East Timor 1999: Crimes Against Humanity a Report Commissioned by the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)
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EAST TIMOR 1999 CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY EAST TIMOR 1999 CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY REPORT COMMISSIONED BY THE UNITED NATIONS OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (OHCHR) GEOFFREY ROBINSON UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LOS ANGELES July 2003 HAK ASSOCIATION & ELSAM DILI & JAKARTA East Timor 1999: Crimes Against Humanity A Report Commissioned by the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) By Geoffrey Robinson University of California Los Angeles July 2003 First published in 2006 by HAK Association & ELSAM HAK Association Rua Governador Serpa Rosa T-091, Farol, Dili, Timor-Leste Tel.: +670 3313323 | Fax: +670 3313324 e-mail: [email protected] ELSAM – Institute for Policy Research and Advocacy Jl. Siaga II/31, Pasar Minggu, Jakarta 12510 Tel.: +6221 7972662 | Fax: +6221 79192519 e-mail: [email protected], [email protected] Cover design & Layout by Alit Ambara | nobodycorp. <[email protected]> Cover photograph: HAK Association ISBN 979-8981-29-4 v Table of Contents Foreword by José Luis de Oliveira viii Introduction by Asmara Nababan x Preface 1 Executive Summary 4 Method and Mandate 5 Outline and Conclusions 6 Part I: Context, Power, and Strategy 7 1. Historical and Political Context 8 1.1 Indonesian Invasion and Occupation 8 1.2 Resistance 10 1.3 International Response 12 1.4 Breakthrough in Indonesia 14 1.5 UNAMET and the Popular Consultation 15 2. Indonesia: Power and Strategy 19 2.1 The Indonesian Armed Forces 19 2.2 The Militias 23 2.3 The Indonesian Police 25 2.4 The Civilian Government and the ‘Socialization’ Campaign 26 2.5 Pro-autonomy Political Parties 28 2.6 Specialized Government Bodies 29 Part II: Human Rights in 1999: Patterns and Variations 31 3. Violations, Victims, and Perpetrators 32 3.1 Types of Violation 32 3.2 Chronology of Violations: Three Periods 36 3.3 The Victims 38 3.4 The Perpetrators 42 4. Patterns and Variations 45 4.1 Temporal Variation – Turning Off the Faucet 45 4.2 Police Inaction and Complicity 50 4.3 Militia Modus Operandi 52 4.4 Geographical Variations 54 vi East Timor 1999: Crimes Against Humanity 5. Six Key Documents 59 5.1 Operation Clean Sweep 59 5.2 The Tavares Document 60 5.3 The Garnadi Document 62 5.4 The East Timor Integration Savior Brigade Telegram 63 5.5 Operation Pull-Out 64 Part III: The Militias and the Authorities 68 6. Militias: History, Formation, and Legal Recognition 69 6.1 Historical Patterns 69 6.2 Militia Formation 73 6.3 Political and Legal Recognition 78 7. Militias: Recruitment, Training, Operations, and Weapons 83 7.1 Recruitment 83 7.2 Training 85 7.3 Operations 87 7.4 Weapons: Testimonial Evidence 90 7.5 Weapons: Documentary Evidence 93 8. Militias: Funding and Material Support 97 8.1 ‘Socialization’ and Militia Funding 97 8.2 Sources of Government Funding 100 8.3 TNI Funding and Material Support 104 8.4 FPDK as Funding Channel 107 8.5 Militia Budgets 108 Part IV: District Summaries and Case Studies 111 9. District Summaries 112 9.1 Aileu (Kodim 1632) 112 9.2 Ainaro (Kodim 1633) 114 9.3 Baucau (Kodim 1628) 118 9.4 Bobonaro (Kodim 1636) 120 9.5 Covalima (Kodim 1635) 126 9.6 Dili (Kodim 1627) 128 9.7 Ermera (Kodim 1637) 134 9.8 Lautem (Kodim 1629) 138 9.9 Liquiça (Kodim 1638) 142 9.10 Manatuto (Kodim 1631) 147 9.11 Manufahi (Kodim 1634) 151 9.12 Oecussi (Kodim 1639) 154 9.13 Viqueque (Kodim 1630) 155 10. Case Studies: Major Human Rights Incidents 159 10.1 Liquiça Church Massacre (April 6, 1999) 159 10.2 Cailaco Killings (April 12, 1999) 163 10.3 Carrascalão House Massacre (April 17, 1999) 166 10.4 The Killing of Two Students at Hera (May 20, 1999) 170 10.5 Arbitrary Detention and Rape in Lolotoe (May-June 1999) 171 10.6 Attack on UNAMET Maliana (June 19, 1999) 173 10.7 Attack on Humanitarian Convoy (July 4, 1999) 175 10.8 Murder of UNAMET Staff Members at Boboe Leten (August 30 1999) 179 10.9 Forcible Relocation and Murder of Refugees in Dili (September 5-6, 1999) 182 10.10 Suai Church Masssacre (September 6, 1999) 184 vii 10.11 Maliana Police Station Massacre (September 8, 1999) 188 10.12 The Passabe and Maquelab Massacres (September-October, 1999) 192 10.13 Rape and Murder of Ana Lemos (September 13, 1999) 194 10.14 The Battalion 745 Rampage (September 20-21, 1999) 197 10.15 Murder of Los Palos Clergy (September 25, 1999) 201 Part V: Questions of Responsibility and Justice 203 11. Individual and Command Responsibility 204 11.1 Individual Criminal Responsibility 204 11.2 Command Responsibility 208 12. International Responsibility and Justice 218 12.1 International Responsibility 218 12.2 UN Responsibility: The Question of Justice 223 Tables 229 Chronology 235 Maps 248 A Note on Sources 249 viii East Timor 1999 Crimes Against Humanity Foreword José Luis de Oliveira According to the reports of the International Commission of Inquiry (established by the UN High Commision for Human Rights) and the Commission of Inquiry of the Indonesian National Commission of Human Rights, both released in Janu- ary 2000, acts of violence against civilians by Indonesian security forces (the mili- tary and the police) and pro-Jakarta militias in 1999 were carried out in a planned, widespread and systematic manner. Both reports also concluded that violations of international humanitarian law had taken place and recommended that the per- petrators of violence be held accountable. These conclusions were reached after a serious investigation of the facts. Everyone in East Timor was affected by the ‘scorched earth’ operations of 1999. Hundreds of thousands of people were victimized: their homes burnt down, their property stolen, their lives taken. Many were forcibly deported to West Timor. The victims included not only people of East Timor but also UN staff and international monitors, including some Indonesians. Agus Mulyawan, an Indonesian journalist, was killed in Los Palos along with a group of nuns. A Jesuit priest from Indonesia, Father Tarsisius Dewanto, was murdered when he was protecting refugees inside the compound of the newly built church in Suai. These facts cannot be denied by the Indonesian military. Unfortunately, despite such strong facts about these planned crimes, the com- mitment to bring those responsible to justice has not been as strong. The law still sides with the powerful and not with the weak and downtrodden. The recommen- dations from the two Commissions gave birth to various ‘resolution’ mechanisms that fall far short of what justice requires in this case. In Jakarta, a Human Rights Ad Hoc Tribunal was established. In Dili, a Serious Crimes Unit and a Special Panel of Judges were established.These mechanisms reflect a willingness to compromise among international leaders and the leaders of East Timor itself. The international criminal tribunal should have become the institution for dealing with these crimes. A trial at an international court would send a strong message to everyone that such crimes will not be tolerated. It would end the circle of impunity and would pro- vide a measure of justice to the victims. The judicial processes in both Jakarta and Dili have proven to be ineffective as instruments for determining the responsibility of the perpetrators for crimes against humanity. The elites of Indonesia and East Timor have collaborated to sabotage the quest for justice. The ad hoc tribunal in Jakarta was a whitewash. Indeed, its fail- ure was expected from the very beginning. It only charged the Indonesian military Foreword ix officers with crimes of ommission and then acquitted them of even those meager charges. The judicial process in Dili was similarly handled with a lack of a serious commitment by those officials entrusted with processing these crimes against hu- manity. The UN, as its Secretary Fred Echardt explained, refused to follow up the indictment against General Wiranto issued by the Serious Crimes Unit. This indi- cates that the UN was half-hearted. The leaders of both countries have not been disturbed by the failure of these institutions. They are reluctant to demand respon- sibility for the crimes against humanity, as is stipulated by international law and the national laws of respective country. It is ironic that the suffering and dignity of the victims are being tossed around by those who are obliged to uphold justice and human rights. The political leaders of East Timor consider an international tribunal as impos- sible, because, they say, it will be too expensive. However, they say nothing of the resources spent – in terms of money, energy, and thought – to carry out the tribu- nals in Dili and Jakarta which were merely ‘political theater.’ And now, the theatre continues: they have agreed to establish a Truth and Friendship Commission. Their dismissal of the calls for an international tribunal using financial excuses is entirely baseless. At this point, the rhetoric of human rights, peace, truth, justice and other big abstract terms have become mere symbols to be bandied about by people concerned only for their own projects or political careers. Instead of defending humanity around the world, international law is being turned upside down to benefit these pet projects. The Truth and Friendship Commision is just another effort to evade the principle of justice and allow the perpetrators to go unpunished. This time the whitewash- ing goes under the name of friendship. But no matter how sophisticated and complex these machinations of the elite, it will not be that easy to bury the truth, because the real truth lives on in the re- alities of the people as historical facts, and not in the fantasies and imaginations of politicians.