Memory, Nationalism, and Human Rights in Post-Independence Timor-Leste
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Financial Report and Audited Financial Statements
A/63/5/Add.1 United Nations United Nations Development Programme Financial report and audited financial statements for the biennium ended 31 December 2007 and Report of the Board of Auditors General Assembly Official Records Sixty-third Session Supplement No. 5A General Assembly Official Records Sixty-third Session Supplement No. 5A United Nations Development Programme Financial report and audited financial statements for the biennium ended 31 December 2007 and Report of the Board of Auditors United Nations • New York, 2008 A/63/5/Add.1 Note Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document. ISSN 0251-8198 [23 July 2008] Contents Chapter Page Letters of transmittal and certification.............................................. vii I. Financial report for the biennium ended 31 December 2007 ............................ 1 A. Changes in accounting practices and policies in the biennium ...................... 2 B. Regular resources .......................................................... 5 C. Other resources activities .................................................... 7 D. Programme expenditure monitoring ........................................... 9 E. Trust funds established by the United Nations Development Programme ............. 10 F. Management service agreements .............................................. 14 G. United Nations Volunteers ................................................... 15 H. Junior Professional -
The Indonesian Who Joined Falintil'
The Indonesian who Joined Falintil' Preface, by Gerry van Klinken The Indonesian who joined Falintil, like the American who joined A1 Qaeda or the Dutchman who joined the 1945 Indonesian revolutionaries, has power to shock because such a person questions the fundamental categories of the conflict. What after all is an Indonesian, an American, or a militant Muslim? What is this contest about? Muhammad Nasir crosses boundaries most see as so natural they are insuperable. He transforms himself from the street kid, Ketut Narto, to the policeman's adopted kid, Muhammad Nasir, and from there to the "oddball" guerrilla Klik Mesak (and presumably from Hindu to Muslim to whatever) and travels from Bah to Comandante Ular's Region 4 headquarters in the mountains of East Timor. For Nasir, these boundaries have little power to exclude. All the communities they enclose have a claim on him, but none more than others. Meanwhile, other boundaries do have authority for him. The eloquence with which this high school dropout describes the boundaries of "rights" is striking. Taking what he needs from a bankrupt school system, he discovers truths in history text books their authors never intended him to find: East Timor, being Portuguese, wasn't available for the taking by the former Dutch colony of Indonesia. The camaraderie of the school yard in Baucau and Dili does not distinguish between names. But here Nasir discovers the rights of "we" locals. "I wouldn't want anyone to take away my rights." The real divide is not between Indonesian and East Timorese, let alone between Muslim and Hindu or Catholic. -
Armed Groups and Diplomacy: East Timor’S FRETILIN Guerrillas
Color profile: Disabled Composite Default screen 4 Armed Groups and Diplomacy: East Timor’s FRETILIN Guerrillas Gene Christy The Red Cross Bell helicopter flew low along the south coast. It was dry season. Only a few wispy clouds hovered over the nearby mountains. Visibility was great. Several hun- dred feet below, tin roofs gleamed from new villages strung along the coast road. A few Timorese looked up and waved. Most kept at their daily tasks. The scene made one won- der where FRETILIN guerrillas could hide.1 Maybe they were just a few thieves and thugs as officials in Jakarta and Dili were saying in 1983. Our stops in Ainaro and Viqueque had been uneventful. It was after lunch, but chil- dren greeted us with cries of “selamat pagi” (good morning). They were going to the new Indonesian schools. Warehouses were stocked with USAID corn and cooking oil.2 Afew shops had Pepsi and packaged ramen noodles. Not exactly a famine, we thought. There might still be problems, but food supplies and security in the south seemed much im- proved. The report to Washington would be positive. Suddenly, the helicopter lurched upward. It turned out over the water. The pilot an- nounced we could not stop in Los Palos. Something about an attack on soldiers at a weekly market, he said. Flying higher over the mountains than before, he set course north to Baucau. The pilot set down in a military compound. He promised to return after refueling at a nearby airfield. The Indonesian commander welcomed his two unexpected guests. -
Indo 87 0 1241189291 73 1
A Tape Recorder and a W ink? Transcript of the May 29, 1983, M eeting between G overnor Carrascalao and Xanana G usmao Introduction and translation by Douglas Kammen On March 23, 1983, more than seven years after the Indonesian invasion of Portuguese Timor, the Indonesian sub-regional military commander in East Timor, Colonel Purwanto, met with the leader of the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (Frente Revolucionaria de Timor-Leste Independente, abbreviated Fretilin), Jose Alexandre "Kay Rala Xanana" Gusmao, and agreed to a temporary ceasefire. This was a truly extraordinary development. Indonesian officials had long insisted that the 1976 act of "integration" was final and irreversible. With the fall of the last Fretilin base areas in the eastern sector in October 1978 and in the western sector in early 1979, the Indonesian military (ABRI) believed that the resistance had been reduced to a mere one hundred rebels, who were now euphemistically referred to as a "band of security disturbers" (gerombolan pengacau keamanan). In 1981, ABRI mobilized at least 60,000 civilians to sweep across the territory to flush out those remaining individuals. And in mid-January 1983, Colonel Purwanto told journalists that "the band of [security] disturbers in East Timor, who are the remnants of Fretilin forces, have no more than one hundred weapons and five hundred members."1 And yet, the resistance not only 1 Paraphrased in "Gangguan Fretilin Sudah Tidak Berarti, Timor Timur Terbuka Untuk Dikunjungi," Sinar Harapan, January 15,1983. Indonesia 87 (April 2009) 74 Douglas Kammen survived but won tactical victories. None was more significant than the ceasefire negotiated in March 1983. -
Timor-Leste Cooperative Agreement Number: AID-486-A-13-00007 Grantee: Counterpart International, Inc
Mai Munisípiu Project Final Report Period: September 23, 2013 – September 22, 2017 Submitted To: USAID/ Timor-Leste Cooperative Agreement Number: AID-486-A-13-00007 Grantee: Counterpart International, Inc. Contact: Belma Ejupovic, Vice President Programs [email protected] Counterpart International Inc. 2345 Crystal Drive, Suite 301 Arlington, VA 22202 1 Contents I. Executive Summary ....................................................................................................... 6 II. Project Purpose ............................................................................................................ 13 III. Project Impacts ............................................................................................................ 15 Objective 1: Enhanced capacity of suco councils to strengthen citizen participation and representation in local governance ................................................................................... 15 Objective 2: Improved communication and linkages of suco councils with district administrations, local GoTL line ministries and other providers of basic services at the sub- national level ................................................................................................................... 25 Objective 3: Strengthened local justice sector institutions that increase access to formal and informal justice for marginalized citizens and the poor .................................................... 34 Objective 4: Strengthened capacity of Government of Timor-Leste (GOTL), -
With Text Wrapping Independent Women Candidates in Local
Consolidated Response Independent Women Candidates in local elections in Mali International Knowledge Network of Women in Politics www.iKNOWpolitics.org With text wrapping Introduction Despite comprising more than 50 percent of the world's population, women continue to lack access to political leadership opportunities and resources at all levels of government. Women‟s equal participation in decision-making is not only a demand for simple justice or democracy, but a necessary pre-condition for women‟s interests to be taken into account. Governance structures which do not result in the equal participation of men and women, or their equal enjoyment of benefits from state interventions are by definition neither inclusive nor democratic. In 2007, recognizing that over the last century women‟s gains in the political arena have been slow and inadequate, five international organizations came together to make women‟s political participation their collective priority and devise a strategy that would scale-up each of the organization‟s efforts to foster gender equality in politics: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) National Democratic Institute (NDI) United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN Women) The International Knowledge Network of Women in Politics (www.iKNOWPolitics.org) is an online network, jointly supported by the five partner organizations, that aims to increase the participation and effectiveness of women in political life by utilizing a technology-enabled forum to provide access to critical resources and expertise, stimulate dialogue, create knowledge, and share experiences among women in politics. -
ANATOMY of PRESS CENSORSHIP in INDONESIA the Case of Jakarta, Jakarta and the Dili Massacre
April 27, 1992 Vol. 4, No. 12 ANATOMY OF PRESS CENSORSHIP IN INDONESIA The Case of Jakarta, Jakarta and the Dili Massacre Jakarta, Jakarta, better known as JJ, is a weekly magazine which its editors like to think of as Indonesia's answer to Paris-Match and its reporters treat as something more akin to New York's Village Voice. A brash, colorful, trendy magazine, JJ has been consistently on the limits of what Indonesian authorities regard as acceptable journalism. It was completely in character, therefore, that after the massacre in Dili on November 12, JJ sent two reporters off to East Timor to see what they could find out, and the two came back with some of the most graphic eyewitness accounts available. The results appeared in the issue No. 288, January 4-10, 1992. By the end of January, three editors had been sacked, a result of veiled warnings from the military and what appears to have been an effort by the publisher to pre-empt more drastic action. Asia Watch has obtained documents which offer a fascinating insight into how the case developed and how press censorship works in Indonesia. 1. The Original Story Issue No.288 contained a three-part report on Dili, consisting of an interview with the new regional commander, H.S. Mantiri whose appointment to succeed the Bali-based Major General Sintong Panjaitan had just been announced; an interview with East Timor Governor Mario Carrascalao on some of the reasons East Timorese resented the Indonesian presence; and a series of excerpts from interviews with eyewitnesses to the killings and subsequent arrests. -
Timor-Leste's Veterans
Update Briefing Asia Briefing N°129 Dili/Jakarta/Brussels, 18 November 2011 Timor-Leste’s Veterans: An Unfinished Struggle? not solved the problem. Judgment on difficult cases has I. OVERVIEW been deferred based on a belief that fraudulent claims will be revealed through denunciation once the lists are pub- More than ten years after the formation of Timor-Leste’s lished. Even with the option to appeal, new discontent is army and the demobilisation of the guerrilla force that being created that will require mediation. fought for independence, the struggle continues about how to pay tribute to the veterans. The increasingly wealthy state Beyond cash benefits, there are two areas where veterans’ has bought off the threat once posed by most dissidents demands for greater influence will have to be checked. The with an expensive cash benefits scheme and succeeded in first is the scope and shape of a proposed veterans’ council, engaging most veterans’ voices in mainstream politics. This whose primary role will be to consult on benefits as well approach has created a heavy financial burden and a com- as to offer a seal of institutional legitimacy. Some veterans plicated process of determining who is eligible that will hope it will be given an advisory dimension, allowing them create new tensions even as it resolves others. A greater to guide government policy and cementing their elite sta- challenge lies in containing pressures to give them dispro- tus. Such a broad role looks unlikely but the illusion that portionate political influence and a formal security role. veterans might be given more influence has likely in- A careful balance will need to be struck between paying creased the government’s appeal in advance of elections homage to heroes while allowing a younger generation of next year. -
EAST TIMOR: REMEMBERING HISTORY the Trial of Xanana Gusmao and a Follow-Up on the Dili Massacre
April 1993 Vol 5. No.8 EAST TIMOR: REMEMBERING HISTORY The Trial of Xanana Gusmao and a Follow-up on the Dili Massacre I. Introduction.................................................................................................................................. 2 II. Xanana Gusmao and the Charges Against Him ....................................................................... 3 The Charges, 1976-1980................................................................................................................ 3 The June 10, 1980 Attack .............................................................................................................. 4 Peace Talks .................................................................................................................................... 5 The Kraras Massacre ..................................................................................................................... 5 1984 to the Present......................................................................................................................... 6 III. The Xanana Trial......................................................................................................................... 7 Circumstances of Arrest and Detention......................................................................................... 8 Why not subversion? .................................................................................................................... 11 Access to and Adequacy of Legal Defense ................................................................................. -
Sport and Diplomacy
David Black and Byron Peacock Sport and Diplomacy pp. 708-725 edited by Andrew F. Cooper, Jorge Heine, and Ramesh Thakur., (2013) The Oxford handbook of modern diplomacy Oxford University Press Staff and students of University of London - School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) are reminded that copyright subsists in this extract and the work from which it was taken. This Digital Copy has been made under the terms of a CLA licence which allows you to: • access and download a copy; • print out a copy; Please note that this material is for use ONLY by students registered on the course of study as stated in the section below. All other staff and students are only entitled to browse the material and should not download and/or print out a copy. This Digital Copy and any digital or printed copy supplied to or made by you under the terms of this Licence are for use in connection with this Course of Study. You may retain such copies after the end of the course, but strictly for your own personal use. All copies (including electronic copies) shall include this Copyright Notice and shall be destroyed and/or deleted if and when required by University of London - School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS). Except as provided for by copyright law, no further copying, storage or distribution (including by e-mail) is permitted without the consent of the copyright holder. The author (which term includes artists and other visual creators) has moral rights in the work and neither staff nor students may cause, or permit, the distortion, mutilation or other modification of the work, or any other derogatory treatment of it, which would be prejudicial to the honour or reputation of the author. -
The End of Suharto
Tapol bulletin no,147, July 1998 This is the Published version of the following publication UNSPECIFIED (1998) Tapol bulletin no,147, July 1998. Tapol bulletin (147). pp. 1-28. ISSN 1356-1154 The publisher’s official version can be found at Note that access to this version may require subscription. Downloaded from VU Research Repository https://vuir.vu.edu.au/25993/ ISSN 1356-1154 The Indonesia Human Rights Campaign TAPOL Bulletin No. 147 July 1998 The end of Suharto 21 May 1998 will go down in world history as the day when the bloody and despotic rule ofSuharto came to an end. His 32-year rule made him Asia's longest ruler after World War IL He broke many other world records, as a mass killer and human rights violator. In 196511966 he was responsible for the slaughtt:r of at least half a million people and the incarceration of more than 1.2 million. He is also respon{iible for the deaths of 200,000 East Timorese, a third of the population, one of the worst . acts ofgenocide this century. Ignoring the blood-letting that accompanied his seizure of In the last two years, other forms of social unrest took power, the western powers fell over themselves to wel hold: assaults on local police, fury against the privileges come Suharto. He had crushed the world's largest commu nist party outside the Soviet bloc and grabbed power from From the editors: We apologise for the late arrival of President Sukarno who was seen by many in the West as a this issue. -
Fieldwork in Timor-Leste
Understanding Timor-Leste, on the ground and from afar (eds) and Bexley Nygaard-Christensen This ground-breaking exploration of research in Timor-Leste brings together veteran and early-career scholars who broadly Fieldwork in represent a range of fieldwork practices and challenges from colonial times to the present day. Here, they introduce readers to their experiences of conducting anthropological, historical and archival fieldwork in this new nation. The volume further Timor-Leste explores the contestations and deliberations that have been in Timor-Leste Fieldwork symptomatic of the country’s nation-building process, high- Understanding Social Change through Practice lighting how the preconceptions of development workers and researchers might be challenged on the ground. By making more explicable the processes of social and political change in Timor- Leste, the volume offers a critical contribution for those in the academic, policy and development communities working there. This is a must-have volume for scholars, other fieldworkers and policy-makers preparing to work in Timor-Leste, invaluable for those needing to understand the country from afar, and a fascinating read for anyone interested in the Timorese world. ‘Researchers and policymakers reading up on Timor Leste before heading to the field will find this handbook valuable. It is littered with captivating fieldwork stories. The heart-searching is at times searingly honest. Best of all, the book beautifully bridges the sometimes painful gap between Timorese researchers and foreign experts (who can be irritating know-alls). Academic anthropologists and historians will find much of value here, but the Timor policy community should appreciate it as well.’ – Gerry van Klinken, KITLV ‘This book is well worth reading by academics, activists and policy-makers in Timor-Leste and also those interested in the country’s development.