East Timor 1999 Crimes against Humanity A REPORT COMMISSIONED BY THE UNITED NATIONS OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (OHCHR)* By Geoffrey Robinson University of California Los Angeles July 2003 *This report has been referenced many times by CAVR and since it is as yet unpublished it is included here in its entirety. The text is identical to that received from OHCHR, but fonts and styles have been altered to fit with the typesetting design of the CAVR report. As of October 2005, an updated version of this report was also due to be published in English and Indonesian by Asosiasi Hak, Dili, Timor-Leste. For more information Asosiasi Hak can be contacted through their website: www.yayasanhak.minihub.org ����� �� �������� ������������ ��� ��������� ������� Method and Mandate Outline and Chapter Summaries Conclusions ���� �� �������� ������ ��� �������� �� ���������� ��� ��������� ������� 1.1 Indonesian Invasion and Occupation 1.2 Resistance 1.3 International Response 1.4 Breakthrough in Indonesia 1.5 UNAMET and the Popular Consultation �� ���������� ����� ��� �������� 2.1 The Indonesian Armed Forces 2.2 The Militias 2.3 The Indonesian Police 2.4 The Civilian Government and the ‘Socialization’ Campaign 2.5 Pro-autonomy Political Parties 2.6 Specialized Government Bodies ���� ��� ����� ������ �� ����� �������� ��� ���������� �� ����������� �������� ��� ������������ 3.1 Types of Violation 3.2 Chronology of Violations: Three Periods 3.3 The Victims 3.4 The Perpetrators �� �������� ��� ���������� 4.1 Temporal Variation – Turning Off the Faucet 4.2 Police Inaction and Complicity 4.3 Militia Modus Operandi 4.4 Geographical Variations �� ��� ��� ��������� 5.1 Operation Clean Sweep 5.2 The Tavares Document 5.3 The Garnadi Document 5.4 The East Timor Integration Savior Brigade Telegram 5.5 Operation Pull-Out ���� ���� ��� �������� ��� ��� ����������� �� ��������� �������� ���������� ��� ����� ����������� 6.1 Historical Patterns 6.2 Militia Formation 6.3 Political and Legal Recognition �� ��������� ������������ ��������� ����������� ��� ������� 7.1 Recruitment 7.2 Training 7.3 Operations 7.4 Weapons: Testimonial Evidence 7.5 Weapons: Documentary Evidence �� ��������� ������� ��� �������� ������� 8.1 ‘Socialization’ and Militia Funding 8.2 Sources of Government Funding 8.3 TNI Funding and Material Support 8.4 FPDK as Funding Channel 8.5 Militia Budgets ���� ��� �������� ��������� ��� ���� ������� �� �������� ��������� 9.1 Aileu (Kodim 1632) 9.2 Ainaro (Kodim 1633) 9.3 Baucau (Kodim 1628) 9.4 Bobonaro (Kodim 1636) 9.5 Covalima (Kodim 1635) 9.6 Dili (Kodim 1627) 9.7 Ermera (Kodim 1637) 9.8 Lautem (Kodim 1629) 9.9 Liquica (Kodim 1638) 9.10 Manatuto (Kodim 1631) 9.11 Manufahi (Kodim 1634) 9.12 Oecussi (Kodim 1639) 9.13 Viqueque (Kodim 1630) ��� ���� �������� ����� ����� ������ ��������� 10.1 Liquica Church Massacre (April 6, 1999) 10.2 Cailaco Killings (April 12, 1999) 10.3 Carrascalão House Massacre (April 17, 1999) 10.4 The Killing of Two Students at Hera (May 20, 1999) 10.5 Arbitrary Detention and Rape in Lolotoe (May-June 1999) 10.6 Attack on UNAMET Maliana (June 19, 1999) 10.7 Attack on Humanitarian Convoy (July 4, 1999) 10.8 Murder of UNAMET Staff Members at Boboe Leten (August 30) 10.9 Forcible Relocation and Murder of Refugees in Dili (September 5-6, 1999) 10.10 Suai Church Masssacre (September 6, 1999) 10.11 Maliana Police Station Massacre (September 8, 1999) 10.12 The Passabe and Maquelab Massacres (September-October, 1999) 10.13 Rape and Murder of Ana Lemos (September 13, 1999) 10.14 The Battalion 745 Rampage (September 20-21, 1999) 10.15 Murder of Los Palos Clergy (September 25, 1999) ���� �� ��������� �� �������������� ��� ������� ��� ���������� ��� ������� �������������� 11.1 Individual Criminal Responsibility 11.2 Command Responsibility ��� ������������� �������������� ��� ������� 12.1 International Responsibility 12.2 UN Responsibility: The Question of Justice ���� �� ������� ������ ���������� ���� The past cannot remain shrouded in mystery. In such situations the victims continue to seek justice and are unable to come to terms with their sorrow and distress.* Introduction and Executive Summary In the course of 1999, East Timor was the scene of terrible violence. Between early January and late October at least 1,200 civilians, and perhaps as many as 1,500, were killed. Some were shot dead, while others were decapitated, disemboweled or hacked to death with machetes. Many were subjected to torture and ill-treatment. Women and girls suffered rape and other crimes of sexual violence. The systematic violence fueled the forcible displacement of the population on a massive scale. The violence took place in the context of a referendum on East Timor’s political status supervised and carried out by the United Nations (UN) on August 30, 1999. In the period before the ballot, suspected supporters of independence were subjected to persistent threats and acts of violence by pro-Indonesian militia groups. In spite of the evident dangers, East Timorese welcomed the opportunity to vote on their political future and voted resoundingly for independence. The worst of the violence followed the announcement of that vote on September 4. Over the next few weeks, Indonesian soldiers and police joined armed pro-Indonesian militiamen in a campaign of violence so sustained and so brutal that it shocked even those who had predicted a backlash. Before a UN-sanctioned military force arrived to restore order in late September, hundreds of people had been killed and an estimated 400,000 people – more than half the population – had been forced to flee their homes. Indonesian authorities have offered a variety of explanations for these events. They have claimed that the pro-Indonesian militia groups formed spontaneously in response to provocation by pro-independence activists, and that the violence was the result of ‘clashes’ between the two sides. The post-ballot violence, according to the official view, was an understandable expression of anger on the part of pro-Indonesian East Timorese at a perceived UN bias toward independence. In response to evidence that Indonesian soldiers had themselves committed acts of violence, the authorities have acknowledged that some ‘rogue elements’ might have done so, but they have insisted that the armed forces as an institution had been disciplined and had worked hard to contain the violence. * UN, Situation of Human Rights in East Timor (UN No. A/54/660) December 10, 1999, paragraph 65. 1 Outside observers, as well as many East Timorese, have offered a different interpretation. They have questioned the claim that the violence was the result of ‘clashes’ among East Timorese, arguing instead that it was instigated by Indonesian military authorities and in particular by its Special Forces Command (Komando Pasukan Khusus – Kopassus). They have asserted that the pro-Indonesian militia groups were essentially proxy forces, created, supplied, and organized by Indonesian military and civilian authorities, and that they acted under orders from Indonesian military officers. In response to official claims that military involvement had been limited to a handful of ‘rogue elements,’ they have pointed to evidence that high-ranking officers were involved, and that much of the violence appeared to have been planned. While bearing these divergent views in mind, this report seeks to provide an independent assessment of the nature and causes of the violence in East Timor. More specifically, it has three aims. First, it sets out to describe and to characterize the violence as fully and accurately as possible, focusing on the period between January 1 and late October 1999. Second, it attempts to explain how and why the violence happened and took the forms that it did. Third, and most importantly, it seeks to establish who was responsible for the violence, and what the appropriate remedy might be. Method and Mandate The findings and conclusions of this report are not based on unsubstantiated claims made by Indonesian Government officials or by their critics. Nor do they rest on the discovery of a ‘smoking gun,’ either documentary or testimonial. Rather, they are based on a careful examination and analysis of the now substantial documentary and testimonial record. The principal sources consulted include: • Secret internal reports, memoranda, and orders originating with Indonesian military, police and civilian authorities, and with various militia groups and other pro-Indonesian organizations; • Testimony of eyewitnesses to and victims of the violence, as recorded and compiled by respected international and domestic human rights organizations, by jurists, and by United Nations officials; • Internal reports and memoranda on the events of 1999 prepared by the UN Mission in East Timor (UNAMET), the UN Transitional Administration for East Timor (UNTAET) and the UN Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET); • Findings of other credible investigations into the violence, including those issued by three UN Special Rapporteurs (December 1999), by the International Commission of Inquiry on East Timor (January 2000), and by Indonesia’s Commission on Human Rights Violations in East Timor (January 2000); • Criminal indictments filed against the suspected perpetrators of the violence, by prosecutors in Indonesia and in East Timor, and information emerging from criminal proceedings in both places; • Scholarly analyses, media reports and other secondary sources. This report was commissioned by the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)