Études canadiennes / Canadian Studies Revue interdisciplinaire des études canadiennes en France

75 | 2013 Canada and the Commonwealth Le Canada et le Commonwealth

Electronic version URL: http://journals.openedition.org/eccs/257 DOI: 10.4000/eccs.257 ISSN: 2429-4667

Publisher Association française des études canadiennes (AFEC)

Printed version Date of publication: 1 December 2013 ISSN: 0153-1700

Electronic reference Études canadiennes / Canadian Studies, 75 | 2013, « Canada and the Commonwealth » [Online], Online since 02 April 2015, connection on 05 October 2020. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/eccs/257 ; DOI : https://doi.org/10.4000/eccs.257

This text was automatically generated on 5 October 2020.

AFEC 1

Ce volume n° 75 inaugure un nouveau cycle pour la revue, celui des thématiques qui remplacent les numéros dits « Varia ». Il nous a semblé pertinent d’ouvrir la revue à un éditeur invité qui propose, à travers un appel à contributions de réunir des chercheurs autour d’une thématique pertinente dans le domaine des études canadiennes. Françoise Le Jeune, directrice de la revue, et Laurence Cros, éditrice invitée, ont initié et testé ce premier numéro thématique en proposant à des chercheurs de réfléchir à la question du Canada et du Commonwealth. Il s’agissait d’analyser la contribution politique du Canada à cet organisme né de l’Empire, dans une perspective longue voire historique, ou encore de reconsidérer la place de cette association internationale dans la politique étrangère canadienne.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Avant-propos Françoise Le Jeune

Articles

Introduction « Canada and the Commonwealth » Laurence Cros

Mobilizing Imperial Sentiment: Identities, Institutions, and Information in British Canada’s Road to War, 1937-1940 Tyler Turek

“First Unto God and then to the Queen”: Frederick Ney’s Empire/Commonwealth Youth Movement from the Inter-war Period to the 1960s Christina Wu

Réformateur ou conservateur ? Le Canada et le Commonwealth pendant la crise rhodésienne (1963-1973) Virginie Roiron

Chrétien and the Commonwealth: Successes and Failures in Canada’s Role as a Middle Power Glen M.E. Duerr

Enhancing Trade Relations between Commonwealth Members: the Case of Canadian and Indian bilateral trade Claire Heuillard

From Ottawa to Colombo: On Canada’s International Role at the hour of Eastphalia Chaminda K. Weerawardhana

Varia

Louise Arbour : carrière et image(s) d’une juriste canadienne à l’international Morgane Le Houssel

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Avant-propos

Françoise Le Jeune

1 Ce volume n° 75 inaugure un nouveau cycle pour la revue, celui des thématiques qui remplacent les numéros dits « Varia ». Il nous a semblé pertinent d’ouvrir la revue à un éditeur invité qui propose, à travers un appel à contributions de réunir des chercheurs autour d’une thématique pertinente dans le domaine des études canadiennes. Laurence CROS et moi-même avons initié et testé ce premier numéro thématique en proposant à des chercheurs de réfléchir à la question du Canada et du Commonwealth. Il s’agissait d’analyser la contribution politique du Canada à cet organisme né de l’Empire, dans une perspective longue voire historique, ou encore de reconsidérer la place de cette association internationale dans la politique étrangère canadienne.

2 Ce volume témoigne donc d’une recherche de grande qualité portée par de jeunes chercheurs européens et canadiens qui démontrent ici la pertinence de notre questionnement initial. Les articles retenus apportent un éclairage historique et géopolitique sur le rôle du Canada au sein du Commonwealth durant la période dite de la décolonisation, ainsi que sur la politique internationale du Canada au XXIème siècle, en analysant l’influence des diplomates et premiers ministres canadiens au sein de cette instance à divers moments de son histoire récente (au moment de l’indépendance de l’Inde, de l’entrée du Ghana, de la crise rhodésienne, des tensions politiques et des violences au Sri Lanka, Rwanda et au Zimbabwe…). Deux articles apportent également une analyse économique en s’interrogeant sur le poids du Commonwealth et de ses réseaux inter-pays dans l’économie canadienne.

3 Si le numéro thématique remplace le volume de « Varia », nous maintenons néanmoins cette rubrique dans chaque numéro pour nous permettre de valoriser un ou deux articles de recherche de qualité qui nous sont soumis pour évaluation. Dans ce numéro, la rubrique « Varia » présente un article de Morgane LE HOUSSEL, récipiendaire du prix de l’AFEC 2012 pour son mémoire de Master obtenu à l’université de Rennes II, sous la direction de Marc BERGÈRE.

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Articles

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Introduction « Canada and the Commonwealth »

Laurence Cros

1 Ce volume est le résultat d’un pari, celui de s’intéresser à la recherche récente sur la relation entre le Canada et le Commonwealth. Le pari était risqué car si historiquement le Commonwealth a été l’un des piliers de la politique étrangère du Canada, aujourd’hui on peut avoir l’impression, en consultant tant les thèmes mis en avant par le Ministère des Affaires étrangères, que la littérature sur les relations internationales, que le Commonwealth n’est plus guère au centre des préoccupations canadiennes. En ce début d’année 2014, un coup d’œil rapide sur le site du Ministère des Affaires étrangères, Commerce et Développement Canada révèle que deux aires géographiques sont mises en avant : les Amériques et l’Arctique. Ces deux aires réapparaissent dans les priorités politiques également puisqu’il s’agit d’une part de « Renforcer les relations entre le Canada et les États-Unis et d’élargir l’engagement du Canada dans l’hémisphère » et d’autre part de « Mettre en œuvre la politique étrangère du Canada pour l’Arctique afin d’y exercer sa souveraineté (…) ». L’Asie apparaît essentiellement dans sa dimension économique car le site indique qu’il s’agit d’« Accroître la présence économique et politique du Canada en Asie ».

2 Dans l’ordre des ministres liés aux priorités stratégiques de ce ministère, on trouve mentionné sur le site : un ministre dont la mission est consacrée à l’Arctique (l’honorable Leona Aglukkaq, ministre de l’Environnement, ministre de l’Agence canadienne de développement économique du Nord et ministre du Conseil de l’Arctique) et le nom d’un second ministre qui se consacre à la francophonie (l’honorable Christian Paradis, ministre du Développement international et ministre de la Francophonie). Le Commonwealth n’apparaît finalement qu’en 4e place par ordre alphabétique dans la liste des vingt organisations internationales dont le Canada est membre. Si on se livrait à l’exercice un peu futile et anachronique d’imaginer la page web du Département des affaires extérieures du Canada dans les années 1950, on peut penser que le Commonwealth aurait occupé une place autrement centrale. Mais le monde change et les priorités de politique étrangère avec lui, ce que nous démontre les chercheurs dans ce numéro.

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3 Si on passe rapidement en revue les tables des matières des grandes revues canadiennes de politique étrangère comme International Journal et Études Internationales, on ne trouve aucun numéro spécial sur le Commonwealth, ni même aucun article isolé sur ce thème depuis ces 10 dernières années. De même, The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History ne propose que rarement des articles sur le Canada et le Commonwealth.

4 Le résultat de l’appel à articles sur la relation entre le Canada et le Commonwealth a néanmoins montré que ce thème est toujours important pour les chercheurs. Sur les six articles retenus pour ce volume, une majorité d’entre eux porte sur la période contemporaine, montrant que le Commonwealth reste, dans les années 1990 et 2000, un partenaire important du Canada.

5 Ainsi Claire HEUILLARD s’intéresse à l’état du commerce bilatéral entre le Canada et l’Inde tirant un maigre bilan d’une relation pourtant historique entre les deux ex-Dominions au sein du Commonwealth. Glen DUERR revient sur la période Chrétien en examinant avec un léger recul historique, les engagements humanitaires pris par le Premier Ministre au sein du Commonwealth, ainsi que les échecs de sa politique lorsque la mobilisation démocratique au sein de cet organisme ne s’était pas faite. Chaminda WEERAWARDHANA part, quant à lui, de l’exemple du dernier sommet du Commonwealth au Sri Lanka pour réfléchir au rôle du Canada dans le nouveau système international « estphalien », après être revenu sur la place du Commonwealth dans les relations internationales du Canada depuis la création de cette association. Virginie ROIRON s’interroge de façon très pertinente sur la place du Canada au sein du « Nouveau » Commonwealth lors de la crise rhodésienne (1963-1973), un épisode rarement étudié dans le petit nombre d’articles publiés sur le sujet.

6 Deux contributions portent sur une période plus ancienne, sur l’avènement du Commonwealth, sur cette période de transition parfois vécue difficilement par certains Canadiens nostalgiques de l’empire. Ainsi l’article de Tyler TUREK revient sur la mobilisation du sentiment impérial de 1937 à 1940 à travers trois associations impérialistes, l’Imperial Order of the Daughters of the Empire (IODE), le Canadian Legion of the British Empire Service League, ainsi que le Canadian Institute of International Affairs (CIIA). De même, Christina WU se penche sur le mouvement de jeunesse « Empire Youth Movement » de 1937 aux années 1960 qui cherchait à préserver au sein du Commonwealth, un mouvement coopératif qui rappelait à la jeunesse canadienne, ainsi qu’aux jeunes issus des pays du Commonwealth, les vertus de l’empire.

7 Les articles historiques confirment la place importante du Commonwealth dans la politique étrangère du Canada juste avant la deuxième guerre mondiale et dans la période qui a suivi. Comme le montrent Tyler TUREK et Christina WU, la centralité du Commonwealth découle avant tout du lien sentimental qui unit le Canada à cette entité impériale en cours de transformation. L’article de Virginie ROIRON montre comment la politique étrangère canadienne a développé une politique de « moyenne puissance » dans le nouveau périmètre et les nouvelles alliances du Commonwealth des Nations, prenant parfois la tête des anciennes colonies vis à vis de la Grande-Bretagne, suivant une tradition déjà bien établie depuis l’après première guerre mondiale.

8 En effet depuis les années 1920 et 1930, William Lyon Mackenzie King avait donné l’impulsion d’un mouvement revendicatif au sein des Dominions britanniques, pour accéder à davantage d’autonomie dans leur politique étrangère, afin d’échapper au

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contrôle impérial que Londres souhaitait continuer à exercer. Ayant ainsi contribué à l’émergence du Commonwealth britannique dès 1926, les gouvernements de Mackenzie King puis de Louis Saint Laurent et de Lester Pearson ont ensuite joué un rôle crucial dans le compromis qui avait permis de faire rentrer l’Inde et le Pakistan dans le Commonwealth en 1949. Enfin John Diefenbaker, Lester Pearson puis Pierre Trudeau, dans les années 1950 à 1970, ont également largement contribué aux débats et aux résolutions autour de la crise rhodésienne ou de boycott contre l’Afrique du sud de l’apartheid, des décisions qui ont symboliquement confirmé la nouvelle nature multiraciale du Commonwealth des Nations dans les années 1980.

9 Il est important de se rappeler le rôle central et historique que le Canada a toujours tenu au sein du Commonwealth pour mieux tirer le bilan de la manière dont le pays considère cet organisme aujourd’hui et pour constater globalement un certain désintérêt pour cette instance depuis les années 1980.

10 Les articles portant sur la période récente de l’histoire du Canada confirment en effet la moindre importance du Commonwealth dans la politique étrangère du pays aujourd’hui. Ainsi l’article de Glen DUERR indique que dans les années 1990, le Canada de Jean Chrétien a toujours une implication importante dans le Commonwealth, mais l’auteur montre dès l’introduction, qu’il n’est plus central comme c’était le cas sous Pearson ou Trudeau. Par le passé, le Canada « a eu un impact sur le monde en utilisant le Commonwealth » et a joué un rôle important pour assurer la stabilité de la transformation de l’Empire en Commonwealth ; néanmoins, à mesure que le rôle global du Canada a crû, son implication dans le Commonwealth a diminué, au point qu’aujourd’hui l’un des atouts principaux du Commonwealth pour le Canada, n’est plus celui de lobby humanitaire ou politique des décennies précédentes, mais l’occasion de fréquenter de nombreux leaders mondiaux dans un cadre restreint et familial au moment des Congrés, ce qui permet ensuite au Canada d’avoir une efficacité plus grande dans les principaux forums internationaux. L’auteur conclut qu’au final, Chrétien n’a pas utilisé le potentiel du Commonwealth pour lutter contre les guerres civiles au Rwanda et au Sri Lanka, ni contre l’incurie au Zimbabwe. Il montre que, par contre, Chrétien a utilisé les liens tissés au sein du Commonwealth pour avancer le traité bannissant l’usage des mines anti-personnel. On voit donc ici les prémisses d’une nouvelle tendance canadienne à utiliser la connexion avec le Commonwealth de façon parcellaire, pour favoriser certaines de ses priorités de politique étrangère. Cela apparait également dans l’article de Claire HEUILLARD sur le commerce avec l’Inde et dans celui de Chaminda WEERAWARDHANA sur le rôle du Canada dans le nouveau système international du début du XXIe siècle. Si dans les années 1940, le Canada s’est impliqué pour que le Commonwealth accueille l’Inde, aujourd’hui, il semble que l’atout essentiel du Commonwealth est d’offrir un terrain commun entre les deux pays, servant ainsi de tremplin pour développer la relation commerciale avec l’un des géants asiatiques. Ce n’est plus le Commonwealth en lui-même qui intéresse le Canada mais c’est plutôt la façon dont il peut aider à développer une relation bilatérale avec l’un de ses membres, ciblé pour son intérêt particulier, et le plus souvent commercial. On retrouve cette même idée dans l’article de Chaminda WEERAWARDHANA qui mentionne que le Canada s’appuie sur le lien tissé au sein du Commonwealth ou de la Francophonie pour renforcer la relation avec certains pays africains prometteurs, en particulier dans le secteur minier.

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11 Tous ces articles confirment donc que l’implication du Canada dans le Commonwealth en tant qu’institution est surtout un héritage historique. Aujourd’hui, la priorité est donnée à la coopération bilatérale avec certains membres du Commonwealth qui intéressent le Canada pour d’autres raisons que leur appartenance à l’institution. Le Commonwealth semble donc avant tout représenté pour le Canada, un tremplin pour développer des relations bilatérales fortes, essentiellement commerciales, avec certains de ses membres. Ce n’est donc pas l’institution elle-même, ou la contribution à son développement ou sa gouvernance, qui intéresse le Canada, mais la façon dont elle peut aider à mener à bien les priorités canadiennes en matière de politique étrangère et surtout commerciale. Cette évolution du Canada dans sa relation avec le Commonwealth reflète une tendance plus générale, annoncée dès les années 1990 mais réalisée surtout depuis l’arrivée au pouvoir des conservateurs qui semblent laisser de côté le rôle traditionnel du Canada comme « honnête médiateur » dans les relations internationales, pour mener une politique étrangère centrée sur les intérêts du Canada. Le boycott du Canada vis à vis du dernier sommet du Commonwealth au Sri Lanka en novembre 2013 bien que justifié par des raisons de défense des droits de l’homme par le gouvernement d’Harper, marque sans doute un nouveau tournant dans les rapports entre le Canada et le Commonwealth.

AUTEUR

LAURENCE CROS Université Paris Diderot

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Mobilizing Imperial Sentiment: Identities, Institutions, and Information in British Canada’s Road to War, 1937-1940

Tyler Turek

1 The narrative of Canada’s entry into the Second World War is simple yet compelling. According to one school of thought, Canadian public opinion was guided by pro-British sentiments to side with Great Britain in war against Germany. In the words of two influential scholars, “old loyalties” and “[t]ies of blood, culture, and sentiment” among Anglophone Canadians were decisive in bringing the nation into war (GRANATSTEIN AND MORTON 2003: 177). By emphasizing parliamentary control in foreign affairs, Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King balanced conflicting linguistic, ethnic, regional, and ideological loyalties to preserve “national unity” (METCALFE 2011: 51-68; GRANATSTEIN 1975: 19). Some historians suggest that pro-imperial opinions trumped French Canadians, pacifist, isolationist, and other resistance to participation in a European conflict (HILLMER AND GRANATSTEIN 1994: 143-151; STACEY 1981: 264-269). Yet this thesis focuses primarily on Mackenzie King’s government and domestic issues with minimal reference to non-government actors. It also characterizes legitimate support for British diplomacy or political values as reactionary and driven by irrational impulses. What, if anything, do imperial sentiments resemble up close?

2 To better interpret imperial sentiment as a form of political culture scholars must examine not only multiple discourses, but also the media through which ideas were communicated and to whom they were directed. This requires looking beyond the traditional national frameworks. The “British World” approach developed by Philip Buckner, Chris Champion, and others over the last two decades highlights the international and transnational dynamics of imperial sentiment in Canada and elsewhere (BUCKNER AND FRANCIS 2006; CHAMPION 2010). These scholars take seriously the cultural, intellectual and social constructions of Britishness, which have impacted Canadian views on international relations. But none has yet reviewed Canada’s entry

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into the Second World War, a pivotal moment in the “colony to nation” narrative. This study adopts a British World approach to complement the foreign policy studies of J.L. Granatstein, Norman Hillmer and others. As such, it suggests that the British Commonwealth’s emotional appeal is found outside official circles. Well-organized print media networks and active executive bodies allowed civic organizations such as the Imperial Order of the Daughters of the Empire (IODE), the Canadian Legion of the British Empire Service League, and the Canadian Institute of International Affairs (CIIA) to communicate political values to wide audiences. These three organizations, whose combined memberships numbered over 200,000 persons in 1938, demonstrate how imperial sentiments defined yet transcended Canada’s national borders within the dynamic British Commonwealth.

3 Civic institutions representing particular interests and demographics worked throughout the 1930s to shape specific policy decisions as well as broader cultural meanings of nation and empire. Seizing the opportunity to prepare public opinion toward Canada’s participation in a European conflict, each mobilized local grassroots networks and used “press, pulpit and radio” (Herbert to Tarr, 12 July 1938, CIIA) to achieve specific goals. The IODE embraced civic education, international peace movements, and practical information through empire study groups. Meanwhile veteran leaders at the Legion’s executive championed more traditional values – a strong nation within a strong empire – alongside civic defense strategies. The CIIA’s elite leadership promoted “North American” worldviews, criticized British “colonial” attitudes, and advocated Canada’s right to neutrality to international audiences. While it claimed to represent a nationalist alternative to explicitly “imperialist” groups, it never sought to sever Canada’s British connection. Rather the CIIA’s leaders sought to maximize Ottawa’s diplomatic authority within a multilateral Commonwealth, which they distinguished from the colonial empire. Through institutions and print media, these case studies integrated their nation into empire-wide diplomatic debates. Only they varied on the degree and responsibilities of such limited independence. As noted by the IODE and CIIA, a rising public demand for news and information stimulated new literatures, contacts, and publicity campaigns with international reach. In their efforts to inform opinions and affect policies, each national executive mobilized certain segments of the population – middle-class women, veterans, and urban professionals, respectively – toward competing conceptions of Canada’s role in the British Commonwealth. In the end their diverse imperial sentiments helped reconcile Canadian public opinion to support Ottawa’s autonomous declaration of war in September 1939.

4 Their conflicting sentiments are understandable. Since the First World War Britain’s relationship with the settler societies – Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa – had evolved considerably but remained ill-defined. The Commonwealth, like each case study, was an amorphous institution whose purpose adapted to changing international circumstances. The 1926 Balfour Declaration gave these “Dominions” considerable liberty to craft their own foreign policies, while the Statute of Westminster offered them legislative independence five years later. Yet few observers knew how theoretical sovereignty affected practical issues of war and peace. Autonomous within the empire but not wholly independent, Canada’s wartime obligations remained open to interpretation. Some emphasized Canada’s diplomatic and constitutional independence. Others dwelled on the cultural, economic, social and ideological interdependence of the English-speaking peoples, which reinforced

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common and conflicting identities. Many successfully reconciled imperial and national worldviews while others, such as the CIIA, considered them incompatible. Widespread debates about Canada’s Commonwealth role thus offer insight not only into how international affairs were discussed in unofficial circles but also how competing ideas of British imperialism reflected collective identities and emotions.

5 Unlike elected officials bound by partisan or bureaucratic limits, these groups had considerable freedom to say and do as they pleased. Each group had unique local, national, and international ties which shaped meanings of Britishness, and consequently reacted differently to diplomatic crises such as the September 1938 Munich Agreement. In contrast to groups such as the League of Nations Society, whose membership declined during this period, these cases studies experienced institutional growth in the three years preceding war. Memberships and subscriptions grew as middle-class Canadians became increasingly interested in world affairs.

6 Overall these case studies were selected based on three criteria. Firstly, each has survived into the twenty-first century in some form. Even if mandates and identities have evolved with time, the IODE, the Royal Canadian Legion, and Canadian International Council remain important cornerstones of national civic life. Moreover, emphasis was on organizations linked to like-minded groups outside Canada. Therefore French-Canadian and other regional institutions lacking affiliated bodies in other Commonwealth countries are not discussed here. Lastly, religious or professional groups were excluded in favour of secular public institutions.

New Perspectives on Imperial Sentiment: Three Case Studies in Britishness

7 Using print media, meeting minutes, circulars and correspondence, this essay examines how civic groups defined imperial sentiments through identities, institutions, and information. Between the world wars, the IODE, Legion and CIIA defined Canada’s British connection in at least three ways. First, each organization complicates scholarly attempts to isolate “blood, culture, and sentiment” from other influences. Their strategic efforts to affect Canada’s international status, apt use of contemporary media, and broad institutional mandates all blurred material and moral influences. For many individuals in the late 1930s the British Empire elicited some emotional or psychological appeal. For others, such as the CIIA’s leaders, “imperialism” and “colonialism” were cultural forces to be rallied against. As the Australian delegate to the 1938 British Commonwealth Relations Conference wrote about his nation’s outlook, “[i]n the world as it is, sentiment, tradition and rationalization are as much to be taken into account as the hope of material gain, ‘obvious’ interests, and cold calculation” (HARRIS 1938: 120). A history of imperial sentiment offers new insight into how emotions and interests collided to shape international relations thinking within Canada and the Commonwealth.

8 Second, while British-inspired ideas of peace, order and Anglo-Saxon culture served as guiding principles in foreign affairs discussions, the IODE and Legion believed imperial sentiment enabled Dominion autonomy within the British World. The British Empire and Commonwealth – terms used often interchangeably – offered a reliable form of economic stability, military security, and moral leadership. The CIIA rejected this

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worldview. Although they differed in their internationalism, the IODE and Legion sought to “modernize” British imperialism to meet ideological threats. By contrast, the CIIA hoped to bring public opinion against an automatic alliance with Britain. All three sought to make the British Commonwealth relevant to Canadian audiences through various avenues of imperial sentiment: empire study groups, commemoration, voluntary defense schemes, academic conferences and public debate. In some form each institution embraced explicit internationalist, imperial, and nationalist ideas.

9 Third, imperial identities were influenced by global contacts and local dynamics. Internationalist themes of diplomatic cooperation, disarmament, civic engagement, and liberal democratic values, and transnational forces such as identities and print media, form core themes of this essay. Cultural and diplomatic interests linked international peace movements, First World War leaders, and intellectuals from around the British Empire. The CIIA, an elite organization with government connections, did not speak for all Canadians, but it had a marked influence on Canadian foreign policy decision-making and historiography (SOWARD 1977-78). The IODE and Legion had complex local and regional organizational structures and diverse social agendas, yet their national executives urged important groups to support British Commonwealth’s nascent alliance. Even in 1940, imperial sentiments, however defined, helped Canadians make sense of international relations and collective identities in novel ways.

10 This essay considers each case study individually in the chronological order in which they were founded. It begins with a brief overview of its mandate and institutional interests before discussing cultural values and interpretations of Britishness. Lastly each section lays out the various media and publicity strategies employed by the case study in its attempts to simultaneously affect policy and political values.

Learned Imperialists: the IODE, World Peace, and Empire Study Groups

11 Formed in Montreal in 1900, the Imperial Order of the Daughters of the Empire was a response to the Empire’s conflict in South Africa. Its primary objective, expressed through patriotic and philanthropic initiatives, was to “stimulate, and give expression to the sentiment of patriotism which binds the women and children of the Empire around the Throne” (“Constitution and Statutes of the IODE”). To this end it funded schools, libraries, and scholarships for study in England. Additionally its membership of about 25,000 middle-class women administered Imperial War Graves sites in South Africa and helped assimilate new immigrants to Canada (COOPS 2005: 252; PICKLES 2002). It was organized into six hundred local chapters (Minutes of the 37th Annual Meeting: 12), most represented by a provincial executive, and junior branches for girls. Following broader patterns of British migration, chapters in the U.S., the Caribbean, and India were also established. By 1937 the national executive was focused on international peace and Canadian immigration concerns, particularly Jewish and Central European refugee issues. It cultivated ties to the global peace movement through the League of Nations Society, the Red Cross, and the YMCA. In addition to fostering imperial sentiment, it petitioned Ottawa to appoint a woman to represent Canada at the League of Nations (Minutes of the 38th Annual Meeting: 21). National President W.G. Lumbers remarked in May 1937 that that “the efforts of British statesmen (…) have been the foundations upon which the Nations inspired hopes for

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the peace of the world” (Minutes of the 37th Annual Meeting: 10). While it remained faithful to British symbols and values, it embraced contemporary international discourses and objectives.

12 Indeed, as its meetings throughout the 1930s attest, the IODE’s identity reflected its own brand of imperial internationalism. Whereas the Canadian Legion pushed for rearmament and an empire-wide alliance and the CIIA desired a firm declaration of neutrality, as will be noted, the IODE tied Britishness and peaceful cooperation through its local chapters, Canada’s League of Nations Society and international allies. In 1937 the executive vowed to contribute “in every way possible” to a nation-wide peace campaign, although no such campaign yet existed. Instead authorities encouraged members to counter intolerance in their own neighbourhoods by improving housing conditions, aiding the poor, and promoting public education (Minutes of the 37th Annual Meeting: 12)1. Fearing the impact of foreign-language publications on immigrant communities, IODE members also cooperated with police to remove “undesirable” German propaganda in Western Canada (Minutes of the 39th Annual Meeting: 26). Meanwhile its own print publication, Echoes, which emphasized pro- British themes, grew in the late 1930s with circulation and subscriptions increasing by over 40 per cent in one year in New Brunswick, Alberta, and Quebec. By 1938 the quarterly magazine had a circulation of over 13,000 per issue (Minutes of the 37th Annual Meeting: 37; Minutes of the 38th Annual Meeting: 39).

13 The IODE’s identity was exhibited through community education and other youth- focused activities that served to promote complementary goals of peace and patriotism. Whether for new immigrants or school children, education meant encouraging Britons and non-Britons alike to become more familiar with their Anglo-Saxon heritage and democratic political system (PICKLES 2002: 5). This took on increasing significance as international tensions rose. According to the organization’s education committee, “[c]hanging times demand constant study in order to keep abreast of modern progress” (Minutes from the National Executive Committee, 1 February 1939)2. Often this philosophy materialized in colourful booklets. In early 1939, the national education committee printed a pamphlet for children titled “Canada within the Empire”, whose primary goal was to teach the privileges and responsibilities of “British democracy” (Canada within the Empire). The text explained civil liberties and the “supremacy of law” in the moderate ideological tone characteristic of the period’s literature. The Union Jack and the monarchy, it argued, symbolized liberal and democratic values in an uncertain age. Canada’s autonomy represented the success of colonial self-government: “[t]he emergence of the Dominions from colonies into six self-governing national groups is especially significant in a world where a number of nations are asserting that democracy is out of date”. By July, over 15,000 booklets had been distributed, mostly to schools but also to department stores (Minutes from the National Executive Committee, 5 July 1939). In this respect they helped stimulate imperial sentiments among youths, educators, and perhaps new immigrants. To what extent is difficult to determine, but they nonetheless set traditional ideas of political authority in contemporary context.

14 Patriotic pamphlets and other efforts helped instil in youth, genuine emotional attachments to imperialism and peaceful cooperation. Calendars, flags, pins, photos and other ephemera were distributed en masse to stimulate patriotic values (Minutes of 39th Annual Meeting: 86-87). In the 1930s, the IODE, in association with the Victoria League, revived the school correspondence program it had ended in 1914. By 1938, at

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least 2,150 students from five provinces, including Quebec, were engaged in the organization’s pen pal program, which facilitated the flow of culture and information between Canada and Edinburgh, Capetown, India, Tasmania, Jamaica and other locales (ibid; Bulletin, May 1938: 11). It was in these informal exchanges that many “British” children of the interwar period had their first personal encounter with an otherwise abstract Empire. Sometimes the students agreed to visit one another, or sent printed materials to communities thousands of miles away. More than the other case studies, they IODE was conscious of the need to cultivate future generations of imperial leaders. As the program’s convener observed, they were “[j]ust small things, these letters with enclosures, but they are links, close-binding our Youth of to-day who will be our Empire citizens of the morrow” (Minutes of the 40th Annual Meeting: 112-113).

15 Self-directed education was also encouraged for similar reasons. Formed in 1931, the IODE’s Empire Study Committee was a well-organised intellectual network whose primary goal was the “spreading knowledge about one part of the Commonwealth in another” (Echoes, March 1938: 1). Its organizer, Edith Henderson, asserted on several occasions that the IODE had global concerns. “How many of you realize that our Order was founded not as just another group of sewing circles but as a patriotic society and with great stress laid on the importance of becoming familiar with subjects vital to the Empire?” To Henderson, the message was simple: “We can have no influence in our country if we are ignorant of what is going on in the Empire either at home or abroad” (Minutes of the 37th Annual Meeting: 75; Minutes of 38th Annual Meeting: 79). Research topics varied across time and space, but the Empire Study Committee was mostly concerned with contextualizing the present world crisis. “If one looks over the list of subjects for study”, Edith Henderson rightly observed in June 1939, “one cannot help being impressed with their intimate connection with stirring world events of today. Gibraltar, Palestine, Hong-Kong...[and] each one of them is included in the Empire Study pamphlet” (Minutes of 39th Annual Meeting: 80). The Commonwealth was the basis of study, but topics included Africa, China, and the Mediterranean. In 1938, the Study Committee began shipping its literature to other “British” communities, including India, where branches already existed, and Argentina, where some members hoped a branch would soon be formed. Through such initiatives, hundreds of Canadian women connected with friends and neighbours through lessons in international relations and imperial history.

16 In 1935 fifty-four Canadian branches hosted Empire Study Groups. Within two years, 246 new groups were established across the country. By 1940, that number had reached 384, made possible by over 3,000 new members that year (Minutes of the 37th Annual Meeting: 82; Minutes of 38th Annual Meeting: 72; Minutes of the 40th Annual Meeting: 33, 39). As membership developed, so did the organization’s professionalism. Local and provincial associations were cooperating with one another through new intellectual channels. Some women presented their own research at the study groups while other chapters preached patriotism to students and organized essay competitions on world peace (Minutes of the 37th Annual Meeting: 75). The study groups were pragmatic and varied, driven by genuine interest as well as emotion. By spring 1940, the committee had turned its attention to providing “authentic information in condensed and readable form” (Minutes of the 40th Annual Meeting: 142). Maps were popular commodities within study groups and in Echoes, giving readers visual perspectives of the British Commonwealth’s regional problems.

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17 Thanks to its active membership and flexible organizational structure, the IODE promoted imperial internationalism among a wide network of middle-class women, children and recent immigrants. While the CIIA has often been credited for bringing internationalism to Canadian audiences, the role of imperial women cannot be discounted. Education and personal contacts were integral to their views of Britishness and peace. The classroom and the community centers became sites of diplomatic colonization whereby “British” ideas of international relations were transmitted through informal social channels. The thousands involved in international peace initiatives and Empire Study Groups show the IODE as a source of, and conduit for, imperial sentiment.

Nation and Empire United: The Canadian Legion, British traditions, and civic defense

18 The Canadian Legion of the British Empire Service League was formed by thirteen veterans’ groups in 1925 under the Earl Haig’s stewardship (Royal Canadian Legion Branch Leadership Manual 1997), and its identity was rooted in war, economic depression, collective memory, and social tensions. Officially it represented servicemen’s social and economic interests, but it also expressed imperial sentiments at ceremonial events, through civic defense, and in print media. With over 178,000 members in 1,512 branches across North America, it was one of Canada’s largest civic organizations (Legionary, Sept 1938: 1).

19 Like its Australian and New Zealand counterparts, the Legion supported a united Dominion within an equally united Empire. Whereas the IODE stressed international cooperation through the League of Nations, the Legion championed diplomacy through “the British family of nations” (Legionary, Sept 1938: 9). Shared historical myths about British democracy, liberty, and rule of law were central to the Legion’s imperialism. According to John Bowler, the Legion’s National Secretary, the “sole purpose” of symbolic events such as Magna Carta week was “to clear the public mind and restore their proper perspective those fundamental rights and principles, including the principle of democratic government, which go to make up our British heritage” (Legion circular 39/4/6, 23 March 1939)3. Magna Carta Week was overshadowed in 1939 by the royal visit to North America. The British Crown’s continental tour offered the Legion an excellent opportunity to bolster North American support for Britain’s rearmament policy and deepen Canadians’ emotional attachment to the empire. Individual branches throughout Canada and the U.S. organized honour guards and security, while the national executive assembled ten thousands veterans in Ottawa for the unveiling of the National War memorial in May 1939. The Legionary, the organization’s monthly periodical, declared that the King’s unveiling of the war memorial “symbolized the fusion of a people in a nation and a nation in an empire” (Legionary, June 1939: 2). Not by accident, the Legion paraded its loyalty to King and Country precisely when influential segments of Canada’s population, notably the CIIA, favoured neutrality in the event of war with Nazi Germany.

20 Veterans’ groups often fostered a broad sense of Britannic citizenship rooted in traditional values but articulated in modern ideological terms. In a phrase that could have been printed in Melbourne or Auckland, The Legionary proclaimed that, “despite the burblings of the ultra-nationalistic champions we ARE British people – Democracy

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has a long discipline of many centuries for its background” (Legionary, March 1938: 21). But what did it mean to be “British”? Former president Alex Ross’ report to the Rowell- Sirois Commission on federal-provincial relations in April 1938 offers some insight. For the Legion, federalism, imperialism and international relations discourses intersected. The submission quoted the Legion’s 1925 constitution that it stood for “loyalty to the reigning Sovereign, Canada and the British Empire, [and] for maintenance of the foundation principles of the British Constitution”. Ross emphasized the importance of democratic liberties and civic rights, which he acknowledged citizens in other nations lacked. He warned Mackenzie King’s government to respect legislative autonomy so that Canada, a “British state”, would not become a “totalitarian state”. Demonstrating how imperial and national goals overlapped, Ross also demanded parliamentary control over Canada’s constitution – an authority Ottawa did not have until 1982 – and supported national unity. “Canada should develop as a united nation and…provincial rights should not be permitted to develop to the point where each province becomes a sovereign state” (Legion circular 38/2/5, 6 April 1938). To be British, in the Legion’s view, was to support a world order where empire, nation, and province formed a seamless hierarchy.

21 Predictably, the Legion was one of the first organizations to urge for closer defense coordination between the English-speaking states. William Foster, the Legion’s President from 1938 to 1940, was pivotal in mobilizing Canadian veterans for civil defense. He also personified the rugged masculine values of the Legion’s imperialism. Born in England, he moved to British Columbia in 1895 where he worked in various positions of authority, including police officer, parliamentarian, and military leader (“In Memoriam”). Determined and resourceful, he coordinated the Legion’s effort to assemble its members and future soldiers to Britain’s side. After September 1938, the Legion ended its association with the League of Nations Society as they did not feel peace would last. Instead of international cooperation, Foster and others believed the Legion had a responsibility to prepare the nation psychologically and materially for war. “War is a terrible thing,” noted one veteran, “but there are worse things than war: loss of civil and religious liberties, submission to a debasing tyranny, and dishonour from the betrayal of those who have trusted us (Abyssinia and the League of Nations) are examples” (Legionary, Jan 1938: 17). With little confidence in Great Power diplomacy, the Legion sought to improve civic and moral defenses before war erupted. For the executive, the end of collective security marked the beginning of peacetime mobilization (Dominion Executive Council Meeting Minutes, 7 September 1938). Foster and other executive members it was also an opportunity to bolster the Legion’s prestige, broaden its public mandate, and monopolize veteran advocacy within Canada. The imperial tie was both a means and an end toward these social and institutional goals.

22 The Legion’s leadership took seriously its self-appointed role to mobilize human resources in preparation for war. In January 1939, the national executive issued a manifesto clarifying that imperial security was a Canadian interest. It asked veterans to enlist for home defense since such volunteerism demonstrated that, unlike Nazi Germany, “our Democratic Nation can inspire unselfish service without any vestige of compulsion” (Legion circular 39/10, 4 March 1939). Voluntary service was viewed as an ideological statement, which blurred the boundaries between nation and empire. Before war was declared in September, over 100,000 veterans had replied to Foster’s appeal, more than 2,700 of which were involved in civil defense (HALE 1995: 59).

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Whether in royal ceremony or garrisoned near a railroad terminal, Legion men stood as symbols of British duty, law, and order on Canadian soil. Since Foster also acquired priority manufacturing contracts for ex-servicemen from the British government (Legion circular no. 39/4/5, 5 September 1939), this mobilization effort sustained inter- imperial trade and met the Legion’s mandate to get veterans employed.

23 The Legion authorities also mobilized its monthly magazine for recruitment, profit, and instruction. Like the IODE’s Echoes but unlike the CIIA’s publications, The Legionary was meant primarily for internal communication and revenue. When the organization took control of the publication in 1933, it had only a circulation of 11,000 and a $6000 deficit. By 1940, the periodical had nearly 42,000 subscribers and a $5200 surplus. The magazine kept soldiers past and present informed about the Legion’s activities, current affairs, and military history. It also connected Canadians and “Imperials” to the British Commonwealth through information, advertisements and images, which bred familiarity and reinforced commonalities. The steady stream of news from Great Britain meant that Canadians knew, for instance, how well their British peers were eating, or the status of South African’s veteran legislation (Legionary, April 1938: 13-24). It often articulated a more forceful worldview which emphasized the British connection: “The British Commonwealth was rapidly becoming a loose federation of democracies…[and] is one of the greatest stabilizing forces in the world today” (Legionary, Jan 1938: 17). These familiar and intimate connections gave meaning to the Commonwealth as a diplomatic and cultural community.

24 The Legion’s strategic use of print media was more limited than our other case studies for it generally distributed materials mostly to its members. Nonetheless its activities reveal some aspects of its worldview. Allusions to “British traditions” were coloured by conservative ideological language and justified a broader mobilization of veterans for civil defense. It relied more heavily on public ceremonies, martial imagery, and patriotic sentiments than many civic groups. Still imperial loyalty had a practical military, diplomatic and social significance to many of its leaders. Like the IODE, the Legion’s executive reconciled an autonomous Canadian nation within a united British Commonwealth, particularly in defense matters. Unlike the IODE, however, it did not support sustained critical analysis of imperial and foreign affairs. Its primary mandate remained soldier welfare and education programs, which became increasingly important as war progressed. Nonetheless it was most successful in achieving its core foreign policy objective: a British Commonwealth alliance against Germany by 1939.

“Self-determination” in North America: the CIIA, neutrality, and public opinion

25 Conversely, the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, the Dominion’s largest foreign affairs study group, claimed to support nationalist or “North American” views of international relations. Its elite leadership viewed imperial sentiments negatively and sought Canada’s right to neutrality before a European conflict. Founded in 1928 by Sir Robert Borden, Newton Rowell and other influential men (SOWARD 1977: 67), the institute had ties to the League of Nations Society, the Royal Institute of International Affairs (RIIA), the Institute of Pacific Relations, and the Department of External Affairs. The organization’s research discussed “international questions and problems…[that] may relate to Canada and the British Empire” (Organization, Objects and Constitution 1929:

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14). Numerous conferences beginning in the 1920s put Canadian intellectuals into contact with others across Asia, North America, and Europe. Although the senior leadership was suspicious of British diplomats, whom they believed did not sufficiently consider Dominion views, it generally cooperated with its Commonwealth counterparts. By 1939, it had seventeen branches in Canada, all in major cities, and a membership of 1,190 (Report on the Work of the CIIA 1939: 28). The organization had its greatest influence in the immediate postwar years (CHAPNICK 2005: 3), yet before the war it had resources, prestige, and influence beyond its size. Indeed, the CIIA’s writings were Canada’s earliest international histories and have strongly influenced its national historiography.

26 As an elite organization, the CIIA’s membership consisted of intellectuals, businessmen, civil servants, and other professionals. Generally its members were well-educated and maintained correspondence with high-level figures at home and abroad. It wanted not only to inform public policy but to shape cultural attitudes toward nation and empire. While critical of conservative parties and policies, the national executive avoided anything resembling propaganda. But as war neared, President Edgar Tarr, a Winnipeg lawyer and businessman, hoped the CIIA would lead public opinion toward a distinctly “nationalist” outlook. Tarr also thought the Canadian government should declare its right to neutrality before Britain and Germany went to war. The organizers were concerned that public opinion was fickle and ill-informed and sought to correct misinformation about Canadian independence (Herbert to Tarr, 12 July 1938)4. But Tarr, Claxton, and F.R. Scott, Professor of Civil Law at McGill University, believed that Canadians needed stronger sense of their national interest both inside and outside the British Commonwealth. Print media, public debates and muted political advocacy were means to their ends.

27 Most CIIA members believed Germany would attack Canada regardless, but Tarr wanted clear evidence of national sovereignty before was erupted. Most important was to clarify Canada’s right to neutrality before war broke out. Neutrality was essential to “the preservation of Canadian unity and the development of Canada’s position in the world”, he remarked to a contact in Geneva. “If only they [British supports] had the sense enough to see it, a neutrality policy is in the interests of Imperialists and anti- Imperialists alike” (Tarr to Craig, 18 January 1939). It was also the only group to address the issue of French Canada’s anti-war opinions, a particular concern for governing authorities focused on national unity. They urged the prime minister, who was reluctant to make binding commitments either way, to publicly declare Canada’s autonomy in the event of war. Tarr was supported by F. R. Scott, who believed that “the only alternative” to neutrality was “to reject the new concept of the Commonwealth” articulated in the 1926 Balfour Declaration and to “delegate expressly to Great Britain the power to conduct our foreign policy” (Scott to Tarr, 23 March 1939). While the situation was more nuanced – the Dominions did not require a neutrality policy to retain diplomatic influence – the CIIA’s leaders saw the Commonwealth’s diplomatic unity as irreconcilable with national autonomy. While many Canadians sympathized with this position, particularly French-speakers, socialists, and ethnic minorities, it was by no means a majority opinion.

28 With particular focus on influencing popular attitudes toward foreign policy, Tarr and others indirectly challenged the IODE and Canadian Legion through academic analysis and publicity campaigns. The Sydney British Commonwealth Relations Conference in

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September 1938 was one such attempt to shape debates war, peace, King and country. This was the second unofficial conference organized to improve Commonwealth relations, but questions of foreign policy, imperial defense, and citizenship hindered consensus among the conference’s ninety delegates (MACKENZIE 1939). As one participant, F.W. Soward, recalled four decades later: “All of us had a strong sense of nationality and an increasing anxiety about the trend of British foreign policy” (SOWARD 1977-78: 70). The Sydney meeting did not resolve the major problems affecting Commonwealth unity, but offered self-proclaimed nationalists a chance to make their case before the empire’s leading scholars.

29 The Canadian delegation’s major scholarly presentation at Sydney was based on F.R. Scott’s manuscript, Canada Today, later published by Oxford University Press. Using a phrase not often employed by Canadian nationalists, Scott encouraged Ottawa’s “self- determination” in foreign affairs (SCOTT 1938: 147). While acknowledging that Canada benefited from informal trade and cultural relations with other Commonwealth countries, he critiqued that “Canadians with a pro-British attitude occupy most important positions in the Protestant churches, in public affairs, in education, in business and in the press” (ibid). Despite many changes, too many persons retained a backward sense of “colonialism” which fuelled a “distrust of things Canadian, a sense of inferiority, a tendency to follow borrowed traditions blindly” (ibid: 102, 115). To be truly Canadian or North American, then, was to reject Commonwealth cooperation for an independent course. Scott’s interpretation of imperial sentiment certainly clashed with those of the IODE and Canadian Legion. Regardless, the book had some popular appeal. Montreal lawyer and future defense minister Brooke Claxton noted that “[q]uite conservative people have been buying copies to give to their even more conservative friends” and that “every store of any consequence should have not less than fifty copies on consignment” (Reid to Tarr, 22 July 1938).

30 The emphasis, however, was on the CIIA’s “North American” identity. What this meant is unclear, but it supported a worldview, which many claimed differed from more traditional imperial outlooks. As Tarr remarked to John Dafoe, the influential editor of the Winnipeg Free Press and a founding member of the CIIA, “[u]nless a sound North Americanism shows signs of developing in a strong way, I fear I shall commence to think that Canadians are morons” (Tarr to Dafoe, 3 November 1938). Brooke Claxton also concluded anyone who supported the British government was “just as ignorant about affairs as [Prime Minister Neville] Chamberlain is himself” (Claxton to Carter, 1 November 1938). However Tarr was right to state that “[c]riticism of British policy is not enough” and that Canada needed a foreign policy based on a “strong North American attitude” rather than “closed-minded imperialism” (Tarr to Claxton, 7 November 1938). This entailed cultivating political, economic and cultural ties with its American neighbour. The organization’s continental identity mirrored its financial position: it survived on grants from the Rockefeller and Carnegie foundations (Report on Activities and Organization for July 1, 1937 to March 31, 1938).

31 American financing notwithstanding, the CIIA took seriously its public education mandate. Its scholarship was generally strong, and it helped develop public discussions on international relations. In the year leading up to war, it sponsored twenty-six radio broadcasts on Palestine, Asia, Anglo-American Relations, and other geopolitical concerns. Tarr also suggested creating a “Public Information Committee” in 1938 to help meet “the increasing popular demand for reliable information on international

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affairs”, although little came of the initiative (Report on the Work of the CIIA 1939: 8, 27). By December, the CIIA had to expand its efforts into a high-profile lecture series. A variety of notable speakers including Harold Laski, Dean Acheson, Vincent Massey and Lionel Curtis were invited (Baldwin to Tarr, 11 August 1939). One of the speakers enlisted to bolster Canadian unity was Tarr himself, who, in April 1939, asked imperial supporters “to genuinely readjust their attitude and give to Canada their primary loyalty” (“Canada at the Crossroads”). During the 1938-39 fiscal year, individual branches hosted fifteen British speakers, eight Americans, and one each from China, Japan, New Zealand, Poland and the U.S.S.R. In 239 branch meetings over that period, fourth-three were dedicated to the British Commonwealth – only topics on Europe and Asia proved more popular (“Annual Report, 1938-39”). While it lobbied for neutrality and isolation, its membership actively engaged scholars and organizations abroad.

32 Still, the CIIA did not seek to end British imperialism everywhere. It sought to strengthen the decentralized and multilateral aspects of the British Commonwealth rather than eliminate it altogether. In correspondence with British colleagues at the RIIA, Tarr distinguished between self-governing territories and colonial dependencies, noting that only the former were allowed national autonomy (Tarr to Ivison Macadam, 10 March 1938). Many also shared, with qualification, the view that the Commonwealth was a stabilizing force in international relations. “[I]f the Commonwealth itself is to last, its center may have to shift westwards to the greatest Anglo-Saxon area in the world, North America”, John Baldwin noted after Germany’s defeat of France. “Great Britain’s position as a traditional and cultural leader may remain but power and leadership must be found on this continent” (Untitled memorandum, July 1940). The CIIA’s hemispheric identity did not undermine its imperialism. Indeed, the evidence suggests that at least some members hoped the New World would inherit and transform the British Commonwealth.

33 The CIIA rejected the “colonial” worldviews of groups such as the IODE and Legion but often for their own emotional and nationalistic reasons. While claiming impartiality, the executive’s contrasted pro-imperial sentiments to their own North American views, implying supporters of British foreign policy were confused, ill-informed, conservative, “morons” or psychologically defective. These intellectuals represented only a fraction of Canadian opinion: educated, urban elites with important official and academic connections worldwide. Nonetheless the CIIA shared with the IODE a commitment to public information and education not matched by the Legion. Arguably they failed to appreciate the nuanced nationalism and social concerns, which motivated the explicitly imperial organizations. While their goals differed considerably with regards to Canada’s Commonwealth and international roles, all three encouraged Canadians’ critical engagement with diplomatic problems in order to shape debate and policy.

Conclusion

34 For at least three imperially-minded civic organizations, Canada’s Second World War started well before September 1939. One year earlier the IODE, Canadian Legion, and CIIA had already organized committees and conferences, printed pamphlets, and assembled troops in their efforts to affect Canada’s place in international affairs. The national executives were particularly active and their efforts reveal how localized English Canadian political values were cultivated in international and transnational

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networks. It is difficult to quantify the impact these organizations had on public opinion and policymaking – their membership rosters and print media distribution provides only two indicators – but the implications for Canadian historiography are clear. If scholars continue to rely on “imperial sentiment” thesis, they must accept that such sentiments intersected with multiple identities, institutional goals, and political interests rather than simply traditional values and loyalties. The IODE’s internationalism and the Legion’s commemoration efforts reinforce this argument. The CIIA’s case against “colonial” worldviews was somewhat misplaced, as is the conventional belief that “old loyalties” and emotional ties were necessarily decisive. Imperial sentiments were modern, dynamic and connected to broad webs of meaning, particularly for the IODE. Institutions supporting the British connection were not colonial relics but were complex, well-organized and well-led civic organizations, which gave agency to imperial voices. They were no less “national” than the CIIA and similar groups antagonistic to pro-British sentiment, but simply sought to realize their nationalism through imperial channels as Canadians had done for at least a century. Their mobilization efforts blended traditional values with contemporary communication methods and political discourses, and consequently served to modernize British imperialism in the Dominions. More broadly, their abilities to evolve with changing local and global dynamics while inside the British Commonwealth suggests how they have survived into the twenty-first century.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Archival Sources (Library and Archives Canada, Ottawa)

Canadian Institute of International Affairs (CIIA) fonds – MG28-I250, vols. 1-2

Imperial Order of the Daughters of the Empire (IODE) fonds – MG28-I17, vols. 5, 12, 17, 29

Royal Canadian Legion (RCL) fonds – MG28-1298, vols. 1, 8, 70

Published Primary Sources

“Annual Report, 1938-39”, 27 July 1939, Canadian Institute of International Affairs (CIIA) fonds, MG28-I250, vol. 1, “Edgar J Tarr Correspondence – CIIA –World Affairs: Correspondence 1939/41” file, LAC.

“Constitution and Statutes of the Imperial Order of the Daughters of the Empire and the Children of the Empire (Junior Branch)”, 1901, Imperial Order of the Daughters of the Empire fonds, MG28- I17, file 4, vol. 17, LAC, Ottawa.

“In Memoriam, William Wasbrough Foster” (1955), The Canadian Alpine Journal, vol. 38, pp. 52-53

CANADIAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (May 1929), Its Organization, Objects and Constitution, Montreal: Southam ltd.

______(1937), Report on the Work of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1936-1937 (1937), Toronto: the Institute.

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______(1939), Report on the Work of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1938-1939 (1939), Toronto: the Institute.

Echoes (periodical)

HARRIS, H.L. (1938), Australia’s National Interests and National Policy, Melbourne: Melbourne University Press.

IMPERIAL ORDER OF THE DAUGHTERS OF THE EMPIRE (1939), Canada within the Empire, Toronto.

The Legionary (periodical)

MACKENZIE, Norman (1939), “The Second Unofficial British Commonwealth Relations Conference”, American Journal of International Law, vol. 33 , pp. 352-354.

SCOTT, F. R. (1938), Canada Today: a study of her national interests and national policy, Toronto: Oxford University Press.

TARR. E.J. (April 1939), “Canada at the Crossroads”, “Edgar J Tarr – CIIA –General: Lectures, Speeches, Articles, etc. 1936/39, 1943, 1950” file, CIIA, vol. 2, LAC.

Monographs and Chapters

BERGER, Carl (1970), A Sense of Power: Studies in the ideas of Canadian imperialism, 1876-1914, Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

BUCKNER, Philip and FRANCIS, R. Douglas, eds. (2006), Canada and the British World: Culture, Migration, and Identity, Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press.

CHAMPION, C.P. (2010), The Demise of British Canada: The Liberals and Canadian Nationalism, 1964-1968, Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press.

CHAPNICK, Adam (2005), The Middle Power Project: Canada and the Founding of the United Nation, Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press.

COOPS, Lorraine (2005), ‘“One Flag, One Throne, One Empire”: The IODE, the Great Flag Debate, and the End of Empire’, in Philip Buckner, ed., Canada and the End of Empire, Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press.

GRANATSTEIN, J.L. (1975), Canada’s War: The Politics of the Mackenzie King Government, 1939-1945, Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

______. and MORTON, Desmond (2003), Canada and the Two World Wars, Toronto: Key Porter.

HALE, James (1995), Branching Out: the story of the Royal Canadian Legion, Ottawa: Royal Canadian Legion.

METCALFE, Heather (2011), “National Identity, Public Opinion and the Department of External Affairs, 1935-1939”, in Greg Donaghy and Michael K. Carroll (eds.), In the National Interest: Canadian Foreign Policy and the Department of External Affairs and International Trade, 1909-2009, Calgary: University of Calgary Press, pp. 51-68.

HILLMER, Norman, and GRANATSTEIN, J.L. (1994), Empire to Umpire, Toronto: Irwin.

PICKLES, Katie (2002), Female Imperialism and National Identity: Imperial Order of the Daughters of the Empire, Manchester: Manchester University Press.

SOWARD, F. H. “Inside a Canadian triangle: the university, the CIIA, and the Department of External Affairs, A personal record” International Journal, vol. 33, no. (1977-78), pp. 66-87.

STACEY, C.P. (1981), Canada and the Age of Conflict, volume 2: 1921-1948, The Mackenzie King Era, Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

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THOMPSON, Denise (1995-96), “National Sorrow, National Pride: Commemoration of war in Canada, 1918-1945”, Journal of Canadian Studies, vol. 30, no. 4, pp. 5-27.

Websites

ROYAL CANADIAN LEGION (July 1997), The Royal Canadian Legion Branch Leadership Manual (July 1997) available at http://www.legion.ca/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/ branchLeadership_e.pdf

NOTES

1. Annual Meeting minutes located in IODE fonds, volume 12 (part2), unless otherwise noted. 2. National Executive Committee Meeting minutes located in IODE fonds, volume 5, file 4, unless otherwise noted. 3. Legion circulars located in RCL fonds, volume 8, unless otherwise noted. 4. All subsequent correspondence located in CIIA fonds, volume 1, unless otherwise noted.

ABSTRACTS

Using print media and institutional records, this essay examines the influence of English Canadian “imperial sentiment” from the perspective of three Canadian civic institutions with international connections. From 1937 to 1940, various interests articulated and influenced Canadian attitudes concerning the British Commonwealth in diplomatic and cultural affairs. These civic organizations mobilized certain segments of the population – middle-class women, working-class veterans, and nationalist intellectuals, respectively – toward distinct political and ideological ends: Canada’s autonomy within a British or democratic world system. Yet their competing objectives helped reconcile Canadian public opinion to support Ottawa’s autonomous declaration of war.

En s’appuyant sur les médias écrits et sur les archives institutionnelles, cet article évalue l’influence du « sentiment impérial » canadien anglais à travers le prisme de trois institutions civiques. De 1937 à 1940, certains groupes influencèrent et articulèrent les perceptions canadiennes envers le Commonwealth britannique dans le cadre d’événements diplomatiques et culturels. Elles mobilisèrent ainsi certains segments de la population – les femmes, les vétérans, et les intellectuels nationalistes, respectivement – à des fins politiques et idéologiques précises : l’autonomie du Canada au sein d’un système-monde britannique ou démocratique. Finalement, leurs objectifs concurrents ou antagonistes contribuèrent à réconcilier l’opinion publique canadienne avec la déclaration de guerre signée par le gouvernement canadien en toute autonomie.

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AUTHOR

TYLER TUREK Western University, London

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“First Unto God and then to the Queen”: Frederick Ney’s Empire/ Commonwealth Youth Movement from the Inter-war Period to the 1960s

Christina Wu

Introduction

1 As 8000 youths filed into London’s Albert Hall for the Empire Youth Rally on the momentous occasion of King George VI’s coronation in May 1937, 14-year-old Penelope Chipman, Canada’s youngest representative, observed the ceremony with a keen eye: “I could notice the smiles that passed over the faces of the girls as their countries were called,” recalled Chipman almost a year after the event. “I realised for the first time, how enormous the Empire really was.” (“Montreal Girl’s Essay” 1938: 7) By offering a grandiose, visual and tangible meaning of the British Empire to the impressionable youths gathered from the corners of the Empire, the Rally also inspired a sense of belonging and responsibility to the Crown in the minds of the youthful crowd. As Chipman expressed succinctly, “[t]he purpose of having a gathering of the youth of the Empire was to make us understand that the future of the Empire and the world lay in our hands.” That sense of duty, according to her, was that which “was impressed upon us most.”

2 Chipman’s reactions were the impact that Major Frederick James Ney, a staunch Canadian imperialist and organiser of the Rally, sought to indelibly imprint upon participants and observers alike. Buoyed by the success of this event, in which distinguished dignitaries such as H.R.H. The Duke of Gloucester and Stanley Baldwin, the Prime Minister of Britain, delivered speeches to the gathered youth, Ney promptly inaugurated the Empire Youth Movement (EYM), which was later renamed the

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Commonwealth Youth Movement (CYM) by the time of Queen Elizabeth II’s coronation in 1953. Ney’s goals for the Movement were both fantastical and ambitious. From the onset in 1937, the Movement endeavoured to “Organise Youth in Empire Ways [...] with the object of consolidating the Empire youth as a world force for peace, goodwill and co-operation.” (“Organise Youth” 1937: 6) These lofty ambitions, however, did not arise in a vacuum. Indeed, Ney’s Movement was conceived against the backdrop of the inter- war period in which totalitarian states across Europe were quickly organising youths into national movements. In response to the looming threat of “the domination of the child mind by pernicious political philosophies” (“Empire Youth Movement” 1939: 6.), politicians such as Viscount Bledisloe, the former Governor-General of New Zealand, thus supported Ney’s enterprise to “take a leaf of the book of Germany and Italy in a systematic attempt to lead the children of the Empire.” (Ibid.) The Movement aimed to serve two purposes: first, as a rallying-point for youth within the British sphere of influence and second, as a bulwark against competing ideological forces such as totalitarianism and Communism. In Ney’s words (and imagination), “The World looks to the British peoples today for help and guidance [...] In this great crusade the youth of the Empire is being called upon to take a lead.” (“Empire Youth Sunday” 1939: 35)

3 Although the Movement never matched the wild expectations of its Founder, Ney’s Movement is interesting to scholars studying the Commonwealth for a variety of reasons. First, Canada – not Great Britain – was chiefly responsible for spearheading, financing and publicising the Movement. As such, an analysis of this organisation could lead to an alternative, non-“Britain-centred” example of how other members or partners of the Commonwealth contributed towards its meaning. Second, since the Movement enlisted – and obtained – the support of other Dominions such as Australia and New Zealand, a study of the Movement’s impact and reception in these territories could also shed light on Canada’s relationship with other Dominions within the context of Empire and Commonwealth. This would allow researchers the opportunity of exploring this particular aspect of Canadian history, which, as the historian Phillip Buckner reveals, has been “difficult to write given the state of current scholarship.” (BUCKNER 2008: viii) Third, the Movement’s history steers our attention towards the role that youth played in the construction and the meaning of Empire and Commonwealth. Indeed, the Movement accorded youth a participatory role in the making of the Empire and the Commonwealth through facilitating educational travel exchanges for its members who were “to form the nucleus of Empire friendships amongst the younger generation.” (“Junior Delegates” 1937: 8) Just as Chipman’s wide-eyed wonder at the grandeur and the expanse of the Empire as the opening anecdote suggests, the Empire and the Commonwealth also had a very real impact upon the lives of some of their youngest members in their most formative years. Examining Ney’s Movement would therefore enable scholars to reach a better understanding of both the agency of youth, as well as the cultural and social aspects of the Empire and Commonwealth that youth helped give meaning to.

4 However, Ney’s EYM/CYM and the topic of educational student exchanges as part of cultural imperialism, have attracted little attention from scholars thus far. (HARPER 2004) To date, apart from several brief mentions of the Movement in the work of historians such as James Mangan (1986), James Sturgis and Margaret Bird’s Canada’s Imperial Past: The Life of F.J. Ney, 1884 – 1973 (2000) remains the sole authoritative biographical account of Ney’s personality and his life-long endeavours in cementing

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relations between Canada, Britain and the Commonwealth. While Sturgis and Bird do not focus upon the Movement per se, their comprehensive research based upon Ney’s personal papers, Canadian sources, as well as their interviews with former members of the Movement are invaluable and fundamental to this paper.

5 In light of the above, I address current gaps in our knowledge of this chapter of history by concentrating upon two aspects of the EYM/CYM. They are broadly grouped as ideas and actions of the Movement. First, I trace Ney’s ideas and British official reactions to the Movement. In connection, I examine the tensions between Ney and officials of the Dominion and Colonial Offices concerning the terms Empire and Commonwealth. For instance, Ney’s initial stubbornness in using the inappropriate (or at least uncomfortable) or anachronistic appellation of “Empire” for the EYM after World War II, provoked visceral reactions which in turn reveal contemporary attitudes on the word Commonwealth in the post-war era. Second, I analyse the extent to which the Movement succeeded in creating a platform for youth to engage in the construction of the meaning of the Commonwealth by delving into the young participants’ experiences of the Movement’s activities – particularly after World War II, as war had interrupted the Movement’s momentum after its inauguration in 1937, consequently, the Movement’s activities only followed a regular pattern after the war. Some of these activities or “Quests” were filled with religious connotations and organised in places charged with symbolic importance within the annals of British imperial history. By analysing these “Quests”, I examine how the Movement negotiated the thin line between promoting an imperial (or propagandistic) and religious/Christian agenda, alongside a more “encompassing”, “neutral”, or “de-imperialised” idea of the Commonwealth.

6 In exploring these facets of the Movement, I argue that Ney’s organisation contributed towards the on-going and shifting negotiations of the meaning of “Commonwealth” in two ways: first, by stimulating discussions of what the Commonwealth was to symbolise and to mean to youth of different ethnicities and religions in the far corners of the British Empire after World War II, and second, by providing opportunities for adolescents within the British sphere of influence to meet under circumstances which encouraged loyalty to the British Crown and a sense of attachment to the Commonwealth. Underlying this main line of argument is the consideration that Ney’s Movement was quasi-religious (of the Christian faith), heavily reliant upon (mostly Canadian) public donations and essentially “unofficial” – or, as one British colonial described it, a “one-man show” (FCO 141/15011). As such, while the limitations of the Movement’s reach and influence must be acknowledged, this paper also contends that these particularities of the Movement lead us to consider the place of religion and the efforts of private individuals in the negotiation of the concept “Commonwealth”. By studying the Movement thus, this article seeks to add towards our understanding of Canadian initiatives in the creation of the social and cultural meanings of the Commonwealth for youth – specifically, in a transitional period of Empire to Commonwealth in the post-World War II era.

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“Strange on Modern Ears”: Ideas of the EYM/CYM and official reactions

7 Although youth movements were hardly novel at the time of the EYM’s inauguration in 1937,1 Ney’s Movement differed in its promotion of educational travel as the main method of moulding and solidifying the relationship between metropolitan Britain and the Empire. In hindsight, this is unsurprising considering Ney’s responsibilities in the Overseas Education League (OEL, or “Hands Across the Seas”) and the National Council of Education (NCE, of which Ney was Secretary). Both these Canadian organisations encouraged educational travel for teachers, youths and schoolchildren. The NCE, particularly, was subsequently used as a “valuable” “front” organisation for the EYM/ CYM. (STURGIS AND BIRD 2001: 141) Ney’s conviction of the need to bridge the vast geographical distance separating Canada and Britain was thus nurtured very early on. In Britishers in Britain (1911), an OEL publication commemorating a teachers’ visit from Manitoba to the “Old Country” [Britain], Ney questioned: How shall the daughter, separated by thousands of miles of sea, have that love of the Motherland if she knows not the mother, or how shall the mother regard the daughter she has not seen? (NEY 1911: 4)

8 To Ney, travel was necessary to fill that gap; seeing and physically experiencing the Motherland would “strengthen the Bonds of Empire and Imperial Fraternity”. Similarly, in planning the 1937 Rally (and the EYM), Ney affirmed the importance of travel by stressing that the 1937 trip would enable Empire youth to feel “at home” through “let[ting] them see something of the charm of its country life in the beauty of an English Spring, as well as of the greatness of our cities and of the splendour of our solemn national celebrations.” (DO 35/537/2) Throughout the lifetime of the Movement, Ney regarded travel as crucial for “saturation in English culture, history, literature, and traditions.” (“Youth Centre Proposed” 1947: 13)

9 In the framework of the EYM, this emphasis on travel was manifested in several ways. First, Ney identified travel costs as “one of the greatest obstacles to Empire intercourse”. Hence, in a 1938 EYM pamphlet, Ney pushed for concessions such as a “flat rate of £10 between any two Empire ports”, or “a flat Steamship rate for Students [...] between all parts of the Empire.” (ED 136/685) Railways (more accurately, rail concessions) also figured within Ney’s scheme, but above all, seemingly in the line of the sensibilities of the time concerning Britain as a maritime power, sea travel was stressed. Thus urged Ney for a ship – the “S.S. Spirit of Youth”: The Movement should possess its own Steamship – a floating school or college – which could exist largely for the purpose of enabling the greatest number of students to see the Empire [...] An Empire which can spend well over £2,000,000,000 upon armaments to defend itself should not find it difficult to provide the relatively small sum needed for a ship by means of which that Empire may be made known to its younger citizens, who will be [...] quite conceivably be called upon to fight for its safety. (Ibid.)

10 Second, to allay the cost of travel accommodations, Ney proposed the construction of a “City of Youth” (“Youth City”) in London. Guided by his belief that “Situation and Surroundings are of the greatest importance if the desired impression of London is to be obtained by the young visitor” (Ibid.), Ney advocated symbolic and prime areas such as the site of the Crystal Palace, Regent’s Park, or a corner in South Kensington as possible locations for Youth City. In Ney’s words, the building was to be “analogous to

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the Cité de l’Université in Paris [Cité internationale universitaire de Paris], [...] each Dominion and the Colonies would be invited to contribute its own building.” (DO 35/537/2) By facilitating educational travel amongst Empire youth and “Youth of other lands”, Ney hoped to encourage international cooperation under the aegis of British leadership and influence by “let[ting] them [Youth] breathe its [England’s] air of freedom and help them to understand its essential friendliness.” (ED 136/685)

11 While Ney’s S.S. Spirit of Youth inspired little enthusiasm, Youth City succeeded in attracting the support of politicians and the attention of the international press. As case in point, a Tasmanian daily, The Mercury, informed its readers in January 1939 that : Former Governor Generals, including Lord Stonehaven for Australia, Lord Bledisloe for New Zealand, Lord Bessborough for Canada and Lord Lloyd, representing Britain” had formed an executive committee to plan Youth City. (“Youth City” 1939: 2)

12 Other newspapers within the Empire, such as Cairns Post (Australia) , The Winnipeg Tribune (Canada), The Straits Times (Singapore) and The Glasgow Herald (Scotland), also devoted editorial space to Youth City, adding to the list of illustrious supporters of the project “Lord Willingdon for India, the Earl of Clarendon for South Africa, Leopold Amery [Colonial Secretary under Stanley Baldwin] for the colonies and dependencies [and] Sir Charles Innes for Burma”. (“Youth City Planned” 1939: 7) Some of these individuals, such as former Canadian Governor-General Lord Bessborough, contributed more than a name by giving an address in Guildhall in January 1939 to generate interest in Youth City. Apart from underlining the “Canadian-ness” of Ney’s ideas in enunciating that the EYM and the 1937 Rally were “due to Canadian initiative”, Lord Bessborough stressed the affordability of the building project by estimating that it would amount to “[a]t most, the cost of a destroyer. The destroyer is built for defence. So will Youth City be.” (“Bessborough Advocates Youth City” 1939: 6)

13 Interestingly, both Ney and Lord Bessborough thus made allusions to the military and Britain’s defence budget in their statements on the financial viability of the S.S. Spirit of Youth and Youth City respectively. On the one hand, the political climate on the eve of war in Europe inspired both men to connect these EYM projects with the defence of the Empire. On the other, this “defence metaphor” was also motivated by another perceived threat to the unity of Empire – the influx of immigration (of “the non-British stock”) in the Dominions.

14 This potential “threat” of emigration in the Dominions was not new in 1937. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the “flood of humanity” in Canada had already alarmed certain members of the public of the “implications for an eventual multicultural Canada [...] and this possible deviation from Anglo Saxonism”. (STURGIS AND BIRD 2001: 17) Ney himself had stressed the need to acculturate new emigrants to Canadian ways and imperial culture through education in Britishers in Britain in his homage to Canadian teachers. To him, these teachers were “holding in their hands the destiny of the Mighty Dominion”, for: Theirs is to make British the thousands of children of foreign birth (with their almost traditional dislike and jealously of our race) who are peopling the Western prairies [...] [On Americans, Dukhuboors, Galicians, Germans, French, Italians, Greeks, Russians and Poles in Canada] – all have to be welded into one race (a British race), and made law-abiding citizens of the vast Dominion, and faithful

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subjects of our Sovereign Lord, the King. What a mission and what a responsibility! (NEY 1911: 5)

15 Along similar lines, the EYM was conceived to address “the important problem of emigration” though educational travel, which would forge imperial identity and cultural attachment to Britain. Concurrently, the EYM was also created to encourage British immigration to Canada. This facet of the EYM appears to have been a priority for Ney for, as he implored in a 1937 Memorandum on the EYM to Colonial Secretary Malcolm MacDonald: The need for peopling the Dominions with British stock and filling our great vacant lands becomes all the more imperative in the face of Germany’s demands for Colonies […] (IT IS WELL TO BEAR IN MIND THAT IN CANADA – THE KEYSTONE OF THE EMPIRE OVERSEAS, THE POPULATION OF BRITISH STOCK IS NOW LESS THAN 50% OF THE WHOLE.) (DO 35/537/2)

16 In light of these “Dominion-based” perspectives on Empire youth, what were British opinions on Ney’s EYM? Letters between officials of the Dominion and Colonial Offices over the span of the Movement’s lifetime (1930s – 1960s) suggest that British attitudes ranged widely from enthusiasm to outright rejection of the EYM. While some officials at the Dominion Office optimistically noted in the 1950s that “there can be no doubt that the Movement achieves its purpose in stimulating and fostering sentiments of Commonwealth unity”, (DO 35/8197) others were convinced at the same time that Ney’s “ideas for the artificial regimentation of ‘Youth’ are fundamentally unsound and modelled on Nazidom.” (DO 35/4217) Some detractors were very vocal about their reservations of the EYM. For instance, in a series of correspondences between Percivale Liesching and Sir Alan Lascelles on Ney’s scheme to “repeat the success of the last Coronation” by organising a similar Rally on the occasion of Queen Elizabeth’s coronation in 1953, the former starkly described Ney as “the plague of my life” and the Movement’s Rally as “profoundly alien to the tradition and natural genius of this country”, whereas his correspondent complained, “Why can’t they let these wretched boys and girls alone, and leave them to enjoy the Coronation in their own way?”

17 Generally, British opinions concerning Ney and the Movement were cautious, but “friendly” and “fairly favourable”. Revealingly, no financial backing on the part of the British Government was supplied to the Movement throughout its lifetime (DO 35/8198). To a certain extent, financial support was not forthcoming as officials opined that, given its “Dominion-centred” background, “initiative should come from the Dominions themselves” (DO 35/537/2). Furthermore, some feared that the Movement was “by no means representative of the whole Commonwealth” because of its Christian agenda and emphasis on loyalty to King and Empire.

18 In the post-World War II context, which demanded sensitivity and political finesse in dealing with indigenous aspirations of independence and decolonisation across the Empire, Ney’s EYM was unsurprisingly deemed “out of date” and “not conducive to attracting support from the newer Commonwealth countries” (DO 35/8198). As case in point, Ney’s insistence on the term “Empire”, as opposed to “Commonwealth” in the naming of the Movement (up till 1953) was a clear signal to British officials of the anachronistic nature of the EYM/CYM. As early as March 1937, Colonial Secretary MacDonald had aired his doubts over the Movement’s name, but while Ney “agreed it is not ideal”, he insisted that “no formula [suitable alternative] has yet been found” and thus, that it was “better to be courageous and frank” about the Movement’s Empire- minded agenda (DO 35/537/2). We obtain a more vivid illustration of Ney’s zeal in his

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fiery address to the Empire Club of Toronto in December 1948, entitled “The Commonwealth on Trial, or What’s in a Name?” On this occasion, Ney accused some of being “ashamed of the very word Empire”, and that the word “Commonwealth would obscure a past which is the greatest envy of our enemies” (DO 35/4217). Instead, challenged Ney, “if we must change our name, then why not merely ‘The Empire’ or ‘The Britannic League?’”2

19 Importantly, Ney’s adamant preference for EYM over CYM, as well as related discussions on the aptness of Empire/Commonwealth for events such as Empire Youth Sunday, propelled British officials to confront the issue of terminology and the meaning of Commonwealth. More precisely, as there was no sharp disjuncture between the two terms (“Commonwealth” had been formulated by Lord Rosebery in 1884) and as the shift from Empire to Commonwealth in common parlance was ongoing, the obstinate adherence to one term over the other (as in Ney’s case) triggered discussions in the Dominion and Colonial Offices. An example of the coexistence (or even equal “appropriateness”) of the two terms is found in the following: in the debate of whether the term Commonwealth ought to replace Empire in Empire Youth Sunday in the 1950s, some officials felt strongly that “the word Empire stirs up so many noxious feelings” in the colonies. Yet they also admitted that in some cases (notably in the Dominions) such as Australia, “the word Empire is more sensible than Commonwealth because the latter, in Australia, has two meanings” (CO 859/673). Another instance of how the EYM/CYM stimulated debates on “Commonwealth” is the Singapore Government’s reaction to Ney’s request for help in encouraging Singapore youths to attend the 1957 CYM “Quest”. To begin with, one colonial asserted positively that Ney’s Movement “have been very successful indeed” in inspiring “the ideals of Commonwealth patriotism and loyalty to the Crown”. The same official noted further that Ney had also made significant changes to the Movement to “avoid upsetting people who are not of the Christian faith” and to attract Asian youths to participate in the EYM’s “Quest”. However, his correspondent argued that “the average Asian youth would consider that there is too much emphasis on cathedrals and castles in these quests” and that Singapore youths were “only too ready to think of England as an old country living on her past” because of the Movement’s selective educational tours of historical sites in Britain (FCO 141/15011). From this, we observe that some colonials imagined that the Commonwealth was to be more culturally inclusive, forward-looking – or even economically-minded, for, as the second British official in this example added, “visits to aeroplane factories, oil refineries and atomic power stations would impress and interest them [Singaporeans] far more.” (Ibid.) In these ways, Ney’s Movement thus contributed towards the negotiation of the meaning of Commonwealth by creating a basis for dialogue and articulation of thoughts amongst British officials – even if his ideas, as Ney conceded, “may sound strange on modern ears”. (Ibid.)

Crusaders and “Quests”: youth at play in the movement

20 Apart from stimulating dialogue between colonials about the idea of Commonwealth, Ney’s Movement also contributed actively towards the meaning of this term through its activities for the youth. The sources available on the participants’ experiences of the Movement indicate that many were grateful for the eye-opening opportunity to travel

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and meet youths of other countries. For instance, Iain Ewing of Ashbury College, Ottawa, considered himself “fortunate enough to be selected” for the CYM’s Quest in 1961. (Ewing 1962: 25) In his 1962 essay on the 1961 Quest, Ewing stressed that he “was not sailing for a standard guide book tour of Europe” as: The CYM is dedicated to the ideals of peace, brotherhood, and understanding. Through its annual Quest, students from the far-flung lands of the Commonwealth are brought together [...] by sharing the common experience of seeing Europe together, they forge a bond of brotherhood [...] I lived with boys and girls whose skin was not the same colour as mine, whose religions were unknown to me, whose homes were foreign to me [...] many of my preconceived ideas and prejudices [were] washed from my mind. (Ibid.)

21 Ewing’s sense of duty (“I was not sailing for a standard guide book tour”) and his emphasis on the multicultural composition of the Quest suggest that some youths did feel they were playing a part in the Commonwealth by “forg[ing] a bond of brotherhood” with youth of other religions and ethnicities within the Commonwealth. Certainly, not every participant eagerly endorsed or imbibed the Movement’s message of youth’s duty to Crown and God. Other Questors (participants) such as Modris Eksteins, who also attended the 1961 Quest, described his experiences in adulthood: The climax of every Quest was an overnight vigil in a historic church. In 1961 the venue was St. George’s Memorial Church in Ypres [site of the Battle of Passchendaele] [...] in half hour intervals throughout the night, Questors knelt in small groups before the altar and confronted their own souls in the context of British imperial history and the crisis of the twentieth century. Ney’s aim was to have each youth come face to face with the ideals of commitment and service as the ghosts of the great conflict that was the First World War dance about in the clammy night air. “You will, I hope, sense something of a fellowship with them,” he said of the dead, “for they were Questors too, and youthful.” Some of my fellows came away from this night of communion proclaiming that it was the most meaningful experience of their young lives. I approached my “watch’ open to impression but also confused by the intricate weave of culture and slaughter. (EKSTEINS 2000: 57-58)

22 In analysing Eksteins’ recollections of his experience as a Questor (written four decades after the event), it is useful to bear in mind that he had immigrated to Canada as a child from Latvia. Subsequently, he became a historian of European history and the relationship between war and culture. It is perhaps for this reason that Eksteins devoted greater attention in describing the Vigil at Ypres (a site fused with deep historical significance in British imperial history) as compared to Ewing, who focused mostly on the act (and excitement) of travelling in Europe. Nevertheless, we find several common points between the two narratives. Both underlined the CYM’s stress on the importance and role of youth within the Commonwealth. Both revealed that some Questors connected with Ney’s vision of the Commonwealth/Empire through the CYM’s activities – Eksteins, for instance, added that some “proclaim[ed] that it [the Vigil] was the most meaningful experience of their young lives.” From other accounts, we also note that the CYM’s activities nurtured a sense of pride or responsibility in the Commonwealth in the minds of the Questors.

23 For instance, during the Quests, each wore a “specially dyed crimson blazer with the Crown and ‘Canada’ in gold on the pocket” and had to swear a “Promise” – a prerequisite for being considered as a Questor – to “unhesitatingly subscribe to its motto: FIRST UNTO GOD AND THEN TO THE QUEEN” (DO 35/8197). Additionally, in assessing the impact of Ney’s educational tours upon youths, Sturgis and Bird assert that one

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participant from Dartmouth, Nova Scotia, spoke to “250 high school students [and] 1,300 junior school pupils”, on top of publishing papers in his school paper and giving talks to the IODE (Imperial Order Daughters of the Empire). Another youth, Nora Gladstone, “was such an effective speaker that she brought tears to the eyes of the many adult audiences which she addressed.” (STURGIS AND BIRD 2000: 167 – 168) Seen in this light, the CYM thus did succeed to a certain extent in inspiring a sense of responsibility and identity towards the Commonwealth amongst youths.

24 Sturgis and Bird’s analysis of these two youths, who were inspired to travel and give talks about their experiences in the CYM, drive us to question how youths also served as effective propagandists in the construction of the meaning of Commonwealth. As early as 1929, Ney’s educational travels had focused on youths as adolescent “ambassadors” who would (and could) establish close relationships between different territories of the Commonwealth. Indeed, in 1929, The Calgary Herald was convinced that “the sending of young ambassadors [Canadian youths] to Australia, New Zealand and other parts of the Empire should become a definite feature in Canada’s educative plan” (“Empire Tours” 1929: 4). According to this newspaper, this was because “the impressions gained […] will remain with them all their lives and be transmitted throughout the circles with which they come in contact.” Underlying this opinion is the assumption that youths were ideal “ambassadors” because they were malleable and impressionable.

25 The following illustrations provide us with a visual idea of how youth could indeed play an active role in propagating certain ideas of the Commonwealth. Consider illustration 1, a picture of a choir at Ney’s 1938 Empire Youth Rally in Vancouver3. This image of youths singing while dressed in white robes emblazoned with a cross on their lapels – reminiscent of Crusaders – accompanied an article delineating Ney’s goals for the EYM, where the Founder declared: “[i]n this great crusade the youth of the Empire is being called upon to take a lead.” In the same article, nine supportive “messages from the Empire’s leaders” were published; for instance, Michael Savage, the Prime Minister of New Zealand, stressed in his letter that “Youth today is rendering service, splendid service” while Joseph Lyons, the Prime Minister of Australia, affirmed: “our British Youth are preparing for the leadership they must give tomorrow to the British Commonwealth of Nations.”

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Illustration 1: “Youth Sunday – ’O Give Us Brother Love for Better Seeing’”, in The Vancouver Sun, 20 May 1939, 36

26 The impression created upon the reader is thus that of youths actually playing a role (singing in an official capacity celebrating Empire and Commonwealth), as well as the importance of youths in the construction of Commonwealth (as exemplified by the declarations of the two Prime Ministers). Although we do not know to what extent the youths in the choir were consenting (did they choose their uniforms?) or aware of the ideas they were propagating, illustration 2, a poster design by a 17-year-old for Empire Youth Sunday, provides us with a basis for comparison.

27 Here, the Crusader-Knight is stoic and armed (ready for action). The motto next to him, “The Great Crusade of Youth”, associates the idea of youth, ready for service, in the character of the Crusader, ready for action. Tellingly, the array of flags representing various territories within the Commonwealth is arranged domino-like – suggesting that each depended upon the other. This example of a piece of propaganda produced by a youth also illustrates that some did invest themselves in the production of meaning of the Commonwealth – effectively, they could be adult-led (as in the case of the choir), but they could also be independent producers of meanings of the Commonwealth in their own right.

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Illustration 2 A design by W.T. Berryman (Aged 17), for Empire Youth Sunday, May 21st 1944.

This design was used as the front cover of a publication of the Commonwealth Youth Movement in 1958 to mark the 21st anniversary of the Movement. DO 35-8198, National Archives, UK. Note as well the similarity between the Crusader/Knight’s uniform and that of the choir.

Conclusion

28 Ney’s EYM/CYM contributed towards constructions of the meaning of the Commonwealth by emphasising youth’s importance and potential in serving the political, social or cultural purposes of the Commonwealth. However, its impact and reach was limited. First, Ney had concentrated his efforts mostly on Canadian and British youths – who also tended to be “elite” and privileged. (STURGIS AND BIRD 2000: 310) Furthermore, the Movement was quasi-religious and its reach was largely restricted to Britain, Canada and some of the other Dominions, such as Australia. According to Sturgis and Bird, only about 900 – 1000 youths had participated in the Quests from 1953 to 1969. Indeed, as one British official had pointed out, Ney was “not a BP [Baden-Powell] or William Smith [founders of the Boy Scouts and the Boys’ Brigade respectively]” (DO 35/4217). In other words, Ney’s Movement never achieved wide appeal.

29 On the other hand, the Movement enabled members of the public to view youth as important youthful “ambassadors” for the promotion of close relationships between Canada, Britain, and the Commonwealth at large. Thus convinced, members of the public (mostly Canadians and British) donated to the Movement and even opened their homes to accommodate youths of different religions and ethnicities from various corners of the Commonwealth on Quests. Apart from raising greater awareness amongst the general public of the idea of the Commonwealth, the Movement also

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certainly had an impact upon youths. Some Questors felt a sense of importance and duty as they were received and entertained by important personalities such as High Commissioners and Ministers during their Quests. While not every Questor felt strongly about the message of loyalty “unto God and then to the King/Queen”, most were thankful for the opportunity to travel and experience more of the Commonwealth that they were part of. Ironically, just as British officials were more positively-disposed towards the Movement as youth had become “more Commonwealth-minded” and “more aware of the existence of other Commonwealth countries” through the Movement’s activities, (DO 35/8197) the EYM/CYM lost its momentum and ceased its activities as Ney became older, frailer, and increasingly fatigued by the demands of organising his “one-man show.”

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Sources from the National Archives, UK

CO 859/673: Empire Youth Sunday (1954 – 1956),

DO 35/537/2: Empire Youth Service (1937 – 1938)

DO 35/4217: Commonwealth Youth Rallies: Empire Youth Movement Coronation 1953 (1952)

DO 35/8197: Activities of Commonwealth Youth Movement (1953 – 1958)

DO 35/8198: Activities of Commonwealth Youth Movement (1958 – 1960)

ED 136/685: Empire Youth Movement: Correspondence with Major Ney, NCE in Canada (1943)

FCO 141/15011: Singapore – Commonwealth Youth Movement (1957)

Newspaper Sources

“Empire Tours for Canadian Youth”, The Calgary Herald, 27 May 1929: 4.

“Junior Delegates to the Coronation”, The Montreal Gazette, 16 April 1937: 8.

“Organise Youth in Empire Ways”, Saskatoon Star Phoenix, 4 October 1937: 6.

“Montreal Girl’s Essay on Call to Youth Wins Her an Empire Prize”, The Montreal Gazette, 18 March 1938: 7.

“Youth City: Helping Empire Spirit, Ambitious Plan”, The Mercury, 5 January 1939: 2.

“Youth City Planned for London”, Cairns Post, 5 January 1939: 7.

“Bessborough Advocates Youth City in London to Serve Entire Empire”, Saskatoon Star-Phoenix, 7 January 1939: 6.

“Empire Youth Sunday -- “O Give Us Brother Love for Better Seeing”, The Vancouver Sun, 20 May 1939: 35

“Empire Youth Movement”, The Courier Mail (Brisbane), 22 May 1939: 6.

“Youth Centre Proposed”, The Sydney Morning Herald, 2 October 1947: 13.

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Books and articles

BUCKNER, Phillip (ed.), (2008), Canada and the British Empire: The Oxford History of the British Empire Companion, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

EKSTEINS, MODRIS (2000), Walking Since Daybreak: A Story of Eastern Europe, World War II and the Heart of our Century, New York, Marnier Books.

EWING, Iain Mackenzie (1962), “Commonwealth Youth Movement”, in The Ashburian (Vol. XLV1), Ottawa, Ashbury College: pp.25-27.

HARPER, Marjory (2004), “’Personal Contact is Worth a Ton of Text-Books’: Educational Tours of the Empire, 1926 – 1939,” The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 32:3, pp.48-76.

MANGAN, James (1986), “’The grit of our forefathers’: invented traditions, propaganda and imperialism” in MACKENZIE, John (ed.), Imperialism and Popular Culture, Manchester: Manchester University Press, pp. 113 – 141.

NEY, Frederick James (1911), Britishers in Britain: Being the Record of the Official Visit of Teachers from Manitoba to the Old Country, Summer, 1910, London: The Times Book Club.

NOTES

1. The Boys’ Brigade, Boy Scouts and Girl Guides had already been founded in 1883, 1907 and 1910 respectively. 2. Sturgis and Bird assert that Ney finally adopted “Commonwealth” after 1953 because the word “received the sanction of the Queen and was unquestionably in common use.” (p. 167) However, Ney “retained a lingering hope that a suitable circumlocution could be found to avoid the necessity of the word ’Commonwealth’.” (p. 250) 3. Illustration 1: “Youth Sunday – ’O Give Us Brother Love for Better Seeing’”, in The Vancouver Sun, 20 May 1939, 36.

ABSTRACTS

The “Empire Youth Movement” (later known as the “Commonwealth Youth Movement”) was the brainchild of Major Frederick James Ney, a “fervent imperialist” and a Canadian military man of English background who sought to solidify Britain’s relationship with Canada. This paper delves into the little known history of this Movement from its inception in 1937 to the 1960s. In doing so, it addresses how Canada directly participated, directed and contributed in tangible ways towards the shifting of meanings and ideas of the British Empire and the Commonwealth for impressionable youth of different territories within the British sphere of influence.

Le mouvement de jeunesse « Empire Youth Movement » (rebaptisé « Commonwealth Youth Movement » par la suite) est une création du Major Frederick James Ney, « un fervent impérialiste » et un Canadien, militaire d’origine anglaise, qui chercha à renforcer les liens entre le Canada et la Grande-Bretagne. Cet article explore l’histoire peu connue de cette organisation, de sa naissance, dans les années trente jusqu’aux années soixante, et analyse comment le Canada

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a contribué culturellement au concept de Commonwealth. Cette contribution se focalise sur l’impact de ce mouvement sur des jeunes membres influençables venant des quatre coins du monde britannique.

AUTHOR

CHRISTINA WU EHESS

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Réformateur ou conservateur ? Le Canada et le Commonwealth pendant la crise rhodésienne (1963-1973)

Virginie Roiron

1 La déclaration de Londres, en 1949, est retenue comme l’élément fondateur du « nouveau Commonwealth ». Avec la suppression de l’allégeance à la Couronne comme condition nécessaire de l’appartenance au Commonwealth, les différents Etats étaient désormais libres de choisir le régime politique de leur choix, et voyaient leur constitution et leur association complètement détachées des institutions britanniques. La méfiance traditionnelle du gouvernement canadien, dirigé jusqu’en octobre 1948 par William Mackenzie King, envers toute organisation formelle et excès de centralisation impériale rendait la réforme du Commonwealth conforme à l’idée que ce dernier se faisait de l’association. La déclaration de Londres représentait pour Ottawa non seulement la libération symbolique de sa propre politique étrangère des ambiguïtés du statut de Westminster, mais également l’émergence du Commonwealth en tant qu’association indépendante et un accès précieux pour sa politique étrangère naissante à de nouvelles aires géopolitiques, notamment l’Inde (SPRY 1957 : 295), et à travers cette dernière, les non-alignés (SMITH 1981 : 283).

2 La crise de Suez offrit au Canada la première occasion à la fois de se construire un rôle sur la scène internationale, celui d’un médiateur (DOXEY 1989 : 200), d’un pont entre le monde « européen » et l’Asie (BOTHWELL 2007 : 77), et de défendre l’esprit du nouveau Commonwealth, fondé sur l’indépendance, mais également sur la consultation et le dialogue pour désamorcer les tensions. De la même façon, en 1961, le Canada se rangea du côté des membres afro-asiatiques pour condamner l’apartheid, poussant l’Afrique du sud vers la sortie, contre l’avis du gouvernement britannique. John Diefenbaker, premier ministre conservateur, évita une division raciale du Commonwealth en réaffirmant le principe d’égalité entre les membres, à commencer par l’égalité raciale, comme fondement de l’association, et en le liant à l’appartenance au Commonwealth

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(HYAM 1998 : 166). Le Canada a ainsi œuvré, pendant la période 1949-61, à donner corps au Commonwealth moderne que la déclaration de 1949 avait créé, parce que la vision portée par cette déclaration correspondait à ses aspirations et lui permettait d’exprimer sa politique étrangère nouvelle (DOXEY 1989 : 197-98).

3 Les enjeux portés par la crise de Rhodésie, qui fut concomitante à des transformations structurelles du Commonwealth, rendit ce rôle de médiateur plus complexe pour le Canada, malgré la popularité gagnée auprès des membres des nouveaux pays indépendants pendant la première décennie. Dès le début des années 1960, la décolonisation de la Rhodésie, qui bénéficiait d’un gouvernement autonome dominé par la population d’origine européenne sans avoir le statut de Dominion, plaçait le gouvernement britannique face à un dilemme : soit il entérinait la situation et accordait l’indépendance à la Rhodésie sans condition, et il provoquait un tollé au sein du Commonwealth, soit il exigeait des réformes préalables à l’indépendance, au risque de concrétiser la menace d’une déclaration unilatérale d’indépendance et de se retrouver également dans une situation difficile au sein du Commonwealth (TNA, CAB 21/5512). La Rhodésie déclara unilatéralement son indépendance le 11 novembre 1965, provoquant une crise sans précédent au sein du Commonwealth.

4 L’objet de cet article sera de montrer que, loin de se ranger aux côtés des nouvelles nations décolonisées comme il avait pu le faire pendant la décennie précédente, et d’adopter une posture avant-gardiste sur le Commonwealth, le Canada s’employa, pendant la crise rhodésienne, à conserver le sens du nouveau Commonwealth tel qu’il l’avait défini. Pour ce faire, Lester Pearson, ministre des affaires extérieures pendant l’affaire de Suez, et premier ministre de 1963 à 1968, comme après lui Pierre Trudeau, remplit une fois encore le rôle traditionnel de médiateur honnête (« honest broker »), (CROS 2013 : 84) afin non pas de défendre les positions des pays nouvellement indépendants contre une Grande-Bretagne dominante, ou trouver une solution à la crise rhodésienne en lieu et place de la Grande-Bretagne, mais d’assurer la survie du Commonwealth en œuvrant pour restaurer la confiance, rétablir un équilibre des forces et ainsi replacer le principe d’égalité, cher au Canada, au fondement de l’association.

L’objectif du Canada : sauvegarder le Commonwealth

Avant la déclaration unilatérale d’indépendance : réaffirmer les acquis du nouveau Commonwealth

5 Lester Pearson reconnaissait que le problème rhodésien relevait de la souveraineté britannique, et que dès lors, le gouvernement britannique était seul maître de sa politique. Il était toutefois conscient, comme le gouvernement britannique, que ce problème était, par nature, susceptible de menacer le Commonwealth à mesure que les anciennes colonies africaines en devenaient membres. L’objectif de Pearson était dès lors d’éviter un faux-pas de la Grande-Bretagne qui aurait mis en danger le Commonwealth, comme lors de la crise de Suez, et de lui porter indirectement assistance dans le difficile exercice d’équilibre qu’elle devait jouer entre les exigences du gouvernement rhodésien et celles des nouveaux membres du Commonwealth. Par exemple, la Rhodésie était habituellement invitée aux conférences du Commonwealth en tant qu’observateur. Interrogé à la Chambre des Communes sur la présence ou non du premier ministre rhodésien à la conférence de 1964, Pearson, tout en évitant de

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prendre position en faveur ou non de l’invitation, envoya un signal au gouvernement britannique sous couvert d’un rappel des règles de fonctionnement du Commonwealth : The Prime Ministers of independent Commonwealth governments, including Canada, would naturally expect to be consulted before invitations to attend a Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Meeting were issued to the representatives of countries which are not fully independent. (CANADA CC mai 1964 : 2876)

6 Pearson entendait ainsi dissuader la Grande-Bretagne d’inviter la Rhodésie afin d’entretenir la confiance entre les membres, fondée sur la sincérité de leur engagement vis-à-vis du Commonwealth multiracial.

7 Pearson s’attachera par ailleurs à présenter la pression exercée par les membres du Commonwealth sur la Grande-Bretagne comme une contribution constructive à la recherche d’une solution. Lors de la conférence de 1964, Pearson encouragea les membres du Commonwealth à officiellement s’engager, comme la Grande-Bretagne, à ne pas reconnaître une déclaration unilatérale d’indépendance de la Rhodésie, ce qui relevait de l’évidence pour la plupart des membres. Il présenta plus tard cet engagement inclus dans le communiqué final (COMSEC 1987 : 86) comme un moyen de « renforcer la position du gouvernement britannique et soutenir les éléments modérés de l’électorat rhodésien » (CANADA CC juillet 1964 : 5605). Pearson mettait ainsi en exergue ce qui unissait le Commonwealth pour faire émerger une communauté d’objectif dans un Commonwealth où la Grande-Bretagne était de plus en plus pointée du doigt. S’appuyant sur les acquis de la conférence de 1961, la première à définir le Commonwealth comme une association multiraciale, la proposition d’une déclaration sur l’égalité raciale allait dans le même sens (ibid : 5604) : The Prime Ministers affirmed their belief that, for all Commonwealth Governments, it should be an objective of policy to build in each country a structure of society which offers equal opportunity and non-discrimination for all its people, irrespective of race, colour or creed. The Commonwealth should be able to exercise constructive leadership in the application of democratic principles in a manner which will enable the people of each country of different racial and cultural groups to exist and develop as free and equal citizens”. (COMSEC 1987 : 83, nous soulignons).

8 En mettant l’accent sur la démocratie, Pearson parvint habilement à dissocier la majorité raciale de la majorité démocratique, en même temps qu’il faisait envoyer par le Commonwealth un signal visant à rassurer les Rhodésiens blancs modérés sur leur avenir dans un Etat rhodésien gouverné par la majorité.

9 En fin de compte, les efforts du premier ministre canadien tendaient surtout à faire accepter la Grande-Bretagne en tant que membre ordinaire partageant sincèrement les principes du nouveau Commonwealth, et non dans son rôle passé de puissance impériale, ravivé par le dilemme rhodésien. Pour ce faire, il obligeait indirectement la Grande-Bretagne à agir dans un cadre défini par les principes du Commonwealth (OGDEN 1964 : 546), tout en lui laissant une latitude d’action qui allait lui permettre de défendre ses choix politiques1. En 1964, le Canada se positionna dans un rôle d’intermédiaire qui permit à l’association de ne pas se diviser racialement. Il contribua à réaffirmer que le Commonwealth était une association dont les membres partageaient un certain nombre de valeurs, tout en respectant le principe de souveraineté.

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Après la déclaration unilatérale d’indépendance : priorité à la préservation du Commonwealth

10 Après la déclaration unilatérale d’indépendance, le Canada se trouva dans une situation plus délicate car il n’était pas prêt à s’aligner sur les positions les plus radicales des Africains, à savoir : faire pression sur la Grande-Bretagne pour qu’elle fasse usage de la force pour imposer l’égalité raciale (PEARSON 1975 : 283). Deux conférences du Commonwealth furent organisées la même année : l’une à Lagos au Nigéria en janvier 1966, l’autre à Londres en septembre 1966 pour évaluer les progrès de la politique britannique.

11 A Lagos, le gouvernement canadien prit soin d’éluder la confrontation avec l’un ou l’autre camp et permit de trouver un compromis pour « gagner du temps » (TNA, PREM 13/782)2. Il parvint notamment à faire dévier le débat sur les moyens pratiques de mettre en place un gouvernement majoritaire en Rhodésie, en proposant notamment un programme de formation pour les Rhodésiens africains (HAYES 1982 : 151). Après Lagos, il encouragea la Grande-Bretagne à prendre l’initiative aux Nations-Unies : Mr. Pearson said that the African delegations were bound to press strongly for mandatory sanctions. His delegation would be as helpful as they could. But he himself was in something of the position of a buffer state between Britain and the Africans and this was becoming uncomfortable (TNA, PREM 13/782).

12 Dès lors que le Canada ne pouvait plus soutenir toutes les positions du nouveau Commonwealth, son rôle de garant de l’équilibre des forces au sein du Commonwealth, dont dépendait la survie de ce dernier, était difficile à maintenir. Il incita ainsi la Grande-Bretagne à donner des gages aux nouveaux Etats indépendants, sinon sur le règlement politique de la crise, du moins sur un positionnement symbolique afin de restaurer la confiance et d’apaiser leurs revendications.

13 Dans son discours à la conférence de septembre 1966, Pearson confirma son opposition à l’usage de la force, considérant que ce n’était qu’un moyen parmi d’autres d’atteindre un objectif commun (PEARSON 1975 : 286). Très habilement ensuite, il continua sur le sujet du gouvernement majoritaire, sans clairement définir ce que cela signifiait réellement, pour finalement dévier vers le thème de l’égalité raciale en Rhodésie, dont il était certain qu’elle remportait l’adhésion de tous les membres, puis sur le caractère multiracial du Commonwealth en rappelant : In my experience of international affairs over the years, I have seen the unfolding drama of political and racial emancipation in Asia and Africa, and in this unfolding, let us not forget, only in Rhodesia, so far as the Commonwealth is concerned, is racial equality still denied as a basis of government and of society. (PEARSON 1975 : 287)

14 Il conduisait ainsi son auditoire à placer la responsabilité de la violation des principes du Commonwealth multiracial non pas sur la Grande-Bretagne, qui, selon lui, avait permis dans ses autres territoires une décolonisation dans le respect de ce principe, mais sur le régime rhodésien lui-même. Il insista dans une lettre à Kenneth Kaunda, le président zambien, sur les efforts consentis par la Grande-Bretagne au cours de la conférence de septembre 1966 et sur son respect pour les positions africaines (PEARSON 1975 : 288).

15 C’est encore au Canada que fut confié, lors de la conférence, le soin de rédiger un communiqué final afin de minimiser les désaccords (HAYES 1982 : 164) :

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Mr. Pearson (Canada) said that he would be very unhappy if a rift developed between the “old” and “new” Commonwealth and if a divided communiqué had to be issued which would draw attention to this rift. The gap between the two positions did not seem very large. There was agreement on objectives, some differences on tactics. (COMSEC, CPM 66/2)

16 Il parvint à éviter une division complète du nouveau Commonwealth en insistant une fois encore sur les principes et les objectifs plutôt que sur la manière de les mettre en œuvre.

17 De la même façon, Pierre Trudeau, qui souhaitait prendre ses distances avec l’image du Canada en tant que médiateur des relations internationales, se conforma rapidement à ce rôle lors de la conférence de 1971 (REDEKOP 1982 : 174). Alors qu’il y était personnellement opposé, Trudeau n’avait pas l’intention d’interdire à la Grande- Bretagne de vendre des armes à l’Afrique du sud, mais, à la manière du Commonwealth, de favoriser un dialogue et des échanges d’arguments susceptibles de convaincre le gouvernement britannique de changer de politique : I would not go so far as to say that I would go into a meeting, even the Commonwealth meeting, with a closed mind and not prepared to listen to arguments from all sides. […] If these arguments were to convince me that the position of the Canadian government was wrong, I hope I would have the courage to correct it. (CANADA CC 1970, 2052)

18 Plutôt que de s’engager à quitter le Commonwealth dans l’hypothèse où la Grande- Bretagne continuerait à vendre des armes à l’Afrique du sud, il déclara sa confiance dans la capacité du Commonwealth à restaurer un dialogue sur le sujet, rappelant ainsi l’esprit d’un Commonwealth en phase avec la politique étrangère canadienne.

19 On voit à travers ces différents exemples que l’objectif premier du Canada était de préserver le Commonwealth, et non de trouver une solution à la crise rhodésienne, ce qui est corroboré par ailleurs par le fait qu’après avoir désamorcé les problèmes lors des conférences de 1966, Pearson n’a plus pris aucune initiative pour veiller à ce que la Grande-Bretagne tienne ses engagements par exemple (HAYES 1982 :168). Dès lors, alors que pendant les crises de Suez et d’Afrique du sud, le Canada était apparu comme un élément modernisateur, il se plaça surtout en gardien des acquis pendant la crise de Rhodésie. Cependant, si cette volonté de sauvegarder l’esprit du Commonwealth l’avait conduit parfois à défendre la Grande-Bretagne, le Canada n’avait pas pour autant changé sa perspective sur le Commonwealth, et il existait en la matière une réelle continuité avec les gouvernements précédents. Depuis 1949, le Canada avait veillé à ce que le principe d’égalité, condition du fonctionnement du Commonwealth, ne soit pas rompu par la volonté de domination d’un membre ou groupe de membres sur un autre ou sur l’esprit du Commonwealth. L’engagement du Canada aux côtés de la Grande- Bretagne était ainsi avant tout circonstanciel et lié à la volonté de sauvegarder le Commonwealth tel qu’il avait évolué depuis 1949, sous son égide.

Les dilemmes de l’institutionnalisation

Un Commonwealth moins canadien

20 Avec la crise rhodésienne, la position du Canada était différente de celle qui avait prévalu lors des crises de Suez et sud-africaine car il apparut assez rapidement que les Etats africains, forts de leur nombre, allaient adopter une attitude peu compatible avec

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la recherche d’un consensus, et que la Grande-Bretagne ne se laisserait pas lier les mains. Au sujet de la conférence de 1964, Pearson écrit : This conference was different than any I had attended in London. There was still a family atmosphere, but also frankness of discussion which would certainly have led to a break-up at the United Nations in New York, and which, indeed, put quite a strain on the Commonwealth. The Canadian delegation actively tried to use its influence to prevent disintegration. (PEARSON 1975 : 283)

21 Si l’idée de franchise n’est pas en soi négative dans le cadre de discussions informelles, le fait qu’elle soit introduite par « mais » la présente comme une gêne plus que comme un atout. L’opposition avec une situation similaire au sein des Nations-Unies montre en creux combien la sauvegarde de l’esprit du Commonwealth était importante à ses yeux.

22 Alors qu’il évoluait avec aisance au sein d’un Commonwealth euro-asiatique dont il avait contribué à défendre l’indépendance vis-à-vis de la Grande-Bretagne, Pearson ne se sentait pas à l’aise avec des conférences du Commonwealth rassemblant un si grand nombre de chefs d’Etats3 (ASHTON, 84). Le principe de consultation et l’informalité des échanges, si chers au gouvernement canadien, pouvaient difficilement être mis en œuvre dans le cadre d’une organisation aussi nombreuse. Pearson partageait les réserves de Wilson au sujet de l’organisation d’une conférence exceptionnelle, avec la Rhodésie pour seul sujet, qui plus est en Afrique, en janvier 1966 (TNA, PREM 13/776). Lors de la conférence de septembre 1966 le gouvernement canadien désapprouva la tenue de « comités » où se retiraient la plupart des membres afro-asiatiques pour discuter de leurs positions communes au sujet de la Rhodésie, et dont les autres membres étaient exclus. Mr. Pearson (Canada) hoped that a pattern had be not been established for the method of dealing with Rhodesia at further meetings. It would be most undesirable for the Commonwealth if the holding of formal caucuses were to become a habit as was the case in the United Nations. (COMSEC, CPM 66-2)

23 Pearson considérait que ces réunions nuisaient à l’esprit du Commonwealth dans la mesure où elles favorisaient les postures rigides plutôt que le dialogue, mais également parce que cela opérait une division raciale du Commonwealth. Ce point de vue n’était cependant pas partagé par le nouveau Secrétaire général du Commonwealth selon lequel elles auraient permis de calmer la virulence de certains dirigeants (SMITH 1981 : 67), même si les comptes rendus des discussions de septembre 1966 peuvent faire douter de l’efficacité du procédé.

Tensions entre Canadiens ? La création du Secrétariat général

24 Lorsqu’en 1964, le Ghana proposa la création d’un secrétariat général du Commonwealth, le Canada, qui s’était toujours opposé à la création d’une institution centralisatrice (SPENCER 1959 : 366), s’y résigna plus qu’il ne l’encouragea. Si l’initiative visait à retirer à la Grande-Bretagne ses dernières prérogatives sur la gestion du Commonwealth, puisque c’est elle qui en assurait toujours l’administration, elle ne rassurait pas pour autant les Canadiens, attachés à l’informalité de l’association.

25 Avec la perspective d’une division plus profonde du Commonwealth en cas de déclaration unilatérale d’indépendance, la création d’une institution impartiale était toutefois susceptible de restaurer le dialogue et de promouvoir la compréhension mutuelle. Pour le Canada, le secrétariat était devenu, par l’effet combiné de

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l’augmentation du nombre de membres, la crise de confiance induite par le problème rhodésien, et la crainte que l’Est ne tire profit des hésitations de l’Ouest vis-à-vis de régimes d’inspiration coloniale, un mal nécessaire, une « évolution non désirée » selon les termes du ministre des affaires extérieures, Paul Martin, mais à l’égard duquel il ne devait pas être vu comme adoptant une « posture négative » (SMITH 1981 : 10).

26 Ainsi, le rôle du Secrétariat fut défini de manière très restrictive par le communiqué de la conférence de 1965. Notamment, il ne devait pas être une « organisation formelle », mais seulement le « symbole visible de l’esprit de coopération » du Commonwealth. Il ne devait pas « s’arroger de fonctions exécutives » mais demeurer au service des Etats membres. Garant du bon fonctionnement du Commonwealth, il devait favoriser les « échanges d’opinion dans une ambiance amicale, informelle et intime » (COMSEC 1987 : 105-106). La fonction fut confiée par les membres du Commonwealth à un diplomate canadien, Arnold Smith. Paradoxalement, sa nomination ne conforta pas la conception canadienne du sens du Commonwealth.

27 D’abord, si Arnold Smith avait été choisi en tant que candidat du Canada par le gouvernement canadien, ce dernier ne fit pas campagne pour lui (MCINTYRE 2000 : 150). Arnold Smith était un diplomate expérimenté (MCINTYRE 1991 : 51), mais il n’était pas un « homme du Commonwealth ». Il assista à sa première conférence en 1964, alors que les positions des différents membres s’étaient déjà radicalisées. Pearson tenta d’influer sur la manière dont ce dernier allait agir, toujours dans l’optique de faire prévaloir la conception canadienne de l’esprit du Commonwealth. A la veille de la conférence de Lagos, il envoya une mise en garde à Smith : I am concerned, too, that during this state of its development the Secretariat should not appear to be taking sides rather than representing whatever consensus there may be among the nations whose common interest it is designed to serve. There are undoubtedly times when issues should be brought to a head. Equally, and perhaps more frequently in the field of international relations, there are times when the best course may be to strive to avoid a showdown. My own feeling is that, if the Lagos meeting is to serve any constructive purpose, it must find some means of re-establishing mutual confidence without forcing the discussion through to what might be counted as a clear win or loss for any given point of view. (PEARSON 1975 : 284)

28 L’avertissement de Pearson reflète ses craintes réelles de voir le Secrétaire général prendre parti. Arnold Smith adopta à ses débuts une attitude engagée4, voire quelque peu hostile vis-à-vis du gouvernement britannique. Cela pouvait s’expliquer par la nécessité de se construire une légitimité et de s’affirmer face à une administration britannique parfois peu coopérative (SMITH 1981 : 6) dont il reprenait le rôle, mais peut- être aussi par une certaine reconnaissance vis-à-vis des Etats afro-asiatiques qui avaient soutenu sa candidature quand les membres plus anciens s’étaient montrés peu enthousiastes (MCINTYRE 2000 : 149). Membre de la délégation canadienne lors de la conférence de 1964, Arnold Smith avait contribué à formuler la nouvelle position du Canada sur le bien-fondé d’un organe centralisateur pour le Commonwealth (MCINTYRE 2000 : 148). Il s’appliqua ensuite à faire entendre la voix des membres africains du Commonwealth en acceptant d’organiser la conférence de Lagos, alors que le gouvernement canadien était réservé. Enfin, alors qu’entre les deux conférences de 1966, le gouvernement canadien évoqua essentiellement avec le gouvernement britannique des questions de tactique pour permettre au dialogue de continuer, le Secrétaire général, comme les membres africains, entendait convaincre ce dernier de

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s’engager à ne pas accorder l’indépendance avant l’établissement d’un gouvernement majoritaire (TNA, PREM 13/1120).

29 Arnold Smith dit avoir compris au cours de la conférence de 1964 combien la vision canadienne du Commonwealth inspirée par Mackenzie King était dépassée (MCINTYRE 2000 : 153). Or « les de Mackenzie King » (Canada CC juillet 1964 : 5795) n’ont jamais été oubliées mais plutôt intégrées dans un nouveau paradigme où ce n’était plus la crainte d’une emprise trop importante de la Grande-Bretagne sur le Commonwealth qui justifiait le refus de la centralisation, mais simplement l’expression d’une certaine vision canadienne du Commonwealth. Ainsi le gouvernement canadien acceptait-il un secrétariat coordinateur et facilitateur, mais pas une instance centrale visant à orienter les débats et les priorités et en faire une organisation internationale ordinaire. Pendant la crise de Rhodésie, Pearson, comme Trudeau après lui, n’ont eu de cesse de rappeler aux membres « l’esprit du Commonwealth » afin d’éviter un éclatement de l’association ou sa transformation en une organisation internationale classique : Even the use of the word “organization” creates an impression of a framework which is misleading. The Commonwealth is an organism, not an institution – and this fact gives promise not only of continued growth and vitality, but of flexibility as well. […] The Commonwealth is not a miniature United Nations Organization ; the conference is not a decision-making body. To attempt to convert it would simply underscore differences of opinion ; it would force countries to take sides and to vote against one another. There exist international organizations where this has to be done and where it is done ; the Commonwealth is not and should not become a replica of them. (CANADA CC 1969 : 4461)

30 Les préoccupations de Trudeau à l’issue de la conférence de 1969 font écho à celles de Pearson à Lagos en 1966 : Rhodesia was essentially a British responsibility and the measures to be taken were for Britain to decide. This Meeting had in his view no decision-making machinery by which it could lay down policies for Britain to follow. Equally, future Meetings could not attempt to lay down policies for any other Commonwealth country to follow on any particular issue. These Meetings could, however, offer advice and he was sure that this was helpful in influencing the decisions of the members. (COMSEC CPM 66 : 3)

31 La méfiance envers toute centralisation et l’idée que le Commonwealth ne devait pas être conçu comme un « bloc » à part ou comme une organisation rigide et exclusive (SPENCER 1959 : 365), mais comme une association ouverte et non exclusive qui devait contribuer à la compréhension mutuelle des peuples, était très présente déjà chez Mackenzie King (MACKENZIE 1999 : 83). On observe ainsi, par-delà les évolutions contextuelles et les personnalités politiques, une continuité de l’intérêt du Canada pour un Commonwealth qu’il aura largement contribué à définir, moderniser puis sauvegarder.

Le triomphe de la vision canadienne du Commonwealth ?

32 Le positionnement d’Arnold Smith se rapprocha de celui du Canada à partir de 1967, notamment après certaines initiatives de ce dernier pour limiter la concentration des activités dans les mains du Secrétaire général au profit des représentants des Etats- membres (KENNAIR 2011 : 48-49). Si Smith est resté constant dans ses pressions en faveur de la mise en place d’un gouvernement rhodésien majoritaire avant l’indépendance, il a

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surtout par la suite cherché des moyens de redonner du sens au Commonwealth, notamment en encourageant la Grande-Bretagne à s’engager dans des actions multilatérales de coopération dans le domaine du développement (TNA, PREM 13/1367) qui devaient permettre à la fois de restaurer la confiance5 et de créer de nouveaux liens. De la même façon, Arnold Smith encouragea certains chefs de gouvernement africains, dont Kenneth Kaunda, à ne pas limiter leur vision du Commonwealth au seul fiasco rhodésien : I fully appreciate the frustration which is caused by the failure as yet to resolve the Rhodesian problem, but I still feel that the Commonwealth association can be extremely important in influencing attitudes and therefore policies towards this problem, as well as towards the broader question of the relationships between the rich and the developing nations. (COMSEC, SG172/ZAM)

33 Le fond de coopération technique du Commonwealth (CFTC) fut mis en place lors de la conférence de Singapour en 1971, avec un Canadien à sa tête, et le gouvernement du Canada comme principal contributeur (DOXEY 1989 : 207). La coopération technique était conçue comme le prolongement du dialogue et des échanges amicaux traditionnellement caractéristiques des relations intra-Commonwealth. Cette vision du Commonwealth comme un pont entre le nord et le sud était pleinement partagée et soutenue par Lester Pearson, auquel Smith fit appel pour convaincre un gouvernement britannique peu enthousiaste de la validité du projet qui aboutit à la mise en place, lors de la réunion de hauts-fonctionnaires de Nairobi en 1967, d’une première mouture du CFTC (MCINTYRE 2000 : 155). Conscient des dangers d’une attitude jusqu’au-boutiste des Etats d’Afrique, d’Asie et de la Caraïbe pour le Commonwealth, pour légitimes qu’il ait pu personnellement considérer leurs demandes, Arnold Smith s’est attaché à minimiser, lors de la conférence de Singapour en 1971, la pression exercée sur Edward Heath au sujet de la Rhodésie et des ventes d’armes à l’Afrique du sud, au nom de la réussite de ce nouvel objectif commun qui devait désormais sous-tendre les relations intra-Commonwealth. Le rassemblement du Commonwealth sur le thème de l’aide au développement coïncida d’ailleurs avec la mise en avant de ce thème comme nouvel axe de la politique étrangère canadienne sous le gouvernement Trudeau, à partir de 1968, avec notamment la création de l’agence canadienne de développement international (ACDI), révélant une fois encore la collusion d’intérêts entre le Commonwealth et le Canada.

34 Si les membres sont parvenus à se rassembler autour d’une déclaration des principes, la conférence de 1971 se déroula dans une atmosphère de méfiance et de division. Aussi le Secrétaire général entreprit-il de donner un nouveau souffle à l’esprit du Commonwealth en travaillant sur son principal outil : les réunions de chefs de gouvernement. La conférence d’Ottawa, organisée en 1973, établit, par bien des aspects, la norme des CHOGMs (Commonwealth Heads of Government Meetings), une norme qui s’inspirait largement de la conception canadienne du Commonwealth. Elle fut préparée avec minutie par Pierre Trudeau et Arnold Smith, dans l’objectif de rendre aux CHOGMs leur fonction originelle de cercle de dialogue informel et d’échange d’idées. Afin d’éviter les discours trop longs et préparés à l’avance, pratique qu’il avait profondément déplorée lors de la conférence de 1971 (STORY 1986 : 263), Trudeau organisa des sessions restreintes rassemblant les seuls chefs de gouvernement, sans leurs conseillers. En tant que président de la conférence, il n’hésita pas à interrompre ses homologues au-delà d’un certain temps de parole et à introduire des questions favorisant l’expression spontanée des points de vue. Il eut enfin l’idée d’inviter les chefs

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de gouvernement et leurs épouses à se retrouver pour le week-end en dehors du cadre officiel de la conférence afin de favoriser la constitution de liens amicaux et les discussions informelles. Une retraite sur le modèle établi à Ottawa fut ensuite systématiquement incluse dans le programme des sommets du Commonwealth, dont il fut décidé qu’ils seraient désormais organisés tous les deux ans.

35 D’un certain point de vue, l’institutionnalisation de l’informalité du Commonwealth, à travers la création et l’évolution du Secrétariat général, l’accent sur la coopération multilatérale ou le nouveau format des CHOGMs, aussi paradoxal que cela puisse paraître, avait été nécessaire pour permettre à la vision du nouveau Commonwealth portée par le Canada après 1949, de perdurer.

Conclusion

36 Le Canada a su, pendant ces années de crise, concilier modernité et tradition en se faisant à la fois l’interprète du nouveau Commonwealth façonné par la décolonisation, en même temps que le gardien attentif des valeurs et procédures héritées du Commonwealth britannique dont il fut le premier membre. Depuis la déclaration de Londres jusqu’à la crise rhodésienne, en passant par la crise de Suez et le départ de l’Afrique du sud, le Canada a toujours défendu la même idée d’un Commonwealth informel, multiracial, décentralisé, facilitateur de dialogue. Jusqu’au début des années 1960, le Canada fut le principal vecteur de la lente transformation du Commonwealth britannique en Commonwealth moderne, parvenant à trouver un juste équilibre entre partage de valeurs communes et respect de la souveraineté et de l’indépendance, incarné par le principe d’égalité des membres. Avec la crise de Rhodésie, qui coïncida avec des changements radicaux dans la structure et la composition du Commonwealth, le Canada se replia sur une posture plus conservatrice, visant à préserver les acquis du Commonwealth moderne, puis à tenter de les institutionnaliser.

37 Dès lors, de même que le Canada s’est largement défini, après la seconde guerre mondiale, comme une « puissance moyenne », on peut se demander si, pendant ces années cruciales pendant lesquelles les membres cherchaient un sens à leur association, ce n’est pas justement cette conception d’ « acteur moyen » des relations internationales qui a prévalu pour définir le rôle du Commonwealth. Comme le Canada (GRANATCHTEIN 1990 : 383), le Commonwealth a fini par se trouver un rôle « de niche » dans les relations internationales, souvent en phase avec les priorités de la politique étrangère canadienne. L’influence du Canada fut certainement déterminante en ce qu’elle a favorisé un mode de fonctionnement et des lignes d’action visant d’abord à promouvoir la compréhension et le dialogue entre chefs de gouvernement aux niveaux de développement, cultures et conceptions politiques différents, autrement dit des moyens par lesquels le Commonwealth pouvait apporter une plus-value dans les relations internationales, plutôt que de se positionner sur le même terrain que les organisations internationales mondiales, ce dont il n’avait ni les moyens, ni l’envergure.

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BIBLIOGRAPHIE

ASHTON, S.R. (2007) “British Government Perspectives on the Commonwealth, 1964-71: An Asset or a Liability?”, The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 35(1), pp. 73-94

BOTHWELL, Robert (2007) Alliance and Illusion ; Canada and the World, 1945-1984, Vancouver, University of British Columbia Press

CROS, Laurence (2013) « A New Canada in a New Commonwealth : Multiculturalism Democratic Governance and International Representation », in M. TORRENT et V. ROIRON (dir), Le Commonwealth des Nations en mutation : décolonisations, globalisation et gouvernance, Cahiers Charles V n° 49, université Paris-Diderot pp. 75-94.

DOXEY, Margaret (1989) « Canada and the Commonwealth, 1945-1980 » in Paul PAINCHAUD (dir) De Mackenzie King à Pierre Trudeau, quarante ans de diplomatie canadienne, Presses de l’université de Laval, pp. 193-215.

GRANATCHTEIN, J.L. et BOTHWELL, Robert (1990) Pirouette : Pierre Trudeau and Canadian foreign policy, University of Toronto Press.

HARNETTY, Peter (1963) “Canada, South Africa, and the Commonwealth, 1960-61”, Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies, 2(1), pp. 33-44.

HAYES, Franck R. (1982) “Canada, the Commonwealth and the Rhodesia Issue” in Richard NOSSAL (dir.), An Acceptance of Paradox : Essays on Canadian Diplomacy in honour of John W. Holmes, Toronto : Canadian Institute of International Affairs, pp. 141-173.

HENSHAW, Peter (1999) “Canada and the ‘South African Disputes’ at the United Nations, 1946-1961”, Canadian Journal of African Studies, 33(1), pp. 1-52.

HYAM, Ronald (1998) “The parting of the ways : Britain and South Africa’s departure from the commonwealth, 1951–61”, The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 26(2), pp. 157-175

KENNAIR, John (2011) A Forgotten Legacy : Canadian Leadership of the Commonwealth, Trafford Publishing.

MCINTYRE, W. David (1991) The significance of the Commonwealth, 1965-1990, Londres : Macmillan

______(2000) “Britain and the Creation of the Commonwealth Secretariat”, The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 28(1), pp. 135-158

MACKENZIE, Hector (1999) “An Old Dominion and the New Commonwealth : Canadian Policy on the Question of India’s Membership, 1947-49”, Journal of Imperial & Commonwealth History, 27(3), pp. 82-112.

OGDEN, Richard (1964) “The Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference”, International Journal, Canada’s Journal of Global Policy Analysis, XIX(4), pp. 545-550

PEARSON, Lester B. (1974), The International Years : the Memoirs of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson, volume 2, 1948-1957, (1973), Londres : Victor Gollancz.

______(1975) Mike : The Memoirs of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson, volume 3, 1957-1968, University of Toronto Press

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REDEKOP, Clarence G. (1982) “Canada, the Commonwealth and the Rhodesia Issue” in R. NOSSAL (dir.), An Acceptance of Paradox : Essays on Canadian Diplomacy in honour of John W. Holmes, Toronto : Canadian Institute of International Affairs, pp. 174-195

ROIRON, Virginie (2013) « De Londres à Singapour : la longue marche du Commonwealth vers l’institutionnalisation » in M. TORRENT et V. ROIRON (dir), Le Commonwealth des Nations en mutation : décolonisations, globalisation et gouvernance, Cahiers Charles V n° 49, université Paris-Diderot, pp. 31-56.

______(2013) « L’impact de la crise rhodésienne sur les relations entre la Grande-Bretagne et les États africains du Commonwealth », Revue Française de Civilisation Britannique, 18(2), pp. 47-64

SMITH, Arnold (1981), Stitches in Time : The Commonwealth in World Politics, Don Mills, Ontario : General Publishing.

SPENCER, Robert (1959), Canada in World Affairs, From UN to NATO, 1946-1949, Toronto : Oxford University Press

SPRY, Graham (1957), “Canada, the United Nations Emergency Force and the Commonwealth”, International Affairs, vol. 33 : n° 3, pp. 289-300.

STORY, Donald C. (1986) “Trudeau’s Commonwealth : A Process Rather Than an Influence”, Dalhousie Review, 66(3), pp. 256-274.

THOMSON, D.C. (1967), “India and Canada : a decade of cooperation, 1947-1957”, International Studies, vol. 9 : n° 404, pp. 404-430.

WATTS, Carl (2008) “Britain, the Old Commonwealth and the Problem of Rhodesian Independence, 1964-65”, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 36(1), pp. 75-99.

Sources primaires

Gouvernement britannique (TNA)

CAB 21/5512, Draft Cabinet Paper, 1964

CAB 130/266, MISC 100/A (66) 12, Future Policy, 1er avril 1966

PREM 11/3537, message de Macmillan à Diefenbaker, 18 novembre 1960

PREM 13/178, télégramme d’Ottawa au Commonwealth Relations Office, n° 1695, 31 décembre 1964

PREM 13/776, discussion entre Lester Pearson et Harold Wilson, 2 janvier 1966

PREM 13/782, conversation entre le Premier ministre et le Premier ministre du Canada, 4 septembre 1966

Secrétariat général du Commonwealth (COMSEC)

Commonwealth Secretariat (1987) The Commonwealth at the Summit : Communiqués of Commonwealth Heads of Government Meetings, 1944-1986.

C152/3/3, réunion entre le premier ministre britannique et le Secrétaire général du Commonwealth, 15 juillet 1966

CPM (66), Compte-rendu des discussions de la réunion des Premiers ministres du Commonwealth, 4ème réunion, Lagos, janvier 1966

CPM (66-2), Compte-rendu des discussions de la réunion des Premiers ministres du Commonwealth, 5ème session restreinte, Londres, septembre 1966.

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SG172/ZAM, lettre d’Arnold Smith à Kenneth Kaunda, 10 novembre 1967

Débats du parlement canadien

Canada, Chambre des Communes (CC), Débats (4 mai 1964), 26ème parlement, 2ème session, vol. 3

Canada, Chambre des Communes (CC), Débats (17 juillet 1964) 26ème parlement, 2ème session, vol. 6

Canada, Chambre des Communes (CC), Débats (20 janvier 1969) 28ème parlement, 1ère session, vol. 4

Canada, Chambre des Communes (CC), Débats, (15 décembre 1970) 28ème parlement, 3ème session, vol. 2

NOTES

1. Wilson refusera toujours de s’engager de manière claire sur le slogan NIBMAR (No Independence Before Majority Rule), selon lui trop connoté racialement, lui préférant le principe selon lequel le gouvernement devrait être « acceptable pour le peuple rhodésien tout entier » qu’il considérait plus démocratique (TNA, CAB 130/266). 2. “Their purpose at the Lagos conference had been to play for time and they had achieved this.” 3. La dernière conférence à laquelle Pearson avait assisté en 1956 rassemblait 9 chefs de gouvernement. Ils étaient 18 autour de la table en 1964, 23 en 1966, 29 en 1969, et 32 en 1971 et 1973. 4. Arnold Smith n’a pas caché sa déception à l’égard de la politique britannique à l’égard de la Rhodésie, et recommandait l’usage de la force avant et après la rébellion (SMITH 1981 : 58). 5. Dès avant la conférence de septembre, Arnold Smith avait abordé avec Wilson le sujet du développement économique multilateral comme moyen de ne pas briser les relations au sein du Commonwealth : “Both the British Prime Minister and the Secretary General agreed that if agreement could be reached at the Prime Ministers’ meeting on a suitable programme, it would provide something positive to emerge out of the meeting”. (COMSEC, C152/3/3)

RÉSUMÉS

Cet article propose d’étudier le sens du rôle du Canada pendant la crise rhodésienne au sein d’un Commonwealth cherchant ses marques entre la gestion de l’héritage impérial et les défis postcoloniaux. Vecteur de la modernisation du Commonwealth pendant la décennie précédente, il a adopté une attitude plus conservatrice à l’égard du Commonwealth au début des années 1960. Le Canada a su concilier modernité et tradition en se faisant à la fois l’interprète du nouveau Commonwealth façonné par la décolonisation en même temps que le gardien attentif des valeurs et procédures héritées du Commonwealth britannique dont il fut le premier membre.

This article enquires into the meaning of Canada’s role in the Commonwealth during the Rhodesian crisis, as the association was struggling to define a new identity for itself between imperial legacy and post-colonial challenges. While Canada had been a major vehicle for Commonwealth modernization during the past decade, she adopted a more conservative stance

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towards the Commonwealth as the Rhodesian quagmire unfolded. Canada managed nevertheless to reconcile modernity and tradition by becoming the main interpreter of the “new Commonwealth” as it emerged from the decolonization process while remaining the vigilant guardian of its values and processes.

AUTEUR

VIRGINIE ROIRON Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Strasbourg

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Chrétien and the Commonwealth: Successes and Failures in Canada’s Role as a Middle Power

Glen M.E. Duerr

1 Jean Chrétien’s time as prime minister from 1993 to 2003 is one that can now be viewed with a little historical distance and less political dogmatism. Politically, Chrétien was (and remains) a major proponent of multilateralism. He worked hard, along with his colleagues around the world, to build a better world as he saw fit. But, on occasion, this did not happen and the world did not progress forward. This paper investigates this dynamic between Chrétien’s legacy and his use of multilateralism, especially through one important institution, the Commonwealth of Nations.

2 Jean Chrétien led the Liberal Party to three straight majorities in the House of Commons, in 1993, 1997, and 2000. After he left office in 2003, his successor, rival, and former finance minister, Paul Martin, then won a minority in Parliament in 2004 preserving, at least for a short period of time, the Liberal Party government. Chrétien governed at a time when the New Democratic Party (NDP) was weak, the conservative wing of Canada was divided between Reform/Canadian Alliance and the Progressive Conservatives, and the Liberal Party core was typically strong and disciplined despite some high profile quarrels. Chrétien did compete against a very powerful Bloc Quebecois (BQ) which, somewhat strangely, became the official opposition after the 1993 election. He faced challenges throughout the country, from inside and outside of his party, but managed to strongly lead Canada for a decade. In fact, Chrétien, among other prime ministers, was so powerful that Globe and Mail journalist, Jeffrey Simpson, described Chrétien playing a part in leading a “friendly dictatorship” (SIMPSON 2002).

3 During his time as prime minister, Jean Chrétien attended five Commonwealth meetings in his ten-year period as Canada’s head of government. Commonwealth meetings are held on a biannual basis; although, the meetings are not held at the exact same time on each occasion. Chrétien’s election came just after the 1993 Commonwealth meeting in Cyprus, but he attended the conferences in New Zealand in 1995, the United Kingdom in 1997, South Africa in 1999, Australia in 2002, and Nigeria

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in 2003 (the latter was held at the very end of his tenure as prime minister). On each occasion, Chrétien had the ability to discuss — and build rapport — with world leaders. In essence, the Commonwealth provides another multilateral forum from which to discuss major global issues, and to further diplomacy between countries. Even though the Commonwealth has limited formal powers, regular meetings amongst world leaders at international forums like the Commonwealth help to build personal rapport amongst leaders, which, under the right circumstances, can lead to further multilateral cooperation at other, more powerful forums like the United Nations (UN) or the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO).

4 Under Chrétien, the Commonwealth received some attention, but not much. In his autobiography, Chrétien only mentioned the Commonwealth a few times. One such example, in a meeting in New Zealand, took on the very serious discussion of Nigerian human rights violations in the mid-1990s (CHRÉTIEN 2010: 365). He also noted the collective decision to expel Zimbabwe from the Commonwealth in his last meeting in Abuja in 2003 where Chrétien stood in opposition to the UK and Australia on the method of how to, in a gentler way, expel Zimbabwe from the organization with the door left open for re-entry if the necessary reforms were undertaken by the Mugabe government (CHRÉTIEN 2010: 367).

5 Perhaps the most important piece of evidence regarding Chretien’s Commonwealth policy was his speech entitled, “Making progress through multilateralism” given at the Commonwealth annual speech in 2004, just after he had left office as prime minister. In his speech, he notes that international institutions “like the Commonwealth and the United Nations” have “enhanced our ability to be constructive” and “to resolve major global challenges” (CHRÉTIEN 2004). Within the Commonwealth, Chrétien notes, is the ability to more regularly dialogue with other countries, and to have “fruitful nation to nation conversations”. One of the major issues in Chrétien’s speech, however, is that he once again only mentioned the Commonwealth sparingly. He noted many successes of Canadian foreign policy—typically through the UN—but only turned to focus on the Commonwealth at the end of his speech.

6 The end of Chrétien’s speech does, however, highlight the successes of the Commonwealth during his time as prime minister. He notes that the Commonwealth “stood united against Apartheid”. He also notes the role played by the Commonwealth in restoring a form of democracy in Nigeria with the release of political prisoners, including future president Olesegun Obasanjo (CHRÉTIEN 2004). Finally, he argues that the Commonwealth played a role in “bringing healing and democratic rule in Zimbabwe”, a point that is very heavily contested by many scholars and organizations. Although, Zimbabwe holds regular elections, the outcomes cannot be considered free or fair, which is a baseline definition of democracy.

7 One important facet of the Commonwealth, Chrétien notes, is that “Leaders’ Retreat” in which the leaders of Commonwealth countries are able to meet, discuss issues, and find consensus (CHRÉTIEN 2004). In this way, Chrétien further acknowledges that the role of the Commonwealth helps to facilitate the work of the UN. In some ways, Chrétien used the Commonwealth to bolster Canada’s role on the world stage, but, in truth, there was also much more that could have been done. Although the Commonwealth does not have binding power around the world, there were plenty of issues that could have been further discussed or promoted through the Commonwealth during Chrétien’s time in

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office. This article assesses the legacy of Jean Chrétien with regards to his involvement (and sometimes lack thereof) in using the Commonwealth to tackle larger global issues.

Canada as a “Middle Power”

8 Any discussion of power requires at least a brief investigation of international relations theory. In particular, the realist and liberal schools of thought are most direct in their assessment of the role of states, international institutions, and power asymmetry in the world. Canada will likely never challenge the predominant powers of the world, but, at the same time, Canada still possesses considerable economic, political, and technological strength. It has an important role to play, then, as a “middle power”. The realist school of thought (MORGENTHAU 1948; WALTZ 1979; MEARSHEIMER 2001; SCHWELLER 1998)1 examines the special roles of economic and military power in the world. Since the United States is still the world’s most predominant power, Canada’s position next to the United States is impacted by geography. Most notably, Canada’s role as a middle power is also influenced by Hegemonic Stability Theory (GILPIN 1981), which argues that the world system is most secure (and peaceful) with the position of a major hegemonic power. But what can Canada do then if geographically located next to the hegemon? The liberal school of thought (DOYLE 1986; KEOHANE AND NYE 1977)2 investigates the role of cooperation in the international arena. Most notable are international institutions — like the Commonwealth — in promoting peace and norms across the world. Canada’s role as a middle power can be most forceful and helpful to world politics by utilizing multilateral institutions wherever and whenever the need arises. A middle power can also balance between hard and soft forms of power (NYE 1990; NYE 2004) to leverage Canada’s position and influence to change and impact the world through agreements and treaties, rather than through the use of military power or economic sanctions (which still remain as policy options if negotiations fail).

9 Canada, given its geographic proximity to the United States, has long sought a foreign policy as a “middle power” (NEUFELD 1995; CHAPNICK 2005). Canada does not have the power to compete economically and militarily with the United States, but the country is a fairly large—and powerful—state, despite being overshadowed by its neighbour. Canadians themselves have contributed to this perception. Rather than settling for being a small power, Canada has taken on the mantle of adopting a strategy to impact the world in niche areas as a “middle power”. By invoking the term, “power”, successive Canadian governments have acknowledged the realist reality in the world that there are threats to world security. However, a middle power also more frequently utilizes international organisations to promote normative changes in the world in favour of human rights and democracy. Liberalism, or more narrowly, liberal internationalism, is a theoretical perspective through which Canada’s impact on world affairs can be viewed.

10 This essay investigates this intersection: Canada’s role as a middle power in the Chrétien years with respect to his use of multilateral organizations, notably the Commonwealth. Although a fuller discussion of the Chrétien years requires an overarching examination of his foreign policy strategy throughout all years and with all institutions, a more narrow focus on the Commonwealth provides an opportunity to assess successes and failures of his opportunity to further Canada’s role as a middle

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power in light of Hegemonic Stability Theory and the current balance of global power in the Twenty-first Century.

11 By the time Chrétien became prime minister he had already had a lot of experience in a range of different government positions. His foreign affairs experience, while noteworthy, was not as comprehensive as other areas though. He briefly served as the Secretary of State for External Affairs (now Minister of Foreign Affairs) under the brief tenure of former Prime Minister, John Turner in 1984. Chrétien coterminously served as Deputy Prime Minister, though, so his specific attention on foreign affairs was more limited. This was also a time in which Chrétien had just lost his challenge to become the leader of the Liberal Party to John Turner, also in 1984 (MARTIN 1995: 341). Therefore, Chrétien was very familiar with the workings of government by the time he became prime minister. He was also acutely aware of the relationship between Canada and the United States, and the ways that Canada could promote its own values on the world stage.

12 Canada’s middle power strategy has been aided by a presence in the Commonwealth. Although not as forceful as other international institutions, Canada has impacted the world through the use of the Commonwealth.

Canada and the Commonwealth

13 Although an in depth review of the Commonwealth is outside of the scope of this project, there are a few important dates and events that mark important changes to Canada and its role within the organisation3. The Commonwealth was initially formed in 1926 out of the dominions of the British Empire. This nascent organisation was more formally developed in 1931 with the Statute of Westminster, which, among other things, gave Canada much more formal independence from the United Kingdom (Canada became a distinct entity in 1867 with the British North America Act, but was still governed by Westminster in foreign policy). Canada joined the Commonwealth when the organisation was created alongside Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa.4 Put simply, the Commonwealth was a mechanism of maintaining the structure and entities contained within the British Empire, but also of engaging in the process of decolonisation at the same time.

14 Canada played a significant role in the Commonwealth and was at the forefront of major discussions such as the London (1949), Singapore (1971), and Harare Declarations (1991). These declarations helped to solidify important norms within the organisation and in the realm of international affairs. In essence, the Commonwealth played a larger role in world affairs. The Commonwealth also gave middle powers, like Canada, an opportunity to influence and shape policy throughout the world.

15 In recent decades, Canada has played an active role in other multilateral organisations as well such as the UN, NATO, the G7/G8,5 the G20, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and La Francophonie. In some ways, these other organisations have helped to raise the profile of Canada, but, in other ways, Canada is less influential in the world. The Commonwealth is unique in the sense that Canada is able to influence West Africa, southern Africa, South Asia, the Caribbean, the South Pacific, and Oceania, among other regions of the world. The growth of Canada’s global role has, however, diminished the role the country plays in the Commonwealth. In Canadian foreign

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policy the Commonwealth has become less of a vital resource. In the words of political scientist, David Black, it has become a “wasting asset” (BLACK 2010).

16 Alongside a discussion of the Commonwealth, it is specifically worth highlighting that Canada is a member of La Francophonie—in essence, a French version of the Commonwealth created in 1970. Canada’s large French-speaking population rooted in modern-day Quebec’s connection to the French Empire speaks to Canada’s dual language and heritage. Although Canada had expressly refuted the growth of La Francophonie in the 1960s (SRINIVASAN 2005: 92), the first Summit was held in 1986 (a few years prior to Chrétien’s leadership of Canada). In fact, Canada hosted the second summit in 1987 in Quebec City, the eighth summit in Moncton, New Brunswick in 1999 (under Chrétien’s tenure), and the twelfth summit in Quebec City in 2008.

17 Chrétien’s role in the Commonwealth should also be noted in light of the role of La Francophonie, and the delicate nature of dealing with an increasingly restive secessionist movement in Quebec throughout the 1990s, which continues today, only with slightly less intensity. Canada’s role in the Commonwealth overlapped with La Francophonie on several occasions. Most notably, Canada’s membership in the Commonwealth helped the country to carefully critique France without overtly jeopardising the Canadian-French relationship. At the 1995 Commonwealth conference in Australia, for example, the members of the Commonwealth were able to collectively condemn the French nuclear tests in the South Pacific, which occurred right before the start of the conference (SRINIVASAN 2005: 141). Canada was able to criticize France within the multilateral organisation without the need to castigate French behaviour and hurt the bilateral relationship.

18 The Commonwealth is not a major global institution — at least as compared to the UN or the European Union — but it remains important for several reasons. It unites almost one-third of the countries of the world, it provides historic and institutional connections, it serves as the second largest multi-sport event in the world behind the Olympics, and unites many English-speaking peoples of the world.

19 For a country like Canada, membership in the UN, World Trade Organisation, and NAFTA are now considered the most important relationships. These relationships are both pivotal to Canada’s political and economic role in the world. However, within the Commonwealth, Canadian leaders are regularly able to meet with other world leaders who share similar values and history. In some ways, the Commonwealth helps Canadian prime ministers in other multilateral institutions because it gives them greater exposure to these other world leaders, and more opportunities to rally support for pressing contemporary issues. Former foreign affairs minister, Lloyd Axworthy, (who served as Chrétien’s second foreign affairs minister from 1996 to 2000) acknowledges that “over the years our aid efforts and our membership in the Commonwealth and La Francophonie brought us into contact with nations in those areas (the Americas and Africa)” (AXWORTHY 2004: 238). The context of the quote is that Canada was able to play a more significant role at the UN because of Canada’s other multilateral priorities.

20 However, over time, Canada’s role in the Commonwealth has diminished as other multilateral institutions have become important. The decreased role of Canada in the Commonwealth was not initiated by Jean Chrétien, but it continued to decline in popularity during his time as prime minister. In essence, he did nothing outstanding to reverse the trend. Consider, in contrast, that Canada — and Canadians more broadly —

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held strong and very positive views of the role of the Commonwealth for its first 50 years (BLACK 2010: 61).

Chrétien’s Commonwealth-driven successes in Nigeria and at the UN

21 During Chrétien’s time within the Commonwealth, the organization advanced with the creation of a significant document, which built upon the Harare Declaration of 1991. After the 1995 meeting, the Millbrook Commonwealth Action Programme instituted the promotion of democracy within the Commonwealth. Heads of Government agreed the Millbrook Commonwealth Action Programme on the Harare Declaration, designed to fulfil more effectively the democracy and development commitments contained in the Harare Declaration. They established the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group on the Harare Declaration to deal with serious or persistent violations of the Harare principles.

22 Millbrook provides a norm against a coup d’etat within a member state and provides, at least on paper, the Commonwealth with an important ability to expel members who violate the democratic norms of the organisation (Millbrook Commonwealth Action Programme on the Harare Declaration, 1995). In effect, the Millbrook programme affords greater powers to the Commonwealth Secretariat.

23 Another significant area of success in the Commonwealth was promoting democracy (or at least elections) in Nigeria. The Chrétien government played a major role in sanctioning Nigeria for its lack of democratic rights. After holding an election in 1993, then reneging on the results, Nigeria military dictatorship remained in power, which, to the chagrin of the international community, still involved significant human rights abuses. The Commonwealth intervened as a major international institution with the ability to pressure the bad behaviour of the Nigerian authoritarian government. Lloyd Axworthy, Canada’s representative in the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group (CMAG) joined with his fellow foreign ministers to implement the Harare Declaration (AXWORTHY 2004: 224). Over the issue of Nigeria, the members of the Commonwealth were divided as to how to proceed. Some members advocated harsh measures; whereas others wanted to push Nigeria towards reform without embarrassing the country on the world stage. On this issue, Canada broke with Britain and Australia on harshly reproving Nigeria and opting to implement the principles of Harare and push for careful reforms (AXWORTHY 2004; CHRÉTIEN 2010). Canada took a leading role on Nigeria through the Commonwealth by engaging the Nigerian government for reform, but also by sending a “strong signal” that reform was expected (AXWORTHY 2004: 225). Canada implemented a range of sanctions aimed at the Nigerian leadership in order to deter bad behaviours. Nigeria reacted by closing their high commission in Ottawa and by blaming Canada in the media for bomb attacks in the country (which turned out to be carried out by dissident groups within the country) (AXWORTHY 2004: 225). Despite the difficult turn in the Nigerian-Canadian relationship, Nigeria was invited to London to discuss its role in the Commonwealth. Nigeria wanted to remain within the Commonwealth, but General Sani Abacha was unwilling to change. When Abacha died suddenly in 1998, his successor was eager to remove Nigeria’s suspension from the Commonwealth and opened the country to new elections in 1999 — a time when Nigeria was more democratic (AXWORTHY 2004: 227).

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24 Outside of specific Commonwealth changes, perhaps the most successful part of Chrétien’s legacy has been the international move to eliminate the use of landmines in warfare. This is his premier legacy on the world stage, despite the fact that not all countries support this policy. Chrétien has often noted that the regular meetings with Commonwealth leaders helped to build relationships, which helped to make changes on the international stage. Canada’s ongoing role facilitated the development of core peace treaties, most notably the Ottawa Treaty.

25 The Ottawa Treaty was first launched in 1996 as a means to decreasing—and then eliminating—the use of landmines in war. More formally, the treaty was drafted in mid-1997 and entered into force in March 1999 making Canada a major spotlight in the world. With the ratification of the treaty, Canada’s role as middle power was obvious. Canada played a significant role in changing the norms and expectations of the world despite its status as a middle power, rather than a superpower.

26 At the time of writing (November 2013), 161 states in the world are part of the Ottawa Treaty. The vast majority of Commonwealth countries supported Canada’s efforts to eradicate the usage of personal land mines. In doing so, the world could be safer for civilians especially those living in post-conflict areas. Under the Ottawa Treaty, signee states are expected to eradicate their landmine stockpiles, and then pledge not to purchase more at a later date. In effect, the norm for peace grows, and the reality of the loss of life and limbs decreases.

27 In using the Commonwealth, the Chrétien government specifically helped to bring change in Nigeria, and around the world with the Ottawa Treaty. Canada also played an important role in the NATO campaign in the former Yugoslavia in the late 1990s. While Russia vetoed the proposed UN Security Council Resolution, Chrétien forged ahead with a desire to prevent another genocide. Although Canada’s role in both Bosnia and Kosovo was not at the forefront like the other cases, Canada used multilateralism to bring change in the world and through two missions: Stabilization Force and Kosovo Force, peace was restored in the Balkans. The Chrétien government deserves credit here for using multilateral institutions to promote peace and to further Canada’s role as a middle power.

Chretien’s Commonwealth failures in Zimbabwe, Rwanda, and Sri Lanka

28 Throughout Chrétien’s tenure as prime minister, there were failures as well. There are limits as to what can be fully blamed on any given prime minister because there are almost 200 other countries in the world responsible for world affairs, but there were times when Canada could have — and should have — done more in the world.

29 Chrétien’s failures are most noteworthy in the civil wars of Rwanda and Sri Lanka, as well as the inability to act for real and viable change in Zimbabwe. Since both Sri Lanka and Zimbabwe were Commonwealth members at least at some point during Chrétien’s time as prime minister, he had the opportunity to act. In the case of Rwanda, Canada played a very significant role in the country, and could have mobilised other members of the Commonwealth in southern Africa to help.

30 The country of Rwanda joined the Commonwealth in 2009 becoming only the second state with no formal links to Britain (after Mozambique) to accede to the organisation.

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This country in southern Africa and its horrific history in the 1990s is a major reason why Chrétien’s legacy was sullied as a result of an inability to mobilize multilateralism to prompt a dictator to reform, and to stop a genocide. Obviously, Chrétien cannot take all the blame as the United States was in a very strong geopolitical position to help. But Canada could have played a role if it helped to assemble an international coalition to at least minimize the bloodshed. Perhaps a well-organized (and well-armed) international force of a few thousand personnel could have altered the extent of the genocide dramatically.6 The international community — including Canada — sat idly by and watched as 800,000 people were slaughtered over the course of 100 days in mid-1994.

31 Perhaps one of the major reasons for the inability — and unwillingness — to act in Rwanda was a result of military resources. Canada’s military fought with distinction in numerous major wars, but, especially in recent years, has faced significant budget and troop cuts. Historian, J.L. Granatstein argues that Chrétien played a role in “killing” the Canadian military by slashing the budget and stalling significant necessary equipment and technology upgrades during the 1990s and 2000s (GRANATSTEIN 2004: 163). This discussion, although not central to this work, reflects a wider debate on the role of the Canadian military and the ability to respond to crises around the world in the case of genocide.

32 The Rwandan genocide is particularly painful for Canada given the prominence of Canadians in the UN at the time. Canada also gave more money (per capita) to Rwanda than any other country in sub-Saharan Africa at that time — the linkages between the two countries were strongly in place (DALLAIRE 2003: 216). Moreover, since many members of the Commonwealth are located in southern Africa, it could have been an opportunity for Canada to emerge as a significant middle power with the ability to do real good in the world, like stopping the genocide. Canadian, Lieutenant General, Roméo Dallaire, was head of the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) during the crisis. Despite his best efforts, Canada and other members of the international community did not respond to his calls for help as the genocide started and then led to widespread bloodshed. The Canadian government, Dallaire notes, did not have a “coherent and integrated policy toward Rwanda, only isolated department initiatives that in a time of crisis did not come together” (DALLAIRE 2003: 216).

33 Rwanda is a case where Chrétien’s legacy must be evaluated negatively. Adding to the sense of shame is that Canada played a prominent role in the mission to protect Rwandans. Roméo Dallaire tried to stop the slaughter of ethnic Tutsi’s (and moderate Hutu’s) by radical Hutu’s, but without any support, he was not able to singly prevent the genocide. Canada could have taken a leading role, or mobilized support through the Commonwealth to stop the genocide. Of course, hindsight is twenty-twenty and it was not expected that Rwanda would descend into extreme violence so quickly. Nonetheless, Rwanda ranks as a failure for many world leaders, including Prime Minister Chrétien. He, and other world leaders, have often expressed regret at their inaction to stop the genocide.

34 Zimbabwe, in many respects and by many statistical measures, is one of the worst countries in the world. The great shame is that Zimbabwe had much potential prior to Robert Mugabe’s time as president. Moreover, many countries in southern Africa are beginning to thrive economically with young, vibrant, and transparent leadership combined with robust institutions that have created fair societies within which business can flourish (RADELET 2010).

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35 Over time Zimbabwe continued to score worse on economic, transparency, and political freedom indicators. One role for the Commonwealth under Section 8 of the Harare Declaration was to work on “democracy, democratic processes and institutions which reflect national circumstances, the rule of law and the independence of the judiciary, just and honest government” (Harare Commonwealth Declaration 1991). Numerous other parts of Section 8 described economic development, education, health care, and general improvements in the society — none of which could be ascribed to Zimbabwe under Mugabe.

36 Zimbabwe was finally suspended from the Commonwealth in March 2002 — and opted to leave the organisation voluntarily at the end of 2003. Canada’s historic role in the Commonwealth — to push countries to reform whilst remaining in the organisation — proved too soft in the case of Zimbabwe. Although, as noted earlier, this strategy proved successful with Nigeria after a diplomatic rift between the countries, Nigeria made some initial improvements. Zimbabwe has continued to get worse, though, and something could have been done in this regard. Canada has a model of acting with both elements of realism and liberalism in its sanctions of Nigeria, which could have been replicated with Zimbabwe.

37 The Commonwealth could still play a role here in continuing to sanction the Mugabe regime. If all Commonwealth members resolved to limit trade with states like Zimbabwe — similar to the way that the United States has sanctioned Iran over its nuclear program and pressured its trading partners —the situation may have changed by now.

38 Overall, the Zimbabwe situation reflects Chrétien’s larger foreign policy, which was much more cautious than Mulroney’s. Canada had a more reduced international presence in the form of peacekeepers and desire for intervention to stop conflict (NOSSAL 1998/1999: 93-94). Part of this was due to electoral politics where Mulroney was seen to have overstepped his bounds; Chrétien, in contrast, did not do enough. Not acting in the international arena is not necessarily a bad thing, but Chrétien could have made better use of international institutions like the Commonwealth to better seek diplomatic solutions to international crises and issues. By further sanctioning Zimbabwe, the Commonwealth could have sent a much clearer message on the erosion of democracy, the rule of law, and human rights in the country. Furthermore, the Commonwealth could have encouraged members to limit trade, or impose sanctions on the regime, at least until improvements have been made in Zimbabwe. The latter option is quite harsh, but Zimbabwe continues to undergo numerous human rights and economic problems, which will only continue to lessen the opportunities of young people in the country. The Commonwealth has, in essence, done a disservice to Zimbabweans by vacillating too long on this issue.

39 Finally, the case of Sri Lanka is worth noting. Starting in 1983 and ending in 2009, Sri Lanka went through a long and bloody civil war. Although Chrétien can only shoulder minimal blame for the conflict, Canada could have initiated more pressure through the Commonwealth to uphold human rights. Given Canada’s large Tamil population, members of the Liberal government often did speak to the issue of supporting the Tamil minority in Sri Lanka, but this rarely made it to the top levels of government. Chrétien was right to distance himself from the Tamil Tigers within the Sri Lankan civil war, but more pressure for a peaceful resolution of the conflict could have been useful,

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even though Chrétien did give a speech on Canadian federalism as a model for post- conflict resolution in Sri Lanka.

Chretien’s legacy and the Commonwealth

40 Historically, the Commonwealth has provided Canadians with a significant diplomatic opportunity to engage parts of the world more deeply than in other international organizations. While Canada typically seeks to utilize multilateral institutions, the country has relatively little power — or voting rights — when compared to the permanent five members of the UN Security Council, for example.

41 Chrétien’s foreign policy legacy remains noteworthy for some successes — especially through the Commonwealth — with regards to Nigeria. Although Nigeria continues to struggle with governance and identity-based politics, there is a modicum of democratic response to the people. Under Olesugun Obasanjo, Nigeria’s President from 1999 to 2007, it was a better system. Chrétien also used the opportunity of the Commonwealth to help build consensus at other international institutions for issues like the eradication of landmines.

42 There are also a number of notable failures of Chrétien’s foreign policy with regards to the Commonwealth. The Rwandan genocide, the Sri Lankan conflict (which only ended in 2009), and the failure to help reform Zimbabwe are amongst the most notable problems of the era. Again, Chrétien cannot shoulder this criticism alone, but he could have been more assertive in his priorities with regards to applying pressure and ending these conflicts.

43 Overall, Chrétien missed an opportunity to revive the Commonwealth, but did so in choosing to engage other organizations. This is not necessarily a poor strategy for a middle power, but it undercuts Canada’s role in the world where the country could be a major leader in an organisation like the Commonwealth. In terms of international relations theory, Canada’s role as a middle power is a response to the need and desire to impact the world, whilst cognizant of the neighbouring hegemonic power, the United States. Canada’s ability to establish peaceful norms can be completed with a mix of realist and liberal positions. Realism is necessary when situations of conflict arise such as Rwanda, Sri Lanka, or in a different way, Zimbabwe. Overt use of military forces, or military support, can play a role, as do other realist options like economic sanctions, and overt diplomatic pressures. Liberalism, specifically liberal institutionalism, can also play an important role. International institutions like the Commonwealth provide a forum from which to cajole, nudge, and alter the poor behaviour of some states. This provides Canada an opportunity to assert itself as a middle power in the world and to make a real —and lasting — impact.

44 Future Canadian prime ministers could do well by revitalising Canada’s role in the Commonwealth. The organisation could be used in two ways. First, the Commonwealth could do more to promote democracy, the rule of law, and human rights among member states by sanctioning member states that continually violate these norms with impunity. By upholding these norms, Canada could help push the world towards greater responsiveness to the needs of people. Second, the Commonwealth could be used as a “staging ground” for major international reforms like the Ottawa Treaty. By using the Commonwealth members as support, major international treaties could be introduced, debated, and then approved through the organisation. At that point, the

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treaty could be taken to the UN with the full support of all Commonwealth members. In essence, this would be a new tactic, and could provide middle powers like Canada an ability to make greater changes on the world stage.

45 Middle powers like Canada will have little opportunity to utilize hard power politics, which, at times, is necessary to stop genocide. By utilizing support from Commonwealth members, an international coalition could have been constructed to stop the atrocities in Rwanda. Or, alternatively, another organisation like NATO or the African Union to could have been used to intervene, simply with funding commitments from Commonwealth states. At the very least, it would have served to improve Canada’s role on the world stage and revitalise the Commonwealth.

46 Overall, Chrétien maintains an enduring legacy in Canada. Given the nature of polarised politics, part of this legacy depends on support for Liberal candidates. Chrétien did a lot of things well as Prime Minister. However, his use of the Commonwealth as an opportunity for furthering international issues was used, but perhaps underutilized. There are a lot of issues for any given Prime Minister to deal with, but there were times when the Commonwealth could have — and should have been — a higher priority.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

AXWORTHY, Lloyd (2004), Navigating a New World: Canada’s Global Future, Toronto: Alfred A. Knopf.

BLACK, David (2010), “Canada and the Commonwealth: the Multilateral Politics of a ‘Wasting Asset’”. Canadian Foreign Policy, 16:2, pp.61-77.

CHAPNICK, Adam (2005), The Middle Power Project: Canada and the Founding of the United Nations, Vancouver: UBC Press.

CHRÉTIEN, Jean (2004), “Making Progress through Multilateralism” Presentation at the Annual Commonwealth lecture (London, UK, March 30).

______(2010), My Years as Prime Minister. Toronto: Random House Digital.

Commonwealth of Nations. www.thecommonwealth.org

Commonwealth of Nations. Harare Commonwealth Declaration, 1991. http:// thecommonwealth.org/sites/default/files/history-items/documents/ Harare%20Commonwealth%20Declaration%201991.pdf

Commonwealth of Nations. London Declaration, 1949. http://thecommonwealth.org/sites/ default/files/history-items/documents/TheLondonDeclaration1949.pdf

Commonwealth of Nations. Millbrook Commonwealth Action Plan, 1995. http:// thecommonwealth.org/history-of-the-commonwealth/millbrook-commonwealth-action-plan- harare-declaration

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Commonwealth of Nations. Singapore Declaration of Commonwealth Principles, 1971 http:// thecommonwealth.org/sites/default/files/history-items/documents/ Singapore%20Declaration.pdf

DALLAIRE, Roméo A. (2003), Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda, Toronto: Random House Canada.

Freedom in the World. (1999), www.freedomhouse.org

GRANASTEIN, Jack L. (2004), Who Killed the Canadian Military?, Toronto: Harper Perennial Canada.

HALL, Hessel Duncan (1971), Commonwealth: A History of the British Commonwealth of Nations, New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Company.

HANCOCK, William Keith, and LATHAM Richard Thomas Edwin (1977), Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs, Vol. 2, New York: Oxford University Press.

MARTIN, Lawrence (1995), Chrétien: The Will to Win, Vol. 1, Toronto: Lester Publishing.

______(2003), Iron man: the Defiant Reign of Jean Chrétien. Vol. 2, Toronto: Viking Canada.

MURPHY, Philip (2011), “Britain and the Commonwealth: Confronting the Past—Imagining the Future”. The Round Table 100:414, pp.267-283.

NEUFELD, Mark. (1995), “Hegemony and Foreign Policy Analysis: The Case of Canada as Middle Power”. Studies in Political Economy 48: pp.7-29.

NOSSAL, Kim Richard (1998), “Pinchpenny Diplomacy: The Decline of ’Good International Citizenship’ in Canadian Foreign Policy”. International Journal 54:1, pp.88-105.

NYE, Joseph S. (1990), “Soft Power.” Foreign Policy 80, pp.153-171.

______. (2004), Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, New York: Public Affairs.

RADELET, Steven (2010), Emerging Africa: How Seventeen Countries are leading the way, Washington D.C.: CDG Books.

RAVENHILL, John (1998), “Cycles of Middle Power Activism: Constraint and Choice in Australian and Canadian Foreign Policies”. Australian Journal of International Affairs 52:3, pp.309-328.

SIMPSON, Jeffrey (2002), The Friendly Dictatorship, Toronto: McClelland and Stewart.

SRINIVASAN, Krishnan (2005), The Rise, Decline, and Future of the British Commonwealth, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

NOTES

1. These books are amongst the most well-known—and cited—on the topic of realism. They can be found with a quick search on the subject of political realism, structural realism, and neoclassical realism. 2. Like the footnote on realism, these books are amongst the most noteworthy on the topic of liberalism in international relations theory. 3. For a full overview of the Commonwealth see SRINIVASAN 2005; HANCOCK AND LATHAM 1977; HALL 1971 4. Newfoundland was Britain’s oldest dominion, but voted to merge with Canada as its tenth province in 1949 rather than staying as a British colony (SRINIVASAN 2005: 17).

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5. The G6 was formed in 1975. Canada joined the group in 1976, thus creating the G7. In 1997, Russia became the eighth member of the group, thus forming the G8. 6. International Relations scholar, John Mearsheimer of the University of Chicago speculated that even a force of 500 well-trained American (or international) military personnel could have dissuaded much of the bloodshed in a panel discussion at the 2013 International Studies Association annual conference in San Francisco.

ABSTRACTS

Jean Chrétien’s decade-long tenure as Canadian prime minister was marked with numerous overtures for Canada to pursue a path as a “middle power” in world affairs through leadership in multilateral institutions. Specifically, this paper investigates Chrétien’s position within the Commonwealth of Nations as part of this overarching strategy. This analysis finds that Chrétien’s government had a number of noteworthy successes in advancing Nigerian democracy, and garnering support for other international issues in the United Nations — such as the Anti- Personal Mine Ban Convention. However, Chrétien had a number of failures including an inability and unwillingness to press for meaningful reforms in Zimbabwe, stopping the genocide in Rwanda, and stopping civil wars throughout the Commonwealth.

Le mandat de Jean Chrétien comme premier ministre du Canada a été marqué par de nombreuses opportunités pour le Canada de poursuivre une politique internationale de « puissance moyenne », grâce à son leadership dans plusieurs institutions multilatérales. Cet article examine plus précisément la position de Chrétien au sein du Commonwealth, dans le cadre de cette stratégie internationale pour le Canada. Cette analyse montre que le gouvernement Chrétien a obtenu un certain nombre de succès notables en faisant avancer la démocratie au Nigéria, et dans son soutien à d’autres questions internationales au sein des Nations Unies, telle que la Convention d’interdiction des mines anti-personnel. Cependant, Chrétien a également enregistré un certain nombre d’échecs, notamment par son incapacité, ou ses réticences, à faire pression pour obtenir des réformes démocratiques au Zimbabwe, à empêcher le génocide au Rwanda ou les guerres civiles dans certains pays du Commonwealth.

AUTHOR

GLEN M.E. DUERR Cedarville University

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Enhancing Trade Relations between Commonwealth Members: the Case of Canadian and Indian bilateral trade

Claire Heuillard

1 In spite of the huge trade potential on offer within an organization comprising one- third of the world population, enhancing commercial interests has never been one of the explicit aims set out by the Commonwealth. Nonetheless, trade between members has always been significant. In 1949, British trade in goods with the Commonwealth represented roughly 40% of the UK’s total international trade. However, the level gradually declined as Britain turned increasingly towards its European partners. By 2011, UK exports to the Commonwealth area had been reduced to 10.6% of UK international exports, and Commonwealth merchandise only represented 8.8% of UK imports (ALLEN 2012: 8).

2 Britain’s waning interest in her historic partners does not, however, signify a systematic erosion of Commonwealth trade; the zone continues to represent a sizeable proportion of world trade. In 2011, Commonwealth trade as a percentage of total world trade in goods stood at 18% compared with 22% in 1960 – a fairly moderate decline. Equally striking is the geographic distribution of that trade; a very small number of countries account for the vast majority of trade today. Six countries – Singapore, India, Malaysia, Australia, Britain and Canada – represent 84% of intra-Commonwealth exports and within that group, the UK, Canada and India form a subset that makes up 36.83% of exports (SANDERS 2012: 4).

3 While it is true that the United Kingdom continues to act as a trade magnet for many of its former colonies, the ties between other Commonwealth members tend to be more tenuous. Trade relations between Canada and India are a case in point. Deep historic links and enormous growth potential failed to spark Canada-India bilateral trade which remained under-developed throughout the Cold War period.

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4 However, the appearance of 21st century global trade networks has breathed new life into old friendships and Canada’s historic Commonwealth partner is now driving growth at a worldwide level. With India poised to become the world’s third-largest economy in GDP terms by 2030 and set to match the American economy by 2050 many admirers are seeking to rekindle relations with this emerging giant through the creation of new trade agreements. Although the UK’s EU membership prohibits it from independently negotiating trade agreements, making the dream of creating a Commonwealth Free Trade Zone a legal impossibility, this obstacle in no ways precludes the adoption of bilateral agreements by other member countries. Today Canada is in the starting line-up of countries seeking new synergies with India through the adoption of a comprehensive economic partnership agreement.

5 Yet given the deep historic links between Canada and India and their leadership within the Commonwealth both in diplomatic and economic terms, it seems curious that these two countries have dawdled over making their bilateral trade a priority. Why has it taken Ottawa so long to recognize India as a potential source of growth for the Canadian economy? This article seeks to assess the changing landscape of Canada-India trade relations and to examine the dynamics behind the relationship. First, a brief overview of historic trade flows between Canada and India will be given in order to delineate past characteristics and the features of trade that still resonate today. Next, recent trends in the Canadian-Indian relationship in the context of Indian economic liberalization will be explored. Lastly, an attempt will be made to identify some of the forces at the heart of bilateral trade relations by shedding light on the roles of Commonwealth heritage and geo-strategic interests.

1946-2001: Strained Beginnings

6 Canada and India are often portrayed as sharing a special relationship. This image springs from memories of the early political support tendered by Ottawa towards the embryonic India state. As early as 1946, before India even acceded to independence, Canada endorsed the fledgling nation by appointing a High Commissioner to India. Over the following years Ottawa worked alongside India on the international scene on numerous occasions. Yet despite countless signs of diplomatic cooperation, Canada- India trade never managed to bloom.

7 In 1950, the two countries’ bilateral trade represented only about 1% of total Canadian trade (ASSANIE et al. 2003: 7). At this stage in their economic development, rather than stimulating bilateral trade, their Commonwealth heritage left them mired in the remains of a traditional model that was difficult to escape. Both economies exported resource-based products to the UK in exchange for manufactured products while bilateral trade between the two former dominions was limited to specialty products (pulp and paper, sulphur and edible oils exported by Canada; tea and spices exported by India).

8 It was during the 1950s that Canada made its first attempts to modernize the structure of bilateral trade with India. As part of its Commonwealth cooperation, in January 1950, Canada set up an aid plan for India at a meeting in Ceylon. The Colombo Plan was based around development projects that would diversify Canada’s export choices by focusing attention on infrastructure development such as power, transportation, environmental technologies and agriculture. A central component of this plan was the donation of a

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nuclear reactor to India in 1956. By providing this material, Ottawa hoped to create a niche market for Canadian technology in India, and the sale of two CANDU nuclear reactors to India in 1963 and 1966 initially appeared to confirm the success of this aim. Unfortunately no safeguards were adopted to avoid nuclear proliferation linked to the first reactor while only limited safeguards were imposed on the two subsequent reactors. When, in 1974, India tested a nuclear device at Pokhran, New Delhi was suspected of having used plutonium extracted from the first reactor in order to manufacture this device. Suddenly the success of Ottawa’s trade strategy appeared more questionable. In response to this military use of civil technology, Canada cut off all nuclear cooperation with India.

9 This diplomatic conflict aggravated a decline in bilateral trade throughout the 1970s alongside other contributing factors. With the general economic climate degenerating in the wake of the first OPEC oil crisis, both countries began adopting protectionist policies in areas of emerging comparative advantage of the other. For instance, in 1976 textile imports from India were hit with Canadian quotas, which had been adopted in response to EEC and US quotas on textiles. Similarly, India was pursuing its policy of import substitution, largely by means of the adoption of tariff and non-tariff barriers that were among the highest in the world. Indian tariffs on non-ferrous metals, iron ore and agricultural raw materials – all major Canadian export products – ranged from 2.5 to 5 times developing country averages. In addition to its import substitution policy, a further break was applied to bilateral trade by India’s non-alignment policy, which contributed to a growing dependence on the Soviet bloc for technological goods. Canadian exports to India fell steadily throughout the Cold War and Canadian strategic trade interests in Asia were concentrated on Japan and China.

10 Unsurprisingly, the consequences for bilateral trade were dismal. Canadian products as a percentage of Indian imports went from 3.4% in 1950-51 to 7.4% in 1970-7 before plummeting to 2.6% in 1980-81 (ASSANIE et al. 2003: 7).

11 During the 1980’s, bilateral trade waned further with India focusing on new partners while Canada continued to deepen its relations with the United States. During the Mulroney government, Canada’s trade policy became centered on developing a free trade agreement with its southern partners in order to maximize the market for its commodities and develop vertical specialization projects. Little was done on the Indian side to encourage renewed trade; although some Indian import tariffs were lowered during this period, price controls persisted in many of the sectors where the Canadian economy held a comparative advantage (e.g. coal, fertilizers, non-ferrous metals, pulp and paper). Not surprisingly, trade relations with India dwindled to an all-time low, with Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) projects becoming the key focus of bilateral relations.

12 It was not until India undertook serious reforms in 1991 that Canada once again showed interest in renewing trade relations. When India’s international reserves plummeted and the economy nearly ground to a halt, New Delhi was obliged to seek help from the IMF. This was a turning point in Indian government policy as it sparked the realization that the subcontinent’s economy would never experience significant growth without some form of economic reform. This epiphany led to a series of tariff reductions and the liberalization of the import licensing system.

13 For a few years, Canada once again looked to India for new commercial opportunities. A variety of government backed trade missions to India took place between 1994 and

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1998 including one led by Prime Minister Jean Chrétien in 1996. In 1998, the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs, Investment and Trade published the India Trade Action Plan that aimed to define priority sectors with comparative advantages for exports and proposed to double Canada-India trade by 2003.

14 The renewed interest was disappointingly short-lived. In May 1998, the Pokhran-II nuclear bomb explosion tests once again strained diplomatic relations, with Canada claiming that India had contravened the Non-proliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty1. Ottawa recalled its high commissioner in India and withdrew all non-humanitarian development aid; a total of $54.5 million in aid was cancelled over five years and talks on trade expansion came to a halt.

15 The consequences for bilateral trade were immediate. Although there was a continual upward trend in Indian imports to Canada throughout the first decade of reform, Canadian exports to India actually dropped. Canada provided 2.6% of Indian imports in 1980-81: but only 1.3% in 1990-91 and 0.8% in 2000-1 (ASSANIE et al. 2003: 7).

16 It is worth noting that Canada’s trade with India was not simply disappointing, but statistically low compared with that of other emerging economies. Between 1985 and 2000, Canada’s exports to its eighteen top partners in emerging markets averaged annual growth of 13.5% while growth in exports to India averaged only 6.2% annually (ASSANIE et al. 2003: 11).

17 Other data confirm the fact that the two countries performed below potential. Using a gravity model2 based on 2003 data for trade in goods, (MILNER 2008) set out to study the level of bilateral trade between 42 Commonwealth countries with the aim of establishing which countries showed the greatest scope for trade creation in areas of comparative advantage. Milner’s study recognizes that distance constitutes a considerable obstacle to trade among Commonwealth countries, which clearly does not play in favour of Canada-India trade. However, even when distance is factored in, bilateral Canada-India trade emerged from the study as being one of the “pairs” of Commonwealth partners with the greatest potential for significantly increased bilateral trade (with the scope for improving trade estimated at over 20%).

18 Milner identified several factors that may have contributed to a surprisingly low level of bilateral trade in the early years of reform. First of all, in spite of the fact that both countries are members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and trade takes place on reciprocated Most Favoured Nation terms, there was a considerable difference in the level of tariffs applied by the two countries at this time. In 2005, the average tariff (all goods considered) applied by India was 19.2% while it was only 5.5% in Canada (MILNER 2008: 37) 3. Secondly, a number of non-tariff barriers could be identified as obstacles to bilateral trade, such as domestic subsidies, customs clearance times (which stood at 13.6 days in India in 2006, one of the slowest in the world) or insufficient transport structures causing costly delays.

19 Milner’s general recommendation to all Commonwealth countries suffering from under-performing bilateral trade was the creation of intra-Commonwealth bilateral free trade agreements (FTA)4. Another possible solution would be trade facilitation i.e. stimulating the efficiency and effectiveness of domestic institutions, improving infrastructure, improving transport services and helping producers to hurdle non- tariff barriers by learning how to meet technical standards.

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20 These are precisely the paths that successive Canadian governments after 2001 began to explore.

2001-2013: Breathing New Life into Old Friendships

21 Once the Pokhran-II storm had blown over and relations began to normalize between Ottawa and New Delhi, the Canadian government started nudging Canada-India relations to the forefront of policy through a series of talks and agreements.

22 This new orientation was first adopted under the Liberals. In March 2001, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, John Manley, announced that Ottawa planned to “pursue the broadest political and economic relationship with India […] including industrial co- operation.” (TOUHEY 2007: 745) Further signs of partnership were given in October 2003 when prime ministers Chrétien and Atal Bihari Vajpayee met in New Delhi where they issued a joint statement expressing their commitment to raising the volume of trade and investment between the two countries. Concrete measures were taken in the form of diplomatic representation with the appointment of a trade representative to Chennai and the creation of a consulate general in Chandigarh.

23 A subsequent joint statement was made in 2005, by Chrétien’s successor, Paul Martin, once again highlighting the two countries’ desire to improve cooperation in areas such as security and counter-terrorism, science & technology, the environment, as well as bilateral trade and investment. The emphasis on science and technology was significant because it indicated the strategies of both the federal and provincial governments to diversify exports towards value-added products.

24 Under the Conservatives, the need to enhance commercial relations with emerging markets has taken on priority status, with the hitherto neglected Indian economy attracting keen attention as the strategic importance of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) comes into focus. In April 2008, Prime Minister Harper stated that “Canada simply cannot afford to miss out on India’s phenomenal economic growth,” (Prime Minister of Canada official website) then later that year, the Canadian Council of Chief Executives and the Confederation of Indian Industry met and issued a statement entitled “India and Canada: A New Era of Cooperation” calling for both private sector engagement and regular government level meetings. Emphasis was placed on the need to establish a comprehensive free trade agreement, with the elimination of non-tariff barriers and the development of areas of complementarity.

25 With the onset of prolonged economic slowdown following the financial crisis, the need to boost trade with the world’s fastest growing economies has become ever more urgent. A 2010 Canadian Senate Committee report recognized that the rise of China, India and Russia had significant implications for Canada and recommended the government begin taking measures to encourage bilateral trade and improve business links with the three emerging economies.

26 Concrete measures have been taken to hasten growth in trade. In 2009, during Prime Minister Harper’s visit to India, the two countries announced the creation of a Joint Study Group, made up of Canadian and Indian officials, to explore the possibility of a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) for all trade in goods and services. The Joint Study group estimated the potential for trade gains between the two countries at 0.4% of GDP for Canada and 0.5% for India if trade barriers were

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eliminated, i.e. a $6 billion stimulus and the creation of 40.000 new jobs in Canada. CEPA negotiations were officially launched in late 2010.

27 Superficially, this new prioritizing appears to have had positive effects with Canadian merchandise exports to India increasing by 117% and imports increasing by 60% between 2005 and 2012. Overall, India is now Canada’s 15th largest trade partner. However, although this is encouraging news, such a cursory reading of the data omits important details.

28 Statistics on total change over the period provide an exaggeratedly optimistic vision of the current dynamics of bilateral trade. Although Canadian merchandise exports to India were, effectively, more vigorous than Indian imports during the 2005-2010 period, the trend has changed since the start of the recession. Whereas for the 2005-2010 period Canadian exports to India grew by 89% while imports grew by only 19%, during the 2010-2012 period Canadian exports slowed while the trend in Indian imports picked up (15% growth in exports for the period compared with 35% growth in imports). Furthermore, Canada had a sizeable negative trade balance with India in 2010 and again in 2012 when Indian imports were 20% higher than Canadian exports.

29 On a more optimistic note, the global trend remains striking; it would be unwise to give an overly critical analysis of the evolution in bilateral trade. Within the wider context of Canadian trade during the global slowdown the results for trade with India are relatively encouraging. Between 2005 and 2010 Canadian exports to India grew annually by an average 14.8% while its exports to the rest of the world fell on average by 1.8% (Statistics Canada trade data).

30 A source of greater concern than the overall level of trade is the merchandise structure of Canadian exports to India, which comprises a large share of commodities. During the first decade of reform, there was disappointingly little evolution in the structure of Canadian exports to India, which continued to lean heavily towards raw materials, with the share of manufactured goods, machinery and transport equipment growing only marginally (cf. Table 1). The basic sector breakdown has improved slightly in recent years yet the weight of raw materials remains problematic. In 2012, the main Canadian export to India was pulse crops (i.e. peas and lentils) while the share of manufactured goods and machinery in exports had actually fallen, representing 53.4% of Canadian exports to India in 2012 compared with 58.2% in 20055. This reliance on raw materials is a source of concern as commodity markets are constantly exposed to speculative forces, which means that revenues from these products can undergo extreme volatility and job creation is easily threatened.

Table 1: 1991-2012 Canada’s exports to India by product group (%)

1991 2001 2005 2012

Live animals, vegetables and food 3,2 30,2 16,6 23,2

Mineral products 31,5 7,7 7,9 10,9

Chemical products and assimilated 18,5 9,0 16,2 10,8

Manufactured goods 27 29,4 39,6 31,5

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Machinery and vehicles 19 22,5 18,6 21,9

Share of total 99,2 98,8 98,9 98,3

Source: Statistics Canada, Canadian International Merchandise Trade Database Online, Using Harmonized System Sections (HSS), accessed October 24, 2013

31 In order to help Canadian exports move away from volatile markets, one of the aims of the CEPA now being negotiated is to improve bilateral trade in areas with high added value. For instance, energy production has returned to the top of the list of trade priorities and since the signing of the Nuclear Cooperation Agreement in 2012, Canadian companies have been authorized to export and import controlled nuclear materials, equipment and technology to and from India. More generally, science and technology are consistently at the center of trade negotiations between the two countries.

32 The focus of this paper is on merchandise trade but as India is now considered “the World’s Office”, bilateral trade in services deserves to be mentioned. Trade in services is still relatively badly developed between Canada and India. The sector is dynamic but much more so on the Indian side than on the Canadian side. During the 2005-2010 period, Canadian exports in services increased by 40% while imports increased by 148%. Canadian imports of commercial services have grown significantly with business services being outsourced to India while Canadian service export growth has remained concentrated mainly in tourism and travel services.

33 Yet although there is still scope for improvement, the progress made in bilateral trade over recent years is undisputable; between 1991 and 2010, total Canadian exports of goods and services to India were multiplied by seven and imports by nine. In the long term, it is hoped that the CEPA could lead to even greater economic dividends as the Indian middle-class grows and pulls the country into the top ranked global economies. According to an IHS Global Insight study quoted in the Canadian government’s Trade and Investment Update 2011, India is likely to become Canada’s 4th largest trade partner by 2040. Nevertheless ensuring the longevity of this new orientation enjoins a reflection on what caused the period of 30 years of neglected relations. While it is clear that steps have been taken to improve bilateral trade, those new links are tenuous. The political forces that influenced Canada-Indian trade in the past need to be assessed in order to discover how those forces still resonate today and how best to maintain constructive bilateral relations in the future.

Globalization Forces and Commonwealth Heritage

34 Two forces stand at the heart of Canadian trade relations with India: western geo- strategic concerns and the Commonwealth. While decolonization and the Commonwealth constituted strong forces pulling Canada and India together, geographic distance and the Cold War pulled them apart during the 20th century. In particular, India’s policies of non-alignment and nuclear independence had a direct impact on the two countries’ trade relations.

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Political alignment and non-alignment

35 Prime Minister St. Laurent’s leading role in negotiating the 1949 London Declaration is often considered symbolic of the Commonwealth spirit that links together peoples from across the globe through a shared heritage. His active mediation helped guide India and the UK to a compromise that ultimately allowed an independent republic to remain a member of the Commonwealth.

36 Yet this early demonstration of Canadian brotherhood with the nascent Indian state was the product of complex motivations and not some simple urge to safeguard the continuity of shared historic traditions. One of the core geo-strategic reasons for keeping India in the organization was to ensure a western foothold in Asia during the Cold War in order to avoid the continent slipping under Moscow’s control. Western Europe and North America were working together to bridle the spread of Communism, and a strong Commonwealth, whose reach extended across Asia, was seen as a significant contribution to the construction of a defense against Moscow’s tentacles. Canada expressed no doubts about the need to champion a western stronghold against encroaching Soviet power. Ottawa’s interests were firmly anchored in the west with historic roots in Britain and an unflaggingly solid relationship with the United States.

37 India’s interests were less unilaterally entrenched in the West and the independent state chose to adopt a policy of non-alignment in order to explore relations with a variety of poles. In particular, New Delhi chose to nurture trade relations with the Soviet bloc while at the same time pursuing a policy of nuclear independence. Ottawa expressed deep misgivings over these choices as it struggled to fathom how a Commonwealth brother could betray their shared historic roots and interests. Incomprehension was reflected in Canada’s vehement reactions to Indian positions, which included trade sanctions. The most obvious example of this type of visceral reaction was when Canada cut off all trade talks and non-humanitarian aid following the Pokhran 2 nuclear test. On this, and other occasions, Ottawa’s diplomatic retaliation had direct consequences on bilateral trade.

38 Basically, Canada has repeatedly demonstrated its difficulty in accepting that Ottawa and New Delhi do not necessarily share the same political interests in the global arena. This was true throughout the 20th century and it is possible that it will continue to be true in the future. India is bound to play a growing role on the world stage in line with its economic rise and Canada is unlikely to have much influence over its partner’s foreign policy. This could, once again, become the source of conflict and sanctions. For instance, how would Canada react if New Delhi decided to turn a blind eye to the human rights records of countries where India has investment interests6? If it does not wish to endanger recently developed trade relations, Canada will need to learn to moderate its response to diplomatic disputes. Ottawa must accept that although India is a member of the Commonwealth, it will not necessarily align itself on western positions.

A Commonwealth Effect on Trade

39 While conflicting geo-strategic interests may have driven Canada and India apart during the Cold War, it is probable that the Commonwealth does in fact play a very

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solid grounding role in trade relations, regardless of slack results throughout the last century.

40 Although encouraging trade has never been a stated Commonwealth objective, the 2013 Charter declares that “the special strength of the Commonwealth lies in the combination of our diversity and our shared inheritance.” Under the title of “the Commonwealth Effect”, these cultural and historic links have been identified as the source of cost-advantages in international trade that are linked to the use of a common language, similar laws and shared history. Studies suggest that this effect may lead to a reduction in overheads of up to 15% for intra-Commonwealth trade as opposed to trade with equivalent non-Commonwealth nations.

41 At first glance, this potential advantage appears to have had little pull on Canada-India trade relations. While the two countries inherited a common link through English as well as Westminster style parliaments and similar legal codes, the statistically low level of bilateral trade suggests that the burden of geographic distance and cultural divergence outweighs the two partners’ historic links.

42 Superficially the attributes separating the two countries outnumber those uniting them. From the very different forms of democracy embraced by the two countries to their socio-economic profiles, Canada and India appear to have very little in common. Indexes measuring performance in areas as varied as corruption, economic freedom or per capital GDP often place Canada and India at opposite ends of the spectrum7. Yet the influences of the Commonwealth are complex and although the immense cultural diversity within the organization may at times leave members feeling perplexed, the institution provides an effective forum for identifying and pursuing common goals. The shared values and interests inherited from the Commonwealth have had an impact on Canada-India trade in at least two ways: through economic assistance, which helped maintain trade relations throughout even the most fraught periods of diplomatic tensions and through the diaspora.

43 With regards to economic assistance, between 1951 and 2006, Canada provided India with over $3.5 billion in Official Development Assistance, making New Delhi one of the major recipients of Canadian aid. Although aid is not trade, assistance can stimulate future business by helping emerging countries build up their trade-related infrastructures and connecting them with potential partners in developed countries. In short, aid can encourage future opportunities. In the case of India, for instance, the CANDU nuclear reactor was given to the country as part of an aid package, but this assistance was followed by the sale of two further reactors a few years later. Thus aid generated trade.

44 With regards to the diaspora, the human links between the two nations has played a key role in developing business links. Until the early 1960’s, Indian immigration to Canada was limited by Canadian legislation that imposed quotas based on ethnic origin. However, as a member of the Commonwealth, Canada grew to respect the aspiration of non-white populations within that area and this may have influenced the 1962 decision to remove racial discrimination on immigration regulations. Today, the Indian diaspora in Canada represents one million people. This presence constitutes a bridge to mutual understanding and a source of enhanced trade in two ways. Firstly, many immigrants arriving from India in recent years have been highly educated professionals, skilled and technical workers as well as transnational entrepreneurs who maintain relations with companies and potential investors back in India. Secondly, the Indian diaspora enjoys a

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growing presence in politics. There are Indo-Canadian representatives both in Ottawa and in provincial legislatures. The diaspora is vocal about bilateral ties and Indo- Canadian stakeholders are intent on seeing a reduction in corruption in India and an acceleration of reforms. Ottawa can help make those voices heard in New Delhi, thus strengthening bilateral links.

Conclusion

45 This brief glance at Canada-Indian trade sketches the paradoxical image of two countries that shared a common experience but failed to find common ground. Yet, the differences that separate them are also part of the opportunity that binds them together. Emerging India, with its growing middle class and blossoming economy offers boundless promise to sophisticated Canadian investors and businesses. As Indian companies grow, they are looking westward for expertise to develop legal, insurance and accounting support. Likewise, huge resources will need to be sunk into areas such as education, transport and energy infrastructure. Canada is in a position to help provide these goods and services but it is just one of many suitors knocking at India’s door. The change in Ottawa’s position over the past ten years clearly indicates that Canada has understood that the stakes are high and that it is time to redefine this bilateral relationship. India is no longer an outpost of the world economy; it is at its center, alongside the other BRICS fuelling global growth. Canada must seek to harness this power but it must do so wholeheartedly. The world has changed since 1949 and the old hierarchies are being turned upside down; very soon emerging economies will outpace developed ones. It remains to be seen whether Canada will have the vision to embrace the emerging giants of the world as the true economic vanguard. If it does choose to turn more enthusiastically to Asia, releasing its hold on its traditionally western trade focus, Canada will be able to draw on its Commonwealth history to help bind it to the new emerging India.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

ALLEN, G. (2012), “UK-Commonwealth Trade Statistics”, Standard Note SNEP 6497, London, Library of the House of Commons.

AGRAWAL, Sandeep and LOVELL, Alex (2010), “High Income Immigrants in Canada”, South Asian Diaspora, Vol. 2, n°2, pp. 143-163.

ASSANIE, Nizar, CHADHA, Rajesh, SHARMA Pooja and WOO Yuen Pau (2003), “Canada-India Trade: Retrospect and prospects”, Canada-Asia Agenda, n°2, pp. 1-60.

GAUTHIER, Alexandre and MEREDITH, Katie (2011), “Trade and Investment: Canada-India”, Publication N°2011-21-E, Ottawa, Library of Parliament.

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MACKENZIE, Hector (1999), “An Old Dominion and the New Commonwealth: Canadian Policy on the Question of India’s Membership, 1947-1949”, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol. 27, n°3, pp. 82-112.

MILNER, Chris (2008), Trading on Commonwealth Ties: A Review of the Structure of the Commonwealth Trade and the Scope for Developing Linkages and Trade in the Commonwealth, Economic Paper n°79, London, Commonwealth Secretariat.

SANDERS, R. (2012), “A Commonwealth Free Trade Area is neither likely nor advisable”, Commonwealth Opinion, December, pp. 1-12.

TOUHEY, Ryan (2009), “From Periphery to Priority: Lessons of the Canada-India relationship 1976-2009”, International Journal, Vol. 64, n°4, pp. 911-925.

______(2007), “Canada and India at Sixty: Moving Beyond History”, International Journal, Vol. 62, n°4, pp. 733-752.

Websites

GOVERNMENT OF CANADA, “Statistics Canada, Canadian International Merchandise Trade Database Online” – 24-10-2013 –

GOVERNMENT OF CANADA, “Prime Minister of Canada, Steven Harper” – 12-10-2013

GOVERNMENT OF CANADA, “Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada” – 10-10-2013 –

GOVERNMENT OF CANADA, “Canada’s State of Trade: Trade and Investment Update 2011” – 10-10-2013

NOTES

1. Relations were strained even further when Pakistan reciprocated with its own series of tests later the same month. 2. Gravity modeling is a frequently used tool in trade analysis, which helps to compare the level of trade predicted by the model and the actual volume of trade between two partners. The basic premise is that economic mass and geographic distance between partners are the core variables influencing the volume of trade. 3. While this level was high, it is worth remarking that it had fallen considerably since its 1994 level of 82% before India joined the WTO. 4. For legal reasons, a Commonwealth-wide preferential FTA would be almost impossible to put into place. The WTO encourages regional trade agreements but the Commonwealth is not a region; it has worldwide reach across all continents. 5. Indian imports to Canada, on the other hand, are essentially centered on manufactured goods, representing 97% in both 2005 and 2010 (GAUTHIER AND MEREDITH 2011: 2). 6. For example, India has invested in developing oil fields in the Sudan in spite of that country’s human rights’ record whereas the Canadian government chose to pressure a Canadian company to abandon a project in the Sudan. 7. Canada ranked 5th out of 144 in the Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom in the World 2010 Index, India 111th (tied with Iran and Pakistan). Canada ranked 9 th out of 157 countries on Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index 2012, while India came 94th. In 2013,

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Canada’s per capita GDP at purchasing power parity was US$43,597 while India’s was only US$3851.

ABSTRACTS

This article examines the surprisingly low levels of bilateral trade between Canada and India throughout the late 20th century and explores the dynamics of present-day relations. While India’s choice of non-alignment created complex geo-political tensions that pulled the two countries apart throughout the Cold War, the appearance of 21st century global trade networks has been driving the two to seek strategic partnerships. The article emphasizes the need to improve mutual understanding in order to avoid jeopardizing the significant efforts that have been made to increase bilateral trade over the past ten years.

Cet article étudie le faible niveau du commerce bilatéral entre le Canada et l’Inde au cours de la seconde moitié du XXème siècle, et analyse la dynamique des relations actuelles. Tandis que le choix de non-alignement de la part de l’Inde engendra des tensions géopolitiques complexes à l’origine de barrières entre ces deux pays durant la Guerre Froide, l’intensification de la mondialisation au XXIème siècle les a conduits à envisager de nouveaux partenariats stratégiques. Cet article met l’accent sur la nécessité d’améliorer la compréhension mutuelle, afin d’éviter de compromettre les efforts considérables qui ont été faits ces dix dernières années pour développer le commerce bilatéral.

AUTHOR

CLAIRE HEUILLARD Université de Paris 2, Panthéon-Assas

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From Ottawa to Colombo: On Canada’s International Role at the hour of Eastphalia

Chaminda K. Weerawardhana

Canada’s Commonwealth stronghold?

1 The Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting took place in Colombo, Sri Lanka from 10 to 17 November 2013. The choice of Colombo as a venue has been a heatedly debated issue, due to widespread allegations over war crimes and crimes against humanity, as well as the prevalent situation of repression and violations of fundamental rights in Sri Lanka. Critics maintain that holding a CHOGM – the biannual summit of an international organisation prized for its discourse on human rights, the rule of law and accountability – in Colombo is synonymous with a tacit endorsement of a regime with little regard for the Commonwealth’s core values. Whereas the Conservative government in London approved the summit and confirmed its participation (Colombo Telegraph 2013), the Harper government in Ottawa upheld a resolute stance in opposing the choice of Colombo as a CHOGM venue, and consistent with its earlier Sri Lanka policy, maintained that its attendance shall depend upon Colombo’s progress in the area of Human Rights, minority rights and accountability (CBC News, Apr. 25, 2013). On the same grounds, Ottawa finally decided to boycott the 2013 CHOGM. Similar opposition also came from New Delhi, but although Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh decided not to attend, a relatively high-profile delegation was sent to Colombo. The Harper government’s position on the Colombo CHOGM has been the subject of much debate (The Star, 13 August 2013, BRADY 2013), and it runs against the approaches pursued by key New Commonwealth member states including the UK and Australia, as well as the Commonwealth Secretary General’s endorsement of Sri Lanka as the 2013 CHOGM host.

2 The Canadian government’s position on the Colombo CHOGM can be explained in two ways. Firstly, Canada is home to the world’s largest ethnic Tamil community outside

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South and Southeast Asia (BRADY 2013, see also AMARASINGAM 2013). The Canadian Tamil lobby has developed into an upwardly mobile, influential, politically active segment of Canadian society. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, the debate surrounding Canada’s decision to boycott the Colombo CHOGM points at a much more complex contemporary dilemma in Canadian foreign policy. The Canadian government, especially through the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), has long been a leading advocate of international development in many Commonwealth member states in the global South. As opposed to highly influential and “politically charged” world powers, Canada enjoys a reputation of exercising soft power and diplomatic leverage on the world stage, especially through her international development cooperation mechanisms.

3 In a transforming international system marked by the rise of China and India, the dynamics of Canada’s role and capabilities as a leverage-wielding soft power have been put into question. This article attempts at conceptualising Canada’s position in an international system in which Western-led liberal peace-building initiatives (MACMILLAN 1998), benign intervention in conflict resolution, discourses on human rights and Responsibility to Protect (R2P) collide steadfastly with the principles that guide the foreign policies of emerging superpowers. A discussion of this nature imperatively revolves around Canada’s past and present position within the Commonwealth of Nations. Over the past few years, a substantial debate in the academic and policymaking circles as well as in think-tanks has sought to develop a revisionist and evaluative critique of Canadian foreign policy. A cursory glance at contributions made by practitioners and academics to Open Canada, the online platform of the Canadian International Council, suffices to take stock of the intensity of such debates. In a somewhat similar vein, the Commonwealth has taken steps to question its functional dynamics, and redefine its priorities. This trend is apparent in policy documents such as the Secretary General’s reports, the output of the Eminent Persons’ Group, and in the Commonwealth strategic plan for 2013-2016 (see Commonwealth Secretary General 2011, BADAWI 2011, The Commonwealth 2013). Discussions on the role and relevance of the Commonwealth have also been developed by governmental bodies of member states (see notably House of Commons, UK, 2012). Focusing on Canada and her ties with the Commonwealth of Nations, it is to such debates that this article proposes to contribute, through an exploration of Canada’s evolving foreign policy priorities on a par with dominant trends in international affairs.

The rise of « Eastphalia » and the emergence of a new international order

4 In conceptualising the easterly shift in global strategic and economic influence, I shall use the typology of “Eastphalia”, i.e. the gradual emergence of a new world order in which the centre-point of world power witnesses an eastwardly shift.1 GINSBURG (2010) visualises Eastphalia as “the perfection of Westphalia”, that an emerging Eastphalian world order – with its emphasis on national sovereignty, territorial integrity of states and discouragement of external involvement in the internal affairs of fellow states – would in fact imply a return to the basics of the original Westphalian discourse of a community of states. Eastphalian priorities thus collide with Western liberal internationalist priorities of R2P and related discourses on human rights and

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accountability. How, and to what extent, have the aforementioned world developments affected Canada’s foreign policy orientation? How could one define Canada’s potential role in an international system that criss-crosses between Western liberal democratic normativity and supra-nationalism versus Eastphalian foreign and international development policies? Where does the Commonwealth stand in Canada’s present-day foreign policy priorities? Reflecting upon these lines, this article is structured in three main parts.

5 Part one recapitulates the evolution of a distinctly Canadian foreign policy agenda. This section is intended to mirror the historical evolution of Canada’s foreign policy priorities, in the backdrop of which Ottawa’s present-day foreign policy agenda is best ascertained. Part two focuses on the development of Canada’s partnerships with the global South, which initially began through the Commonwealth framework, and the subsequent emergence of Canada as a key partner in international development. Part three focuses on pressing contemporary foreign policy dilemmas, and seeks to outline strategies pursued by Ottawa in managing them. This discussion terminates with an appraisal of the utility of the Commonwealth to contemporary Canadian foreign policy. This article highlights the reality that the role of Canada as a leading world power at the hour of Eastphalia is closely linked to her overall foreign policy legacy, as a government that strived for its own independent foreign policy and an equal footing on the world stage. It concludes that in asserting her due place in an Eastphalian world order, it is vital for Canada to develop an international agenda of her own, inverting tendencies to follow the scripts laid out by more influential superpowers.

I: The development of a distinctly Canadian foreign policy: from side lines to the centre ground

6 Until the 1940s, Canada had very tenuous relations with the non-western world, and Canada’s international perceptions were considerably conditioned by British policy. The British Empire and the Commonwealth constituted Canada’s principle channel of communication to the rest of the world (THOMSON AND SWANSON 1971: 77). The first territory to gain Dominion status in 1867, and consequently, near-complete control of her domestic affairs, Canada occupies a unique place in Commonwealth constitutional history (Ibid. 79, BUCKNER 2008 : 66-86). As it will be evoked later in this article, Canada’s legacy as the first territory to acquire Dominion status subsequently prompted Ottawa to develop closer affinities with New Commonwealth countries, especially in the post- WWII era. This view of Canada as a precedent for self-government has also been reciprocally affirmed in many a New Commonwealth polity. Despite its apparent salience, this perception is wanting in historical accuracy. As historian Ronald Hyam has highlighted, British Imperial policy was primarily based on geopolitical priorities. The granting of Dominion status to Canada, for instance, was largely motivated by geopolitical, economic and strategic concerns, as Canadian shipbuilding timber, the Halifax naval base, and a sizable merchant marine were strategic assets which the United States had to be denied. In some ways the new Canada represented a revamped imperial defence posture on the North American continent (HYAM 1999: 33). In common with other early (Caucasian) Dominions (i.e. Australia in 1901, New Zealand in 1907 and South Africa in 1910), the decision to grant self-government in internal affairs was, by

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and large, intended to sate the burgeoning nationalism of the white colonies while keeping them within an unaltered conception of empire (KRELING 2009 : 54-55).

7 Whereas the Canadian government in Ottawa held power over domestic matters, article nine of the Constitution Act of 1867 reserved all executive powers2, including foreign policy-related powers, to the British Crown (Government of Canada, 2012). This meant that Canada’s role in and interactions with the wider world were limited to matters of domestic concern such as trade, tariffs, fisheries and immigration. Foreign affairs and the powers related to war and peace continued to remain London’s exclusive preserve. Canada’s contacts with the world were channelled through London. The Colonial Conferences3 that began in 1887 facilitated interactions between Canadian legislators and policymakers in Britain and in other self-governing entities in the British Empire. From the 1880s, a Canadian High Commissioner was stationed in London and a Commissioner General’s office had been opened in Paris. These posts were devoid of diplomatic credentials, but served to interact with the British and French governments and with private citizens in matters such as immigration and trade. The concentration of executive powers in London meant that although the views of Dominions were not sought in making crucial decisions, the Dominions had no choice but to abide by London’s decisions (MACKENZIE 1999: 85). In 1914, for instance, Canada automatically entered WWI when Britain declared war on Germany (VEATCH 1975: 3-5), a reality that – despite growing Canadian reluctance to follow the British lead on international affairs – was repeated in 1939 (Ibid: 82-83).

8 The two World Wars had strongly transformative effects on the aforementioned mode of governance, facilitating Canada’s emergence as a leading world power. In the aftermath of WWI, Canada reinforced her position on the international scene as a member of the League of Nations, which, in theory, provided all its member states with the opportunity to take part in interactions on the full range of international problems of the day (VEATCH 1975: 184, CHAPNICK 2005: 52-53). However, the League’s policies were largely dictated by the interests of the more influential world powers, and Canada’s mission to the Palais des Nations was involved in the task of promoting a fully independent status for herself internationally, a desire to minimize Canada’s commitments under the collective security system, and a Westphalian insistence that the League did not become involved in questions such as tariff and immigration policy, which the Canadian government viewed as purely domestic, internal matters (Ibid: 181). When Canada’s progresses during the League years are taken at face value, one could concur that Canada fared well in achieving the aforementioned goals.

9 Over the first few decades of the 20th century, Canada was faced with the primary challenge of asserting herself as a government independent from British Imperial power. Efforts in this direction were constrained by Canada’s position as a Dominion state within the Commonwealth, and London’s strong influence within the Commonwealth as well as at the helm of world affairs. The terms of the Statute of Westminster of 1931, which was specifically intended to ensure the policymaking freedom of the dominions, did not include provisions for the repeal, amendment or alteration of the British North America Acts, 1976-1930. Canada’s foremost priority in foreign policy, to borrow from Allan Gotlieb (1991: 2), was that of emancipating herself from her subordinate imperial status. The course of Canada’s foreign policy from the 1920s to 1945 was largely manoeuvred by one man, Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King. King and a number of his senior officials including, most notably, Dr

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Oscar D. Skelton, the Prime Minister’s closest advisor and Under-Secretary General of External Affairs, who is widely credited as the architect of Canadian foreign policy, were categorically opposed to Canadian participation in World War II. However, and despite this strong inclination to carve out a distinctly Canadian foreign policy agenda, Canada was bound by her own position as a Dominion within the Commonwealth, and by her special relationship with the United Kingdom, prompting Prime Minister King to approve Canada’s participation in WWII (VEATCH 1975: 184, GOTLIEB 1991: 2-3). The Commonwealth connection was multi-faceted. On the one hand, it represented the umbilical chord that linked Ottawa to London, a living reminder of the overarching power and influence of the British establishment on the first British territory to be granted Dominion status. The foremost challenge for the emergence of a distinctly Canadian foreign policy agenda was Ottawa’s tendency to align itself, in theory and in practice, with British policy (GRANATSTEIN 1970: 2).

10 On the other hand, it was through Commonwealth-related legislative mechanisms and diplomatic ties that Canada found her path to develop as an independent power with her own distinct domestic and international agenda. As it will be outlined in Part two of this article, it was the Commonwealth that served as Ottawa’s primary channel to develop strong ties with the wider world. The core elements of a distinctly Canadian foreign policy, with its emphasis on development cooperation, peacekeeping assistance and most importantly, as a middle power with no colonial baggage that could interact with newly independent states in the non-Western world on an equal footing, were initially developed within the Commonwealth framework. Developing a distinctly “Canadian” foreign policy agenda implied a search for common ground with fellow states in the Commonwealth community.

Post-WWII: Canada’s pursuits on the supra-national platform

To be Canadian in 1945 meant to be engaged in world affairs and actively concerned about the socio-economic state of less fortunate communities. Canadians wanted to help, to make a difference. But they also wanted these feelings to be noticed (…) they needed external affirmation that they were unique and exceptional (…) One might affirm that this desire for approval was just as Pearsonian as the idealism that accompanied it (…) however (…) the passion, and the national enthusiasm, the Canada that helped to create the United Nations were not Lester Pearson’s. It belonged to Mackenzie King (CHAPNICK 2005 152).

11 It was WWII that provided Canada with a tremendous opportunity to assert her position internationally, and gain fuller control of the executive powers, including the management of foreign policy. Canada’s wartime foreign policy was largely characterised by the overlapping of two conflicting approaches. The first was marked by caution and an inclination for non-intervention, and the second called for a more forthright, interventionist and engaged international agenda. As early as 1943, Prime Minister King affirmed Canada’s potential of emerging as a “middle power”. His approach to foreign policy was marked by caution, and a preference for quiet diplomacy, which was strongly endorsed by his advisor Dr Oscar D. Skelton. As Chapnick (2005: 9-10) notes, Skelton was highly influential in shaping Ottawa’s foreign policy until his sudden demise on 28 January 1941, paving the way for the prominence of advocates of a more internationalist and interventionist foreign policy, such as Lester Pearson, who was appointed as Assistant Under-Secretary General of External Affairs in the aftermath of Skelton’s demise. However, throughout Prime Minister

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King’s tenure, the priority was on the breaking up of Canada’s older tradition of following British policy, and developing a foreign policy agenda with a distinctly Canadian face.

12 In early 1944, observing that the USA and the Soviet Union were bound to emerge as the foremost post-WWII world powers, the British sought to resurrect the old doctrine of British Imperial unity, with the objective of creating a stronger Commonwealth alliance. This view was most poignantly expressed – much to the outrage of Prime Minister King – in a speech delivered in Toronto by Lord Halifax, a politician with strong Imperialist credentials, ex-Vice Roy in India, close confidante of Winston Churchill, and British ambassador in Washington DC, on 24 January 1944. In this speech, made on Canadian soil without any prior approval or clearance from Canadian authorities, Halifax called for the creation of a centralised empire so that Britain could compete in a post-war world with what he termed the “titans”, i.e. Russia, China and the United States (MANSERGH 1953 : 576-9, MCKENZIE 2006 : 555). The political tide in Ottawa at the time, however, was all but favourable to a vision of that nature. By 1945, Canada under Prime Minister King was gradually moving on the path towards a foreign policy agenda of its own. The King government reinforced wartime defence cooperation with the United States, especially through the Ogdensburg Agreement of 17 August 1940 between Prime Minister King and President Roosevelt.

Canada and the United Nations: a conflicting narrative?

13 The prioritisation of an Ottawa-based foreign policy agenda was further strengthened by Canada’s membership of the United Nations (UN). Opinion on the Canadian contribution to the founding of the UN is marked by two conflicting narratives. Whereas one takes pride in Canada’s growing position as a significant player on the international scene, the other is more sceptical of such successes, and calls for an appraisal of Canada’s limits in international diplomacy. The former opinion came to be known as “Pearsonian internationalism”. In the post-WWII years, Canada’s role in the international scene was considerably characterised by the role of Lester Pearson, who had emerged to higher government office, first as Secretary of State for External Affairs in 1948 and subsequently as Prime Minister in 1963. Pearson’s internationalism was strongly demonstrated in Canada’s contributions to create a system of UN-mandated peacekeeping operations (see Carroll 2009). The first significant test of Canada’s facilitative role in developing peacekeeping operations was the Suez crisis of 1956. On 2 November 1956, Pearson abstained from voting a UN resolution on the Suez issue, citing the absence of provisions for what he described as: A United Nations force large enough to keep these borders [of Egypt and Israel] at peace while a political settlement is being worked out (…) My own government would be glad to recommend Canadian participation in such a United Nations force, a truly international police and peace force. (PEARSON 1957: 8-11, reproduced in GRANATSTEIN 1970: 84).

14 Pearson’s contribution to UN peacekeeping in the Suez won him the Nobel Peace Prize in 1957, providing Canada a highly publicised international standing as a promoter of world peace. In one of the most comprehensive analyses of Canada’s role vis-à-vis the UN’s genesis, Chapnick (2005) challenges the received wisdom of Canada’s pioneering role in establishing the UN. At the San Francisco conference of the United Nations on International Organisation in June 1945, Canada did make a significant contribution to

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the founding of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), whereas its efforts to find its due place in the Security Council through the functional principle proved to be a failure. Security happened to be the great powers’ reserved realm (ibid :126). In the course of the San Francisco deliberations of 1945, Canada under Prime Minister King chose prudence over popularity, concluding that a stable, economically and socially integrated world order was more valuable than international recognition as the leader of the so-called middle powers (ibid : 138).

15 However, mediatisation of Canada’s international role during this period was such that a somewhat contrasting memory was left with the Canadian public psyche, which led to the notion that Canada had become the international community’s helpful fixer. Despite Canada’s failure in emerging as a “middle power” at the inception of the modern UN in 1945, it is vital to highlight that the notion of a “middle power”, i.e. a Western state that shares neither a superpower status nor a historical legacy of colonisation, is of vital relevance to Canada’s present-day international role. Canada’s present-day international reputation considerably rests on the “helpful fixer” and “middle power” typologies, and as it will be highlighted later in this article, exploiting this reputation to the benefit of the country can be seen as Canada’s foremost contemporary foreign policy challenge.

Canada as a non-decisive power: A Commonwealth consequence?

16 In Ottawa’s efforts to develop a distinctly Canadian foreign policy, its historical legacy of British rule and position as a Dominion within the Commonwealth formed a barrier on the path to gain due acceptance outside the Commonwealth as a full-fledged, independent government. This was particularly the case with Canada’s interactions with the United States. Concerning North Atlantic political cooperation in the early years of WWII, for instance, the U.S. government preferred direct interactions with London, thereby effectively relegating Canada to a position of secondary importance. When President Roosevelt met Prime Minister Churchill for secret talks on post-war cooperation on 9 August 1941 (on board a battleship off Argentia harbour in Newfoundland) Prime Minister King was kept uninformed, due to the U.S. assertion that Canada had no place in bilateral discussions between two world powers (CHAPNICK 2005: 16). Whereas Canada’s contribution to WWII was substantial, Canada continued to face challenges in emerging as a key player in international security. In her quest to be part of the key global decision-makers in this domain, Canada sought to reinforce her role on the security front by actively engaging in the North-Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and, as highlighted above, in UN peacekeeping missions.

NATO: exit strategy from subordinate status on the world stage?

17 The break-up of the wartime alliance between the Soviet Union and the Western allies, and the resulting tension between the Western and Soviet blocks posed major problems for the UN to function independently. The emergence of the Cold War required an emphasis on regional collective security, leading the way to NATO, in the founding of which Canada played a significant role (LAWLESS 2006). Lester Pearson, together with like-minded counterparts in the United States such as Dean Acheson, the Truman administration’s Secretary of State, actively prioritised NATO. The importance Canada accorded to NATO prompted Pierre Trudeau to observe on his election as Prime

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Minister in 1968 that in the preceding years, Canada had no significant defence or foreign policy apart from NATO (ENGLER 2012). Whereas some analysts perceive Canada’s contributions to NATO and NATO’s impact on Canada in a positive light (SAIDEMAN 2012), others, such as Granatstein (2013) call for a reassessment of NATO’s contemporary relevance to Canada, calling for a shift of focus from NATO to exclusive defence partnerships with the United States. It is scarcely acknowledged that for Ottawa, engagement with NATO (as well as with UN peacekeeping measures) provided an opportunity of inverting its above-mentioned position of subordination in the international community. NATO provided the Commonwealth Dominion with a unique opportunity of interacting with the U.S. and UK governments on a relatively equal footing. Contrary to Prime Minister King’s absence in the Roosevelt-Churchill secret meeting of 1941, Secretary of State for External Affairs Lester Pearson was present in secret talks held between the UK and USA in March 1948, on the possibility of creating a North Atlantic alliance (ENGLER 2012).

Governance and realpolitik: Canada’s early experiences of national security dilemmas

18 Canada’s dominant politico-historical narrative is marked by a general picture of gaining full control over the hitherto “reserved” prerogatives and moving on to propagate fundamental rights and peacekeeping across the world. This reading, however, lacks in critical insights into aspects of Canadian policy orientation during the post-WWII period. Contrary to popular belief, Canada’s encounters with counterterrorism can be traced back decades before 9/11 and the infamous Maher Arar case (ABU-LABAN and NATH 2007, WHITAKER 2010: 57), to the turbulent immediate aftermath of WWII. The discovery of a Russian-run spy-ring on Canadian soil in 1946 – better known as the Gouzenko Affair – prompted Ottawa to adopt a highly repressive process of control, infringing fundamental rights and civil liberties (WHITAKER 2010: 37-44, CLÉMENT 2012: 756-757). Ottawa’s approach to this issue was at the heart of the Canadian government’s initial reluctance to extend its support to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in 1948. Canada’s subsequent vote in favour of UDHR was largely the result of pressure on Ottawa from within and without, as well as her unwillingness to side with the likes of the Soviet Union, Saudi Arabia and South Africa, the UDHR’s most fervent opponents (CLÉMENT 2012: 755-757). The Canadian government explained its anti-UDHR stance on the basis of the principle of parliamentary supremacy, deeply entrenched in Canada’s political and legal culture. The courts of justice never challenged, for example, the federal cabinet’s prerogative to suspend due process and indefinitely detain and interrogate suspected Russian spies in 1946 (ibid. :757-758). It is a significant irony of world affairs that Canada, a Western state to adapt an incongruous and questionable stance on the UDHR back in 1948, subsequently emerged – as her opposition to the 2013 Colombo CHOGM implies – an ardent advocate of human rights and civil liberties.4 The crucial underlying reality is that at different junctures of history, important policy decisions have been taken on the basis of quintessential realpolitik and the political interests of the governments in power. Hans Morgenthau’s infamous observation that political policy seeks either to keep power, to increase power, or to demonstrate power is of special relevance to the entirety of Canada’s foreign policy trajectory (MORGENTHAU 1948: 21-22). By no means is

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this a feature unique to the Canadian establishment alone. It is deemed worthy of reiteration in the present reflection due to its significance to a discussion on the present-day challenges facing Canadian foreign policy, including Canada’s position within the Commonwealth of Nations.

II: Canada and the developing world: a foreign policy focal point?

Canada in the Commonwealth: early interactions and reputation- building

19 Over the post-WWII years, the Canadian government strove to develop an international image as a nation that identified itself with the political aspirations of fellow Commonwealth member states beyond the Western hemisphere (THOMSON AND SWANSON 1971: 80-81). The Commonwealth framework was crucial in facilitating Canada’s links with emerging New Commonwealth nations including India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Ghana and Nigeria (ibid.: 77).

20 Canada’s lobbying was instrumental in facilitating the integration of the Republic of India into the Commonwealth of Nations, which set in place a trend that Pakistan and Ceylon also followed. As the independence of India, Pakistan and Ceylon was being negotiated in the mid/late 1940s, the “Canadian view”, i.e. the original admixture of unfettered sovereignty and close cooperation within the Commonwealth, had acquired a position of crucial importance. The Canadian contribution to the 1949 London Conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers, which ensured the inclusion of the Republic of India in the Commonwealth and turned a new page in the organisation’s evolution, is well-documented (MACKENZIE 1999). Prime Ministers Mackenzie King and St Laurent were particularly keen to seek a formula that would reconcile Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s firm commitment to making India a republic, while remaining within the Commonwealth. This objective was ultimately achieved by incorporating the words “Head of the Commonwealth” to the British sovereign’s title, enabling some member states to recognise the British monarch only in that non-binding capacity (THOMSON AND SWANSON 1971: 79-80).

21 Canada’s own experience as a nation that saw the world through “British eyes” and subsequently emerged as an independent power had a strong appeal on leaders of New Commonwealth countries. Yet, Canada’s efforts to develop the profile of a Western partner that acutely shared the politico-historical challenges of New Commonwealth states were oftentimes marred by practical hurdles. Such constraints were considerably apparent, for example, in Canada’s relations with India. The Canadian government was keen to develop an Indo-Canadian entente, a partnership that both parties cherished. However, Ottawa found it challenging to maintain a smooth relationship with Nehru and the Indian government during the 1950s and 60s, especially under the premiership of John Diefenbaker. Delhi’s subsequent adherence to a foreign policy based on non- alignment caused further concern in Ottawa. Senior government officials found Indian leaders (especially Nehru) rather unfathomable, mainly due to their inclination to juxtapose highly anglophile lifestyles and (in many cases) Oxbridge backgrounds with strong discourses of Indian nationalism, anti-colonialism and a foreign policy emphasis

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on non-alignment. Under the Diefenbaker premiership, such rifts with Indian leaders resulted in a rapprochement of Canadian leaders with their Pakistani counterparts (TOUHEY 2011 : 430-431).

22 As a Commonwealth Dominion, Canada’s position on the world stage was not favourable to adopt a robust foreign policy agenda. In 1950, for example, Prime Minister Nehru made a persuasive speech at the first summit of the Colombo Plan for Cooperative Economic Development in South and Southeast Asia, held in Colombo, Ceylon, in January 1950, calling for the early recognition of the newly-formed Communist government of mainland China, highlighting the potential dangers of isolating China from the world community. Secretary of State for External Affairs Lester Pearson expressed full agreement with Nehru’s views, and so did Prime Minister Louis St Laurent. Yet, Ottawa was not in a position to take action due to pressure from Washington DC and Québec-related concerns. The outbreak of the Korean War further tied Canada’s hands in this regard (THOMSON AND SWANSON 1971: 80-81). Geopolitical hurdles took some twenty more years for Canada to establish diplomatic relations with china in 1970, as China began to reach out for greater international contact and support in the face of growing power and pressure of the Soviet Union at the time (STUTTER 2012 336).

Development assistance: key component in Canada’s international agenda

23 Canada has long enjoyed a strong reputation as a leading provider of Official Development Assistance (ODA), which, at the outset, was focused on the Commonwealth of Nations. After the election of Prime Minister John Diefenbaker in 1957, it was staunchly maintained that development assistance was crucial to stave off economic offensives launched from Moscow and Peking (TOUHEY 2011: 431-432). 5 The dissemination of Canadian aid in South and Southeast Asia was largely carried out within the Commonwealth framework, through the Colombo Plan (ibid.). The significance of this role dates back to the early 1950s, when the Canadian government agreed to contribute some 25 million CAD per annum to the Colombo Plan at the latter’s first international conference (THOMSON AND SWANSON 1971: 80). Within the Colombo Plan, Canada contributed a staggering billion dollars in assistance from 1950 to 1969, more than two-thirds of which went to India, and the rest to Pakistan and Ceylon (ibid. : 81). The role of a generous donor for international development began to characterise Canadian foreign policy and international presence in the developing world. Over the 1950s and 1960s, Canada contributed some two billion CAD for international development. This, however, does not imply that prioritising international aid did not trigger controversy. A Gallup poll conducted in 1968 revealed, for example, that two-thirds of Canadians expressed opposition to increases in income taxes to help developing countries. Canada’s success in managing such challenges lay in the ability of a small number of influential politicians such as Lester Pearson to appeal to the “idealism of a nation making its first steps on the international stage” (THOMSON AND SWANSON 1971: 93-94, TRIANTIS 1971).

24 Domestic political contentions emanating from Québecois nationalism and language politics had a strong impact on the expansion of Canadian development assistance to the French-speaking world. As more and more French colonies in the African continent

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gained independence, Québec’s nationalist lobbies were increasingly conscious of extending support to their francophone counterparts in Africa. In 1961 such pressures prompted Prime Minister John Diefenbaker to allocate some 300,000 CAD as development aid to francophone African countries (ibid : 84). Québec expressed a willingness to extend its highly politicised claim to deal directly with France without passing through Ottawa to the rest of the French-speaking world, prompting the federal government to take further action. In 1967-68, for instance, Ottawa sent a high- level mission to Africa, which identified a range of projects that would receive Canadian support, and by 1973, development aid to Africa rose to some 100 million CAD. This made the division of development aid between English and French-speaking countries roughly proportionate to the size of the two linguistic groups within Canada’s national borders (ibid : 85).

25 In the early years of Canada’s role as an international donor, aid distribution was relatively straightforward, with the emphasis on countries in need. This was subsequently replaced by a focus on capacity building, in which the CIDA provided financial assistance to government departments in recipient countries, which would enable local officials to develop experience in administering their own development and poverty alleviation initiatives. Concerns over the misappropriation of funds and corrupt practices put an end to aid for capacity building, paving the path to a juxtaposition of trade and aid, with aid poured into countries with trade potential for Canada (YORK 2013). Canadian aid largely flows to countries of focus (The National Post, 11 Jan. 2013), which alter in accordance with Canada’s foreign policy and multilateral priorities. The Harper government has particularly prioritised drastic cuts in foreign aid, a policy that has earned it much criticism. It has considerably reduced aid allocations to Africa, and a recently updated list of priorities contains twenty countries and regions, but excludes countries such as Rwanda, still rising from the tragedy of genocide, Niger, where government struggles against Islamist militants who kidnapped two Canadian diplomats in December 2008, and Burkina Faso, whose leaders assisted in the negotiations to release the diplomats in late April 2009 (YORK 2009).

26 At the heart of this gradual policy transformation is the Harper government’s resolve to firmly incorporate foreign aid with international trade. Whereas aid to the poorest nations has witnessed cuts, aid allocations have been increased for middle-income countries where Canada has business and geopolitical interests. In a somewhat intriguing development, the Harper government has been altering its Africa policy since 2011, in an effort to interact with emerging African markets (HORNSBY 2013). The present-day emphasis is on applying the aforementioned trade/aid binary focus to selected African destinations. As a short press release on a meeting between Prime Minister Harper and his Senegalese counterpart Macky Sall during the 2013 UN General Assembly outlines, Canada’s relations with Senegal largely revolve around trade interests, which notably involve Canadian investments in Senegal’s mining industry (Office of the Prime Minister, 2013, HORNSBY 2013). This policy orientation was further cemented by the March 2013 merger of CIDA with the Department of External Affairs and International Trade, a decision that has been questioned for its inability to resolve fundamental questions of policy consistency, and to develop a long-term, sustainable strategy for international development (PARIS 2013). The present-day priorities of Canada’s international aid policy are succinctly summed up in a May 2013 research report produced by the North South Institute, which avers that:

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27 An overarching policy framework for Canada’s engagement with the developing world is needed. The key components needed in this framework are the rationale and vision for Canada’s aid and engagement with the developing world, clarification on the role of different policies and partners, and guidance for the Canadian government as a whole. Such a framework could provide an effective way for Canada to demonstrate its commitment to global development and provide a basis for its relationships with developing countries (BÜLLES AND KINDORNAY 2013: 35).

III: Commonwealth side-lined? Neoliberal priorities and contemporary Canadian foreign policy

28 In examining Canada’s international role in an Eastphalian world, the following discussion lays emphasis on two vital aspects, Canada’s relationship with the United States and the growing partnership with China. An exploration of key aspects of U.S.- Canada and China-Canada relations is complemented by a discussion of the Harper government’s foreign policy priorities, which have caused much debate. Parts One and Two of this article served to highlight the significant role of the Commonwealth framework in the development of Canadian foreign and international development aid policies. In comparison, the Commonwealth occupies a subordinate position in the following discussion, which is considerably suggestive of Canada’s contemporary foreign policy preoccupations. Whereas the Commonwealth of Nations no longer plays a decisive role in shaping Canadian foreign policy, it is highlighted that the organisation’s salience to Canadian governance in general and foreign policy in particular continues to remain a reality that could be exploited to Ottawa’s advantage.

Canada and the United States: a vital partnership of imbalance?

It would be a mistake to indulge the fantasy that Canada will ever preoccupy the U.S. to the same degree that the U.S. preoccupies Canada. We need to move beyond such conceits, stop the misdirected blame game, and get on with business. (PARIS, 29 June 2012)

29 An effort to explore Canada’s international role in the context of emergent Eastphalian power dynamics would be incomplete in the absence of an appraisal of decisive contemporary challenges to Canadian foreign policy, and Canada’s track record of addressing them. Ottawa’s close partnership with Washington DC has been interpreted as the “bedrock” of Canadian foreign policy (PARIS 2012). This relationship has been constrained by the power imbalance between Ottawa and Washington DC, and it has often appeared, to the dismay of many Canadians, that Washington DC was instrumental in defining the orientation of Canadian foreign policy. The view that Canadian economic policy orientation is near-exclusively directed by the United States has long dominated international attitudes towards Canada. In 1975, for instance, President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing of France opposed Canada’s entry into the Group of Seven industrialised countries (G7), on the grounds that Canada was an economic appendage of the United States and that, consequently, a separate representation was unwarranted (NOSSAL 1997: 197, MASSIE 2008: 87).

30 Debates on the U.S predominance of Canadian affairs have continued to characterise Canada-USA relations in the post-9/11 era. The effects of 9/11 on Canada’s foreign

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policy orientation have received much academic attention (ROACH 2003, 2011, WHITAKER 2010). Canada’s reaction to the 9/11 attacks was two-fold. Firstly, Ottawa immediately responded to UN Security Council Resolution 1373 with the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001 that contained a broad definition of terrorism, tougher immigration and asylum controls and reinforced security on the US border. These measures were complemented by the deployment of a military contingent in southern Afghanistan, in direct confrontation with Taliban and Al-Qaida guerrillas. Canadian military presence in Afghanistan has been stepped up under the Harper government (WHITAKER 2010: 48).

31 The second tier of Canadian action involved a comparatively less publicized venture that revolved around the maintenance of security on the open land border with the USA. The position of the USA as Canada’s powerful immediate neighbour as well as key partner on the international scene is complemented by the USA’s significance to Canada in terms of external trade. The USA is the primary trading partner for most Canadian provinces (KUKUCHA 2008 19). In this backdrop, border security constituted the centre point of Canadian security policy in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 (WHITAKER 2010: 50, ROACH 2011: 424). The Canadian trade establishment unequivocally called for the reopening of the U.S. border for unimpeded commerce at whatever political cost. This was a crucial priority for Canadian businesses. The economic costs of a protected U.S. border were unacceptable to Canada, which sends more than 85 per cent of its exports to the United States. Consequently, Ottawa was faced with a double-edged sword. If it were to ensure an open U.S. border, it had to comply by the U.S.-led dictates of a North American security perimeter in which Canadian sovereignty would be seriously threatened by pressures to “harmonize” Canadian laws and practices along U.S. standards. Ottawa was faced with the challenge of reassuring the United States sufficiently on border security so that commercial traffic can be maintained, while not surrendering a critical degree of Canadian sovereignty in the process (WHITAKER 2010: 50).

32 Canada’s cooperation with the USA on the diplomatic front witnessed a setback when Ottawa refused to partake in the Bush administration’s war in Iraq. The Iraq war cut a wedge between the two countries rather than deepening the closeness that has historically characterized the continent with the “world’s longest undefended border” (ibid : 49). Although Canadians sympathized with Americans in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, the Bush administration’s subsequent tendency to pursue an aggressive “America First” course of action put severe strains on a Western alliance that had remained relatively cohesive throughout the Cold War (ibid). Similar to Washington DC’s post-Iraq aversion of the Jacques Chirac administration in Paris, the Liberal governments of Jean Chrétien and Paul Martin were perceived in Washington DC as “anti-American”, and the Conservatives under Stephen Harper as more favourably inclined to the Bush administration. In the Obama era, the Harper government has undertaken painstaking efforts to be seen as following the lead of President Obama’s popular Democratic administration. Despite this political strategy, the Harper government is ideologically not on the same page as its American counterpart (ibid).

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Between a “big” neighbour, new horizons and the reputation of a “middle power”: Canada at crossroads

33 In announcing his Cabinet on 6 February 2006, and following a long-standing tradition, Prime Minister Harper also established a Cabinet committee on foreign affairs. This was accompanied by the reintegration of the portfolios of external affairs, trade and development into a single unit (HART 2008 : 66). This decision mirrored the Harper government’s subsequent orientation on foreign policy priorities. It launched an internal foreign policy overhaul in 2011, which was accelerated after the appointment of Foreign Minister John Baird in May 2011. This initiative, named Foreign Policy Plan (FPP), was intended at redefining Canada’s foreign policy priorities, especially with regards to emerging markets in Asia, and in addressing concerns related to trade cooperation with state-owned Chinese firms, which risks enabling China’s strategic and national interests play a role in international business (CTV News, 17 Nov. 2011). The overall orientation of this foreign policy agenda could be glimpsed in the draft of a classified new “Canadian Foreign Policy Plan” dated September 6, 2012, and leaked to the press in November 2012 (CBC News, 19 Nov. 2012). This document unambiguously maintained that: The situation is stark: Canada’s trade and investment relations with new economies, leading with Asia, must deepen, and as a country we must become more relevant to our new partners (…) To succeed we will need to pursue political relationships in tandem with economic interests even where political interests or values may not align (Ibid.).

34 This line of thinking was further entrenched into the Harper government’s foreign policy through the Global Markets Action Plan of 2013, which outlined Ottawa’s priorities in international trade (Government of Canada, 2013). An underlying aspect of this document is its firm juxtaposition of international trade policy with foreign policy. As Paris (2013) outlines, Ottawa’s primary strategy of promoting Canadian commercial interests in foreign markets risks looming over the rest of Canada’s foreign policy. In an era of international trade marked by Western states near-unanimously adopting “look East” policies, Canada’s shift to Asia, as well as Africa and South America does not come as a surprise. However, the reason that prompted the Canadian government to keep the key document detailing its new foreign policy agenda classified, was the slowness with which Canada has been making her “look-East” transition, and a potential public backlash against Ottawa’s objective of seeking close trade-related cooperation with ideologically opposed countries. Trade relations with China, for instance, have been particularly strengthened in the late 2000s, with the signing of the Foreign Investment Protection and Promotion Agreement (FIPPA) with China, which Duc (2012) describes as the punctuation mark at the end of a declaration, which denotes that Canada is ready and willing to do business with China.

On Canada’s new international priorities at the hour of Eastphalia?

35 China’s rapid economic development required more foreign trade, involving increasing imports of energy, foods, and other resources, which Canada willingly provided. Chinese exports of manufactured goods to Canada grew enormously, leading to a large trade deficit for Canada, estimated at over half the value of total trade (STUTTER 2012, 336). Over the 2000s, China’s role in Canada’s economic life has gained unprecedented

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relevance and influence. China has heavily invested in Canada’s natural resources. Some critics of the Harper government’s decision to boycott the 2013 Colombo CHOGM cited the case of China’s human rights record and especially the Chinese government’s approach to Tibet, on which the Canadian government adopts a much more diplomatic posture. This critique maintained that Sri Lanka’s comparative lack of diplomatic and economic leverage on the international scene enabled the Harper government to adopt a stern policy on not-so-influential Sri Lanka and turn a blind eye to identical concerns in decisively influential China. Despite the salience of this argument, Canada’s relations with China have not always been devoted to economic cooperation and a disregard for China’s human rights situation. In the early years of the Harper government, Ottawa did take a stern stance on China’s human rights issues (STUTTER 2012: 336).

36 In the present-day context, Canada’s foremost priority in terms of her relations with China and the rest of Southeast Asia involves extensive economic cooperation that builds upon existing partnerships, which Prime Minister Harper describes as moving Canada-China relations to the “next level” (CBC News, 10 Feb. 2012). This notably involves new accords on energy-related cooperation and an overall effort to diversify the Canadian export market, which has been largely focused on the U.S. market (Government of Canada, 14 Mar. 2013).6 China already plays an active role in the Canadian oil industry; in October 2011, Sinopec acquired Canadian oil and gas producer Daylight Energy Ltd. for CAD 2.2 billion, a year after it invested CAD 4.65 billion in an Alberta oil-sands project, China’s largest-ever investment in North America (Huffington Post, 16 Nov. 2011). A not insignificant juncture of this partnership was Ottawa’s increased emphasis on trade partnerships with China, notably in relation to oil, in the aftermath of the U.S. federal government’s decision to postpone the construction of the Keystone XL pipeline, in the face of large-scale protests in front of the White House on 6 November 2011. The pipeline was meant to transport some 700,000 barrels of Albertan oil to refineries in the U.S. Gulf Coast, generating thousands of jobs (BURNEY AND HAMPSON 2012). Soon after the U.S. decision to postpone the project, the Canadian government emphasised its prioritisation of trade with East Asia and especially, China. Prime Minister Harper directly clarified this stance to President Obama, and days after the U.S. postponement, Canadian Finance Minister Jim Flaherty visited China, reiterating Canada’s commitment to trade ties and seeking opportunities to strengthen cooperation with regards to oil exportations (CTV News, 14 Nov. 2011). Despite these forward steps, the U.S. market continues to remain Canada’s foremost destination for oil exports. Whereas the Keystone issue -- due to the opposition not only from environmental activists but also rail transportation firms – has been highly mediatised with some observers, also noting that the Keystone project risks being hampered by the latent surge of U.S. oil output (CBC News, 28 Nov. 2013), the US market is set to be open for Canadian oil exports for the foreseeable future. Alberta is not the only Canadian state to export oil to the USA and Newfoundland, for instance, has been continuing its exports to the USA while maintaining a low media profile.

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“We know where our interests lie”: on Canada’s international role at the hour of Eastphalia

Challenges of Eastphalia and problems of consistency

37 Commenting in 2011 on the Harper government’s defeat (to Portugal) in the contest to gain a temporary seat at the UN Security Council, one observer attributes Canada’s defeat to what she describes as “the Harper government’s enduring lack of sophistication in international affairs” (GAGNON, 2011). The Harper foreign policy orientation since 2006 has witnessed a rather abrupt series of fluctuations, such as curtly halting aid programmes and diplomatic representations and the tendency to redirect Canadian focus from Commonwealth-linked efforts in Africa towards projects in Latin America in the late 2000s (KRELING 2009 : 52, S IDDIQUI 2012). As highlighted above, this inconsistency is also apparent in the Harper government’s critical stance on China’s human rights situation at the beginning of its first term of office, and the subsequent “un-doing” of all such critiques, adapting a discourse of reinforced trade cooperation with China.7 Canada’s overall present-day foreign policy, as highlighted in the previous section, is closely linked to international trade, and the promotion of Canadian businesses abroad. This approach, in the context of global economic woes, low growth in Canada’s traditional exports in the West and the rapid rise of non- Western (especially Southeast Asian) markets, is an advisable policy. However, it also raises concerns over its impact on Canada’s overall foreign policy. It is deeply entrenched in the neoliberal drift in contemporary world politics. Concerning Africa, for instance, the Canadian government is focused on its trade interests at the expense of longer-term sustainable development goals, a policy that has been criticised as short-sighted and strategically unsustainable (PEARSON 2011, GOLDFARB 2013). While analysts calls for a more consistent, involved and nuanced Africa policy (HORNSBY 2013), African diplomats have reiterated the necessity of increased political and diplomatic partnerships with Canada (CLARK 2012).

38 A foreign policy agenda with a distinctly “Canadian” emphasis on multilateralism, peacekeeping, the promotion of liberal democratic values and most importantly, as a middle power constitutes, by and large, Canada’s foremost contribution to the international system. In the contemporary political zeitgeist, Canada possesses substantive potential in playing a vital role as a middle power. In the context of post-9/11 emphasis on counterterrorism, the increased leverage of emerging Eastphalian superpowers, as well as the neoliberal drift in world politics, Canadian foreign policy faces new challenges, especially vis-à-vis the global South. Rapidly increasing Chinese influence in Asia and Africa is largely facilitated by the China’s “Eastphalian” foreign policy priority of non-involvement in the internal affairs of fellow states. In this context, many governments in the global South with dubious human rights records and reputations for repression have been developing closer ties with Peking, and are less inclined to abide by Western liberal internationalist dictates. The leverage wielded by Western development assistance and financial support has thus witnessed a considerable Eastphalian challenge throughout the global South.

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Canada and today’s Commonwealth: a new international agenda for Ottawa?

39 The corollary to the aforementioned prospects is the fact that Canada, despite her long struggle to wield autonomy in managing her international affairs, has often tended to follow the scripts laid down by Western superpowers. The latest foreign policy focus on trade and investments in Asia and Africa, and a lesser emphasis on human rights and accountability, leaves one somewhat bemused concerning Canada’s foreign policy priorities. The realist rationale that guides Ottawa maintains that strong emphasis on fundamental rights and accountability in political contexts where Canada has substantive trade dividends is all but counterproductive. Despite the dominance of this discourse, recent developments such as Ottawa’s boycott of the Colombo CHOGM demonstrate that the Harper government is not completely oblivious to the cons of this new foreign policy emphasis. As reiterated earlier in this article, the Harper government’s foreign policy emphasis (of lack thereof) on issues of governance and accountability is determined by the constraints of trade dividends. It is within this narrow framework of realpolitik that Ottawa is disposed to uphold the Commonwealth’s core values of respect for human rights, the rule of law and accountability. Canada’s role within the Commonwealth of Nations is thus shaped by more pressing priorities including, most importantly, decisive trade partnerships. Despite this reality, the Commonwealth continues to play a non-negligible role in Canadian governance. Ottawa has taken steps towards reinforcing Canada’s presence in the Commonwealth through generous financial allocations as well as gestures of commitment including the appointment of a special envoy to the Commonwealth (Government of Canada, Oct. 23, 2013), not to mention CAD 7.5 million spent on the Queen’s golden jubilee celebrations in 2012 (Ibid). However, such commitments no longer imply a central role to the Commonwealth of Nations in Canadian foreign policy. Changing priorities have relegated the Commonwealth to a ceremonial, omnipresent yet near-unarguably insignificant position in Canadian foreign policy.

40 A vital factor that requires reiteration is that in order to exploit Canada’s potential within the Commonwealth, it is necessary for Ottawa to emerge as a power with an international agenda of its own, with little trace of an inclination to follow the scripts laid down by more influential world powers. Canada’s tremendous human resource potential and image of a middle power on the international scene are of vital importance in reaping the best out of its position as a leading member of the Commonwealth. As an international body based on voluntary association, the Commonwealth has entered a new era of enhanced supra-national interaction across linguistic and politico-historical boundaries. This trend was clearly demonstrated, for example, in the invitation extended to President Nicolas Sarkozy of France to deliver the keynote address at the 2009 CHOGM held in Port-of-Spain, Trinidad and Tobago.8 In this context of such new trends in international cooperation, Canada enjoys an especially advantageous position, which is reinforced by her simultaneous membership of the Commonwealth, the Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie, the G8 and NATO. In strengthening bilateral cooperation across supra-national bodies and their priorities in a new era of international cooperation, Canada possesses much potential to play a constructive role, which the Harper government has been relatively slow to exploit. In sum, Canada’s capabilities within the Commonwealth have been side-lined, partly due to the emphasis on the “voluntary” nature of the organisation, and partly

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due to Ottawa’s near-exclusive emphasis on international trade and influential bilateral partnerships.

Conclusions: Canada and the Commonwealth in an Eastphalian world?

41 This article sought to reflect upon Canada’s international role in a changing world order, characterised by an easterly shift in world power and influence. In an effort to briefly reconstruct the key tenets of Canadian foreign policy, its contemporary priorities and options, this article took a diachronic approach that evoked the development of a distinctly Canadian foreign policy in the post-WWII era, and the evolution of priorities in Ottawa’s international agenda. Canada’s domestic and international politics represent a complex web of structures, agendas, strategic priorities and historical trajectories, and by no means is this article a comprehensive account of present-day Canadian foreign policy. Instead, its primary objective involved a glimpse, through the benefit of insights into key aspects of the politico-historical evolution of Canadian foreign policy, of the challenging prospects for Canada in an emergent Eastphalian world order. The Harper government’s neoliberal foreign policy is largely characterised by substantive efforts to increase trade partnerships with emerging markets. In terms of the Canadian economy, this policy approach may indeed be promising, but Canada’s contemporary international standing is not limited to economic strength alone. Canada’s legacy of international interaction, from the Commonwealth to the UN, NATO and ODA, provides her with tremendous potential in international diplomacy, especially with regards to the manoeuvring of complex international disputes. In 2012, the British and Canadian governments decided to operate a number of foreign diplomatic missions in partnership, partly as a cost- cutting initiative (DAVIES 2012). In Canada, this measure earned much domestic criticism. This decision followed a persuasive speech delivered by British Prime Minister David Cameron at the Canadian House of Commons on 22 September 2011, calling for increased UK-Canada cooperation (CAMERON 2011). While such partnerships may certainly have a beneficial dimension, Canada today requires a more nuanced appraisal of her strengths on the international arena, as an influential member of the community of states with a “middle path” international agenda of her own. This imperatively involves thinking beyond the ‘foreign policy as international trade’ paradigm. It also involves thinking beyond much valued bilateral partnerships, including UK-Canada and U.S.-Canada cooperation. Such an agenda would enable Canada to reinforce her position on the contemporary international scene as an influential middle power. If a lesson were to be gleaned from the past, a balanced mixture of the cautious foreign policy approach that Prime Minister Mackenzie King envisioned for Canada in the mid-decades of the last century, and the energy of Pearsonian internationalism, would be of tremendous relevance to Canada’s efforts to consolidate her pleine place in an emerging Eastphalian world order.

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NOTES

1. See KIM (2009), FIDLER AND GANGULY (2010), LO (2010) and FIDLER (2010) 2. The term “Constitution Act” has been used in Canadian government records since the Pierre Trudeau government’s patriation of the Canadian Constitution in 1982. The Act’s original name – the British North America Act – continues to appear on British government documentation (HART 2008: 58). 3. The Colonial Conferences were subsequently termed « Imperial Conferences » (for an extensive discussion on the role and impact of Imperial Conferences on governance in the British Empire, see, for example, KENDLE 1967). 4. Canada plays a vital role in human rights advocacy at transnational level, especially through the Canadian Human Rights Council’s efforts to support human rights commissions in other countries, both multilaterally and bilaterally (see most notably, CARDENAS 2003: 783). 5. There is a broad literature on the motives of Canadian aid policy, which has been traditionally ascribed to a mixture of three motivations, philanthropic, economic and political. For an early discussion of these motives and the predominance of political interests in development policy, see Triantis 1971. For a revisionist reading of these three motives, see NOSSAL 1988). 6. In terms of petroleum, to quote Minister of International Trade Ed Fast, Canada is the “largest oil supplier to the United States”. In 2011, Canada delivered 2.8 million barrels a day of crude oil and refined products—more than Saudi Arabia and Venezuela combined (Government of Canada, 14 Mar. 2013). 7. At the inception of the Harper government (and to China’s outrage), it conferred honorary Canadian citizenship on the Dalai Lama in September 2006 (CBC News, March 8, 2012). 8. In his speech, Sarkozy strongly highlighted the importance of cooperation between the Commonwealth and the Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie (see SARKOZY 2009).

ABSTRACTS

This article reflects upon the gradual emergence of an Easterly shift of global power and its impact on Canada’s role in the international system. These transformative dynamics have resulted in new challenges for the Canadian government, which has been reviewing the orientation of its foreign policy agenda over the last two years. Burgeoning economic concerns have prompted Ottawa to mingle foreign policy with international trade. How can Canada’s role in an Eastphalian world be conceptualised? Through an initial review of the development of a distinctly Canadian approach to foreign policy and Canada’s reactions to pressing contemporary geopolitical challenges, this article seeks to conceptualise Canada’s place in an emergent Eastphalian world, through an appraisal of the strengths, weaknesses and lacunae of the Harper government’s on-going foreign policy approach.

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La géopolitique internationale reste profondément transformée par l’émergence des grandes superpuissances non-occidentales. Ce développement apporte de nouveaux défis au gouvernement fédéral canadien qui tente depuis la fin des années 2000 de restructurer les priorités de sa politique étrangère. Les questions relevant de l’économie nationale ont amené Ottawa à placer le commerce international au cœur de sa politique étrangère. Comment conceptualiser le rôle potentiel du Canada au sein d’un système international « estphalien » ? Après un bref rappel des traits marquants de la politique étrangère canadienne ainsi que des politiques d’Ottawa envers quelques enjeux-clés contemporains, le présent article vise à mettre en lumière le rôle potentiel du Canada au sein d’un système international en transition, en évaluant les forces, les limites et les lacunes de la politique étrangère actuelle du gouvernement Harper.

AUTHOR

CHAMINDA K. WEERAWARDHANA Queen’s University Belfast

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Varia

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Louise Arbour : carrière et image(s) d’une juriste canadienne à l’international

Morgane Le Houssel

1 Magistrate canadienne, rendue célèbre pour l’inculpation de Slobodan Milosevic, Louise Arbour n’a cessé d’occuper des postes clés. Elle a été successivement juge à la Cour Suprême puis à la Cour d’Appel de l’Ontario, Procureur général des Tribunaux Pénaux Internationaux pour l’ex-Yougoslavie (TPIY) et le Rwanda (TPIR), Juge à la Cour Suprême du Canada, Haut-commissaire des Nations unies aux droits de l’homme, et depuis 2009 Présidente de l’ONG International Crisis Group.

2 Afin d’appréhender son parcours, cet article1 se situe au carrefour de plusieurs champs de recherches : relations internationales, justice et genre. Les années 1990 ont vu l’essor de la justice pénale internationale en lien avec un nouvel ordre mondial. La genèse de plusieurs institutions, comme le TPIY et le TPIR, plus récemment la Cour Pénale Internationale (CPI), font aujourd’hui l’objet de plusieurs études. Angle dynamique de la recherche, ce thème est pluridisciplinaire, il englobe historiens, juristes, politistes, sociologues du droit et journalistes. Cette historiographie est continuellement mise à jour, intégrant de fait les nouvelles formes de justice dans les sociétés post-conflictuelles, l’évolution juridique des crimes internationaux et les actualités de la justice internationale comme les arrestations de criminels et les procès.

3 L’un des enjeux de la recherche dans ce mémoire de Master, a été de constituer un corpus de sources diversifié afin de porter un regard neuf sur le parcours de Louise Arbour et le fonctionnement du TPIY. Le mémoire de recherche a privilégié les prises de paroles de la magistrate (discours, ouvrages et articles), les hommages, les interviews, des sources audiovisuelles (documentaires et fictions) et le regard croisé de la presse française et québécoise à travers deux quotidiens : Le Monde (157 articles entre janvier 1996 et octobre 2010) et Le Devoir (169 articles entre janvier 1996 et septembre 2010). Enfin, six entretiens déterminants ont été menés avec Fannie Lafontaine (ancienne assistante juridique de Louise Arbour à la Cour suprême du Canada et conseillère en matière juridique à son cabinet exécutif au Haut-commissariat des droits

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de l’homme à Genève), Ole Gjertsad (auteur de deux documentaires sur Louise Arbour), Luc Côté (enquêteur québécois du bureau du Procureur au Rwanda), le Général Morillon (commandant des forces armées de l’ONU en Bosnie-Herzégovine en 1992-1993), Christian Chartier (porte-parole de Louise Arbour aux TPI) et enfin Louise Arbour elle-même que j’ai rencontré à Bruxelles2.

4 Il s’agissait de savoir comment Louise Arbour avait imprimé sa marque sur la scène internationale et de voir si la féminisation d’un poste changeait l’exercice du pouvoir et ses représentations. L’article présente une femme évoluant dans des mondes d’hommes défendant au fil de ses postes ses convictions de droit. Il s’agit aussi de dresser le portrait d’une Canadienne au cœur d’institutions internationales.

Une femme dans des mondes d’hommes

5 La magistrature a longtemps été un domaine traditionnellement masculin, les juristes étant « par définition des hommes de loi » (CACOUAULT-BITAUD 2001 : 99). A la fin des années 1970, lorsque Louise Arbour débute sa carrière à l’école de droit de l’Université York de Toronto, il y a encore peu de femmes en faculté de droit et peu de professeures de droit. La juge Arbour était la quatrième femme à être nommée à la Cour suprême de l’Ontario en 1987 et la troisième à la Cour d’appel de l’Ontario en 1990. En 1999, elle était également la quatrième femme à être nommée à la Cour suprême du Canada et son arrivée porta à trois le nombre de femmes juges à la Cour suprême, une première dans l’histoire du tribunal. Louise Arbour appartient à la seconde génération de femmes arrivées dans la magistrature, la première génération de pionnières étant constituée plutôt autour de Bertha Wilson et Claire L’Heureux-Dubé. Louise Arbour explique qu’elle a bénéficié d’un contexte favorable : Je suis arrivée à une époque dans la profession juridique au Canada où il y a beaucoup de portes qui ont été ouvertes par d’autres avant moi et j’en ai bénéficié [...]. Dix ans plus tôt je n’aurais peut-être pas été très bien reçue, il y avait encore beaucoup de discriminations, de préjugés3.

6 A l’échelle internationale, « la diplomatie passe pour n’être qu’une affaire d’hommes » (DELAUNAY, DENÉCHERE 2006 : 22). En 2000 par exemple, seule la Jamaïque était représentée par une femme au Conseil de sécurité (GASPARD 2000 : 735) et en 2006 quatre femmes figuraient parmi les 25 chefs d’Etat ou de gouvernement de l’Union européenne. En général, il n’y a pas plus de « 10 à 15 % en moyenne de femmes diplomates de rang élevé dans leurs administrations » (DELAUNAY, DENÉCHERE 2006 : 343). Aux Nations unies, « l’ascension est difficile pour les dames : même si elles parviennent au camp de base en proportion égale par rapport aux hommes – elles occupent 50 % des postes moins élevés –, elles ne représentent que 15 % du groupe qui escalade le sommet » (MATHIEU 2008 : 42). La carrière de Louise Arbour à l’international participe à cette lente mais certaine féminisation des postes de pouvoir de la diplomatie onusienne.

7 A contrario, la justice pénale internationale est bien investie par les femmes. Entre 1997 et 1999, trois femmes occupent les plus hautes responsabilités au TPIY : Louise Arbour au Bureau du Procureur, Gabrielle Kirk McDonald à la Présidence du Tribunal et Dorothee de Sampayo Garrido-Nijgh au Greffe. Christian Chartier, premier porte-parole du TPIY, illustre par ses propos la situation : « De ce point de vue là, on était l’institution modèle de l’ONU quant à la parité, la promotion des femmes on avait

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assuré, on était dirigé par des femmes, on était devenu un véritable matriarcat »4. Une autre procureure marquante des TPI est également une femme, Carla Del Ponte, qui effectue son mandat de 1999 à 2007. La récente nomination de Fatou Bensouda comme procureure de la CPI vient confirmer ce processus déjà bien amorcé de féminisation de la justice internationale.

8 Les femmes sont désormais reconnues comme actrices et interlocutrices du pouvoir, mais la juge Louise Arbour a-t-elle fait face à des discriminations ? A cet égard, deux témoins livrent des anecdotes sur les rapports de Louise Arbour avec des interlocuteurs internationaux masculins. D’abord, Christian Chartier raconte son passage au quartier général de l’OTAN : Ce n’est sans doute pas la première femme à visiter l’OTAN, mais c’est de toute façon le premier procureur international à se rendre dans cette forteresse machiste, qui plus est militaire [...]. Elle est arrivée au bureau avec un pantalon et une veste, donc un habit d’homme, et une cravate. Certes, une cravate sur un chemisier, dénouée, pas nouée comme un homme [...]. Ce n’était pas un clin d’œil elle avait parfaitement conscience de là où elle mettait les pieds5.

9 Puis, Fannie Lafontaine, une des proches collaboratrices de Louise Arbour à la Cour suprême du Canada puis au Haut-commissariat aux droits de l’homme, relate l’anecdote d’une réunion au Darfour : Je me souviens d’une réunion sur le Darfour, on était sa chef de cabinet [...], Louise Arbour et moi, dans un meeting avec le Ministre de la Justice du Soudan et le chef du cabinet […]. On parlait du viol au Darfour, […] ils nous disaient premièrement « Oui on est conscient maintenant.. », parce qu’ils ont nié longtemps le problème au Darfour, et puis à un moment donné il dit « Oui on fait des efforts là-dessus ». Et là il s’approche comme ça, on est trois femmes de l’autre côté, et il dit : « Mais entre vous et moi », et là il baisse le ton, « les femmes du Darfour sont plutôt faciles ». Ce qui était fantastique c’est qu’il disait ça à trois femmes, il y avait une espèce d’idée que cette femme là [Louise Arbour] n’était pas comme les femmes de chez eux6.

10 Les propos de Louise Arbour permettent de répondre à la question soulevée. Pendant l’entretien, elle dresse la liste des quelques exemples sur toute sa carrière où le fait d’être femme a été perçu négativement : Quand je suis arrivée en ex-Yougoslavie [...] c’était encore un environnement qui était très macho [...]. Ils […] n’étaient pas capables d’accepter la possibilité qu’une femme ait autant de pouvoir [...]. La seule vraie expérience que j’ai eu concrètement, c’est par la suite quand j’ai été Haut-commissaire aux droits de l’homme, mais ça c’est tellement classique [...]. Je suis allée au Darfour, je suis allée dans des camps [...]. Les premières tentes en avant c’est tout le leadership du camp [...]. Quand je suis sortie de la voiture, j’avais un chauffeur, un garde du corps, un interprète, et dans l’autre voiture il y avait quelques jeunes femmes qui avaient beaucoup travaillé dans le camp [...]. On est arrivé, l’interprète m’a présenté en disant « C’est la chef de notre délégation », l’homme avec son turban ne m’a même pas regardé, il s’est adressé à mon chauffeur, mon chauffeur lui a dit « C’est pas moi le chef c’est elle », là il s’est adressé à mon garde du corps qui lui a dit également « Ça sert à rien de me parler à moi, c’est elle, c’est la représentante de Kofi Annan ici », mais ça ne rentrait pas [...], il s’adressait encore à l’autre interprète, à tous les hommes, il ne m’a pas adressé la parole. Après cinq minutes, j’ai dit à mes collègues « Ecoutez, continuez donc à lui parler, [...], je vais aller avec les jeunes femmes on va aller voir les femmes” [...]. On a passé un après-midi fantastique, [les femmes] ont commencé à me raconter toute la corruption qu’il y avait dans le camp […]. Je suis convaincue qu’il y a aucun de mes collègues masculins des Nations unies qui aurait pu avoir la même expérience. C’est la seule fois là où […] c’était tangible à quel point c’était sexiste mais au fond ça m’a très très bien servi7.

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11 In fine, elle déclare avoir connu peu de discriminations par rapport à son sexe : « Je suis [...] très consciente que beaucoup de femmes ont subi beaucoup de discriminations professionnelles, [...] mais moi je n’en ai pas été victime »8.

12 La cause des femmes n’en reste pas moins étrangère à la juge Arbour. Déjà en 1995, elle dirige l’enquête sur les événements survenus dans la prison de femmes de Kingston (Ontario). Suite à une altercation entre des détenues et des agents de correction en 1994, des détenues ont été placées en unité d’isolement. La directrice de la prison a fait appel à une Equipe Pénitentiaire d’Intervention d’Urgence pour procéder au retrait des cellules et à la fouille à nu des femmes en isolement. Le retrait des cellules et la fouille ont été filmés comme à chaque intervention et la Canadian Broadcasting Corporation en a diffusé quelques extraits. La Commission d’enquête, mise en place par le gouvernement et présidée par Louise Arbour, établit un rapport de plus de 350 pages (ARBOUR 1996). La juge plaide en faveur des droits des détenues et le rapport accable de façon sévère la prison, sa hiérarchie et son fonctionnement, et entraîne la démission du directeur du Service correctionnel canadien.

13 Louise Arbour s’est ensuite engagée aux TPI pour que les femmes soient reconnues comme victimes de violences spécifiques dans la jurisprudence internationale. Luc Côté, avocat et enquêteur canadien affilié au Bureau du Procureur du TPIR de 1995 à 1999, explique : [Il a fallu] Louise, une femme, pour faire comprendre que « Non non on va mettre les crimes de nature sexuelle sur le même pied et on va enquêter de façon en parallèle […] ». Goldstone aurait sans doute dit « Oui c’est bien », mais sûrement pas avec le même acharnement que pouvait avoir Louise, et puis la même conviction9.

14 Lors de l’entretien, Louise Arbour précise : On a commencé à le faire de façon plus systématique, pour moi c’était très important [...] la question de la victimisation des crimes sexuels [...]. C’était très très important de démontrer que d’abord ce n’était pas l’assouvissement de besoins irrésistibles, ce sont des gestes violents, des gestes de pouvoir, de contrôle. Il fallait le faire de façon déterminée et je pense qu’on l’a bien lancé10.

15 Les femmes sont également au centre de ses préoccupations lors de son passage au Haut-commissariat aux droits de l’homme. Elle affirme que « la violence contre les femmes [doit être] qualifiée à juste titre de crime le plus courant et le moins sanctionné dans le monde » (Le Devoir 2007a) et que : Les femmes ont une voix distincte parce que leur relation avec la violence est très différente de celle des hommes, collectivement elles en sont largement victimes, autant dans les domaines privés que dans les domaines publics, dans certains domaines je pense que c’est inévitable que les femmes aient une prédisposition à se préoccuper de ces questions là11.

16 Cette sensibilité sincère aux droits des femmes s’inscrit dans un double principe d’égalité et d’altérité. Pour elle : La contribution la plus importante que peuvent présentement faire les femmes à l’éthique judiciaire est la promotion non pas de leur point de vue mais de l’idée même qu’il existe plusieurs façons de voir le monde et qu’il est possible de concevoir le point de vue des autres. (Conseil du Statut de La Femme 1994 : 27)

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Le primat d’une femme de droit(s) sur la scène internationale

17 S’appuyant continuellement sur le droit, Louise Arbour se pense et agit prioritairement en juriste. En 1995 lorsqu’elle rédige l’enquête sur la prison de Kingston, elle s’appuie sur le droit pour démontrer que la durée indéterminée de l’isolement préventif et les fouilles à nu sont contraires aux normes juridiques et au respect de la dignité humaine.

18 La magistrate a toujours défendu au fil de sa carrière l’indivisibilité et l’universalité des droits fondamentaux. Une de ses convictions profondes est la défense et la promotion des droits des minorités, les moins visibles et les moins défendus. Dans une entrevue, elle déclare que « la ligne de conduite [doit] toujours [être] de se préoccuper d’abord des plus démunis, des plus marginalisés, des plus défavorisés. Beaucoup se trouvent parmi ces catégories : femmes, enfants, personnes LGBT12, personnes handicapées, immigrants, réfugiés, etc. » (VEILLEUX 2009 : 31-34). Elle s’emploie également à promouvoir les droits économiques, sociaux et culturels, souvent moins médiatisés que les droits civils et politiques. Comme Haut-commissaire aux droits de l’homme, elle met en avant le droit à la nourriture, à l’eau, à la santé, à l’éducation, la lutte contre la pauvreté et la discrimination raciale, et cela pour tous.

19 A cette conviction universelle se mêle celle de la primauté du droit, de la Rule of law. Selon la sociologue Liora Israël, « le droit est un des outils auxquels se confrontent souvent, par choix ou par obligation, ceux qui entendent contester une situation, un Etat, des adversaires [...]. La menace du droit peut, par exemple, à elle seule être un outil efficace face à un adversaire » (ISRAEL 2009 : 9-10). De par sa formation à la criminal law, Louise Arbour côtoie un droit coercitif et autoritaire qu’elle applique tout au long de sa carrière. Elle conteste les violations humanitaires en se référant au droit et fait valoir le rôle de l’Etat de droit dans la protection de chaque citoyen. Elle explique : « I have spent my entire professional life working with, in, or around criminal law. I believe that I have a realistic sense of what it can and cannot dot and what it should and should not do » (ARBOUR 1999 : 16).

20 En bref, « le droit est [s]on outil de travail et [elle] croi[t] qu’il peut changer les choses » (VEILLEUX 2009 : 31-34). Comme Haut-commissaire aux droits de l’homme, sa conviction pour le droit et la justice reste prégnante. Elle rappelle à plusieurs occasions que les dirigeants politiques et militaires peuvent faire l’objet de poursuites pénales, que nul n’est au-dessus des lois et que les abus doivent faire l’objet d’enquêtes. Cette conviction est également symbolisée par le discours qu’elle tient après les attentats du 11 septembre 2001 : la guerre contre le terrorisme et le contexte de crainte perpétuelle qui lui est rattaché ne doivent pas porter atteinte aux droits fondamentaux. L’exception de la situation ne saurait justifier le recul des droits au sein d’une démocratie. C’est une conviction qui lui tient à cœur et qui trouve une de ses origines dans les événements d’octobre 1970. Suite aux enlèvements de James Cross, délégué commercial britannique à Montréal, et de Pierre Laporte, Ministre du Travail et de l’Immigration du Québec, par le Front de Libération du Québec, le gouvernement canadien avait déclaré l’entrée en vigueur de la loi sur les mesures de guerre. Cette loi entraîne la suspension des libertés civiles et une sévère répression policière. Durant ce mois d’octobre, alors jeune étudiante en droit, Louise Arbour « watched in horror as the state overstepped its bounds to arrest and detain hundreds of suspects in the name of fighting terrorism ». Elle déclare : « The

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most dramatic event in my professional, political awareness was the enactment of the War Measure Act » (THOMPSON 2004 : 681-692). A la suite de ces événements, lui viennent sa conviction de la primauté du droit et sa lutte contre les arrestations arbitraires et les transgressions étatiques.

21 Cette position de femme de droit(s) lui attire de nombreuses reconnaissances. Son parcours de juriste, ses actions pour les droits de l’homme et les libertés civiques font l’objet de plusieurs prix et médailles. En 2001 par exemple, elle reçoit le diplôme de docteur en droit de l’Université de Colombie-Britannique de Vancouver. Il y est souligné le prestige de son parcours et de ses actions à l’échelle canadienne : « Her reputation as one of North America’s most eminent jurists », « her dedication to Canadian and international law » et « her contribution to elevating the rule of law and Canada’s stature as a champion of justice » (Université de Colombie Britannique, 2001). En 2007, elle est nommée compagnon de l’Ordre du Canada où elle est « récompensée pour son dévouement à faire avancer les droits de la personne » (Le Devoir 2007b). En 2008, elle reçoit deux prix témoignant de son engagement dans les droits de la personne : le Grand Prix du Conseil Québécois des Gais et Lesbiennes et le Prix des Nations Unies dans le domaine des droits de l’homme.

22 Néanmoins, parfois jugée trop intransigeante, son attitude lui apporte de sévères critiques. Le gouvernement canadien conservateur de Stephen Harper, en poste depuis 2006, la critique en particulier pour ses positions sur le Proche-Orient. Lors du conflit entre le Liban et Israël en 2006, le bureau du Haut-commissariat a dénoncé les crimes commis par les deux pays et s’est interrogé sur la responsabilité possible des dirigeants israéliens qui ont autorisé les bombardements tuant des civils. Louise Arbour a appelé les belligérants à respecter le droit de la guerre, les principes de proportionnalité et de distinction, et a rappelé aux dirigeants que leurs choix pouvaient engager leur responsabilité pénale individuelle. Elle s’est ainsi attirée les foudres des partisans de l’un et l’autre camp. Le Président du Conseil du Trésor Canadien déclare alors qu’elle est « une honte » (Le Devoir 2008) en référence à ses prises de positions. Lorsqu’elle quitte son poste de Haut-commissaire, le Canada est d’ailleurs le seul pays à ne pas lui rendre hommage (OFF 2008).

23 Les postes internationaux que Louise Arbour a occupés amènent à s’interroger sur le style qu’elle a impulsé et sur sa projection d’une identité canadienne sur la scène internationale.

Une Canadienne au cœur d’institutions internationales

24 En 1996, le Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies choisit la juge Arbour pour le poste de procureur en chef des TPI pour succéder au Sud-Africain Richard Goldstone. Celui-ci soumet le nom de Louise Arbour, pour lui « It has to be a woman » (OFF 2001 : 276) afin que les crimes de violences sexuelles acquièrent une visibilité. Au-delà de l’atout du bilinguisme, de la maîtrise de la Common Law et du droit français, du fait d’être une femme, Goldstone « realized that his successor needed to be skilled in the strategic use of criminal law » (HAGAN 2003 : 93).

25 Le Conseil de sécurité qui valide sa nomination, est relativement unanime : la Russie soutient la Canadienne car elle a laissé entendre qu’elle voulait un conseiller russe dans son équipe, la France souhaite un francophone, la Grande-Bretagne est heureuse que ce

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ne soit pas l’Américain Cherif Bassiouni et la Chine n’émet pas de contestation (OFF 2001 : 288). La position de la secrétaire d’Etat Madeleine Albright résume bien celle des Etats-Unis : « She had a reputation for championing women in high office, and she was personally intrigued with the idea of having a Canadian female take over the chief prosecutor’s job at The Hague » (OFF 2001 : 287).

26 Le fait que Louise Arbour soit inconnue des milieux militants et politiques a également joué en sa faveur. Toutefois, les ONG et les groupes de défense des droits de l’homme craignent justement ce manque de militantisme. Deux décisions juridiques qu’elle a rendues au Canada la précèdent. D’abord, la juge Arbour a déclaré inconstitutionnelle la loi canadienne qui empêchait d’utiliser le passé sexuel d’une victime de viol comme moyen de défense car cela pouvait violer les droits de la Défense et de l’accusé. Elle s’attire alors les foudres des associations féministes. Puis, comme juge à la Cour d’appel de l’Ontario, elle accorde le droit de vote aux prisonniers, ce qui lui vaut la réputation d’être une juge favorable aux droits des accusés.

27 A son arrivée à La Haye et Arusha, l’environnement est sceptique. C’est une femme, jeune, juge de formation, soucieuse des libertés individuelles et plutôt favorable aux droits des accusés. La sphère internationale est inédite pour elle : L’environnement international évidemment était complètement nouveau, faire des enquêtes sans pouvoir avoir des mandats de perquisition, sans pouvoir faire de l’écoute électronique, sans avoir des réseaux d’informateurs déjà sur place, ce n’est pas évident. Travailler dans un pays dont on ne connaît pas la culture, dont on ne parle pas la langue, […] c’est en soi un défi gigantesque13.

28 La fonction de procureur est aussi nouvelle : Je n’avais pas vraiment d’expérience de procureur, en fait j’en n’avais pas du tout, la seule chose qui m’a plus ou moins qualifiée c’est qu’au moment où j’ai été nommée je faisais ma commission d’enquête sur la prison des femmes donc commission d’enquête ça sonnait un peu procureur alors je pense que cela les a convaincu que je pouvais travailler comme procureur14.

29 Comme procureure en chef des TPI, elle effectue un mandat charnière à plusieurs titres. Tout d’abord, elle applique une nouvelle stratégie : les actes d’accusation scellés, c’est-à-dire qu’ils ne sont plus divulgués. L’acte d’accusation est désormais signé par un juge puis transmis aux forces internationales en charge de procéder à l’arrestation. L’acte est uniquement connu de ces protagonistes et du petit nombre de juristes ayant rédigé l’acte d’accusation. Les médias et les ONG ne sont plus au courant des actes d’accusation, et surtout les criminels de guerre ne savent plus s’ils sont recherchés ou non. Avec cet effet de surprise, le nombre d’accusés arrêtés augmente : de 7 à 34 personnes sont incarcérées en trois ans au TPIY et, au début de l’année 1998 au TPIR, 29 personnes sont mises en accusation, dont 20 sont arrêtées. Les actes d’accusation scellés reflètent alors le pouvoir du droit pénal dans les relations internationales et les capacités de juriste de Louise Arbour, permettant ainsi aux TPI de gagner en crédibilité. Selon la procureure, cela « a vraiment débloqué le dossier »15.

30 Cette stratégie nouvelle s’accompagne de pression exercée sur les Etats. La crise du TPIY avec la France est à cet égard emblématique. Les soldats français en 1997 n’avaient procédé à aucune arrestation, Louise Arbour décrit leur attitude comme suit : « The French were doing a pretty good job of ignoring indicted war criminals in their sector » ( OFF 2001 : 307). En décembre 1997, la procureure se rend à Paris où elle rencontre Alain Richard, ministre de la Défense. Ce dernier a une position défavorable aux TPI, il dénonce une « justice spectacle » et déclare « qu’aucun officier français ne

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témoignerait jamais devant le Tribunal de La Haye autrement que par écrit » (Le Monde 1997a). Suite à ces propos, Louise Arbour livre une interview décisive au Monde qu’elle conclut par ces mots : « C’est dans le secteur français que se trouvent beaucoup de criminels de guerre, et ils s’y sentent actuellement en sécurité absolue » (Le Monde 1997b). La magistrate déclenche ainsi une première crise ouverte entre le Tribunal et un Etat. Un article du Devoir pointe le mépris de la France et illustre le soutien canadien apporté à la procureure : Il n’en fallait pas plus pour que Mme Arbour perde son sang froid légendaire et dise haut ce que tout le monde sait depuis longtemps sur l’attitude de la France envers les TPI […]. La France a répondu à Louise Arbour par l’insulte, la menace et l’indifférence [...]. Louise Arbour doit pouvoir compter sur le soutien de la communauté internationale (Le Devoir 1997).

31 Après de nombreuses réticences, les tensions s’apaisent et la France procède à une meilleure coopération. Elle arrête des criminels et autorise en 1998 ses militaires ayant servi pendant la guerre en Bosnie à aller témoigner au Tribunal, une décision d’ailleurs saluée par la procureure (Le Monde, 1998).

32 Louise Arbour souhaite également inculper les supérieurs hiérarchiques au détriment des exécutants. D’où le tournant majeur au TPIY et ce qui a fait sa renommée : l’annonce publique le 27 mai 1999 de l’inculpation du Président serbe Milosevic, pour avoir « planifié, incité à commettre, ordonné, encouragé la campagne de terreur et de violence dirigée contre les civils albanais du Kosovo vivant au Kosovo en République Fédérale de Yougoslavie. »16 L’événement a des conséquences dans le monde politique, militaire et diplomatique. En inculpant Milosevic, Louise Arbour empêche sa participation à un accord de paix et une négociation de son impunité. Christian Chartier informe de la situation politique à laquelle elle fait face lorsqu’elle reçoit un appel de la secrétaire d’Etat américaine Albright : [Louise Arbour] refuse de prendre le téléphone et dit la chose suivante « Vous rappellerez à Madeleine Albright que lorsque j’ai été nommée procureur, elle m’a donné un conseil : be tough, today I am being tough ». […] Et elle [Louise Arbour] a travaillé elle-même sur la mise au point de l’acte d’accusation jour et nuit, faisant des réunions de dernière minute pour que l’acte d’accusation soit absolument irréprochable et imparable17.

33 Son action est globalement louée dans la presse en France et au Canada. Le 28 mai 1999, une photographie de la procureure annonçant l’inculpation de Milosevic fait la Une du Devoir (Le Devoir 1999a), le quotidien est fier de « [sa] québécoise montée au front » qui a « fait un geste d’une immense portée morale dans la lutte contre l’impunité » (Le Devoir 1999b). Le Devoir souligne une « initiative sans précédent » (Le Devoir 2002) et « une nouvelle étape salutaire dans le combat contre l’impunité et la barbarie » (Le Monde, 1999).

34 La préoccupation d’inculper les hauts dignitaires s’applique également au Rwanda. En témoigne l’opération Naki du 18 juillet 1997 pendant laquelle Jean Kambanda, ancien Premier Ministre du Gouvernement intérimaire du Rwanda, est arrêté puis transféré au TPIR. Kambanda reconnaît les six chefs d’inculpation et son procès marque la reconnaissance sans précédent de l’implication directe d’un chef de gouvernement dans le génocide.

35 Louise Arbour a ainsi personnifié un droit contraignant envers les Etats, les forces internationales et les criminels de guerre. Avec sa stratégie du « No more small fish » (BINAME 2005), elle a marqué de son empreinte la lutte contre l’impunité et l’histoire des

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TPI. A son départ en septembre 1999, il y avait 66 actes d’accusation et 33 accusés en prison au TPIY. Elle a donné une image forte au poste de Procureur et les TPI ont, pendant son mandat, atteint une phase de maturité. Avec les inculpations de Milosevic et de Kambanda, elle a ouvert la voie aux actes d’accusation internationaux contre les chefs d’Etat, ce qui semblait impossible il y a quelques décennies. Tous ces éléments tendent à esquisser un « style Louise Arbour », à la fois direct, indépendant, contraignant et s’appuyant sur le droit.

36 Auparavant inconnue des milieux militants et politiques à l’échelle internationale, elle quitte les TPI avec une renommée internationale et elle est considérablement célébrée au Canada. Un éditorial du Devoir de 1999 en témoigne : Rares sont les Canadiens qui oseraient contester la valeur exceptionnelle de Mme Louise Arbour la juriste », elle a « gagné l’admiration de ses concitoyens », une « excellente candidate à la Cour suprême » et « si le TPI a aujourd’hui acquis un début d’autonomie c’est grâce à cette femme. (Le Devoir 1999c).

37 Une fiction est même réalisée au Canada sur son mandat au TPIY : Hunt for Justice du canadien Charles Binamé. Diffusé sur la chaîne de télévision canadienne CTV et sur la chaîne européenne ARTE, le film relate assez fidèlement les événements. Il montre le travail de procureur international, la difficile coopération des Etats avec le Tribunal, la concentration des poursuites sur la chaîne de commandement, la création des actes d’accusation scellés, la genèse de l’acte d’accusation de Milosevic et son annonce publique à La Haye. Toutefois ce film reste une fiction, avec notamment le personnage de l’interprète inventé pour le film. Aussi, la présence de la magistrate à la frontière de la Macédoine ne s’est, dans les faits, pas déroulée de nuit et, dans la fiction lorsque le personnage de Louise Arbour est bloqué à la frontière du Kosovo elle y décide « We’re going after Milosevic ». Or, c’est bien avant cet événement qu’elle a décidé de mener des enquêtes pour l’inculper. Mais pour Louise Arbour, cette fiction a plusieurs avantages : Ce n’est pas un documentaire mais [...] cela rend bien une époque, un effort, et puis cela a permis de vulgariser dans l’opinion publique canadienne, […] ça passait beaucoup à la télévision. Cela a fait comprendre un peu aux gens qu’on était des gens ordinaires, on faisait un travail difficile18.

38 Après avoir exercé la fonction de procureur pendant trois ans, Louise Arbour laisse la place à la Suisse Carla Del Ponte. Elle est nommée à la Cour suprême du Canada, poste qu’elle occupe de 1999 à 2004. Le 1er juillet 2004, acceptant la proposition de Kofi Annan, elle revient sur la scène internationale onusienne et devient la Haut- commissaire des Nations unies aux droits de l’homme. Un article du Monde interprète les possibles raisons du choix de Louise Arbour à ce poste : les politiques désirent un juriste et les défenseurs des droits de l’homme demandent quelqu’un avec une envergure politique, la juriste canadienne convient aux deux critères (Le Monde 2004). Première Canadienne à occuper ce poste, son rôle est de promouvoir, défendre et contrôler le respect des droits de l’homme et du droit international humanitaire dans le monde. Une mission qui n’est pas sans faire écho à l’image que le Canada cherche à donner à l’international.

39 En effet, fortement attaché au système multilatéral de coopération entre les Etats et à la justice sociale, le Canada défend ses valeurs à l’étranger, notamment « la démocratie, l’état de droit et les droits de la personne » (BOISMENU, LACROIX 2008 : 18). Depuis la crise de Suez (1956) et la proposition de Lester Pearson d’établir des forces de maintien de la paix afin de procéder au retrait des forces britanniques, françaises et israéliennes d’Egypte, le Canada n’a cessé de prôner une « approche multilatérale dans la

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gouvernance internationale » (BOISMENU, LACROIX 2008 : 129). L’ère qui s’en est suivie, dite pearsonienne, voit l’implication active du Canada dans des organisations internationales et régionales (Nations unies, Organisation du Traité de l’Atlantique Nord, Commonwealth, Organisation des Etats Américains, Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation, etc.) afin de résoudre les conflits et d’assurer le maintien de la paix. L’implication du Canada aux Nations unies participe à l’image que le pays souhaite renvoyer à l’international et à sa politique étrangère : « The image of Canadians as international do-gooders is a part not just of the national mythology, but of Canadian foreign policy […]. It is in our genetic code. » (OFF 2001 : 2)

40 La carrière de la juge Arbour à l’international s’inscrit dans cette logique. Défendant la primauté du droit, la paix, les droits de l’homme et la démocratie, elle se conforme à l’image que se donne le Canada sur la scène internationale. Un article du Devoir de 1999 souligne d’ailleurs « l’immense atout que constitue Mme Arbour pour la politique extérieure du Canada » (Le Devoir 1999c). Louise Arbour semble ainsi aux yeux de ses compatriotes porter l’image d’un pays en quête de visibilité sur la scène internationale. Elle a pu incarner une certaine image canadienne, qui plus est à un moment où le Premier Ministre Harper rompait avec l’image traditionnelle d’un Canada pacifique et multilatéral en soutenant la guerre en Irak.

41 D’autres Canadiens participent à cette visibilité dans les organisations internationales. L’ouvrage de Carol Off présente par exemple trois figures canadiennes employées à l’ONU dans les années 1990 : le « lion » Roméo Dallaire, commandant des Forces de la Mission d’assistance des Nations unies au Rwanda (MINUAR), le « renard » Lewis MacKenzie, chef de la Force de Protection des Nations unies (FORPRONU) en Bosnie et basé à Sarajevo en 1992, et « l’aigle » en la personne de Louise Arbour. Off explique : « They were not necessarily chosen for their mission because they are Canadians, but their nationality was a determining factor – the United Nations has come to depend on Canada for people the world believes it can trust […]. They became celebrities around the world, and all were decorated or honoured by their country for their perceived accomplishments » (OFF 2001 : 1).

42 Le Canada a ainsi pu voir en Louise Arbour, de par ses convictions et son parcours, une projection d’une certaine identité canadienne et un atout de sa politique étrangère.

BIBLIOGRAPHIE

ARBOUR, Louise (1996), Commission d’enquête sur certains événements survenus à la Prison des femmes de Kingston, Ottawa, Travaux publics et Services gouvernementaux Canada.

______(1999), « The Prosecution of International Crimes : Prospects and Pitfalls », Holocaust Memorial Lecturer, Washington University Journal of Law and Policy 1.

BOIGEOL, Anne (1997), « Les magistrates de l’ordre judiciaire : des femmes d’autorité », in MARUANI Margaret, Egalité, équité, discrimination : hommes et femmes sur le marché du travail, Les Cahiers du Mage, pp. 25-35.

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BOISMENU, Gérard, LACROIXA, Jean-Michel (2008), Les enjeux de la politique étrangère canadienne. Marges de manœuvre et éléments de distinction, Presses Sorbonne nouvelle.

CACOUAULT-BITAUD, Marlaine (2001), « La féminisation d’une profession est-elle le signe d’une baisse de prestige ? », Travail, genre et sociétés 5, pp. 91-115.

CASSESE, Antonio, DELMAS-MARTY, Mireille (2002), Crimes internationaux et juridictions internationales, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France.

Conseil du Statut de la Femme (1994), Pour une réelle démocratie de représentation – Avis sur l’accès des femmes dans les structures officielles de pouvoir.

COPELON, Rhonda (2000), « Gender Crimes as War Crimes : Integrating Crimes Against Women into International Criminal Law », McGill Law Journal 46, pp. 217-240.

CRUVELLIER, Thierry (2006), Le Tribunal des vaincus. Un Nuremberg pour le Rwanda, Calmann- Lévy.

DELPA, Isabelle, BESSONE, Magali (2010), Peines de guerre. La justice pénale internationale et l’ex- Yougoslavie, Editions de l’Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales.

DENECHERE, Yves (2004), Femmes et diplomatie, Bruxelles, Presses Interuniversitaires Européennes.

______et DELAUNAY, Jean-Marc (2006), Femmes et relations internationales au XXe siècle, Presses Sorbonne nouvelle.

FOOT, Rosemary (1990), « Where Are the Women ? The Gender Dimension in the Study of International Relations », Diplomatic History 14/4, pp. 615-622.

GASPARD, Françoise (2000), « Les femmes dans les relations internationales », Politique étrangère 65/ 3, pp. 730-741.

GUENIVET, Karima (2001), Les violences sexuelles, la nouvelle arme de guerre, Editions Michalon.

HAGAN, John (2003), Justice in the Balkans. Prosecuting War Crimes in the Hague Tribunal, Chicago, University of Chicago Press.

HAZAN, Pierre (2000), La justice face à la guerre, de Nuremberg à La Haye, Editions Stock.

ISRAEL, Liora (2009), L’arme du droit, Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques.

MATHIEU, Annie (2008), « Où sont les femmes à l’ONU ? », La Gazette des femmes 30/1, pp. 42-45.

NAHOUM-GRAPPE, Véronique (1997), « La purification ethnique et les viols systématiques. Ex- Yougoslavie 1991-1995 », CLIO Histoire, femmes et sociétés 5, pp. 163-175.

OFF Carol (2001), The Lion, the Fox and the Eagle, Toronto, Vintage Canada Edition.

______(2008), As It Happens Daily, Interview with Louise Arbour, CBC.

THOMPSON, Allan (2004), « Movers & Shakers : Louise Arbour », International Journal 59/3, pp. 681-692.

VEILLEUX, Marco (2009), « Un combat pour la dignité humaine. Entrevue avec Louise Arbour », Relations 730, pp. 31-34.

Médias

BINAME, Charles (2005), Hunt for justice : the Louise Arbour Story, A Galafilm-Tatfilm Production, 95 min.

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Le Devoir (1997), « Le combat de Louise Arbour ».

______(1999), « Louise Arbour monte au front ».

______(1999), « Arbour contre Satan ».

______(1999), « Le procureur de fer ».

______(2002), « Milosevic contre-attaque ».

______(2007), « Une femme sur cinq est victime de violence sexuelle avant 15 ans ».

______(2007), « Louise Arbour nommée à l’Ordre du Canada ».

______(2008), « Une honte ! ».

LE MONDE (1997), « Paris est accusé de boycotter le Tribunal international sur l’ex-Yougoslavie ».

______(1997), « En Bosnie, “les criminels de guerre se sentent en sécurité absolue dans le secteur français” ».

______(1998), « Le procureur du TPIY espère une comparution rapide de Radovan Karadzic au Tribunal de La Haye ».

______(1999), « Editorial – Milosevic, criminel de guerre ».

______(2004), « Louise Arbour est nommée Haut-commissaire de l’ONU aux droits de l’homme ».

Université de Colombie Britannique (2001), « The Title and Degree of Doctor of Laws, Conferred at Congregation. Madam Justice Louise Arbour » Vancouver.

NOTES

1. Cet article s’appuie sur mon mémoire d’histoire de Master 2 : Louise Arbour, une femme au cœur de la justice internationale, sous la direction de M. Bergère, Rennes, 2011, disponible à la bibliothèque de l’Université Rennes 2. 2. Nous tenons à remercier ces témoins qui ont chacun accordé de leur temps, en particulier Mme Louise Arbour qui nous a reçu à Bruxelles en février 2011. 3. Entretien réalisé avec Louise Arbour le 23 février 2011 dans les locaux de l’International Crisis Group, Bruxelles. 4. Entretien réalisé avec Christian Chartier le 20 janvier 2011 à Limoges. 5. Op.cit. 6. Entretien avec Fannie Lafontaine le 14 septembre 2010 à l’Université Laval de Québec. 7. Entretien avec Louise Arbour. 8. Ibid. 9. Entretien réalisé avec Luc Côté le 20 septembre 2011. 10. Entretien avec Louise Arbour. 11. Ibid. 12. Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgendered people. 13. Entretien avec Louise Arbour. 14. Ibid. 15. Op.cit. 16. Acte d’accusation du 22 mai 1999, Le Procureur c/ Slobodan Milosevic, Milan Milutinovic, Nikola Sainovic, Dragoljub Ojdanic, Vlajko Stojiljkovic, affaire IT-99-37. 17. Entretien avec Christian Chartier. 18. Entretien avec Louise Arbour.

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RÉSUMÉS

Rendue célèbre par son passage remarqué et remarquable comme procureure aux TPI (Tribunaux Pénaux Internationaux pour l’ex Yougoslavie et le Rwanda), Louise Arbour apparaît comme une femme de pouvoir ayant contribué au droit international et à la lutte contre l’impunité. Cet article dresse le portrait d’une femme au cœur de mondes traditionnellement masculins (relations internationales et haute magistrature) affirmant le primat de ses convictions de droit(s) et portant haut le rayonnement international du Canada.

Made famous by her noteworthy and remarkable service as Chief Prosecutor at the ICT (International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda), Louise Arbour appears as a woman of authority having contributed to international law and through her fight against impunity. This article presents the portrait of a woman at the heart of traditionally masculine worlds (International Relations and magistracy) affirming the primacy of her legal convictions and supporting the Canadian nation at international level.

AUTEUR

MORGANE LE HOUSSEL Prix Master AFEC 2012

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