Issue Brief 1

TLAVA issue brief Timor-Leste Armed Violence Assessment TIMOR!LESTE ARMED VIOLENCE ASSESSMENT Number 1 | October 2008 Dealing with the kilat1 An historical overview of small arms availability and arms control in Timor-Leste Six years a!er independence and two years and 2006. But Timor-Leste is hardly awash small number of modern and colonial-era a!er the ‘Krize’,2 the role of small arms in with guns. While existing public and weapons remain dispersed among a wide Timor-Leste society has not yet received a private holdings are poorly registered and range of civilian groups (i.e. gangs, martial thorough accounting. Such weapons have accounted for, there are comparatively few arts groups, and veterans movements). played a decisive role in shaping repressive manufactured arms in the country; however, Likewise, there are potentially signi$cant tactics of the former colonial powers and cra! weapons do present a clear challenge. challenges related to ammunition and countermeasures by resistance movements, Nevertheless, as the 2006 crisis readily grenade availability following outbursts through to contemporary criminal demonstrated, even a small number of illicit of violence in 1999 and 2006. Managing violence. Today, against a backdrop of weak small arms can generate a disproportionately existing stocks and controlling illicit arms institutions, lingering tension, and poorly large impact. Speci$cally, this Issue Brief $nds presents a major challenge, but such e%orts enforced legislation and arms control norms, the following: are likely to yield important improvements in safety and security. military and civilian-style arms continue to "e presence or rapid in#ux of small trigger interpersonal and collective violence. arms into Timorese society has triggered "e issue of missing small arms from state periodic, but nevertheless widespread, The rise of the gun: stocks has generated media headlines violence. every week for the last six months.3 Stories the Portuguese period Since the 1970s, and especially in the associated with the distribution of arms to 1990s, weapons leakage from state (1520–1975) civilians are no less controversial.4 stockpiles and the intentional arming of Portuguese o&cials $rst introduced "e gradual militarization of Timor-Leste civilians by security forces have le! a pool substantial numbers of small arms to Timor is a legacy of the country’s recent history. of weapons that are unlikely ever to be during the nineteenth century. "ese were "e modest numbers of arms #owing completely recovered. to be used against encroachment from into the country during the Portuguese Although small arms and light weapons the Dutch East Indies and directly against colonial period stand in stark contrast to availability is not new, high levels of domestic opposition, but also by way of the progressive arming of Timorese society militarization in civilian society is a transfers to local allies. During the latter part in the 1970s, which lasted until 1999. comparatively new phenomenon. of the century, new technology improved on Although there are in fact comparatively "e application of small arms has the art of killing: rapid-$ring breech-loading few small arms and light weapons in the changed over time—from repression and weapons led to more e&cient paci$cation. country, sophisticated military-style weapons insurrection to household defence, gang- But these weapons were also soon turned grew more common during the period of related predation, and for intimidation. against the Portuguese themselves,6 including Indonesian occupation (1975–99), with a 7 New transfers of arms are comparatively during the Manufahi war (1908–12). modest, but nevertheless signi$cant, number rare, but existing public stockpiles and "e pivotal role of small arms in contributing held by the Timorese resistance.5 patronage-led di%usion constitutes the to insurrection was highlighted during a In tracing out a chronology of arms largest source of new weapons in the 1959 insurrection led by a mixture of anti- availability in Timor-Leste, this Issue Brief country. imperialist Timorese and Indonesians. $nds that the availability and motivations Critically, during the 2006 crisis, the Timor- In this year, Viqueque district in eastern associated with arms acquisition and use Leste government lost control of much Timor was the site of the $nal major armed evolved over time. During the Portuguese of its armoury. A history of poor security revolt mounted against the Portuguese. "e and Indonesian era, arms were used primarily management of existing stockpiles of insurrection was enabled by a small number of as an instrument of repression by colonial weapons and ammunition combined with uncontrolled weapons. In June 1959 the rebels forces, while armed groups used them to the largely uncontrolled distribution of arms seized just 48 weapons from government further resistance and insurrection. In the to civilian groups before the crisis increased o&ces.8 Prior to the onset of the rebellion, past decade, arms enabled and exacerbated tensions and eventually hastened the onset a small number of illegal arms seizures and communal violence, particularly in 1999 of acute violence. As such, a comparatively transfers also generated a climate of insecurity.9 Timor-Leste Issue Brief October 2008 | 1 stores, claiming that less than ten per cent of its pre-invasion stocks were still in hand.18 FALINTIL conducted mobile operations designed to harass (but not substantively engage) ABRI. "ese served to highlight the continued resistance, but also, critically, they provided opportunities to seize Indonesian weapons and ammunition.19 Such raiding was a hallmark of FALINTIL operations until 1999; only their scale and frequency20 changed over time.21 Crucially, beyond its existing supplies of Portuguese-era weapons and raids (or illegal purchases22) of Indonesian stocks,23 FALINTIL was unable to acquire new weapons from abroad. "e escalation of indiscriminate attacks on Timorese civilians by Indonesian forces marked a turning point. For example, the 1991 massacre of 271 mourners during a Maj. Alfredo Reinado and Lt. Gastao Salsinha group Maubisse, Timor-Leste. © HDC 2008 funeral procession at Santa Cruz cemetery in central Dili by Indonesian security forces was Portugal’s response to these the!s was decisive From war to low- $lmed and broadcast worldwide. "e capture and bloody: at least 1,000 Timorese were killed and subsequent imprisonment of Gusmão in a rapid crackdown that year. level con!ict: the in 1992 heralded a sharp drop in military Recognizing the need to shore up the Indonesian period confrontation and the beginning of a political colony’s domestic security apparatus, the (1975–99) contest for legitimacy. Portuguese imported new weapons. By By 1999 Indonesian President Habibie 1975 Portugal had shipped a large quantity With Portugal and Timor-Leste both in proposed that the Timorese decide their of modern NATO standard G3 semi- turmoil, Indonesia, with the tacit support of future in a popular consultation for either automatic ri#es to Dili. Portugal itself was the United States and other Western states, autonomy under Indonesian rule or undergoing political transformation in the seized Dili on 7 December 1975.14 "e independence. But the successes reaped wake of the collapse of the Salazar regime ensuing regime and domestic opposition to it during the political struggle were then and the beginning of colonial divestment. resulted in a large-scale war in which armed overtaken by bloody violence. During the "e resulting instability in Lisbon allowed violence was a daily feature of Timorese life. August 1999 ballot, in which more than for the emergence of a number of new "e con#ict featured several distinct phases, three-quarters of all Timorese voted for political parties, including FRETILIN, UDT, each in#uenced by weapons supply factors. independence, roughly 1,500 people were APODETI, KOTA, and Trabalhista.10 With killed, hundreds of thousands displaced, During the initial phase, while Dili abruptly Indonesia in#uencing the process from across and considerable property destroyed. "e fell to the Indonesians, FRETILIN’s armed the border, domestic political competition distribution of small arms to pro-autonomy wing, Forcas Armados de Libertacao soon turned violent. Weapons from poorly civilian militias by the armed forces of Nacional de Timor-Leste (FALINTIL), secured weapons armouries played a key role Indonesia (Tentara Nasional Indonesia— o%ered sustained resistance to the Indonesian in sparking civil war. TNI), and direct actions undertaken by armed forces, Angkatan Bersenjata Republik the Indonesian security forces, were the "e chain reaction that eventually ignited 15 Indonesia (ABRI). Popular support and primary causes of bloodshed.24 Even a!er civil war began on 27 July 1975, when UDT liberal supplies of Portuguese G3 and TNI withdrew from Timor-Leste in October held a large anti-FRETILIN demonstration Mauser ri#es fuelled the resistance, and 1999, most pro-autonomy militia moved to in the centre of Dili. "e next day, in a show casualties were high on both sides (see border regions separating Indonesia from of force, FRETILIN put $!y men on the 16 Table 1). Indonesia had overwhelming Timor-Leste and began dispersing new streets armed with G3 ri#es.11 Fearing a human and material resources at its disposal arms. Half-hearted Indonesian government FRETILIN attack, UDT accessed the police and gradually pushed FALINTIL into the weapons collection e%orts yielded few armoury and took control of the city on 10 interior of the country. "e use of artillery meaningful returns. Few weapons-related August 1975. On 20 August 1975 Lt. Rogerio and airpower was particularly e%ective in crimes ever made it to trial. Lobato, a senior FRETILIN activist, later reducing FALINTIL’s strength. Between 1977 to become the $rst minister of defence, and 1980 large numbers of FALINTIL (and "e distribution of weapons to proxy militia convinced most Timorese regulars in the their supporters) surrendered, bringing their forces was hardly unprecedented.

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