TLAVA issue brief Timor-Leste Armed Violence Assessment TIMOR!LESTE ARMED VIOLENCE ASSESSMENT Number 1 | October 2008
Dealing with the kilat1 An historical overview of small arms availability and arms control in Timor-Leste
Six years a!er independence and two years and 2006. But Timor-Leste is hardly awash small number of modern and colonial-era a!er the ‘Krize’,2 the role of small arms in with guns. While existing public and weapons remain dispersed among a wide Timor-Leste society has not yet received a private holdings are poorly registered and range of civilian groups (i.e. gangs, martial thorough accounting. Such weapons have accounted for, there are comparatively few arts groups, and veterans movements). played a decisive role in shaping repressive manufactured arms in the country; however, Likewise, there are potentially signi$cant tactics of the former colonial powers and cra! weapons do present a clear challenge. challenges related to ammunition and countermeasures by resistance movements, Nevertheless, as the 2006 crisis readily grenade availability following outbursts through to contemporary criminal demonstrated, even a small number of illicit of violence in 1999 and 2006. Managing violence. Today, against a backdrop of weak small arms can generate a disproportionately existing stocks and controlling illicit arms institutions, lingering tension, and poorly large impact. Speci$cally, this Issue Brief $nds presents a major challenge, but such e%orts enforced legislation and arms control norms, the following: are likely to yield important improvements in safety and security. military and civilian-style arms continue to "e presence or rapid in#ux of small trigger interpersonal and collective violence. arms into Timorese society has triggered "e issue of missing small arms from state periodic, but nevertheless widespread, The rise of the gun: stocks has generated media headlines violence. every week for the last six months.3 Stories the Portuguese period Since the 1970s, and especially in the associated with the distribution of arms to 1990s, weapons leakage from state (1520–1975) civilians are no less controversial.4 stockpiles and the intentional arming of Portuguese o&cials $rst introduced "e gradual militarization of Timor-Leste civilians by security forces have le! a pool substantial numbers of small arms to Timor is a legacy of the country’s recent history. of weapons that are unlikely ever to be during the nineteenth century. "ese were "e modest numbers of arms #owing completely recovered. to be used against encroachment from into the country during the Portuguese Although small arms and light weapons the Dutch East Indies and directly against colonial period stand in stark contrast to availability is not new, high levels of domestic opposition, but also by way of the progressive arming of Timorese society militarization in civilian society is a transfers to local allies. During the latter part in the 1970s, which lasted until 1999. comparatively new phenomenon. of the century, new technology improved on Although there are in fact comparatively "e application of small arms has the art of killing: rapid-$ring breech-loading few small arms and light weapons in the changed over time—from repression and weapons led to more e&cient paci$cation. country, sophisticated military-style weapons insurrection to household defence, gang- But these weapons were also soon turned grew more common during the period of related predation, and for intimidation. against the Portuguese themselves,6 including Indonesian occupation (1975–99), with a 7 New transfers of arms are comparatively during the Manufahi war (1908–12). modest, but nevertheless signi$cant, number rare, but existing public stockpiles and "e pivotal role of small arms in contributing held by the Timorese resistance.5 patronage-led di%usion constitutes the to insurrection was highlighted during a In tracing out a chronology of arms largest source of new weapons in the 1959 insurrection led by a mixture of anti- availability in Timor-Leste, this Issue Brief country. imperialist Timorese and Indonesians. $nds that the availability and motivations Critically, during the 2006 crisis, the Timor- In this year, Viqueque district in eastern associated with arms acquisition and use Leste government lost control of much Timor was the site of the $nal major armed evolved over time. During the Portuguese of its armoury. A history of poor security revolt mounted against the Portuguese. "e and Indonesian era, arms were used primarily management of existing stockpiles of insurrection was enabled by a small number of as an instrument of repression by colonial weapons and ammunition combined with uncontrolled weapons. In June 1959 the rebels forces, while armed groups used them to the largely uncontrolled distribution of arms seized just 48 weapons from government further resistance and insurrection. In the to civilian groups before the crisis increased o&ces.8 Prior to the onset of the rebellion, past decade, arms enabled and exacerbated tensions and eventually hastened the onset a small number of illegal arms seizures and communal violence, particularly in 1999 of acute violence. As such, a comparatively transfers also generated a climate of insecurity.9
Timor-Leste Issue Brief October 2008 | 1 stores, claiming that less than ten per cent of its pre-invasion stocks were still in hand.18 FALINTIL conducted mobile operations designed to harass (but not substantively engage) ABRI. "ese served to highlight the continued resistance, but also, critically, they provided opportunities to seize Indonesian weapons and ammunition.19 Such raiding was a hallmark of FALINTIL operations until 1999; only their scale and frequency20 changed over time.21 Crucially, beyond its existing supplies of Portuguese-era weapons and raids (or illegal purchases22) of Indonesian stocks,23 FALINTIL was unable to acquire new weapons from abroad. "e escalation of indiscriminate attacks on Timorese civilians by Indonesian forces marked a turning point. For example, the 1991 massacre of 271 mourners during a Maj. Alfredo Reinado and Lt. Gastao Salsinha group Maubisse, Timor-Leste. © HDC 2008 funeral procession at Santa Cruz cemetery in central Dili by Indonesian security forces was Portugal’s response to these the!s was decisive From war to low- $lmed and broadcast worldwide. "e capture and bloody: at least 1,000 Timorese were killed and subsequent imprisonment of Gusmão in a rapid crackdown that year. level con!ict: the in 1992 heralded a sharp drop in military Recognizing the need to shore up the Indonesian period confrontation and the beginning of a political colony’s domestic security apparatus, the (1975–99) contest for legitimacy. Portuguese imported new weapons. By By 1999 Indonesian President Habibie 1975 Portugal had shipped a large quantity With Portugal and Timor-Leste both in proposed that the Timorese decide their of modern NATO standard G3 semi- turmoil, Indonesia, with the tacit support of future in a popular consultation for either automatic ri#es to Dili. Portugal itself was the United States and other Western states, autonomy under Indonesian rule or undergoing political transformation in the seized Dili on 7 December 1975.14 "e independence. But the successes reaped wake of the collapse of the Salazar regime ensuing regime and domestic opposition to it during the political struggle were then and the beginning of colonial divestment. resulted in a large-scale war in which armed overtaken by bloody violence. During the "e resulting instability in Lisbon allowed violence was a daily feature of Timorese life. August 1999 ballot, in which more than for the emergence of a number of new "e con#ict featured several distinct phases, three-quarters of all Timorese voted for political parties, including FRETILIN, UDT, each in#uenced by weapons supply factors. independence, roughly 1,500 people were APODETI, KOTA, and Trabalhista.10 With killed, hundreds of thousands displaced, During the initial phase, while Dili abruptly Indonesia in#uencing the process from across and considerable property destroyed. "e fell to the Indonesians, FRETILIN’s armed the border, domestic political competition distribution of small arms to pro-autonomy wing, Forcas Armados de Libertacao soon turned violent. Weapons from poorly civilian militias by the armed forces of Nacional de Timor-Leste (FALINTIL), secured weapons armouries played a key role Indonesia (Tentara Nasional Indonesia— o%ered sustained resistance to the Indonesian in sparking civil war. TNI), and direct actions undertaken by armed forces, Angkatan Bersenjata Republik the Indonesian security forces, were the "e chain reaction that eventually ignited 15 Indonesia (ABRI). Popular support and primary causes of bloodshed.24 Even a!er civil war began on 27 July 1975, when UDT liberal supplies of Portuguese G3 and TNI withdrew from Timor-Leste in October held a large anti-FRETILIN demonstration Mauser ri#es fuelled the resistance, and 1999, most pro-autonomy militia moved to in the centre of Dili. "e next day, in a show casualties were high on both sides (see border regions separating Indonesia from of force, FRETILIN put $!y men on the 16 Table 1). Indonesia had overwhelming Timor-Leste and began dispersing new streets armed with G3 ri#es.11 Fearing a human and material resources at its disposal arms. Half-hearted Indonesian government FRETILIN attack, UDT accessed the police and gradually pushed FALINTIL into the weapons collection e%orts yielded few armoury and took control of the city on 10 interior of the country. "e use of artillery meaningful returns. Few weapons-related August 1975. On 20 August 1975 Lt. Rogerio and airpower was particularly e%ective in crimes ever made it to trial. Lobato, a senior FRETILIN activist, later reducing FALINTIL’s strength. Between 1977 to become the $rst minister of defence, and 1980 large numbers of FALINTIL (and "e distribution of weapons to proxy militia convinced most Timorese regulars in the their supporters) surrendered, bringing their forces was hardly unprecedented. ABRI/ Portuguese Army to align with FRETILIN, TNI had, for example, armed, $nanced, weapons with them.17 and was able to obtain weapons from the and supplied pro-Indonesia militias since armoury of the armed forces (see Table 1).12 A!er su%ering heavy losses, FALINTIL 1975 in a bid to terrorize and subjugate the By 28 November, when FRETILIN declared entered a period of internal consolidation civilian population.25 "e use of militia also Timor-Leste’s independence, hundreds of and reorganization. In 1981 Xanana Gusmão provided a means of distancing the TNI political prisoners had been executed and was chosen to lead the organization’s new from blame. For example, the March 2008 several thousand people killed, with large guerrilla phase. Gusmão recognized that $nal report of the Commission of Truth and numbers forcibly displaced to Indonesia.13 FALINTIL urgently required fresh weapons Friendship, Indonesia–Timor-Leste (CTF)
2 | Timor-Leste Issue Brief October 2008 Timor-Leste Issue Brief October 2008 | 3 concluded that ‘[t]here is credible evidence ballot asserted that the weapons publicly The United Nations … that shows the TNI both supplied transferred at the time represented just a weapons to the militia and pro-autonomy fraction of the arms in militia hands (see period: building a leaders and then took them away when it Table 1).29 security sector 26 chose to do so’. Even so, the CTF noted Command and control of the weapons that the sustained supply of weapons was Between November 1999 and May 2002 transferred by the TNI to the militia were Timor was administered by the United crucial to the militias’ operations and that weak. "e TNI o!en failed to regain the Nations Transitional Administration in they obtained weapons from many sources.27 weapons it distributed, despite orders to East Timor (UNTAET). Even following In his testimony to the CTF, Wiranto, the militia to surrender them, which were o!en the restoration of independence in mid- ranking TNI general, referred to ‘[armed simply ignored. Transferred ammunition was 2002, however, UNTAET’s successor, the militias] consisting of approximately 1,100 poorly controlled. "e Indonesian special United Nations Mission of Support in East people … equipped with 546 weapons forces were also responsible for the rise at Timor (UNMISET), retained executive 28 of various types’. While there has never this time of homemade $rearms—so-called authority for internal security and external been a comprehensive attempt to catalogue rakitans—to perpetuate community level defence until mid-2004. Despite the fact weapons and ammunition distributed to terror while minimizing the risk of modern that the con#ict had come to an end, a militias in 1999 by TNI and the Indonesian weapons falling into the wrong hands.30 A number of manufactured weapons remained national police (POLRI), military liaison rakitan along with a supply of ammunition unaccounted for inside Timor-Leste, and o&cers (MLOs) from the United Nations was o!en equally as e%ective at intimidation large numbers were dispersed among militia Assistance Mission East Timor (UNAMET) as a modern assault ri#e. "e problem of groups in West Timor, Indonesia. Together charged with administering the 1999 rakitans lingers to the present day (see Box 1). with the challenging process of nation building; disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR); and the creation of an independent security sector, these factors set Box 1. Rakitans: adding fuel to the "re the stage for future problems.
Rakitan is a Bahasa Indonesia term the case of Timor-Leste, it was both the meaning ‘an assembled item’. In common policy and practice of Kopassus (the “Weapons remained usage, rakitans are homemade/cra! Indonesian special forces) to instruct unaccounted for inside weapons and come in two main varieties: militia members on how to make rakitans bom rakitans (homemade grenades) or at the SGI headquarters in Dili. "is Timor-Leste, and were senjata rakitans (homemade $rearms). In train-the-trainers programme created dispersed among militia Dili, when one refers to a rakitan, it usually a host of potential rakitan cra!smen. refers to a $rearm, although bom rakitans "e Indonesian Army also supplied groups in West Timor.” are not unknown. the materials necessary to assemble the "e process of DDR constituted a potential 33 "e production and distribution of weapons, and in some cases TNI also #ashpoint. Between 1999 and 2001, for 34 rakitans has been common throughout distributed rakitans. In 2008 it is easy example, FALINTIL members were cantoned much of neighbouring Indonesia during to order the manufacture of a rakitan in in Aileu. Old rivalries quickly surfaced recent periods of communal or sectarian Dili. For example, the Timor-Leste Armed and generated new security dilemmas.36 violence. In some cases, rakitans are Violence Assessment (TLAVA) contacted A number of commanders and their sophisticated and highly e%ective. During one ‘cra!sman’ who was able to assemble a men le! the cantonment areas following communal $ghting in Sulawesi in 2002, for rakitan (subsequently disassembled) in less disagreements.37 During this period, example, the town of Ampana acquired than 24 hours. FALINTIL weapons stocks were placed in a reputation for copying pistols and two containers under joint FALINTIL–UN In street violence dominated by bladed even M16s. Factory-made rounds of control. Weapons lists of FALINTIL-era ammunition, some with TNI markings, weapons, there is o!en a tacit agreement holdings dating from 2004 and 2005 provide were selling for Rp. 5,000 (USD 0.55) per not to employ guns or rakitans. However, signi$cant, but spotty details (see Table 1). unit.31 In the case of the Aceh con#ict, rakitans intimidate, and as $ghting slides the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) used towards chaos, they can signi$cantly In order to satisfy FALINTIL’s aspirations signi$cant numbers of rakitans.32 increase the energy and scale of con#ict. and deal with border security, it was agreed If employed with deadly e%ect, a rakitan to create a national defence force based on Usually quite primitive, rakitans are two light infantry battalions. But a closed can set o% a chain of events never initially essentially $tted pipes with wooden grips selection process led to suspicions that the imagined or intended by the protagonists. and handles designed as muzzle-loading newly created FALINTIL-Forças de Defesa In an environment in which ammunition ‘street muskets’ that can $re all manner of de Timor-Leste (F-FDTL) was less than is readily available, rakitans become metal objects. As they can easily explode representative. Critically, the UN lost its right when $red, they o!en pose as much more common and dramatically increase to observe FALINTIL weapons holdings and danger to the user as the intended target. insecurity in communities. During these were in any case eventually moved to More sophisticated versions are breech- Operation Kilat between 15 July and 31 the new Nicolau Lobato Training Centre in loading pistols or ri#es with $ring pins August 2008, communities surrendered Metinaro.38 In order to provide for a light able to discharge bullets. "ese ‘zip’ or ‘nail 9,116 rounds of ammunition (5.56 mm x infantry capability, F-FDTL was initially guns’ are particularly e%ective, enabling 2,854/7.62 mm x 116/12.4 mm x 1/others x equipped with 1,200 M16A1 semi-automatic increased accuracy and rate of $re. In 6,145) and 152 rakitans.35 ri#es on loan pending national weapons procurement (see Table 1).39
2 | Timor-Leste Issue Brief October 2008 Timor-Leste Issue Brief October 2008 | 3 Table 1. Reported small arms and light weapons stocks and recovered weapons, Timor-Leste, 1975–2008 Period Category Assessed weapons and holders Source and assessment date 1975 Civil war stocks FALINTIL: 3,700 G3 ri!es, 15,000 Mausers, a ‘few’ MG250s, 20 81 mm mortars, 40 60 mm Portuguese Army Maj. F. Dentinho, ordnance mortars, 20 US-made 3.5 inch bazookas, 6 Rheinmetal-Borsig 75 mm howitzers, quantities of o"cer, Dili (1975)1 FBP9 (based on the German MP40, MG34 Spandau machine guns, Danish Madsens, US M3s, and similar) UDT: 1,000 G3 ri!es, 8,000 Mauser ri!es, 6–7 81 mm mortars Portuguese Army Maj. Dentinho, ordnance o"cer, Dili (1975)2
15,000 G3s, 12–15 81 mm mortars, 12–15 60 mm mortars, a ‘small number’ of bazookas, Portuguese Army Maj. Fransisco Mota, political ‘some’ older artillery, ‘lots’ of artillery ammunition capable of being transformed into a#airs o"cer (1975)3 explosives 1975–99 FALINTIL stocks Circa 1988, the remnants of the GPK (Gerombolan Pengacau Keamanan or Gangs of Security Truth and Reconciliation Commission (2005)4 Disturbers) comprised ‘less than 244 people … and possessed around 217 weapons composed of various light, long and short types’. ‘About 200 FALINTIL, with 106 weapons’ General commander of the Bali-based KODAM Udayana military region, covering Timor (1995)5
188 FALINTIL members with 88 weapons BIA (Indonesian Military Intelligence Agency) (1996)6
242 FALINTIL members with 127 weapons FALINTIL representative quoted in Jawa Pos (1999)7
1,350 FALINTIL (up from 670 earlier in the year due to new recruits and returning $ghters) UNAMET MLO (1999)8 with at least 237 weapons in the central cantonment of Aileu
1999– Ex-FALINTIL stocks F-FDTL: FALINTIL-era holdings totalling 343 items: 66 SKSs, 105 SPs, 41 G3s, 43 M16s, 9 AR15s, F-FDTL, J4 Division (January 2004)9 2006 19 FNCs, 5 LEs, 4 FBPs, 31 Mausers, 3 Metras, 1 AK, 1 Guerem, 3 Rugers, 4 Uzis, 45 Pistolas, 2 Pistola 9 mm, 3 Pistola revolvers, 1 Pistola Beret (spelling errors in the original)
F-FDTL: FALINTIL-era holdings totalling 338 items: 13 SS1s, 7 FNCs, 51 M16A1s, 1 AR15, 44 F-FDTL (July 2005)10 SP1s, 60 SP2s, 1 SP342 G3, 64 SKS, 32 Mausers, 1 Metra FNC, 3 Ruger Mini 14s, 1 Galasi, 4 FBP M63s, 4 Uzis, 2 Metra/Minimis, 3 LEs, 1 GRM 77, 3 Pistolas
1,200 government and 342 ex-FALINTIL weapons (1,542 total) International Weapons Audit Team (IWAT) (June 2006)11 1998–99 Pro-autonomy stocks TNI-sourced weapons: at least 20 SKS ri!es and 1 AK (transferred 27 December 1998); 3 M16s Militia ‘Commander A’ quoted in the Commission (transferred 30 December 1998); 34 G3s, 18 SP2s, 8 Mausers, 2 LEs, 35 units of assembled of Truth and Friendship (2008)12 weapons (transferred 26 August 1999); 50 SKSs to various militias in Wehali village, Malaka Tengah sub-district, Belu district, West Timor (transferred 26 October 1999) 153 SKS units were reportedly returned to TNI on 5 April, 29 April, and 16 June 2000, in West Timor. Team Saka (Baucau) militia as of February 1999: 19 G3s, 56 SP2s, 10 SP1s, 1 Mauser, 1 M16, Commission of Truth and Friendship (2008)13 and other assault weapons; possibly also 1 PMI/Pindad, 1 FNC, 1 AK Makikit (Viqueque district) militias as of 1998: 3 M16s, 35 SP1s, and 11 Garands, although Commission of Truth and Friendship (2008);16 there are contradictory reports. Laksaur (Cova Lima district) was armed with at least 10 SKSs,14 UNTAET Peacekeeping Force (PKF) (2001)17 and Mahidi (Ainaro district) with 20 SKSs.15 The Korem (East Timor military) commander reportedly distributed at least 600 weapons Letter from the CNRT’s Internal Political Front (FPI) to militias on 31 August 1999, and subsequently possibly 800 more, for the purposes of to UNAMET’s Political A#airs O"ce (September ‘repressive actions against pro-independence $gures in the event of their victory’. 1999)18 1999– Pro-autonomy militia Militia weapons surrendered to TNI: Firearms (217 in total): 10 M16A1s, 3FN35s, 2 FN46s, Cohen (2003)19 2002 weapons collected 3 SP1s, 2 SP2s, 7 Mausers, 28 Getmis, 1 Ruger, 1 LE, 20 mixed weapons, 141 SKSs. Grenades: and/or destroyed 36 Manggis/Korea, 1 Nenas, 3 smoke, 3 launch tools. Ammunition: 159 M16A1, 718 SKS, 8,625 G3/SP1, 34 Mauser, 214 Ruger, 31 FN45, 6 FN46, 2,402 SS1, 42 AK, 10 SMR, 53 Sten, 10 Colt, 60 M16A1, 24 SKS, 55 G3. Generic weapons: 628 short muzzle and 370 long muzzle Commander A’s group: a number of weapons were surrendered to TNI by Commander A’s Militia ‘Commander A’ quoted in the Commission group in 1999, but the group remained active and partly armed. An itemized list of remaining of Truth and Friendship Indonesia (2008) weapons in the militia’s possession, and their owners, was provided as recently as 200520 17 tonnes of con$scated militia weapons dumped into the sea in May 2000, most con$scated UNTAET (2000)21 from October 1999 by the Australian-led International Force in East Timor (INTERFET). This quantity included knives, spears, bows and arrows, homemade $rearms, pistols, ri!es, and military magazines.
4 | Timor-Leste Issue Brief October 2008 Timor-Leste Issue Brief October 2008 | 5 Period Category Assessed weapons and holders Source and assessment date Between 1 January and 28 May 2002, 50 ri!es, 189 homemade ri!es, 41 old ri!es, 267 KODAM IX/Udayana and UN PKF high commands grenades, 10,442 munitions, 74 magazines, 2 anti-personnel mines, and other material were (2002)22 retrieved. 2002–08 PNTL weapons stocks 219 PNTL weapons were missing from the PNTL list, including: 190 Glock 9 mm, 13 Steyers, IWAT (September 2006)23 (missing) 10 HK33s, 2 FNCs, and 4 12-gauge shotguns. All 7 F2000s were accounted for. No ammunition stocks were reported. 44 PNTL weapons missing, including 20 Glock 9 mm, 1 Steyr, 1 12-gauge shotgun, 2 FNCs, National Investigation Department (May 2007)24 and 20 HK33s 15 missing PNTL weapons: 5 HK33s and 10 Glock 9 mm; though subsequently PNTL General Senior PNTL inspector (June 2008);25 Timor Post Commander Afonso de Jesus said PNTL was still missing 20 Glock 9 mm (August 2008)26 Missing 16 Glock 9 mm (serial numbers, EFP139, EFP140, EFP203, EFP608, EFP777, EFP790, Departemento Logistica Nacional, Seccao EFP806, EFP926, EFP993, EEH690, EEH773, FGT466, FGT482, FHX267, FHX272, FHX370), at Armamento, PNTL (11 and 14 July 2008) 14 July 2008 Missing 4 HK33 ri!es (serial numbers ATM 000790, ATM 014779, ATM 020163, ATM 016989) at 11 July 2008 Missing 1 STC, 12-gauge shotgun (serial number R336462) as at 11 July 2008 2002–08 F-FDTL weapons 1,200 government and 342 ex-FALINTIL weapons (1,542 total) held by F-FDTL, though there is IWAT (June 2006)28 stocks a discrepancy of 30 M16s in the $gure for government weapons By November 2005 the F-FDTL could account for only 1,073 M16 weapons.27 On 9 June 2006 IWAT was informed that F-FDTL held 1,200 government weapons and 342 IWAT (June 2006)29 ‘ex-FALINTIL weapons’. The IWAT $ndings state that audits circa 2002 indicate that F-FDTL held 1,200 M16A2s. However, as of February 2004, audits indicated an additional 30 M16A2s. There is, however, no public record of further imports. By November 2005 only 1,073 M16A2s were accounted for. The June 2006 IWAT audit revealed a total of 1,190 M16A2s, 117 more than were accounted for in the previous count. Also, when current holdings are compared to records circa 2002, 46 M16A2s are missing. F-FDTL is in possession of 1 Minimi, 1 .38 Special, 1 Browning 9 mm, 2 G3 semi-automatic ri!es, 1 M16A1, and 1 M2 .50 calibre not previously counted. F-FDTL also no longer in possession of previously counted 3 FNC semi-automatic ri!es, 3 SKS semi-automatic ri!es, and 2 Uzis Ammunition: 427,560 rounds of 5.56 mm ammunition, but had used 238,813 in training Lista Geral de Municoes, F-FDTL (2006)30 and operations, of which 19,013 were expended during the crisis; 45,920 rounds of 5.56 mm tracer ammunition; 21,905 rounds of .45 calibre ammunition, but had used 10,462 in training and operations; and 3,720 K413 grenades, of which 161 had been used. Unclear how many remain of these various categories.
Table notes 1 Debriefed in Darwin, 3 September 9 Lista do Material das FALINTIL, J4 Division, 22 Minutes of the 12th Inter-Command Meeting 1975 (email communication with F-FDTL, 15 January 2004. Does not include (held between KODAM IX/Udayana and Australian Army Brig. Gen. (ret’d) Ernest those arms used by Brig. Gen. Taur Matan UN PKF high commands) held in Handara Chamberlain, 25 August 2008). Ruak’s escort. Kosaido Hotel, Pancasari, north Bali, 29–31 2 Debriefed in Darwin, 3 September 10 Lista Kilat Tuan, Quartel em Metinaro, May 2002. 1975 (email communication with F-FDTL, 12 July 2005. 23 IWAT included representatives from the Australian Army Brig. Gen. (ret’d) Ernest 11 OHCHR (2006), p. 42. "e pedigree of these UN, Timor-Leste, Malaysia, Australia, New Chamberlain, 25 August 2008). weapons is unclear (OHCHR, 2006, p. 42). "is Zealand, Portugal, and the United States. is all the more of interest as at least 35 of these 3 Debriefed in Lisbon, 4 September 24 "e NID Department Supporting the weapons remain is use by F-FDTL as of 2006. 1975. He suggested that the older O&ce of the Prosecutor-General stated 12 CTF (2008), p. 197. artillery and artillery ammunition was on 17 May 2007 that these PNTL arms unusable (email communication with 13 CTF (2008), p. 229. were missing (Victorino, 2007). Australian Army Brig. Gen. (ret’d) Ernest 14 CTF (2008), p. 198. Chamberlain, 25 August 2008). 25 Interview with senior PNTL inspector, 19 15 Robinson (2003), p. 109. June 2008. 4 CAVR (2005), part 4, p. 13. 16 CTF (2008), p. 233. 26 Timor Post (2008b). 5 Quoted in Della-Giacoma (1995). 17 In April 1999 some reports estimated Mahidi’s 27 OHCHR (2006), p. 41. 6 Information is contained on a BIA map on $le strength at 2,000 members with 500 weapons, with author. but local NGOs said the real $gures were closer 28 OHCHR (2006), p. 42. "e ICoI notes that the 7 Herman (1999); email communication with to 1,000 members and 37 $rearms (UNTAET pedigree of these weapons is unclear (p. 42). Australian Army Brig. Gen. (ret’d) Ernest PKF, 2001). "is is all the more of interest as at least 35 of Chamberlain, 25 August 2008. 18 Quoted in Robinson (2003), p. 81. these weapons remained in use by F-FDTL as of 2006. 8 Email communication with Australian Army 19 Cohen (2003), pp. 99–101. Brig. Gen. (ret’d) Ernest Chamberlain, 9 June 20 CTF (2008), p. 224. 29 Ibid. 2008. 21 UNTAET, Tais Timor, 1–14 May 2000. 30 Lista Geral de Municoes, F-FDTL, 5 June 2006.
4 | Timor-Leste Issue Brief October 2008 Timor-Leste Issue Brief October 2008 | 5 In 2000 there was an increase in border turned against civilians between 2001 and The Timor-Leste incursions by pro-autonomy militia 2002.48 "e most vocal backlash against supported by elements inside TNI. "is both the F-FDTL and PNTL emerged from period (2004–08): from generated considerable alarm. "ere were a wide range of veterans’ organizations in independence to crisis also growing concerns that militia were 2001.49 armed and growing in number.40 While Following the transfer of responsibility for casualties were relatively low, perceived Politically-minded veteran groups were internal security and external defence from the insecurity was rising. "ese attacks one of a number of new non-state entities UN to Timor-Leste in 2004, the government spurred the creation of the F-FDTL. "e to rise in prominence between 2001 and immediately began procuring new weapons. threats were considered to be so grave 2004,50 along with so-called martial arts An initial shipment was received from that UNTAET peacekeepers obtained groups or gangs51 and ‘social movements’.52 Malaysia of 180 HK33 semi-automatic assault permission from UN headquarters in New In most cases, these groups relied on ri#es for the URP, the police reserve unit. Also, York to use pre-emptive and lethal force traditional sharp-edged weapons, and in September 2004, the government purchased against militia groups that crossed the in some cases, rakitans. Very few, if any, 200 Steyr semi-automatic assault ri#es for UPF, the border patrol unit. Another 66 FNC border. "is quickly reduced the number possessed modern small arms. While of incursions. Likewise, international semi-automatic assault ri#es and 7 F2000 these organizations have o!en been at political pressure and growing concerns automatic machine guns were also purchased odds with the state, and therefore PNTL with the predatory nature of the militia for UIR, the rapid response unit (see Table 1). and F-FDTL, they also hold considerable groups forced Indonesia to take militia Although the HK33s and Steyrs involved state- disarmament more seriously. Consequently, community-level legitimacy and count to-state transfers, a Dili-based intermediary TNI made several serious attempts to their a&liates as meaningful security purchased the FNCs and F2000s directly from disarm the militias in 2001 and 2002, providers. Likewise, their a&liations with FN Herstal59 for the government. F-FDTL though their e%ectiveness remains a matter public security providers53 also provide did not disguise its displeasure with these of debate.41 sporadic access to small arms for political purchases.60 Also in 2005 the Ministry of the or criminal purposes.54 "e membership of Interior procured 257,000 rounds of 5.56 mm Militia-led violence did not disappear. In some of these groups (particularly martial ammunition for USD 107,940 from Cavalo January and February 2003 attacks took 61 arts groups) overlaps with the police, in Bravo, a company owned by Bader Alkatiri, place in Atsabe, Ermera, and Atabae, 62 55 the brother of the prime minister at the time. Bobonaro in which a number of people particular the PSHT martial arts group. were killed.42 In response to a request One group was deemed so dangerous that Signi$cantly, these weapons and ammunition by the Government of Timor-Leste, it precipitated presidential intervention in purchases were not subject to proper UNMISET assigned F-FDTL a temporary 2003. "e south coast district of Covalima parliamentary scrutiny or oversight. area of operations in the Ermera district. had hosted an armed group consisting When civil society groups contested these The subsequent F-FDTL security of an assortment of veterans known as acquisitions, their protests were dismissed operation was criticized as being heavy ‘isolados’.56 In September 2003 then- and they were chastised by the political 63 handed at the time by some Timorese President Xanana Gusmão sought logistical establishment. "e Organic Law for PNTL 43 and international observers. But militia assistance from the UN to help his states, ‘it is the exclusive responsibility attacks persisted in number and intensity. intermediaries convince the group to ‘give of the PNTL to control the manufacture, On 24 February 2003 a small group, storage, sale, use and transport of weapons, up any weapons in their possession and to alternately described as criminal or pro- ammunition [etc.] … that do not belong to meet with me’.57 autonomy militia, armed with automatic the Armed Forces or other security forces weapons attacked Atabae, Bobonaro from Lingering militia and dissident activities recognized by law’.64 Interestingly, other parts across the border.44 On this occasion, in 2003 led to the government’s decision of government also issue licences for the 65 F-FDTL was not deployed in favour of to establish and subsequently arm supply of $rearms. 45 a UN response. At the time, weapons paramilitary police units. "ey included, 46 Tensions between the government and caches were discovered in the area, but 58 among others, UIR, UPF, and URP, with segments of the community lingered between it was believed that the Atabae attackers URP and UPF established to maintain 2004 and 2006. In July 2004 ex-FALINTIL were in possession of just three SKS border patrols, and to protect civilians veteran Elle Sette held a demonstration in rifles.47 against cross-border militia attacks and front of the Government Palace. UIR broke Ongoing militia attacks refocused attention rural insurgency. Recruitment into these up the demonstration using tear gas and on the need to bolster Timor-Leste’s units appeared to have been deliberately batons, a show of force later denounced as nascent security sector. "e Timorese politicized by Rogerio Lobato, the heavy-handed. In April 2005 the Catholic police service (Policia Nacional de Timor- minister of the interior. "e formation Church led a large anti-government demonstration calling for the resignation of Leste—PNTL) was established in 2000, of paramilitary units was greeted but the way in which it was formed and Prime Minister Alkatiri. "is is viewed by with apprehension by F-FDTL, which its subsequent behaviour undermined some as the precursor to crisis. Following the viewed them as a political and practical its legitimacy. UNTAET used a core outbreak of violence in April and May 2006 encroachment on its role as security group of Timorese ex-POLRI in its initial (see Box 2), the international community recruitment, which placed the PNTL at provider. Many civilians also perceived the was called in to re-establish order. "e odds with many in the community and paramilitary police as a threat to their own Australian-led Joint Task Force 631 e%ectively with the new defence force. Further, PNTL well-being. Sensing the ill-advised nature averted a return to war, even if simmering was armed by the UN Police (UNPol) of these special police units, UNMISET insecurity persisted and communal lorosae/ with a large number of Glock 9 mm semi- resisted e%orts by Lobato to procure loromunu gang $ghting and arson remained automatic pistols, some of which were weapons for them. commonplace a!er its arrival.
6 | Timor-Leste Issue Brief October 2008 Timor-Leste Issue Brief October 2008 | 7 Box 2. The 2006 crisis and the distribution Dealing with disorder: of weapons weapons audits and other interventions From 24 to 28 April 2006 hundreds For example, on 23 March, 60 Steyrs of F-FDTL soldiers, led by Lt. Gastão were sent to URP Aileu, and on 15 April, A major concern following the 2006 crisis Salsinha, staged a demonstration outside 10 Steyrs were sent to the Liquiça police was the state of weapons inventories and the Government Palace in Dili. A!er a station. On 11 and 21 May a group arsenals. Within a few weeks of the events, January petition to the president claiming of PNTL led by Dili District Deputy the International Weapons Audit Team discrimination, these ‘petitioners’ le! Commander Abilio Mesquita (a leading (IWAT)69 completed a review of F-FDTL their posts unarmed and were dismissed PSHT adherent) were armed with Steyrs. weapons on 26 June. "e weapons control in March. On 28 April the demonstration A!er disarming eastern PNTL in the and management of F-FDTL stocks were turned ugly. A number of people were UPF, on 8 and 21 May Minister Lobato considered to be superior to that of the killed and wounded. "e minister of the secretly armed a civilian militia led by PNTL. IWAT found that F-FDTL was interior’s reaction was to instruct his former F-FDTL veteran Rai Los with 18 in possession of a number of previously senior commanders to ‘kill them all’ and HK33s and 6,000 rounds of 5.56 mm unknown weapons and that it could not to arm himself with an F2000 and 2,000 ammunition.68 On 17 May 2008 Brig. account for the whereabouts of others. Its 66 rounds of ammunition. Gen. Taur Matan Ruak wrote to the prime records are also unclear on ammunition F-FDTL was called into the city in an minister requesting an audit of F-FDTL and grenade stocks (see Table 1). Amateur e%ort to restore order. It was attacked with weapons stocks in response to accusations video footage taken on 25 May of veterans grenades, and killed several people in that civilians were being armed by the armed by F-FDTL in central Dili suggests response. F-FDTL was wrongly accused of defence force. "ere were also signi$cant that ammunition was handed out massacring 60 people. However, because rumours of secret weapons imports, indiscriminately. F-FDTL was composed primarily of which persist to the present day. IWAT also completed a review of PNTL easterners (lorosae) and the petitioners weapons stores on 24 September. "e On 23 May Maj. Reinado and 11 of his were westerners (loromunu), the rumours di%usion of PNTL weapons among the men along with 10 URP o&cers armed of massacre gained credence and soon population was considered at the time to with Steyrs engaged a contingent of pitted one community against the other. be a major hindrance to the completion of Maj. Alfredo Reinado, commander of the F-FDTL in a violent clash in eastern the audit. "e $nal report noted that PNTL military police, deserted his post on 3 May Dili. On 24 May PNTL and a civilian o&cers o!en moved weapons without and, with 17 of his men and two UIR, took militia led by Rai Los and armed with proper authorization. PNTL was also with him a small number of weapons and a HK33s supplied by the minister of the criticized for the way in which ‘verbal orders large supply of ammunition. Other F-FDTL interior attacked F-FDTL in west Dili. [were] used by PNTL’s senior leadership soldiers le! with Maj. Tara a few days later, Additionally, on 24 May Sub-Inspector to distribute weapons and ammunition, also carrying their weapons with them. Mesquita attacked the residence of and $nally for the lack of accountability the chief of the defence force. F-FDTL During this period, the police service for ammunition once it has been issued responded by distributing 200 M16A2s also began to come unstuck. On 9 May from the PNTL National Armoury’.70 IWAT to sympathetic veterans and PNTL. On the murder of a lorosae PNTL o&cer in a submitted no $ndings on the state of PNTL 25 May, PNTL and F-FDTL engaged demonstration in the western petitioner ammunition stocks (see Table 1). stronghold of Gleno Ermera caused PNTL in $re $ghts between their respective to experience similar communal fractures. headquarters in central Dili and a number But many weapons also remained at large "e irregular movement of weapons, of F-FDTL and PNTL were killed or outside of public control. Shortly a!er claiming particularly PNTL ri#es and ammunition,67 wounded. In total, 37 people were killed, to have surrendered his weapons to Joint Task spurred suspicion and the slide to con#ict. 150,000 #ed from their homes, and Force 631 in July 2006, Reinado was arrested "e PNTL general commander sometimes thousands of properties were destroyed. in Dili for (additional) weapons possession. removed weapons from the PNTL National Weapons distribution and irregular He and his followers escaped from prison in Armoury without the knowledge of the movement were signi$cant drivers of the August that year. By 25 February 2007 Reinado armoury o&cer. events of 2006. rearmed by relieving UPF border posts in Covalima of a small number of HK33s. In March the International Stabilisation Force assaulted Reinado’s base in Same, Manufahi. A number of people were killed, while Reinado and some followers escaped. For the remainder of 2007 Timor-Leste experienced considerable insecurity, in both Dili and the districts. Maj. Reinado and his armed group were a focus for discontented youth and gangs in Dili, but also cemented feelings of insecurity among internally displaced people. Against a backdrop of growing numbers of politically and criminally motivated killings, martial arts groups and gangs rose in prominence and activity, partially as a result of their increased Australian Defence Force personnel Joint Task Force 631, Dili, Timor-Leste © ADF 2006 access to weapons.71
6 | Timor-Leste Issue Brief October 2008 Timor-Leste Issue Brief October 2008 | 7 A!er the announcement that the Aliança while political e%orts were made to have 29 guns (25 ri#es and 4 handguns), in para Maioria Parlamentar (AMP) would them surrender peacefully. Finally, PNTL addition to 7 grenades and 4,547 rounds of form the new coalition government, an paramilitary police units were (re-)issued ammunition.76 Other sources suggest that armed group exchanged gun$re with long-barrelled $rearms immediately in the Operation Halibur retrieved just 12 HK33s, a UN convoy in Baucau on 10 August wake of the 11 February attacks. 1 M16A2, 1 FNC, 1 Minimi, 2 Mausers, 72 2007. On 5 October 2007 there was a a number of rakitans, ammunition, and grenade attack on the Australian Defence grenades. Importantly, Operation Halibur Cooperation Programme compound in “Rebels drew from a also retrieved four bipod mounted light central Dili. Making global headlines, in machines guns that were allegedly smuggled February 2008 the Reinado group attacked limited supply of former from Indonesia, since they are unknown the president and prime minister. President to F-FDTL and PNTL.77 "ese are however Ramos-Horta was critically wounded, state weapons and almost certainly the ‘light bipod’ variant of while a group led by Gastao Salsinha ammunition to hold the the G3. failed in their attempt to ambush Prime Minister Gusmão. In a case of domestic country to ransom for "e Timorese government also undertook ‘blowback’, it is conceivable that the very some two years.” at least two ‘so!er’ initiatives to rein in same HK33s that the government received the threat of arms availability, i.e. the from Malaysia when Ramos-Horta was introduction of dra! legislation and foreign minister were used to shoot him as "ese activities generated some tangible voluntary arms collection. Firstly, in 2008 president less than four years later. results. By March 2008 Amaro ‘Susar’ the government sought to redraw the da Costa, Reinado’s senior accomplice, legal framework for small arms, while Hard and soft surrendered himself and his weapons. In simultaneously seeking to encourage citizens interventions late April Gastao Salsinha and his remaining to voluntarily hand over weapons to the group surrendered, along with weapons authorities. Speci$cally, on 9 June 2008 a "e government adopted a multi-pronged dating from the Portuguese, Indonesian, $rearm law (Gun Law No. 9/11/2008) was ‘crackdown’ response to rising levels of and current period (i.e. 9 HK33s, 1 Mauser, forwarded by the Council of Ministers to armed violence. A national ‘state of siege’ 1 SKS, and 1,386 rounds of ammunition).75 the Parliamentary Committee B for Foreign was declared on the day of the shootings, With the bene$t of hindsight, it is clear A%airs, National Security, and Defence and on 17 February the government that the hold-out rebels drew from a for its consideration.78 A preliminary established the combined F-FDTL/PNTL limited supply of former state weapons and analysis of the proposed law by the Small Komando Operasaun Konjunto (KOK), ammunition to hold the country to ransom Arms Survey found that it contains certain with F-FDTL assuming command of for some two years. "e exact $gures omissions and limitations and that the law joint operations.73 Almost immediately, on weapons collected during Operation would potentially increase the number KOK commenced ‘Operasaun Halibur’ Halibur are contradictory. Lt. Col. Meno of guns in civilian hands.79 Civil society (Operation Halibur),74 designed to apply Paixao (F-FDTL) is quoted by an o&cial actors registered their concerns almost physical pressure on the armed groups publication as stating that KOK collected immediately (see Box 3).
Box 3. Civil society reactions to the proposed gun legislation
"e Gun Law No. 9/11/2008 was law also does not address the issue of when juxtaposed with the gun law, is dra!ed by the Ministry of Justice stockpile management and security. contradictory and confusing. He also and considered by the Council of stated that if some can carry weapons, it A number of senior government and Ministers.80 It was forwarded directly to civil society leaders contested the dra! will create the conditions where others the relevant parliamentary committee will want $rearms, whether legally or for consideration without consultation gun legislation. President Ramos-Horta otherwise (and thus create a black market with civil society and other outside voiced his concern, suggesting that he 82 in guns).84 stakeholders.81 When it reached would veto the proposed law. Mario Carrascalao, president of PSD, a major plenary debate in Parliament, it was Nevertheless, ardent supporters of alliance partner of the Gusmão-led AMP an immediate political #ashpoint. Of the legislation are convinced that it greatest concern is Article 4, which coalition government, suggested that some 83 should be passed. On 22 August 2008 proposes that the police commander business people were behind the law. "e Fernando ‘Lasama’ de Araujo, the should exercise sole discretionary in#uential bishop of Baucau has reportedly president of the national Parliament, powers over which civilians might stated that the new gun law could create possess weapons. "is is especially and exacerbate a culture of violence, was reported as stating that controlling unusual, given that this power and that it should not be a government guns is important, that the intention is currently rests with the PNTL general priority to give weapons to civilians, as the not to indiscriminately issue weapons commander, who is empowered by people cannot ‘eat a gun’. Additionally, he to civilians, and that the Gun Law is a Decree Law No. 8/2004. "e proposed stated that the proposed gun collection, parliamentary priority.85
8 | Timor-Leste Issue Brief October 2008 Timor-Leste Issue Brief October 2008 | 9 In addition to attempting to revise the legal obtained in Oecusse;87 152 rakitans; 712 air A major weakness of Timorese arms control framework, the government commenced ri#es; 9,116 rounds of various ammunition; regime is the management and security of a national gun collection/amnesty dubbed 48 grenades; and 7,930 traditional weapons o&cial public stockpiles. "e government, Operation Kilat on 15 July 2008. "e public (see Table 2). It appears that the presence of members of the security sector (F-FDTL authorities made little e%ort to broadly homemade $rearms and explosives may have and PNTL), and civilians at large are acutely articulate the purpose and objectives of this increased since 2006. Rakitans, in particular, aware of these current weaknesses. "e collection, other than to recall weapons became relatively common, partially due to 2006 Krize highlights how leakage can easily from the hands of civilians either from availability of ammunition (particularly 5.56 generate instability. While the secretary of the pre- or post-1999 periods. Prime mm rounds).88 state for defence has identi$ed the physical Minister Gusmão made a belated public improvement of F-FDTL armouries as a announcement on national television on 31 "ese initial $gures also point to a number priority, critical management and procedural July 2008. Originally scheduled to end on of emerging trends. For example, in one case, reforms have still not been proposed.93 15 August, it was extended to 30 August, 600 bullets were surrendered, suggesting Standard measures, such as the registration and the public destruction of these weapons larger civilian holdings than widely of state-held weapons, periodic and e%ective is scheduled for 24 October. Reports of the anticipated.89 In another case, and contrary auditing, and increased penalties for leakage, results have emerged slowly and, in some to the UNPol $gures, on 22 July, an M16 are possible starting points. But there are cases, contradictorily. What is clear is that, in with 116 rounds was reportedly surrendered other ways to enhance stockpile security. addition to the large numbers of traditional to PNTL in Aileu.90 It has been suggested Firstly, administrative mechanisms associated sharp-edged weapons recovered, a number that this was neither an ex-FALINTIL nor with the issuing of arms to police o&cers of grenades and signi$cant amounts of an F-FDTL weapon. A senior Timorese and soldiers and their recalling need to ammunition and homemade $rearms were government adviser noted that it could have be made more robust and conscientiously also gathered.86 been purchased in Indonesia for the Reinado implemented. Secondly, periodic armoury and TLAVA obtained the initial $gures of group, indicating that weapons tracing could transparent audits of holdings are crucial to 91 weapons surrendered as compiled by the be required. Intriguingly, calls have been ensure increased command and control, and UN peacekeeping operation, the United issued to veterans to give up their weapons, to rebuild broken con$dence with the public. Nations Integrated Mission Timor-Leste since they are no longer needed. Indirect "irdly, penalties for sloppy and wilfully illegal (UNMIT). "ese $gures o%er an early sense calls for veterans to surrender weapons are behaviour can provide the necessary incentives of the apparent confusion of the Operation o!en pointed at Elle Sette, now president of for security personnel to prevent leakage. Kilat collection results. In short, these UNDERTIM and a member of Parliament. Without sanctions and veri$cation, no amount $gures suggest the following was collected However, he claims that he surrendered all of administrative tinkering will adequately between 15 July and 31 August 2008: 1 HK33, weapons in Aileu in 2000.92 secure weapons stocks.94
Table 2. Weapons collected before and during Operation Kilat
Firearms of Homemade Other "rearms, Ammunition Bombs/ Traditional Others Total Government of "rearms including air (rounds) grenades/ weapons (e.g. bayonets) Timor-Leste ri!es mortars
1 May– 15 Jul– 1 May– 15 Jul– 1 May– 15 Jul– 1 May– 15 Jul– 1 May– 15 Jul– 1 May– 15 Jul– 1 May– 15 Jul– 14 Jul 31 Aug 14 Jul 31 Aug 14 Jul 31 Aug 14 Jul 31 Aug 14 Jul 31 Aug 14 Jul 31 Aug 14 Jul 31 Aug 2008 2008 2008 2008 2008 2008 2008 2008 2008 2008 2008 2008 2008 2008 1 May–14 Jul 2008 Jul May–14 1 Sub-total Sub-total Sub-total Sub-total Sub-total Sub-total Sub-total Sub-total Sub-total Sub-total Sub-total Sub-total Sub-total Sub-total 15 Jul –31 Aug 2008 Districts
Aileu 0 0 0 3 0 18 0 8 0 4 0 261 0 0 0 294 Ainaro 0 0 0 2 0 24 0 129 0 0 0 167 0 0 0 322 Baucau 0 0 0 30 0 31 0 2,908 0 4 0 236 0 0 0 3,209 Bobonaro 0 0 0 30 0 145 0 10 0 4 0 636 0 3 0 828 Covalima 0 0 0 3 0 22 0 1,037 0 2 0 383 0 0 0 1,447 Dili 0 0 0 0 0 12 0 2,634 1 10 0 4,271 0 4 1 6,931 Ermera 0 0 1 0 0 0 808 0 2 7 26 55 1 6 838 68 Lautem 0 0 19 25 1 202 98 125 2 2 21 149 0 0 141 503 Liquica 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 372 1 1 0 22 0 10 1 408 Manatuto 0 0 7 8 0 111 130 519 0 7 9 130 6 9 152 784 Manufahi 0 0 0 0 0 50 0 111 0 3 0 607 0 0 0 771 Oecussi 0 1 0 51 0 70 0 131 0 0 0 55 0 125 0 433 Viqueque 0 0 0 0 0 24 0 1,132 0 4 0 958 0 7 0 2,125 Total 0 1 27 152 1 712 1,036 9,116 6 48 56 7,930 7 164 1,133 18,123
Source: UNPol Operations, United Nations Integrated Mission Timor-Leste (UNMIT), as of 2 September 2008.
8 | Timor-Leste Issue Brief October 2008 Timor-Leste Issue Brief October 2008 | 9 17 "is is still a sensitive subject today, with the Conclusion Notes rendidos (surrenderees) viewed by many as not having held out appropriately, and those that "e type and availability of small arms is !is Issue Brief is based on research and surrendered with large amounts of weapons entering a qualitatively new phase in Timor- analysis by Edward Rees, Political Adviser continue to be viewed dimly by some to the Leste. While no longer present in large to UN Special Envoy, Ian Martin, during the present day. numbers, weapons are dispersed among 2006 Timor-Leste Crisis. 18 Gusmão (2000), p. 62. 19 For example, on 8 August 1983, during the civilian population in an uncontrolled 1 Tetun for gun. fashion. Despite the country’s small size, the the Kraras attack in Viqueque, FALINTIL 2 Krize: the colloquial expression for the crisis of captured 17 SP1 ri#es. On 21 November 1986, combination of simmering mistrust with 2006. 34 M16 ri#es were captured from ABRI in a small number of uncontrolled weapons 3 On 23 September 2008 the prosecutor-general Iliomar (email communication from Ernie can create signi$cant insecurity in Timor- called upon Col. Lere Annan Timur and Lt. Chamberlain, 6 August 2008). Col. Falur Rate Laek to appear before his o&ce Leste. Furthermore, ill-advised government 20 "e last major FALINTIL action against to answer questions with regard to charges Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI) was the reactions to real and perceived (illegal) relating to the 2006 crisis (Timor Post, 2008c). 1998 assault on a TNI post in Alas, Manufahi. weapons holdings can spur even more formal "e PNTL deputy commissioner for operations Carried out contrary to orders, it was organized and informal procurement. Despite the informed the press that many weapons had by Commandante Elle Sette and led by Amaro been lost since the 2006 crisis. However, seemingly successful execution of Operation ‘Susar’ da Costa, and it resulted in a number of since 11 February 2008 a number have been TNI deaths and captured weapons. Reprisals Halibur, the security sector continues to returned, but seven Glock 9 mm, one 12-gauge were severe. shotgun, and $ve HK33s remain missing su%er from persistent questions associated 21 One such attack was caught in the $lm (Timor Post, 2008d). Former PNTL general with its institutional and programmatic Blockade. "e $lm shows an attack on an ABRI commander, and now member of Parliament, convoy in Baucau on 20 August 1996 led by capacity and legitimacy. It also continues to Paulo Martins, responded by asserting David ‘Alex’ Daitula, with Taur Matan Ruak act as a potential conduit of arms from legal that no weapons were lost as a result of his in overall command. It is signi$cant because, administration of the PNTL. to illegal weapons holders. a!er the attack, with at least one man mortally 4 Suara Timor Lorosae (2008b). While this Issue Brief has described the role of wounded, the commander happily notes that it 5 CAVR (2005), Executive Summary, p. 13. was ‘worth it’, as they had captured ‘a single ri#e small arms in the recent phases of Timorese 6 Durand (2006), p. 56. and some ammunition’. history, a number of questions remain 7 "e rebellion led to violent countermeasures 22 Weapons were bought from Indonesian security unanswered. For example, the dynamics of by the Portuguese. By 1912 an estimated personnel, o!entimes Timorese in ABRI/ state procurement require more investigation. 15,000–25,000 Timorese had been killed. By TNI-Indonesian national police (POLRI). comparison, 40,000–70,000 Timorese died One ex-FALINTIL said that in 1997 one could Given the chronic weaknesses in routine during the Japanese occupation of Timor from purchase a pistol for Rp. 500,000–1,200,000, stockpile management, it is questionable 1942 to 1945. During the Second World War an AK-47 for Rp. 1,500,000–2,000,000, and an whether stockpiles should be expanded the Australian military, and to a lesser extent M16 for Rp. 2,500,000–3,500,000 (interview even more in the absence of appropriate the Japanese, provided modern $rearms to with ex-FALINTIL, Dili, 27 August 2008). Timorese auxiliaries. Weapons were bought from Indonesian security control and veri$cation systems. Appropriate 8 "e weapons were primarily 1886-model personnel, o!en Timorese in ABRI/TNI-POLRI. civilian oversight over the procurement of Kropatschek (Mauser) 8 mm bolt-action 23 One ex-FALINTIL said that a small number weapons can serve to inhibit excessive and ri#es manufactured by Steyr for Portugal of Uzi sub-machine guns were seized from inappropriate procurement.95 Likewise, there (Chamberlain, 2008, p. 48). captured or cornered Indonesian intelligence are lingering concerns over ammunition and 9 ‘… in late 1958, 16 ri#es were stolen from the operatives from SGI (SATGAS-INT), the military storehouse in east Dili (13 of which Indonesian special forces Kopassus Joint munitions stocks: a surfeit of ammunition were eventually recovered), and weapons and Intelligence Task Force (interview with in vulnerable communities may spur on the explosives were being passed to Indonesian ex-FALINTIL, Dili, 27 August 2008). cra!-made arms industry. vessels from Japanese wartime caches in the 24 In the general confusion around the 30 Lautem and Viqueque’ (Chamberlain, 2008, August 1999 ballot, a number of Indonesian In the context of the current debate over p. 48). and pro-autonomy militias were relieved the dra! Gun Law, it is important to note 10 FRETILIN (Frente Revolucionária de Timor- of their weapons by pro-independence that it may be wise for the government to Leste Independente); UDT (União Democrática elements, further dispersing militia weapons Timorense); APODETI (Associação Popular into the wider population. In one case, a address issues relating to the counting and Democrática Timorense); KOTA (Klibur Oan pro-independence group stopped a convoy controlling of its own guns before it proposes Timor Asuwain). transferring refugees in Laileia, where a truck to further disperse weapons into the hands of 11 Nichol (2002), p. 303. guarded by POLRI was ambushed. Twenty ‘authorised’ civilians. Ultimately, a domestic 12 ‘At 1.00am on 20 August, Rogério Lobato and weapons belonging to POLRI were taken. debate on a distinctly ‘Timorese’ approach Hermenegildo Alves launched FRETILIN’s 25 For example, the main Bobonaro district militia armed insurrection by taking control of group, Halilintar, was founded with Indonesian to controlling arms is much needed. "is is the Quartel Geral (army headquarters) in support in 1975 and assisted in the invasion. an especially important conversation given Taibessi. "e Commission received testimony 26 CTF (2008), p. 256. that the international community is set that there were liberal supplies of weapons 27 "eir types ranged from modern military to withdraw from the country in the next in Dili, and that both sides handed them out issue weapons (M16s, Mausers, SKSs, Rangers, indiscriminately. "is increased the scale of RPDs, SP2s, SP1s, AR16s, G3s, pistols, and 12–24 months. While Timorese solutions violence exponentially’ (CAVR, 2005, p. 42). grenades) to homemade guns (rakitans) and will undoubtedly be more sustainable than 13 CAVR (2005), pp. 43–4. sharp weapons (CTF, 2008, p. 195). international ones, they also require steady 14 ABRI had commenced special forces cross- 28 CTF (2008), p. 108. border operations in September 1975, and with and reliable political leadership to prevent the 29 Robinson (2003), p. 109. regulars in October 1975. recurrence of previous mistakes. 30 Ibid, p. 109. 15 An April 1976 an American embassy report suggests the di&culties faced by the Indonesian 31 HRW, Indonesia (2002), p. 30. military: ‘Gen Yogi [Soepardi, assistant for 32 Between May 2001 and December 2002 TNI planning, Department of Defence] … estimated captured 824 GAM weapons in Aceh: 498 Fretilin strength to be around 3,000 with only standard and 326 rakitan (usually bom rakitan). 5,000 of 15,000 weapons so far captured by 33 CTF (2008), p. 197. Indonesia’ (CAVR, 2005, p. 74). 34 On one occasion, a TNI armourer signed over 16 In excess of 100 000 people had been killed 36 senjata rakitan to a militia leader (CTF, 2008, (CAVR, 2005, Executive Summary, p. 44). p. 193).
10 | Timor-Leste Issue Brief October 2008 Timor-Leste Issue Brief October 2008 | 11 35 UN Police, United Nations Integrated Mission 129 portable light machine guns for F-FDTL 76 Jornal Defeza Nasional (2008), p. 5. Timor-Leste, Operation Kilat, 2 September 2008. (MacDonald, 2006). 77 Discussions with F-FDTL and PNTL o&cers 36 See, for example, Peake (2008). 60 In relation to the F2000s, the owner of that associated with Operation Halibur. 37 For example, Commander Elle Sette (L7) le! dealership commented to the Sydney Morning 78 "e English translation of the law can be the cantonment with a number of his men. A Herald in 2006 that ‘[t]his is what you would found at
10 | Timor-Leste Issue Brief October 2008 Timor-Leste Issue Brief October 2008 | 11 CTF (Commission of Truth and Friendship). 2008. OHCHR (O&ce of the High Commissioner for TVTL. 2008. ‘Illegal Weapons Handed over to Final Report of the Commission of Truth and Human Rights). 2006. Report of the United PNTL in Viqueque.’ 15 August. Friendship Indonesia–Timor-Leste. Dili: CTF. Nations Independent Special Commission of UNMIT (United Nations Integrated Mission in Inquiry for Timor-Leste. Geneva: OHCHR. 2 Della-Giacoma, Jim. 1995. ‘Timorese Rebel Timor-Leste). 2007. Weekly Situation Report. Displayed as Youth Group Launched.’ Reuters October. 22–27 April. News, 19 July. Parker, Sarah. 2008. ‘Commentary on Dra! Arms Durand, Frederic. 2006. East Timor: A Country at Law in Timor-Leste.’ East Timor Law Journal. UNOTIL (UN O&ce in Timor-Leste). 2005. the Crossroads of Asia and the Paci"c: A Geo-
"e Timor-Leste Armed Violence Assessment (TLAVA) is an independent research TLAVA project overseen by Austcare and the Small Arms Survey. Working with public and non- governmental partners, the project was designed to identify and disseminate concrete !e project is supported by Australian entry points to prevent and reduce real and perceived armed violence in Timor-Leste. Agency for International Development With support from a network of partners, the project will serve as a Dili-based repository (AusAID). of international and domestic data on violence trends. Between 2008 and 2010, the TLVA will act as a clearing house for information and analysis with speci$c focus on: Credits the risk factors, impacts, and socioeconomic costs of armed violence in relation to Design and layout: Go Media Design population health—particularly women, children and male youth, and internally Editorial support: Emile LeBrun, displaced people; Robert Muggah, James Turton the dynamics of armed violence associated with ‘high-risk’ groups such as gangs, speci$c communities in a%ected districts, petitioners, veterans, state institutions, and Contact potential triggers such as elections; and For more information, visit the availability and misuse of arms (e.g. bladed, homemade, or ‘cra!’ manufactured) as a www.timor-leste-violence.org or factor contributing to armed violence and routine insecurity. contact [email protected]. "e project’s objective is to provide valid evidence-based policy options to reduce armed violence for the Timorese government, civil society, and their partners. "e project draws on a combination of methods—from public health surveillance to focus group- and interview-based research—to identify appropriate priorities and practical strategies. Findings will be released in Tetum, Bahasa, Portuguese, and English. TLAVA Issue Briefs provide timely reports on important aspects of armed violence in Timor-Leste, including the availability and distribution of small arms and cra! weapons in Timor-Leste and election-related violence.
12 | Timor-Leste Issue Brief October 2008