence and from the St. John River often fought together with Wabanaki warriors from as far south as the in Maine. The region's firstfightin g broke out on the New England frontier in 1688 - an incident between English settlers and their Indian neighbors which triggered a violent chain reaction in the northern and eastern borderlands. After nearly five years of bloodshed, a split emerged within the Wabanaki Confederacy. Exposed to English seaborne raiders, several bands in the Maine coastal region felt they had no choice but to accept a peace pro­ posal from the English. Several chieftains, including the famous Madock- awando of Penobscot, agreed to sign a treaty with the government (which claimed jurisdiction over Maine until 1820). Accord­ ing to the English, who relied on their own interpreters, the treaty clearly stated that these Wabanaki chiefs acknowledged their "hearty subjection and obedience unto the Crown of England" (in Baxter 10:7-11; Ghere 1995:127-29; Morrison 1984:128-29). 364 HARALD E.L. PRINS

Dismayed by this breach within the Wabanaki Confederacy, the French did their best to demean the peacemakers as traitors and persuaded the renowned Kennebec warchief Taxous (whose name is rendered as 'he who crushes') to prevail upon their wavering companions. Having mar­ ried a woman from the Penobscot, this Abenaki tribal leader was strategi­ cally situated in the contested borderlands between French Acadia and New England. Reinforcing their alliance with the region's Wabanaki, the French rewarded Taxous not only with gifts but, as Joseph Robineau de Villebon, the commander of Acadia, noted in his journal: "I adopted him as my brother and gave him the best suit of clothes I had..." (in Webster 1934:55). Taxous assured Villebon "on leaving that, although he was going to gather together a large war-party, he would not stop there but would make up another immediately after the first and induce Madokawando to join him, or render him contemptible to all the young Indians" (ibid.). He succeeded, and in the summer of 1694 the Wabanaki Confederacy closed ranks and resumed fighting their common English enemy. Meanwhile, Taxous was appointed headman of , an important Abenaki village on the Upper Kennebec. Selected as the site for a new French Jesuit mission post because of its strategic position on the New England frontier, this village played a crucial role in the Wabanaki struggle for independence (Prins & Bourque 1987:144-49). The conclusion of the decade-long War of the Grand Alliance came when the French, English, and other European powers signed the Treaty of Rijswijk in late September 1697. It took a while, however, before this tiding reached everyone in the American colonies. So fighting continued. The English in Boston received word of the treaty by mid-December, but it did not reach the French in Canada until several months later. By sum­ mer 1698, allies within the Wabanaki Confederacy finally knew what had occurred in Europe and began their own negotiations with their English enemies. In January 1699 chiefs representing the Wabanaki Confederacy came to on the Maine coast to end formally their conflict with the New Englanders. Presented with the earlier text of an aborted treaty supposedly affirmed by some of their own peers in 1693, the Wabanaki chiefs were shocked to hear how English translators had misrepresented their words and how their original offer of mutual friendship had turned into a pledge of submission to the English crown (in Baxter 23:84) The chiefs strongly THE CROOKED PATH OF DUMMER'S TREATY 365

protested and insisted that they wanted to maintain their autonomy as sov­ ereign tribal nations (in Kenneth M. Morrison 1984:128, 143-53). Clearly articulating their position, they refused to accept the English king as "our common father," pointing out that the King of France held that honor. However, now that the French and English kings had made peace with each other as "brothers," the Wabanaki would be willing to call the English monarch "Uncle King William." As such, they said that they were thankful that their "uncle" had accepted them "into the league of friendship" (in Baxter 10: 87-95).

WABANAKI BETRAYAL AT THE 1713 TREATY OF UTRECHT Always dependent on an aboriginal buffer against New England, the French tried hard to maintain their traditional influence on the Wabanaki Confederacy. In 1703, after the French and English had once again declared war against each other in Europe, they dragged the Wabanaki into yet another cycle of conflict. During the next ten years violence, hun­ ger, and diseases took the lives of about one third of the population of the Wabanaki Confederacy. Finally, the Europeans agreed to a negotiated peace, signing the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713. The war in Europe having ended badly for the French king, he was forced to cede Acadia to the British crown and recognize its claims to Newfoundland and Hudson Bay territories. As an absolute monarch, he believed firmlyi n his God-given right to rule over all the lands that had been staked out as French colonies. Given this and the fact that the French had viewed their sovereign claims over Wabanaki territories pre-eminent to that of the tribal nations themselves, the English assumed they acquired clear title to the French colonial domains ceded to them at Utrecht (Dick- ason 1986:33-34; Murdoch 1865(1):352). The Wabanaki had a different view. Some 360 members of the vari­ ous tribes, including Mi'kmaqs, attended the gathering at Casco Bay on the Maine coast to participate in peace negotiations with English officials from Boston. Father Sebastien Rasle, the French Jesuit missionary who lived many years among the Kennebec Abenaki, later reported that a Wabanaki orator speaking in the name of the allied tribal nations addressed the English delegates as follows: "It is well that the kings should be in peace ... It is not I that am striking you these past twelve 366 HARALD E.L. PRINS

[sic] years past, it is the Frenchman who has availed himself of my arm to strike you.... Now the Frenchman tells me to lay [my tomahawk] down; I throw it very far, that no one may see any more the blood with which it is reddened. So, let us live in peace, I agree to it" (in MHSC II, 4: 293). Then the Wabanaki were told that the French king had given up his sovereign title over Acadia, from Penobscot to Gaspe, with the exception of Cape Breton and . Although this news seemed utterly unbelievable to the Wabanaki, their French "father" had indeed asserted his royal prerogative to dispose of Indian territories within the boundaries of his colonial domains as he pleased. Accordingly, the English delegates from Boston instructed them to peacefully submit themselves as loyal subjects to their mighty lord, King George. Not having been conquered, and hearing ideas so alien to their worldview, the members of the Wabanaki Confederacy were completely bewildered by this logic. To begin with, they did not consider themselves "subjects" of the French crown. It is true that they referred to the French governor in Canada (and by extension the French king) as "father," but this did not entitle him to their territories. Indeed, the Wabanaki believed that they held their ancestral lands "only of heaven" (in NYCD 10:187). For them, the issue was quite simple: living on their own lands, they were still free. Denying that the French king had the right to give away their land, the Wabanaki spokesman explained (as later related by Rasle): "But you say that the Frenchman has given you Plaisance [Newfoundland] and Por- trail [] which are in my neighborhood, with all the lands adja­ cent: he shall give you all that he will; for me I have my land which the has given me for living, as long as there shall be a child of my people, he will fight for its preservation" (in MHSC II, 4: 293). While allowing the English to "forever enjoy all and Singular the Rights of Land and former Settlements, Properties and Possessions," the Wabanaki agreed that "their own ground" would be saved, as well as "free liberty of hunting, fishing, fowling, and all other lawful liberties and privileges" (in Penhallow 1726 [1859]: 76-77). Not certain if they had been deceived by the English or that they had actually misunderstood what had been agreed to in the Treaty of Utrecht, the Wabanaki later asked their resident missionaries: "By what right did the King of France dispose of [our] country?" (Charlevoix in NYCD 9: THE CROOKED PATH OF DUMMER ' s TREATY 367

879-880). Embarrassed, the priests tried to allay their suspicions. Accord­ ing to a French official "memoir respecting the Abenaquis of Acadia," the missionaries told them that "they had been deceived by an ambiguous expression, and that their country was not included in that which had been ceded to the English..." (in NYCD 9:878-879). Although not precisely true, it was a convenient response. After all, what was Acadia and where were its exact boundaries? In 1698 the French had still identified the colony as the territory from Penobscot to Cape Breton and Gaspe Peninsula. However, afraid that the loss of so much territory endangered their colony in Canada, they now quickly adopted a narrower definition of the territory and argued that Acadia really only comprised the Nova Scotia peninsula. Never before had the French Crown considered the idea of aboriginal title, but now seriously concerned with geopolitical self-interests, it began to play with this novel idea. In other words, as far as the French were concerned, the Wabanaki could now claim aboriginal title to the region from the Saco River in southern Maine to Annapolis on the Nova Scotia coast. That said, no mat­ ter what geographic definition one accepted, Wabanaki domains had become a contested and divided land (Dickason 1986:33; Murdoch 1865(l):352-54).

THE FOURTH ANGLO-WABANAKI WAR (1722-1727) After several years of relative quiet, English settlers and fishermen resumed their encroachments on Wabanaki domains. Unwilling to turn a blind eye to these inroads, but eager to avoid bloodshed, the Wabanaki Confederacy firsttrie d diplomacy. In 1721 Mi'kmaq and Maliseet ambas­ sadors traveled to the Maine coast where they joined hundreds of for a conference with English officials from Boston. Once again asserting aboriginal title, the Wabanaki presented the English with a for­ mal letter addressed to the Governor of Massachusetts: Thou seest from the peace treaty of which I am sending the copy that thou must live peacefully with me. Is it living peacefully with me to take my land away from me against my will? My land which I received from God alone, my land of which no king nor foreign power has been allowed, or is allowed to dispose against my will, which thou hast been doing none the less for several years, by establishing and fortifying thyself here against my wishes.... Consider, great captain that I have often told thee to withdraw from my land and that I am tell- 368 HARALD E.L. PRINS

ing thee so again for the last time. My land is not thine either by right or conquest, or by grant or by purchase, (in NYCD 9:904-05) Ignoring Wabanaki appeals and simply repeating earlier arguments, the English told the tribal delegates that the French had ceded all territo­ ries east of the Kennebec as far as the Gulf of St. Lawrence (excepting Cape Breton and Prince Edward Island). Unable to convince the English aggressors to back off, the Confederacy had no choice but to take up arms and defend their ancestral territories. Soon after this diplomatic setback, tribal messengers traveled between the major Abenaki villages on the Upper Saco, Androscoggin, Kennebec and Penobscot rivers, and special envoys journeyed to more distant confederacy villages among the Passa­ maquoddy, Maliseet and Mi'kmaq. Yet others went to inform the mission Abenakis at St. Francis and Becancour, as well as the French governor. When fighting erupted on the Maine coast in 1722, the news also alarmed more distant tribal nations, including the mission Iroquois at near Montreal, who also recognized the French governor as their "father". By way of Canada, the news even reached the Mohawk and Oneida in . By then, these Iroquois had already heard the same news from their English neighbors in Albany, who themselves stood in regular con­ tact with friends in Boston. To crush the Wabanaki or press them into permanent submission, Massachusetts governor recruited Indian warriors from the Cape Cod area. However, he was especially keen on getting Mohawks and contacted them by way of New York's governor. Invited to come to Boston, Mohawk ambassadors carefully evaluated the situation. Not will­ ing to commit their confederacy to this war, they diplomatically offered only a token of military support. Meanwhile, Wabanaki raiders inflicted serious damage on New England's eastern frontier communities, but suffered very heavy losses themselves. A stunning blow came in March 1723 when English troops launched a surprise attack against Panawamskek, burning the abandoned mission village at Indian Island to the ground. In August 1724, they also raided Norridgewock, destroying this Abenaki head vil­ lage on the Kennebec. The troops then returned to Boston where they claimed "bounty on 26 scalps - including those of the Jesuit priest, Sebas- tien Rasle, and 14 children" (in Prins & Bourque 1987:138). In the wake of such devastation, some factions within the Wabanaki Confederacy THE CROOKED PATH OF DUMMER'S TREATY 369 moved to end the war. In April, after a flurry of diplomatic action, even involving Iroquois ambassadors, Abenaki chieftains from the Kennebec and Penobscot traveled to Portsmouth, , where they "urged peace, provided the English would come into just methods with them...." (inBaxter 10:250-54; 23:168-86).

SAGOUARRAB'S PREDICAMENT In the summer of 1725 the English agreed to a cease-fire and made a peace proposal, inviting Wabanaki tribal leaders to meet with them on the Maine coast. Anxious to resolve the conflict, the sent their great orator Loron Sagouarrab and another tribal envoy to Boston where the governor of Massachusetts, Dummer, informed them via a local English interpreter of his conditions for peace: "Submission to His Maj­ esty & agree[ment] upon Articles of Pacification" (in Baxter 10:322). Not only did the Penobscots have to "acknowledge themselves subjects of the Crown of England," but Governor Dummer also insisted they would "be bound to make all the other Indians, even those domiciliated in Canada, parties to this peace" (in NYCD 9:955). After returning to Penobscot, where he reported on his diplomatic mission in Boston, Sagouarrab left for Canada. Accompanied by ten tribesmen, the Penobscot ambassador took several important wampum belts for their allies. Offering one of these peace belts to the French gov­ ernor in , he asked for his approval of the peace initiative. But the governor responded that "this war did not concern the French [and] that he was surprised at the proceedings of these at Panaomske [Penobscot], who, like the other Abenaquis, had promised not to listen to any proposal for peace, except in the Colony [of Canada] and in his presence" (in NYCD 9:955). The Penobscot delegation then traveled far up the St. Lawrence River and arrived in the Abenaki mission village of St. Francis for a great council fire. Sagouarrab himself later reported that there were not only Arresaguntacooks (St. Francis Abenaki), but also envoys from other allied villages, including "Ahwenoh, Pasanawack, Pamaniack, Norridge- wock & Wessungawock with several other small Villages: And not only those Tribes but the Eastern Tribes so far as Cape Sables [Nova Scotia] have join'd with us in this affair" (in Baxter 23:188). At this pan-tribal 370 HARALD E.L. PRINS

conference, Sagouarrab explained: "I have a full Relation of every Thing that pass'd between the Penobscot & [the Massachusetts] Govern­ ment from the first discourse We had in the Spring, And informed those Indians That [Governor Dummer] would give no Answer to the Penob­ scot Indians as to what they offered till he knew the mind of the other Tribes" (in Baxter 23:188). Returning to Penobscot, Sagouarrab relayed what had been accom­ plished. But what exactly had he achieved? We do not know for sure, because French and English records appear to contradict each other. According to the French governor, the Penobscot ambassador had offered wampum peace belts to the allied tribal nations "to induce them to accept those proposition" for peace with the English. However, he wrote, they had "refused the belts and said they wished to continue the war" (in NYCD 9:955). But an English transcript reports that Sagouarrab himself (supposedly) later told Governor Dummer that his journey to the great council firea t St. Francis had been successful: And all these Tribes have left it to us [Penobscots] to act for them in a Treaty of Peace, And they said We desire you as being next Neigh­ bours to the English would go on heartily & with good Courage in making Peace And what ever you shall conclude upon We will agree to, For there is Nothing impossible for God to perform, And we wish there may be a good Conclusion of the Matter to all Parties con­ cerned. .. & they sent their Belts to the Penobscot Tribe for a Confir­ mation of their Agreeing to what shall be Concluded, which Belts are lodged with our Chiefs which is equivalent to a Writing or Articles under their Hands, (in Baxter 23:188) Resuming his shuttle diplomacy to Boston in early November, Sag­ ouarrab informed the English on the progress. Three Wabanaki delegates accompanied him on this important diplomatic mission - Meganumba for the Mi'kmaq, Francois Xavier for the Maliseet, and Alexus representing the Abenaki of Kennebec. Using English interpreters (more or less) famil­ iar with the , Governor Dummer dictated once again his conditions for peace. The treaty awaiting Wabanaki signatures stated that the Indians "have concluded to make ... our submission unto his most Excellent Majesty George ... in as full and ample manner, as any of our predecessors have heretofore done." Furthermore, the document stated that the Penobscots would be held responsible for their allies "inhabiting within the French territories," obliging them to join the English forces "in THE CROOKED PATH OF DUMMER'S TREATY 371 reducing them to reason" in case of future hostilities (in Calloway 1991:111-14). Titled "The Submission and Agreement of the Delegates of the East- em Indians," this 1725 document (known as Dummer's Treaty) also addressed the crucial problem of landownership in the disputed territo­ ries, stipulating that "the English shall and may peaceably and quietly enter upon, improve and for ever enjoy all and singular their rights of land and former settlements ... and be in no ways molested, interrupted or dis­ turbed therein. Saving unto [the Wabanaki], and their natural descendants respectively, all their lands, liberties and properties not disposed of, pos­ sessed, or improved by any of the British subjects as aforesaid..." (in Baxter 23:195). This particular demand made the Wabanaki envoys wonder what the English meant by "former settlements." Precisely which lands were they talking about? Government officials produced several old records show­ ing large tracts that they claimed had been sold or given away by various Wabanaki individuals in the past (ibid.: 195, 198). They assured them that these "Indian deeds" were authentic, but the Wabanaki envoys were not convinced and suspected that these documents were forgeries (in NYCD 9:942). Reluctant to negotiate on the basis of such dubious evidence, they proposed: "We think it would be better to come wholly upon a new foot­ ing, for all those former treaties have been broke because they were not upon a good footing..." (in Baxter 23:197). Dismissing this option, the English noted that, notwithstanding those deeds, the Wabanaki "are not to be debarred [from those tracts], but shall have free liberty to hunt and fish [and fowl] any where but where the lands are [fenced in]" (in Baxter 23:199,202). After more than two weeks of diplomatic tangling, the four Wabanaki ambassadors agreed to a provisional treaty document and to try to get the document "solemnly ratifyed" by the entire Confederacy. Resolving to have a conference after spring planting, they returned home with a copy of Dummer's treaty proposal.

DUMMER'S TREATY: A DUBIOUS DEAL Back at Penobscot, Sagouarrab showed a copy of the document to Father Etienne Lauverjat, a Jesuit missionary who had long lived among the 372 HARALD E.L. PRINS

Wabanaki of Penobscot River. Well-educated, he "interpreted to the Indi­ ans the acts" of Dummer's treaty (in Baxter 23:210). Hearing the French­ man's translation, Sagouarrab became offended. Feeling misled by the English, he dictated a sharp response to the Massachusetts governor. Translated into English by the priest, who certified "that I have writt this Letter word for word as Sagouarrab has dictated himself," the Penob­ scot's letter charged: The disagreement I find between your writtings & what I spoke to you viva voce [in actual speech] stopps me & makes me suspend my nego- ciation till I have receiv'd your answer. I thought to have spoken justly and according to the interests of my nation, butt I have had the confu­ sion to see that my words have been taken in a quite contrary sense. (in Baxter 23:209) Sagouarrab was particularly embarrassed to discover that he had agreed to submit himself in the name of my nation to you & to King George your king [and] that I have acknowledged your king for my king & that I have own|d that my ancestors have acknowledged him for such & have declar'd themselves subjects to the Crown of England. Reminding Governor Dummer of what was actually said when they met in Boston, Sagouarrab noted in his letter (translated into English and writ­ ten by the Jesuit): As for what relates to your King, when you have ask'd me if I acknowledg'd him for king I answer'd yes butt att the same time have made you take notice that I did not understand to acknowledge him for my king butt only that I own'd that he was king in his kingdom as the king of France is king in his. (in Baxter 23: 208-209) Although it was obvious that the Wabanaki Confederacy had been misled (whether by intent or mistake), the Penobscots were in a terrible bind. With the English enemy nearby and in control over their seacoast, they could hardly afford to turn their backs on the powerful Massachu­ setts governor. Sticking to their scheduled rendezvous, the Penobscots went ahead and met with Dummer and his staff at Casco Bay. Conspicu­ ously absent, however, were their Abenaki allies from Norridgewock, St. Francis, and Becancour. Nonetheless, the Penobscot chiefs and leading men formally signed the controversial treaty. That same summer, a group of Mi'kmaq and Maliseet chiefs ratified the same document at Annapolis on the Nova Scotia coast. THE CROOKED PATH OF DUMMER'S TREATY 373 •

Still, serious concerns over the treaty lingered. In the early months of 1727, the Wabanaki Confederacy gathered again at a council fire to dis­ cuss "whether thier should be a treaty wth the English or not" (in Baxter 10:408). As before, they assembled at the Abenaki mission village of St. Francis () near Montreal. The French, along with several addi­ tional allied tribal nations, including Iroquois from French Catholic mis­ sion villages, also attended this important pan-tribal meeting (ibid.). Not long afterwards the Penobscot chiefs decided "to send Messangers to [Kennebec], St. Johns, [Nova Scotia], To Invite two of each Tribe to be at their Great Annual Meeting at Panobcut" (in Baxter 10:379-380; 385-387). By mid-June, Mi'kmaq delegates had informed their Maliseet neighbors on the St. John that they approved of Dummer's Treaty, and "the Canebacks & St. John Indians" now joined with the Penobscots in a General Council, discussing trade issues, boundaries with the English, "and Concerning the french & Indian Pirotrs [pirates] tht wear hanged Last fall [in Boston]..." (in Baxter 10:404). In July 1727, large tribal delegations representing the Abenaki vil­ lages of Norridgewock, Penobscot, Becancour and St. Francis canoed to Casco Bay on the Maine coast to meet with an English delegation headed by Governor Dummer. They had finally come to confirm the treaty already signed by their Penobscot brothers (NYCD 9:991). As speaker for the Wabanaki Confederacy, Sagouarrab addressed the large gathering with words that cast a dark shadow of doubt over the treaty they had come to ratify: I Panaouamskeyen [Penobscot], do inform ye - ye who are scattered all over the earth take notice - of what has passed between me and the English in negotiating the peace that I have just concluded with them. It is from the bottom of my heart that inform you; and as proff that I tell you nothing but the truth, I wish to speak to you in my own tongue. My reason for informing you, myself, is the diversity and con­ trariety of the interpretations I receive of the English writing in which the articles of peace are drawn up that we have just mutually agreed to. These writings appear to contain things that are not, so that the Englishmen himself disavows them in my presence, when he reads and interprets them to me himself. I begin then by informing you; and shall speak to you only of the principal and most important matter, (in Calloway 1991:115) After this powerful reminder of the treacherous waters of frontier diplomacy, Sagouarrab caused Governor Dummer to remember their ini­ tial peace negotiations two years before: 374 HARALD E.L. PRINS

We were two that went to Boston: I, Laurance [Loron] Sagourrab, and John Ehennekouit. On arriving there I did indeed salute him.... He began by asking me, what brought me hither? I did not give him for answer - I am come to ask your pardon; nor, I come to acknowledge you as my conqueror; nor, I come to make my submission to you; nor, I come to receive your commands.... Much less, I repeat, did I, become his subject, or give him my land, or acknowledge his King as my King. This I never did, and he never proposed it to me. I say, he never said to me - Give thyself and thy land to me, nor acknowledge my King for thy King, as thy ancestors formerly did. He again said to me - But do you not recognize the King of England as King over all his states? To which I answered - Yes, I recognize him King over all his lands; but I rejoined, do not hence infer that I acknowledge thy King as my King, and King of my lands. Here lies my distinction - my Indian distinction. God hath willed that I have no King, and that I be master of my lands in common. He again asked me - Do you not admit that I am at least master of the lands I have purchased? I answered him thereupon, that I admit nothing, and that I knew not what he had reference to. (ibid.: 116) Concluding his address, the great Sagouarrab warned: What I tell you now is the truth. If, then, any one should produce any writing that makes me speak otherwise, pay no attention to it, for I know not what I am made to say in another language, but I know well what I say in my own. And in testimony that I say things as they are, I have signed the present minute which I wish to be authentic and to remain for ever, (ibid.: 118) News that the treaty had been finally confirmed at Casco Bay spread quickly. Returning home, Wabanaki delegates told their own communi­ ties, while their missionaries informed French authorities in Quebec, Montreal, and Cape Breton (NYCD 9: 991). Soon, Wabanaki ambassa­ dors were on their way to formally present the news to more distant allies. In August 1727, a delegation of Wabanaki chiefs arrived in Albany in order to establish "Peace & Friendship" with New York's colonial gov­ ernment (Wraxall 1915 [1968:171]).

CONCLUSION

The Wabanaki Confederacy signed about a dozen treaties with New England's colonial governments. Many of these were negotiated on the coast of Maine. The Confederacy remained a force to reckon with until the end of the American Revolutionary War. From then on, politically eviscerated by an international boundary slicing through the ancestral homelands of the member tribes, it gradually waned in importance. THE CROOKED PATH OF DUMMER'S TREATY 375

Demoralized and weakened by pressures from superimposing non-aborig­ inal polities (in particular the State of Maine), the cross-border alliance finally collapsed about 1870. After more than a century of dormancy, the Wabanaki confederacy was resurrected in the 1970s (Walker 1998:110-39). That decade proved to be a turning point for the Wabanaki on both sides of the international boundary. To the surprise and dismay of U.S. and Canadian federal and other governmental agencies today, almost-forgotten Anglo-Wabanaki treaties have also reappeared. Subject to renewed scrutiny in recent court battles over aboriginal land claims, hunting and fishing rights, these con­ troversial documents continue to stir critically important debates. Responding to the Miawpukek Mi'kmaq attorney's question during the Newfoundland aboriginal rights trial noted in the introduction, this paper suggests there is ample reason to critically examine colonial treaty documents and pertinent minutes to determine their truthfulness. Do they accurately reflect what factually transpired? As the episode described in this paper demonstrates, we have ample reason to be suspicious of all-too- facile methodological assumptions. In addition to the major cultural and linguistic barriers dividing the Wabanaki leaders and English colonial authorities who originally negotiated these 18th-century treaties, it appears that none of the tribal leaders involved in these diplomatic encounters actually could read and interpret the relevant documents for themselves. Without being able to judge the accuracy of these English documents, they certainly could not fully appreciate the monumental sig­ nificance of treaties forced upon their peoples. Moreover, none of the rel­ evant historical records were actually penned or preserved by the respective aboriginal groups who have challenged and continue to contest their interpretation. Anglo-Wabanaki treaty negotiations were typically "strained by the structural and grammatical differences" between the respective languages (Ghere 1995:121). Moreover, as this paper tried to show, official commu­ nications "suffered the distortions of translations. Translators were usu­ ally French missionaries or English and French militia officers who added their own interpretations, prejudices, and biases to the documents" (ibid.). Sometimes, colonial authorities intentionally twisted the facts recorded in these texts. As one English witness openly admitted in 1717: "I have been present when an article of Peace has run in one sense in the English [Ian- 376 HARALD E.L. PRINS guage] and quite contrarie in the Indian by the Governor's express order and this has brought unnumbered mischiefs upon them" (Bannister, in Kenneth M. Morrison 1984:170-171). When negotiating Dummer's Treaty about 275 years ago, Penobscot orator Sagouarrab insisted that the Wabanaki rejected becoming subjects of any foreign Crown and refused to give up their tribal lands. Their long struggle to reclaim or hold on to a fragment of their ancestral domains and aboriginal rights continues to this day and is now primarily waged in the courts. In their quest for justice, they depend on scholars to interpret the historical record judiciously and, if possible, accurately reconstruct the deeply troubled and troubling past of Indian-White encounters. Because these political records may (be designed to) trap the un­ wary, it behooves us to monitor such hotly contested records for possible misrepresentations due to cultural biases and inadvertent or deliberate mistranslations. While the treaty documents may accurately reflect what the colonial authorities wished the historical record to show, no such trust can be placed in these writings actually reflecting the Wabanaki perspec­ tive. In short, scholars testifying as expert witnesses in aboriginal rights cases are well advised to be highly circumspect about these one-sided documents as truthful records of tortuously complex cross-cultural encounters.

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