Armed Groups and Diplomacy: East Timor’S FRETILIN Guerrillas
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Color profile: Disabled Composite Default screen 4 Armed Groups and Diplomacy: East Timor’s FRETILIN Guerrillas Gene Christy The Red Cross Bell helicopter flew low along the south coast. It was dry season. Only a few wispy clouds hovered over the nearby mountains. Visibility was great. Several hun- dred feet below, tin roofs gleamed from new villages strung along the coast road. A few Timorese looked up and waved. Most kept at their daily tasks. The scene made one won- der where FRETILIN guerrillas could hide.1 Maybe they were just a few thieves and thugs as officials in Jakarta and Dili were saying in 1983. Our stops in Ainaro and Viqueque had been uneventful. It was after lunch, but chil- dren greeted us with cries of “selamat pagi” (good morning). They were going to the new Indonesian schools. Warehouses were stocked with USAID corn and cooking oil.2 Afew shops had Pepsi and packaged ramen noodles. Not exactly a famine, we thought. There might still be problems, but food supplies and security in the south seemed much im- proved. The report to Washington would be positive. Suddenly, the helicopter lurched upward. It turned out over the water. The pilot an- nounced we could not stop in Los Palos. Something about an attack on soldiers at a weekly market, he said. Flying higher over the mountains than before, he set course north to Baucau. The pilot set down in a military compound. He promised to return after refueling at a nearby airfield. The Indonesian commander welcomed his two unexpected guests. He of- fered cups of bitter local coffee. Much sooner than expected, we heard an incoming heli- copter. Then the air was full of the thump, thump, thump of helicopters. The birds A career member of the U.S. foreign service, Ambassador Christy is currently the State Department political advi- ser to the combatant commander, U.S. Pacific Command. Previously, he was the State Department adviser to the president of the Naval War College and a professor in the National Security Decision Making faculty. Prior to his arrival in Newport in September 2005, Ambassador Christy served as ambassador of the United States to the Southeast Asian nation of Brunei Darussalam from 2002 to 2005. In his 35-year career with the Department of State, Ambassador Christy served in Indonesia twice (both the U.S. consulate in Surabaya and the U.S. embassy in Jakarta), in Turkey two times (both at the U.S. embassy in Ankara), and at the U.S. embassy in Kuala Lumpur, Malay- sia. Ambassador Christy was a pioneer in establishing the U.S. embassy in Ashgabat, Turkmenistan, after the fall of the Soviet Union (1992–94), and the ambassador served as political counselor at the U.S. embassy in Port-au-Prince, Haiti, both before and during the period of the U.S.-led intervention (1994–96). The ambassador has also served on several occasions in the State Department in Washington, DC. He was director for Asia at the National Security Council 2000–01. A member of the Senior Foreign Service, he has the rank of Minister Counselor. Rebuild Armed GroupsApril21.08.ps C:\Documents and Settings\ken.derouin\Desktop\WorkInProgress\armed group\Rebuild Armed GroupsApril21.08.vp Tuesday, April 22, 2008 8:41:51 AM Color profile: Disabled Composite Default screen 36 Armed Groups: Studies in National Security, Counterterrorism, and Counterinsurgency landed one by one. Soldiers and medics ran to meet them. On some stretchers, wounded soldiers writhed. On others, nothing moved. The commander squirmed in his chair. He muttered to himself in Indonesian. This was not part of the American diplomats’ well-scripted program. They weren’t even set to stop here. What would he tell Jakarta? Reality had trumped the best of military schedul- ing. On that fair day, FRETILIN was not a spent force. It was a deadly one. ARMED GROUPS AND HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTING: INDONESIA AND EAST TIMOR3 My presence in Baucau with a foreign service colleague was not planned, but it was no ac- cident. “Being there” was precisely the point of the trip. An armed group, FRETILIN (Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor), and U.S. diplomacy came to- gether that day. East Timor was an enigma. Most states accepted Indonesia’s sovereign control of the territory. That extended to control of access. The Indonesian military managed the outward flow of people and information, but it did so incompletely. Stories of FRETILIN attacks and Indonesian counterattacks slipped out. There were claims of famine and health crises. The Indonesians countered that these were lies or exaggera- tions. The U.S. government required diplomats on the ground to make its own assess- ment. I was one of those diplomats. The market attack happened on my second trip to Indonesian-controlled East Timor. The first took place in late November 1983. A few weeks before, during Defense Secretary Weinberger’s stop in Bali, an Indonesian Navy captain interviewed me over dinner. Captain Sudibyo worked for military intelligence chief General Murdani. Sudibyo controlled access to Timor. He wanted to know if a year of study at Cornell’s Southeast Asia Studies Program had prejudiced my views.4 I passed muster. In the embassy, I was responsible for human rights reporting. A midlevel foreign ser- vice officer, I had previous experience in Indonesia and as a political officer in Turkey. There, human rights was part of the job, too. A graduate of State Department Indonesian-language training, I spoke the language with an East Java accent after serving from 1974 to 1976 in the U.S. consulate in Surabaya. That consulate covered all of southeastern Indonesia and Portuguese Timor. The principal officer was accredited to Lisbon. As junior officers, two of us visited the colony’s capital briefly in 1974. The Portuguese were still in control. Dili had the look of a seaside Mediterranean town. There were no overt signs of the turmoil to come. That visit made a useful reference point for the visits I made between 1982 and 1985. It also proved to be an unexpected bookend to my Timor experiences when I returned 25 years later and met with the head of FRETILIN, who by that time was East Timor’s acknowl- edged political leader as it prepared for independence. In 1982, human rights held an important place in American diplomacy with Indone- sia. Washington policy makers and analysts closely read embassy human rights reporting. The embassy prepared the first draft of the annual country human rights report, which was not just a compilation of facts. It was also a policy document, as both critics and supporters used it to back their cases for change or continuity in policy. U.S. assistance Rebuild Armed GroupsApril21.08.ps C:\Documents and Settings\ken.derouin\Desktop\WorkInProgress\armed group\Rebuild Armed GroupsApril21.08.vp Tuesday, April 22, 2008 8:41:51 AM Color profile: Disabled Composite Default screen Christy: Armed Groups and Diplomacy: East Timor’s FRETILIN Guerrillas 37 to Indonesia was at stake. A credible human rights report needed direct, documented information. The Carter years had been complicated for the bilateral relationship. President Carter understood that Indonesia was important. He wanted to respond to Jakarta’s re- quests for support. Development and military aid were at the top of the Indonesians’ agenda. But Suharto’s military-dominated “New Order” had a checkered history. It had brutally suppressed the Indonesian Communist Party. Members and sympathizers had been jailed for years. Many never had a trial. Giving economic development and stability highest priority, the New Order de-emphasized electoral politics and restricted freedoms of speech, assembly, and the press. Also, the takeover of Timor in 1975 had been violent. The regime stood accused of violating bilateral agreements by using American arms. Members of Congress, already clamoring for the administration to win release of political detainees, pressed Carter to take action on East Timor. They talked of restricting U.S. military assistance.5 The pressure carried over into the new Reagan administration. Indonesian diplo- macy had eroded support for a critical UN General Assembly resolution to the point that no country would sponsor a new one after 1982. Diplomats at the UN largely accepted Indonesia’s argument that its incorporation of the former Portuguese colony was a success. Hearts and minds were being won. Indonesia’s military was mopping up the last remnants of FRETILIN’s fighting forces. So Indonesia and its international supporters argued. A band of African and Portuguese diplomats and human rights advocates thought otherwise. FRETILIN also had diplomats. The best known was José Ramos-Horta, a key negotiator at the UN in New York who traveled on a diplomatic passport issued by Mozambique.6 Their voices echoed in the halls of Congress, especially with Democratic Party members like Tony Hall (OH) and Steven Solarz (NY) and in the Senate with Paul Tsongas (MA). The Reagan administration wanted to demonstrate renewed interest in Southeast Asia. Doing so called for stronger relations with Jakarta. The administration sought to in- crease security assistance levels. The Indonesians wanted to buy more American military equipment at favorable rates. U.S. officials worked to increase exchange opportunities under the International Military Education and Training program.7 Congressional criti- cism of Indonesia’s human rights record and threats to curtail military aid put these goals at risk. One response was to set up regular on-the-ground embassy reporting from Timor. Credible reporting required frequent visits and, preferably, repeated ones. It called for talking to other diplomats, humanitarian relief and aid officials, and journalists. It de- manded following up on allegations from human rights activists and FRETILIN sup- porters.